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Thucydides 450 400 BCE

Like other classical political theorists, Thucydides (460411 B.C.E.) saw politics as involving
moral questions. Most importantly, he asks whether relations among states to which power is
crucial can also be guided by the norms of justice. His History of the Peloponnesian War is in
fact neither a work of political philosophy nor a sustained theory of international relations.
Much of this work, which presents a partial account of the armed conflict between Athens and
Sparta that took place from 431 to 404 B.C.E., consists of paired speeches by personages who
argue opposing sides of an issue. Nevertheless, if the History is described as the only
acknowledged classical text in international relations, and if it inspires theorists from Hobbes to
contemporary international relations scholars, this is because it is more than a chronicle of
events, and a theoretical position can be extrapolated from it. Realism is expressed in the very
first speech of the Athenians recorded in the Historya speech given at the debate that took
place in Sparta just before the war. Moreover, a realist perspective is implied in the way
Thucydides explains the cause of the Peloponnesian War, and also in the famous Melian
Dialogue, in the statements made by the Athenian envoys.
1.1.1 General Features of Realism in International Relations
International relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of
human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government.
Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in
which the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in
which there is little place for morality. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism,
anarchy, power, security, and morality that define the realist tradition are all present in
Thucydides.
(1) Human nature is a starting point for classical political realism. Realists view human beings as
inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral
principles. At the debate in Sparta, described in Book I of Thucydides' History, the Athenians
affirm the priority of self-interest over morality. They say that considerations of right and wrong
have never turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior
strength (chap. 1 par. 76).
(2) Realists, and especially today's neorealists, consider the absence of government, literally
anarchy, to be the primary determinant of international political outcomes. The lack of a
common rule-making and enforcing authority means, they argue, that the international arena is
essentially a self-help system. Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define
its own interests and to pursue power. Anarchy thus leads to a situation in which power has the
overriding role in shaping interstate relations. In the words of the Athenian envoys at Melos,
without any common authority that can enforce order, the independent states survive *only]
when they are powerful (5.97).
(3) Insofar as realists envision the world of states as anarchic, they likewise view security as a
central issue. To attain security, states try to increase their power and engage in power-
balancing for the purpose of deterring potential aggressors. Wars are fought to prevent
competing nations from becoming militarily stronger. Thucydides, while distinguishing between
the immediate and underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, does not see its real cause in
any of the particular events that immediately preceded its outbreak. He instead locates the
cause of the war in the changing distribution of power between the two blocs of Greek city-
states: the Delian League, under the leadership of Athens, and the Peloponnesian League,
under the leadership of Sparta. According to him, the growth of Athenian power made the
Spartans afraid for their security, and thus propelled them into war (1.23).
(4) Realists are generally skeptical about the relevance of morality to international politics. This
can lead them to claim that there is no place for morality in international relations, or that
there is a tension between demands of morality and requirements of successful political action,
or that states have their own morality that is different from customary morality, or that
morality, if any, is merely used instrumentally to justify states' conduct. A clear case of the
rejection of ethical norms in relations among states can be found in the Melian Dialogue
(5.85113). This dialogue relates to the events of 416 B.C.E., when Athens invaded the island of
Melos. The Athenian envoys presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or surrender, and
from the outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to think only about their survival. In
the envoys' words, We both know that the decisions about justice are made in human
discussions only when both sides are under equal compulsion, but when one side is stronger, it
gets as much as it can, and the weak must accept that (5.89). To be under equal compulsion
means to be under the force of law, and thus to be subjected to a common lawgiving authority
(Korab-Karpowicz 2006, 234). Since such an authority above states does not exist, the
Athenians argue that in this lawless condition of international anarchy, the only right is the right
of the stronger to dominate the weaker. They explicitly equate right with might, and exclude
considerations of justice from foreign affairs.

The Influence of Thucydides in the Modern World
The Father of Political Realism Plays a Key Role in Current Balance of Power
Theories
By Alexander Kemos
Thucydides, the Ancient Greek historian of the fifth century B.C., is not only the father of
scientific history, but also of political "realism," the school of thought which posits that
interstate relations are based on might rather than right. Through his study of the
Peloponnesian War, a destructive war which began in 431 B.C. among Greek city-states,
Thucydides observed that the strategic interaction of states followed a discernible and
recurrent pattern. According to him, within a given system of states, a certain hierarchy among
the states determined the pattern of their relations. Therefore, he claimed that while a change
in the hierarchy of weaker states did not ultimatley affect a given system, a disturbance in the
order of stronger states would decisively upset the stability of the system. As Thucydides said,
the Peloponnesian War was the result of a systematic change, brought about by the increasing
power of the Athenian city-state, which tried to exceed the power of the city-state of Sparta.
"What made the war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this
caused Sparta," Thucydides wrote in order to illustrate the resulting systematic change; that is,
"a change in the hierarchy or control of the international political system."
Thucydides' realism has had a timeless impact on the way contemporary analysts perceive
international relations. Adding to the works of Gilpin and Waltz, Leo Strauss of the University of
Chicago viewed The Peloponnesian War as containing propositions that could be brought into a
coherent framework and identified as "Thucydides' political philosophy" or serve even as the
basis for a series of laws about the science of modern politics. In fact, political scientists have
treated the work of Thucydides as a coherent attempt to communicate silent universals that
have served as the basis for American foreign policy and security doctrine in the post World
War II era.
Thus, on one hand, Thucydides was the first to describe international relations as anarchic and
immoral. The "Melian dialogue" best exemplifies Thucydides' view that interstate politics lack
regulation and justice. In the "Melian dialogue," he wrote that, in interstate relations, "the
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." For
him, international relations allow the mighty do as they please and forfce the weak to suffer as
they must. On the other hand, Thucydides illustrated the Cold War phenomenon of
"polarization" among states, resulting from their strategic interaction.
The impact of Thucydides' work upon scholars of the Cold War period consists evidence for the
relevance of his realist theory in today's world. In fact, while his Peloponnesian War is
chronologically distant from the present, Thucydides' influence upon realist scholars in the
post-1945 period, and in turn upon American diplomacy, is direct. Specifically, the foundations
of American diplomacy during the Cold War with regard to the struggle between the two
superpowers and the ethical consequences or problems posed for smaller states caught in the
vortex of bipolar competition are derived from his work.
Writings of the early Cold War years often derive their inspiration from Thucydides' work. This
period has spawned a significant body of theoretical literature which finds in the Athenian-
Spartan rivalry a precedent to the Soviet-American bipolar competition. Structural realists such
as Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin found that the Hellenic world, and particularly the
relationship between Athens and Sparta, as Thucydides describes it, provided an allegory for
the Cold War polarization. In 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall had called attention to
the significance of the Peloponnesian War for an understanding of the contemporary world. "I
doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding
certain of the basic issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the
Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens," he said.
Moreover, during the polarization of the Cold War period, policy-makers equated America's
power to Ancient Athens' glory, as told in The Peloponnesian War. Thus, in 1952, Louis J. Halle,
at the time Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, wrote that "the present, in
which our country finds herself, like Athens after the Peloponnesian wars, called upon to
assume the leadership of the free world brings him [Thucydides] virtually to our side... It seems
to me that since World War II Thucydides has come still closer to us so that now he speaks to
our ear."
Throughout the Cold War, scholarly work focused on the conclusions which Thucydides drew
from his study of power and competition in bipolar systems. The contemporary interpretation
of the Peloponnesian War paraphrases what realists have come to term the "security
dilemma": as the power of a subordinate state in a relatively stable international system
increases disproportionately, it is brought into conflict with the dominant state(s). The struggle
between these contenders for preeminence and their accumulating alliances lead to a
bipolarization of the international system. In the language of game theorists, a zero-sum
situation results, in which one state's gain is the other state's loss. As bipolarization proceeds,
the system becomes increasingly unstable, and so does the likelihood of system-changing
conflict.
Indeed, the study of polarity in the Hellenic world in the period between the Persian and
Peloponnesian wars has influenced the work of realist authors such as Robert Gilpin, Kenneth
Waltz, Joseph Nye, and John Mearsheimer. In turn, this scholarship has influenced American
diplomacy as reflected in the work of Louis Halle in the 1950s, and Henry Kissinger, not only in
the doctoral thesis, but in his tenure as Secretary of State in the 1970s. Specifically, reference of
the parallel bipolarity of th Peloponnesian and Cold wars influenced the manner in which the
U.S. saw the superpower world, and the manner in which it treated political developments and
cultures in non-western regions.
As a result of his study of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides drew a fundamental distinction
between the mode of politics within a certain state and the pattern of political interaction
among several states. This distinction that is still the subject of intense debate in foreign policy
circles. Within a state, citizens enter a community based on a form of social contract, which
provides the protection of laws at the expense of some individual freedom. As a result of the
legal equality with which the social contract provides the citizens, the weak are able to
withstand the strong and ethical considerations are respected. In the international realm,
however, there is no social contract among citizens of different states, and, consequenlty, there
are no laws to defend legality and morality of state interactions. Thus, in interstate relations, it
is the strong who decide how the weak should be treated, as moral or ethical judgments are
virtually nonexistent. This distinction between the ethics of domestic and international
relations are implicit in the "Melian dialogue." Here, Thucydides had Demosthenes, the
Athenian orator, specifically contrast the affairs of a city-state, where laws (nomoi) and
customs exist to treat weak and powerful equally, with international disputes (en tois
Hellenikois dikaiois), where the strong coerce the weak.
Demosthenes is not the only one, however, to identify the place of justice and ethics in
domestic relations and their absence in interstate relations. In his Politics, Aristotle accused
individuals for having double standards. While they might restrain from behaving in an
unacceptable way with regard to their fellow citizens, in the case of outsiders it is a different
case entirely. He wrote, "most people seem to think sheer domination is what is appropriate in
the political sphere; and they are not ashamed to practice in regard to outsiders what they
recognize is neither just nor expedient in their dealings with each other as individuals. For their
own affairs, among themselves, they demand an authority based on justice: but in regard to
outsiders justice is no concern of theirs."
Moreover, later writers have endorsed Thucydides' argument that "might makes right." Later
realists, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, agree with Thucydides that "might makes right" is an
intoxicating precept for states to indulge in. Also, like Thucydides, these later realists suggest
that, although Ethics has its own proper sphere within the community of a certain state, the
attempt to regulate interstate relations according to similar precepts contains the risk of
justifying cases of intervention in a sovereign state. To paraphrase the contemporary theorist
Hans Morghenthau, the mixture or morality and foreign policy is a very dangerous one. Indeed,
in the early days of the Cold War, Morgenthau disapproved of the U.S. policy to view any region
or political development, no matter how far-flung or inconsequential, as a linchpin of the
contested balance of power.
Throughout the Cold War period, as a result of America's zero-sum competition with the Soviet
Union for the worldwide balance of power, the US justified intervention in regions such as Latin
America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean, with the objective of denying
communist influence. The critical importance of interventions for American interests overrode
any sense of "immorality" that American support for anti-communist and often brutally
undemocratic regimes may have caused. In short, concern for the customs and privileges of civil
society in the United States was often not extended to cultures and countries whose political
allegiance risked to upset the Cold War bipolar balance. One need only refer to American
(mis)adventures in Iran, Greece, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, to name a few.
Thucydides may have been the father of a cruel realist view of international reations, but this
does not mean that Thucydides himself endorsed the immorality of the international realm.
Rather, if one accepts the distinction between internal and external affairs in The
Peloponnesian War, it becomes clear that, when Thucydides deals with the relations of
individuals within the state, he is indeed ready to make moral judgements. In his reproduction
of Pericles' funeral oration, the historian does not hesitate to comment on the tragedy of the
plague that befalls Athens. Furthermore, in the debate prior to the Sicillian expedition,
Thucydides did not hesitate to compliment Nicias for his sense of morality, by saying that
"[Nicias] had ordered his whole life by high moral standards." Of Nicias's cruel and unjust
opponent Alcibiades, he wrote, "his way of life made him objectionable to everyone as a
person, and thus [the Athenian people] entrusted their affairs to other hands." Finally, of the
oligarchic coup that swept Athens after the exiled Alcibiades collaborated with the Persians and
Spartans to dissolve democracy, Thucydides stated that democracy had been, in his experience,
the best government Athens had had; its composition, of the few as well as the many, had been
truly representative.
There have been, however, some misleading misinterpretations of Thucydides. For instance,
Thomas Hobbes, great admirer of Thucydides, grieviously misinterpreted the historian when it
suited his political interests to do so. He wrote, in fact, that the ancient historian "least of all
liked democracy" and "best approved of regal government." Moreover, some classical scholars
are uneasy with the conclusions that have been drawn by contemporary international relations
theorists from the fifth century B.C. and the Peloponnesian War in the stark hues of the Cold
War. "We have been presented lately with an up-dated version of the Thucydidean thesis that
the war was the inevitable outcome of the division of the Greek world into two power blocs. In
its new guise, the Thucydidean view is fortified with the weapons of modern social science. The
condition that troubled the Greek world and brought on the war is discovered to the
'bipolarity.' Typically, such words are borrowed from the physical sciences to lend an air of
novelty, clarity, and authority to a shopworn, vague, or erroneous idea."
Actually, while the use of Thucydidean scholarship in international relations theory is useful and
accepted in the political science community, the lack of ease with which classical scholars
consider such a relationship justifies the examination of realist Balance of Power precepts as
derived from Thucydides. The significance of such an examination is found in the parallels that
have been made between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War, and the practical
consequences of such scholarship on American diplomacy in the Cold War era with regard to
the relationship between the superpower balance and regional politics in regions of contested
influence.
Finally, the end of the Cold War requires a re-examination of Thucydidean scholarship and the
theories of interstate behaviour which are derived from his work. Furthermore, if there is to be
a new world order, the United States must recognize that the dynamics of interstate relations
are constantly fluctuating. While there may be certain constants in the behaviour of states and
individuals, the possibilities for interaction, cooperation, and conflict are always constant, and
often present themselves in new and previously unknown forms. In this case, the study of
history is only a guide, not a prescription. If the work of Thucydides is considered in these
terms, it will truly be considered a possession for all time, just as the author had intended.
Alexander Kemos was a graduate student in International Relations at Harvard University.


The Mytelenian Debate
(Brown et al, IR in political thought, pp. 44-53)
Cleon's Speech:
P 67
Democracy cannot rule an empire
o changing your minds about Mytilene illustrates that
you think that because in Athens you can afford not to worry about conspiracies,
you can do the same amongst your allies
but your empire is a tyranny and you have unwilling subjects who continually plot
against you
they obey you only because you are stronger

decisions must stand firm
o a city with bad laws is better if they are strict than a city with good laws if they are
unenforced
people are better off if they are sensible but uneducated than if they are clever but lack
self-control
o the common people govern better than the more intelligent
intellectuals love to be wiser than the laws and to win a debate
common people are content to think their laws wiser than they
common people are not interested in making too-clever speeches
We should follow the commoner and not be carried away by cleverness
o I have the same opinion I had before (kill the Mytilenians)
A delay only helps the wrongdoer
the victim's anger is allayed
right after a crime, the victim metes out a harsher penalty
No one should be opposing me
o we already decreed to kill them
o the injustice the Mytilenians committed is not good for us
o their injustice does not harm our allies but ourselves
either my opponent is going to say the opposite-that the Mytilenians helped us
by revolting and harmed our allies-or he was bribed!
Athens has hurt herself by cultivating fine rhetoric
o the rhetorical contests you hold have formed bad habits
you enjoy looking at spectacles
o real action is not your wont
o you consider what to do in the future on the basis of fine speeches
fine speeches are not about what is possible, but what sounds good
o you think that what is presented in speech is more certain than what you see with
your own eyes
o you have a taste for the unusual and spurn the ordinary, the common-sensical
o you all want to be effective speakers above all
even if you are not, you try to compete with effective speakers
o you applaud the fine speaker's point before it is made just to appear clever
yourselves
but you do not see the point's consequences
o you want to hear about things extraordinary
but you do not understand what happens under your noses
o you are so engrossed in what sounds good that you resemble art critics more than
people deliberating about public policy
The Mytilenians have done us a greater harm than any other city
o cities which rebel because they cannot stand us are understandable
o cities that rebel because they are forced to are understandable
o But the Mytilenians were not forced to rebel and they had sweet conditions
o THEREFORE, they are worse than others who rebel
o it is not even a rebellion
o rebellions can only come from oppressed people.
o the Mytilenians were not repressed
o BUT they have joined our worst enemies
o THEREFORE, they are guilty not of rebellion but of betrayal
o their action is far worse than if they had rebelled simply to increase their own power.
They did not learn from others' example
o we put down every rebellion of their neighbors
o their prosperity made them arrogant and reckless
We should never have given them their extraordinary privileges
o too great fortune leads to temerity and recklessness
o they would not have waxed so insolent had we not made them so great
o humans generally look with contempt on those who serve them and look up to those
who never give in to them
THEREFORE, they should be punished as they deserve!
o the commoners as well as the oligarchs
o the commoners betrayed you as much as the oligarchs
Consider what your allies will do
o if you treat those who rebel because they are forced to the same as those who rebel
on their own, everyone will rebel on their own
if they win, they are free
if they lose, they are treated in no irreparable manner
o if you create a situation like that, one city after another will rebel
if we put down the rebellion, we get a weaker subject city less capable of paying
tribute
if we fail, we lose all the tribute and gain new enemies and waste our time and
effort fighting
We must not, THEREFORE, give our allies any reason to be hopeful about rebellion: we
must punish the Mytilenians!!
o we must not let them think that they can rebel, then if they lose, bribe us into letting
them off easy
o nor must we let them think that we are soft and forgiving of human error
they conspired against us of their own free will
only involuntary wrongs are to be pardoned
THEREFORE< we should stick to our previous decision to kill them all
o do not give in to pity
o do not give in to your delight in good speeches
o do not give in to your sense of fairness
They will not have pity on us
the pleasure of a good speech is lightweight in comparison to the price we will pay
if we are wooed by sweet speech
we should only be fair to our friends
Summary:
o following my advice will be justice for the Mytilenians and in your interest!
o pardoning them will not win their favor
it would be tantamount to admitting that they were right to rebel
if it is right that they rebel, we ought not to rule them
if your empire is unjust, if you want to hold it anyway, you must be harsh or give
up the empire
o if they had won, they would have tried to eliminate you
therefore, since you won, you should treat them as they would have treated you
Diodotus' speech:
haste and anger are inimical to good judgement (i.e. we should not act hastily or
angrily)
o haste is usually thoughtless
o anger is ill-formed and narrow-minded
discussion is necessary for action (i.e. we need to discuss now, and carefully)
o If one does not want to discuss the matter, he is either
stupid
because there is no other way to consider the future
or has ulterior motives
because he wants to persuade you to do something awful, but offers slander
instead of good argument
accusing opponent of being bribed is worst of all (a "loaded-question")
o no defense against it
if one prevails, suspicion still there
if one fails, one is thought stupid AND unjust
o such accusations do the city no good
it loses advisors who fear such accusations
People like my opponent Cleon would do the city the most good if they could not speak
well
o they would then persuade the city to fewer errors
o he terrifies those who would speak against him
good advice should no more be rewarded than bad advice
o rewarding leads to good speakers seeking popularity against their better judgment
o also leads unsuccessful speakers to seek popularity by gratifying the people
instead of giving good advice
P72
But we should reward the advisors
Athens distrusts its advisors
and so no one could possibly benefit Athens openly
o people will suspect he has something to gain.
Orators should show more foresight than commoners
o orators are held accountable
o commoners are not held accountable for decisions they make based on orators'
advice
o commoners punish an orator for one piece of bad advice rather than themselves,
who made the decision
IMPLICIT PREMISE: whoever makes/takes part in the decision should be
blamed
Not killing the Mitylenians is to Athens' advantage in the future
73
o the death penalty has been handed down for lesser crimes than the Mytilenians'
current crime
as time goes on, more and more crimes are punished by the death penalty
because people continued violating the laws, the penalties will have gotten
stiffer.
but people still commit crimes
thus, the death penalty does not work to deter crimes
o motives for crime are passions: desire and hope
poverty compels people to be daring
tuche (fortune) also contributes by tempting people to take risks
o cities are especially susceptible to these motives
greater desires
acting with others leads people to have greater hope
o therefore cities will always be tempted to rebel, and it is foolish to think we can
deter them.
o given that cities will inevitably rebel anyway
and that the death penalty leaves them no option to quit before they have
either utterly succeeded or utterly failed
the death penalty will only make rebellions harder to put down.
74
o if we kill them, we will lose revenue from Mytilene
We should look for a way to impose moderate penalties and insure revenue from
Mytilene in the future
o rigor of law will not work to contain them
o we must watch them closely
o they had a good reason to rebel: they wanted autonomy
o if we want to keep them in our power, we must make them not think of rebelling
o we should lay the blame upon as few of them as possible (i.e. find scapegoats?)
if we punish them all, in the future the democrats of other cities will not support us
once there has been a rebellion, because they know they will be punished along with
the oligarchs who started it all.
even if the democrats are guilty, we should pretend they are not, so that they can
perhaps support us in the future
75
I am not arguing for pity or fairness, but for Athens' advantage
let the Mytilenians live and take your time punishing the ringleaders
P 78-the leaders, not the followers are to blame-end of 55
Diodotus prevailed.
1.1.2 The Melian DialogueThe First Realist-Idealist Debate
We can thus find strong support for a realist perspective in the statements of the Athenians. The
question remains, however, to what extent their realism coincides with Thucydides' own
viewpoint. Although substantial passages of the Melian Dialogue, as well as other parts of the
History support a realistic reading, Thucydides' position cannot be deduced from such selected
fragments, but rather must be assessed on the basis of the wider context of his book. In fact, even
the Melian Dialogue itself provides us with a number of contending views.
Political realism is usually contrasted by IR scholars with idealism or liberalism, a theoretical
perspective that emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states, and international
cooperation. The Melian Dialogue, which is one of the most frequently commented-upon parts
of Thucydides' History, presents the classic debate between the idealist and realist views: Can
international politics be based on a moral order derived from the principles of justice, or will it
forever remain the arena of conflicting national interests and power?
For the Melians, who employ idealistic arguments, the choice is between war and subjection
(5.86). They are courageous and love their country. They do not wish to lose their freedom, and
in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are prepared to defend
themselves (5.100; 5.112). They base their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they
associate with fairness, and regard the Athenians as unjust (5.90; 5.104). They are pious,
believing that gods will support their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and trust in
alliances, thinking that their allies, the Spartans, who are also related to them, will help them
(5.104; 5.112). Hence, one can identify in the speech of the Melians elements of the idealistic or
liberal world view: the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, that
they have mutual obligations to one another and will carry out such obligations, and that a war of
aggression is unjust. What the Melians nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In their
decision to defend themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand
or by prudent calculations.
The Athenian argument is based on key realist concepts such as security and power, and is
informed not by what the world should be, but by what it is. The Athenians disregard any moral
talk and urge the Melians to look at the factsthat is, to recognize their military inferiority, to
consider the potential consequences of their decision, and to think about their own survival (5.87;
5.101). There appears to be a powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their
position, based on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on rationality,
intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination, their logic proves to be seriously
flawed. Melos, a relatively weak state, does not pose any real security threat to them. The
eventual destruction of Melos does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which
Athens will lose a few years later.
In the History, Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of
justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power. There are no logical limits to the
size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and gain after conquering Melos, the
Athenians engaged in war against Sicily. They paid no attention to the Melian argument that
considerations of justice are useful to all in the longer run (5.90). And, as the Athenians
overestimate their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves to be
very shortsighted indeed.
It is utopian to ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely
on power alone. Thucydides appears to support neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the
cynicism of their Athenian opponents. He teaches us to be on guard against nave-dreaming on
international politics, on the one hand, and against the other pernicious extreme: unrestrained
cynicism, on the other (Donnelly 2000, 193). If he can be regarded as a political realist, his
realism is nonetheless not a prefiguring of either realpolitik, in which traditional ethics is denied,
or today's scientific neorealism, in which moral questions are largely ignored. Thucydides'
realism, neither immoral nor amoral, can rather be compared to that of Hans Morgenthau,
Raymond Aron, and other twentieth-century classical realists, who, although sensible to the
demands of national interest, would not deny that political actors on the international scene are
subject to moral judgment.

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