[CASE TITLE] Patricia Natcher vs. Hon.

Court of Appeals
[CASE #] G.R. No. 133000
[DATE] October 2, 2001
[PONENTE] Buena, J.
[NATURE] Petition for review on certiorari

Doctrine:

Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.

Facts:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a
land in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his 6
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's adjudicating and
dividing among themselves the said land. Under the agreement, Graciano received
8/14 share while each of the children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, TCTs were issued in the name of
Graciano and the children.

Further, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided
among themselves the land into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land leaving only
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name. Subsequently, the said
land was further subdivided into 2 lots where the 1
st
with an area of 80.90 sqm.
and the 2
nd
lot with an area of 396.70 sqm. Eventually, Graciano sold the 1
st
lot to
a 3
rd
person but retained ownership over the 2
nd
lot.

On 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the (2
nd
) land to his wife Patricia to which a TCT was
issued in her name. On 1985,Graciano died leaving his 2
nd
wife Patricia and his
children by his 1
st
marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint, private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, Natcher
through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery acquired the TCT making it appear
that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale. And, that their legitimes have been
impaired.

Petitioners Allegations: She was legally married to Graciano in 1980. Thus,
under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. That
during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to
his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

RTC (Manila): Deed of sale is void being contrary to law. No evidence of
separation of property or a decree of judicial separation of property between them,
the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale; Prohibited
donation; Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it
may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia
Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.

CA: Reversed and set aside RTCs ruling. (It is the probate court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate Thus the
court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What
the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of the sale and leave
the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for
that purpose.)

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC (in an action for reconveyance) may adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to his heirs.

Held:
No, the RTC trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. (Petition
DISMISSED)

A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may
either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact.

There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party,
or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake
of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of
its limited jurisdiction.

Under Sec. 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and
on the heir.

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in
Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter should
be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited
probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure.
In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be
waived".

We do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as
the children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the RTC, acting in its
general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the
decedent.

This Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if
the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership.



[CASE TITLE] FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA
RIVERA, AND EUTIQUIO DICO, JR. VS PETER ENRIQUEZ, ET. AL.
[CASE #] G.R. No. 162956
[DATE] April 10, 2008
[PONENTE] Puno, C.J.
[NATURE] Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court

Doctrine: If there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among
other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for
its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir
in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

Facts:
Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the
subject parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu, with Anacleto Cabrera. On the
other hand respondents, claim to be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as husband and
daughter of Anacleto's daughter.

On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez, sold 200 sq. m.
out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina
Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in this case. When
Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they
discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by
Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the
subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes
dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while
302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by
Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico.

Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a
complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the
subject property.
The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed, hence the petition.





Issue:

Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil
action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.

Held:

Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance. The respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to
prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is the one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to
the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one
which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. A plaintiff is a real party
in interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, while a
defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal
obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act
or omission which had violated the legal right of the former. The purpose of the
rule is to protect persons against undue and unnecessary litigation. It likewise
ensures that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse
parties in the consideration of a case. Thus, a plaintiffs right to institute an
ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was
registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary
civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition, or nullification of
transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto, this
Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an
ordinary civil action since the matter is within the exclusive competence of the
court in a special proceeding.

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the
Declaration of Non-Existency, Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates
of Title, etc., a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being
asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they
claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as
stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul.


[CASE TITLE] Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte,
et. al.
[CASE #] G.R. No. 198680
[DATE] July 8, 2013
[PONENTE] Perlas-Bernabe, J.
[NATURE] Petition for review on certiorari

Doctrine:

A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact; a declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right

Facts:

Magdaleno Ypon died intestate, leaving behind lots covered by two TCTs.
Respondent, Gaudioso Ricaforte (aka Gaudioso Ypon), claimed to be the sole heir
of Magdaleno and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. After which,
caused the cancellation of the TCTs and had the lots transferred to his name.

The transfer led to Petitioners filing a case for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance, alleging that Magdaleno died childless; and that Gaudiosos
transfer of property is prejudicial to their rights as successors-in-interests.

The RTC held in favor of Gaudioso, being able to prove through his Birth
Certificate that he is the son of Magdaleno. Petitioners also failed to show they
had a cause of action against Gaudiso, Petitioners not having proved that they are
Magdalenos compulsory heirs; albeit, being able to prove their relationship to
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration.

After the motion for reconsideration of Petitioners was denied, they sought direct
recourse to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioners had a proper cause of action against Respondent

Held:
No, Petition DENIED

Petitioners allege that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno, and if proven to be
true, would warrant the cancellation and reconveyance they seek. However,
jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.

The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,

or when a special proceeding
had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot
be re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar
nature, appear to exist.



[CASE TITLE] Sheker v. Estate of Alice
[CASE #] G.R. No. 157912
[DATE] December 13, 2007
[PONENTE] Austria Martinez, J.
[NATURE] Petition for Review on Certiorari

DOCTRI NE:

Special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings;
but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the
Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings,
as far as practicable.

Certification of Non-Forum Shopping Not Required in a Contingent Money
Claim

FACTS:
Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria
Medina. Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all creditors
to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker
filed a contingent money claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the
amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; and
another P275,000 as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others
that the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because; (1) the latter did not
attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto (2) failed to pay the necessary
docket fee (3) failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not
filed and served personally. RTC dismissed the claim of Alan Sheker and agreed
on the claim of Medina.

Petitioner now files the petition for review on certiorari and maintains that the
RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing,
and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2,
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable
to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner. Hence the case.






ISSUE:

(1) Won the rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings.
(2) Won the claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because of non-filing of certificate
of non-forum shopping and non-payment of docket fees.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court.

RATIO:

1) No, Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern
special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions
shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of
being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of
special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings
as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum
shoppingfor complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-
personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they
are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.



2) No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum
shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case
at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money claim
but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers will.
Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims
which is to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of
the properties of the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of
the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates
to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected
with and dependent upon the principal remedy.


Pilar S. Vda De Manalo et. al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al.,
G.R. No. 129242
January 16, 2001

Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners seeking to annul the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court and the Resolution which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Doctrine:
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint,
or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.

It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limited
and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and
issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.

Facts:
Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his
wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo,
Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando
Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.

herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio
Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and
Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Trial Court for the judicial settlement
of the estate of their late father, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo
Manalo, as administrator.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for
hearing and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing
service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at
their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued
an order declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and set
the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993.

However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion
of herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to
file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel,
culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to
set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which
denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set for
preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the
case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons
of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on
July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of
the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding
Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on
September 9, 1993 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.

A motion for reconsideration is filed but denied the trial court.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, In their petition for certiorari with the appellate court, they contend that:
(1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving
spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no
certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned
orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright
dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the
petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving
members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but
that the same have failed.


Held:
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

According to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss
a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver
in the petition in special proceeding, that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of the
petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint,
or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.

The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for
the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late
Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of
Manila at the time of his said death.

The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration
of the estate rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings

It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limited
and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and
issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were
to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the
dismissal, The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take
refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify
the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal
of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035
(underscoring supplied).
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.
This is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or
persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff
pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in
SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was
impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and
subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that
they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation
of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of
the probate court.




























THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHIU GUIMCO, defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. 12184
September 27, 1917

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; COMMITMENT FOR FAILURE
TO PRODUCE WILL. A court cannot make a valid order committing a person
to jail for failure to produce the will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629
of the Code of Civil Procedure, except when acting in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons.

Facts:

Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the municipality of
Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting China. Before his departure
from the Philippines he had executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, a notary
public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. Chiu
Guimco is Joaquin Cruzs brother.

Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his deceased brother,
entered into an agreement with his brothers Filipina wife, whereby she
relinquished her claims to the estate for a consideration. He also entered into an
agreement with Uy Cuan, his brothers Chinese wife, for the distribution of the
estate and for the payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate. No
payments have, however, been made by Guimco.

Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to Guimco urging
him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful proceedings in
accordance therewith. Guimco replied that the will in question had never been in
his possession and that he had never seen it.

A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure charging
Guimco with the failure to produce the will within the time required by law. The
court found the accused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800.
Subsequently, the court, believing that the will was in his possession, ordered him
to produce it but Guimco still failed to do so. The court ordered the confinement
of Guimco in the provincial jail.

Issue:
Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered the commitment
of Guimco to the provincial jail?




Held:

No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of Rule 75), which
allows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver a will after the death of
the testator without reasonable cause, can only be applied when a court is acting in
the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased
persons. Where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court,
before taking action under this section, should require that there be before it some
petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court
under this section appropriate.

The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is clearly a totally
different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628 (now
section 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 to
superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of
imprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.

To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec. 628
would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the
will by him would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the
criminal complaint. This would constitute an infringement of the provision of law
which says that in a criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying
against himself.






















[CASE TITLE] In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA
INGEBORG JOHNSON
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-12767
[DATE] November 16, 1918
[PONENTE] STREET, J .
[NATURE]

Doctrine: One cannot acquire a new (or lose his) citizenship by the mere change
of domicile.

Facts:
Biographical facts:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he
emigrated to the US and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898.

May 9, 1898: Chicago he married to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately
thereafter embarked for the PH as a soldier in the Army of the US. Ebba Ingeborg
(daughter) was born a few months after their marriage.

After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the US he continued
to live in the PH.

November 20, 1902: Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce from him
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion.

January 10, 1903: he procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago.

From Chicago he went to Sweden, where a photograph was taken in which he
appeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba
Ingeborg, who was then living with her grandparents in Sweden.

Deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in business and continued to
live until his death.

In this city he to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibaez, by
whom he had three children, to wit, Mercedes Encarnacion and Victor.

The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased by
Simeona Ibaez.

February 4, 1916: Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen
of the US, died in the city of Manila, left a holographic will, dated September 9,
1915, by which he disposed of an estate worth P231,800.
It was written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

February 9, 1916: a petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of
this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the
State of Illinois, USA; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws
of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636
(Will made here by alien) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The hearing was set for March 6, 1916, and 3 weeks publication of notice was
ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." (Due publication was made.)

March 16, 1916: Document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.
At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T.
Pickett as administrators of the estate. (Pickett signified his desire not to serve,
and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.)

In the will, the testator gives to his:
brother Victor 100 shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope
Company;
father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000;
daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000;
wife, Alejandra Ibaez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single;
Simeona Ibaez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single.

The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children Mercedes,
Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.

After the will had been probated, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson moved to vacate the
order of March 16 and also various other orders in the case (purpose: to annul the
decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing
the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate
heir of her father.) DENIED!

The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are:
Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the
State of Illinois at the time the will in question was executed;
The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State
of Illinois;
The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner;
and
The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.


Issue:

Whether judgment should be set aside because the testator was not a resident of
the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State.

Held:

No, Petition DENIED.

The probate of the will was regular and that the publication was sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.

No law in force which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized
citizen of the PH; and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even if he had
so desired, to expatriate himself from the US and change his political status from a
citizen of the US to a citizen of these Islands.

PRESUMPTION: He retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his
status as a citizen of the United States. (It would be novel doctrine to Americans
living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose their
citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.)

A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of
which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the
law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the
laws of these Islands the state, being not capitalized, does not mean that United
States is excluded from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still
a territory of the US).

Also, with regard to the alleged impaired legitime, the Court ruled that: the
probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree
of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will.

The issue as to the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will must be
determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by
the general provisions here in the PH.





Article 10 (2) of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary
successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be
situate."

[CASE TITLE] ERNESTO M. GUEVARA v. ROSARIO GUEVARA and
her husband PEDRO BUISON
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-48840
[DATE] December 29, 1943
[PONENTE] Ozaeta, J.
[NATURE] Petition for Certiorari

Doctrine:

The presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and
distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy.

Facts:

On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara, a resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan,
executed a will (Exhibit A), distributing assorted movables and a residential lot
among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren, Vivencio,
Eduvigis, Dionista, Candida, and Pio Guevara. To his second wife Augustia
Posadas, the testator bequeathed, in addition to various movables, a portion of 25
hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd hectare parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618,
plus another five (5) hectares in settlement of her widows usufruct. The balance
of the 259 odd hectares he distributed as follows:
100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testators lifetime and for payment
of his debts and family expenses;
108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein
43.2342 hectares by way of mejora;
21.6171 hectares to mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara.

Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond.
On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto
Guevara, conveying to the latter the southern half of the 259-hectare lot heretofore
mentioned, and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern
half.
Prior to this sale, on November 1, 1932, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointly
applied for registration of the big parcel (case No. 15174), but in view of the sale
from the former to the latter, the decree was issued in the name of Ernesto
Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a certificate of title being issued in
his sole name on October 12, 1933.

On September 27, 1933, Victorino Guevara died, but his will was not filed for
probate. About four years later, Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized
natural child of the deceased Victorino, and on the assumption that he had died
intestate, brought suit against Ernesto Guevara (legitimate son) to recover 423,492
square meters of the tract covered by certificate of title No. 51691 as the portion
that should correspond to her (Rosario) by way of legitime.

Rosario presented the will to the court not for the purpose of having it probated
but only to prove that the deceased Victirino had acknowledged her as his natural
daughter. She claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or
assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated. This
theory was upheld by both the trial court and Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals said that a will, unless probated, is ineffective. They relied
upon Section 1 of Rule 74 and sanctioned the procedure adopted by the Ernesto.
The filing of testate proceedings would cause injustice, incovenience, delay, and
much expense to the parties. It is preferable to leave them in the very status which
they themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all,
since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same criterion
(Leao vs. Leao), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court.

CA also cited Sec. 6 of Rule 124 which provides that if the procedure which the
court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed
out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process for mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said Rules.

Issue:
A) Was the procedure adopted by Rosario legal?
B) What is the efficacy of the deed of sale and the effect of the issuance of a
certificate of title to Ernesto?

Held:

CA partially affirmed. Action instituted by Rosario was not in accordance with
law.
The awarding of relief in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent must
depend on the custodians duty of complying with the probate of the will.

(A) Presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance
by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel
the probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to
the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not
presenting it, he may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the
will.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the
partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that
"no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in
the proper court"

It was wrong for Ernesto to claim that the will has been superseded by the deed of
sale and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title in his favor.

Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court applies. The proceeding for the probate of a
will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and with
personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
(Rule 77).

Although not contested (sec. 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact
that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and
not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to
the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given
effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested
by the seal of the court.

Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the
estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not say that
in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among
themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate.

Leao vs. Leao (25 Phil., 180) like section 1 of Rule 74, sanctions the
extrajudicial partition by the heirs of the properties left by a decedent, but not the
nonpresentation of a will for probate.

Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, departed from the procedure sanctioned by
the trial court and impliedly approved by this Court in the Leao case, by holding
that an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession. The property
must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial
partition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by the court.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the
partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that
"no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in
the proper court"

(B) There was a valid and efficacious conveyance of the southern half of the
hacienda to Ernesto in consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to
pay all the debts of the deceased. He had to alienate considerable portions of the
land to fulfil the obligation. There was no alienation.
The registration of land under the Torrens system does not have the effect of
altering the laws of succession, or the rights of partition between coparceners,
joint tenants, and other cotenants nor does it change or affect in any other way any
other rights and liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec.
70, Land Registration Law).

Rosario is not in estoppel, nor can the doctrine of res judicata be invoked against
her claim. She has the right to compel the defendant to deliver her corresponding
share in the estate left by the deceased, Victorino.

Affirmed CA that the land still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino.
Ernesto is under obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent portion
from the southern half of said land that has not yet been sold in case of alienation.

Rosario Guevara and the parties are ordered to present the document Exhibit A
to the proper court for probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such
action as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible
party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76.

Separate Opinions:
BOCOBO, J., concurring:
There is extrajudicial settlement by agreement among the heirs is authorized by
section 1 of Rule 74. only "if the decedent left no debts." There being debts when
the father died, section 1 of Rule 74 is not applicable.

Ernesto M. Guevara, in consideration of the conveyance to him of the southern
half of the hacienda, assumed all the debts of the deceased; but this agreement is
binding only upon the parties to the contract but not upon the creditors who did
not consent thereto. (Art. 1205, Civil Code.)

MORAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The situation is not one contemplated by section 1 of Rule 74. Thus, plaintiff may
not invoke its provisions.

The phrase "extrajudicial settlement" unquestionably means liquidation and
distribution of the estate without judicial proceeding.

If the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will,
the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in
a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.

Uy Kiao Eng vs Nixon Lee
GR 176831
January 15, 2010

Doctrine: Generally, mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
obligations. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against
his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel
petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings
for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested
his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal
heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case.
After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner
demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.
However, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,
the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the
appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent
moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its
earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the
payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by
testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner
brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for
mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the
appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

Issue:
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

Held:
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the
public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be
resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the
public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the
quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus
issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial
doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus
will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be
used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to
enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless
some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ
is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of
mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would
be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the
government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in
matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus
can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of
remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy,
mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by
equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound
discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in
the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot
be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has
a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is
in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.--Any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the
production of the original holographic will. Thus--
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.--The person who has custody of a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will
to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.--A person named as
executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the
testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he
obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the
court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other
manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus,
the Court grants the demurrer
























































[CASE TITLE] Ethel Grimm Roberts, petitioner vs. Judge Tomas R.
Leonidas, Branch 38, Court of First Instance; Maxine Tate-Grimm, Edward
Miller Grimm II and Linda Grimm, respondents.
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-55509
[DATE] June 19, 1982
[PONENTE] Aquino, J.
[NATURE] Petition for Allowance of Wills

Doctrine: A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with
two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98
Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is
anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the
testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.

Facts:
Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati
Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife,
Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II
(Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts
(McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.

He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his
second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of
the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate
situated in this country.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm
and E. LaVar Tate in Utah.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila
by Ethel in January, 1978. In its order, the Third Judicial District Court
admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil. Two weeks later, or on April 25,
1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second
parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into
a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine
estate. It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate
should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the
homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila. The agreement indicated the computation
of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the
fees of the Angara law firm.

It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share
equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should
each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital
share.

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-
three days after Grimm's death, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, through
lawyers, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate
proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named special
administratrix.

The second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate
of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She
submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September
8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and
Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of
Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by
the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that
Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to
account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine.
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement
was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and
that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of
merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or.
alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and
that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior
to the petition for probate.



Issue:
Whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in
an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be
entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).

Held:
Yes, Branch 38 can entertain the intestate proceeding in Branch 20. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

The Court held that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

CASE TITLE: Angel T. Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Pedro O Fragrante
CASE #: G.R. No. L-770
PONENTE: Hilado, J.
NATURE:
DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain, and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.

The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibanez, it
held that authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant will
promote public interest and convenience; the original applicant, at the time of his
death is a Filipino Citizen; and his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service.

This decision overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered that under
the provisions of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Fragrante, authorizing said intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-
half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to seel the ice produced from
said plant in the said municipality and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal,
and in Quezon City, subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail.

The petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow
the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante for
the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be
in contravention of law.

ISSUE:
WON the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a citizen of the
Philippines within the meaning of Section 16 of the Public Service Act, as
amended.









HELD:
Yes. Within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the
judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. As applied in this case, one of
those rights was before the Public Service Commission consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion.

The term person used in section 1 (1) and (2) in the bill of rights of the
constitution, must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons. Otherwise
the latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of
property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The framers of the constitution must intend to include artificial or
juridical persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature
and among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.


Octavio S. Morales II v. Pacita delos Reyes,
GR No 129505 (2000)
January 31, 2000
Mendoza, J.

Doctrine:
The right to intervene belongs to any interested person. "Interested person" is one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not
merely incidental or contingent.

Facts:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City,
filed a petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged
that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that
copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will was annexed to the petition for
probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch
61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.

Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996;
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio
L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus
prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of
letters of administration in his name.

Judge Gorospe denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention.
Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision
promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for
intervention.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos of RTC-Makati, Branch 65 granted
petitioner's motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997,
rendered a decision setting aside the trial court's order on the ground that
petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, being the nearest of kin and a creditor of the late Dr.
Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

Held:
NO.
Rule 79, 1 provides: Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary.
Simultaneous petition for administration. Any person interested in a will may
state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the
persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing
upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at
the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely
incidental or contingent.

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part
of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.






Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the
deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is
incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in
Ozaeta v. Pecson:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who
can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment
of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give
bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these
circumstances is present in this case.

[CASE TITLE] VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-40502
[DATE] November 29, 1976
[PONENTE] Martin, J.
[NATURE] Petition for Letters of Administration

Doctrine:
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death.

Facts:
Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration
of Amando G. Garcia. The latter died intestate in Manila and leaving properties in
Calamba, Laguna and in other places within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court.

Fule also filed a petition for appointment as a special administratix over the estate.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia questioning the
appointment of Fule as special administratix and was issued without jurisdiction.
She also prayed that she be appointed and not Fule as special administratix.

The notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Fule was
published in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation of
Southern Luzon.

Preciosa Garcia received a Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator and she filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction , venue,
lack of interest of Fule in the estate of Garcia and disqualification of Fule as
special administratix.

Fule filed an omnibus motion praying for the authority to take possession of the
properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons and to secure
cash advances from the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association. Preciosa Garcia opposed the motion and asking the judge to limit the
authority or power of the special administratix.

The judge issued an order denying the motion. Preciosa moved to dismiss the
petition because jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not
been acquired by the court; venue was improperly laid; and Fule is not a party in
interest as she is not entitled to inherit.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Laguna has jurisdiction to hear the
case.

Held:
No, the petition of Virginia Fule was denied for lack of jurisdiction.
Sec. 1 of Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that if the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death.

We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term resides connotes ex vi termini
actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. In other
words, resides should be viewed or understand in its popular sense, meaning the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.

On this issue, we rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado
Garcia was at #11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.

The death certificate of Amado Garcia was presented in evidence by Fule and
Preciosa Garcia; it shows that his last place of residence was at #11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City and not at Calamba,Laguna.

The conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Fules petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the CFI of Laguna. Nevertheless, the long
settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. In the case
before US the CA had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Fule as special
administratix, Preciosa did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction
or venue assumed by CFI of Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
residence of the decedent.

[CASE TITLE] Remedios Bongon Viuda De Manzanero vs. The CFI of
Batangas
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-44042
[DATE] August 23, 1935
[PONENTE] Villareal, J.
[NATURE] Petition for certiorari

Doctrine:

The jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance, for the settlement of an
estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, or of the location
of his estate, cannot be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.

Facts:

Esteban Manzanero, then assistant district engineer of Albay, died in the
provincial hospital on February 1935. On March 1935, his brother Fortunato filed
in the CFI of Batangas a sworn application alleging that his deceased brother had
his legal residence in Santo Tomas, Batangas; that he had left no property except a
life insurance policy of P5,000 with the Filipinas Life Assurance Co., of Manila;
that his deceased brother owed him P500; that he was survived by a widow, herein
petitioner, Remedios Bongon, residing in Tabaco, Albay; and praying for a
summary settlement of his estate. A copy of said application was sent by ordinary
mail to said widow.

The CFI of Batangas issued an order setting said application for hearing and
directing the publication of the notice. When the application was called for
hearing only the applicant Fortunato appeared through his attorney. As the
vacation Judge, Eduardo Gutierrez David, was holding judicial session in Lucena,
Tayabas, said applicant and his attorney requested the clerk of the CFI of
Batangas to send the record to Lucena.

Upon petition of the applicant, and after making sure that no opposition to the
application had been presented, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David ordered the clerk
of court of Tayabas to take the evidence in the case and to submit his report.

The clerk of the CFI of Tayabas forwarded the evidence with his report to said
court.

The case was set for hearing and the corresponding notice sent by registered
special delivery mail to herein petitioner Bongon and to Manzanero.

The case was called for hearing without the petitioner having appeared to oppose
the application.

CFI: Granted. (Esteban was a resident of Batangas, with temporary residence in
Tabaco, Albay and directing the summary distribution of the sum of P5,000, after
payment of the sum of P500 which said deceased supposedly owed his brother
Fortunato and after the filing of a bond of P3,500 by the alleged heirs, said
distribution to be subject to any valid claim that might be presented within two
years against said distribution. Required the Filipinas Assurance Company to pay
to the heirs of the deceased the proceeds of his insurance policy.)

**The insurance company sent the net proceeds of the policy amounting to
P4,276.03 to the clerk of said court.

Having been informed that the proceeds of the policy had been distributed among
the heirs of her deceased husband, the petitioner filed a motion praying for the
return and delivery to her of the money.

Issue:
Whether or not the question of jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a
summary settlement of the estate of a deceased person, by reason of residence,
may be raised by means of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

Held:
No, Petition DISMISSED.

Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
Jurisdiction, when may be contested. The jurisdiction assumed by a Court of
First Instance, for the settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of a person, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

From the pleadings before us, the want of jurisdiction of said court does not
clearly appear. The communication of the municipal treasurer of Tabaco, Albay,
stating that the deceased appears in the list of registered voters and the affidavit of
the municipal president stating that the deceased resided before his death in
Tabaco, Albay, do not form part of the record of the lower court. It not appearing
from the orders of the lower court, as disclosed by the copies thereof attached to
the record of these certiorari proceedings, that said court lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the application for summary settlement by reason of the legal
residence of the deceased, certiorari does not lie, an appeal being specially
provided in such case by section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Furthermore, it appears of record that there is a motion in the special proceeding
for the summary settlement of the estate under consideration, praying that the
heirs of the deceased who received the latter's property, be ordered to return it to
the court for delivery to the herein petitioner as the only alleged beneficiary
named in the insurance policy of her deceased husband. This motion is pending
decision and is in accordance with the reservation made by Judge David in his
order directing the distribution of the net proceeds of the insurance policy among
the brothers and sisters of the deceased after payment of the only indebtedness of
P500. Said reservation is in accordance with the provision of section 598 of said
Code of Civil Procedure.

[CASE TITLE] ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. vs
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-21993
[DATE] June 21, 1966
[PONENTE] REYES, J.B.L., J.
[NATURE] Petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special
Proceeding

Doctrine: Jurisdiction and Venue. The place of residence of the deceased is not
an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is
upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue"


Facts:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila.
On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the
Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.

On March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed
a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will.

On March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was
withdrawn.

On March 12, 1963, the aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr.
Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of
Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria
Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate and on the same
day, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court (CFI
of Bulacan) for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.

It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal;
that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the
year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque,
and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for
probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the
same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon
delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the
case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March
12, 1963.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over
the settlement of Fr. Rodriguezs estate

Held:
Yes, the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement
of the estate in question and the intestate proceedings in the Rizal Court should be
discontinued.

The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if
no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place
for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is
prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule
77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published.
When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the
Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the
will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall
cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has
been filed by the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition
for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon
the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit
of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the
Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.



The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins
that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper
venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first
invoked, without taking venue into account.














































































[CASE TITLE] Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia vs. Hon. Conrado M. Vazquez
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-26808
[DATE] March 28, 1969
[PONENTE] Fernando , J.
[NATURE] Petition for review on certiorari

Doctrine:

Facts:

Petitioner, Fr. Lucio Garcia, filed for probate the will of Gliceria Del Rosario.
Upon which, he was asked by the trial court to pay the corresponding docket fees.
Petitioner refused to pay, contesting that another alleged will has already been
filed for probate and the corresponding docket fees for such had already been
paid; claiming such payment for the other alleged will is no longer required as
they all refer to the settlement of the same estate.

Respondent Judge Vasquez, ordered Petitioner to pay the Docket Fees, otherwise,
his petition would be dismissed. Petitioner filed for certiorari amounting to grave
abuse of discretion of Respondent Judge.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner need not pay Docket Fees

Held:
No, Petitioner still needs to pay Docket Fees. Petition DENIED

Petitioner should have been aware that there is no escape from the payment of the
corresponding docket fee, otherwise, the Court is not called upon to act on a
complaint or petition. Nor does it suffice to vary the rule simply because there is
only one decedent whose estate is thus to be disposed of by will that must first be
probated. It is not farfetched or implausible that a decedent could have left various
wills. Under such circumstances, there is nothing inherently objectionable in thus
exacting the payment of a docket fee, every time a will is sought to be probated.
Petitioner here could have sought the probate of the will presented by him in the
same proceeding. He did not; he filed instead a separate action.

Also, the Rules of Court require that for all clerical services in the allowance of
will, the "fees payable out of the estate shall be collected in accordance with the
value of the property involved ...."

The specific legal provision is thus clear and
unmistakable. It is the clerical service in the allowance of the will that has to be
paid for. The docket fees exist for that purpose and must be collected at the outset.
There is no exception according to the above legal provision.















































[CASE TITLE] Apolonia Banayad Frianela v. Servillano Banayad Jr.
[CASE #] G.R. No. 169700
[DATE] July 30, 2009
[PONENTE] Nachura, J.
[NATURE] Petition for review under Rule 45

Doctrine
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moisess estate.
Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The lower court
therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction
despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be
ordered motu proprio by the courts.

Facts:

Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F. Banayad, petitioner, who
was named as devisee in the will, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, on June 3, 1991, for the allowance of the November 18, 1985
holographic will of the decedent. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue
and left to her the following properties, namely: (1) a parcel of land situated in
Pasay City and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9741; (2) images of
Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown; and (3) all personal belongings.

Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned
for the allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated
September 27, 1989 and another dated September 28, 1989.

After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered its
Decision declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked
the November 18, 1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as
administrator of Moisess estate.

On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005 Decision, modified the decision
of the trial court and ruled that the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only
revoked the November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of
Moisess real property was concerned.

Issues:
Won the lower courts have jurisdiction over the matter.



Held: IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Ratio:

Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein,
including the decision rendered, are null and void. With the above disquisition, the
Court finds it unnecessary to discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the
petition.

Sec. 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P) 129, is the applicable law, which confers
the jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on
the gross value of the estate, which must be alleged in the complaint or petition to
be filed.

Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moisess estate.
Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC
therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction
despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be
ordered motu proprio by the courts. Further, the CA, on appeal, should have
dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court,
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.

Note: I know the facts does not provide any information regarding the matter but
rest assured the case did not provide for any facts other than those that are copied
and pasted.

The SC disregarded everything and focused on the fact that the initial petition did
not provide estimation of the estate to confer jurisdiction to which court, making
the petition void.










RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG v. COURT OF
APPEALS et al.
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
TOPIC: Allowance of Will
PONENTE: Melenio-Herrera, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition to Review the April 28, 1981 decision of the Court of Appeals.

May 21, 1977 Clemencia Aseneta, 81 years old, single, died at the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital; left a holographic will, the pertinent portions are:
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City,
Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my
death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously
for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have
been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness with them even during the
time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being
troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as
Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for
myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things
against my will.

June 9, 1977 - Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent with the CFI Br IV of Quezon City (testate case)

July 25, 1977 Bernardo Aseneta, adopted son, claimed to be the sole heir of the
decedent, instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI Br XI of Pasig, Rizal
(intestate case)

December 23, 1977 - the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated
before Branch XI

Bernardo filed a Motion to Dismiss the testate case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the compulsory heir, was
preterited and intestacy should ensue.

Soledad opposed the Motion to Dismiss and averred that it is still the rule that in a
case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by the decedent.

September 8, 1980 the lower court dismissed the testate case



On September 8, 1980 - the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case
December 19, 1980 the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit;
Bernardo was appointed as the administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent
considering that he is a forced heir of the decedent.

Maninang filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

April 28, 1981 CA denied the petition and ruled that the lower courts dismissal
was final in nature as it finally disposed of the testate case and appeal was the
proper remedy which they failed to avail of.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the testate case should be dismissed because the compulsory heir
was preterited and that intestacy should instead ensue

HELD:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside ; the decision of the lower court
is nullified. The testate case is ordered to be reinstated and consolidated with the
intestate case.

RATIO:
The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
testate case. The probate of a will is mandatory. No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.

By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The Testate Case was
dismissed under the conclusion that Bernardo has been preterited. However, from
the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable.

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because
unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.

Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.

The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.

It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency
(sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain
entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the
law.

Bernardo, relied on the pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid however, the ruling
in this case as well as the ruling in the case of Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez are
exceptions rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases
was passed upon even before probate because of "practical considerations.

Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Neri
vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325).

Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his
share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing
cases)

Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon the other hand, is presumed
to be "involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition,
Volume 2.o p. 1131).

The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.

Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of
heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies.

In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172).

Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate
of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

Certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its
jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari.

*Even if the remedy is appeal, a petition for certiorari may be entertained
particularly if appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Nuguid vs. Nuguid In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area
of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
Court should meet that issue.

*The parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic
validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of
whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us
now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on
the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.

**In the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it
completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue
that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private
respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a
valid disinheritance.

Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue.