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Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The
Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time
Havi Carel
a
a
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
Online Publication Date: 01 December 2007
To cite this Article: Carel, Havi (2007) 'Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility:
The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time', International Journal of
Philosophical Studies, 15:4, 541 - 556
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Vol. 15(4), 541556

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

ISSN 09672559 print 14664542 online 2007 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09672550701602916

Temporal Finitude and Finitude of
Possibility: The Double Meaning
of Death in

Being and Time

Havi Carel

Taylor and Francis RIPH_A_260143.sgm 10.1080/09672550701602916 International Journal of Philosophical Studies 0967-2559 (print)/1466-4542 (online) Original Article 2007 Taylor & Francis 00 00000002007 Havi HannahCarel havi.carel@uwe.ac.uk
Abstract

The confusion surrounding Heideggers account of death in

Being and Time

has led to severe criticisms, some of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent
and obtuse. I argue that Heideggers critics err by equating Heideggers
concept of death with our ordinary concept. As I show, Heideggers concept
of death is not the same as the ordinary meaning of the term, namely, the
event that ends life. But nor does this concept merely denote the finitude of
Daseins possibilities or the groundlessness of existence, as William Blattner
and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. Rather, I argue, the concept of death has
to be understood

both

as temporal finitude and as finitude of possibility. I
show how this reading addresses the criticisms directed at Heideggers death
analysis as well as solving textual problems generated by more limited inter-
pretations of the concept.

Keywords:

death; Heidegger; finitude; mortality; being-towards-death;
temporality

Introduction

The concept of death plays a pivotal role in

Being and Time

; it is a central
element of Daseins structure and existence. Heidegger claims that death
defines the limit of Daseins existence, thus structuring it ontologically. This
limit has an existential significance because of Daseins ability to anticipate
death, an ability that structures Daseins existence as a movement towards
death, or what Heidegger calls being-towards-death (

Sein-zum-Tode

).
But what does Heidegger mean by being-towards-death? Is it the fact that
every living creature is constantly moving towards death? Is it Daseins
capacity to understand its finitude? And in what sense is death a possibility,
as Heidegger says (

Being and Time,

Macquarrie and Robinson translation
(hereafter

BT

), p. 307;

Sein und Zeit

(hereafter

SZ

), p. 262)? The confusion
surrounding Heideggers analysis of death has led to severe criticisms, some
of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent or obtuse. In the words of one
recent commentator, Heideggers allegedly deep analysis of death does not
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

542
contain significant philosophical insights. It is a mesmerising play with
words, a masterly piece of rhetoric (Philipse, 1998: p. 354).
I argue that Heideggers critics err by taking his concept of death to be
identical to the ordinary concept. Heidegger is not talking about death in
the ordinary sense, i.e. the event that ends life. But nor does his concept of
death merely denote the finitude of Daseins possibility, or the groundless-
ness of existence, as William Blattner and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested.
Rather, Heideggers concept of death must be understood as involving both
temporal finitude

and

finitude of possibility. I argue that this interpretation
makes sense of the relevant sections of

Being and Time

. It follows that
Heideggers analysis of death is capable of withstanding many of the criti-
cisms levelled against it.
I begin by outlining the criticisms of Heideggers concept of death. I then
present an alternative interpretation of death as limitation of possibility (the
Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation) and show what is still lacking in this view.
Finally I show how my suggested

dual

interpretation overcomes the criti-
cisms, improves on the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation and provides a
coherent account of Heideggers concept of death.

Criticisms of Heideggers View

In his famous, trenchant critique, Paul Edwards judges the Heideggerian
theses on death to be platitudes, clearly false and flagrant contradiction
(1979: pp. 5960). He concludes that Heideggers death analysis is a
grotesque pseudo-inquiry (1979: p. 60; see also 1976). Philipse (1998) has
recently taken up Edwards critique and reformulated his claims. In this
section, I outline the Edwards/Philipse critique of Heidegger and criticize its
underlying assumptions.
The first criticism is that if death is simply the absence of existence, then
Heideggers definition of death as the possibility of impossibility becomes
meaningless and obscure. It is meaningless because Heidegger defines
possibility as a possible way of existing, so non-existence is not a possibility
at all. It is obscure because death is not a possibility of anything, but is
simply the lack of all possibility; therefore, death cannot meaningfully be
defined as the possibility of impossibility, Edwards argues (1975; cf.
Mulhall, 2005: p. 304).
Secondly, Edwards takes Heideggers claim that death is non-relational
to mean that all human beings die alone, a statement he takes to be false
(1979: p. 5). Similarly, Philipse takes Heideggers description of death as
Daseins ownmost possibility to mean that death is an essentially lonely
affair. He then argues that Heideggers description is at best trivial and at
worst false. It is obviously false that everyone dies alone whether we
mean physically, emotionally or temporally alone. If we redefine dying on
ones own as simply dying, then Heideggers description is true but trivial.
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TEMPORAL FINITUDE AND FINITUDE OF POSSIBILITY

543
Philipse concludes: it is impossible to interpret Heideggers statement as
both true and informative (1998: p. 355).
A third criticism is directed against Heideggers statement that death is
non-substitutable, that no one can take Daseins dying away from it (

BT

,
p. 284;

SZ

, p. 240). Philipse describes this claim as an empirical platitude
because death, like any other bodily affair, cannot be removed or taken away
from that particular body (1998: p. 358). Edwards says of the same thesis that
it is true, but trite (1979: p. 13). It is true that someone could die instead of
me, but also that no one can deliver me from my death. Heideggers state-
ment does not assert any fact over and above the fact that I am going to die:
it simply reasserts this fact and hence it is not a discovery or an insight or a
contribution to our understanding of anything (1979: p. 14).
A fourth and final problem identified by both critics concerns Heideggers
pronouncements on the possibility of an afterlife.

1

Philipse points to a
contradiction between 49 and 53 of

Being and Time

. In 49 Heidegger
says that his analysis does not rule out ontic notions of an afterlife, whereas
in 53 he makes unqualified statements about the terminal nature of death.
Philipse argues that if Heidegger wants to leave open the question of an
afterlife, he cannot claim that death is the end of all possibility, as this claim
rules out the ontic possibility of an afterlife. If Heidegger thinks that death
is indeed the final point, he cannot claim that his analysis is compatible with
any notion of afterlife (1998: pp. 3701). According to Edwards, this contra-
diction shows that much of the time the distinction between ontological
and ontic questions is exceedingly nebulous (1979: p. 41).
These criticisms may seem devastating for Heideggers analysis of death.
Edwards and Philipse seem to have demonstrated that Heideggers analy-
sis is inconsistent, plagued by linguistic trickery and contains nothing of
philosophical value. However, both critiques stem from a failure to make
two key distinctions. The first is the distinction between death and demise.
The second is between the ordinary meaning of the term possibility
(

Mglichkeit

) and the specific sense Heidegger gives it in

Being and Time

.
This specific sense of possibility is crucial for understanding what
Heidegger means when he defines death as a possibility. As we will see in
the final part of the paper, once these two fundamental points are clari-
fied, Edwards and Philipses seemingly powerful criticisms prove to be
groundless. But first it is necessary to explicate the death/demise distinc-
tion and present Dreyfus and Blattners interpretation of the concept of
death.

Death is Not Demise

The main problem with Edwards account, which is uncritically adopted by
Philipse, is his understanding of death as the event that ends life. Heidegger
makes it clear that he does not use death (

Tod

) to denote the event that ends
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

544
Daseins life; the term reserved for that is demise (

ableben

). All organisms
perish (

verenden

), but Dasein perishes in a particular way, indicated by the
special term demise. It demises rather than perishes because of Daseins
unique way of being, namely, existence, which Heidegger takes to be
distinct from non-human animals way of being. Because Dasein exists, and
is engaged in an interpretation of its existence, it is also aware of its demise.
Heidegger captures this by distinguishing perishing from demise. But
demise is not death, and certainly not dying (

sterben

).
Demise is distinct from perishing, or other animals way of ending,
because it is an intermediate phenomenon, not entirely fact and not
entirely interpretation. This is based on Heideggers general distinction
between factuality (

Tatschlichkeit

) and facticity (

Faktizitt

). For Heidegger
factuality is the

factum brutum

of something present-at-hand (e.g. that I am
5 feet 4 inches tall), while facticity is the same fact viewed through the prism
of Daseins being (that I interpret myself as short) (

BT

, pp. 82, 174;

SZ

,
pp. 56, 135). Perishing is factual, for it is a biological fact that organic life is
finite. Demise is the factical interpretation of that fact, which is unique to
Dasein as self-interpreting (ibid. and see also Dreyfus, 1991: p. 309).
Another common misinterpretation of demise is seeing it as the

inauthen-
tic

end of ones life, as opposed to authentic dying. This interpretation is
inconsistent and forces those who understand demise in this way to admit
that there is certain instability in Heideggers use of the term demise
(Mulhall, 2005: p. 302). But Heidegger does not say that demise is inauthen-
tic death. Rather, he says that when Dasein relates inauthentically to its
death, it turns its attention to demise instead (Blattner, 1994: p. 55). Dasein
transforms anxiety in the face of death into fear of a future event, its demise.
Demise is taken as a substitute for death, that can be dealt with by tranquil-
ization, whereas anxiety cannot be similarly assuaged. So death and demise
are clearly not the same. In this erroneous interpretation death is reduced
to an ontic event because it is not understood as an existentiale, a way to be
(Leman-Stefanovic, 1987: p. 62).
By saying that Dasein is towards its end (

Sein zum Ende

), Heidegger
picks out another feature of Daseins existence, which gives it its finite struc-
ture. This feature is the focus of Dreyfus and Blattners interpretations of
Heideggers concept of death, to which I now turn. Armed with this new
interpretation we will be able to return to the Edwards/Philipse critiques
and provide a definitive reply to them.

The Dreyfus/Blattner Interpretation

On Dreyfus early view, what death illustrates in a perspicuous but
misleading way is not the fact that Dasein is temporally finite, but that it is
limited in another way: Dasein can never make any possibilities its own
(1991: p. 310). Possibilities are always there for anyone, part of the public
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TEMPORAL FINITUDE AND FINITUDE OF POSSIBILITY

545
world, and therefore have no

intrinsic

meaning for Dasein. The only
ownmost possibility is nullity, the groundlessness of Daseins being. So
death in Heideggers sense, claims Dreyfus, is not the

existentiell

or ontic
possibility of demise, but the

existential

ontological possibility of not
having any possibilities. Not only is this existential nullity not exposed in
demise, it is also covered over by thinking about death as an event that has
not yet happened to me. As Dreyfus writes, The cover up consists in
assuming that the anxiety of death is a response to the end of being alive or
to the possibility of that end rather than to the true condition of Dasein
(1991: p. 311).
This interpretation of death as the existential condition of lack of all
possibilities is further supported by Heideggers identification of being-
towards-death with anxiety (

BT

, p. 310;

SZ

, p. 266). Anxiety is the affective
state allowing Dasein to uncover its groundlessness, its inability to project
itself into a for-the-sake-of-which. In anxiety Dasein is cut off from its possi-
bilities, which are usually taken up unreflectively and provide a mostly
transparent, shared framework of everyday life. Once these possibilities are
removed, the background that provides Daseins world and actions with
intelligibility disappears as well, leaving Dasein unable to project itself into
any particular possibility.
Thus Dasein is, but is entirely unable to proceed in any intelligible
pursuit. All action becomes impossible. It is the state of being cut off from
the world and therefore incapable of action that being-towards-death and
anxiety share. Heidegger picks this state out in his distinction between genu-
ine (

echt

) and non-genuine (

unecht

) attitudes. This distinction is not analo-
gous to the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction, and merits attention.
As Heidegger points out in his discussion of understanding, understand-
ing can be either authentic or inauthentic, but it is further qualified as genu-
ine or not genuine. Genuine understanding must express being-in-the-world
as a whole, whereas non-genuine understanding is partial or reductive, and
loses the holistic character of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The moment of
anxiety or authentic being-towards-death qualifies as

authentic

but

non-
genuine

. These states are authentic because they disclose the world as a
whole, but they are non-genuine because they cut Dasein off from its world
and leave it unable to act (Dreyfus, 1991: p. 194).
The result of anxiety is Dasein equipped with authentic understanding
but unable to enact it. In order to achieve authentic

and

genuine under-
standing Dasein must be resolute, which allows it to act with a sight which
is related primarily and on the whole to existence, which Heidegger calls
transparency or perspicuity (

Durchsichtigkeit

) (

BT

, p. 186;

SZ

, p. 146).
Death and anxiety are both conditions in which action is ruled out, in which
Dasein is unable to be.
A similar interpretation is proposed by Blattner (1994). He bases his
rejection of the idea that death in

Being and Time

is the ending of ones life
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

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on a careful analysis of Heideggers concept of possibility. This, in turn,
justifies the seemingly paradoxical view that death is a way to be in which
Dasein is unable to be (1994: p. 49). On Blattners view, death is a condi-
tion in which Daseins being is at issue, but in which Dasein is anxiously
unable to understand itself by projecting itself into some possible way to be
(p. 50). This is so because Heidegger defines death as a possibility (of
impossibility); this possibility is not a theoretical or logical concept, but an

existentiale

.
Possibility does not mean a free-floating ability-to-be. Rather, possibility
always involves an affective or motivational understanding, which requires
Dasein already to take up an attitude towards a certain possibility, already
to be caught up in concrete possibilities, rather than abstractly contemplate
them (

BT

, p. 183;

SZ

, p. 144). On Blattners reading, in anxiety all possibil-
ities become equally irrelevant for Dasein, and although it still

is

, it is

unable to be

in the thick sense of throwing oneself into a definite possibility.
Blattner concludes that in anxiety Dasein is, but is unable to be (it is unable
to press into possibilities), and this matches Heideggers characterization of
death as the possibility of impossibility (1994: p. 62).
Dreyfus and Blattner both understand anxiety as an extreme case of
breakdown of Daseins world (Dreyfus, 2005: pp. xixxx).

2

Both point to an
experience of complete helplessness, of finitude, as the ontological break-
down Heidegger calls death. If we look at Dreyfus most recent formulation
of what Heidegger means by death, we find the view that death is the struc-
tural condition that an individuals identity can always be lost. Dying is the
resigned, heroic acceptance of this condition (2005: p. xxx). This formula-
tion is close to Blattners idea of death as being unable to be anything; or in
Dreyfus terms, losing ones identity.
Dreyfus and Blattner have offered what I take to be the most coherent
interpretation of the difficult passages on death found in

Being and Time

.
The view that death is the inability to be, in the thick sense of being as press-
ing into possibility, and that this constant threat of loss of identity delineates
Daseins existence, I refer to as the Dreyfus/Blattner view.

3

Crucially the Dreyfus/Blattner view states that death is neither demise
nor authentic demise, contrary to what Edwards and Philipse believe. When
Heidegger discusses death, being-towards-death and anxiety, he is not
referring to physical death or to our attitude towards physical death. In this
respect the Dreyfus/Blattner view is clearly correct. This position shows that
the Edwards/Philipse criticism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the text.

The Incompleteness of the Dreyfus/Blattner Interpretation

But the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation is incomplete. I add to it a notion of

temporal

finitude, which I take to be an essential aspect or a prototypical
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TEMPORAL FINITUDE AND FINITUDE OF POSSIBILITY

547
state of being unable to be. I believe that the Dreyfus/Blattner interpreta-
tion needs this additional dimension, which provides the otherwise missing
link between death and temporal finitude. Death should be understood as
involving two types of finitude: finitude in possibility and temporal finitude.
The Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation solves local problems in specific
sections of

Being and Time

, at the expense of the overall meaningfulness of
the concept of death. Many central ideas of

Being and Time

only make sense
in relation to Dasein as

temporally

finite. The discussion of temporality and
the phenomenology of our attitudes towards the death of others, the char-
acterization of death as certain and the analysis of other types of ending are
all central elements of

Being and Time

.
These issues cease to make sense if we understand death only through the
Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation, namely, as the condition of being unable
to be that is not linked to Daseins mortality. The Dreyfus/Blattner inter-
pretation solves the problems and contradictions that seem to obfuscate
Heideggers discussion of death, but at the same time their analysis is
incomplete because it lacks the essential notion of temporal finitude that is
so crucial to Division II of

Being and Time

.
I therefore propose to maintain the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation of
death, but add to it a second and related analysis of being-towards-the-end,
or dying, which I designate as

temporal finitude

. This essential element will
enable the emphasis on temporality, historicality and finitude to be main-
tained and linked to Dasein via the notion of death. In what follows I use
the term death as containing both

temporal finitude

and

finitude of possi-
bility

(the Dreyfus/Blattner sense).

4

It is crucial to my interpretation that the
two types of finitude are internally related. They are both essential compo-
nents of the transition to authenticity.
The discussion of being-towards-the-end brings out Daseins mortality
as a structuring principle and central concern (see Leman-Stefanovic, 1987:
p. 6). Being-towards-the-end defines Dasein as finite temporality, as a
constant movement towards its annihilation. Beyond all possible projec-
tions into the future lies the ultimate anticipation of shutting down Daseins
temporal trajectory. Consequently, Daseins end is something that is only
ever impending, but can never be made actual, that is, be experienced by
Dasein. Moreover, whereas other things are possible only at certain times,
Daseins end is possible at every moment. Our end is always and only a
possibility (Mulhall, 2005: p. 303).
In the same way that death was not a possibility in the ordinary sense of
the word, but a possibility of being unable to take up any possibility,
Daseins end is also not a possibility in the ordinary sense. Daseins end is
not a possibility waiting to be realized, but an ontological condition under-
lying Daseins temporal structure. Both are conditions for the meaningful-
ness of all other possibilities and both are limit concepts that define the
boundaries of meaningful experience. Daseins finitude is a fundamental
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

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although ungraspable aspect of its existence that accompanies every
moment of life, making it mortal and finite.
We can now see how finitude of possibility and temporal finitude are
conceptually related. Both define the end or limitation of life, and as limit
concepts they assign significance to life by delineating its confines. Being-
towards-the-end expresses temporal finitude; death (in the Dreyfus/Blattner
sense) is the finitude of possibilities, the helplessness and limitation on what
is achievable within life. The concepts are also related through the concept
of anxiety. Anxiety is the state of being dead (in the Dreyfus/Blattner sense);
it is also the affective state that discloses Dasein to itself as temporally finite,
as being-towards-the-end.
The question that emerges with respect to these two types of finitude is not
how one ought to die, but how one ought to live knowing that one will die,
taking into account both mortality and finitude. Our relation to our death is
not something that is realized when we die, but something we either realize
or fail to realize in our life (Mulhall, 2005: p. 303). Confronting life as Daseins
ownmost possibility requires Dasein to acknowledge that its being is always
an issue for it, that its life is something for which it is responsible, that it is
its own to live (or to disown) (ibid., p. 306). Because death could come at any
moment, the radical contingency of each individual life becomes apparent,
and to acknowledge this is to acknowledge finitude, the fact that our exist-
ence has conditions or limits, that it is neither self-originating nor self-
grounding nor self-sufficient, that it is contingent from top to bottom (ibid.;
see also Hatab, 1995: p. 411).

Addressing the Criticisms

With this explication in mind, let us now assess the Edwards/Philipse
critique. As I said, two key distinctions are lacking from Edwards and
Philipses interpretations. The first is the distinction between death and
demise, which was explained above. The second is the specific sense
Heidegger gives the term possibility (he defines death as the possibility of
impossibility), which was briefly discussed earlier and to which we now
return.
Edwards maintains that Heidegger uses the term possibility in a special,
technical sense throughout

Being and Time

,

except

when talking about death,
and that this is, naturally, confusing (1975: p. 549). Edwards understands the
technical sense of possibility as an action or strategy or a mode of life
(p. 550), so the notion of death as possibility, death as an action or mode of
living, seems puzzling, indeed a contradiction. This contradiction is also the
starting point of Blattners analysis, but, as explained above, Blattner
resolves the apparent paradox by reinterpreting death as the situation of
anxiety, while Edwards searches for an alternative meaning of the term
possibility when applied to death.
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549
As Edwards correctly points out, Heidegger explicitly rules out three
possible misunderstandings of the term being-towards-death as being-
towards-a-possibility. Death is not a possibility that can be actualized.
Death does not call for brooding (

grbeln

). Nor should we expect death,
because expecting (

erwarten

) is essentially a waiting for actualization. The
correct attitude is one of forerunning or anticipation (

vorlaufen

) in which
death is understood as the possibility of impossibility, as utter nullity. For
Edwards, who insists on possibility being understood as not actual, the
possibility of impossibility is simply impossibility

per se

(1975: p. 558).
Edwards rejects the existential meaning of possibility when he points out
that Heidegger juxtaposes possibility with actuality. He calls this an incom-
plete disjunction because on his view death (and non-existence before
birth) is total absence, and therefore neither a possibility nor an actuality at
all (pp. 5601). But Heidegger is clear in his formulation: death is a possibil-
ity. As Blattner shows, death is not non-existence but existence without the
ability to press into any specific possibility. This explains Heideggers seem-
ingly baffling definition of death as the possibility of impossibility and why
Edwards critique is unjustified.
In Heideggers sense, death is not complete absence (this is the conse-
quence of demise), but a peculiar situation in which Dasein is unable to take
up any possibility and is therefore lacking the ability to act. Possibility has
the fixed meaning it has throughout

Being and Time

, but death does not
mean being dead, but

being unable to be

in the sense proposed by Blattner
and Dreyfus. This addresses Edwards dismissal of the formulation as
nonsensical.
Philipse takes a different tack. He chooses to redefine possibility as
knowing that one will die at the end (1998: pp. 362f.). This, Philipse feels,
amounts to merely stating familiar facts, couched in pretentious and fantas-
tically misleading language (p. 362, grammar modified). But death does not
mean the knowledge of our mortality, but the situation of anxiety, of being
unable to be anything, and this is indeed a possibility. So Philipses criticism
depends on his mis-defining death.
As shown by Blattner, death can coherently be seen as possibility if we
distinguish death and demise, something both Philipse and Edwards fail to
do. Additionally, as Blattner argues, dying is not Heideggers term for
Daseins understanding of its

demise

, but of its

death. Heidegger defines
dying as that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death (BT, p. 291;
SZ, p. 247, my italics). Therefore Heidegger is not making the trivial point
Philipse attributes to him.
Philipse further argues that death is not available for phenomenological
scrutiny and that in order to address this problem Heidegger redefines
dying as knowing that one will die. But dying is not an epistemic condition
of Dasein (i.e. the knowledge that it will die), but its ontological structure
(the fact that it is temporally finite). The significant feature of dying is that
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Dasein is in fact progressing towards its end. Dasein is temporally finite. As
Heidegger says, Dasein does not have an end at which it just stops, it exists
finitely (BT, p. 378; SZ, p. 329). It is also unique in being the only kind of
entity that is capable of interpreting itself as finite. The second claim is
entirely reliant on the first, so Philipses epistemic interpretation of dying
obscures the more fundamental ontological claim, as well as blurring the
distinction between factuality and facticity discussed earlier.
Nor does Heidegger claim that demise is significant for a phenomenolog-
ical investigation of death, as he explicitly states and as many commentators
point out (Leman-Stefanovic (1987); Dastur (1996); Mulhall (2005)).
Demise is phenomenologically opaque: we cannot experience our demise
or that of others (BT, p. 291; SZ, p. 247 and BT, p. 282; SZ, pp. 2389).
Death, on the other hand, is a phenomenon of life and as such is phenom-
enologically available (BT, p. 290; SZ, p. 246; and see also Heidegger, 2000:
p. 139; 1983: p. 100).
The second criticism was that Heideggers definition of death as ownmost
is trivial. Philipse defines ownmost as most on our own, and death as the
terminal phase of ones life, the phase of dying, and then argues that
Heideggers claim is at best trivial, if we redefine dying on ones own as just
dying. At worst it is false because it is never true that everyone dies alone
in any sense of the word (1998: p. 355). Philipse ignores Heideggers explicit
claim that death is not the terminal phase of ones life, which Heidegger
calls demise.
Furthermore, Philipses interpretation of ownmost (eigenst) as most on
our own is misleading and would not make sense in many of the other
places in Being and Time in which Heidegger uses this term, most clearly
when he talks about death as Daseins ownmost possibility (BT, p. 294; SZ,
p. 250). Most our own is more appropriate, because Heidegger is not trying
to pick out the ontic possibility of being alone in a certain situation, but the
ontological transition that takes place when Dasein is wrenched away from
its world, individuated by its death.
The non-relational character of death is not expressed in a sense of lone-
liness at the time of demise, but in the loss of the network of significance that
makes up Daseins world, a loss that is experienced in anxiety. Philipse
misunderstands the characterization of death as individuating as making
Dasein feel lonely, whereas for Heidegger individuation removes Dasein
from its world, curtails its links to intelligibility and absorption. This de-
contextualizing is an ontological, not an affective, state.
Philipse then turns to a second interpretation of the statement that death
is our ownmost possibility, understanding death as the moment of our high-
est fulfilment, or an excellent possibility of Dasein (p. 356, italics in the
original). The translation of ausgezeichnet as excellent is unhelpful and
misleading. Edwards makes a similar point by suggesting splendid or
distinguished while criticizing the Maquarrie and Robinson translation of
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TEMPORAL FINITUDE AND FINITUDE OF POSSIBILITY
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ausgezeichnet as distinctive as weak and inaccurate (1975: p. 551, and cf.
Stambaugh, who uses eminent). Attributing this death-fetishizing view to
Heidegger, who explicitly resists a teleological view of Daseins death as
fulfilment, ripening or exhausting of possibilities, is even less convincing. As
Heidegger states, for the most part Dasein ends unfulfilled (BT, p. 288; SZ,
p. 244). Neither death nor demise is seen as a fulfilment or culmination of
Daseins existence.
Philipse also runs together death and demise. In the above passage
Heidegger does not mention demise, but speaks of being-towards-the-end
(Ende). A little later he stipulates: Let the term dying stand for that way
of Being in which Dasein is towards its death. Dasein can demise only as
long as it is dying (BT, p. 291; SZ, p. 247). Demise is enabled by, and not
identical with, dying.
The third criticism is directed against Heideggers statement that death is
non-substitutable (BT, p. 284; SZ, p. 240). Philipse thinks that this claim is
an empirical platitude (p. 358). But this statement is neither empirical nor
self-evident. Heidegger is not making the trivial claim that every Dasein
must eventually physically cease to be alive. Rather, he is spelling out the
ontological structure of Dasein as finite in the sense of not having possibili-
ties of its own, or being the null basis of a nullity (BT, p. 331; SZ, p. 285).
Thus Philipses claim that non-substitutability characterizes not only
death but also all bodily functions is irrelevant, because death is not a bodily
event. Heidegger is treating death as an ontological condition. As such it is
non-substitutable, but it also has additional features, such as being an
ownmost possibility that is not to be outstripped, which are absent in other
bodily functions. Non-substitutability is a necessary but insufficient condi-
tion of death. Although it is true that no one can sneeze my sneezes, sneez-
ing fails to match up to the two other elements in Heideggers tripartite
existential characterization of death (Mulhall, 2005: pp. 3034).
We can understand ownmost in either an analytic or an existential sense.
The analytic sense is simply the fact that when I have a sensation or percep-
tion they are mine; they belong to me by definition. The existential sense of
ownmost is different. It is the condition of owning up to or taking responsi-
bility for something. It is the existential significance that is required for a
correct understanding of the term ownmost.
A further argument can be made even under Philipses mistaken interpre-
tation of demise as non-substitutable. Philipse is correct in saying that all
bodily functions are non-substitutable. It is also true, as Philipse and many
other commentators before him point out, that this fact is suppressed in
Being and Time because it lacks a discussion of embodiment (Philipse, 1998:
p. 360; Levinas, 1969, pp. 125ff.; Chanter, 2001: pp. 78ff.; Carman, 1994:
p. 215; Taminiaux, 1997: p. 45). But this does not render insignificant the fact
that demise is non-substitutable. Carman argues that Philipse plays down the
importance of death by assimilating it to what Philipse takes to be trivial
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
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mental and bodily analogues. But this attempt fails, Carman says, because
there is nothing trivial about the mineness of bodily and mental phenomena
(2003: p. 277n.).
5
Indeed, demise and birth are the most significant of bodily
events: the founding and closing off of a life. Their significance is not fully
captured in the trivial analytic sense of mineness suggested by Philipse, but
only in the existential sense.
Heidegger is not trying to separate demise from other first-person
processes; rather, he wants to contrast the non-substitutable character of
death to social roles, which are substitutable.
6
Philipses next argument is
therefore directed at this view of social roles as entirely public, or substitut-
able. Philipse argues contra Heidegger and Dreyfus that the substitutability
of social roles does not hold. If behaviour is not only determined by rules
and roles but also by idiosyncratic features genetic make-up, personal
history, etc. then the view that no possibility of existing can be exclusively
my own is unsupported (1998: p. 361). This is not only another way of attack-
ing Heideggers singling out of death, but also a critique of Heideggers
alleged claim that existence is always inauthentic, except when we relate
ourselves properly to our own death.
Philipse attributes to Heidegger a view he does not hold. Heidegger does
not claim that existence is always inauthentic except when Dasein relates
properly to its death, but that authentic existence depends on its under-
standing itself as ultimately groundless (BT, pp. 330ff.; SZ, pp. 284ff.). It is
not the case that the only situation in which authenticity is possible is one of
relating to death. Rather, once Dasein has faced its finitude and has grasped
its groundlessness, it can be authentic in any situation. Dreyfus emphasizes
this in his discussion of genuine authenticity, in which Dasein is absorbed in
its world.
Additionally Philipse equates authenticity with idiosyncrasy, or in other
words, he juxtaposes Daseins social dimension with authenticity. This view
contradicts the later sections of Division II, where the possibility of an authen-
tic community is presented (BT, SZ, 74). It is also not what Dreyfus holds
in his interpretation of das Man as the neutral background of social practices.
Philipses emphasis on the self as the kernel or source of authenticity only
makes sense within an interpretation that takes the self to be such a source.
Dreyfus (1995) squarely rejects this interpretation.
7
It also distorts Heideg-
gers view, which emphasizes Daseins inherently relational character.
Finally, what is at stake in being or not being ones own is not behaviour,
as Philipse thinks, but the significance of the behaviour, its uptake as social
role. Roles and behaviours are very different, so the idiosyncratic element
Philipse brings up as counter-example to Dreyfus claim that no possibility
can be entirely my own pertains to behaviour but not to role and is therefore
irrelevant. A particular way of existing can by no means be reduced to
behaviour alone, because behaviour without interpretation, without a rich
network of meaning and intelligibility, is hermeneutically meaningless.
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TEMPORAL FINITUDE AND FINITUDE OF POSSIBILITY
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Dreyfus point is to show that behaviour is only intelligible within such a
network. So although Dreyfus opposes the mentalistic language which
certain interpretations impose on Heidegger, he is certainly not endorsing a
bald behaviourist view.
8,9
The Edwards/Philipse fourth and final objection has to do with the
tension between the possibility of an afterlife and the finality of death. They
claim that if Heidegger wants to leave open the question of an afterlife, he
cannot claim that ontologically death is the end of all possibility, since this
claim rules out the ontic possibility of an afterlife. If he wants to claim that
it is indeed the final point, he cannot claim that his analysis is compatible
with any notion of afterlife.
This argument over-determines Heideggers position. What is final, in
Heideggers view, is being-in-the-world, which indeed ends with Daseins
demise. The possibility of another kind of existence, i.e. non-embodied or
extra-worldly, does not have to be denied or indeed settled at all. Daseins
existence as being-in-the-world comes to an end with its demise; all notions
of an afterlife agree on this point. An afterlife, if it exists, does not take place
in the world by an embodied entity (see also Polt, 1999: p. 87). Therefore in
order to argue that Dasein ceases to exist, Heidegger does not need to deny
the possibility of an afterlife, and can indeed claim that this is a moot point.
The Edwards/Philipse critique ignores important dimensions of
Heideggers analysis. Neither discusses Heideggers notion of temporality
as ecstatic unity, or places the death analysis within the broader context of
Being and Time. Similarly, Heideggers emphasis on Daseins understand-
ing of itself as finite is conceived as trivial at best. Both fail to distinguish
between death and demise and consequently read the discussion of death
as a discussion of demise. Both fail to appreciate Heideggers unique use
of the term possibility and therefore attribute to him a contradictory
position. For these reasons they overlook Heideggers significant formula-
tion of death as both temporal finitude and the finitude of possibilities.
Conclusion
Heideggers concept of death has been widely misunderstood and misin-
terpreted. These misinterpretations are the basis of criticisms of the
concept which are ultimately unjustified. I have proposed a new reading of
Heideggers concept of death that overcomes the criticisms, suggesting that
the concept refers to two kinds of finitude: temporal finitude and finitude
of possibility. I have shown why the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation is
insufficient on its own and how the combination of the two kinds of fini-
tude provides a comprehensive and robust notion of death that is no
longer susceptible to the Edwards/Philipse criticisms.
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
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Notes
1 Philipse and Edwards make a few additional minor criticisms, but these will not
be addressed here for reasons of space and because they are inessential and
derived from the main criticisms discussed here. For the full critical account see
Philipse (1998) and Edwards (1975, 1979).
2 Dreyfus stresses the difference between his account and Blattners and criticizes
the latters understanding of being-towards-death as being ready for an anxiety
attack (2005: pp. xx, xxx; 2000: p. 333). As Dreyfus notes, since an anxiety attack
is sudden and unmotivated it is hard to see how one should live in order to be
ready for it. Blattner does not even try to explain what a life of readiness for an
anxiety attack would be like (2005: p. xix). He goes on to say that it is not clear
that Heidegger holds that Dasein can be ready for this kind of attack, and more-
over, that anticipatory or forerunning (vorlaufen) resoluteness is already
constantly anxious (ibid.). In other words, if authentic Dasein is constantly
anxious, it need not be ready for an anxiety attack. Dreyfus further suggests that
an anxiety attack is the nearest experience an inauthentic Dasein can have to
death.
3 I deliberately bracket their disagreement about anxiety and forerunning reso-
luteness as the state of preparedness for such an attack, because I do not think
that this specific issue is the central one; nor is it the strongest aspect of Blattners
view.
4 Polt suggests the term mortality (1999: p. 86). The problem with this term is that
it does not designate the end of Daseins life, but the condition of being finite.
5 Carman adds: indeed failing to take seriously the first/third-person asymmetries
constituting [bodily and mental phenomena] is sure to yield profound philosoph-
ical confusion (2003: p. 277n.).
6 Dreyfus thinks that mineness does not apply to private feelings or sensations, but
to Daseins public stand on itself (1991: p. 26). This leaves statements about
death as Daseins ownmost unintelligible. If Daseins mineness is the public
stand it takes on itself (ibid.), what does the mineness of death, the most non-
public condition of Dasein, mean? Dreyfus also criticizes John Haugelands
(1982) broad interpretation of Dasein, pointing out that for Heidegger Dasein
designates exclusively entities like each of us, that is, individual persons (ibid.,
p. 14). This makes the question even more pertinent, as one clear mark of indi-
vidual persons is their being a finite organic unit. For a critique of Haugelands
view see Stewart (1987).
7 See also Dreyfus (1995) exchange with Carman (1994) and Olafson (1994a,
1994b) in Inquiry, and Ewings (1995) response to Dreyfus.
8 For two social behaviourist views see Brandom (1983) and Haugeland (1982).
For a critique of this approach see Stewart (1987), especially p. 96n.
9 Many complex questions arise, though, from this objection. What is das Man?
What is the nature of social roles? What is the relationship between authentic-
ity and sociality? These questions stem mainly from the overlap of two exis-
tentiales that are meant to account for the social aspect of Dasein: das Man
and Mitsein. Heidegger does not work out the relationship between the two in
Being and Time, and the interpretation of this relationship remains a difficult
problem to this day. Moreover, he does not mention the term das Man in
other work from the same period. It is notably absent from The Basic Prob-
lems of Phenomenology, although naturally it appears in the earlier History of
the Concept of Time, a lecture series given in 1925 that is an earlier version of
Being and Time. Nor does he return to the notion in later writing, a fact that
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some interpreters took to signify a rejection of this concept (Olafson, 1994a, p.
55). I discuss this issue elsewhere (Carel, 2006).
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