DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE

INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,

E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2011-048, document no. 31
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Langley Air Force Base SiteVisit
Type of event: Recorded Interview
Date: Monday, December 01,2003
Special Access Issues: None, someof thediscussion was classified andthetape classified
accordingly. Those discussions weretechnical andareavailable ontape.
Prepared by: Miles Kara
TeamNumber: 8
Location: 119
th
Fighter Wing, Detachment One, Headquarters
Participant - Major Brad Derrig, Wingman for theQuit scramble on9-11
Participants - Commission: Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer
Observer - Colonel PamJ efferson, USAF, Base Legal Office
Note: Please refer totherecorded interview for additional details.
Background:
Major Derrig has been intheAir National Guarad 19years andhas been flying
with his unit since October 93, almost ten years.
Scramble Experience:
First three years (94-96), alert once amonth for aweek, scramble maybe once
every twomonths. At Langley beginning four years ago, sat alert maybe once aquarter.
Pre 9/11no real world scrambles, any heparticipated inwere usually against non-
squawking Navy aircraft, generally over water. [Note: Staff briefly reviewed theofficial
logbook at theNortheast Air Defense Sector inmid-J anuary, 2004. Specifically the
months Apr-J un 2001were reviewed. Five scrambles were recorded over a90-day
period, Threeof thefivewere against targets that were later determined tobeNavy
aircraft.] No scrambles over land. No hijacks having to dowith ahijack. Procedures
when scrambled weretobasically vector totheaircraft andthen watch where thetarget
went.
Training-wise, probably zero concerning hijacks. Never involved with intercepts
dealing with liveexercises with FAA.
9/11
Nothing hedid inthecockpit that daywas recorded, nor didhewrite asubsequent
report or make/retaiIi any notes. No internal 119
th
hot wash was conducted. [Note:
Derrig was formally interviewed aspart of thehistory programby the 119
th
Public
Affairs NCO. Staffhas acopy of that interview.]
It was anormal day with alocal flight scheduled at 0900; hewas onthesecond
day of aMon- Thurs shift. Cpt Eckmann was scheduled for leadduty that day, even
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though Derrig outranked him, andEckmann andBorgstrom were scheduled to conduct
the local flight working with Langley fighters fromtheFirst Fighter Wing.
Hefirst learned of events fromthecrewwho reported that oneof thetowers had
been hit. Hewas thelast into thecockpit because hestopped toput inhis contacts. In
that process helearned that thesecond tower was hit. Hewas the only pilot that knew
that information andhedoes not recall sharing it with his flight mates. Hehadno sense
of where they might beheaded when scrambled. Heassumed that when scrambled they
would beheaded toNew York.
Inthecockpit andduring the approach tothe CAP over DC hehadno situational
awareness of developing events ontheground, thePentagon, an unknown aircraft
approaching fromtheNorthwest, acivilian airliner approaching DC fromtheNorth, or
VA93 turning around over Cleveland andreturning to theEast.
Heisn't surethat heknew what thescramble heading was. The delay frombattle
stations to scramble andthe ultimate scramble heading areup to theSector onwhat they
determine thethreat tobe. Herecalled thedelay to be20minutes. To say it was unusual,
no. It isnot unusual tosit battle stations for anextended period. During thecivil aircraft
suicide inTampa, for example, they sat battle stations for almost anhour.
Inreference tohis previous interview in2001, hewas asked to comment about
saying our radios suck and it was usual East Coast procedures, talking to 5 different
entities, andthat accounted for thedelay in scrambling. Hedidn't answer directly but
speculated that they [Sector] was trying to determine thetarget, thethreat.
Hewas confused on thetimeline concerning thecall tobattle stations [0909] and
thesequence of impacts inNew York.
Inhis experience thetypical timetoget airborne fromascramblewas inthe 5-15
minute range, depending on circumstances. His personal standard was they shouldbe
airborne in5 minutes. Standard onthebooks was specified intheATO. [Hesaidthe
figure was classified]
Radio Communications
Cpt Eckmann was on frequency withAir Traffic Control. Derrig andBorgstrom
were on frequency with Ground Control Intercept at HUNTRESS, with Derrig prime.
His recall was that thepilots had tobepretty lownot tohear HUNTRESS. Hedidnot
recall that they were controlled by GIANT KILLER on9/11. Hethen volunteers that
"GIANT KILLER was not very good." Henever had very good luck with GIANT
KILLER, whether it was aradio problemor aninfrastructure problem, hedidn't know.
Sometimes when they reached GIANT KILLER they didn't know who theair defense
fighters were.
Command and Control
Onscramble the fighters should begetting amplification fromHUNTRESS, that
ishow it should work. Hewas shown theradar reduction of thetrack ofthe QUIT flight
and thescramble order that was broadcast. Only thing hecould think of was that in order
tohave anIFR flight plan inthesystemthey hadto have aclearance limit. HUNTRESS
makes thehot linecall. Norfolk/Langley puts themonthe"legal" route to get themclear
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of air traffic. Hedoes not recall ifhe was still trying tocommunicate with HUNTRESS
during theinitial flight totheEast or hadcontact with them. Legally, they haveto do
what ATC tells themto do. When they do get ahold ofNEADS they aregiven CAP
coordinate procedures to theCAP. Hewas toldthat that transmission came later.
Obviously, hesaid, based onthedatashown, hecould not get ahold of HUNTRESS
during theinitial minutes of thescramble.
AFIO. Hedidnot recall theAFIO order fromHUNTRESS. Theorder would
have comethrough him, he acknowledged. Nor did heremember theBaltimore
instructions.
GIANT KILLER.' Derrig was informed that GIANT KILLER was involved and
theGIANT KILLER was acting as arelay. Hedoes not recall thedirection to CAP near
BWI. Hereiterated again, inreference to the360 heading, that hethought they were
going to New York.
Henever went supersonic. If Eckmann did so, it was only for ashort period of
time.
[Note: when Derrig says "here" onthetapeheisreferring to aprint of the 84
th
radar data
depicting theLangley scramble and theincorrect heading to aCAP southwest of
Washington]
ThePentagon. When he flewover thePentagon hefirst thought it was atruck
bomb, didn't think it was anairplane. Intheback of his head heremembered they loaded
airplanes because theRussians wereconducting their exercise andmay have thought of a
Cruise Missile as apossibility.
The CAP. They had ablock of altitudewithin which towork. Herecalled that
early intheCAP Eckmann got direction to identify anunknown. Primarily they were
waiting, intheCAP, for NEADS to tell themwhat to do.
ROE. At that point they wereinpeacetime ROE and'herecalled at onepoint
authenticating anorder for transition ROE. Theycarried alert packs with themthat
contained theROE andthe authentication tables. Hethought at thetimeof transition
Eckmann was chasing atarget, aDoctor. Hethought theorder for transition ROE came
before theAndrews airplanes got into theCAP. Herecalled IDing thetwo Andrews
. fighters that cameup because NEADS was nervous about them. Healso recalled theone
fighter that came up briefly before that andthen landed. Hethought hewould have told
Eckmann andBorgstrom, ROE changed, next level. That didnothing for them, however.
They still would haveneeded anauthenticated order. Theonly options they had were for
self defense or acruisemissile. Hedoes not recall ''weapons free" until that night, but
recalls Andrews fighters declare onguardthat their Class B airspace was closed andthat
any intruders would beshot down. [Note: At onepoint, Washington Center, put out a
periodic announcement on Guard frequency toall aircraft similar to theoneDerrig
ascribes totheAndrews fighters.] .
Vectoring toUnknowns. That was primarily accomplished by NEADS, NEADS
took control. [Note: early in thescramble vectoring was accomplished by Washington
Center.] Command andControl was confusing when theAndrews fighters became
airborne. They did not have alert packs, for example, Herecalled second hand the
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"guarding thehouse" direction that Eckmann got fromSecret Service. He thought at one
time NEADS cameup and said "we own theairspace."
Attorney General. NEADS directed thevector to escort theAttorney General's
aircraft, Derrig was thepilot who executed theorder. Hewas given aVHF frequency to
talk to theAG's plane.
Hewas never given anyorder or authority to engage acommercial aircraft.
Confusion arosebecause Borgstrom hadno missiles when hetook off andthat was
noticed when helanded. Derrig recalled that Borgstrom talked to General Arnold and.
that all threepilots signed aletter toFirst Air Force certifying that they hadnot shot
down anaircraft. Borgy said, "I just got off thephone with him[Arnold] andthat weall
have towrite aletter."
. Authentication to shoot down. Derrig said that had any of thethree received that
order they would have asked for re-authentication several times. The authentication
proces~would not takelong.
Time-distance toDC. Given: takeoff to theEast, two minutes for runway
heading, max subsonic, eighteen miles over water, climbing at 350nm. How longwould
it take. He figured, total, no more than fifteen minutes fromthe start. [Heused 9nmper
minute as arule of thumb, Staff has been toldby others touse 10nmper minute.] Hehas
done themental math, therewas not enough time, given a0930 takeoff, to getto DC, let
alone get anorder. Hewas walked through the'effects of anearlier scramble, closeto
0910 vice0925. During that conversation Staff learned that it takes time, also, toactually
findthetarget at low altitude andmakepositive identification. Not.only does hehave to
find thetarget, but so does theGCL Theair defense fighters have tobevectored to a
..target positively designated ashostile. The"hostile" has to come fromsomebody higher
thanNEADS.
Payne Stewart. A lot of theresponse was simply timing. They had aircraft
airborne, theplanewas squawking andwas flying straight and level.
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