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This training session will provide Phase1 Fuel Tank Safety training information (previously
known as Level 1 – Familiarisation Training).
2 Training Objectives
Completion of the previously termed ‘Level 1 Familiarisation’ training complies with the training
requirements for Phase 1. The UK CAA set a deadline for completion of the previously termed ‘Level
1’ training within their remit as the end of March 2008.
Phase 1 Training does not require a two yearly Continuation Training input. It is acceptable that
Phase 1 training may be delivered by a Training Bulletin, other self study or informative session.
Signature of the reader is required to ensure that the person has passed the training.
1. Know the history and the theoretical & practical elements of the subject; have an
overview of FAA Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) 88 and JAA Temporary
Guidance Leaflet TGL 47;
2. Be able to give a detailed description of the concept of fuel tank Airworthiness
Limitations Items (ALI), Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), and
use theoretical fundamentals and specific examples;
3. Have the capacity to combine & apply the separate elements of knowledge in a logical &
comprehensive manner;
4. Have detailed information on how the above items affect the aircraft;
5. Be able to identify the components or parts or the aircraft subject to FTS from the
manufacturer’s documentation;
6. Plan the action or apply a Service Bulletin and an Airworthiness Directive.
Compliance to Phase 2 training is within 12 months of joining the organisation or at the latest by 31st
December 2010 for required personnel.
A multi-choice examination with a 75% pass mark is required to validate the Phase 2 training.
See EASA AMCs referenced in ED 2009/006/R and 2009/007/R for further details and guidelines.
Part 145 staff required to plan, perform, supervise, inspect and certify the maintenance of aircraft &
fuel system components. - Refer to AMC in EASA ED 2009/007/R for details, training content and
further guidance on training materials.
The following slides summarise significant fuel accident events since the mid 1990’s
A short circuit outside of the centre wing tank allowed excessive voltage to enter the tank
through Fuel Quantity Indication System (FQIS) wiring.
The TWA 800 accident, alongside other historically unexplained fuel tank explosions, then
commenced the drive to the latest change in fuel safety working practices adopted by the FAA and
EASA.
17th July 1996, a B747-100, Registration N-93119, departed JFK at 20.19 hrs local time for Paris. 11
minutes into the flight at 13,700ft near Long Island NY, a fuel explosion occurred.
Problems were found in the Fuel Quantity Indication System and ground handling actions.
‘Contributing factors to the accident were the design and certification concept that fuel tank
explosions could be prevented solely by precluding all ignition sources and the design and
certification of the Boeing 747 with heat sources located beneath the CWT (Centre Wing Tank) with
no means to reduce heat transferred into the CWT or to render the fuel vapour in the tank non-
flammable’.
Estimated temperature in empty CWT with ground running before take-off was 49°C.
Many basic design and certification assumptions about installed fuel tank systems had to be
substantially revised.
Ambient air temperatures were high, at least 35°C, was recorded. The air conditioning packs located
beneath the centre wing fuel tank which had been running on the ground before pushback for
approximately 30 to 45 minutes.
The centre wing fuel tank, which had not been filled for 2 days, probably contained fuel vapours.
Shortly after pushback a powerful explosion in the centre fuel tank pushed the cabin floor violently
upwards. 8 out of the 114 passengers died.
The airline had fitted logo lights after delivery which involved additional wires to be passed through
vapour seals in the fuel tanks.
The NTSB issued four safety recommendations, urging immediate inspection or testing of fuel boost
pumps, float switch wiring from float switches to the refuelling panel for chaffed or damaged insulation
material on Boeing 737-300,-400 and -500 series aircraft.
Source: Investigation Report B737-300 / PR143, 11 May 1990; NTSB safety recommendations A-90-
100/103
Following retraction of the slats after landing and taxy to stand, a loose bolt of the main slat track
downstop assembly punctured the wing slat can which resulted in a fuel leak. The hole was about
0.8-1.2 inches in diameter. An ignition occurred of unknown origin and a fire progressively destroyed
the aircraft. Passenger Human Factors during this evacuation from the aircraft also became an issue.
The FAA subsequently issued an Emergency AD requiring a detailed inspection and test on of each
main slat track downstop assembly on to all Boeing 737 - 600 to 900ER Series aircraft.
Ignition Sources
There are three primary occurrences that can result in ignition of fuel vapours in aeroplane fuel tanks.
• The first is electrical arcs - electrical component and wiring failures, direct and indirect effects of
lightning, HIRF (High Intensity Radiated Fields)/ EMI, and static discharges
• The second is friction sparks resulting from mechanical contact of rotating equipment in the fuel
tank - typically this may result from debris contacting a fuel pump impeller or an impeller contacting
the pump casing
• The third is hot surface ignition or auto ignition - defined as hot surfaces which come within 30C of
the autogenous temperature of the fuel air mixture for the fluid as ignition sources. Surface
temperatures not exceeding 200°C have been accepted against current fuel types
11 Actions Commenced
• In 2000, FAA & Aircraft Industry Formed a Task Force to Investigate Fuel Tank
Explosions
• In 2001, Special Federal Air Regulation (SFAR) 88 issued with 18 Month Compliance
• Created Several FAA FAR 25 Amendments.
1. Ignition source elimination - requiring rigorous design reviews by Type Certificate Holders and
enhanced continuing standards of maintenance practices. Adopted by industry as standard
practises following regulation
2. Flammability Reduction systems - to mitigate ignition and evolution. Work within FAA & EASA
continues to harmonise requirements to the industry. Currently driven by FAA actions
In parallel with SFAR 88, wiring problems were being investigated by the Ageing Transport Systems
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) -set up by FAA. This produced rule making known as the
Enhanced Airworthiness Programme for Aircraft Systems/Fuel Systems (EAPAS)
Various JAA documents were released, notably JAA INT/POL/25/12 on 1st October 2000 requiring
aircraft safety assessments ‘showing that the presence of an ignition source within the fuel system is
Extremely Improbable and does not result from a single failure’.
JAA TGL 47 provided guidance to show compliance with the Interim Policy and in order to harmonise
the approach of the JAA community and the FAA.
*both are used in the consultation phase when introducing new legislation/rules
• Items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure
mode(s) associated with an ‘unsafe condition’
• An unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or
practices are not performed IAW manufacturers’ requirements
• Located in the CMRs (Certification Maintenance Requirements in the maintenance
schedule).
In order to ensure continuing airworthiness in Fuel Tank Safety, Airworthiness Limitations are
instructions issued for inspections, modifications and other maintenance actions that are mandated to
avoid an ‘Unsafe Condition’ arising.
Also these provide information necessary to maintain design features specified in the original type
design to preclude ignition sources and are included in the critical design configuration control
limitations.
Airworthiness Limitations can be of two types (ALIs and CDCCLs) and both may be activated on a
particular task.
NB: Airbus uses the terminology Fuel Airworthiness Limitation (FAL) instead of AWL.
ALIs are ‘required periodical inspection tasks’ related to fuel tank ignition source prevention which
must be completed to maintain the ‘design level of safety’ and so preventing an ‘unsafe condition’
arising for the operational life of the aircraft.
15 Implementation of CDCCL’s
• Features of System Design that require their integrity to be maintained in order to ensure that
unsafe conditions do not develop in the fuel system throughout the service life of the aircraft
• Must be retained during modification, repair or maintenance
CDCCLs are used to identify certain design configuration features - potentially multiple active and
latent failures - intended to preclude a fuel tank ignition source for the operational life of the aircraft.
These translate to instructions that mandate specific practices when working in critical controlled
areas to identify ‘unsafe conditions’ and their corrective actions.
CDCCLs can be concerned with the fuel system or systems/components/assemblies that interact with
the fuel system.
For example:
• Bonding & redundant bonding paths that attach components and tank
• Separation of fuel gauge wiring from other higher energy wiring
• Wire support for high energy wiring in proximity to tanks
16 CDCCLs – Practice
CDCCLs are identified in AMMs by the TC Holder (manufacturer) and also appear specifically in
Maintenance Planning Data and relevant Component MMs.
AMC Part 145.A.45(e) states: ‘The maintenance organisation should transcribe accurately the
maintenance data onto such work cards or worksheets or make precise reference to the particular
maintenance tasks or tasks contained in such maintenance data making reference to the CDCCL
where applicable’.
The following slides are for illustrative purposes only and are used to outline examples in an
aircraft configuration [B767in this instance] for Phase 1 Training purpose.
• All Airworthiness Limitation tasks should be clearly identified and provide a reference for
guidance.
• An operator replaces a fuel tank component that has a critical design feature. The lack of a
bonding strap would disable an ignition source prevention feature and thus, would contribute
to an unsafe condition.
20 CDCCL’s - Example 2
• Separation of external wires of the fuel gauging system has been determined to be a way to
keep unsafe energies out of the fuel tank. An instruction is required to comply with the
CDCCLs to ensure wiring for the fuel gauging system remains separated from other wiring.
• A CDCCL statement is inserted into both the Component Maintenance Manual and the
Aircraft Maintenance Manual
• A specific feature of the fuel tank system creates an unsafe condition in the event of
certain failures: For example if a fuel pump is repaired or overhauled, but certain critical
ignition source prevention features within the pump are not installed or are not overhauled in
accordance with the CMM.
A third example that illustrates the requirement for CDCCL statements for critical components to be
placed in Component Maintenance Manuals (CMMs) and subsequent adherence.
This affects the activities of both the component organisation and the maintenance organisation.
Planners and Maintenance Controllers could use these more frequently so may be more aware.
Comment: When using traditional AMM layouts, be aware this safety issue is not just about items in
ATA Chapter for Fuel; but also for say Hydraulics because fluid cooler pipes for cooling can pass
through tanks. Additionally, ATA Pneumatics and Air conditioning (heat exchangers and adjacent
ducting etc) Chapter requirements could also be affected. Further investigation may also be required
at a component level.
26 B767 SB Examples
• SB 28A0083 Engine Fuel Feed System - Fuel Pump Inlet Protection - Auxiliary Fuel
Tank Pump Automatic Shut Off Installation
• SB 28 0087 FQIS Spar Connector Back shell Inspection, Test, and Change
• SB 28A0075 Main Tank Fuel Boost Pumps and Center Auxiliary Tank Fuel
Override/Jettison Pumps Inspection
• SB 28A0072 Engine Fuel Feed Tube, Front Spar Bulkhead Fitting Bonding Test, and/or
Bonding Rework
• SB 28A0064 Honeywell Fuel Quantity Indicating System Out-Tank Wire Bundle
Replacement
• SB 28 0054 Fuel Tanks - Fuel System Inspection - Main Tanks (51 for aux tanks)
Here are some SBs that have been incorporated on the 767 fleet [as a training example]. Similar SBs
are introduced on other aircraft types.
As examples these highlight the need for effective fuel tank close-up and final inspections
• The presence of sharp metal shavings, which can be attributed to drilling, can strip
insulation away from wiring. As a result, the core conducting wires become exposed and
enhance the likelihood of a spark.
• Exposed wires becoming coated with sulphur ‘syrup’ or metallic drill shavings can be
dangerous because either substance can act as a conductor. Substances such as these
could function as a base point for an electrical arc, which may ignite contents of a fuel tank.
Be careful of debris in the tanks. Thorough inspections are required by certifying staff.
31 Arcing Example
An arcing event has occurred here, but it may not always be this obvious to detect due to visual
restrictions or access on some tasks. Consider how to use available lighting and inspection
techniques most effectively.
A key point here is also the Human Factors affecting vigilance on tasks that need to be managed: ‘We
just don’t see what we don’t see’ unless we can actively train ourselves to look for the unexpected.
N2
O2, CO2, H2O
N2
O2
CO2
H2O
Air
The purpose of ATA Chapter 47 (Inert Gas System) is to detail the maintenance procedures relating
to fuel tank or related fuel tank systems when minimal fuel loads exist in the tank. It also details
additional procedures relating to design changes, inspections and maintenance of these systems.
Illustrated above is an example of a N2 purging system fitted to a737NG aircraft using bleed air.
Another significant fuel accident that caused the demolition of the hangar on the night of 5th May
2006.
Four aircraft undergoing heavy maintenance (Three A320s and one C130) were destroyed. One
technician was seriously injured and four received minor injuries. The blaze took over two hours to get
under control by Brussels Airport RFFS.