Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No.

L-35512
The parties in this case contest the ownership of a parcel of land situated in Barrio
Valencia, Ormoc City. Herein petitioners maintain that the land is public land by virtue of a
1940 cadastral court decision. Private respondents meanwhile take the opposite view
claiming the land as their own based on their purchase thereof from the original claimant,
Apolonia Parrilla, and its subsequent adjudication in their favor in 1972. The facts are
undisputed. On October 31, 1940, a decision was rendered by the Cadastral Court declaring
Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land.
Thirty-two years later, more specifically on January 12,1972, Felipe Adolfo and Francisca
Padilla, hereinafter referred to as the SPOUSES, filed a petition docketed as Cadastral Case
No. 34, GLRO Rec. No. 1789 seeking to "re-open the October 31, 1940 decision of the
Cadastral Court under Rep. Act No. 931, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2061 and further
amended by Rep. Act No. 6236" [Petition, Annex "B," Rollo, p. 9]. The SPOUSES, claiming to
be the owners of Lot No. 8423 by virtue of having purchased the same in 1948 as evidenced
by a Deed of Quitclaim and Confirmation dated August 28, 1969, likewise allege that due to
the excusable negligence, accident or mistake of the previous claimant and her counsel, the
land was declared public land; that they and their predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the land and have declared the same
for purposes of taxation in their name(s); that Lot No. 8423 has not been alienated,
reserved, leased, granted or otherwise disposed of either provisionally or permanently by
the government or its entity; and that up to the filing of the petition, they and their
predecessor-in-interest have not applied for any homestead, free patent, lease or sale, over
the parcel of land under Public Land Act No. 141. Despite the opposition of the Director of
Lands respondent Judge granted the SPOUSES' petition on May 9, 1972. Hence, Lot No.
8423 was adjudicated in their favor.
ISSUE: The petitioners' stance that the lower court is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition to re-open the cadastral proceedings is premised on their
argument that SPOUSES' petition is barred by the expiration of the period for re-opening of
cadastral proceedings under Rep. Act No. 931. They argue that said period expired on
December 31, 1968 and was never extended.
HELD: The lower court has no jurisdiction. This law took effect on June 20, 1953, hence, the
period for reopening cadastral proceedings expired on June 20, 1958. However, Rep. Act
No. 2061

section 2 extended this period until December 31, 1968, after which there had
been no further extension. [Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35780, January 27, 1983,120
SCRA 220].
In the case at bar, the SPOUSES filed their petition more than three years after the lapse of
the reglementary period required by the law. The period having expired, respondent judge
was without jurisdiction when he entertained SPOUSES' petition to re-open the decision of
the cadastral court.
Hermosilla vs. Remoquillo G.R. No. 167320
Petitioners Heirs of Salvador Hermosilla, namely: Adelaida H. Dolleton,
Ruben Hermosilla, Lolita H. de la
Vega, Erlinda H. Inovio, Celia
]
H. Vivit, Zenaida H.Achoy, Precilla H. Limpiahoy, and
Edgardo Hermosilla, assail the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 29, 2004 which
reversed the trial courts decision in their favor and accordingly dismissed their
complaint.Subject of the controversy is a 65-square meter portion of a lot located
in Poblacion, San Pedro, Laguna. On August 31, 1931, the Republic of
the Philippines acquired through purchase the San Pedro Tunasan Homesite.

Apolinario Hermosilla (Apolinario), who was occupying a lot in San
Pedro Tunasan Homesite until his death in 1964, caused the subdivision of the lot into two,
Lot 12 with an area of 341 square meters, and Lot 19 with an area of 341 square meters of
which the 65 square meters subject of this controversy form part.On April 30,
1962, Apolinario executed a Deed of Assignment transferring possession of Lot 19 in favor
of his grandson, herein respondent Jaime Remoquillo (Jaime). As the Land Tenure
Administration (LTA) later found that Lot 19 was still available for disposition to qualified
applicants, Jaime, being its actual occupant, applied for its acquisition before the LTA
on May 10, 1963.

On July 8, 1963, Apolinario conveyed Lot 12 to his son
Salvador Hermosilla (Salvador), Jaimes uncle.
Salvador later filed an application to purchase Lot 12 which was awarded to him by
the defunct Land Authority on December 16, 1971. On February 10, 1972, Jaime and his
uncle Salvador forged a
Kasunduan ng Paglipat Ng Karapatan sa Isang Lagay na Lupang Solar (Kasunduan)
whereby Jaime transferred ownership of the 65 square meters (the questioned property)
in favor of Salvador.

After Apolinario died, his daughter Angela Hermosilla filed a protest before the Land
Authority, which became the National Housing Authority (NHA) contending that as an heir
of the deceased, she is also entitled to Lots 12 and 19. By Resolution of June 10, 1981, the
NHA dismissed the protest. The NHA later awarded on March 16, 1986 Lot 19 to Jaime for
which he and his wife were issued a title, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-156296,
on September 15, 1987. On May 25, 1992, petitioners filed an action for Annulment of Title
on the ground of fraud with damages against Jaime and his spouse, together with the
Register of Deeds, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, alleging that by
virtue of the Kasunduan executed in 1972, Jaime had conveyed to his uncle Salvador the
questioned propertypart of Lot 19 covered by TCT No. T-156296 which was issued in
1987.

By Decision of May 11, 1999, the RTC of Bian, Laguna, Branch 25, found
the Kasunduan a perfected contract of sale, there being a meeting of the minds upon an
identified object and upon a specific price, and that ownership over the questioned
property had already been transferred and delivered to Salvador.On the alleged failure of
consideration of the Kasunduan, the trial court held that the same did not render the
contract void, but merely allowed an action for specific performance.

ISSUE: The application of the law on prescription would perpetrate fraud and spawn
injustice, they citing Cometa v. Court of Appeals; and that at any rate, prescription does not
lie against a co-owner.
HELD: Petitioners contention that prescription does not lie against a co-owner fails
because only the title covering the questioned property, which petitioners claim to solely
own, is being assailed. From the allegations of the Complaint, petitioners seek
the reconveyance of the property based on implied trust. The prescriptive period for
the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned from the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title if the plaintiff is not in possession,
but imprescriptible if he is in possession of the property. It is undisputed that petitioners
houses occupy the questioned property and that respondents have not been in possession
thereof. Since there was no actual need to reconvey the property as petitioners remained
in possession thereof, the action took the nature of a suit for quieting of title, it having been
filed to enforce an alleged implied trust after Jaime refused to segregate title
over Lot 19. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right. From the body of the complaint, this type of action
denotes imprescriptibility.

As priorly stated, however, when the Kasunduan was executed in 1972 by Jaime in
favor of Salvador petitioners predecessor-in-interest Lot 19, of which the questioned
property forms part, was still owned by the Republic. Nemo dat quod non habet. Nobody
can give what he does not possess. Jaime could not thus have transferred anything
to Salvador via the Kasunduan.

PNB vs. CA 187 SCRA 735
This is a petition for review of the decision dated February 27, 1976 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, dated February
27, 1970 which declared as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-1439 in the name of Felisa Boyano, ordered its cancellation and the reinstatement of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1412 of the private respondent, Chu Kim Kit.
On September 6, 1968, Chu Kim Kit, represented by his uncle, Chu Tong U ,filed in the Court
of First Instance of Leyte against Felisa Boyano an action for cancellation of the latter's
Certificate of Title No. T-1439. The complaint alleged that Chu Kim Kit, a Chinese national
and son of defendant Boyano, is the absolute owner of a commercial lot and building on
Rizal Avenue, Tacloban City, registered in his name under TCT No.
T-1412 of the Registry of Deeds of Tacloban City; that in 1945, Chu Kim Kit went to
mainland China; that he was prevented from returning to the Philippines when the
Communists took over mainland China; that through letters, he requested Chu Tong U to
take care of his aforementioned property; that although defendant Boyano was aware that
her son was still alive, she executed an affidavit on May 21, 1963, alleging that he had died
and adjudicating to herself, as his sole heir, the above-described property; that by means of
said affidavit of adjudication, she was able to obtain Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
in her name; that she thereafter mortgaged the property to the Philippine National Bank,
Tacloban Branch, to secure a loan of P25,000; and that she is about to dispose of the
property.
On October 11, 1968, the defendant filed her answer, admitting that Chu Kim Kit was still
alive but she alleged that she signed the affidavit of adjudication without having read its
contents, the same being written in English which she does not understand. As affirmative
defense, she alleged that plaintiff Chu Tong U is not the real party in interest, being only an
uncle of Chu Kim Kit and co-heir to his estate. Lucy Perez and the Philippine National Bank,
as mortgagees, were allowed by the trial court to intervene in the action.On February 27,
1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Can a mortgagee rely only on the certificate of title in good faith.
HELD: A mortgagee had the right to rely on what appeared on the certificate of title, and in
the absence of anything to excite suspicion, it was under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of the certificate
The right or lien of an innocent mortgagee for value upon the land mortgaged must be
respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained his title through fraud. The
remedy of the persons prejudiced is an action for damages against the persons who caused
the fraud, and if the latter be insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines
may be filed for recovery for damages from the Assurance fund.


This is an appeal from two orders dated July 31, 1959 and September 12, 1959, both of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio, presiding, rendered in
Land Registration Case No. N-564; G.L.R. Rec. No. N-7544, entitled "Jose O. Duran and
Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran, applicants, versus Bernabe Olivia, Fe Almazan, Heirs of Vicente
Godesano, Manuel Arce and Esperanza Salud, oppositors." The order of July 31, 1959 is for
the dismissal of the land registration case for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court with
respect to Lots Nos. 3, 6, 7, 9 and 15, and that dated September 12, 1959 with respect to
Lots Nos. 12 and 16.
Duran vs. Olivia 3 SCRA 154
On December 3, 1952, Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran filed an application for
the registration in their names of sixteen lots (denominated in said application as Lots Nos.
1 to 16, inclusive) under Plan PSU-128386 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.
On April 20, 1954, the case was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed
their opposition to the application. On August 27, 1958, the oppositors filed a motion to
dismiss the application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree
registration of the lots respectively claimed by them, because said lots are already
registered and certificates of title have been issued thereon in their names. They attached
to the motion to dismiss the following: Original Certificate of Title No. 2342, in the name of
Bernabe Olivia (covering Lot 6); Original Certificate of Title No. 2343, in the name of Fe
Almazan (covering Lot 7); Original Certificate of Title No. 514, in the name of Manuel Arce
(covering Lots Nos. 9 and 15); Original Certificate of Title No. 433, in the name of
Esperanza Salud (covering Lot No. 16); and Original Certificate of Title No. 7439, in the
name of Heirs of Florencio Godesano (covering Lots Nos. 3 and 12). The applicants filed
their objection to said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not
appear in the application but are mere assertions of the parties and that the trial court has
jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof are
already covered by certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the
oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered successively the
two orders of dismissal appealed from.
ISSUE: Can oppositors-appellees not avail of a motion to dismiss in a land registration case
and that the application and the titles do not show similar identities between the lots
covered by said titles and those applied for in these proceedings.
HELD: The first assignment of error cannot be sustained. By express provision of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral
cases in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay v. The
Director of Lands, Vol. 53 O.G. p. 161). The Land Registration Act does not provide for a
pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is
necessary for the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion contained
in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties in this case.
With respect to the alleged failure of the oppositors-appellees to prove similar identities of
the lots covered by the titles and those applied for, We have examined the certificates of
title and the application, and We concur with the finding of the trial court that the lots
covered by said titles are the same as some of those applied for by the appellants. We,
therefore, find no justification for reversing the orders appealed from based only upon the
first assignment of error.

Avila vs. Tapucar G.R. No. L-45947
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a parcel of land situated at
Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte, which is more particularly described as
follows:A parcel of coconut land containing an area of 1.8340 has. (now reduced to 1.3485
due to road) covered by Tax Dec. No. 270, bounded on the North by Anastacio Luyahan, on
the East and South by Tabangao Creek and on the West by Tomas Colon, assessed in the
amount of P330.00 and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 5461 of even year.
In 1965, said property was inherited by private respondents Julito Bahan, Cristina Bahan-
Panis, Lucita Carters, Boy Cartera and Candelaria Bahan-Mendoza as successors-in-interest.
On October 11, 1960, petitioner Magdalena Avila (then Mrs. Magdalena R. Vda. de Leon)
bought a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte, containing
an area of 4,371 square meters more or less from Luis Cabalan and his wife under a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and under Tax Declaration No. 3055.
On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan filed Free
Patent Application No. (IX-2) 10144 for an area of 2.2400 hectares of Lot No. 2383, Pls-736
which lot has a total area of 6.9027 hectares in its entirety. Deputy Public Land Inspector
Francisco C. Baylen in his report, dated November 28, 1971 stated that the heirs of Pedro
Bahan represented by Julito Bahan, have cultivated only 2.2500 hectares of land applied for
and consequently, he did not recommend the issuance of the patent. Said report was
erroneously forwarded to the Bureau of Lands by then Acting Assistant District Land
Officer of Butuan City dated December 23, 1971, recommending the issuance of patent
therefor.
In May 1973, private respondent Julito Bahan together with ten persons who were alleged
to be members of the Free Farmers Federation, gathered coconuts from the land purchased
by petitioner Magdalena Avila but was intercepted by the Chief of Police of Tubay, Agusan
del Norte.
On June 27, 1973, private respondents Bahans filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch I
docketed as Civil Case No. 1585 entitled "Julito Bahan, Cristina Bahan-Panis, Lucita Carters,
Boy Carters, Candelaria Bahan-Mendoza, Alfreda Pol, in her own behalf and in behalf of her
minor children: Carmencita, Oscar, Julia, Julita and Gervacio, Jr., all surnamed Bahan versus
Ludovico Avila (Mariano Avila) and Magdalena Avila" alleging that they were the
successors-in-interest of "a parcel of coconut land containing an area of 1.8340 has. (now
reduced to 1.3485 due to the road)" and that sometime in 1968, he discovered that the
northwestern portion of said land containing an area of about 1/3 of a hectare was already
in the possession of the Avilas; and the latter were harvesting the fruits of about 40 coconut
trees found therein. The Bahans prayed that the petitioners Avilas be ordered to pay the
Bahans the sum of not less than P1,800.00 a year from the time they took possession of the
aforesaid property until the possession thereof is restored to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
respondent judge is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction that necessitates the strong hand of certiorari.
HELD: Admittedly, the Bahans are the successors-in-interest of a parcel of coconut land
containing an area of about 1,8340 square meters situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay,
Agusan del Norte. On the other hand, the Avilas are the purchasers for value of a 4,371
square meters lot situated in the same place and are in possession of aforesaid property
since 1960. The Order of January 14, 1974 granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
issued for the purpose of enjoining the Bahans to cease and desist from harvesting the
fruits on the land possessed by the Avilas until the final determination of the suit for
quieting of title between the parties.
The trial judge obviously abused his discretion in dissolving the writ of injunction by
relying on the mere presentation by the Bahans of an Original Certificate of Title in their
names which was secured while the case is on-going and erroneously included lands
claimed by the Avilas, et. al. which were not even applied for by the Bahans. Such
dissolution of the injunctive writ would put the Bahans in an advantageous position over
the Avilas. Respondent judge's pronouncements that the Bahans' title to the property has
become indefeasible and incontestable is a prejudgment and uncalled for inasmuch as the
parties have not as yet finally rested their cases and the trial is still in progress.
It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that "while land registration is a proceeding in rem and
binds the whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens
Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or
oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue
of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included" (Miranda v.
Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 303 [1989] citing Coronel v. IAC, 155 SCRA 270; Ledesma v.
Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, 773; Caragay-Layno v. CA, 133 SCRA 718).
Lam vs. METROBANK G.R. No. 178881

Petitioners Alexander and Julie Lam obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from the respondent
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company. To secure its payment, petitioners executed a deed
of real estate mortgage
]
over their property in Davao City, covered by TCT No. T-
115893. Petitioners were subsequently granted additional loans and signed several
amendments to the real estate mortgage.
]


Petitioners, however, failed to pay the loans; hence, respondent instituted an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding with the Office of the Clerk of Court and the Ex-
OfficioSheriff of Davao, which was granted by the latter. A sheriffs sale was held and the
property was awarded to the respondent as the sole bidder. A Provisional Certificate of
Sale
]
was issued in favor of the respondent on May 20, 1998, and it was registered with the
Registry of Deeds on July 7, 1998.
]


Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption
period. Accordingly, a Final Certificate of Sale in favor of the respondent was executed by
the Sheriff on October 1, 1999.
]
Respondent consolidated its title to the subject property;
thus, TCT No. T-115893 in the name of petitioners was cancelled and TCT No. T-327605
]
in
the name of respondent was issued.

Respondent demanded that petitioners turn over actual possession of the subject
property,
]
but the latter failed and refused to do so. This prompted respondent to file a
Complaint for the issuance of a writ of possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao City, with the case docketed as Other Case No. 097-2001, and raffled to Branch 13.

ISSUE: Is a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex parte and not adversarial.

HELD: It is settled that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public
auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of
the mortgagor to redeem the property, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a
matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a
ministerial function.It is undisputed that herein petitioners failed to redeem the property
within the redemption period and thereafter, ownership was consolidated in favor of
herein respondent and a new certificate of title (TCT No. T-327605) was issued in its
name. Thus, it was a purely ministerial duty for the trial court to issue a writ of possession
in favor of herein respondent upon the latter's filing of a petition.
As to the nature of a petition for a writ of possession, it is well to state that the proceeding
in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial
proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any
person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.
David Enterprises VS Insular Bank of Asia and America G.R. No. 78714
For alleged non-payment of obligations secured by a real estate mortgage executed by
Francisco and Norma David in its favor on July 17, 1980, IBAA instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings. The auction sale was held on August 11, 1980 and the mortgaged
property was sold to IBAA as the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was registered on
August 13, 1990. After one year, no redemption having been effected by the mortgagors,
ownership of the land was consolidated in IBAA and a new certificate of title was issued in
its name on August 23, 1982. On December 30, 1984, IBAA filed a petition for a writ of
possession over the said lot in what was subsequently docketed as LRC No. 145 in the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 41. The petition was granted on January 31,
1985, and the writ prayed for was issued on February 4, 1985.

On May 8, 1986, IBAA filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory injunction with the Court of Appeals questioning Judge Kalalos refusal to issue
the writ of possession and its order of February 12, 1986, denying its second ex parte
motion for reconsideration. In a decision dated November 28, 1986, the respondent court
reversed the trial court and ordered it to issue the writ of possession. 2

A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners counsel at his address
of record at Suite 349 Isabel Building, Espaa, Manila, but remained unclaimed despite
registry notices sent to him on December 3, 1986, December 4, 1986, and December 5,
1986.
Insisting that it had not yet been served with an official copy of the decision of the
respondent court, the petitioner requested from, the clerk of the Court of Appeals a
certified copy thereof, which it received on February 26, 1987. It was only on this date that
the petitioners counsel formally notified the respondent court of his new address at his
residence in Quezon City.
ISSUE:Is the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court was filed
out of time.
HELD: The petitioners counsel was deemed served with a copy of the challenged decision
on December 8, 1986, five days after the first registry notice sent to him on December 3,
1986. The applicable rule is Rule 13, Section 8 of the Rules of Court reading as
follows:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

SEC. 8. Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery.
Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing,
unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5)
days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the
expiration of such time.
The notice was sent to the address of record of the petitioners counsel, Atty. Reynaldo L.
Libanan, which at that time was still Suite 349 Isabel Building, Espaa, Manila. His excuse
for the delay in informing the Court of Appeals of his new address is not satisfactory.
The facts are incontrovertible. The decision of the respondent court was promulgated on
November 28, 1986. Conformably to Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, service
thereof on the petitioner at his address of record was deemed completed on December 8,
1986. The petitioner had 15 days, or until December 23, 1986, within which to file a motion
for reconsideration. The motion was actually filed on March 12, 1987, or 79 days later. The
decision had then long become final and executory and could no longer be disturbed.c On
this justification alone, the present petition can be denied outright.
Sueno vs. LBP G.R. No. 174711
On different occasions, Sueno obtained loans from LBP, the total sum of which
reached P2,500,000.00, as evidenced by the Contracts of Loan
[4]
executed by the parties
on28 February 1996 and 9 October 1996. The loans were secured by Real Estate
Mortgages over two parcels of land (subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) No. T-299900 and No. T-314839 registered in Suenos name and registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City. Subsequently, Sueno incurred default, which
prompted LBP to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the
subject properties,
[5]
and the sale of said properties at a public auction. LBP was the
highest bidder in the auction sale, as shown in the Certificate of Sale
[6]
dated 6 March
2000 in its favor.

Before the expiration on 6 March 2001 of the one-year period for the redemption of
the subject properties, Sueno wrote LBP a letter
[7]
dated 16 February 2001 requesting a
six-month extension of her period to redeem. Upon receipt of Suenos letter, LBP informed
her that she needed to post an initial amount of P115,000.00, so that LBP would not
consolidate the titles to the subject properties in its name. The said amount shall be used
to answer for penalties and surcharges that the Registry of Deeds may impose as a result of
the failure of LBP to consolidate the titles to the subject properties within the required
period.
[8]


In partial compliance with the aforesaid condition, Sueno issued a check on 23
February 2001 in the amount of P50,000.00 with LBP as the payee. Upon receipt of Suenos
partial payment, LBP, in a letter dated 6 March 2001, reiterated its previous condition that
Sueno must post the full amount of P115,000.00 for LBP to approve her request for the
extension of the redemption period. The LBP further warned Sueno that should she fail to
pay the balance of P65,000.00 by 7 March 2001, it would proceed toconsolidate the
ownership of the subject properties in its name. Despite such warning, Sueno failed to
remit the balance of P65,000.00.

Thus, in a letter dated 7 March 2001, LBP denied Suenos request for an extension of
the period to redeem the subject properties, and proceeded to consolidate ownership of
the said properties in its name. Accordingly, TCTs No. 299900 and No. 314839 in Suenos
name were cancelled and were replaced by TCTs No. 411101 and 411102, respectively, in
the name of LBP.

In order to acquire physical possession of the subject properties, LBP filed an Ex
Parte Petition/Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession
[9]
before the RTC, docketed as
LRC Case No. R-2002-551-MK. During the hearing set by the court for the issuance of the
writ, Sueno manifested her Opposition
[10]
thereto on the ground that a novation of the
original obligation was already effected by her and LBP, thereby extending the original
period for the redemption of the subject properties. Therefore, the right of LBP to
consolidate the titles to the subject properties in its name was held in abeyance pending
Suenos exercise of her right of redemption within the extended period.

In a Decision dated 24 January 2003, the RTC recognized the right of LBP to the
possession of the subject properties as the registered owner thereof after having lawfully
acquired the same at the auction sale. It dismissed Suenos opposition to the pending
Petition/Motion for utter lack of merit, since she failed to establish that she and LBP indeed
agreed to extend the redemption period for the subject properties. Hence, the RTC granted
the Petition/Motion of LBP for the issuance of a Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Is there a valid novation entered by the parties for the extension of the redemption
period.

HELD: There was no valid novation. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the
substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or
modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by substituting
another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites are
indispensable: 1. There must be a previous valid obligation; 2. There must be an
agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract; 3. There must be the
extinguishment of the old contract; and 4. There must be the validity of the new contract
The elements of novation clearly do not exist in the instant case. While it is true that
there is a previous valid obligation (i.e., the obligation of LBP to honor Suenos right to
redeem the subject property within a period of one year), such obligation expired at the
same time as the redemption period on 6 March 2001. There is, however, no clear
agreement between the parties to a new contract, again imposing upon LBP the obligation
of honoring Suenos right to redeem the subject properties within an extended period of six
months. Without a new contract, the old contract cannot be considered extinguished.