IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

- vs -

MARISSA ALEXANDER,

Defendant.


Case No.: 16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
Division: CR-G

The Honorable James Daniel







DEFENDANT MARISSA ALEXANDERS MOTION TO RECONSIDER
THE COURTS MARCH 14, 2012 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT REGARDING AN INCIDENT
ON DECEMBER 30, 2010




BRUCE A. ZIMET, P.A. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
One Financial Plaza & SULLIVAN, LLP
Suite 2612 51 Madison Avenue, 22
nd
Floor
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394 New York, New York 10010
Tel: 954-764-7081 Tel: 212-849-7000
Fax: 954-760-4421 Fax: 212-849-7100
Bruce A. Zimet (Bar No. 225053) Faith Gay (Bar No. 129593)
BAZimetLaw@aol.com FaithGay@quinnemanuel.com


HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP
50 North Laura Street, Suite 3900
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Tel: 904-353-2000
Fax: 904-358-1872
George E. Schulz Jr. (Bar No. 169507)
Buddy.Schulz@hklaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................1
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .............................................................................................3
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................7
IV. ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................................11
A. The December 30 Incident is Not Relevant to Alexanders Self Defense
Claim. .....................................................................................................................11
B. Even If Conduct That Occurred Five Months Later Had Some Relevance,
Which It Does Not, The Prejudice and Confusion Surrounding That
Incident Is More Prejudicial Than Probative and Will Result in a Trial
Within a Trial. ........................................................................................................17
V. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................23


ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Alexander v. State,
121 So. 3d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ...................................................................................... 6
Bozeman v. State,
698 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ...................................................................................... 19
Bush v. State,
690 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) .................................................................................20, 21
Carr v. State,
578 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) .......................................................................................19
Christie v. State,
246 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) ........................................................................................13
Cotita v. State,
381 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) .....................................................................................14
Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683 (1986) .................................................................................................................20
Denmark v. State,
927 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ......................................................................................19
Devonbrook, Inc. v. Lily Lynn (Lilywear), Inc.,
No. 70 CIV. NO. 4687, 1977 WL 921 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1977) ............................................15
Fike v. State,
4 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) ...........................................................................................19
Fla. Bar v. Marable,
645 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1994)...................................................................................................1, 13
Glary v. Israel,
53 So. 3d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) .........................................................................................7
Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319 (2006) ...........................................................................................................20, 21
Jankins v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., Inc.,
21 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................15
Jones v. State,
944 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) .......................................................................................18
Joyner v. State,
4 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) .............................................................................................17
iii

Knox v. State,
361 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) .......................................................................................14
Lavin v. State,
754 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) ..................................................................................12, 13
Mobley v. State,
No. 3D13-1566, 2014 WL 20660 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 2, 2014) ................................................12
Modeste v. State,
760 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) .....................................................................................20
Mooney v. State,
898 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) .....................................................................................18
Old Chief v. United States,
519 U.S. 172 (1997) .................................................................................................................18
Price v. Grays Guard Serv., Inc.,
298 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) .......................................................................................12
Slocum v. State,
757 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) .....................................................................................21
Smith v. State,
606 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) .......................................................................................16
State v. Drolet,
549 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) ......................................................................................13
State v. Hubbard,
751 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1999).......................................................................................................18
State v. Kelly,
685 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984)................................................................................................16, 17
State v. Betts,
16 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 1994) .....................................................................................................14
Steverson v. State,
695 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1988).................................................................................................17, 18
Tingle v. Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commrs,
245 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1971)...........................................................................................................7
United States v. Boyd,
595 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1978).................................................................................................1, 14
United States v. Cowart,
90 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................1, 15
United States v. Echeverri,
854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).....................................................................................................15
iv

United States v. Haywood,
280 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................15
United States v. Hinshaw,
No. 91 CR 0163, 2002 WL 31870561 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ...........................................................15
United States v. Jimenez,
613 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1980) .................................................................................................15
United States v. Mills,
122 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................14, 15
Weiand v State,
732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).....................................................................................................16
Williams v. State,
110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).......................................................................................................20
Ziegler v. State,
404 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) .......................................................................................13
Rules / Statutes
90.401, Fla. Stat. ...........................................................................................................................1
90.402, Fla. Stat. ...........................................................................................................................2
90.403, Fla. Stat. ...............................................................................................................3, 17, 18
776.012, Fla. Stat. ...................................................................................................................1, 12
784.021, Fla. Stat. .........................................................................................................................3
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) ...............................................................................................16
Other Authorities
E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 185 (3d ed. 1984) ..............................................................17
Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence 403.1 (2d ed. 1984) ......................................................18

1

Marissa Alexander (Alexander), through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this
Motion to Reconsider the Courts March 14, 2012 Order on Defendants Motion in Limine (the
March 14, 2012 Order or the Order). In the March 14, 2012 Order, the Court ordered that
the State was not precluded from mentioning or presenting evidence regarding the events leading
up to and during an incident between Alexander and Rico Gray, Sr. (Gray) on December 30,
2010 (the December 30 Incident or the Incident) to rebut Alexanders claim of self-defense,
including evidence that she was a battered spouse who suffered a reasonable fear for her safety
from Gray on August 1, 2010 due to his previous acts of violence against her.
I.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Evidence of Alexanders subsequent conduct is not relevant to her claim of self defense.
Subsequent conduct by a defendant is not relevant where the crime charged and the defense
asserted require the jury to determine the defendants state of mind at the precise moment the
crime charged occurred. Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material
fact. 90.401, Fla. Sta. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeal has statedand the Florida
Supreme Court agrees[t]he logic of showing prior intent or knowledge by proof of
subsequent activity escapes us. United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1978); see
Fla. Bar v. Marable, 645 So. 2d 438, 443 (Fla. 1994) (holding that defendants conduct five
weeks later [did] not shed light on his state of mind at the time of the charged offense).
Section 776.012, entitled Use of Force in Defense of Person, states in relevant part:
a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if (1) he or she
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm
to himself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. Thus, under
776.012, Alexander had no duty to retreat before using deadly force, so long as she reasonably
2

believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm, death, or a forcible
felony. Accordingly, only evidence that bears on Alexanders state of mind when she fired the
warning shot is relevant for the purpose of establishing Alexanders reasonable belief. In
contravention of the well-established prohibition on the introduction of evidence that is not
relevant, however, see 90.402, Fla. Stat., the State seeks to introduce evidence of subsequent
conduct by Alexander to prove her previous August 1, 2010 state of mind. Alexander therefore
respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its March 14, 2012 Order and preclude admission
of any evidence or argument on the December 30, 2010 Incident.
The fact that Alexander went to Grays home on December 30, 2010, and that the two
engaged in an altercation months after the event for which she faces trialfollowing numerous
interactions with Gray in the interimis utterly irrelevant to her state of mind when she fired the
warning shot. The December 30 Incident is not probative of Alexanders state of mind nearly
five months earlier, before she and Gray went to marital counseling, before Grays profuse
apologies and proclamations of love, and before Alexander learned that her daughter Rihannas
health insurance was set to expire at the end of 2010 unless Alexander obtained Grays signature
on Rihannas birth certificate. Furthermore, evidence of the December 30 Incident is excessively
prejudicial, far beyond any probative worth, and thus, under substantial binding precedent cannot
be introduced. The admission of the December 30 Incident must be precluded at Alexanders
new trialand, if granted by the Court, a supplemental Stand Your Ground hearingor the
proceedings will be subject to fundamental error.
3

II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior to her first trial in this case, Alexander, through prior counsel,
1
filed a motion in
limine (Motion in Limine) requesting that the Court prohibit the State from introducing [her]
December 30, 2010, arrest for Domestic Battery. (Motion in Limine at 1, attached as Ex. 1).
She raised three grounds for exclusion: (1) the incident was not relevant because it does not
tend to prove or disprove any disputed facts in a 784.021(1)(A) Aggravated Assault; (2) the
incident is not relevant to [her] reasonableness and or actions because it came months after the
instant offense; and (3) any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury as prohibited by Section 90.403,
Florida Statutes. (Id.).
The Court heard argument on the Motion in Limine on March 13, 2012. (See Hrg Tr.
Mar. 13, 2012, 177:3-193:16, attached as Ex. 2). At the hearing, the State claimed that
evidence of the December 30 incident was admissible to rebut the particular claim of [Grays]
prior acts of violence (id. at 183:9-10) because [i]t would be misleading . . . if the jury was not
allowed to hear that [Alexander] couldnt be that afraid if shes going to his house and engaging
in argument. (Id. at 185:21-24). The State further promised it did not intend to make [the
December 30 Incident] a feature of the trial. (Id. at 185:8-9).
After hearing argument, the Court ruled on the record that although the fact of
Alexanders arrest and prosecution for the domestic battery was inadmissible,
if there is a self-defense argument put forward by the defendant in
the defendants case in chief, and if that self-defense argument is
based at least in part on a history of violence on the part of the
victim directed towards this individual so that it wasit

1
Kevin Cobbin, Esq. represented Alexander before the trial court in all proceedings
relevant to this Motion.
4

contributed to her reasonable fear of being in fear for her safety,
then I think that the fact that she did go over there four months
after all this took place, after she had been arrested she went over
there again, and the fact that there was an altercation and the
victim was punched or whatever it was, is at least I think, its
certainly probative of that issue. Certainly its subject to dispute,
and it may not be that the jury believes the victims side of what
happened on, you know, December 30th, and they believe the
defendants side, as another episode of violence directed by the
victim towards her, I dont know.
But if there is testimony that she went over there, got into a
fight because he wouldnt let her stay over there, and the victim
has, you know, has injuries afterwards, I think thats relevant,
made relevant by a self-defense argument that is put forward by
the defendant that theres been a history of violence here. Not just
specificallynow, if the self-defense argument in this case was
premised simply on he was coming at me with a knife, or just the
facts that are discreetly limited to what happened in the incident, I
dont think this stuff is relevant. But a battered woman syndrome
type argument, and we get into the relationship between the victim
and the defendant, I think even though its subsequent to the arrest,
I think its not too remote, its not too far distanced from the time,
the critical time in this case, I think its relevant.
So its granted, if after I hear the defenselet me put it this
way. Its granted in part as well, because the State cannot bring up
this evidence until such time as the defendant has put on their case
in chief, and at that point it appears that the self-defense argument
is not limited simply to the discrete acts that occurred on the day in
question.
(Id. at 188:25-190:19). The Court memorialized its ruling in a written order dated March 14,
2012, in which it further noted that while the State would present witnesses to testify that the
victim displayed injuries after the December 30 Incident, the probative value of the evidence of
the Incident outweighs any prejudicial effect. (Mar. 14, 2012 Order on Defendants Motion in
Limine at 2, attached as Ex. 3).
Although the State had announced its intent to introduce evidence of the December 30
Incident only in its rebuttal case, Alexander realized that if it did so, she would have no
opportunity to respond with her own account of the events of that day, or evidence of her own
5

substantial injuries and attendant hospitalization, unless the Court afforded her substantial
surrebuttal. (Accordingly, Alexander had no choice but to testify about the December 30
Incident in her case-in-chief. (See Trial Tr. Mar. 16, 2012, 266:14-270:5, 271:14-275:5, attached
as Ex. 4; see also Hrg Tr. Mar. 9, 2012, 19:22-24:10, attached as Ex. 5).
The State then called two witnesses in its rebuttal case: Gray and Officer C.K. Jimenez
of the Jacksonville Sheriffs Office. (See Ex. 4 at 433:9-450:16). Through these rebuttal
witnesses, the State presented testimony and photographic evidence of Grays purported injuries
arising from the December 30 Incident (id. at 436:14-438:4, 444:7-10, 444:18-445:1), Grays
version of events through his own testimony (id. at 433:9-436:11, 438:12-440:8), and the
testimony of Officer Jimenez (which included hearsay statements made by Gray, Pernell Gray
and Rico Gray, Jr. (see id. at 443:2-13)). In its closing argument, the State then pointed to the
December 30 incident as evidence of Alexanders propensity to overreact. (Id. at 494:9-21
(emphasis added); see also id. at 538:4-6 (We know that she can hit people. We know that she
is just not going to sit back and take it. She hit him in the face.)).
On March 22, 2012, Alexander filed a Motion for New Trial on grounds including that
[t]he Court erred in denying Defendants Motion in Limine allowing testimony of the
December 30, 2010 incident which took place after the instant offence [sic]. (Motion for New
Trial at 1, attached as Ex. 6). In the subsequently-filed Amended Motion for New Trial,
Alexander explained that she had not made any misleading . . . factual assertions that would
have opened the door to allow the collateral act evidence in, that the December 30 Incident was
not probative because it was too remote in time from August 1, and that the prejudicial effect of
its admission outweighed any probative value. (Amended Motion for New Trial, attached as Ex.
6

7). Affirming its prior ruling, the Court held on the record at the May 3, 2012 hearing on the
motion that
in this case there was clearly testimony by the defendant of other
acts that had occurred and their history of violence between Mr.
Gray and directed towards her along with the reputational evidence.
And so I believe that it was proper to allow the evidence that
occurredthat she went over to the house by herself four months
later and got into another domestic battery in this case where there
was at least some evidence that was disputed evidence, but there
was some evidence where she may have actually hit Mr. Gray, Sr.
It was disputed, but that was what the jury was allowed to
do or is allowed to do, is to sort through conflicts in the evidence.
So I thought it was directly relevant to rebut the type of self-
defense that was put on by the defense in this case and so that
ground for motion for new trial is denied.
(Hrg Tr. May 3, 2012, 20:11-21:2, attached as Ex. 8).
Meanwhile, following the jurys verdict in this case, Alexander on March 27, 2012
entered a plea of no contest in Case No. 16-2011-MM-284 before the Honorable Charles G.
Cofer to the misdemeanor domestic battery charge arising from the December 30 Incident. (See
Hrg Tr. Mar. 27, 2012, 4:9-17, attached as Ex. 9). She was sentenced to 365 days in the
county jail, with credit for 365 daysthat is, time already served. (Id. at 5:14-17).
Alexander remained in jail pending her sentencing in this case, and on May 11, 2012, she
was sentenced to a 20-year mandatory minimum term of incarceration for each of the three
counts of aggravated assault, with the sentences to run concurrently. (Judgment at 7, attached as
Ex. 10). On September 26, 2013, Alexanders conviction was reversed in total by the First
District Court of Appeal due to error in the pattern jury instructions, and the case was remanded
for a new trial. Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
Because Alexanders previous conviction was overturned and because this case has been
remanded for re-trial, this Court now has the authority to consider new legal standards and new
7

evidence, and to modify its interlocutory rulings. See Tingle v. Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Commrs, 245 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1971) (Upon a remand of the case the trial judge [i]s of
course back in the interlocutory stage of the proceedings.); Glary v. Israel, 53 So. 3d 1095, 1099
n.9 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ([A] trial court has inherent authority to reconsider and modify its
interlocutory orders).
III.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As the Court has recognized, the events of August 1, 2010 that gave rise to the charges in
this case did not occur in a vacuum. To the contrary, the actions of both Alexander and Gray
were informed and influenced by their respective histories, including their past interactions and
their knowledge of each others behavior on similar prior occasions. The same is true for the
events of December 30. Beginning shortly after August 1, Gray, the alleged victim, expressed
his desire to rekindle his relationship with Alexander. She eventually agreed to accompany Gray
to counseling sessions, hoping that Grays violent, abusive behavior could be rehabilitated.
Pursuant to these efforts, Alexander and Gray interacted without incident throughout the fall.
Indeed, Grays text messages throughout that period reflect his promises to change his
ways. For instance, on September 21 he wrote, Just had to text you to tell you I LOVE YOU
MRS GRAY, and on September 28 he wrote, I love you girl more than you know. (Text
Messages from Gray to Alexander, attached as Exs. 11 and 12). On October 7, he asked her
to move in with him. (Text Message from Gray to Alexander, attached as Ex. 13). When she
did not respond, he continued to send her proclamations of love, stating, on October 12, You
dont want to talk to me? Guess not I love you Tell me something I all ways picked up my phone
is this how it is I will stop call n sorry, following up on October 26, claiming, I love you just
want better for us, and on December 5 telling her, Love you baby. (Text Messages from Gray
8

to Alexander, attached as Exs. 14 through 16). They spent Christmas together. (See Lincoln
Alexander Dep. 54:3-9, attached as Ex. 17). A few days later, on December 29, Gray admitted
to Alexander that his jealousy over Alexanders friendship with her ex-husband, Lincoln
Alexander, was the cause of their relationship troubles. (Text Message from Gray to Alexander,
attached as Ex. 18).
That same day, Alexander received an e-mail from her employer stating that, for her
daughter with Gray, Rihanna, to retain coverage as a dependent under Alexanders health plan,
Alexander needed to provide Rihannas birth certificate. (E-mail from E. McCormick to
Alexander, Dec. 29, 2010, attached as Ex. 19). However, to obtain it, Grays signature was
required. (Trial Tr. March 16, 2012, 267:17-268:13, attached as Ex. 4). So early the next
morning, on December 30, Alexander forwarded Gray the e-mail and asked him to sign the birth
certificate. (E-mail from Alexander to Gray, Dec. 30, 2010, attached as Ex. 19). Gray
responded and said that Alexander should come to his house for his signature. (Trial Tr. Mar. 16,
2012, 268:23-269:1, attached as Ex. 4).
Alexander went to Grays home later on December 30, 2010, requesting that Gray sign
the birth certificate as well as their divorce papers. (Id. at 272:1-10 (testimony of Marissa
Alexander), attached as Ex. 4). Alexander informed friends Twan Brown and Earriet Green,
as well as Lincoln Alexander, of her plans to visit Gray to obtain his signature on the birth
certificate. (Id. at 269:8-13, attached as Ex. 4). At Alexanders request, Green and Brown
followed Alexander in their vehicle to Grays street, where they parked at the corner and waited
fifteen to twenty minutes until they saw Alexander leave, and then went home. (See Sworn
Statement of E. Green, attached as Ex. 20). According to Greens sworn statement, shortly
after they returned home,
9

I was in the garage and I heard a voice asking for help. I went
outside and saw Marissa on her knees on the ground. She said that
she had the worst whopping [she] ever had. I helped Marissa
into the house and she was crying and said her head was hurting.
She had a knot on her head, there was a mark on her neck, and
her arm was swollen. She said, he was beating me like a
man. . . . When the police arrived my girlfriend told the police
that they needed to look at her bruises. We even offered to give
him gloves, if he wanted them, in order for him to look at her
bruises. The police officer said that he would not look at her
bruises, that he had already seen bruises on Rico Gray, and that
they were going to arrest her. I could see the knots on Marissas
head the knots were so big that when her hair was parted, we
could see the lumps and could feel the dent of knuckles across her
head. I could tell that she was hit hard. The ice pack we gave her
for her head hurt her. I boxed for 7 years, and I have never had
any lumps that big on me.
(Id.; see also Hrg Tr. Jan. 13, 2011, 11:22-11:25, attached as Ex. 21 (testimony of Lincoln
Alexander) (THE COURT: You could see bruises on her wrists? A. Yes. And she had knots
on her head. That was the reason why she went to the hospital.)).
The testimony regarding the events on December 30, 2010 varied widely. Alexander
testified that after arriving at Grays home, she let Gray visit with Rihanna for approximately
fifteen minutes. (Trial Tr. Mar. 16, 2012, 272:1-10 (testimony of Marissa Alexander), attached
as Ex. 4). As Alexander attempted to leave, Gray asked whether Rihanna was going to stay
with him, but because Alexander did not intend to stay at Grays, Gray and Alexander placed
Rihanna in Alexanders truck. (Id. at 272:11-20). Alexander again asked [Gray] to give [her]
the birth certificate and could he just go ahead and, you know, sign those divorce papers as well.
(Id. at 272:21-25). Rather than sign the papers, Gray became upset and started swinging at
Alexander. (Id. at 273:1-3). Alexander put her hands up in attempt to block Grays punches. (Id.
at 273:8-14). She acknowledged that she may have hit Gray while attempting to block his attack,
but wasnt going for body shots. (Id. at 273:12-24).
10

Gray disputed Alexanders testimony regarding the December 30 Incident, claiming that
after he refused to allow Alexander to stay the night at his home and placed Rihanna in
Alexanders car, Alexander refused to pull her car out of the driveway. (Id. at 434:13-436:11,
attached as Ex. 4). Gray further testified that Alexander got out of her car and did not leave, at
which point Gray instructed his son, Pernell Gray, to call the police. (Id.). Gray claims that
Alexander sucker punched him and then jumped in her car and ran. (Id.). Grays elder son,
Rico Gray, Jr., testified that Alexander hopped on my daddy[s] back and then she was hitting
him, and after Alexander got off Gray, she again turned around and hit him. (Rico Gray, Jr.
Dep. 20:9-20, attached as Ex. 22). Gray testified that he did not touch Alexander on December
30, 2010 (Trial Tr. Mar. 16, 2012, 439:12-440:8, attached as Ex. 4 (Q. So on December 30th
you never put your hands on Ms. Alexander? A. I never put my hands on Ms. Alexander.)), and
he has no idea how Alexander received any injuries during the encounter (id. at 440:2-5 (Q.
So you have no idea how she would have got any kind of knots on her head or any kind of
wounds? A. Not to my lifeI dont know anything about it.)).
Officer Jimenez, the investigating officer, refused to examine Alexander. (Id. at 445:11-
13 (testimony of Officer Jiminez) (Q. On that night, December 30th, did you touch Ms.
Alexanders head? A. No, sir, I did not.)). He stated that his refusal was based on his desire
to limit his own involvement in any potential court case, so that he could avoid having to testify.
(See Helen Jenkins Dep. 48:3-20, attached as Ex. 23 (And he said, I dont want to have to
testify. So in other words, if I dont see nothing, I dont have to.)). Without taking any
affirmative steps to determine whether Alexander had injuries, Officer Jimenez arrested her.
When Alexander was booked at the jail, she was immediately re-routed to the Shands
Jacksonville Clinic to obtain treatment for her injuries sustained during the Incident. (Id. at
11

49:20-50:13). She was diagnosed with a thumb contusion, facial abrasions, and head contusions.
(Clinic Report, attached as Ex. 24). Despite the injuries Gray inflicted on Alexander on
December 30, and despite him seeking her arrest on the basis that she allegedly harmed him on
that date, Gray attempted to establish an intimate relationship with Alexander. On January 12,
2011the very same day the State sought to revoke Alexanders bond on the basis of the
December 30 IncidentGray texted her:
You dont have to answer this question if you dont want to but it is
a yes or no question can we just have sex til I find someone I truly
love might take a while
(Text Message from Gray to Alexander, attached as Ex. 25). Alexander did not respond.
Alexander filed for divorce from Gray on August 18, 2010. (Petition for Dissolution of
Marriage, attached as Ex. 26). Divorce proceedings, as well as custody proceedings regarding
the Alexander and Grays daughter, Rihanna, are ongoing.
IV.
ARGUMENT
A. The December 30 Incident is Not Relevant to Alexanders Self Defense Claim.
The December 30 Incident did notand could not haveinformed Alexanders state of
mind on August 1, 2010. The Incident therefore is irrelevant for the purpose of establishing that
Alexander reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary at the moment that she fired
her warning shot. Subsequent conduct is not legally relevant where the crime charged and
defense asserted require the jury to determine the defendants state of mind at the time the
incident occurred. Unlike Grays past brutalization of Alexander, which directly informed her
fear of Gray at the moment she fired the warning shot, and is therefore relevant to her claim of
self defense, Alexanders future actions did not and could not have affected her reasonable fear
in the moments at issue in this case.
12

The use of deadly force is justified only if the defendant reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to him/herself or another, or to
prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. 776.012, Fla. Stat. The objective
standard applicable to Alexanders self defense claim requires the court to determine whether,
based on circumstances as they appeared to the defendant when he or she acted, a reasonable and
prudent person situated in the same circumstances and knowing what the defendant knew
would have used the same force as did the defendant. Mobley v. State, No. 3D13-1566, 2014
WL 20660, at *4 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 2, 2014) (emphasis added); see also Price v. Grays Guard
Serv., Inc., 298 So. 2d 461, 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) ([T]he conduct of a person acting in self
defense is measured by an objective standard, but the standard must be applied to the facts and
circumstances as they appeared at the time of the altercation to the one acting in self
defense[.]) (emphasis added). Thus, for the purposes of a self defense claim, a defendants state
of mind is determined solely on what she knew at the time of the altercation and how this
knowledge informed his/her actionsand not on a defendants future knowledge or conduct.
Subsequent interactions between the victim and the defendant shed no light on a
defendants state of mind, and in fact are dangerous for a jury because of the likelihood of
confusion. For instance, in Lavin v. State, 754 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), the defendant
was charged with aggravated assault for threatening to kill two individuals while holding a
shotgun after a traffic altercation. The defendant, Lavin, left the scene when he heard sirens but
was arrested two hours later. Id. In the course of his arrest Lavin threatened one of the victims
and the arresting officer, and those threats were admitted into evidence during his trial as
probative of his state of mind at the time he allegedly committed the aggravated assault. Id. at
787. Reversing the defendants conviction, the Third District Court of Appeals, however,
13

rejected the admission of these threats because aggravated assault requires proof of a specific
intent to do violence to the person of another and Lavins threats were not probative of his
specific intent at the time of the alleged assault, but rather were more probative of Lavins
anger over his arrest[.] Id. (emphasis added).
Subsequent conduct generally is held to a much higher standard of relevance than prior
conduct. See Christie v. State, 246 So. 2d 605, 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (We look . . . with
jaundiced legal eye at subsequently committed extraneous-offenses). This is particularly true
where the State seeks to introduce the later offense to illuminate the defendants state of mind at
the time of the charges offense. See Marable, 645 So. 2d at 443 (conduct five weeks later does
not shed light on his state of mind at the time of the comment); State v. Drolet, 549 So. 2d 1172,
1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (Evidence of acts approximately six months subsequent to the time of
the charged crimes was not relevant to prove predisposition to commit those crimes.).
For example, in Ziegler v. State, 404 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (per curiam), the
defendant was charged with second degree murder for shooting a woman named Williams inside
a bar, after assisting the bouncer in ejecting a belligerent patron on December 31, 1978. Id. at
862. Four months later, while out on bond, the defendant shot Smith, the woman with whom he
lived. In his statement to the police after Smiths shooting, defendant claimed that Smith drew a
gun after he said he was leaving her, after which a struggle ensued and Smith was shot. The
defendant shot her three more times before fleeing. Id. The defendant was convicted for Smiths
murder before the Williams case came to trial. Id.
At the subsequent trial for Williams murder, the State submitted evidence regarding
Smiths death, including a comparison by its forensic pathologist regarding the manner of entry
of the bullets into the respective womens bodies and the defendants statement to the police in
14

the Smith case. Id. The First District Court of Appeal, however, rejected outright [t]he States
theory . . . that [the collateral crime evidence] was relevant to appellants state of mind or
absence of mistake in shooting Williams. Id. at 862. Noting that the differences between the
two crimes were numerous and significant, the court held the evidence was simply not
relevant for any purpose other than to show criminal propensity, and, even if the evidence was
relevant, its admission was not harmless because it had become a feature of the trial. Id. at 863.
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the defendants conviction and remanded for a new
trial. Id.
Knox v. State, 361 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) is also instructive. The defendant in
that case faced charges for the sexual assault of his daughter on May 21, 1977. Citing the
Williams rule, the court admitted evidence of sexual contact between defendant and his daughter
after the charged date, on May 22. Id. at 799. The First District, however, held that the
admission of evidence of the May 22 incident was highly prejudicial and constituted reversible
error, as it was not relevant to prove appellants intent, motive, absence of mistake, modus
operandi, or any other element of the crime charged. Its only relevance was to show appellants
propensity to commit the crime, which is clearly improper[,] and its prejudicial effect
outweighed any possible relevance it may have had. Id. at 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
(disapproved on other grounds by Cotita v. State, 381 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)).
The federal courts agree that subsequent conduct is seldomif everrelevant to
demonstrate present intent. See Boyd, 595 F.2d at 126 ([t]he logic of showing prior intent or
knowledge by proof of subsequent activity escapes us); United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154,
158 (6th Cir. 1996) (rarely will an event that occurred subsequent to the charged crime be
probative of motive, knowledge, or intent) (citing Boyd, 595 F.2d at 126); State v. Betts, 16
15

F.3d 748, 758 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d
346 (7th Cir. 1997) (Subsequent . . . activity . . . , particularly conduct that is substantially
separated in time from the charged offense, is far less likely [than prior conduct] to illuminate the
defendants state of mind on an earlier occasion.); Jankins v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., Inc., 21 F.3d
436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ([T]he allegedly similar acts followed the one in dispute, a sequence
that further weakens the link. Projection of an evil purpose backward in time seems weaker than
inferring its continuation. The temporal (as well as the logical) relationship between a
defendants later act and his earlier state of mind attenuates the relevance of such proof . . . .)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Jimenez, 613 F.2d
1373, 1376 (5th Cir. 1980) (similar); see also United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 722 (6th
Cir. 2002) (holding that defendants December 1997 crack cocaine possession has no bearing
on whether he intended to distribute the crack cocaine allegedly in his possession on August 1,
1997); United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 645 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the presence
of cocaine in [defendants] Los Angeles apartment 18 months after the termination of the alleged
conspiracy and four years after the last overt act of which there was direct evidence was clearly
[not] probative of the knowledge and intent of the alleged co-conspirators during the relevant
period); United States v. Hinshaw, No. 91 CR 0163, 2002 WL 31870561, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(holding that evidence of conviction in 1997 was not relevant to show intent, knowledge, or
opportunity with respect to offense in 1991); Devonbrook, Inc. v. Lily Lynn (Lilywear), Inc.,
No. 70 CIV. NO. 4687, 1977 WL 921, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1977) (in civil action for breach
of contract, holding that inferences of a present or post-transfer intent not to perform [contract]
[did] not at all establish the existence of such an intent at the time the transaction was closed)
(emphasis in original).
16

Moreover, the introduction of Grays prior acts of violence toward Alexander or others
does not alter the conclusion that the December 30 Incident is irrelevant to her state of mind at
the moment she fired her warning shot. Under Florida law, the history of domestic violence
between Gray and Alexander prior to August 1, 2010 is probative of the reasonableness of her
fear that Gray would behave similarly on that date. See Smith v. State, 606 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla.
1st DCA 1992); see also Weiand v State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1057-58 (Fla. 1999) (holding that trial
courts exclusion of witnesses and prior acts of domestic violence by the victim against the
defendant was prejudicial error). Indeed, the Florida pattern jury instructions on self defense
expressly instruct the jury to consider:
If you find that the defendant who because of threats or prior
difficulties with (victim) had reasonable grounds to believe that
[he] [she] was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands
of (victim), then the defendant had the right to arm [himself]
[herself]. . . .
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.), Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, 3.6(f). As the pattern jury
instructions and binding precedent make clear, evidence regarding a history of violence between
the defendant and victim is a critical part of any self-defense claim under Florida law, as it is
probative of the defendants reasonable grounds to believe that [he] [she] was in danger of
death or great bodily harm at the hands of (victim) at the time of the offense. Grays repeated
battering of Alexander throughout the course of their relationship thus informed her reasonable
fear that he would do the same, again, on August 1. This does not in any way contradict or
abrogate the firmly-grounded principle that future acts are not probative of a defendants state of
mind at the time of the charged offense.
Similarly, the introduction of expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome does not
affect the relevance or probative value of the December 30 Incident. The Washington Supreme
Court in State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) squarely addressed the issue before
17

this Court. In Kelly, the defendant asserted self-defense and introduced expert testimony that she
suffered from battered spouse syndrome in defense to charges that she had murdered her husband.
Id. at 190. She explained that her husband had physically abused her throughout the course of
the marriage, and she stated that she was in fear he would attack her at the time she shot him. Id.
The State, in rebuttal, sought to introduce evidence of specific acts of aggression by the
defendant, particularly those aimed at her husband, the alleged victim. Id. at 191. The en banc
court held that the States proffered evidence was irrelevant to the defendants self-defense
claimand, in any event, the evidence of her collateral acts against her husband at other times
did not logically serve to rebut her reasonable belief that she was in imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm, in light of the facts and circumstances known to her at the time of the
shooting. Id. at 196-99. Finding no relevant purpose for the admission of evidence of the
defendants collateral acts, and concluding that admission of that evidence could only distort the
true issues at trial, the court held that the defendant had been prejudiced, reversing her
conviction and granting a new trial. Id. at 200 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
475-76 (1948) (Jackson, J.)).
B. Even If Conduct That Occurred Five Months Later Had Some Relevance, Which It
Does Not, The Prejudice and Confusion Surrounding That Incident Is More
Prejudicial Than Probative and Will Result in a Trial Within a Trial.
Section 90.403, of the Florida Statutes compels the trial court to weigh the danger of
unfair prejudice against the probative value. Steverson v. State, 695 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla.
1997) (quoting State v. McClain, 525 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1988)) (in turn quoting E. Cleary,
McCormick on Evidence 185 (3d ed. 1984)). A trial court should exclude even relevant
evidence if any probative value of the proffered evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, [or] misleading the jury. Joyner v. State, 4 So.
3d 76, 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting 90.403, Fla. Stat.). Even assuming that evidence of the
18

December 30 Incident was marginally relevantwhich it is notsuch evidence remains
inadmissible because the probative value is significantly outweighed by the prejudice and
confusion that will necessarily result if the Court admits Alexanders conduct which occurred
five months after the incident at issue in this trial.
In balancing the probative value of evidence of a defendants collateral conduct against
its prejudicial effect pursuant to 90.403,
it is proper for the court to consider the need for the evidence; the
tendency of the evidence to suggest an improper basis to the jury
for resolving the matter, e.g., an emotional basis; the chain of
inference necessary to establish the material fact; and the
effectiveness of a limiting instruction.
Steverson, 695 So. 2d at 689 (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence 403.1 (2d ed.
1984) (footnotes omitted)). Weighing these considerations, the probative value of the December
30 Incident is clearly and substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to
Alexander.
The Florida Supreme Court has clarified that unfair prejudice refers to an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis. State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 565 (Fla.
1999) (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)). The admission of the
December 30 Incident clearly suggests an improper basis for resolving the matter, as it will
permiteven invitethe jury to infer guilt on the August 1, 2010 charge, based on alleged
subsequent actions on December 30. Confusion of the issue will inevitably result. See Mooney
v. State, 898 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that collateral crimes evidence is
presumptively harmful and highly inflammatory); Jones v. State, 944 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2006) (noting that admission of a collateral bad act is inherently prejudicial because it
creates a risk that a conviction will be based on the defendants bad character or propensity to
commit crimes, rather than on proof he committed the charged offense); Mooney v. State, 898
19

So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that collateral crimes evidence is
presumptively harmful and highly inflammatory). Here, admission of the Incident will
impermissibly lead the jury to conclude, as the State suggested in its closing argument at
Alexanders first trial, that if Alexander had a propensity to overreact on December 30 she
must also have overreacted on August 1. (Trial Tr. Mar. 16, 2012 at 494:9-21, attached as Ex.
4).
Such an inference has particular force where the defendants credibility is at issue. See
Carr v. State, 578 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (where the real jury issue was
appellants credibility as opposed to . . . the credibility of the state witness who testified against
him . . . . [e]vidence of appellants prior conviction . . . permitted the jury to infer guilt of the
present charge on the basis of evidence which suggested appellant has a propensity to commit
this kind of crime . . . [this] indicates the evidence should have been excluded, because its
probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); Bozeman v. State, 698 So.
2d 629, 631-32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (noting that [e]vidence that suggests that a defendant has
committed . . . other bad acts can have a powerful effect on the results at trial and holding that
reference to such acts in closing argument was not harmless error where the case turned on the
credibility of the witnesses).
Additionally, if evidence of the December 30 Incident is admitted, no curative or limiting
instruction could dispel the potential prejudice arising from its admission. A curative or limiting
instruction would be wholly insufficient to remedy the damage and prejudice, given the extent of
the information likely to be presented if the December 30 Incident is admissible, the hotly
disputed nature of Alexanders self-defense claim, the surrounding credibility issues, and the
sensitive and often-politicized nature of the battered spouse defense. See, e.g., Fike v. State, 4
20

So. 3d 734, 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Denmark v. State, 927 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA
2006).
In light of the substantial factual disputes regarding the events of December 30, it would
be impossible for the Court to limit the presentation of such evidence to prevent the Incident
from becoming a feature of the trial. Prejudice is inevitable where the state makes a collateral
offense a feature, instead of an incident, of a trial. Bush v. State, 690 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1997). [D]ue to the severely prejudicial effect of such evidence, the [c]ircumstances
under which a jury may learn of a defendants prior bad acts are extremely limited[.] See
Modeste v. State, 760 So. 2d 1078, 1081-82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Williams v. State, 110
So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)). If the Incident were to be included in this case, Alexander would have
no choice but to raise issue in her case-in-chief and/or to request that the Court allow her a
substantial surrebuttal caseincluding evidence of the contact between Gray and Alexander
during the five intervening months, her injuries following the altercation with Gray, and the
testimony of various percipient witnessesin order to place the Incident in context and rebut the
States allegations that she was not in fear and was the aggressor on December 30, and its
attendant assertion that she was therefore not in fear and was the aggressor on August 1. See
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690 (1986)) ([T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense).
If this evidence is admitted, there can be no doubt that the jury would hear a mini-trial
regarding the December 30 Incident; face substantial confusion regarding its pertinence to the
Alexanders claim of self-defense on August 1 (the sole issue in this case); endure needlessly
lengthy presentations by both sides; and may in its deliberations impermissibly view the Incident
21

as evidence that Alexander has a propensity to commit violent acts when confronted by Gray.
See Slocum v. State, 757 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (To open the door to evidence
about an unrelated case was to create a trial within a trial; there was a risk that the trial would be
needlessly lengthened and that the additional evidence would obscure the discovery of the
truth.). Thus, even if the December 30 Incident were relevant to rebut her testimony that she
reasonably feared Gray after he attacked her five months earlierwhich it is notthere is
simply no way to limit its effect if introduced to prevent it from becoming a feature of trial and
thus creating fundamental error, see Bush, 690 So. 2d at 673, without obstructing Alexanders
constitutional right to present a complete defense. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. Admission of
evidence of the December 30 Incident therefore would constitute fundamental error and should
not be permitted. See Bush, 690 So. 2d at 673.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Alexander respectfully requests that the Court reconsider
its March 14, 2012 Order regarding her Motion in Limine and preclude the State from
introducing any evidence or argument regarding the December 30, 2010 Incident at trial during
its case-in-chief and in its rebuttal case, and, if granted by the Court, in a supplemental Stand
Your Ground hearing.
22

Respectfully submitted,


BRUCE A. ZIMET, P.A.

BY: /s/ Bruce A. Zimet
Bruce A. Zimet
Florida Bar No. 225053

One Financial Plaza, Suite 2612
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394
Tel: 954-764-7081
Fax: 954-760-4421

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
Faith Gay
Florida Bar No. 129593
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, New York 10010
51 Madison Avenue, 22
nd
Floor
New York, New York 10010
Tel: 212-849-7000
Fax: 212-849-7100

HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP
George E. Schulz Jr.
Florida Bar No. 169507
50 North Laura Street, Suite 3900
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Tel: 904-353-2000
Fax: 904-358-1872
Attorneys for Defendant

23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served, in
accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516(b)(1), on March 14, 2014 by
electronic mail on Rich Mantei, Esq., State Attorneys Office for the Fourth Judicial District, at
RMantei@coj.net.

BY: /s/ Bruce A. Zimet
Bruce A. Zimet
Florida Bar No. 225053

BRUCE A. ZIMET, P.A.
One Financial Plaza, Suite 2612
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394
Tel: 954-764-7081
Fax: 954-760-4421












Exhibit 1
STATE OF FLORIDA
V .

DIV ISION: CR-G
MARISSA DANIELLE ALEXANDER
MOTION IN LIME
Defendant, MARISSA DANIELLE ALEXANDER, by and through the undersigned
attorney, Kevin M. Cobbin, Esq. , moves this Honorable Court to prohibit the State from
introducing Defendant's December 30, 2010, arrest for Domestic Battery. Defendant
further moves this Court to prohibit the State from making reference to such evidence or
testimony during voir dire or opening statement or during any stage of these
proceedings until the Court rules upon its admissibility. As grounds in support of this
motion, Defendant states:
1. This December 30, 2010 arrest is not relevant to any of the issues being tried
in the present case as it does not tend to prove or disprove any disputed facts in a
784. 021(1)(A) Aggravated Assault, as required by Section 90. 401, Florida Statutes.
2. Even where the defense my possibly raise a self-defense argument claiming
justifiable use of force/deadly force based upon defendant's reasonable belief that the
force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, this December 30,
2010 arrest is not relevant to the defendant's reasonableness and or actions because it
came months after the instant offense.
3. If the court finds that this December 30, 2010 arrest does have any probative
value, it is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues, or misleading the jury as prohibited by Section 90. 403, Florida Statutes.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR DUV AL COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO. : 2010-CF-008579
FILED
MAR 1 2 2012
iffo.e.l.rgra
MARX CIRCUIT. COURT
PAGE # 0219 OF 0825
Motion in Limine
Page 2
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to prohibit
the State from making reference to, introducing, or otherwise making use of any of the
above-mentioned evidence or testimony until the Court rules upon its admissibility.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing Motion in Limine
has been furnished to the Office of the State Attorney, by hand, this 9 th day of March,
2012.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /24
Kevin M. Cobbin, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 0645206
525 N. Newnan Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Tel. (904) 357-8448
Fax (904) 357-8446
Attorney for Defendant
Copies to:
The Honorable James H. Daniels
Office of the State Attorney
Kevin M. Cobbin, Esquire
PAGE # 0220 OF 0825












Exhibit 2
175
1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
2

AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA
3 CASE NO.: 2 010-CF-008579
4 DIVISION: CR-G
5
6 STATE OF FLORIDA
7 -vs-
8 MARISSA ALEXANDER,
9 Defendant.
10
11 STATE OF FLORIDA )
12 COUNTY OF DUVAL )
13
14 PROCEEDINGS taken before the Honorable JAMES H.
15 DANIEL, Judge of the Circuit Court, Division CR-G, in
16 the Duval County Courthouse, Jacksonville, Florida, on
17 Tuesday, March 13 , 2 012 , at 2 :2 8 p.m., and as reported
18 by Colleen S. David, a Notary Public in and for the
19 State of Florida at Large and Court Reporter.
2 0.
2 1
2 2
2 3
OFFICIAL REPORTERS, INC.
2 4

2 01 EAST ADAMS STREET
JACKSONVILLE, FL 3 2 2 02
2 5

(904) 358-2090
177

1 PROCEEDINGS
2 March 13 , 2 012 2 :2 8 p.m.
3 THE COURT: All right. Marissa Alexander,

4 were here on a motion in limine filed by the
5 defendant, and I believe I've gotten it, and it's
6 dealing with a December 3 0, 2 010 arrest.

7 MR. COBBIN: Yes.

8 THE COURT: All right. What's -- I know --

9 and I'll give you a chance to argue, but just

10
generally, what is the State's position on this,

11 generally, not argument, lust generally what's your

12 position.

13 MR. LAKE: Generally, the State's position

14 is --

15 THE COURT: Are you in agreement with it.

16 MR. LAKE: The State is not in agreement with

17 the motion in limine.

18
THE COURT: All right. Then let's hear from

19 Mr. Cobbin.

2 0 MR. COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor. We filed this

2 1 motion in limine, as the State provided information

2 2 as to a December 3 0, 2 010 arrest for domestic

2 3 battery, which is currently still pending actually;

2 4 and did not tile it or argue it in the Williams

2 5 rule in the case in chief. But would -- possible
178
1witnesses as rebuttal to a defense claim of

2

self-defense.
3

Your Honor, we would argue that that

4

December 3 0 arrest which was months after the

5

instant offense is not admissible in this case,

6

does not go to the -- if they're raising it based

7

upon a self-defense argument, does not go to the

8

mindset or the defendant at the time of the instant

9 offense. Case law is clear that the Court may rely

10 on other prior instances. I believe the State
11

provided some case law, I have some case law that

12

clearly talks about the evidence that tends to show

13

the defendant in a criminal offense committed other

19

crimes or offenses wholly independent of the crime

15

for which he is on trial and not otherwise relevant

16

to the issue or current crime or offense, is

17

complete and inadmissible for the purpose of

18

showing defendant committed the offense charged.

19

What we're afraid of is that this evidence

2 0

would go to confuse the jury as to what the claim

2 1

of self-defense is.

2 2 THE COURT: Talk to me a little bit more while

2 3 we've got some time about your claim of

2 4 self-defense. I've got Dr. Harry Krop coming in

2 5 here, he's a listed as a witness.
1 7 9
1 MR. COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor.
2 THE COURT: So, I assume that the defense's
3 self-defense claim is not going to be necessarily,

4 I was in fear about specific acts that the victim
5 committed in the immediate moments before this
6 incident took place, but it's that and the history

7 of violence between these two individuals, and

8 really are what she believes or perceives as a

9 history of violence directed against her by this

10 victim. In other words, we used the short term of

11 battered woman syndrome, I assume that's kind of a

12 summary of what in the defense is going to argue or

13 present evidence on?

14 MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, the evidence that we

15 would present I believe would go to the evidence,

16 it's not like a tricky case or we're not trying to

17 hide anything. It's clearly a case where you have

18 a husband and wife, prior to that boyfriend and

19 girlfriend and boyfriend, where we believe there

2 0 was a history of domestic battery, a documented

2 1 history of domestic violence and it was ongoing.

2 2 And that on this specific day in August of 2 010,

2 3 that the alleged victim was again perpetrating

2 4 violence against Ms. Alexander.

2 5 THE COURT: In which she was the aggressor.
180
1
MR, COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor.

2
THE COURT: And you're going to back that up

3
though with evidence of prior incidents of violence
4
involving the victim and the defendant, or again,

5 at least the testimony from your standpoint will be

6 the victim was the aggressor at that time.

7 MR. COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor. And there will

8 be prior instances against Ms. Alexander that we

9 will bring in, that he was the aggressor, and that

10 on this specific incident things that had happened

11 in the past, the predicament that my client was it

12 that led to an incident where she had to defend

13 herself. I believe the witnesses will come in and

14 testify who were there as to what was going on.

15 THE COURT: And part of what you're trying to

16 argue is her reasonable fear for her safety is

17 based on past history.

18
MR. COBBIN: Based on past history. My client

19 was in the hospital before, because of the

2 0 defendant, on several occasions. And then,

2 1 depending whether or not it would come in or not,

2 2 reputation or other bad acts. But for the purpose

2 3 of this, their argument, we believe we have enough

2 4 based upon their past history to say that she

2 5 clearly was or had reasonableness that she was in
181

1 fear of great bodily harm.

2 THE COURT: So, this is a December 3 0, 2 010

3 arrest, she was arrested on an aggravated assault.

4 MR. CORBIN: No. She was arrested on domestic

5 battery.

6 THE COURT: On domestic battery, okay. Has

7 there been a conviction on that?

8 MR. COBBIN: No, Your Honor.

9 THE COURT: So, has it been resolved?

10 MR. COBBIN: It has not been resolved, it's in

11 front of Judge Cofer pending next week.

12 THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

13 MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, just clearly that

14 believe the case that the State has -- states as

15 prior threats, harms, or bad acts can come in. The

16 Court raises an issue of remoteness, and a lot of

17 the cases are murder cases, so you're not going to

18 have anything after, of course, where the defendant

19 may raise self-defense depending if he has prior

2 0 domestic batteries or prior violent acts against

2 1 either the victim or other people. The Courts have

2 2 said as long as it's in a remote time period, that

2 3 information can come in to refute a self-defense

2 4 claim. But there is no case law, there's nothing

2 5 that the Court will find about an incident that
182
1 took place after, and definitely some months after,

2
anything that's happened. We believe that would

3 just prejudice the jury and confuse them as to the
instant offense and the nature of the claim of
self-defense.

6 THE COURT: All rlght. Mr. Lake.

7
MR. LAKE: Your Honor, defense counsel is

8 correct that in raising a claim of self-defense, he

9
and she are entitled to, as long as a predicate is

10
laid, to establish prior conduct on behalf of the

11
victim which created feelings of apprehension on

12
the part of the defendant, such that she could only

13
take the drastic act of pointing a gun and firing

14
towards the defendant because of her apprehension

15 and because of his past history of violence

16 committed by the alleged victim. I agree, the case

17 law -- and that's the case law provided to the

18 Court initially, State v. Smith.

19 But Judge, I don't think that leaves the

2 0
State in a position that we are unable to rebut the

2 1 claim that given all of this history of violence

2 2 that she was, in fact, apprehensive. In fact,

2 3 think under self-defense law, the law essentially

2 4 contemplates a scenario that the State is required

2 5
to rebut this type of evidence, otherwise we face
183
1 potential JOA arguments, and that's in D.S. v.

2
State, such that they were subject to JOA because

3 the State presented no evidence to rebut the
4

defendant's direct testimony that he acted in
self-defense, nor was it ever diminished to

6 testimony on cross-examination.
7 So Judge, the reason I point that out is just

8 to establish that the State is left with an avenue

9 to rebut the particular claim of his prior acts of

10 violence.

11 THE COURT: But can you rebut it in an

12 incident that occurred after the incident that's

13 the subject of the prosecution?

14
MR. LAKE: Yes, Judge. By putting her state

15 of mind, her apprehension, her fear in issue, she

16 has essentially opened the door to other acts which

17
rebuts that she is actually afraid of him. And

18 it's no so much the fact that she was arrested,

19 but --

2 0
THE COURT: I was going to say, you can agree

2 1
that the fact that she was arrested is probably not

2 2 admissible.

2 3 MR. LAKE: Judge, T would agree. However,

2 4 don't think that means that her actions cannot be

2 5
introduced to rebut that she's afraid of this
184

1 person. Specifically that after this incident took

2

place, she went to his home, this is somebody who's

3

purportedly so afraid she would shoot a gun at him,

4

with two children in a home, this is somebody who's

5

so afraid that months later she goes to his house,

6

gets in an argument with him because he would not

7

allow her to stay the night, and then she, becoming

8

upset, attacked him to the point where police were

9

called, noted injuries on the alleged victim.

10

Judge, when the defendant opens the door, the

11

State is entitled to rebut that claim that she's,

12 in fact, apprehensive. And I've provided the Court

13 with a case of the Supreme Court of Florida case,

14 Robertson ;phonetic) v. State. Even if prior crime

15 evidence is not relevant under 90.4 04 , such as

16 propensity, we're not establishing that the

17 defendant has a propensity towards violence. A

18 testifying defendant may, nonetheless open the door

19 to the prior crime evidenced by offering a trait of

2 0 her good character. I don't know if she's going to

2 1 get up there and say that she was peaceful. But T

2 2 do anticipate that they're going to establish that

2 3 a material fact is her being fearful, her

2 4 apprehension. If she's going to open the door to

2 5 that, the State can rebut that by establishing that
185
1 she is inaccurately testifying to material facts.
2 That can be contradicted by other relevant facts.
3 That's contemplated by 90.74 5.
4 Specifically, if she's so afraid of him that
5 she has to take this drastic action, she would not
6 be going to his house and engaging in an argument.
7 She would stay away from him.
8 And we don't intend to make it a feature of
9 the trial. The defense counsel has said this is
10 not something that's coming in, in the State's case
11 in chief. The State is not going to mention it in
12 opening statement. But the State needs an avenue
13 to give the jury a full picture.
14 Robertson case points out: Thus, to open the
15 door, the defendant must first offer misleading
16 testimony or make a specific factual assertion,
17 i.e., apprehension, which the State has a right to
18 correct so the jury will not be misled. The jury
19 is going to hear, I anticipate, as long as a
2 0 predicate is laid, of these prior acts of violence
2 1 by our alleged victim. It would be misleading,
2 2 Judge, if the jury was not allowed to hear that she
2 3 couldn't be that afraid if she's going to his house
2 4 and engaging in argument.
2 5 Again, the State has the right to correct, so
186
1that the jury will not be misled.
2

Opening the door concept allows the

3

cross-examination to reveal the whole story of the

4 transaction only partially explained. Again, it's

5

not about making it a feature of the trial, it's

6

not about the case in chief, but really I think the

7

State would be in a precarious position if not

8

allowed to use this testimony, and is subject to

9

JOA if we can't rebut her apprehension of fear.

10 And I provided the case of C.M. v. State that

11 we may rebut this by specific acts. Specifically,

12 that the State recall the police officer to testify

13 of the specific act of the defendant to nullify a

14 particular explanation that he gave on direct

15 examination.

16 THE COURT: All right. Rebuttal.

17 MR. CORBIN: Your Honor, to the last case that

18 the State mentioned, the case specifically says the

19 reason that they're allowed to bring that

2 0 information in, is because it happened 15 minutes

2 1 prior to the defendant saying that he felt uneasy

2 2 about the officer, and it's clearly in the last

2 3 paragraph of the case, which I have highlighted.

2 4 Every case that the State has presented, and
25 every case, T believe that the Court is going to
187
1 find about this specific instance, about bringing

2 in to rebut self-defense evidence, talks about

3 prior incidents, prior threats, prior occurrences.

4 There is not one case, if there was it would be in

5 front of the Court right now, there is not one case

6 that allows the State to bring in an incident that

7 took place four months down the road.

8 And there is no -- the State said that she

9 was going to open the door by raising a

10 self-defense argument. That is not the case. Her

11 argument, if it's raised, is that at the time of

12 the instant offense, at the time of the overt act

13 that would be part of that predicate that she

14 gives, at that time in her mind there was a

15 reasonable fear that she was going to be put in

16 great bodily harm.

17 THE COURT: Based on?

18 MR. COBBIN: Based upon past acts against her

19 by that alleged victim. Something that happened in

2 0 December does not go to refute that, or prove that

2 1 one way or the other. It doesn't go to her

2 2 apprehension at that time, four months down the

2 3 road. We don't know what took place in between, or

2 4 what goes on as to why she goes over there.

2 5 And to read the facts off the police report,
188
1 again that case is still pending, clearly do not
2 articulate what we believe the facts in that case
3 were.
4 Your Honor, we just believe that if this had
5 happened in July or June, that the case would
6 have -- the State would have grounds to bring that
7 up, if my client argued that she was in so much
8 fear. But something that happened in December, we
9 clearly believe would only prejudice the defendant,
10 and its probative value is clearly outweighed by
11 that prejudice, and should not be admitted.
12 THE COURT: All right. Appreciate counsel's
13 argument on both sides in this issue.
14 I'm granting the motion in limine in part.
15 Clearly the fact that there was an arrest and a
16 prosecution should not be put in front of this jury
17 in any way, shape, or form. It adds nothing to the
18 jury's consideration of the issues in this case,
19 it's not relevant, it's improper character
2 0 evidence, and it's clearly -- its probative value
2 1 is nil, and it's prejudicial effect is great.
2 2 So, the fact that there was an arrest and
2 3 there was a prosecution on this particular event
2 4 should not be mentioned at all.
2 5 However, if there is a self-defense argument
189

1 put forward by the defendant in the defendant's

2 case in chief, and if that self-defense argument is
3 based at least in part on a history of violence on

4 the part of the victim directed towards this
5 individual so that it was -- it contributed to her

6 reasonable fear of being in fear for her safety,

7
then I think that the fact that she did go over

8 there four months after all this took place, after

9 she had been arrested she went over there again,

10 and the fact that there was an altercation and the

11 victim was punched or whatever it was, is at least

12 I think, it's certainly probative of that issue.

13 Certainly it's subject to dispute, and it may not

14 be that the jury believes the victim's side of what

15 happened on, you know, December 3 0th, and they

16 believe the defendant's side, as another episode of

17 violence directed by the victim towards her,

18 don't know.

19 But if there is testimony that she went over

2 0 there, got into a fight because he wouldn't let her

2 1 stay over there, and the victim has, you know, has

2 2 injuries afterwards, I think that's relevant, made

2 3 relevant by a self-defense argument that is put

2 4 forward by the defendant that there's been a

2 5 history of violence here. Not just specifically --
190

1 now, if the self-defense argument in this case was

2 premised simply on he was coming at me with a
3 knife, or just the facts that are discretely

4 limited to what happened in the incident, I don't

5 think this stuff is relevant. But a battered woman

6 syndrome type argument, and we get into the

7 relationship between the victim and the defendant,

8 I think even though it's subsequent to the arrest,
9 I think it's not too remote, it's not too far

10 distanced from the time, the critical time in this

11 case, I think it's relevant.

12 So, it's granted, if after I hear the

13 defense -- let me put it this way. It's granted in

14 part as well, because the State cannot bring up

15 this evidence until such time as the defendant has

16 put on their case in chief, and at that point it

17 appears that the self-defense argument is not

18 limited simply to the discrete acts that occurred

19 on the day in question.

2 0 So, you can't mention it in opening

2 1 statement, all right, I mean the State cannot. It

2 2 depends on what the defense brings out in its case

2 3 in chief, all right.

2 4 So, that's the ruling.

2 5 I'll put it, probably put it in a short order
191

1 when I get back, I'll type something up so it's
2 more abbreviated than on the record.

3 But it can't be mentioned, the arrest cannot

4 be mentioned at all, the fact there's a prosecution

5 cannot be mentioned at all. The fact that this

6 incident did occur on December 3 0, 2 010, can't be

7 mentioned in opening statement.

8 I'll have to wait to see what self-defense

9 evidence is put forward by the defendant. But

10 can tell you right now, if the evidence is as

11 defense counsel has represented here, then I think

12 it's probably relevant.

13 MR. COBBIN: And Your Honor, just for clarity

14 for my personal use, if we believe that we have

15 reached that threshold where the Court would

16 consider allowing that information in, I'm clearly

17 allowed to preempt that with testimony about that

18 incident.

19 THE COURT: Yes. I mean, if you believe that,

2 0 I mean, you know, if you're telling me, yes, that

2 1 it is, you know, we've got, you know, we're going

2 2 to be putting on battered woman syndrome of

2 3 evidence, that deals with the whole relationship,

2 4 not just discretely limited to what happened on the

2 5 day in question, then I don't think you waive your
192

1 right for appellate purposes to mention that, if

2 that's what you're trying to ask me, okay. So,

3 yeah, I mean I know, that I've got to give you a

4 clear enough answer, or a clear enough order on

5 that so you can do -- you know make a preemptive

6 argument. I think I have, but others may differ,

7 okay. But, do you understand what the ruling is?

8 MR. COBBIN: Yes. I understand the ruling,

9 I'm just trying to make sure that I understand my

10 limitations. Because again, I don't want this
information to come in, but I understand that if

12 its coming after me, and I have no chance to then

13 come back behind it.

14 THE COURT: It's coming if your evidence is as

15 you say it is, okay. It's coming in, all right.

16 If the State wants to proffer it in rebuttal.

17 They're not to mention that in opening

18 statements, until such time as we figure out what

19 you want to do. And if you want to make a

2 0 preemptive opening statement and talk about that,

2 1 then I don't think you've waived it. I think

2 2 you're entitled to do that under the case law,

2 3 without inviting error, I guess, or waiving your

2 4 right to claim that as error.

2 5 Is there anything else we need to address?
193

1 MR. LAKE: Judge, I understand the Court's

2 ruling. The State will make no reference to an
3 arrest, no reference to a prosecution. In the

4 event that this evidence becomes admissible,

3 depending on the defense, is the State precluded

6 from calling a law enforcement officer to say, I

7
saw injuries, we don't mention the arrest, we don't

8 mention anything but that he saw injuries, these

9 are the photos?

10 THE COURT: I don't believe -- if they're

11 eyewitnesses, they're able to testify. But they

12 can't say, I made an arrest, this is what I

13 believed happened, obviously it's not a hearsay,

14 the victim told me this, or anything of that

15 nature. But what he or she personally observed

16 when they were out there, is admissible.

17 MR. LAKE: And Judge, T understand the State's

18 walking a careful line, so we'll be abundantly

19 careful not to do anything contrary to the Court's

2 0 ruling.

2 1 THE COURT: Okay. Any other questions or

2 2 anything along those lines?

2 3 MR. COBBIN: No, Your Honor. Just for

2 4 clarity, we're going to start at 1:00 on Thursday?

2 5 THE COURT: That is the plan. We've got, its
194

1 my final pretrial day, it will take a while.

2 know we'll have at least 2 0 final pretrials. And

3 hopefully some of those will go away.
THE CLERK: It's maybe 2 2 pages.

5 THE COURT: Well, depending on the

6 arraignments, if we don't get too many more

7 arraignments between now and then.

8 THE CLERK: This is as of right now.

9 THE COURT: So, be prepared to go at 1:00,

10 that's my goal, we'll go from 1:00 to 5:00. And

11 then I need, I think I'm going to need to start at

12 9:3 0 on Friday. I've got a meeting that I'm

13
supposed to go to at 10:00, but obviously with

14 trial, I can't do that. I'm trying to move it up

15 to before then.

16 All right. We'll see everybody here on

17 Thursday.

18 MR. COBBIN: Yes.

19 MR. LAKE: Thank you, Your Honor.

2 0 THE COURT: Thank you.

2 1 Proceedings concluded at 2 :52 p.m.)

2 2 - - -
2 3
2 4
2 5
2 5
1 CERTIFICATE
2
3 STATE OF FLORIDA )
4 COUNTY OF DUVAL )
5
6
7
8
9
10 stenographic notes.

11 DATED this day of
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2 0
2 1
2 2
2 3
2 4
that I was authorized to and did stenographically
report the foregoing proceedings and that the
transcript is a true and complete record of my
I, Colleen S. David, Court Reporter, certify
COLLEEN S. DAVID
()
to,t)c)
, 2 012 .
195












Exhibit 3
Fn..;
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR
DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 2010-CF-8579-AXXX
DIVISION: CR-G
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
MARISSA DANIELLE ALEXANDER
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE
Upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion in Litnine, and after hearing argument of
counsel and being otherwise advised of the issues and applicable law, the court grants, in part, the
Defendant's motion based upon the following grounds:
1. Defendant seeks to preclude any evidence or mention of her December 30, 2010 arrest
for domestic battery involving the victim in this case. Charges stemming from this incident are
currently pending in County Court.
2. Any evidence or mention that Defendant was arrested for this incident, or currently
subject to prosecution for this incident, is prohibited because the arrest and any criminal proceedings
arising therefrom constitute improper character evidence. Additionally, this evidence is highly
prejudicial and not probative of any relevant issues in this case and, therefore, precluded under
90.403, Fla. Stat.
3. However, Defense counsel has represented to this court that he will pursue a claim
of self-defense on the part of the Defendant. Furthermore, Defendant's claim of self-defense will
not be based strictly on specific actions taken by the victim on the day of the incident giving rise to
this case. Instead, Defense counsel has indicated that he will also present evidence to the jury about
the victim's history of violence and abuse towards the Defendant and that these past experiences also
Page 1 of 3
PAGE # 0222 OF 0825
contributed to her reasonable fear for her safety on the day in question.
4. If the Defendant puts forward competent evidence demonstrating that she has in the
past suffered violence at the hands of the victim, then evidence of the actual events surrounding the
December 30, 2010 incident would be relevant to rebut the Defendant's claim of self-defense.
5. According to representations of counsel, the State is prepared to present evidence that
the Defendant went over to the victim's house on December 30, 2010 and that an altercation ensued
when the victim told the Defendant that she could not stay over night. The State also represented
that witnesses will also testify that the victim displayed injuries after this altercation.
6. While the December 30, 2010 incident happened approximately 4 months after the
incident involved in this case, it still provides evidence to assist the trier-of-fact in deciding the
credibility of Defendant's claim that she was in fear for her safety because she has been subjected
to a history of domestic violence from the victim. Additionally, the probative value of this evidence
outweighs any prejudicial effect.
7. That said, evidence concerning the events of December 30, 2010 are only relevant
if the Defendant seeks to introduce evidence of abuse by the victim that occurred at a date and time
other than the incident involved in this case. Until such time as the Defendant introduces such
evidence, the State is prohibited from mentioning or providing any evidence of a domestic battery
that occurred on December 30, 2010.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
A. The State is prohibited from mentioning or presenting any evidence that the
Defendant was arrested on December 30, 2010 or that she is the subject of a prosecution arising out
of the events that occurred on that date;
B. Evidence and testimony as to what occurred leading up to, and what happened during,
Page 2 of 3
PAGE # 0223 OF 0825
H. DANIEL, Circuit Judge
the domestic battery on December 30, 2010 is admissible to rebut the Defendant's claims that she,
herself, was the victim of domestic violence committed by the victim in this case over a period of
time and that this contributed to her reasonable fear for her safety on the date that the incident giving
rise to this case occurred;
C.The State, however, is precluded from mentioning or presenting evidence as to what
occurred on December 30, 2010 until such time as the Defendant puts forward evidence concerning
her experiences as the victim of domestic violence;
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, this 14'
day of March, 2012.
Copies furnished to:
State Attorney's Office
Division CR-G
Public Defender's Office
Division CR-G
Page 3 of 3
PAGE # 0224 0F0825












Exhibit 4
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT,
FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA
229
CASE NO.:
16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
DIVISION: CR-G
STATE OF FLORIDA
-VS-
MARISSA DANIELLE ALEXANDER,
Defendant.
(Pages 229 - 428)
TESTIMONY AND PROCEEDINGS taken on Friday,
March 16, 2012, before The Honorable James H. Daniel,
Judge of the Circuit Court, Division CR-G, in the Duval
CountyCourthouse, Jacksonville, Florida, and as
reported by Jayne McCully, Court Reporter and Notary
Public in and for the State of Florida at Large.
1
Q
265
And when you see those police officers, do you
2 run back in the house?
3 A No.
4 Q Do you do anything? What do you do?
5 A l comply. l didn't want to be shot so l
6 complied.
7 Q Andwhat did they do with you?
8 A They Just came over and then they grabbed my
9 phone, and then they had a female officer Just kind of
10 look at me a little bit.
11
12
13
Q
A
Q
And did they put -- where did they place you?
In the back of the car.
Did the officer ask you what had happened
14 inside of that home?
15
16
A
Q
No, not initially, no.
Did anybody at any time come and ask you what
17 happened inside the home?
No.
No officer asked you that day what happened?
18
19
20
A
Q
A Not initially. He asked me after he came back
21 to sit in the car.
22 Q And what did you tell him happened inside?
23 A l told him that, you know, l told him about
24 the text messages, and l told him he jumped on me, and l
25 told him l was scared.
266
1 Q
And you told him that's what -- and you told
2 him that's why you fired the weapon?
3 A Yeso
4 MR. COBBIN: May l have one second, Your
5 Honor?
6 THE COURT: You may.
7 BY MR. COBBIN:
8 Q
Now, moving past August lst, moving on to a
9 totally different time --
Uh-huh (affirmative) 10
11
A
Q did you and Mr. Gray have another incident
12 after that?
13 A Yeso
14 Q And when was that incident?
15 A December 30th.
16 Q December 30th of the same year?
17 A Yes.
18 Q 2010?
19 A Yeso
20 Q Now, what happened in that incident?
21 A l believe he was on a trip driving over the
22 road, and l was off because it was during Christmastime.
23 l received an e-mail from my job.
24
25
Q
A
So you got -- what did the e-mail say?
The e-mail stated that if l had not produced
1 Rihanna's birth certificate, that they were going to
2 drop her from my insurance and l would not be able to
3
4
5 A
MR. LAKE: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
l would not be able to add her into open
6 enrollment again.
7 Q Why was it important that Rihanna have
8 insuranc e?
9 A Rihanna was a premature baby. You know, she
10 had several doctor' s appointments, specialists she
11 needed to see. She was going to Wolfson and she was
12 going to Nemours. At that particular time Rihanna had
13 -- l can't pronounce it but l'm going to try,
267
14 hydronephrosis, which is swollen -- an enlarged kidney.
15
16
17
Q
A
Q
And so insurance was important?
Yeso
Now, what was the issue with the birth -- why
18 was there an issue with the birth certificate?
19 A Because Rihanna has Rico's last name, and mine
20 -- l had not changed my name yet, so it was -- all my
21 dependents had my last name except Rihanna.
22 Q
23 yours?
24
25
A
Q
So having Lincoln's last name of Alexander is
Right, right.
So what did you need to do in order to satisfy
1 your company's insurance company to maintain that
2 insurance?
268
3 A
4 papers.
Initially what l did was send in my discharge
Back when l had my twins, you'd get your birth
5 certificate in the mail, but now you have to go and get
6 it once you have a baby. So they needed to have the
7 birth certificate to validate.
8
9
10
Q
A
Q
So discharge papers aren't good enough?'
No.
In order to get that birth certificate, what
11 did you need?
12 A l needed to have him sign the birth
13 certificate. Me and his names were different.
14
Q
And did you advise Mr. Gray that you needed
15 this birth certificate signed?
16 A l did. l forwarded the e-mail to him and
17 said, Hey, can you sign the birth certificate so l can
18 keep Rihanna -- keep the insurance on Rihanna.
19
Q
And this was -- you did that the same day that
20 you got the e-mail?
21 A l looked in my Blackberry. l came from work.
22 l looked in my Blackberry and l forwarded it to him.
23 Q So in order to get him to sign the birth
24 certificate what did you decide to do?
25 A
l forwarded it to him to let him know and he
1 sa id it is okay that l corne by.
2
3
4
Q
A
Q
And so you are going to go to his house?
Right.
Now, he is living at the same house or a
5 different location?
6 A Living at a house literally, probably less
7 than a mile from my house, from where l was living.
8 Q Do you make any arrangements before you go
9 over there?
269
10 A Yeso l went ahead and spoke with Antwan -- l
11 mean Twan Brown and Eric. l went and spoke with them.
12 They stay not too far either.
13 would accompany me.
And l asked them if they
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
MR. LAKE: Objection, Judge, hearsay.
THE COURT: Let me -- l'm trying to -- yes,
l'm just going to sustain it actually. l believe it
qualifies. Sustained. If you want to hear side bar
on it, l'Il be happy to ...
MR. COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor, briefly.
(Side-bar conference held outside the hearing
of the jury.)
THE COURT: Can you read back the last
question and answer.
(The court reporter read back the last
question and answer.)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Il
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
THE COURT:
AlI right, fi Il me in.
MR. COBBIN:
l'm not going ta ask her what
they said, who she was talking ta, anything like
that.
THE COURT: l'm sorry. I was writing sorne
notes down.
270
I don't think that is hearsay, okay. I don't
think it's being offered -- first of aIl, l'm not
sure that he even asked her about the conversation.
Even if he did, the conversation, I don't know --
even if he did get into the conversation, l'm not
even sure it's being offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. I mean ...
MR. COBBIN: I wasn't going to ask her what
they said to her or anything like that.
THE COURT: AlI right. WeIl, that is fair
enough. That is fine. Yeso
MR. THOMPSON: If she testifies what she told
them, then that's for the truth of the matter
asserted, and we would ask the Court to sustain it.
It is still hearsay.
THE COURT: But she is not -- I understand you
can't of fer -- a party can't offer that as an
admission as testimony, but I don't think -- this
isn't being really offered for the truth of the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
271
matter asserted. l think it's just more of what
happened. lt's more of -- anyways, it is -- l don't
believe that it qualifies as hearsay, and l think
you're okay.
l should have picked up on it, and l was just
writing sorne notes when you asked that question.
You guys always time your objections when l'm
writing a note or something. So anyways. Thanks.
It's overruled.
(Side-bar conference concluded; proceedings
resumed before the jury.)
THE COURT: You may proceed.
13 BY MR. COBBIN:
14 Q And you say you contacted them, and you said
15 they live very close to Mr. Gray's house?
16 A Yeso We all stayed pretty much in the same
17 area right off of Capper Road.
18 Q Did you contact anyone else before you went
19 over to Mr. Gray's house?
20 A l let Lincoln know.
21 Q
That is Lincoln Alexander?
22 A Right.
23 Q
And then where did you go?
24 A l went ahead and went around there to give it
25 to him to sign.
1
2
3
4
Q
A
Q
A
80 you went to get him to sign the paper?
Right.
And when you got there what happened?
l let him visit with Rihanna.
He had just
272
5 gotten back from a particular trip.
l let him visit her
6 and gave him that particular paperwork, and l also
7 mentioned to him about the divorce paperwork and.
8
9
Q
A
And after -- how long are you there?
No more than -- no more than anywhere between
10 l'd say about 15 minutes.
11
12
Q
A
And then when you try to leave, what happens?
When l'm trying to leave, he asked me was
13 Rihanna going to stay, and l told him -- it was one of
14 those things where somebody asks you a dumb question and
15 you give them a dumb answer, so l said was Rhianna's
16 mother going to stay, and he was like, No.
17 Okay.
l said,
18 Q Now, when you said that, then what did you
19 guys do with Rihanna?
20
21
A
Q
We gO to put her in the truck.
And then what does he do after he puts Rihanna
22 in the truck?
23 A l asked him to give me the birth certificate
24 and could he just go ahead and, you know, sign those
25 divorce papers as well.
1
2
Q
A
And what does he do at that point?
He got really upset, and that is when he
3 started -- he started swinging on me.
4 Q Where are you guys in reference to that home
5 that house?
273
6 A By -- my truck was outside and we were inside
7 the garage. That particular house is a one-car garage.
8 Q And you said he start swinging on you. How is
9 he swinging on you?
10 A That was actually the first time he actually
11 swung on me like -- like a swing.
12
13
Q
A
And what are you trying to do?
l'm blocking him. l had my hands up like this
14 (demonstrating).
15 Q At any time are you trying to get back at
16 him l mean get away like hold him off or anything
17 like that?
18
19
20
21
A
Q
A
Q
Yes, l am.
At any time is it possible that you hit him?
Yeso
Do you know if you could have possibly hit him
22 in the eye?
23 A Yes, it is a possibility. l wasn't going for
24 body shots.
25 Q
When did -- where did you go after -- were you
1 able to get away?
Yeso
Where did you go?
2
3
4
A
Q
A l just -- l got -- l went to Twan's house.
5 That was .the first place l could get to without trying
6 to go aIl the way home.
7
8
Q
A
And did you have any injuries on you?
l had -- l had bruises on my arms from
9 bloc king up.
l had -- l had -- my wrist was -- this
10 thumb area was swollen. It was bruised. l had a scar
11 under my eye. l had knots in my head.
12
13
14
15
16
17
Q
A
How many knots did you have in your head?
l had two.
Q Did anyone observe those injuries?
MR. LAKE: Speculation.
THE COURT: Overruled as to anyone is
anyone there that could have observed.
18 BY MR. COBBIN:
19 Q Was anyone there that could have observed
20 those injuries?
Yes, Eric and Twan.
274
21
22
A
Q Did anyone else come that could have observed
23 those injuries?
24
25
A
Q
Lincoln.
At a later date like the next day or anything
1 like that, did anybody el se observe those injuries?
2 A My -- my rest of my family, my sister, my
3 mother, hum ...
4 Q Did you go to the hospital that night?
5 AYes.
MR. COBBlN: One second, Your Honor.
275
6
7
8
9
No further questions at this time, Your Honor.
10
11
12
THE COURT: AlI right, Mr. Cobbin has
finished.
ls the state ready to cross-examine?
MR. LAKE: Yes, Judge.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
13 BY MR. LAKE:
14 Q Ms. Alexander, l think on direct examination
15 you testified that you felt like you had to get the gun
16 because it was a kill or be killed situation; is that
17 correct?
18
19
A
Q
Yeso
And given the prior history of violence that
20 you testified about, you had that -- you went into the
21 garage to get the gun because you felt like he was going
22 to kill you or seriously injure you; is that correct?
23
24
25
A
Q
A
lnitially l went in to leave.
You went to leave initially?
Uh-huh (affirmative).
1 Q
2 said, it
3 A
4
Q
5 A
6
Q
Okay.
276
80 you did get the gun because, as you
was a kill or be killed situation, yes?
l had to protect myself, yes.
And that was on August lst of 2010, correct?
Correct.
And after that incident, once again, you
7 actually made up with Mr. Gray, correct? .
8
9
10
11
12 2010?
13
14
15 20107
16
17
18
19
20
21
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Made up7
You reconciled, you got back together7
No, we did not get back together.
Did you ever meet him again after August lst,
Yeso
And did you meet him before December 30th,
Yeso
And how many times did you meet with him?
It was a few times.
A few times you met with him?
Uh-huh (affirmative).
And l think previously you testified on one of
22 these incidents previously when you were going to break
23 up with him and move your stuff out, you wanted to have
24 your father there to be careful; is that right?
25 A Yeso
432
1
PRO CEE D l N G S
2 March 16, 2012
2:00 p.m.
3 (Defendant and jury present.)
4 (Continued from page 428.)
5 THE COURT: All right, will defense counsel
6 call their next witness.
7 MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, at this time the
8 defense would rest.
9 THE COURT: All right, counsel, just approach
10 side bar real quick about scheduling.
11 (Side bar, Court and counsel.)
12 THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen,
13 the defense has now rested their case and concluded
14 their case. We are now moving into the rebuttal
15 phase where the state gets to present any rebuttal
16 evidence that the state wishes to provide for your
17 consideration.
18 Mr. Lake, do you wish to proceed forward?
19 MR. LAKE: Yes, Judge. The state calls
20 Rico Gray, Sr.
21 THE COURT: All right, come forward. You can
22 take the stand, sir.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24 THE COURT: Before we begin though, sir, l
25 wanted to remind you that you are still under oath
1
2
3
from yesterday.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right.
4 RICO GRAY, SR.,
433
5 having previously been produced and first duly sworn as
6 a witness on behalf of the state, testified as follows:
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION
8 B Y MR. LAKE:
9 Q Mr. Gray, l want to discuss with you the
10 incident that took place on December 30th of 2010. Do
Il you remember that day?
12 A Yes/ sir.
13
Q
Where were you living at that time?
14 A 3228 Brockett Way.
15
Q
Is that where you're living now?
16 A Yes, sir.
17
Q
And who was living there on December 30th,
18 2010, with you?
19
20
A
Q
Me and my son pernell Gray.
Before anything happened on December 30th,
21 2010, how would you describe your relationship with the
22 defendant?
23
24
25
A
Q
A
l was getting along fine.
Okay.
We was getting along fine.
She was --
434
1
Q You were getting along because the incident
2 that happened on August -- the previous incident that we
3 talked about actually happened on August lst of 2010.
4 Am l correct that after some time you reconciled?
5
6
A
Q
Yes, sir.
And we already talked about what you said in
7 deposition and ultimately you decided to tell the truth;
8 is that right?
9
10
A
Q
Correct.
Was the de fendant at your home on
Il December 30th, 2010?
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
when
Rer
A
Q
you
A
car
Q
A
Yeso
AlI right. And tell me how she got there or
got there or how she first came to be there?
When l got off work, she was already there.
was in my garage.
What did you think when you saw her car there?
WeIl, we had words the night before, so l was
19 dumbfounded to Even see her car in my garage.
20 think she would be there.
l didn't
21
Q
All right. Did you eventually have a
22 conversation, an argument with her in the driveway?
23
24
A
Q
Yeso
All right. And what was the plan as far as
25 whether Rihanna was going to stay the night or not?
435
1 A Well, she -- it was cold, so she asked me was
2 l going to give Rihanna a bath, and l know that Rihanna
3 never stayed to my house without her, so l immediately
4 asked her was Rihanna spending the night, and she said
5 if Rihanna is spending the night, l'm spending the
6 night. So l told her, well, 1'11 not going to give
7 Rihanna a bath because, you know, that -- let her know
8 t ~ t she wasn't spending the night.
9 Q And at sorne point did you go out into the
10 driveway or go out to where the car was?
Il
12
13
A
Q
A
Yeso
What happened?
Well, she pulled her car out of my garage, and
14 she was packing up her things, and she got it all packed
15 up, and l went and put Rihanna in Marissa's car, and l
16 was waiting on her to pull out of my driveway, and she
17 didn't pull out because l -- once l put -- once l put
18 Ri'h2wna in the car, l immediately got in my car because
19 l was waiting on her to pull out of my one-car garage
20 because l was fixing to pull my car in the garage. But
21 she never moved out of my driveway, so l got back out of
22 my car and just was going to walk in my house through
23 the garage, and she got out of the truck and came behind
24 me. And l said, Marissa, l don't want to argue with
25 you, you know, just go ahead and leave. And she
436
1 wouldn't leave.
2
And like l know my kids was in the living
3 room, pernell and Rico. So she didn't leave. So l
4 opened up my door to the house, make -- hoping that she
5 would leave, but she seen my kids there, you know, and
6 she didn't leave. So l told Pernell, excuse me, to call
7 the police, and l looked away for a second. Then she
8 sucker punched me and then shejumped in her car and
9 ran.
10
11
12
13
14
Q
A
Q
Did you ever lay your hands on her that day?
No, sir.
MR. LAKE: Can l approach the witness?
THE COURT: You may.
l'm showing you what has been marked as
15 State's Exhibits R, S, and T for identification. Can
16 you look through those three exhibits and tell me if you
17 recognize those photographs?
18
19
A
Q
Yeso
Do you recognize all three photographs in
20 State's R, S, and T?
21 A Yes, sir.
22 Q And do they reflect the injuries inflicted by
23 the defendant upon you on December 30th, 2010?
24
25
A
Q
Yes
l
sir.
A fair and accurate representation?
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9
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16
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18
19
20
21
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25
A Yes, sir.
MR. LAKE: Judge, at this time 1 move R, S,
and Tinto evidence now as the next numbered
exhibits.
THE COURT: Any objections?
437
MR. COBB1N: No, we would not object to those
pictures.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. LAKE: May 1 publish?
THE COURT: You may. Before we do it though,
it would be, 1 think, 14, 15, and 16?
THE CLERK:
THE COURT:
18, 19, and 20.
18, 19, and 20. They will be
admitted as State's Exhibits 18, 19 and 20.
(State's Exhibit Nos. 18, 19 and 20 were
received in evidence.l
MR. LAKE: And, Judge, 1'm going to ask
instead of publishing them on the screen, to publish
directly to the jury.
THE COURT: That is fine.
MR. LAKE: 1'11 have them marked once they are
done publishing them around.
THE COURT: They are already marked for
identification at this point.
(The exhibits are published.l
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
jury.
MR. LAKE:
THE COURT:
438
May l have the photographs marked.
Mr. Levant can take them from the
And then you can mark the photographs.
MR. LAKE: Nothing further at this time,
Judge.
THE COURT: Any cross-examination?
MR. COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You may proceed when ready.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Il BY MR. COBBIN:
12
Q
Mr. Gray, you said that on December 30th when
13 you got home, Ms. Alexander was already there?
14 A l got home December 31st. l was on the road
15 December 30th. l was on my way home.
16
17
Q
A
Okay.
WeIl, that night, December 30th, is the night
18 l got home that night. Yeso
19
20
21
Q
A
Q
You said that she was already there?
Yes, that's correct.
Did you get an e-mail from Ms. Alexander that
22 day about Rihanna's insurance?
23 A l don't recall it, but l believe that she
24 e-mailed me before about it, but l don't know if it was
25 e-mailed that day.
1 Q
439
And she needed you ta sign a birth certificate
2 to keep her insurance; is that correct?
3
4
5
A
Q
A
Yeso We talked about that. Yes.
So you did get an e-mail from her saying
Yeso But l don't knaw if it was that night,
6 sir. l don't.
7 Q And you knew that she had to come over to get
8 the birth -- she came over to get the birth certificate
9 signed?
10 A No, sir.
11 she lived with me.
She pretty much -- when l was home,
When l was home, she was there.
12 Q And that night you attacked Ms. Alexander,
13 didn' t you?
14
15
A
Q
NOl sir.
You attacked her because she wouldn't stay
16 there; is that correct?
17
18
A
Q
NOl sir.
You punched Ms. Alexander in the head that
19 night several times, didn't you?
20 A No, sir.
21 Q And Ms. Alexander tried to defend herself that
22 day again; isn' t that correct?
23
24
A
Q
No, sir.
So on December 30th you never put your hands
25 on Ms. Alexander?
1
2
A
Q
440
l never put my hands on Ms. Alexander.
So you have no idea how she would have got any
3 kind of knots on her head or any kind of wounds?
4 A Not to my life -- l don't know anything about
5 i t .
6 Q
Because she had them five minutes after she
You would have no idea how she got those?
7 saw you.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
A l don't know how she got them, sir.
MR. COBBIN: l don't have any further
questions.
THE COURT: Any redirect?
MR. LAKE: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
You may step down and you are
excused, sir.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
(Witness excused.l
THE COURT:
AlI right, the state may calI its
next witness.
MR. THOMPSON:
The state calls
Officer C. K. Jimenez.
THE CLERK:
Sir, please raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you
give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth so help you God?
THE WITNESS: l do.
1 THE COURT: You may proceed when you are
2 ready.
3 OFFICER CHRISTOPHER JIMENEZ,
4 having been produced and first duly sworn as a witness
5 on behalf of the defendant, testified as follows:
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION
7 BY MR. THOMPSON:
8 Q Good afternoon, Officer. Can you introduce
9 yourself to the jury, please.
10 A
11 Q
12 A
13 Q
14 A
15 Q
16 A
17 Side.
18 Q
Yeso l'm Officer Christopher Jimenez.
And who do you currently work for?
The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office.
Approximately how long?
Six years now.
And what are your current duties?
l work patrol in Zone 6, which is the North
l want to refer your attention back to the
441
19 December 30th of 2010. Do you recall the events of that
20 evening?
21
22
A
Q
l do.
Do you remember being dispatched to
23 3228 Brockett Way?
24
25
A
Q
Yes, sir.
And what was that calI in reference to?
442
1 A A domestic battery.
2 Q
When you arrived on the scene, who did you
3 come in contact with?
4 A The victim, Mr. Rico Gray.
5 Q Did you assess what had occurred at this
6 point?
7 A Yes/ sir, l did.
8 Q What was that?
9 A The suspect, Marissa Alexander, had come to
10 his residence to drop off one of their children. She
11 became angered when he wouldn't let her spend the night
12 at his house and began striking him and then proceeded
13 to leave the residence.
14 Q Do you see Ms. Marissa Alexander here in the
15 courtroom today?
16 A l do.
17 Q And can you please identify her with her
18 location and clothing?
19 A She is sitting at that table with a white
20 jacket and purple shirt.
21 MR. THOMPSON: If the record could reflect the
22 witness has identified the defendant?
23 THE COURT: The record will reflect this
24
witness has identified the defendant in open court.
25 You may continue.
443
1 BY MR. THOMPSON:
2 Q
Officer Jimenez, in assessing the credibility
3 of your victim, Mr. Gray, did you also speak to two
4 children witnesses that were there?
5
6
A
Q
7 events?
8
9
10
11
A
Q
A
Q
Yes, sir, l did.
And did they confirm his account of the
Yes, sir, they did.
What were those children's names?
It was pernell Gray and Rico Gray, Jr.
Were you advised that the victim actually just
12 held his hands up while the de fendant was beating him?
13
14
A
Q
Yes, sir.
Was the de fendant there at the scene while you
15 were there?
16
17
A
Q
18 defendant?
19 A
20 Q
21 A
22 Q
No, sir.
Did you ever get in contact with the
Yes, sir, l did.
So she in fact had left the scene?
Yes, sir.
When you initially spoke with the defendant,
23 what did she initially tell you?
24 A l spoke with her over the phone originally.
25 She was hesitant to meet with me, speak about the
444
1 incident.
She told me that she didn't know what l was
2 talking about and that she had an alibi.
3 Q
Eventually were you able to make contact with
4 this defendant?
5 A Yeso She agreed to meet with me at a later
6 time.
7 Q When you came in contact with Mr. Gray, did he
8 have any visible injuries that you could see?
9 A Yes, sir, he did. He had a small swelling
10 under his left eye.
11 Q
When you came in contact with the defendant,
12 could you see any injuries on her?
A No, sir, l didn't. 13
14
15
16
MR. THOMPSON: Permission to approach the
witness, Judge?
THE COURT: You may.
17 BY MR. THOMPSON:
18
Q Officer Jimenez, l'm showing you what has been
19 marked as State's Exhibits 18 and 19.
20 these?
21 A Yes, sir.
22 Q And what are they?
23 A That is the victim and his
Do you recognize
injuries.
24 Q ls that how he looked on December 30th, 2010,
25 when you saw him?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
BY
Ms.
A Yeso
MR. THOMPSON:
May l have a moment, Judge?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. THOMPSON: Nothing further.
THE COURT: Cross-examination.
MR. COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
MR. COBBIN:
Q Good afternoon, Officer Jimenez.
A Good afternoon, sir.
Q On that night, December 30th, did you touch
Alexander's head?
A
Q
No, sir, l did not.
Did anything give you cause to think she may
445
15 have had knots on her head?
16 A She informed me that she did have a swelling
17 on the top of her head.
18 Q But you never touched her head?
19 A No, sir. l informed her that l wouldn't be
20 able ta tell the difference, you know, the shape of her
21 head before the incident and after the incident.
22 Q So it's very possible that she had right there
23 in front of you she had injuries ta her head?
24
25
A
Q
l can't say one way or the other, sir.
Do you know if Ms. Alexander went to the
446
1 hospi tal that night?
2
3
4
5
A l believe she did.
MR. COBBIN: l don't have any further
questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any redirect?
6 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
7 BY MR. THOMPSON:
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Q
A
Didn't fire and rescue say she wasfine?
Yes, sir, they did.
MR. THOMPSON: Nothing further, Judge.
THE COURT: Mr. Cobbin, is there anything you
would like to address?
MR. COBBIN:
question. 1 ...
THE COURT:
standing up --
Yes, sir, follow up to that
l just didn't know if you were
MR. COBBIN: Approach side bar, or ...
THE COURT: l understand. Approach side bar.
(Side-bar conference held outside the hearing
of the jury.)
THE COURT: What do you want to ask the
witness?
MR. COBBIN: l would have objected to his
question but he asked it quick and 1 ...
THE COURT: Do you want to lodge an objection?
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7
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9
10
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12
13
14
15
16
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18
19
20
21
22
23
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25
Do you want to lodge an objection?
MR. COBBIN:
objection.
THE COURT:
Yes, l would like to lodge an
Based on what?
447
MR. COBBIN: What fire and rescue observed as
to hearsay.
THE COURT: AlI right, state.
MR. THOMPSON: l would allege that it is not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted whether
or not she went to the hospital or not.
THE COURT: l can't hear you?
MR. THOMPSON: l would allege that it is not
for the truth of whether she was injured or not or
whether she was hurt or not.
THE COURT: l mean it really goes back to
whether -- what his knowledge was based upon whether
it is hearsay or not. l mean does he have personal
knowledge of that or not, and l don't know that it
was established that he has personal knowledge.
other words, his knowledge is completely based on
hearsay.
In
MR. THOMPSON: WeIl, l mean, l know based upon
your ruling l couldn't go into the arrest.
Basically what happened is she fell out of his back
seat and he had to go and find rescue to come to his
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448
car, and then he took her to the (inaudible) come
out so l know l can't bring that out, but he had
knowledge that she was (inaudible) took her back and
put her in the jail.
THE COURT: l mean it sounds to me like you
might be able to establish that she had a -- that he
had personal knowledge because he was watching her
at times and put her in the car, so the objection is
overruled on that basis. l think -- and l don't
know that you want to go any further into this --
because l want you aIl -- we're not getting into
arrests and why and aIl of that.
MR. THOMPSON: l was done.
THE COURT:
But it sounds like he has personal
would have personal knowledge.
It wasn't really
established, but if you want to -- l mean it sounds
like he has personal knowledge of it.
MR. COBBIN: AlI right.
THE COURT:
l mean if you want him to inquire
further to establish that personal knowledge, l can
do that, but l don't want -- but, you know, if he
comes out and says arrest, you know, because l took
her
you know, put her in my car and took her in
for an arrest, then that presents problems, aIl
right, so what do you want to do?
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449
MR. THOMPSON: l was done.
THE COURT: l understand the for his
personal knowledge hasn't been established yet. It
sounds like he can, but it sounds like also you're
going to get into some pretty dangerous territory as
far as l'm concerned.
MR. THOMPSON: That is why l left it where it
was. Can he establish that he knows that she went
back.
THE COURT: AlI right, the objection is
sustained at this point.
to do anything else?
AlI right, do you want me
MR. COBBIN:
THE COURT:
MR. COBBIN:
No.
Let's leave it at that.
(Inaudible. )
l sustained the objection.
MR. COBBIN: (Inaudible) disregard the
statement.
THE COURT: WeIl, you can ask me for a
curative instruction, but l would also give him the
opportunity to cure it.
MR. COBBIN: AlI right.
THE COURT: It's your choice.
MR. THOMPSON: (Inaudible) and also cure
(inaudible) ask him about his personal knowledge.
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450
MR. COBBIN: I know he (inaudible) ...
THE COURT: We need to make a decision quickly
on this, gentlemen. This is not the major point,
but it can go into something that could be bad.
MR. COBBIN: (Inaudible) l'm good.
THE COURT: So what do you want me to do?
MR. COBBIN: l'm not going to ask, Your Honor.
THE COURT: AlI right, fair enough.
(Side-bar conference concluded; proceedings
resume before the jury.)
THE COURT: AlI right, is there anything else
from either side?
MR. COBBIN: No, Your Honor.
MR. THOMPSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The witness may step down. Thank
you, sir.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Witness excused.)
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that
concludes the evidentiary portion of this trial. I
am going to need for you to recess back to the jury
deliberation room for about 10 to 15 minutes while I
take care of a few matters with counsel that I have
to do again outside of your presence.
Hopefully, though, we got a lot of the work
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451
done over the lunch that we would normally do at
this point or stage of the trial.
And so l'm
hopeful that we'll get it done very quickly and
bring you back out here so we can begin closing
arguments. So that is why l would just like you to
stay here as opposed to go out and spread out from
the courthouse, aIl right.
You have now heard aIl of the testimony and
evidence in this case. However, it is still not
time for you to discuss amongst yourselves what
you've heard or your feelings about the testimony or
anything that you've heard or seen here in the
courtroom.
arguments.
That will come shortly after closing
Again, l instruct you not to do any
research on your own. If you do need to use your
phone, which you -- if you need to make a phone
calI, we can certainly arrange that with Mr. Levant
or someone handing you the phone in there or
whatever. But just do not do any research on your
own or make any contact with anyone to discuss the
case.
with that you aIl will retire. Leave your
notes on the chair. We'll hopefully get done with
this as quickly as possible.
(The jury exit the courtroom.)
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photos and decide for yourself how this happened,
but 1 would submit that the physical evidence is
consistent with Mr. Gray's testimony and not the
defendant's.
Now, again, you have been introduced to the
493
world of domestic violence. You have heard about a
lot of incidents and a lot of people's opinion about
Mr. Gray, and it's about how he is a viblent person,
about how he's committed acts of domestic violence
against this defendant, and presumably that she is
justified in thinking that he was going to kill her.
WeIl, what is at issue is her fear, whether
she had a reasonable apprehension, whether those
were the acts ofa reasonably cautious and prudent
person.
How do you determine what a person's state of
mind is? WeIl, by their actions, by what they do
and also by what they say.
Now, you heard about the se prior incidents.
Not at any time did she ever say that she called
911, that she called police. You heard about aIl of
the se incidents leading up to it, and yet she
continued to go see him. ls this really a kill or
be killed situation?
On December 30th of 2010, this is months after
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494
this allegedly happened where she feels like she has
to dfend herself with deadly force.
She continues
to see him. Is this somebody who is in fear?
Decide for yourself and consider the facts.
Based on appearances the defendant must have
actually believed the danger was real. You
de termine what a person was thinking and what they
felt based on what they do.
What about December 30th of 2010? When she
went over to Mr. Gray's new house, she said it was
just Rihanna that went with her; it was just the
baby. She didn't bother taking her father this time
despite what she said earlier about an incident that
she felt like he needed to (inaudible) and yet this
is after the incident where he is allegedly trying
to kill her, but she is comfortable going to his
house and committing an act that you see there, that
we heard a rebuttal testimony. Are those the
actions of somebody who has fear of Mr. Gray or
somebody who simply gets upset with him and
overreacts?
Ladies and gentlemen, you're going to be given
a set of jury instructions, and you have to make
several findings. If you ~ i n that the de fendant is
guilty of aggravated assault -- you're going to be
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given what 1s called a verdict form. You are going
to be provided a verdict form. And the Judge will
show this to you, and you are going to have some
options. If you decide the de fendant is guilty, it
must be unanimous. If you find the defendant is not
guilty, it must be unanimous.
That issue is not whether she possessed a gun
or discharged a gun, but y ~ will have to make some
further f1ndings. If you find that the de fendant is
guilty, it will be marked as such. If you fihd that
she actually possessed a gun and discharged it, it
would be marked as such.
Now, there is something called lesser included
crimes. If you think that the de fendant is not
guilty of the highest crime of aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, you may find that the evidence
supports something called a lesser included crime.
And a lesser included crime of aggravated assault is
simply assault. In other words, it is the act of
unlawfully threatening by word or act to do violence
without a deadly weapon. That is the lesser
included crime. But the evidence is supported, and
it is really not an issue whether she possessed a
gun. 80 l don't find -- l don't believe that you
will find that she is guilty of aggravated assault.
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537
She wanted the marriage to work.
But after he
punched her -- she punched him in the eye in front
of his kids, he said this can't happen anymore.
But his account on that day was he put his
hands up, and she went by him and brandi shed -- said
l got something for your ass, because he said a
comment that he probably shouldn't have said about
the baby not being his. That does not give you the
right to pull out a gun on someone and shoot at
them.
But by her own words she said she -- he did
not put his hands on me. AlI he did was belly me.
Lincoln Alexander told you that, and that happened
right after the shooting, members of the jury.
Nothing about choking, nothing about getting hit,
thrown around, none of that.
Now, she gets on the stand and says he choked
me and he hit me and he threw me. She had to say
that because she had to prove -- she has to now say
to you, l was in fear for my life. Members of the
jury, she ran right past him and ran and got that
gun.
What else did the mother say? She told you
that that gun is in there locked. She had the keys.
She could have left. She didn't want to leave. She
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538
was pissed off.
When she was testifying on the
stand, every instance that they are arguing, member
of the jury, every instance she never said one word
back. She didn't argue back. We know that she can
hit people. We know that she is just not going to
sit back and take it. She hit him in the face.
isn't going to sit there and not say anything.
She
They
were cursing back and forth. He told you, we were
arguing back and forth. He was honest. l was
calling her this. She was calling me names. We
argued back and forth. They were married.
Arguments happen, sometimes names get exchanged.
That happens.
But by her testimony she never did anything
wrong. She was very up there, solace. Members of
the jury, she needs you to believe that, but that is
not what happened.
This reputation testimony that they talked to
you -- they brought in Ms. pitts and his other
sister-in-law, Ms. Poole. This reputation testimony
that you heard was from this defendant. As
Ms. pitts told you, she talked to this de fendant and
that is where she got the reputation in the
community, her and another ex-girlfriend.
The only violence against her was three
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539
instances, and both of those women told you in
22 years and 8 years that they knew him never saw
him be violent, never saw him hit anyone, but aIl of
a sudden he has this huge, violent, reputation in
the community. They both told you they had never
seen him be violent. That is their testimony from
the stand, members of the jury.
The house and the gunshots, and you have the
pictures. You can take that back there. The gun
casing, that shows you -- look, if you're there and
the buIIet casing, as you heard from Mr. Lardizabal,
exits from the right, the gun casing is not to the
corner over here from where it should be by her
account. It is in the middle. That is facing this
way towards the kit chen and eject -- and the casing
ejecting to the right. That physical Evidence
matches the testimony of Mr. Rico Gray, Sr. and
Mr. Pernell Gray.
Aggravated battery, the felony that is alleged
in this self-defense instruction, that he
intentionally touched or struck her against her will
and she was caused great bodily harm, that is what
she had to believe, that she was in fear of death or
great bodily harm. And to prove that they brought
three instances in over three or four years of her
STATE OF FLORIDA)
)
COUNTY OF DUVAL )
COURT CERTIFICATE
587
l, Jayne McCully, Professional Court Reporter,
certify that l was authorized to and did
stenographically report the foregoing proceedings and
that the transeript is a true and complete record of my
stenographie notes.
l further certify the original transcript
herein will be delivered to Lincoln Alexander.
DATED this 12th day of June 2012.
/ ~
.--r ,-, _c'/
( ,i(fC// ,",:;
";:","-_j' (:t,<,-, r U ~ ,i 1 Lilrt--tt.--j
~ ~
Jayne MoCully tf
Notary Public, State o ~ Florida
My Comm. expires June 16, 2014
Commission No. DD 992676












Exhibit 5
1
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, OF THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 2010-CF-8579-AXXXMA
DIVISION: CR-G
STATE OF FLORIDA,
VS.

FILED
MARISSA ALEXANDER,

UbW58A 9789
Defendant.

995848;3
CLU1K CIRCUIT COURT
MOTION PROCEEDINGS
taken on
Friday, March 9, 2012,
before the Honorable James H. Daniel, Judge of the
Circuit Court, in the Duval County Courthouse,
Jacksonville, Florida, as reported by Cindy M. Griffis,
Registered Professional Reporter.
OFFICIAL REPORTERS, INC.
201 EAST ADAMS STREET
Jacksonville, FL 32202
(904) 358-2090
T
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MR. LAKE: Oh, Judge, I'm sorry, I thought two
half -- okay, two half days would obviously make
one full day. Um, upon thinking about it, Judge,
given the number of defense witnesses that will
testify, I think it's going to be more than one day
of testimony. Um, just, I'd hate to be in a
situation, even if we start really early on Friday
and move along really well and take a short lunch
break, that we're going to be going well into
Friday night. And I'll stay as long as the Court
wants. I'm happy to stay as long as it takes. I'm
just concerned that the testimony may actually take
more than one day. I don't know, Mr. Cobbin may
know, but, in my experience, I think we're really
going to have to consider the testimony may go two
days, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. I don't know when you
are going on. I'll try to work with your schedule,
but this needs to take priority on both of your
schedules.
MR. COBBIN: Judge, I cleared up my whole next
week.
MR. LAKE: Based on what the Court indicated
last time that this was going, I am not trying any
other cases next week, my schedule is clear for
19
1 this case, so --

2 THE COURT: All right. I've got Khari Gaynor
3 and some of the people coming over this morning.
4 My trial -- they had to move to continue the trial
ZME9ALX 5 that was supposed to go today because of the last
6 minute amendments to the Information, so I'm going
7 to try to coordinate this and figure this out
8 today. I don't know when it is when I'm going to
9 schedule it. I'll call you-all this afternoon or
08:261kM 10 probably later this morning after I sit down. I've
11 just got to figure out where -- where I can place
12 it in the schedule, see if there is anybody else
13 that can take one of these other cases I've got.
14 My other cases are just half day pn"r"3 so, I, you
08:261kM 15 know -- and it really -- we can probably fit them
16 all in. The problem is I've got, you know, one
17 attorney on multiple cases so they had to be tried
18 obviously on different days. So I'll figure it out
19 and we'll get there and I'll give you guys a call.
7C E 9BLX 20 Okay?
21 MR. LAKE: Thank you.
22 MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, the only other, I

23 guess, thing we have, I was anticipating filing a
24 motion in limine based upon my conversation with
08:27AM 25 the prior State Attorney as to an act that happened
C
after the fact. I know Mr. Lake just gave me --
THE COURT: Was this the one that --
MR. COBBIN: While she was incarcerated. My
understanding is that they are not going to file a
Williams Rule hearing and they have not done that,
and were not going to mention that testimony in the
trial.
THE COURT: They got into another fight, or
whatever it was. Are they going to mention the
fact that she went over there?
MR. LAKE: Well, this other incident, Judge,
occurred after this particular case, and my intent
would be that would be rebuttal. Um, in other
words, if the defendant raises its self-defense
claim, and that the victim has a propensity towards
violence, the State can thereby rebut that.
THE COURT: But not the fact they got in a
fight when she went over there?
MR. LAKE: Well, I think that's absolutely
relevant to negate the defendant's claim that she's
acting out of self-defense and that it's in fact
the alleged victim's who has a propensity towards
violence.
MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, my understanding is
that the State is going to use that information if
9 1
1 my client during her testimony made it sound like

2 that she was so scared of him that she couldn't be

3 around him, or that she was scared to be around

4 him. That is not the testimony she has ever
7CE97X 5 elicited ever, and they were only going to raise

6 that if she was going to say that.
7 THE COURT: Well, it sounds to me they are

8 going to raise it, or try to bring it in if you try
9 to raise a self-defense claim, which, based upon
ZME9M8X 10 the last 30 minutes here, I'm pretty sure that's

11 your defense. So I mean, if you want to have a

12 motion in limine on it, or if you want to have a

13 full-blown hearing on it, I've got the time today.

14 You know, I've got time right now. But I mean, I'm
08:29AM 15 not -- if you-all want to talk about it and come
16 see me later on today, that's fine as well. If

17 you-all want to -- I don't know when your case is

18 going to go next week. I know that we're going to

19 pick a jury on Monday. I don't know when that's

08:29AM 20 going to be. Um, I'm thinking about trying to talk

21 to my attorneys and "rr if we can't start it like

22 maybe 8:30 or something like that on Monday, court

23 personnel, and maybe start picking a jury and/or
24 maybe two juries at once, you know, hopefully by
78:9D6a8 25 11, 11:30. At least get a little bit done before

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lunch and then come back. I just don't know, it's
call kind of up in the air right now.
MR. LAKE: That's fine, Your Honor, I mean,
we'll just -- I'm flexible so --
THE COURT: Let me say this: I know -- I
can't make a ruling on what's been stated to me,
you know, just right now in sort of passing by both
sides concerning the evidence. I'm aware of the
incident. I'm looking over the materials I have.
Um, it would seem to me that there is a colorable
argument by the State to bring that in for
rebuttal. Now, whether or not it actually would
come in and would be admissible in rebuttal, I
mean, I'll give you an opportunity to argue it and
consider it, but it's certainly at least -- it's
something which merits looking at. And, you know,
a lot of times I will hear evidence that one side
wants to put in or the other side wants to put in
and it doesn't really take long to figure out
that's probably not really relevant, but is
something that, you know, that merits discussion.
And if you want to come back today, that's fine.
If you want to talk about it today and figure out a
time to deal with it some time next week, I'll do
my best to give you some time before then.
2 3
MR. COBBIN: I understand. Your Honor, I
2 guess what I'm asking the Court, ah, if, assuming
3 that that was going to come in we have -- we
4 listed two witnesses that are rebuttal to rebuttal
7C:8LX 7 that we --
6 THE COURT: There is -- there is no
7 surrebuttal.
8 MR. COBBIN: Exactly, Your Honor, so we
9 couldn't bring them in our case in chief, because
7CE:8L[T 87 then they'd bring up something that we don't know
11 is ever going to be raised and we weren't going to
12 raise.
13 THE COURT: I don't -- well, I mean, I'm not
14 sure that you couldn't bring it out in the case in
ZME:8LX 15 chief knowing what the evidence is. I don't think
16 -- I don't think you would be prohibited from doing
17 that, understanding that the State has made good
18 faith representations to you and the Court that
19 this is what they are going to bring in as
08:31m 20 rebuttal. And, you know, if suddenly all that came
21 out and it was brought out and the State never, you
22 know, decided to put that rebuttal evidence in,
23 that might place it in a different posture and we
24 can look at it from a motion standpoint whether a
ZME:9Lyy 25 mistrial is warranted. But I don't think there is
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anything that would prohibit you from doing that in
your case in chief. And if you want a ruling on
it, I'll give you a ruling on it. In fact, I think
its probably important that you do get a ruling on
it, but if you are not prepared to go forward with
it right now, which I'm not saying you should be
prepared to go on it right now. You guys need to
get together and streamline the issues and call me.
I'm here. I pick up my child at 3:30 today. I'll
be here all day. Okay?
MR. LAKE: And, Judge, even if it takes
longer, if the Court is willing to hear that issue
next week, I'm good with hearing that next week,
because if we have to hear it next week, that's
fine.
MR. COEBIN: I'm going to talk to him right
now, but I'll do everything I can to --
THE COURT: My time next week could be wide
open, because everything goes away like this week
for whatever reason, or it could be that you get
ten minutes from me and that's about it.
MR. COBBIN: I'm going to get on it right now.
THE COURT: Fair enough. Well, I look forward
to trying the case with you.
MR. LAKE: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you
25
for the Court's patience.
THE COURT: No, its good. I did not know
until basically 5:00 last night that the trial was
going to go away today. If I would have known
before that, I would have contacted everybody and
got you in here nine, 9:30, whatever, but there
really wasn't any time. So I got a phone call from
defense counsel and the prosecutor at like five
till five or something. So anyways.
MR. LAKE: Was the jury sworn to hear the
case?
THE COURT: No. No. No, it was not.
THE CLERK: One of them showed up. They
showed up to catch the jury shuttle, and I
contacted the jury, I guess, and then two other
ones called in this morning because they said my
message was garbled. I don't know.
THE COURT: Your messages usually are not
garbled, you are usually loud and clear.
THE CLERK: And if they had two numbers, I
called both of them.
THE COURT: We'll call you-all today once I
figure this all out. Knowing what the schedule is,
I'm thinking probably a day and-a-half. So I mean,
I don't need -- I mean, I'm going to have a jury
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF FLORIDA )
COUNTY OF DUVAL )
I, Cindy M. Griffis, Registered Professional
Reporter and Florida Professional Reporter, certify
that I was authorized to and did stenographically
report the foregoing pages 1 through 27, and that the
transcript is a true and complete record of my
stenographic notes.
DATED this 16th day of July, 2012.
;7;8A5;837855#
Cindy M.
4.0
$ or
ovlffis
Registered Professional Reporter
Florida Professional Reporter
19
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4.1
25












Exhibit 6
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DUVAL
COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA
V.
MARISSA ALEXANDER
CASE NO. : 2010-CF-008579
DIVISION: CR-G
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Defendant, MARISSA ALEXANDER, by and through the undersigned attorney,
pursuant to Rules 3.580, 3.590 and 3.600, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
respectfully requests this Honorable Court to grant a new trial in the above-styled cause.
Defendant states the following grounds for this motion:
i. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Stand Your Ground Motion and
grating her immunity from prosecution.
2. The Court erred in granting in part state's Pre-hearing Motion not allowing
testimony regarding reputation and prior bad acts.
3. The Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion Limine allowing testimony of the
December 30, 2010 incident which took place after the instant offence.
4. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
made at the close of the State's case.
5. This Court erred by not letting in impeachment testimony of Deshawna Gray.
6. This Court erred in not allowing Defense counsel to inquire as to the depth that
reputation witness knew of Rico Gray Sr.'s reputation for violence and lying once the
r:FLEE
iN C O m P u l E R
G . R.
P AG E 0519 O F 0825
Motion for New Trial
P age 2
State opened the door by chal l enging them abou t their knowl edge of specific events and
peopl e.
7. This C ou rt E rred by l im iting the nu m ber of repu tation witnesses who wou l d have
been cal l ed to testify as to R ico G ray Sr.'s repu tation for viol ence when his aggressive
and viol ent natu re was a key issu e in the Defendant's cl aim of sel f-defense.
8. This C ou rt erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Ju dgm ent of
Acqu ittal m ade fol l owing the cl ose of al l the evidence.
9.
This C ou rt erred in not m aking a ru l ing on the C ou nt III Ju dgm ent of
Acqu ittal before reading the ju ry the ju ry instru ctions and su bm itting case to
ju ry.
10.
The cu m u l ative effect of al l of the above m entioned cau sed Defendant
su bstantial preju dice by the m em bers of the ju ry.
11.The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
12.The verdict is contrary to the l aw.
13. The ju ry was grossl y negl igent by their l ack of del iberation based on the am ou nt
of evidence that was presented at trial .
WHE R E FO R E , Defendant respectfu l l y requ ests this Honorabl e C ou rt to grant a
new trial for the reasons cited herein. Defendant fu rther requ ests l eave to am end this
m otion with fu rther enu m erations of error.
P AG E 4 0520 O F 0825
Motion forNew Trial
Page 2
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing Motion for New Trial
has been furnished to the Office of the State Attorney, by hand, this day of March
2010.
Respectfully su mitted,
By:
Kevin M. Cobbin, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 0645206
525 N. Newnan Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Tel. (904) 357-8448
Fax (904) 357-8446
Attorney for Defendant
PAGE # 0521 OF 0825












Exhibit 7
STATE OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 2010-CF-008579

V .

DIV ISION: CR-G

MARISSA ALEXANDER
AMENDED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FILED
MAY 03 2012
CLERK CIRCUIT COURT
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR DUV AL COUNTY, FLORIDA
. r t
Defendant, MAR1SSA ALEXANDER, by and through the undersigned attorney, pursuant
to Rules 3.580, 3.590 and 3.600, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, respectfully requests that
this Honorable Court grant a new trial in the above-styled cause. Defendant states the following
grounds for this motion:
I. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Stand Your Ground Motion and in not
granting her immunity from prosecution.
2. The Court erred in granting, in part, the state's Pre-hearing Motion to disallow certain
testimony regarding reputation and prior bad acts.
3. The Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion in Limine allowing testimony of the
December 30, 2010 incident, which took place after the instant offense.
4. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal made at
the close of the State's case.
5. This Court abused its discretion by not allowing the impeachment testimony of Deshawna
Gray.
6. The Court abused its discretion by limiting defense counsel's inquiry into the extent of
the reputation witnesses' knowledge of Rico Gray Sr.'s reputation for violence and
dishonesty, once the State raised the issue by challenging their knowledge of specific
events and people.
7. This Court abused its discretion by limiting the number of reputation witnesses the
defense could call to testify as to Rico Gray Sr.'s reputation for violence when such
FILED 1
I N C O M P U T E R
A. J.
DE" 44 rica.< coo AQ14
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
testimony was probative and not cumulative, and when Rico Gray, Sr.'s aggressive and
violent nature was central to the Defendant's claim of self-defense.
8. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal made
following the close of all the evidence.
9. This Court erred in not ruling on the Count III Judgment of Acquittal before reading the
jury instructions and submitting case to jury.
10. The cumulative effect of all of the above mentioned caused Defendant substantial
prejudice before the members of the jury.
11. The verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
12. The verdict is contrary to the law.
13. The Court must order a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this case, as the jury's
verdict was clearly erroneous, given its lack of deliberation, in the face of the substantial
evidence that supported the defendant version of the facts presented at trial.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
I. Standard of Review
When evaluating a motion for a new trial based on the verdict being contrary to law or the
weight of the evidence, the court must use the weight of the evidence standard, not the
sufficiency of the evidence standard reserved for motions for judgment of acquittal. Geibel v.
State, 817 So.2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
Additionally, "the trial court acts as a safety valve by granting a new trial where "the
evidence is technically sufficient to prove the criminal charge but the weight of the evidence does
not appear to support the jury verdict," State v. Hart, 632 So.2d 134, 135 (Fla. 4t h DCA 1994)
(quoting Robinson V. State, 462 So.2d 471, 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), rev. denied, 471 So. 2d 44
(Fla. 1985)).
H. Whether the court committed harmful error. by sustaining the state's obiection lon
cumulative grounds, to the testimony of two witnesses who would testify as to the
victim's reputation for exhibiting a propensity for violence against women when
PA C.-E 0537 CIFOR25
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
the admission of such testimony was crucial to the defendant's claim of self-
defense.
Without an in camera hearing to determine the nature of the evidence that the defense
proposed to offer, the sustaining of the state's objection on the grounds that such evidence was
cumulative was an abuse of discretion that denied the defendant her right to a fair trial, due
process of law and the effective assistance of counsel.
The court's failure to allow the defendant to present evidence as to the alleged victim's
reputation for acting violently against women with whom he had prior relationships constituted
prejudicial and harmful error when the defendant's only defense is self-defense.
Harmless error occurs only if the appellate court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. See State v.
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) (holding the focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-
of-fact). Here, the trial court erroneously sustained the state's objection to the proffered
testimony of two witnesses during trial. Said proffered testimony related to the victim's
reputation for violence against women. Evidence is cumulative when relevant evidence that was
admissible was already presented during trial going to prove the same kind or to the same point.
See Levine v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 17 A.2d 500 (1941).
In the instant case, the two witnesses had firsthand knowledge, not hearsay, of the
defendant's reputation for violence towards woman. Furthermore, the state was allowed to imply
in closing argument that the defense failed to provide witnesses with firsthand knowledge of
victim's propensity for violence. The witnesses' proffered testimony, if allowed, would have
proved a distinct issue and probative facts different from that presented by the two witnesses who
PAGE # 0538 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
the court did allow to testify during trial. Therefore, this evidence was not needlessly
cumulative. See Joseph F. Maimone Sec. and Investigations, Inc. v. American Exp, Travel
Related Services, Inc., 598 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1992).
The Court failed to admit evidence with probative value that would go show that the
witness had first-hand knowledge of victim's reputation in the community for violence towards
women. Erroneous exclusion of evidence concerning victim's past violent acts is not harmless
error when the excluded evidence goes to support the defendant's only defense.
Generally, evidence of the victim's character is inadmissible. See Espinosa v. Florida,
505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (Evidence that the victim "had a history of violent behavior when he lived
in Nicaragua" was inadmissible under section 90.404(1) to show that victim" had a history of
violent character ...."); See also Haynes v. State, 581 So.2d 121, 126 (Fla. 1991). However, if a
defendant alleges a defense that rests upon the conduct of the victim, the defendant may offer
evidence of the victim's character as circumstantial evidence to prove that conduct. See Fla. R.
Evidence, 90.404(1) (b). The evidence offered must be a pertinent character trait of the victim
when it is being offered to prove the victim acted in conformity with his character. When a
criminal defendant alleges self-defense, evidence of the victim's character trait of violence may
be admissible to show the victim was the aggressor. See Munoz v. State, 45 So. 3d 980 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2009) (a defendant asserting self-defense may use relevant evidence to show the victims
conduct or as to the reasonableness of the defendant's fear at time of incident).
In Florida, it is well-settled law that evidence-providing information on victim's
dangerous character is admissible when being tendered to show defendant acted in self-defense.
f
PAGE # 0539 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
See Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 136 (1891); See also Quintana v. State, 452 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla.
1st DCA 1984) (reversing first-degree murder conviction because defendant erroneously
precluded from offering reputation and specific-act evidence relative to self-defense claim).
When a defendant is offering reputation evidence to show the alleged victim acted in conformity
with said reputation, the defendant is not required to have knowledge of victim's reputation. See
Bank v. State, 351 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, the defendant must have
had knowledge of the victim's character if offered to prove the reasonableness of the defendant's
apprehension. Id; See also Smith v. State, 606 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Furthermore, whenever there is the slightest evidence of an overt act by the victim that
may reasonable be regarded as placing the accused apparently in imminent danger of losing her
life or sustaining great bodily harm all doubts as to admissibility of evidence based on her theory
of self-defense must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See Warren v. State, 577 So.2d 682
(Fla 1st DCA 1991) and see Hedges v. State, 667 So. 2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) and
Borders v. State, 433 So.2d 1325 (Fla 3rd DCA 1983). The entire purpose of allowing evidence
of violent character is to show the reasonableness of defendant's apprehension, which led to the
use of deadly force. It is error to exclude evidence which bears directly on 1) defendant's state of
mind, 2) relationship between defendant and victim, and 3) reputation of victim. The state has
the burden to prove the that the error is harmless; hence, when "[C]onsidering the nature of the
evidence in this case, especially the conflicts between the theories offered by the two sides and
the fact that the erroneously excluded evidence went to appellant's only defense, the error must
be considered harmful." Smith v. State, 606 So. 2d 641, 643-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
PAGE # 0540 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
The Court committed prejudicial and harmful error when it erroneously excluded, without
hearing, two witnesses from testifying as to the alleged victim's reputation for violence against
women.
III.
The Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion Limine allowing testimony of the
December 30, 2010 incidents which took place after the instant offense.
When a collateral crime is improperly submitted into evidence it is presumptively
hattuful and highly inflammatory. Evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by
the defendant is admissible if it is relevant to a material fact and issue. Evidence is not
admissible where its sole relevance is to prove the character or propensity of the accused.
In the instant case the defendant raised the self-defense claim and the state brought in the
collateral act as proof of the defendant's state of mind. The courts have often applied this to
statements, threats or actions immediately following the charged crime. See
Jenkins v. State, 697
So.2d 228, (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). In Jenkins' testimony of a collateral threat, pointing a gun and
threatening to kill two witnesses if they said anything about what they had just observed, was
allowed in to show the defendant's state of mind at the time of the charged offense.
hi the instant ease, the collateral act being admitted took place four months after the charged
crime. The state did not attempt to bring the collateral crime in under the Williams Rule but
rather to rebut the defendant's claim that she was in fear at the time of her using deadly force.
The defendant testified at trial but did not make any misleading or factual assertions that would
have opened the door to allow the collateral act evidence in. See Mooney v. State, 898 So.2d
1030, (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
PAGE / I 0541 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
Furthermore, the evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs or acts that were not related to the
charged crime in time, place, perpetrators, victims, means, motives or any other factor, is an
erroneous admission of the collateral crime. See Drayton v. State, 763 So.2d 522, (Fla. 3rd DCA
2000). In this case while the defendant and victim in the collateral crime are the same, the fact
that the collateral evidence took place four months after the charge crime is too remote in time to
meet the criteria for which this evidence could be admitted. In this case the prejudice of the
evidence substantially outweighed any probative value that the evidence presented so the court
allowing it to come in was an abuse of discretion.
IV. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Stand Your Ground Motion and
granting her immunity from prosecution.
An appellate court's review of a circuit court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is governed
by the same standard which applies in an appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress.
Therefore, the same way that a court may, in a motion for new trial, decide whether evidence was
properly admitted or suppressed, the court may review its ruling on a stand your ground or
immunity from prosecution hearing.
The trial court admittedly has broad discretion when determining a defendant's immunity
from prosecution during an evidentiary hearing; however, the test to determine whether that
discretion has been abused is based on qualitative information more than quantitative. If the
evidence presented by defendant would lead a reasonable, cautious person to a different
PAGE 4 0542 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
conclusion from the one adopted by the court, then it must be said that the court has misapplied
the requisite preponderance of the evidence standard to the facts presented at bar.
A defendant may raise question of statutory immunity based on justifiable use of force
during a pretrial evidentiary hearing. During the evidentiary hearing, the court must determine
whether the defendant has shown a preponderance of evidence that the immunity attaches. Fla.
Stat. 776.032(1); See also Peterson v. State, 983 Sa.2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
The legislature intended the "Stand Your Ground" law to create immunity from
prosecution rather than an affirmative defense. The preponderance of the evidence standard must
apply to immunity determinations under the statute. Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 836 (2009). The
preponderance of the evidence standard is qualitative more than quantitative, and the phrase
necessarily implies that the evidence must lead a reasonable cautious person to that conclusion,
produce a reasonable belief, and convince as of its truth. Saporito v. Bone, 195 So. 2d 244, 245
(Fla. 2nd DCA 1967).
In a criminal case, qualitative evidence has constitutional dimensions because a right to a
fair trial is at issue. 15 Fla. Jur 2d Criminal LawProcedure 1628. Hence, the trial court
should look through multiple channels in aid of determining the weight of the qualitative value of
the evidence and not the quantitative value of the evidence. Cruz v. State, 54 So. 3d 1067 (Fla.
4th DCA 2011) (holding trial court is required to determine defendant's entitlement to immunity
by a preponderance of the evidence not only on disputed facts). Trial courts may conduct a
thorough evidentiary hearing through multiple channels. See Saporito v. Bone, 195 So. 2d 244
PAGE Ai 0543 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
(Fla. 2nd DCA 1967) (holding live testimony from witnesses, testimony from the defendant,
weighing credibility of witnesses, making numerous findings of fact with a substantial completed
basis for its factual findings, and applying the preponderance of the evidence standard).
The Court in this case did conduct an evidentiary hearing during defendant's Motion For
Determination Of Immunity From Prosecution. The Court did hear live testimony from all
available witnesses. This should have allowed the Court to from weigh the credibility of
pertinent witnesses and have the ability to make numerous findings of fact with a substantial,
competent bases for its factual findings. These tools augment the use of the preponderance of the
evidence standard. id. The trial court cannot deny defendant's motion to dismiss on disputed
facts alone but must give reasons for denying the defendant's motion. See McDaniel v. State, 24
So. 3d 654 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009) (holding defendant was entitled to a new hearing because trial
court gave no reason for its original denial).
Therefore, the Court shall only deny the defendant's motion after holding an evidentiary
hearing, making determinations of credibility, weighing the numerous pieces of conflicting
evidence, and setting forth extensive factual findings. See State v. Gallo, 76 So. 3d 407 (2001)
(holding on defendant's motion to dismiss granted after court given extensive factual findings in
a nine-pager- order). When the court's denial of a motion to dismiss is not clear from the record,
i.e., whether the trial court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, as is proper, or
whether it denied the motion on factual disputes, or lack of evidence thereof, a rehearing is in
order. See McDaniel, 24 So. 3d at 654 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009).
PAGE 140544 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
The trial court misapplied the preponderance of the evidence test and failed to provide the
extensive factual findings required as a prerequisite to denying the defendant's motion,
Furthermore, the court should review its finding in the denial of the stand your ground
hearing because of newly discovered testimony that came out at trial. A defendant must meet
two requirements to obtain a new trial (hearing) based on newly discovered evidence: first, the
evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel a the time of trial,
and it must also appear that neither the defendant or defense counsel could have known of such
evidence by use of diligence, and second, the newly discovered evidence must be of a nature that
it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence. See Davis v.
State, 26 So.3d 519 (Fla. 2009). In Davis, the defendant asked for a new trial, post conviction,
based upon new witnesses recanting their prior testimony. The court had to apply the newly
discovered evidence test to see whether this evidence would probably produce an acquittal on
retrial, as element for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, if it weakens the case
against the defendant so as to give rise to reasonable doubt as to his culpability.
In the instant case, in the original immunity hearing, Rico Gray Jr. testified on behalf of
the state, that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. However, at trial Rico Gray Jr.
testified in a light that was consistent wit h the defendant's direct testimony that his father was
attacking the defendant and threatening to kill her. He further testified that it was only at this
time the defendant discharged her weapon to prevent his father from attacking her further. This
newly discovered evidence was only made known to the defendant the Thursday before the trial
began. If this newly discovered evidence had been heard during the original stand your ground
PAGE 4 0545 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
immunity hearing the probability that it would have produced a different ruling by the court is
substantial, as it would have further supported defendant's self-defense claim. Moreover, the
court would have most likely concluded that the defendant had a right to stand her ground and
defend herself by the preponderance of evidence standard that should have been applied at the
hearing.
Lastly, the court in the stand your ground hearing erred by engrafting a condition to
retreat that is not in the stand your ground statutes 776.032(1) and 776.013(3). This Court
highlights in its fact finding that, "despite the defendant's claim she was in fear for her life at that
point and was trying to get away from Rico Gray, she did leave the house through the back or
front doors, which were unobstructed" (p.4). This Court in its legal reasoning states that this is
inconsistent with a person who is in genuine fear of his or her life. The stand your ground law
specifically states that individuals have no duty to retreat in their own home.
The Court should rehear or reverse its ruling in the stand your ground hearing because its
ruling was erroneous, 1) based upon the fact the court did not follow the preponderance of
evidence standard, 2) the court misapplied the immunity statute and 3) newly discovered
evidence which would have proved favorable to defendant has now been discovered.
V. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
made at the close of the State's case, all evidence, and not making the ruling on the
count III judgment of Acquittal before reading the jury instructions and submitting
ease to jury.
PAGE # 0546 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
Although the question of whether a defendant acted in justifiable self-defense is generally
a question for the jury. "when the defense presents a prima facie case of self-defense, the State
has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.
Behanna v. State, 985 Sold 550, 555 (Fla 2nd DCA 2007). The State may meet this burden by
rebuttal or inference in its case-in-chief. Self defense cases are intensely fact specific, but where
the evidence "leaves room for two or more inferences of fact, at least one of which is consistent
with the defendant's hypothesis of innocence, it is not legally sufficient to make a case for the
jury." Fowler v State, 492 Sold 1344, 1348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
In the instant case, the defendant through her testimony and that of Rico Gray Jr. and
other defense witnesses clearly made a self defense claim. The State on rebuttal simply brought
up a collateral act that did not overcome her burden on self defense at the time of the incident.
The state's rebuttal evidence was also entirely consistent with self defense as stated by a police
officer involved in the investigation of the later incident, the defendant had been taken to the
hospital. Therefore, the state had not overcome its burden, and the ease should not have gone to
the jury. The Court erred in not granting the Defendant's Judgment of acquittal at the end of all
evidence.
Further, the State did not call victim Rico Gray Jr. to testify in it case-in-chief. The
alleged victim did testify on behalf of the defendant. In his testimony, Rico Gray Jr., clearly said
that the gun was not pointed at him, that his father had charged at the defendant and threatened to
kill her, and that he was not in fear for his life at any time. The Court should have granted the
Defendants Judgment of Acquittal as to Count (III) as the state clearly did not prove a prima fade
PAGE # 0547 OF 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
case that Rico Gray Jr. was in fear based upon the testimony that was presented at trial. By not
granting the Judgment of Acquittal and allowing count (III) to be submitted to the jury the court
erred and prejudiced the defendant.
VI. The cumulative effect of all of the above mentioned caused Defendant substantial
prejudice by the members of the itiry.
There were a series of items that the court ruled improperly on in this case. While defendant
has argued that each one individually has created harmful error and is ground for new trial, it
must also be argued that the weight of all of the issues together had a cumulative effect
substantially prejudiced the defendant to the jury. This can clearly be seen by the fact that in a
case with the amount of evidence that was presented to the jury in a two day trial coupled with
the defendant's claim of self defense that the jury only deliberated for twelve minutes. The jury
has a duty to presume defendant innocent and to weigh impartially the evidence to determine
whether such presumption has been overcome. See Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481 (1945) The
juries lack of deliberation was a breach of their duty to deliberate and if this court does not grant
a new trial the verdict is truly a manifest of justice and a miscarriage of the law.
The Court must order a new trial or order a Judgment Notwithstanding the V erdict in this
case, as the verdict was clearly erroneous.
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to grant a new trial
for the reasons cited herein. Defendant further requests leave to amend this motion with further
enumerations of error.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing Motion for New Trial has
been furnished to the Office of the State Attorney, by hand, this day of May 2012.
PAGE # 0548 O F 0825
Motion for New Trial
Page 2
Respectfully submitted,
By:
Kevin M. Cobbin, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 0645206
525 N. Newnan Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Tel. (904) 357-8448
Fax (904) 357-8446
Attorney for Defendant
C2.7
PAGE # 0549 OF 0825












Exhibit 8
F I E 1 1 )
J U N 1 8 2 0 1 1
A
-LA- 77-4,14.
C LE R K C I R C U I T C O U R T
STATE OF FLORIDA
- vs -
MARISSA ALEXANDER,
Defendant.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
15
16
17
18
19
2 0
2 1
2 2
2 3
2 4
L 2 5
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DUVAL
COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 16 -2 010-CF-008 5 7 9 -AXXX-MA
DIVISION: CR-G
Proceedings taken on
Thursday, May 3 , 2 012 ,
before the Honorable James Daniel, Judge of the
Circuit Court, Division CR-G, in the Duval County
Courthouse, Jacksonville, Florida, and as reported by
Holli V. Callahan, Court Reporter and a Notary Public in
and for the State of Florida at Large.
PAGE # 0755 O F 0825
13

1was evidence brought forward to the jury in the form

2 of Mr. Gray's reputation. I know that there were at

3 least two witnesses_ There may have been more. I

4 don't remember that Ms. Gray and Ms. Anderson -- I

5 don't remember the proffer, if there was one, what

6 their testimony was. But I thought it was specific

7 acts.

8 But the Court's ruling in this -- on that

9 particular issue is set forth in a pretrial order and

10that was as long as they can lay the predicate for

11reputation that they have knowledge of the person's

12 reputation, in this case Rico Gray, Sr.'s reputation

13 in the community for propensity for violence, then

14 they can testify. All right. That's the only

15 predicate I will require for reputational testimony.

16 For specific acts involving Mr. Cray prior to

17 the incident in question, there had to be proof that

18 the defendant knew about those specific acts and that

19 ruling is consistent. I will cite the case of Munoz

2 0vs. State, 4 5 So.3 d, 9 5 4 .

2 1It is a 2 010 case that offers a good discussion

2 2 about that principle. So, I mean, I don't think the

2 3 ruling itself is contrary to the law at all. I think

2 4 I applied that in the situation concerning the

2 5 witnesses and all I was requiring they knew the

PAC T '.1 .1 1 1 T
14

1relevant reputation for Mr. Cary, Sr.

2 I don't recall the testimony specifically of

3 Gray and Anderson that you proffered_ I thought it

4 was specific act evidence, though, that they were

5 going to offer, but there was plenty of reputational
6 evidence brought forth at trial through other
7 witnesses. I know of at least two that came in and
8 -talked about reputation and one as the State has

9 accurately stated that Mr. Gray, Sr_ had a reputation

10for choking women. And that was allowed by the Court

11to be put forth in front of a jury. So on the

12 grounds for motion for new trial with respect to

13 that, it is denied.

14 I don't find there is any prejudice, even if the

15 .testimony of Gray and Anderson were going to be

16 offered for reputational evidence only, it would have

17 been cumulative at that point. There's already two

18 witnesses that were able to testify to his reputation

19 and involvement in the community. All right.

2 0MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, the next point we would

2 1go to is the Court allowing the December 3 0th, 2 010,

2 2 incident between Mr. Cray, Sr. and Marissa Alexander

2 3 to be admitted into court.

2 4 . When a collateral crime is improperly admitted

2 5 into evidence, it's presumptively harmful and highly

PAGE # 0768 OF 0825
15

1inflammatory. Evidence of the collateral crime,

2 wrongs or acts committed by the defendant, if

3 admissible, if it is, it's relevant to a material-

4 fact and if evidence is not admissible where the sole

5 relevance is to prove a character or propensity of

6 the accused. In the instant case the defendant

7 raised self-defense claims and the State brought the

8 collateral act as proof of a defendant's state of

9 mind.

10In Jenkins the Court has often applied this

11statement, threats or actions immediately following

12 crimes_ The courts have allowed subsequent acts or

13 wrongs to come in and this is where Jenkins where two

14 witnesses after he had shot someone he pointed a gun

15 and threatened him if they told anyone. The Court

16 has commonly used it in short time frames like that

17 to show the defendant's state of mind.

18 In this case we have an incident that took place

19 four months after. While the State did not bring it

2 0

in as Williams rule they did argue it came in to show

2 1the defendant's state of mind in August_ Four months

2 2 is too remote in time for the defendant's state of

2 3 mind -- to prove the defendant's state of mind in

2 4 August. The collateral act is therefore extremely

2 5 prejudicial and very limited and probative. The

P CI? 1i 111-7dal 115r7ti
16
1court itself when the State wanted to bring it in

2 said it had very limited probative value.

3 And at no time did the defendant mislead the

4 Court when she testified to open the door or

anything, give any inconsistent statements that would

6 open the door for them to bring in that information_

7 Again, in this case while the defendant and

8 victim in the collateral crime are the same, the fact

9 that the collateral event took place four months

10after the charged crime is too remote in time to meet

11the criteria for which evidence could be admitted.

12 in this case the prejudice of the evidence

13 substantially outweighs any probative value that the

14
evidence presented so the Court -- to allow the Court

15 to bring it in,

16 And so, again, we would argue that the Court has

17 abused its discretion in this and caused harmful

18 error to Ms_ Alexander.

19 THE COURT: All right. The State's response?

2 0MR. LAKE: Judge, again, I would rely upon the

2 1
Court's previously written order to this_ This was

2 2 not testimony that was offered. For one, it wasn't

2 3 even mentioned in the opening statements. It was not

2 4 offered in the State's case in chief, but only as

2 5 possible rebuttal evidence. The Court properly

Ti A 44 111'711 (IV InaGrIZ.
17
1limited how much we could say about this incident in .

2 December, specifically there was no introduction of

3 any evidence that she had been arrested. But after

4 the defendant herself testified extensively as to the

5 fear that she was -- how afraid she was of the victim

6 specifically, that at one point when she was going to

7 break off the relationship, she felt like she had to

8 go to his house with her father because she was

9 afraid of what might happen when she informed him

10they were going to break up.

11Again, the other witnesses who testified as to

12 this victim's alleged reputation for violence, again,

13 was to corroborate whether she had a reasonable fear

14 that when she fired the gun she thought that he was

15 going to kill her. The State is permitted, once she

16 opens that door to rebut that evidence, that she was

17 not, in fact, in fear and that she went to his house

18 and committed a battery upon him. For that, Your

19 Honor, I have presented the Court and I would cite

2 0the Supreme Court of Florida case of Roberson v.

2 1State.

2 2 Specifically, Judge, on page 11, what it states

2 3 is thus, to open the door, the defense must first

2 4 offer misleading testimony or make a specific factual

2 5 assertion, which the State has a right to correct so

P AC V. # 0771 C M' O S7.5
18

1the jury will not be misled. Opening the door

2 concept allows the cross-examination to reveal the

3 whole story of a transaction, only partly explained

4 in the direct examination.

5 The specific factual assertion that the

6 defendant made herself and through these witnesses

7 was that she had a reasonable fear of this person

8 because of propensity towards violence and that she

9 had to get the gun_ She had to shoot in his

10direction because she was so afraid that this is

11somebody who was going to kill her.

12 In order for the jury to get the complete

13 picture, it was proper to introduce the evidence that

14 despite her alleged fear, she goes back to his

15 residence alone and commits a battery upon him.

16 Judge, that rebuts her claim of reasonable fear

17 of this person and I think the Court's ruling and

18 written order is correct as to that piece of

19 evidence.

2 0THE COURT: Response?

2 1MR. COBBIN: Yes, Your Honor_

2 2 Again, the State is correct. The defendant did

2 3 say that she.was in fear on August let and that is

2 4 why she acted in the nature_ The testimony, I

2 5 believe, supported that apprehension.

1 7, A C.V. 1 4 1 1 771 OP ir1 527^;
19

1But as to December 3 0th, there was no close time

2 or connection to connect her fear on August 1st has

3 any probative value of producing what happened on

4 December 3 0th at all. The only thing it can do is to

5 bring in the inference that she is a batterer or

6 something of that nature. It does not show what her

7 fear was or what her apprehension was on August 1st.

8 The courts have shown that they will allow the

9 information in if it's closely related in time to an

10act or something that someone says. I was not in

11fear. I did do this or don't say this to another

12 witness_ That is not what happened here_ We have a

13 young lady that went over to someone's house. That

14 shows nothing about what happened, again, on August

15 1st. It is too remote in time and we would argue

16 that it was improper to bring in that collateral bad

17 act.

18 THE COURT: All right. The Court entered an

19 order before trial with respect to this particular

2 0evidence. First of all, precluding any evidence at

2 1all that the defendant was arrested and charged with

2 2 the crime of domestic battery in that case. However,

2 3 the order also stated that if the defense in their

2 4 self-defense position was going to rely on more than

2 5 simply the events that occurred on the day in

PAGE, * I 6 7 7 3 OF 08 2 5
2 0

Iquestion -- in other words, in this case if the

2 defense was going to rely on a history of violence by

3 Mr. Gray directed towards the defendant and/or

4reputational evidence of the defendant in the
community for violence and not strictly limit to
defense based on the fact of the assault that was the

7 subject of the charge, then it was proper for the

8 State to bring in this evidence of what happened four

9 months after the incident to rebut that, the claim of

10the defendant.

11And in this case there was clearly testimony by

12 the defendant of other acts that had occurred and

13 their history of violence between Mr. Gray and

14 directed towards her along with the reputational

15 evidence. And so I believe that it was proper to

16 allow the evidence that occurred -- that she went

17 over to the house by herself four months later and

18 got into another domestic battery in this case where

19 there was at least some evidence that was disputed

2 0evidence, but there was some evidence where she may

2 1have actually hit Mr. Gray, Sr.

2 2 It was disputed, but that was what the jury was

2 3 allowed to do or is allowed to do, is to sort through

2 4 conflicts in the evidence. So I thought it was

2 5 directly relevant to rebut the type of self-defense

PA C.7.1R (IV fiSt?z
21
1that was put on by the defense in this case and so

2 that ground for motion for new trial is denied.

3 MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, my next point is that

4the Court erred in granting the defendant's -- in not

5 granting the defendant's stand your ground motion and

6 granting her immunity from prosecution.

7 An appellate court's review of circuit court's

8 rulings, a motion to dismiss is governed by the same

9 standard, which is an appeal as an .order to deny like

10a motion to suppress. Therefore, the same way the

11Court in a motion for new trial may decide whether

12 evidence was properly submitted or kept out.

13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Cobbin, I mean,

14have reviewed the transcript of the stand your ground

15 hearing that has been filed that was heard by my

16 predecessor judge. It -- 1 mean, it was a lot of the

17 same testimony that I heard. In fact, it was very

18 much the same testimony. There might have been some

19 elaborations and difference, but by and large it was

2 0the same testimony that I heard at trial.

2 1All right_ Would you agree with me that my

2 2 predecessor judge made a factual determination as she

2 3 is required to do concerning the allegations in your

24stand your ground motion?

2 5 MR. COBBIN: Yes.

13 A 1,117 41 an,- elor:o (toot
2 2

1THE COURT: She resolved the conflicts in the

2 evidence. Okay. And would you agree with me on

3 that?

4 MR. COBB1N: Yes, Your Honor.

5 THE COURT: Do I have the right to go back and

6 basically overturn my predecessor judge's

7 determination as to factual decisions if I disagree

8 with them?

9 MR. COBBIN: Your Honor, I believe in this case

10you do.

11THE COURT: And why is that?

12 MR. COBEIN: Because there has been newly

13 discovered evidence.

14 THE COURT: What newly discovered evidence is

15 that?

16 MR. COBBIN: At the trial -- actually, the

17 Friday or Thursday before trial it was discovered

18 that Rico Gray, Jr., was going to testify along the

19 same lines as Ms. Alexander, that Mr. Rico Gray, Sr.,

2 0had beaten Ms. Alexander in the bathroom because of

2 1text messages, had heard noise of her being thrown

2 2 against the wall, had pursued her when she came back

2 3 in the house, charged her and made an explicit

2 4 comment and he said he was going to kill her. That

2 5 was Rico Gray, Jr.'s testimony at trial. But the

1) 4 r.V 44 11'7'7K (YU

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
13
14
15
16
18
19
2 0
2 1
2 2
2 3
2 4
L
2 5
COURTCERTIFICATE
STATE OF FLORIDA )
COUNTY OF DUVAL)
'I, Holli V. Callahan, Court Reporter and Notary
Public, do hereby certify that I was authorized to and did
stenographically report the foregoing proceedings and that
the transcript is a true and complete record of my
stenographic notes.
DATED this 15 th day of June 2 012 .
Holli V. Callahan,
Notary Public, State of Florida
My Commission No EE 13 4 2 5 7
Expires: November 15 , 2 015 .












Exhibit 9












Exhibit 10
FILED
MAY 11 2012
CLERK CIRCUIT COURT
Doc # 2012104653, OR BK i2 Page 2164, Number Pages:,Recorded 05/12/2012
10:33 AM, JIM FULLER CLERK CIRCUIT COURT DUVAL COUNTY R.L....JRDING $0.00
IN THtko6IRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR
DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE: 16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
DIVISION: CR- 6-
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
MARISSA DANIELLE ALEXANDER, DEFENDANT
El
Probation Violator
Community Control Violator
0 Retrial
El
Resentence
The defendant, MARISSA DANIELLEALEXANDER, being personally before this court represented
, the attorney of record, and the state represented by
, and having:
-
r
been tried and found guilty ba_y r /by-ettrrt-of the following crime(s)
entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s)
entered a plea of nob contendere to the following crime(s)
Count Offenses
Statute
Number s
Degree
of Crime
Case
Number
OBTS
Number
NMI a __I umpl -,. IMMEINIIIIIIIMININIIIIIIIMI
IIIIIIIMMIIIIIIMIIMEMIIMMIIIIIIMIIIMINI
INI101111111=1=1111MIIIIIMIIIIIIILIMIIIN
IIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIINIII =MI
NIF Il l . I IA,. . -.
1. 0E3 1
1 : L 'IIIIIrl aiNIMINIMI
MININ1111111111111. 111. 111
11111111111111111111111111111
WWII
=MI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 M1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MMIIIMIN
NM
111. 1. 1111. 111. 1101=IMMIIIIMIIIIMII
is .Da-7
: A . s_: z,. . -HEIIIIMICEIMINSIIIIICIIIIMIIIIIIIIIN
IIIMIIIIIIIIIMII1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 M1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 M
111111111111MIIIMINIIIMIIIIM111111111
Il l =1111111111111
NIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIII11111111111=11111111=111111111111111 MOM
and no cause being shown why the defendant should not be adjudicated guilty, IT IS ORDERED that the defendant is
hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the above crime(s).
0 and having been convicted or found guilty of, or having entered a plea of nob o contendere or guilty, regardless
of adjudication, to any felony offense, as provided in Florida Statute section 943.325, the defendant shall be required to
submit two blood specimens or other biological specimens approved by the Department of Law Enforcement,
0 and good cause being shown; IT IS ORDERED THAT ADJUDICATION OFGUILT BEWITHHELD.
Page I o f Fa.)
PAGE# 0553 OF0825
1. RIght Thumb 2. Right Index 3. Right Middle 4. Right Ring 5. Right Little
6. LAIC'fibmb Middle 9. Left ing 7. Left Index 10. Left Little
OR BK 15942 PAGE 2165
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
Swe
MARISSA DANIELLE ALEXANDER, DEFENDANTCASE: 16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
0 Imposition of Sentence
Stayed and Withheld
(Check if Applicable)
The Court hereby stays and withholds the imposition of sentence as to count(s)
and places the Defendant on probation/ community control for a period
of under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
(conditions of probation/ community control set forth in a separate order)
FNGERPRINTS OFDEFENDANT
Fingerprints taken by:A
Name: , 4
,
Jitirefq/
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and foregoing are the fingerprints of the defendant, MARISSA
DANIELLE ALEXANDER, and that they were placed thereon by the defendant in my presence in open
court at this date.
DONE AND ORDERED in open cokkrt at Jacksonville, Duval County Florida, this 1 .k day of
f-NLN
,20 ).
Page 2of
PAGE # 0554 OF 0825
OR BK 15942 PAGE 2166
STATE OF FLORIDA
*are
vs.
MARISSA DAM ELLE ALEXANDER, DEFENDANT
IN THIN4AID CIRCUIT COURT, FOUTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE: 16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
DIVISION: CR-6-

TORDEREDCOST/FINES/FEES
The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the following sums if checked:
Er$ 50.00 pursuant to section 938.93, Florida Statues, (Crimes Compensation Trust Fund).
12-
1 3.00 as a court cost pursuant to section 938.010, Florida Statutes, (Additional Court Cost Clearing
Trust Fund).
O $ 2.00 as a court cost pursuant to section 938.15, Florida Statutes, (Criminal Justice Education by
Municipalities and Counties).
D A fine in the sum of $pursuant to section 775.0835, Florida Statutes, (This provision refers
to the optional fine for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund and is not applicable unless checked and
completed. Fines imposed as a part of a sentence to section 775.083, Florida Statutes are to be
recorded on the sentence pages(s.))
E3--A sum of $100.00 pursuant to section 938.27, Florida Statutes, (Sheriffs Office Investigative Cost).
A sum of $101.00 pursuant to section 938.10, Florida Statutes, (Crimes Against Minors). 7:4. 7 1 ,
sum of $100.00 pursuant to section 938.27, Florida Statutes, (Prosecution Investigative Cost).
A sum of $pursuant to section 938.29, Florida Statutes, (Public Defender Fees / RCC).
El $15.00 pursuant to 938.13, Florida Statutes, Misd. convictions involving drugs or alcohol.
113--$225.00 pursuant to section 938.05, Florida Statutes, (Local Government Criminal Justice Trust
Fund).
El A sum of $ pursuant to 938.04, Florida Statutes, (additional cost 5% of fine).
0 $135.00 pursuant to section 938.07, Florida Statutes, (EMS -DUI cases).
11 101 $100.00 pursuant to section 938.25, Florida Statutes, (FDLE Operation Trust Fund).
DI A sum of $ pursuant to 938.23, Florida Statutes, (Grant For Alcohol & Other Drug Abuse
Program -Drug Abuse Trust Fund).
D A sum of $ 3.00 pursuant to Section 318.18(17)Florida Statues, [State Radio System (SRS)]
O Restitution in accordance with attached order.
lig-A sum of $20.00 pursuant to 938.06, Florida Statutes, (Assessment of Additional Court Cost for Crime
Stoppers Trust Fund - not to exceed $500.00).
12-A sum of $ 3.00 pursuant to 938.19, Florida Statutes, (Assessment of Additional Cost - Duval County
Teen Court Trust Fund).
EA sum of $ 201.00 (Domestic Battery surchange).
ErA sum of $ 151.00 pursuant to 938.085, Florida Statutes, (Rape Crisis Trust Fund).
12-A-sum of $ 65.00 pursuant to 938.185, Florida Statutes, (Assessment of Additional Court Cost to be
used for innovations, legal aid, law library, teen court programs - not to exceed $65.00).
O $ 50.00 pursuant to section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes, (Cost of Court).
O Other
, 7" 4
DONE AND ORDERED in open court at Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, this I/ day of
,20
Judge
Page 3 of
PAGE # 0555 OF 0825
OR El<15942 PAGE 2167
' 44460
MAR1SSA DANIELLE ALEXANDER, Case Number: 16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
OBTS Number: 1603038745
(As to Count 1
The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record
and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the court having given the
defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant
should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown:
2-11id the court having on 1Le I .9) deferred imposition of sentence until this date.
fdatel
and the court having previously entered a judgment in this case on
now resentences the defendant.
and the court having placed the defendant on probation/community control revoked the defendant's
probation/community control.
It is The Sentence Of The Court That:
0 The defendant pay a fine of $
pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes plus $at the 5% surcharge
reqt. _Lired by 938.04, Florida Statutes.
AV The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
El The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Duval County, Florida.
El The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.
To be imprisoned (Check one; unmarked sections are inappl icabl e):
El
Fore term of natural life.
132-rbr a term of 217 y ea.frIS
0 Saki SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of subject to conditions set forth in this order.
If "split" sentence, complete the appropriate paragraph.
0 Followed by a period of on probation/community control under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of Supervision set forth in a separate order entered
herein.
0 However, after serving a period of imprisonment in , the
balance of the sentence shall be suspended and the defendant shall be placed on probation/community control for a
period of under supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and
conditions of probation/community control set forth in a separate order entered herein.
In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before the
defendant begins service of the supervision terms.
)1/44 * (be)Ipirm
Retention of
Jurisdiction
Jail Credit
Prison Credit
Consecutive/
Concurrent
As To Other
Counts
t] The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes.
t is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of L 4 - 5 ? - , days as credit for time
incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.
El It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed credit for all time previously served on this count
in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing.
It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run (check one)E
consecutive to
El
concurrent with the sentence set forth in count of this case.
Page 4-of
PAGE 4 0556 OF 0825
OR BP 1 5942 PAGE 21 68
MARISSA DANIELL6kLEXANDER, Case Number: 16-200/-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
OBTS Number: 1603038745
SENTENCE
(As to Count 2
)
The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record
3(1
-Cr)Vth7 1 and having been adjudicated guilty herein,and the court having given the
de 'endant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant
should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown:
Ert-nd the court having on . " It. D 1 , 21 deferred imposition of sentence until this date.
0 and the court having previously &tared a judgment in this case on
now resentences the defendant.
ri and the court having placed the defendant on probation/community control revoked the defendant's
probation/community control.
It Is The Sentence Of The Court That:
El The defendant pay a fine of $ pursuant to section 7 7 5. 083, Florida Statutes plus $ at the 5% surcharge
rcisiced by 938. 04, Florida Statutes.
['The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
0 The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Duval County, Florida.
The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958. 04, Florida Statutes.
To be Imprisoned (Check one; unmarked sections are Inappl icabl e):
Fore term of natural life.
E r r ; r a term of 2C7 y e v-C
Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of subject to conditions set forth in this order,
If "split" sentence, complete the appropriate paragraph.
Ej Followed by a period of on probation/community control under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of Supervision set forth in a separate order entered
herein.
However, after serving a period of imprisonment in , the
balance of the sentence shall be suspended and the defendant shall be placed on probation/community control for a
period of under supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and
conditions of probation/community control set forth in a separate order entered herein.
In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before the
defendant begins service of the supervision terms.
OTHER PROVISIONS
Retention of
Jurisdiction
Jail Credit
Prison Credit
Consecutive/
Concurrent
As To Other
Counts
The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947 . 1 6(4), Florida Statutes.
lt is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of 451a days as credit for time
incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.
El It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed credit for all time previously served on this count
in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing.
211is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run (check one)
Li
consecutive to
garoncurrent with the sentence set forth in count

of this case.
Pageof
PAGE # 0557 OF 0825
OR BK15942 PAGE 2169
MARISSA DANIELLSVLEXANDER, Case Number: 16-204CF-008579-AXXX-MA
OBTS Number: 1603038745
(As to Count 3
The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record
Cem}--31 , 1rTh and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the court having given the
defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant
should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown:
r-q -a-nd the court having on
- 1.91deferred imposition of sentence until this date.

(date)
0 and the court having previously entered a judgment in this case on
now resentences the defendant.
0 and the court having placed the defendant on probation/community control revoked the defendant's
probation/community control.
It Is The Sentence Of The Court That:
El The defendant pay a fine of $pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes plus $at the 5% surcharge
required by 938.04, Florida Statutes.
he defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Duval County, Florida.
ci The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.
To be Imprisoned (Check one; unmarked sections are inappl icabl e):
0
Fore term of natural life.
21& a term of 2c, eA Vet. ,
0 Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of subject to conditions set forth in this order.
If "split'' sentence, complete the appropriate paragraph.
El
Followed by a period of on probation/community control under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of Supervision set forth in a separate order entered
herein.
0 However, after serving a period of imprisonment in , the
balance of the sentence shall be suspended and the defendant shall be placed on probation/community control for a
period of under supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and
conditions of probation/community control set forth in a separate order entered herein.
In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before the
defendant begins service of the supervision terms.
OTHER PROVISIONS
Retention of
Jurisdiction
Jail Credit
Prison Credit
Consecutive/
Concurrent
As To Other
Counts
El The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes.
It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of 1-0P-- days as credit for time
incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.
n It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed credit for all time previously served on this count
in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing.
21i- is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shalt run (check one)El
consecutive to
[ggancurrent with the sentence set forth in count of this case.
OR BK 15942 PAGE 2170
MARISSA DANIELLEXANDER, Case Number: 16-2044CF-008579-AXXX-MA
OBTS Number: 1603038745
By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed:
further ordered that the 2 1.)yhi A 1, e(A7/fr,rninimurn imprisonment provisions of
section 7 7 5. 087 , Florida Statutes, is rhereby imposed foe the sentence specified in this count.
AS TO CeC et COc,z-L-rI,2 /- co,14 - Avoek -r-
OH is further ordered that the
mandatory minnimum imprisonment
provisions of section 893. 1 35(1 ), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence
specified in this count.
Controlled Substance Olt is further
ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provisions of section 893. 1 3(1 )(c)1 ,
within 1 , 000 feet of
Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
School
Firearm
Drug Trafficking
Habitual Felony
Offender
Habitual Violent
Felony Offender
Violent Career
Criminal
Eine Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an
extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 7 7 5, 084(4)(a), Florida Statutes.
The req uisite findings by the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in
open court.
OThe Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an
extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 7 7 5, 084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A
minimum term of year(s) must be served prior to release. The req uisite findings of
the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.
OThe Defendant is adjudicated a violent career criminal and has been sentenced to an extended
term in accordance with the provisions of section 7 7 5. 084(4)(c), Florida Statutes. A minimum
term of year(s) must be served prior to release. The req uisite findings of the court
are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.
DThe Defendant is adjudicated a prison released re-offender in accordance with the provisions
of section 7 7 5. 082(8), and must server 1 00 percent of the court imposed sentence.
01 t is further ordered that the defendant shall serve a minimum of year(s) before
release in accordance with section 7 7 5. 0823, Florida Statutes.
olt is further ordered that the defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with the
provisions of section 7 7 5. 082(1 ), Florida Statutes.
Prison Release
Re-Offender
Law Enforcement
Protection Act
Capital Offense
Short-Barreled Rifle, Olt is further ordered that the 5 year minimum provisions of section 7 90. 221 (2), Florida Statutes,
Shotgun, Machine Gun are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
Continuing Criminal
Olt is further ordered that the 25 year minimum sentence provisions of section 893. 20, Florida
Enterprise

Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
Dui ProvisionsOlt is further ordered that the 4 year minimum mandatory pursuant to the provisions of section
31 6. 1 93(3)(c)3, Florida Statutes, and hereby imposed for this sentence specified in this court.
Dangerous Sexual ['The Defendant is adjudicated a dangerous sexual felony offender and has been sentenced to
Felony Offender

an extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 7 94. 01 1 5, Florida Statutes. A
mandatory/minimum term of year(s) must be served. The req uisite findings of the court
are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.
Page -1 of.5_1g2g2,s_
PAGE # 055
OR BK 15942 PAGE 2171
MARISSA DANIELLSWLEXANDER, Case Number: 16-204-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
OBTS Number: 1603038745
OTHER PROVISIONS
Consecutive/
Concurrent As To
Other Convictions
It is further ordered that the corn..p9site term of all sentences imposed for the counts specified in

this order shall run (check one)consecutive to

E
concurrent with the following: (check one)
any active sentence being served.

specific sentences:
In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Duval
County, Florida is hereby ordered and directed to deliver the defendant to the Department of
Corrections at the facility designated by the department together with a copy of this judgment and
sentence and any other documents specified by Florida Statute.
The defendant in open court was advised of the right to appeal from this sentence by filing a
notice of appeal within 30 days from this date with the clerk of this court and the defendants right to
the assistance of counsel in taking the appeal at the expense of the State on showing of indigency.
In imposing the above sentence, the court further recommends:
, 20 a ,.
1 *.ciay ? DONE AND 0My E in open coc
f
irt at Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, this I of
Judge
Page. F--)of
PAGE # 0560 OF 0825
* L eef












Exhibit 11












Exhibit 12












Exhibit 13












Exhibit 14












Exhibit 15












Exhibit 16












Exhibit 17












Exhibit 18












Exhibit 19
rmau ~Fw: Arnon Required - ReADP Healthcare coverage for dau... https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=c14988247f&view=pt&sear. ..
Gl'8] iI John Kattman mail.com>
by.(>_t:<~:,~k
Fw: Action Required - Re ADP Healthcare coverage for
daughter
1 message
Alexander, Marissa adp.com>
To: @ gmail.com" @ gmail.com>
Mon, Jan 3, 2011 at 8:20 AM
Marissa Alexander, Solution Center Manager
904.412.9048
From: Alexander, Marissa
Sent: Thursday, December 30,201008:29 AM
To: @ gmail.com' @ gmail.com>
Subject: Fw: Action Required - Re ADP Healthcarecoverage for daughter
Can you sign the birth certificate papers so that I can order her BC & make sure Rihanna continues
to health insurance.
Marissa Alexander, Solution Center Manager
904.412.
From: McCormick, Elaine
Sent: Wednesday, December 29,201003:59 PM
To: Alexander, Marissa
Subject: Action Required- Re ADP Healthcare coverage for daughter
I received a report today stating ADP Dependent Audit Services has not received a
response to their requests for you to provide proof of eligibility for one dependent
covered under one or more ADP Health Care plans. Perhaps there was some confusion
regarding the documents that are required to complete this process; if so please contact
me with any questions you may have so we can proceed to complete this important
requirement of the plan. If validation of dependent eligibility is not received (i.e. birth
certificate listing you as the parent or court papers listing you as legal guardian), we will
have no choice but to terminate healthcare coverage for Rihanna . It is our desire to
avoid such action and I am reaching out to assist you in adhering to this requirement of
the ADP Health Plans as quickly as possible.
Please contact me no later than noon (EST) on Tuesday, January 4, 2011 to complete
this request. Your support of this important ADP initiative is appreciated and please
don't hesitate to contact me directly for assistance and/or questions.
ElaineJ McCormick
1/3/2011 8:45 AM
mall - rw: AnIOn Required - ReADP Healthcare coverage for dau... https://mail.google.comlmail/?ui=2&ik=c14988247f&view=pt&sear...
ADP Corporate Benefits
Mgr Health & Welfare Plans Admn
Phone: (973)974-5
.~~ .. =~.. =-.. --. -.... -...~~~- .... ==~~-===
This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the addressee and may contain
information that is privileged and confidential. If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an
authorized representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination of this
communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, notify the sender
immediately by return email and delete the message and any attachments from your system.
113/2011 8:4S AM












Exhibit 20
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DUVAL
Before me, the undersigned authority, this 7th day of J anuary, 2011, personally
appeared EARRIET GREEN, who being duly sworn, states:
My name is EARRIET GREEN, and I reside at J acksonville, Florida
32218. My niece, Crystal Green, previously had arelationship with Rico Gray and has ababy
with Rico Gray, which child is currently four years of age. I met Rico Gray when hewas inthe
relationship with my niece. Crystal told me about Rico's violence toward women and that Rico
told her that he only hit women that he loved. I met Marissa Alexander when Rico brought her
to our home when hewas bringing something to Crystal.
This past Thursday, December 30,2010, Marissa came to my home at approximately 8:00
p.m. My girlfriend, Twan Brown, and I were at home alone at that time; however, we were
waiting for friends to arrive. Marissa advised us that sheneeded to take some papers to Rico
Gray for himto sign related to medical insurance for their child and divorce papers, and asked if
we would follow her to Rico's home. Twan and I followed Marissa in our car, but went no
further than the comer of Capper Road, where weparked. From that location we could seethe
back of Rico's house. We waited there approximately 15-20 minutes, when we saw Marissa
drive past us quickly. We thought shewould be heading back to our home, so we turned around
and went back home. Shortly after we arrived home, I was in the garage and I heard avoice
asking for help. I went outside and saw Marissa on her knees on the ground. She said that she
"had theworst whooping [she] ever had." I helped Marissa into the house and she was crying
and said her head was hurting. Shehad a"knot" on her head, there was amark on her neck, and
her armwas swollen. She said, "he was beating me like aman." We asked Marissa if we should
-- - -_. -----
call the police, and she said, "no." Marissa received atelephone call while shewas at our home
from someone asking her where shewas, and shetold the person that shewas at our home. She
asked us for the address. The police then came to our home, approximately anhour after Marissa
arrived at our home, and arrested Marissa. When thepolice arrived my girlfriend told the police
that they needed to look at her bruises. We even offered to give himgloves, ifhe wanted them,
in order for himto look at her bruises. The police officer said that he would not look at her
bruises, that hehad already seen bruises on Rico Gray, andthat they were going to arrest her. I
could seethe "knots" on Marissa's head - the "knots" were sobig that when her hair was parted,
we could see the lumps and could feel the dent of knuckles across her head. I could tell that she
was hit hard. The ice pack we gave her for her head hurt her. I boxed for 7years, and I have
never had any lumps that big on me.
Earriet Green
Sworn to and subscribed before me this
')'t'''-day of J anuary, 2011.
Notary Public
Personally known
Produced identification
Type of identification produced ... ( --t.)












Exhibit 21
1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DUVAL
2 COUNTY, FLORIDA
3 CASE NO.: 16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA
DIVISION: CR-G
4
STATE OF FLORIDA
5
- vs -
6
MARISSA ALEXANDER,
7
Defendant.
8
___________________________
9
10
11 Testimony and proceedings taken on Thursday,
12 January 13, 2011, before the Honorable Jefferson Morrow,
13 Judge of the Circuit Court, in the Duval County
14 Courthouse, 330 East Bay Street, Jacksonville, Florida,
15 and as reported by Holli V. Callahan, Florida Professional
16 Reporter and a Notary Public in and for the State of
17 Florida at Large.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
10
1 incidences of violence?
2 A No.
3 Q Is she living with you now?
4 A Yes.
5 Q All right. Do you have any information that you
6 would like to advise the Court, knowing what the
7 circumstances are about this case in terms of the reason
8 we are here this morning is on a motion to revoke her
9 bond?
10 A As far as what I know of Marissa, she is a good
11 person and she is trying to be civil and friendly with her
12 current husband since they have a child together. And I
13 know that the contact was made to try and get things
14 moving in a different direction and then also to sign some
15 papers related to their daughter. He was unwilling to do
16 that and that is what caused the incident. I was there
17 the night that she was arrested.
18 THE COURT: Oh, you were there?
19 THE WITNESS: I wasn't at the house where the
20 physical contact occurred, but I was at the location
21 where she was arrested. She had called me right
22 after they got into the altercation and my first
23 question to her was did you call the police. And she
24 told me, no, she did not call the police. She was
25 just trying to get out of there, to get away from the
11
1 house because he had her in the garage away from the
2 kids and after he had finished pushing her and
3 beating her on the head, he opened up the door so
4 that the kids could see what was going on. That's
5 when she had left with the baby in the car to another
6 friend's house.
7 On the way to the friend's house she called me
8 and, like I said, I asked her about calling the
9 police. I told her that I was going to call the
10 police. She told me where she was. Before I could
11 leave the house, the police showed up at my house and
12 asked me where she was located and me and the police
13 met her at the location. That's where I was able to
14 see what had happened to her. I felt the knots that
15 was on her head. I saw the bruises on her wrists
16 from her trying to put her hands up to keep him from
17 hitting her.
18 When the police arrested her, I was really
19 surprised that they arrested her because of the
20 damage that was done to her and she assured me that
21 she did not hit him. So as far as --
22 THE COURT: You could see bruises on her wrists?
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. And she had knots on her
24 head. That was the reason why she went to the
25 hospital.
12
1 THE COURT: All right. Would the State like to
2 inquire?
3 MS. LUIKART: Yes, Your Honor.
4 CROSS-EXAMINATION
5 BY MS. LUIKART:
6 Q You weren't actually there for the incident,
7 correct?
8 A No, I was not at Mr. Gray's house.
9 Q So you have no idea if she sustained those
10 wounds while hurting him, correct?
11 A Correct.
12 Q Okay.
13 A But you can --
14 Q Okay. And she did not call 911, correct?
15 A No.
16 Q And she's the one that went to his house,
17 correct?
18 A Correct.
19 MS. LUIKART: I have nothing further.
20 THE COURT: All right. And did you want to put
21 on any more evidence from this witness?
22 MR. KATTMAN: No, Your Honor.
23 THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
24 Do you have any other witnesses?
25 MR. KATTMAN: They are merely character
17
1 C O U R T C E R T I F I C A T E
2 STATE OF FLORIDA )
3 COUNTY OF DUVAL )
4
5 I, Holli V. Callahan, Florida Professional
6 Reporter and Notary Public, do hereby certify that I was
7 authorized to and did stenographically report the
8 foregoing proceedings and that the transcript is a true
9 and complete record of my stenographic notes.
10
11 DATED this 9th day of October 2013.
12
13 __________________________________
Holli V. Callahan,
14 Florida Professional Reporter
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25












Exhibit 22












Exhibit 23












Exhibit 24












Exhibit 25
--0- ........, ......
John Kattman < gmail.com>
(no subject)
1 message
mms.att.net < mms.att.net>
To: gmail.com
Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 2:38 PM
You dont have to answer this question if you dont want to but it is a yes or no question can we just have sex till
find someone I truly love might take a while
https:llmail.google.comlmaill?ui=2&ik=c14988247f&view=pt&search=inbox&th=12d7bb... 111212011












Exhibit 26