70

23. Sturma, ibid., p. 111n.

Self and Subject
24. See Sturma, ibid., pp. 56, 117, on how the unique "self-referential" character
of the "I" makes it a "quasi-object," something concrete but something for which our
access is not limited to our knowledge of any specific spatiotemporallocation.
25. Henrich, "SelbstbewuBtsein," p. 280: "selbstlosen BewuBtseins vom Selbst."
Cited at Sturma, Kant aber Selbstbewuj3tsein, p. 111n.
26. Sturma, Kant aber Selbstbewufitsein, p.116; the quotation is also in Henrich,
Fichtes ursprungliche Einsicht, p. 21, and comes from Fichte's Siimtliche Werke I, ed.
I. H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit, 1845-56), p. 528.
27. However, I do not think it is valid to say that each instance of self-awareness
must see itself this way. That is an extra and dubious claim (tied to certain ideas about
"constant" self-awareness that are challenged below in my discussion of Neuhouser). All
I mean to endorse is that at some point in its existence a subject must be able at least
implicitly to understand that it has some spontaneity.
28. Cited in Sturma, Kant aber Selbstbewufitsein, p. 118, from J. G. Fichte,
Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. R. Lauth, H. Jacobs,
and H. Gliwitzky (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1964ft) IV, 2,30.
29. Cf. Sturma's (ibid., p. 119) helpful distinction between "logical" and "descrip-
tive" elements of an explication of self-consciousness.
30. Cf. Sturma, ibid., p. 25, who points out the problems in restricting self-con-
sciousness either to such "rationalist" self-as-pure-object episodes, or to mere "Humean"
reflective episodes (= mere consciousness of consciousness).
31. I believe all this can be affirmed without immediately going further (cf.
Sturma, ibid., p. 10), to claim that the "immediate egocentric sense" of self-conscious-
ness could never be explained either naturalistically or by "speculative" reference to an
immaterial soul. For a comparison with some current analytic theories, cf. my "Kant and
Mind: Mere Immaterialism."
32. Cf. what Gerold Prauss (Erscheinung bei Kant, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971)
calls "Erscheinungsurteile," for example, "it appears to me that it is warm." However,
contrary to what Roderick Chisholm has suggested, I think we should not transform "I
think x is red" into "I think I am appeared to redly." Rather, "I am under the impression
of being appeared to redly" is enough; a second level "I" should not be introduced
here. Cf. my "Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy," and "Contemporary
German Epistemology," Inquiry 25(1982), 125-38.
33. One source of resistance to this line of interpretation may come from the
belief, suggested by the original formulation of Henrich's Claim I, that separate and prior
awareness of the identity of a self as an enduring object (a person) may underlie (i.e., dis-
close the conditions sufficient for) the objective unity of experience that is asserted in the
Transcendental Deduction. But what Kant claims is only the opposite: that any objective