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68 Self and Subject

lated in: The Unity of Reason: Essays in Kant's Philosophy, ed. R. Velkley (Cam-
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), 123-208]; and HThe Identity of the Subject in the
Transcendental Deduction," in Reading Kant, ed. E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 250-80. See also Manfred Frank, "Fragmente zu einer
Geschichte der SelbstbewuBtseinstheorien von Kant bis Sartre," in Selbstbewuj3tseins-
theorien von Fichte bis Sartre, ed. M. Frank (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991),415-599; cf.
my "From Kant to Frank: The Ineliminable Subject," in The Modem Subject: Concep-
tions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy, ed. K..Ameriks and D. Sturma
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995),217-30.
4. See Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte' s Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1990); Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990); and Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions
ofSelf-Consciousness. (Calnbridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989).
5. Charles T. Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1990). Cf. Peter F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen,
1966).
6. Andrew Brook, Kant and the Mind (Can1bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1994); Patricia Kitcher, Kant's Transcendental Psychology (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1990). I discuss aspects of Brook's interpretation (and contrast it with recent
work by Colin McGinn) in "Kant and Mind: Mere Immaterialism, Proceedings of the
Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. H. Robinson (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ.
Press, 1995).
7. For other overviews of treatments of Kant's theory of the self, see especially:
Gunter Zoller, "Main Developn1ents in Recent Scholarship on the Critique of Pure
Reason," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53(1993),445-66; Richard
Aquila, "Self as Matter and Form: Some Reflections on Kant's View of the Soul"
(chapter 2 of this volume); Gary Hatfield, "Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental
Psychology: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy," in The Cambridge Kant Com-
panion, ed. P. Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), 200-27; and
Vladimir Satura, Kants Erkenntnispsychologie, Kant-Studien Ergiinzungshefte no. 101
(Bonn: Bouvier, 1971).
8. See my "Understanding Apperception Today," in Kant and Contemporary
Epistemology, ed. Paolo Parrini (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994),331-47. The first part of that
\ article overlaps with much of the first part of the present chapter, but whereas in that arti-
cle I go on to contrast Kant's account prin1arily with current empiricist analyses, in
this chapter I go on to contrast it primarily with current Fichtean analyses.
9. I have argued that, at least in Fichte's published writings, recourse to a practi-
cal sense of the I is essential to make sense of his arguments. See at n. 34 below, and cf.
my "Kant, Fichte, and Short Arguments to Idealism," ArchivfUr Geschichte der Philoso-
phie 72(1990), 63-85; and my "Fichte's Appeal Today: The Hidden Primacy of the
Practical," in The Emergence of German Idealism, ed. Michael Baur and Daniel
Dahlstrom (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, forthcoming).

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