Sison vs.

People
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986
Evidence; Witnesses; The fact that a witness was argumentative and evasive is not enough reason to reject his testimony if he did
not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony.The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times
by the trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. This is not enough reason to reject Sumilangs
testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony was correctly
given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances.
Same; Same; Except for compelling reasons, the Supreme Court cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of
witnesses.Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering
their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and
non-verbal dimensions of a witness testimony.
Same; Same; The mistake of a witness in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witnessan honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony.Banculos mistake in identifying another
person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. It does not make his whole testimony a falsity.
An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect
senses. In the courts discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect
to the others.
Same; Photographs; The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced.The rule in this
jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified
as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation
or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
Same; Same; The photographer is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has takenthey can also be identified by
any other competent witness who can testify to their exactness and accuracy.The photographer, however, is not the only witness
who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object port rayed
can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court
can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identi-fied by the photographer or by any
other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
Same; Same; Even if the person who took the photographs was not presented to identify them, the use of said photographs by
some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was
not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-
participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of
the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein
and gave reasons for their presence thereat.
Same; Same; Even if the pictures did not record two of the accused hitting the victim, they were unequivocally identified by
witnessestheir denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and
he, although afflicted with hernia, is shown merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the
pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire
sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo,
they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.
Criminal Law; Death in a Tumultuous Affray; Elements.For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established
that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous
manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6)
that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Tumultuous Affray Explained.A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs
between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor is there a reciprocal aggression where one
distinct group picks on one defenseless individual and attacks him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on
him.The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion
may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to
Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no
confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of Superior Strength; The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as
fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and
excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden
to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a
time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers
continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to
save him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they
ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless
victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person being attacked.Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is
no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants safety from any defense the
victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he
was wearing a yellow t-shirt
or because he allegedly flashed the Laban sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well
found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken
by them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
being attacked.
Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated where the attack against the victim was
sudden and spontaneous.The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against Joselito
Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and
spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called Coryistas. It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; There is conspiracy where, at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly
showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim.We find however the existence of
a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose
among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who
among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts
of the others regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
Same; Same; Damages; The reckless disregard for a young persons life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three small
children warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00.The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo
P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he
died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi Arabia.
The reckless disregard for such a young persons life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of
the victim.
Sison vs. People
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor-General for respondents in G.R. Nos. 108280-83 and for plaintiff-appellee in G.R. Nos. 114931-33.
M.M. Lazaro and Associates and Lazaro Law Firm for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 108280-83 and for accused-appellants in G.R.
Nos. 114931-33.
PUNO, J.:

The case before us occurred at a t [Sison vs. People, 250 SCRA 58(1995)]

GUTIERREZ, JR., J :
This petition for review invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court for admitting and giving credence to the
testimony of the vendor regarding the sale of the disputed lot. The testimony is contrary
to the contents of the deed of sale executed by the vendor in favor of the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the private
respondents, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern
portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. She alleged that
they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and refused to surrender the
possession of the same despite demands made by the petitioner. The complaint was
dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo where
the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5055.
While the above appeal was pending, the petitioner instituted another action before the
CFI of Iloilo for recovery and possession of the same property against the private
respondents.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5303. The two cases were tried jointly. After
trial, the court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is rendered, to wit:
a. dismissing the complaints in two cases;
b. declaring defendants except Salvador Anona and Jose Lozada as
owners and lawful possessors of the land in question together with all the
improvements thereon;
c. dismissing the claim for damages of all defendants except that of Jose
Lozada;
d. ordering plaintiff to pay defendant Jose Lozada the sum of P500.00 as
attorney's fees and the amount of P300.00 as litigation expenses; and
e. ordering plaintiff to pay the costs of both proceedings.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter sustained the dismissal of
the cases. Hence, this petition with the petitioner making the following assignments of
errors:
I
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING PAROL
EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER IN ORDER
TO VARY THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE
(EXHIBIT A) ALTHOUGH THE LAND THEREIN IS DESCRIBED AND
DELIMITED BY METES AND BOUNDS AND IdENTIFIED AS LOT NO.
5456 OF LAMBUNAO CADASTRE.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
THEORY OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL THAT THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE DEED OF SALE
(EXHIBIT A) IS LOT NO. 5522 INSTEAD OF LOT NO. 5456 OF THE
LAMBUNAO CADASTRE, THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY BEING THAT THE
DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT A) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE
LEONCIA LASANGUE CAN NOT SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION IN
1950 SINCE IT WAS ALLEGEDLY SOLD IN 1941 BY HER FATHER
EMETERIO LASANGUE.
III
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT CANNOT REFORM THE DEED OF
DEFINITE SALE BY CHANGING ITS SUBJECT MATTER IN THE
ABSENCE OF STRONG, CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND
ON THE STRENGTH OF LONG TESTIMONY OF THE VENDOR AND
ALTHOUGH NO DIRECT ACTION FOR REFORMATION WAS FILED IN
THE COURT OF ORIGIN.
A summary of the facts which brought about the controversy is contained in the findings
of the appellate court:
Plaintiff (petitioner) Victoria Lechugas testified that she bought the land
now subject of this litigation from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a
public "Deed of Absolute Sale" which plaintiff had caused to be registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds; preparatory to the execution of the
deed Exhibit "A", plaintiff had the land segregated from the bigger portion
of 12 hectares owned by Leoncia Lasangue by contracting a private land
surveyor, the Sirilan Surveying Office, to survey the land on December 3,
1950 and establish its boundaries, shape, form and area in accordance
with the said plan which was attached to exhibit A as Annex A thereof.
She also states that she caused the declaration of the said portion of six
hectares subject of Exhibit A in her name beginning the year 1951 under
tax declaration No. 7912, paid taxes on the same land, and has taken
possession of the land through her tenants Jesus Leoncio, Roberta
Losarita and Simeon Guinta, who shared one-half of the produce of the
riceland with her, while she shouldered some of the expenses in
cultivation and seeds, and one-third share in other crops, like coffee
beans, bamboos, coconuts, corn and the like.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff's declaration is corroborated by her tenant Simeon Guinta who
testifies that the land subject of the complaint was worked on by him 1954
when its former tenant, Roberto Lazarita, now deceased, left the land. As
tenant thereof, he planted rice, corn peanuts, coffee, and other minor
products, sharing the same with the owner, plaintiff Victoria Lechugas; that
on June 14, 1958, while witness was plowing Lot A preparatory to rice
planting, defendants entered the land and forced him to stop his work.
Salvador Anona and Carmelita Losa, particularly, told witness that if he
(witness) would sign an affidavit recognizing them as his landlords, they
would allow him to continue plowing the land. On that occasion, Salvador
Anona, David Loza and Jose Loza were carrying unsheathed bolos, which
made this witness very afraid, so much so that he left the land and
reported the matter to Victoria Lechugas who reportedly went to the Chief
of Police of Lambunao to ask the latter to intervene. The advise however
of the chief of police, who responded to the call of plaintiff, was not
heeded by the defendants who stayed adamantly on Lot A and refused to
surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff appropriating the harvest to
themselves. This witness further declares that on June 24, 1958,
defendants entered Lot B of the land in question, situated on the northern
portion, and cut the bamboo poles growing thereof counted by plaintiff's
brother and overseer in the land, Bienvenido Laranja, to be 620 bamboo
poles all in all. Despite the warning of the overseer Laranja, defendants
did not stop cutting the bamboos, and they remained on the land, refusing
to leave the same. To top it all, in June of 1959, defendants, not
contended with just occupying the middle and northern portions of the land
(Lots A and B), grabbed the whole parcel containing six hectares to the
damage and prejudice of herein plaintiff, so that plaintiff was left with no
other recourse but to file Civil Case No. 5303 for ownership, recovery of
possession and damages.
Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the land which plaintiff
bought from Leoncia Lasangue in 1950 as evidenced by the deed exhibit
A, is different from the land now subject of this action, and described in
paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint. To prove this point, defendants called
as their first witness plaintiff herself (pp. 6167, t.s.n., Tuble), to elicit from
her the reason why it was that although her vendor Leoncia Lasangue was
also residing at the municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, plaintiff did not care to
call her to the witness stand to testify regarding the Identity of the land
which she (plaintiff) bought from said vendor Leoncia Lasangue; to which
query witness Lechugas countered that she had tried to call her vendor,
but the latter refused, saying that she (Lasangue) had already testified in
plaintiff's favor in the forcible entry case in the Justice of the Peace Court.
In connection with her testimony regarding the true Identity of the land
plaintiff, as witness of defendants, stated that before the execution of
Exhibit "A" on December 8, 1950 the lot in question was surveyed (on
December 3, 1950) by the Sirilan Surveyor Company after due notice to
the boundary owners including Leoncia Lasangue.
Defendant's evidence in chief, as testified to by Carmelita Lozada (pp.
100-130, t.s.n., Trespeces; pp. 131-192, t.s.n., Tuble) shows that on April
6, 1931 Hugo Loza father of Carmelita Loza and predecessor-in-interest of
the rest of the heirs of herein defendants, (with the exception of Jose Loza
and Salvador Anona) purchased a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor
as evidenced by the deed "Venta Definitiva" (exhibit 3, pp. 49-50, folder of
exhibits). This land, containing 53,327 square meters is bounded on the
north by Ramon Lasangue, on the south by Emeterio Lasangue and
covered by tax declaration No. 7346 (exhibit 3-9, p. 67, Id.) in vendor's
name; that immediately after the sale, Hugo Loza took possession of the
said parcel of land and declared the same in his name (exhibit 3-10, p. 67,
folder of exhibits) starting the year 1935. On March 17, 1941, Hugo Loza
bought from Emeterio Lasangue a parcel of land with an area of four
hectares more or less, adjoining the land he (Loza) had earlier bought
from Victoria Limor, and which sale was duly evidenced by a public
instrument (exhibit 2, pp. 35-36, folder of exhibits). This property had the
following boundaries, to wit: on the north by Eladio Luno, on the south, by
Simeon Lasangue, on the west, by Gregorio Militar and Emeterio
Lasangue and on the east, by Maximo Lasangue and Hipolito Lastica
(exhibit 2, exhibit 2-B, p. 37, Id). After the execution of the deed of sale,
Exhibit 2, Hugo Loza cause the transfer of the declaration in his own name
(tax declaration No. 8832, exh. 2-C, p. 38, Id.) beginning 1945, and started
paying the taxes on the land (exhibits 2-d to 2-i, pp. 39-44, Id.). These two
parcels of land (that purchased by Hugo Loza in 1941 from Emeterio
Lasangue, and a portion of that bought by him from Victoria Limor
sometime in 1931) were consolidated and designated, during the
cadastral survey of Lambunao, Iloilo in 1959 as Lot No. 5456; while the
remaining portion of the lot bought from Victorina Limor, adjoining Lot
5456 on the east, was designated as Lot No. 5515 in the name of the
Heirs of Hugo Loza. Defendants claim that the lot bought by plaintiff from
Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by exhibit A, is situated south of the land
now subject of this action and designated during cadastral survey of
Lambunao as Lot No. 5522, in the name of Victoria Lechugas.
xxx xxx xxx
Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor in exhibit A, testifying for defendants
(pp. 182-115, t.s.n., Tambagan; pp. 69-88, t.s.n., Tuble) declared that
during his lifetime her father, Emeterio Lasangue, owned a parcel of land
in Lambunao, Iloilo, containing an area of 36 hectares; that said Emeterio
Lasangue sold a slice of 4 hectares of this property to Hugo Loza
evidenced by a deed of sale (Exh. 2) dated March 17, 1941; that other
sales were made to other persons, leaving only some twelve hectares out
of the original 36; that these 12 hectares were transferred by her parents
in her (witness) name, being the only child and heir; that on December 8,
1950, she (Leoncia Lasangue) sold six hectares of her inherited property
to Victoria Lechugas under a public instrument (exhibit A) which was
prepared at the instance of Victoria Lechugas and thumbmarked by
herself (the vendor).
Refuting plaintiff's contention that the land sold to her is the very land
under question, vendor Leoncia Lasangue testifies that:
Q. But Victoria Lechugas declared here that, by means of
this document, exhibit 'A', you sold to her this very land in
litigation; while you declared here now that this land in
litigation was not included in the sale you made of another
parcel of land in her favor. What do you say about that?
A. I only sold six (6) hectares to her.
Q. And that was included in this land in litigation?
A. No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you tell her where that land you were selling to her
was situated?
xxx xxx xxx
A. On the South.
Q. South side of what land, of the land in litigation?
A. The land I sold to her is south of the land in litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What portion of these thirty-six (36) hectares of land did
you sell actually, according to your agreement with Victoria
Lechugas, and was it inside the thirty-six (36) hectares of
land or a portion on one of the sides of thirty-six (36)
hectares?
A. It is on the edge of the whole land.
Q. Where is that edge? on the north, east, west or south?
A . This edge. (witness indicating the lower edge of the piece
of paper shown into her)
Q. Do you know what is east, that is, the direction where the
sun rises?
A. I know what is east.
Q. Do you know where the sun sets ?
A. The sun sets on the west.
Q. If you are standing in the middle of your land containing
thirty-six (36) hectares and facing the east, that is, the
direction where the sun rises, where is that portion of land
sold to Victoria Lechugas, on your left, on your right, front of
you or behind you?
A. On my right side. (Witness indicating south). (Testimony
of Leoncia Lasangue, pp. 209-211, rollo) (emphasis
supplied).
On the basis of the above findings and the testimony of vendor Leoncia Lasangue
herself, who although illiterate was able to specifically point out the land which she sold
to the petitioner, the appellate court upheld the trial court's decision except that the deed
of sale (Exhibit A) was declared as not null and void ab initio insofar as Leoncia
Lasangue was concerned because it could pass ownership of the lot in the south known
as Lot No. 5522 of the Lambunao Cadastre which Leoncia Lasangue intended to sell
and actually sold to her vendee, petitioner Victoria Lechugas.
In her first assignment of error, the petitioner contends that the respondent Court had no
legal justification when it subjected the true intent and agreement to parol evidence over
the objection of petitioner and that to impugn a written agreement, the evidence must be
conclusive. Petitioner maintains, moreover, that the respondent Court relied so much on
the testimony of the vendor who did not even file a case for the reformation of Exhibit A.
The contentions are without merit.
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in admitting the
testimony of Leoncia Lasangue. The petitioner claims that Leoncia Lasangue was the
vendor of the disputed land. The petitioner denies that Leoncia Lasangue sold Lot No.
5522 to her. She alleges that this lot was sold to her by one Leonora Lasangue, who,
however, was never presented as witness in any of the proceedings below by herein
petitioner.
As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule
does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against
the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to
the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert
a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. (Francisco on
Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155 citing 32 C.J.S. 79.)
In Horn v. Hansen (57 N.W. 315), the court ruled:
...and the rule therefore applies, that as between parties to a written
agreement, or their privies, parol evidence cannot be received to
contradict or vary its terms. Strangers to a contract are, of course, not
bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the construction of
writings is inapplicable in such cases; and it is relaxed where either one of
the parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written
agreement, and does not claim under or through one who is party to it. In
such case the rule is binding upon neither. ...
In the case of Camacho v. Municipality of Baliuag, 28 Phil. 466, this Court held that
parol evidence which was introduced by the municipality was competent to defeat the
terms of the plaintiff's deed which the latter executed with the Insular Government. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Moreland stated:
It should be noted in the first place, that there is no written instrument
between the plaintiff and the municipality, that is, between the parties to
the action; and there is, therefore, no possibility of the question arising as
to the admissibility of parol evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an
instrument. The written instrument that is, the conveyance on which
plaintiff bases his action was between the Insular Government and the
plaintiff, and not between the municipality and the plaintiff; and therefore,
there can arise, as between the plaintiff and defendant no question
relative to the varying or contradicting the terms of a written instrument
between them ...
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not
applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and
third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria
Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private
respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was
shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot
No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her
first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which
petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale
described the disputed lot instead.
This fact was clearly shown in Lasangue's testimony:
Q. And how did you know that that was the description of the
land that you wanted to sell to Victoria Lechugas?
R. I know that because that land came from me.
S. But how were you able to read the description or do you
know the description?
A. Because, since I do not know how to read and write and
after the document was prepared, she made me sign it. So I
just signed because I do not know how to read.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What explanation did she make to you?
A. She said to me, 'Manang, let us have a document
prepared for you to sign on the land you sold to me.' So,
after the document was prepared, I signed.
Q. Did you tell her where that land you were selling to her
was situated?
xxx xxx xxx
A. On the South.
Q. South side of what land, of the land in litigation?
A. The land I sold to her is south of the land in litigation.
Q. Did you tell her that before preparing the document you
signed?
A. Yes, I told her so because I had confidence in her
because she is my first cousin. (pp. 198-207, rollo)
From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but that Lasangue did not intend
to sell as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.
The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for the reformation of Exhibit "A"
is of no moment. The undisputed fact is that the respondents have timely questioned
the validity of the instrument and have proven that, indeed Exhibit "A" does not reflect
the true intention of the vendor.
There is likewise no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the respondents
changed their theory on appeal.
Respondents, from the very start, had questioned and denied Leoncia Lasangue's
capacity to sell the disputed lot to petitioner. It was their contention that the lot was sold
by Leoncia's father Emeterio Lasangue to their father, Hugo Loza wayback in 1941
while the alleged sale by Leoncia to the petitioner took place only in 1950. In essence,
therefore, the respondents were already attacking the validity of Exhibit "A". Moreover,
although the prior sale of the lot to their father may have been emphasized in their
defenses in the civil cases filed against them by the petitioner in the lower court,
nevertheless in their affirmative defense, the respondents already raised doubt on the
true intention of Leoncia Lasangue in signing Exhibit "A" when they alleged that..."
Leoncia Lasangue, publicly, and in writing repudiated said allegation and pretension of
the plaintiff, to the effect that the parcel of land now in litigation in the present case
"WAS NOT INCLUDED in the sale she executed in favor of the plaintiff ... .
Consequently, petitioner cannot impute grave abuse on the part of the appellate court
and state that it allowed a change of theory by the respondents for the first time on
appeal for in reality, there was no such change.
The third issue raised by the petitioner has no merit. There is strong, clear, and
convincing evidence as to which lot was actually sold to her. We see no reason to
reverse the factual findings of both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals
on this point. The "reformation" which the petitioner questions was, in fact, intended to
favor her. Instead of declaring the deed of sale null and void for all purposes, the Court
upheld its having passed ownership of Lot No. 5522 to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.