The Diplomacy of Restraint: The

United States' Efforts to Repatriate

Greek Children Evacuated During the
Civil War of 1946-49*
Howard Jones
In early 1948 the Department of State began receiving reports that
Greek communist guerrillas were evacuating thousands of Greek
children from the country and relocating them in neighboring com-
munist states in East Europe. Stories of atrocities during the Greek
civil war were not new, of course, but these revelations seemed par-
ticularly shocking. The government in Athens charged that the
rebels were kidnapping youths aged three to fourteen, causing the
entire episode to take on the sinister appearance of a calculated effort
to destroy Greece as a nation. Indeed, the Greek government ac-
cused the rebels of genocide and appealed to the United Nations for
help. Afterward it turned to the United States, which had earlier an-
nounced the Truman Doctrine of military and economic aid to pre-
vent the spread of Soviet communism into Greece and Turkey. This
seemingly new communist threat, which the Greeks called paedoma-
zoma or "gathering ofthe children," aroused indignation within the
Truman administration because it violated the fundamentals of
humanitarianism; more importantly, some American observers sus-
pected that the evacuations were a device for undermining the Tru-
man Doctrine by deepening the chaos in Greece and making the
country a breeding ground for communism (U.S., Dept. of State,
Athens Post Records, Embassy to Sec. of State, 17 April 1948). Al-
though numerous writers have referred to the displacement of Greek
children, they have been unable to determine motive for obvious rea-
*The author wishes to thank the Earhart Foundation, Truman Library, and
University of Alabama for support in the preparation of this article. He also ex-
presses appreciation to Richard V. Burks, Robert H. Ferrell, and Hugh Ragsdale
for their advice and encouragement.
65
66 Howard Jones
sons: the files in the East European states and in Greece remain
closed to researchers.
The accessibility to American documents permits only a one-
sided examination ofthe question, but even this approach raises im-
portant implications that extend beyond the immediate issue of the
children. The evidence demonstrates that at least in this instance the
Truman administration was less rigid in its response to foreign policy
matters during the Cold War than usually appeared to be the case.
Despite pressure from many sources, the government in Washington
refused to engage in a propaganda campaign against the com-
munists, attempting instead to make a dispassionate decision about
whether there was proof of kidnapping. There were reasons for this
restraint. The purpose of the Truman Doctrine in Greece was to
wind down the war and establish internal stability not to aggravate
further relations between the Athens government and its neighbors
to the north. Furthermore, the Cold War itself would soon have an
effect on these incidents relating to the children. The Truman ad-
ministration was aware of the growing troubles within the Corn-
inform (Communist Information Bureau), and would try to exploit
Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet bloc in June 1948. Undoubtedly
this move by Yugoslavia's leader, Marshal Josip Tito, had an impact
on the manner in which the United States dealt with the kidnapping
allegations brought before the United Nations. State Department
materials show that the Truman administration was so interested in
the overtures made by Tito shortly after the rift became public that
by 1949 it was sending economic assistance to Yugoslavia (Lees,
407-22; Coufoudakis, 417, n. 47). Such a policy strongly suggests
that Secretary of State George C. Marshall and others in Washing-
ton could not have wanted to criticize the Yugoslav government (or
any other potential dissident in East Europe) over the fate of the
Greek children. With these realities in mind, the purpose of this es-
say is to explore the delicate diplomacy exercised by the State De-
partment in dealing with this new twist in the Greek situation.
The White House suspected that both sides in the child contro-
versy had exaggerated the issues, and yet it also knew that the matter
was part of the ongoing civil war in Greece and for that reason could
affect the outcome of the Truman Doctrine. Supporters of the Ath-
ens government complained that Yugoslavia was attempting to
undermine the Greek nation as part of an effort to construct a Balkan
federation. More importantly, these Greek loyalists asserted, the
child abductions were proof of the darkest kind of crime. According
to the government in Athens, the communists transported the youths
to foster homes inside the neighboring states of East Europe, where
Repatriating Greek Children 67
in ideological training camps they were converted to communism
and returned to Greece as guerrillas. A spokesman in Athens insisted
that the scheme "was intended to destroy Greece by destroying
Greece's futureher youth" ( Time, 15 March 1948, 35). The Greek
government marshalled a considerable amount of circumstantial evi-
dence for kidnapping. A team of inquirythe United Nations Spe-
cial Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)interviewed witnesses
ofthe removals; the Greek government provided documentation for
the evacuations; Red Cross agencies and independent observers ver-
ified the existence of thousands of Greek children outside the coun-
try; Time's correspondent in Greece reported that the "Reds" had
taken the youths into the "people's democracies" to receive a
"Marxist education" (28 May 1949, 26); and most governments ac-
cepting the youths defended their actions as humanitarian attempts
to save the children from "monarcho-fascist" Greek armies allied
with Anglo-American imperialists. In the atmosphere of civil war,
perception and reality often merged. Once they did, the United
States could no longer ignore the matter.
The Truman administration faced a highly sensitive situation.
It realized that even if true the charge of kidnapping was impossible
to prove; indeed, many observers in Washington were probably cor-
rect in believing that the evacuations had taken place primarily to
save the children from starvation and war. One of the few reliable
accounts of the practice indicates that the guerrillas initiated the re-
movals as a propaganda effort to arouse worldwide sympathy, but
wound up alienating villagers as well as other Greeks worried that
their country would be sacrificed for a Balkan federation (Gage,
245ff.). Yet no matter what the truth was, American policymakers
knew that failure to defend their Greek protg would unsettle other
nations looking to the United States for leadership in the Cold War.
There were domestic considerations as well. The White House rec-
ognized that the issue could have serious political implications, for
numerous Greek-American organizations inside the United States
demanded that Washington take action. Under Marshall's leader-
ship, the United States decided upon the only possible course: it ap-
pealed to the UN to seek the children's repatriation on humanitarian
grounds.
The origins of the controversy over the Greek children lay in the
civil war itself. The removals perhaps began as early as January
1948, but the first confirmed instances took place soon after a Balkan
68 Howard Jones
States Youth Conference in Belgrade the following month, where a
Cominform arrangement provided that all children three to fourteen
years of age should be relocated for safety in foster homes in Yugo-
slavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and
Rumania (Sweet-Escott, 71). In early March, the leader ofthe Greek
rebels' "Democratic Army," "General" Markos Vafiades, called
for the evacuation of eighty thousand youths from the northern
Slavophone (Slavic-speaking Greeks) villages in western Macedonia
(U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Charles Bohlen, Dept. of
State counselor, to Rep. Ralph Gwinn of N.Y., 30 March 1948;
NY. Times, 4 March 1948, L3; 15 March 1948, L8; Times (Lon-
don), 4 March 1948, 4e; 6 March 1948, 3e; 16 March 1948, 4e).
Despite the rhetoric that accompanied the announcement, it is likely
that the guerrilla command realized the necessity of evacuating the
northern areas, soon to become the scene of a heavy military offen-
sive by the Greek National Army.
The problem was that the Greek government denounced the
evacuations as kidnappings, creating a situation which threatened to
force the United States into a broader commitment to Greece at a
particularly touchy time in Yugoslavia's relationship to the Soviet
Union. Given the panicky atmosphere of civil war, many Greeks
probably believed what they were saying. Slavic communists,
spokesmen in Athens proclaimed, had abducted the youths with the
intentions of indoctrinating them for a later round in the civil war.
The Soviets were involved, some Greeks declared. Moscow wanted
to detach Greek Macedonia and incorporate it into an independent
Macedonian state, where it would become part ofthe Federal State
of Yugoslavia. Once the Russians were assured an outlet to the Ae-
gean Sea, they would install a communist regime in Athens, cut off
Turkey from the West, and secure access to the eastern Medit-
erranean (Burks, 99-101; Nicholson). Regardless of whether the
Greek charges were valid, some Americans in Washington were cer-
tain that the East European communist regimes were not free to do
anything without the approval of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. The
danger was that the ensuing chaos in Greece would promote the col-
lapse of the government in Athens and undermine the Truman Doc-
trine (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report
4664, 17 April 1948, 22; U.S., Dept. of State, Foreign Relations 107,
Dwight Griswold, Chief of American Mission for Aid to Greece, to
Sec. of State, 16 June 1948).
Countries providing refuge for the children were not hesitant in
detailing their actions and further inflaming the situation. Radio So-
fia declared in early March that Hungary welcomed the youths and
Repatriating Greek Children 69
other Greek refugees "in response to the appeal of the People's
Councils of Free Greece [rebel areas in the north]." In fifty-nine vil-
lages, the bulletinvcontinued, "parents have given 4,684 children
aged three to thirteen, who will be transferred to Hungary, Czech-
oslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia." Eleftheri Ellada, the
communist voice of Markos' rebel forces, listed over a half-dozen
Greek villages and the numbers of children taken from each. Free
Greece radio declared that over four thousand children had already
been relocated, and in April Radio Belgrade reported the arrival of
seven thousand more. Three days later it claimed that twelve thou-
sand would be divided among Albania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary (Voight, 188, 189, 198, 198, n. 3; Times (London), 12
March 1948, 3e; UN, General Assembly, Official Records, 3 sess.,
Supplement8, 1948, 19; UNSCOB Report A/574, Annex 2, 29, 31;
N. Y. Times, 11 April 1948, L28; 23 June 1948, L23; "Childrenor
Slaves?", Union Jack, 17 April 1948, enclosed in U.S., Dept. of
State, Athens Post Records, Embassy to Sec. of State, 12 May 1948).
The United States had become concerned about the Greeks'
frontier troubles even before it announced the Truman Doctrine. In
December 1946 the Athens government complained to the UN Secu-
rity Council that Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were providing
the rebels with war matriel, places of refuge, and hospital facilities.
The Security Council established an investigatory commission which
compiled information in Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria
before submitting its report in May of 1947. The commission agreed
with the charges of border violations brought by the Greeks, and was
convinced that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were working through a
communist controlled organization known as the National Libera-
tion Front (EAM) to separate Greek Macedonia from the homeland.
The hostilities in Greece therefore constituted more than a civil war;
they involved external dangers as well. But the Security Council
would go no farther. It could not agree on any action and removed
the item from the agenda (UN, Security Council, Official Records, 1st
Year, 2d Series, Suppl. 10, Vol. 4, 1946, 169-92; Vol. 3, 1946, 637-
701; 2d Year, Vol. 5, 1947, 2368-2405; 2d Year, Special Supple-
ments 2, 1947).
The United States, by March 1947 committed to Greece
through the Truman Doctrine, brought the border problems to the
attention of the General Assembly. The result was a resolution in
October, which established the UN Special Commission on the Bal-
kans (UNSCOB) to investigate the border disputes. Headquartered
in Salonika, Greece, UNSCOB was composed of representatives of
Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Paki-
70 Howard Jones
stan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with "seats being
held open" for Poland and the Soviet Union, should they reverse
their decisions to abstain. The Polish delegate to the Security Coun-
cil had opposed any commission of inquiry because, he argued, the
disturbances in Greece were internal in nature. The creation of such
a group, he complained, "was linked with a declaration ofthe guilt
of Greece's northern neighbors, which had never been established."
The only way to calm the situation in Greece, he and the Soviet dele-
gate insisted, was to install a democratic government in Athens that
would restore civil liberties and seek the withdrawal of all outside
military forces (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB
Report A/692, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 1; Annex 1, 19; 3 sess.,
Suppl. 2 (A/620), 3, 11-12).
The controversy over the children then threatened to mesh with
the border issue when in February 1948 the Greek delegation made
an official protest to the Secretariat ofthe Assembly. The Greek for-
eign minister later emotionally charged that "the abduction of Greek
children was more than a mere violation of treaty pledges"; it was a
"crime against humanity." The Greek Liaison Service to the UN
maintained that witnesses reported great opposition to the removals.
Markos' guerrilla bands, it declared, had instituted a census of chil-
dren in northern Greece for the purpose of funneling them into
nearby communist countries for "re-education." The guerrillas
hoped to destroy the "Greek race" by converting the children to
"communist ideology." The Greek delegate to the General Assem-
bly called this the "crime of genocide" (UN, General Assembly, Of-
ficial Records, UNSCOB Report A/574, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 18;
Annex 2, 29, 31).
The General Assembly quickly authorized UNSCOB to investi-
gate the alleged abductions. Under the supervision of a Chief Ob-
server in Salonika, a half-dozen observation groups prepared to work
along the northern frontier, although only inside Greece because Yu-
goslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria barred their entry. The guidelines
were clear. Those questioned were to be chosen at random, coercion
was forbidden, and to ensure safety the witnesses were not to be
sworn or identified (UN, General Assembly, Official Records,
UNSCOB Report A/574, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 18; A/935, Annex
3, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 23).
Meanwhile American officials abroad confirmed that mass re-
movals of Greek children were indeed taking place. The Joint United
States Military Aid Program to Greece QUSMAPG) informed
Washington that in mid-March communist guerrillas had attacked a
number of villages and taken both adults and children (U.S., Army,
Repatriating Greek Children 71
JUSMAPG Reports No. 6, 25 March 1948; No. 7, 1 April 1948;
No. 9, 15 April 1948). American diplomatic sources reported the ar-
rival of 300 Greek youths in Rumania, another 500 in Yugoslavia,
and 800 in Czechoslovakia (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records,
Rudolf Schoenfeld, Legation in Bucharest, to Sec. of State, 17 April
1948; Cavendish Cannon, Legation in Belgrade, to Sec. of State, 19
April 1948; Laurence Steinhardt, Legation in Prague, to Sec. of
State, 28 April 1948). A story in one communist publication, Miada
Fronta, was headlined "We save Greek children" and carried a pho-
tograph of two visibly exhausted boys over the caption: "The first
picture of persecuted children of democratic Greece shows two of
these courageous young comrades who had to flee their homeland
before monarchic terror. Entirely without means, they are depen-
dent on international solidarity of people's democratic and progres-
sive countries" (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Steinhardt
to Sec. of State, 28 April 1948).
II
UNSCOB encountered numerous problems gathering informa-
tion. Its members had great difficulty reaching remote villages, and
in several instances were fired on from outside the country. There
was another obstacle. The rebels had accused UNSCOB of being un-
der control ofthe "Anglo-Saxons and their satellites" and warned
that "every individual or group from the above-mentioned Commis-
sion" who entered areas under their control would be "arrested im-
mediately" and "treated as prisoners of war" (Voight, 190-91;
Woodhouse, 248; Matthews, 177-78). UNSCOB had the formida-
ble task of determining the truth without being able to gather testi-
mony outside Greece (UN, General Assembly, Official Records,
UNSCOB Report A/574, Annex 2, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 29).
Though UNSCOB compiled what it termed a "considerable
body of evidence," it was circumstantial in nature and thus failed to
prove kidnapping. During March and April 1948, the observation
groups learned, the guerrillas transported large numbers of Greek
youths by trains, trucks, and ox-drawn carts into the neighboring
states. The committee could not prove the complicity of Yugoslavia,
Albania, and Bulgaria, although it argued that the repeated commu-
nist radio broadcasts suggested that the program had the "approval
and assistance of these Governments. " There was another complica-
tion. The UN observers came across more than a few cases of volun-
tary relocation of children by parents, particularly in the Slavic-
speaking region of western Macedonia. Of twenty-eight removals in
72 Howard Jones
a village near Kastoria, for example, the investigatory teams discov-
ered that in five instances chosen at random, the children had will-
ingly gone to join their fathers who were members ofthe rebel army.
UNSCOB concluded that a "fairly large number of parents" who
supported the removals were also sympathetic with the guerrillas.
The crucial determinant in leaving Greece seems to have been
whether a child's father was a member of the guerrilla force (UN,
General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report A/644, 3 sess.,
Suppl. 8, 1948, 9, 16-17; Annex 3; A/574, Annex 2, 3 sess., Suppl.
8, 1948, 19, 29-31).
According to one member of the UN observation teams, Ken-
neth Spencer, the important consideration was personal in nature
(Spencer, 31-32). In villages supporting the guerrillas, the parents
decided for themselves whether to send their children; but in ' 'hostile
villages," Spencer asserted, there was "little doubt that the ap-
proach was different and a process of virtual conscription enforced."
Though some children went by force, others went voluntarilyespe-
cially in the Slavic areas of western Macedonia and Thrace. The key
factor, Spencer emphasized, was whether the father was a rebel. In a
village near Kastoria, a girl of twelve "neatly summed up the situa-
tion" when asked if the children had left on their own: "Yes," she
replied, "the children whose fathers are in the mountains wanted to
go. My father was not a guerrilla, therefore I didn't want to go."
Without access to countries north of Greece, UNSCOB's find-
ings were necessarily inconclusive. It could not resolve the two most
important issues involved in the investigation: the number of chil-
dren moved north against their will, and whether the purpose ofthe
removals was to indoctrinate the youths with communist ideology.
The Times (London) in early December 1948 reported that the
League of Red Cross Societies recently informed UNSCOB that
nearly 24,000 abducted Greek children were now living in the "sat-
ellites of Russia." Six months later it raised the figure to 28,000.
Although the paper had no evidence of kidnapping, its coverage sug-
gested that it believed the charge (3 Dec. 1948, 3d; 30 May 1949,
3e). The truth is that there was no reliable way of determining how
many children went involuntarily and whether the central objective
of the child program was to spread communism. Doubtless there
were mixed reactions even to evacuations for safety reasons; and it is
logical to assume that communist regimes would promote their own
teachings, just as non-communist nations would seek to expand their
ideas and way of life. UNSCOB's inability to collect first-hand evi-
dence meant that the arguments would intensify after submission of
its report.
Repatriating Greek Children 73
Although UNSCOB observers were unable to enter communist
countries, several individuals, including Americans, received per-
mission to visit homes for the Greek children. In one instance a Brit-
ish news correspondent and well-known non-communist, Kenneth
Matthews, accompanied an American newspaperman in securing vi-
sas from the Bulgarian government and visiting a children's home in
the town of Plovdiv. The building, formerly the town hall, sat in a
wooded public park and housed 170 Thracian children. Upon the
arrival ofthe two visitors, the children marched from their rooms to
present themselves. Older boys joined them from the garden nearby,
carrying spades and singing in unison: "We're giving the death-
blow to Fascism; we're marching to civilization." Many ofthe chil-
dren were orphans and either did not know their own names or were
too frightened to say. Matthews believed that the Greek government
had converted "an act of politically motivated charity" into a diabol-
ical plot. The American was dubious about this assessment (Mat-
thews, 177, 180-82).
In another case, the American embassy's cultural attach in So-
fia joined French, British, and Canadian newsmen in inspecting a
Greek Children's Home outside the city. The home, once a hotel
bombed during the war but now rebuilt, housed 510 children in
clean, comfortable surroundings. The attach claimed that the
schools in Bulgaria emphasized a "pattern of thought" that was
communist in orientation. When someone entered the room, the
youths stood, extended a clenched fist salute, and declared, "Wel-
come, Dru gario [comrade]." People they talked with were "syn-
agonistes," or fellow fighters, the salutation given by the communist
guerrilla force. Wherever they went in groups, they did so in march
step while singing partisan songs that substituted the word "for-
eigners" for "Germans" or "Nazis." Slogans often chanted were
"Forward with Markos," "Let us struggle for liberty," and "Down
with imperialism and fascism. ' ' The school textbook opened with the
Greek National Anthem and a picture of General Markos, and in-
cluded poems and stories praising the guerrillas' wartime efforts
against the Nazis and the British, while urging a campaign to drive
all "foreigners and barbarians" from Greece (U.S., Dept. of State,
General Records, Donald Heath, Legation in Sofia, to Sec. of State,
21 July 1948).
Reports also came from American visitors to children's homes
in Yugoslavia and Poland. Homer Bigart, a correspondent for the
New York Herald Tribune who was known for his non-communist feel-
ings, described the care received by Greek youths. All of the chil-
dren, according to Bigart, had left Greece voluntarily (14 June
74 Howard Jones
1948). Two members ofthe American embassy in Warsaw observed
Greek children in their quarters in Poland (U.S., Dept. of State,
General Records, C. H. HaIl1Jr., to Dept. of State, 23 Dec. 1949).
The Americans were not granted permission to talk with the youths,
but their observations convinced them that the children received sat-
isfactory care. A Greek teacher noted that the children would remain
in Poland until there was "real peace" at home.
These on-site inspections of children's homes outside Greece
did not resolve the issue. The lodgings were clean, the food was am-
ple, the supervision and education were better than what most chil-
dren experienced in Greek villages. And yet the uniform behavior of
the youthsthe slogans, the ritual, the group activities, the educa-
tional sessions, the attempt to blame the "fascists" (Greek govern-
ment aided by the British and Americans) for all troublessuggests
that there was an effort to convert them to communism, as the Ath-
ens government declared.
UNSCOB meanwhile adopted another tactic: it proclaimed that
the Greek government, not the guerrillas, should be responsible for
the children's safety. Removal "without their parents' free con-
sent," it declared, "raises the issue ofthe inherent rights of parents"
and breaks "accepted moral standards of international conduct."
Furthermore, it violates Greek sovereignty and endangers relations
between Greece and its northern neighbors. The United States and
Britain supported UNSCOB's recommendation that the Greek gov-
ernment should bring the matter before the governments involved. If
there were "humanitarian grounds" for relocating the children,
UNSCOB noted, the government in Athens ought to carry out the
program. Should this not work, the committee would assure that the
evacuations took place "through the intermediary of an appropriate
international organization." In June the Greek government in-
formed UNSCOB that it had already contacted Yugoslavia, Al-
bania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland; by Septem-
ber all governments had either ignored or refused the appeals (UN,
General Assembly, OfficialRecords, UNSCOB Report A/574, 3 sess.,
Suppl. 8, 1948, 19, 20; A/644, 3 sess., Suppl. 8A, 1948, 4, 5; Times
(London), 3 June 1948, 3f; 25 June 1948, 3g).
Indeed, the Ministry of Social Welfare in Athens had taken
measures to transport the children out of northern Greece and into
"colonies" or "children's cities" established on the mainland and
on the islands. Whether the Greek government had begun this pro-
gram to protect the children from the guerrillas or to resettle them in
preparation for military operations in the north, it had taken more
than five thousand youths from Macedonia, and had already relo-
Repatriating Greek Children 75
cated over two thousand in Salonika. Nearly half of five thousand
from Thrace had been transported to the Greek interior. In a hous-
ing program staffed by volunteers and having the support of Queen
Frederika, the Greek government eventually resettled nearly 15,000
youths, from both communist and loyalist background, in forty-
eight children's homes (UN, General Assembly, Official Records,
UNSCOB Report A/674, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 19, 20; Annex 2,
31; N. Y. Times, 21 June 1948, Ll).
By the spring of 1948 the Chief of the American Mission for Aid
to Greece (AMAG) in Athens, Dwight Griswold, reported to the
State Department that General Markos' recent announcement of
child evacuations was "unusually effective psychological warfare"
and that the queen had overreacted in relocating the Greek youths
(U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, 23 March 1948). Both
AMAG and JUSMAPG warned Greek officials ofthe "political and
psychological danger" derived from the government's program. Up-
rooting the youths would not only necessitate child care arrange-
ments, but it would cause military problems by forcing the govern-
ment to use army transport units in relocating the children, and
would add to the country's already enormous refugee burden. The
Americans recommended that the Greeks establish "voluntary refu-
gee centers" in large towns where parents might choose to send their
children. Griswold was convinced that Markos' strategy was to
"snatch" a few youths from time to time "to support propaganda of
mass abductions and continue [to] produce [a] demoralizing result
among Greeks." His assessment found support in Salonika, where
the American consul general, Raleigh Gibson, believed that the
rebels were waging an "effective war of nerves" designed to prove
the Greek National Army incapable of guaranteeing security (U.S.,
Dept. of State, General Records, Gibson to Sec. of State, 28 April
1948).
American diplomats meanwhile reported growing fear in
Greece that the guerrillas' abductions were part of an effort to estab-
lish a free Macedonian state dominated by either Slavs or Bulgars.
Gibson in Salonika noted the Greeks' belief that the communists
sought the "dismemberment" of their country (U.S., Dept. ofState,
General Records, Gibson to Sec. of State, 16 April 1948). The
American ambassador in Prague, Laurence Steinhardt, reported
that the Greek charg was convinced that the guerrillas wanted to
further the "Slav-ization" ofthe children in communist surround-
ings (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Steinhardt to Sec. of
State, 8 April 1948). Indeed, a later report filed by UNSCOB took
note of frequent radio broadcasts, press releases, and statements of
76 Howard Jones
public officials in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria calling for the separation
of "Greek" or "Aegean" Macedonia from Greece. The National
Liberation Front called for an ' ' independent and equal Macedonian
State" within "the confederation of democratic Balkan peoples"
(UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report A/935, 4
sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 5).
Propaganda from both sides intensified the uproar in a country
already torn by civil war. The American consul in Patras reported on
a demonstration in that city against the abductions of children (U.S.,
Dept. of State, General Records, L. Pittman Springs to Sec. of State,
27 March 1948). One speaker warned: "Do not forget that Greek
children are kidnapped to be turned into Bulgarians." Another pro-
claimed that the Slavs intended to "annihilate the Greek race by
their satanic plans." The Greek press meanwhile denounced the ab-
ductions. One paper lashed out at the "hateful and barbaric action
by Slav-led bands of gangsters," while another blasted the UN for
being "indifferent" to the "extermination of a race" (U.S., Dept. of
State, General Records, quoted in Karl Rankin, Embassy in Athens,
to Sec. of State, 19 April 1948).
The First Secretary of the American Embassy in Athens, Karl
Rankin, urged the State Department to publicize the child removals
along with a recent newspaper report of a mass murder of other
youths. His sources revealed that "senior Communist officials in
[the] Slav states" had not counted on the evacuations having such
adverse effect, and that they now sought to return to their original
policy of taking "only the willing children of willing members ofthe
rebel army and its followers." Rankin then noted press reports in
Greece alleging that during the government's recent military offen-
sive in Roumeli its forces had come across the bodies of forty children
along the slopes of Mount Ghiona. According to the account, the
Greek National Army had trapped the retreating bandit forces,
whose leaders feared that the children would reveal their places of
refuge, and therefore ordered them strangled. The day following the
discovery, the Greek Ministries of War and Justice sent an investiga-
tory team under JUSMAPG's leadership. Rankin suggested that if
the story proved accurate, the United States should expose the atroc-
ity before the world (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Rankin
to Sec. of State, 3 April 1948, 10 May 1948; Times (London), 10 May
1948, 4b).
The information soon gathered by JUSMAPG did not confirm
a massacre at Roumeli. Despite the testimonies of three witnesses
about multiple murders, the team found only two bodies. Nonethe-
less, the officer in charge of the investigation, Captain James Hur-
Repatriating Greek Children 77
ley, Jr., asserted that the lack of evidence did not exonerate the
rebels. The Greek National Army had failed to safeguard the area
after discovering^he bodies, he pointed out, and "it is my opinion
that the children originally were there and that they were since re-
moved by radio instructions and dumped into snow crevices in
Ghiona, where no one will ever find them." (U.S., Dept. of State,
General Records, Report enclosed in Embassy in Athens to Dept. of
State, 14 June 1948).
Ill
The State Department was skeptical about the kidnapping
charges brought by the Athens government. In a dispatch to diplo-
mats in Athens, Budapest, Bern, Salonika, and Moscow, Secretary
of State Marshall explained that British and American sources in
Greece and within the "iron-curtain area" believed that guerrilla
propaganda had twisted the evacuation effort for the "dual purpose"
of winning praise for "humanitarianism" and for "terrorizing [the]
Grk [Greek] nationalist peasantry" (U.S., Dept. of State, General
Records, 29 April 1948). A "few thousand" youths had been taken
from Greece, some by force from loyalist families, but the majority
from the "guerrilla infested area, where they constituted [a] welfare
problem for Markos, and departed with more or less willing consent
[ofthe] slavic minority or communist parents." In a statement that
summed up the State Department's position, Marshall declared that
the child removal program appeared to be more "convenience and
psychological warfare than planned 'genocide,' but is of course no
less reprehensible for that reason."
Although it is doubtful that the Kremlin was involved in Gene-
ral Markos' efforts to remove the children, American intelligence an-
alysts suspected the Soviets of playing at least an indirect role (U.S.,
Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report 4340.4, 3
July 1947, 41). In a secret study of April 1948, the Research and
Analysis Division of the Department of State noted several reasons
for the communist guerrillas' "actual or threatened evacuation" of
Greek children. For one, it would "relieve [the] guerrilla economy"
by moving the youths from combat zones; it also would "supply fu-
ture manpower while exerting psychological pressure on Greece. ' ' A
few paragraphs later, however, the analysis declared it "reasonable
to assume that all action in support of Markos takes place with the
prior knowledge and approval of Moscow and with the participation
of Soviet coordinators on the spot." The Soviets, the report contin-
ued, intended to obstruct economic stability by keeping Greece in a
78 Howard Jones
"constant state of turmoil" that was designed to "undermine Greek
morale." Such a "war of attrition" aimed at eroding faith in the
Athens government, draining American resources, and facilitating
communist takeover (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Re-
search, Report 4664, 27 April 1948, 20, 22, 26-27). By implication,
the report seemed to say, the Soviets tacitly approved the child evac-
uation program because it interfered with the Truman Doctrine.
The disclosure of UNSCOB's findings in May 1948 helped to
determine Washington's policy: it would appeal for the repatriation
of only those youths taken against their will. But the Department of
State was not happy with this approach. In a dispatch released to the
press in late June and sent to the American embassies in Athens,
Paris, London, Belgrade, Sofia, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, and
Moscow, Marshall explained that even in the cases of children who
went voluntarily, he agreed with UNSCOB that their "protracted
retention" was "contrary to the accepted moral standards of inter-
national conduct." It was "difficult to understand the 'humanitari-
anism' of harboring foreign children of uncertain family status with-
out having the means to care for them, and of refusing their
repatriation because of political considerations" (U.S., Dept. of
State, Foreign Relations 249-50, Marshall to Embassies, 23 June 1948;
NY. Times, 25 June 1948, L14).
By the autumn of 1948, the United States was under public
pressure to express moral condemnation of the alleged abductions
and to seek restoration of the children to their families. Time maga-
zine featured an article containing a picture of fifteen Greek children
over the caption "Abductions for instruction" and quoting Lenin:
"Give us the child for eight years, and it will be a Bolshevist forever' '
(15 March 1948, 35). The New York Times carried a front-page story
by journalist C. L. Sulzberger, who asserted that Markos' purpose
was to establish a Slavophone minority in Greece grounded in "new
ideologies" acquired in communist education camps (21 June 1948,
Ll). Cries of indignation came from Boy and Girl Scout organiza-
tions, state legislatures, and members of Congress, while a veritable
deluge of letters and telegrams fell upon President Truman, begin-
ning in August 1948 and not abating until the summer of 1951. Cor-
respondence to the White House came from fourteen countries and
more than thirty states, and included protests from university stu-
dents in the United States, private citizens, Greek-American organi-
zations, and Greek church groups, including the Greek Orthodox
Archbishop of North and South America (Truman Papers, folder la-
beled "Greek Children"). Meanwhile both houses of Congress
passed resolutions urging the Truman administration to halt the ab-
Repatriating Greek Children 79
ductions and to secure repatriation of the children through the UN
and other international agencies (U.S., Dept. of State, General Re-
cords, Gertrude Engstrom, Commissioner of Girl Scouts in Pitts-
burgh, to Marshall, 25 May 1948; Bohlen to Gwinn, 30 March
1948 ; Ernest Gross, Asst. Sec. of State, to Sen. Scott Lucas of 111., 11
Oct. 1949; Jack McFaIl, Asst. Sec. of State, to Sen. Sheridan Dow-
ney of Calif., 22 Dec. 1949; U.S., Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., 2d
sess., 18Jan. 1950, Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 1, 507; part 2,
27 Feb. 1950, 2366-67; House, Appendix, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1
March 1950, Vol. 96, part 14, A1514; 20 March 1950, A2070;
House, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 22 March 1950, Vol. 96, part 3, 3812;
Senate, Appendix, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 27 March 1950, Vol. 96,
part 14, A2215-16; Senate, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 17 July 1950, Vol.
96, part8, 10356; 13 Sept. 1950, part 11, 14667; House, 82dCong.,
1st sess., 23 April 1951, Vol. 97, part 3, 4222). The president prom-
ised only to cooperate with the UN and the International Red Cross
in seeking the youths' return (U.S., President, Public Papers 32, Tru-
man to Greek Orthodox Archbishop Michael, 6 Jan. 1950; 259,
Truman to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, 19 April 1950;
663, Truman to Vice-President Alben Barkley, 29 Sept. 1950).
In mid-August 1948 the Greek government heightened its ef-
forts to secure State Department cooperation in bringing kidnapping
charges before the General Assembly ofthe UN. Five months earlier
its ambassador in Washington, Vassili Dendramis, had handed Wil-
liam Baxter, specialist in Greek, Turkish, and Iranian affairs, a draft
note concerning the child removals which the Athens government
intended to take before the UN. Dendramis wanted to send it to the
UN Secretary-General at the same time the Greek Foreign Office
published the text and sent copies to UNSCOB and all foreign mis-
sions in Athens. This approach, the Greek ambassador believed,
would exert pressure on those countries holding the youths in so-
called "protective custody" to permit repatriation (U.S., Dept. of
State, General Records, memorandum by Baxter, 24 March 1948).
Before Baxter forwarded the proposal to his superiors, he sought
to avert a confrontation with the Soviets by making important altera-
tions in the note. The Greeks, according to the draft, condemned
"Soviet Communism" ["Soviet" struck] for a "diabolical interna-
tional conspiracy" designed to kidnap their children. Radios in "So-
viet dominated" [both deleted] Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, Buda-
pest, and Tirana had announced the children's arrival. The purposes
ofthe abductions, the note asserted, were to scare the Greek people
into supporting the rebels and to drive villagers into the cities, in-
creasing the government's refugee burden. "In the long run the
80 Howard Jones
Communist objective is to warp the minds ofthe kidnapped children
of Greece in order that they may become agents in the enslavement
of their native land" (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, memo-
randum by Baxter, 24 March 1948). Without proof for the Greeks'
allegations, Baxter recognized the wisdom in eliminating references
to the Soviet Union.
If Baxter and any others in the State Department supported the
Greek approach, Secretary Marshall overruled them for at least
three reasons. First and most importantly, he knew that the charge of
kidnapping was the "weakest link" in any case the General Assem-
bly could make against the communist states. As UNSCOB admit-
ted, there was no evidence tying these governments to the removals,
even though they had admitted to providing a haven for the children.
Marshall later explained to a representative of the Greek embassy
that the "only group which could be definitely indicted as responsi-
ble for [the] removal [of] children from Greece is guerrillas, and no
useful purpose would be served by endeavoring [to] obtain GA [Gen-
eral Assembly] condemnation of [the] guerrillas." Second, Marshall
realized that the communist governments had found an unassailable
defense in calling their reception of the children a "humanitarian
act." Denunciation of these countries, he told the American ambas-
sador in Greece, would invite counter charges that terrorist practices
by the Athens government had driven these people from Greece
(U.S., Dept. of State, Foreign Relations 254, Marshall to Embassy in
Athens, 14 Aug. 1948). Third, Marshall undoubtedly recognized
that his government had to be careful about criticizing the East Euro-
pean countries; as mentioned earlier, Yugoslavia had defected from
the Cominform that same summer of 1948, and there were obvious
advantages in trying to establish ties with Tito.
Marshall emphasized to the Greeks that for "tactical reasons,"
the State Department preferred that they avoid a charge of kidnap-
ping and make an appeal through the General Assembly for the re-
patriation ofthe children on a humanitarian basis. The secretary un-
derstood the "justice" of their complaint, but he "would not rpt
[repeat] not feel able [to] support them in any attempt [to] fix blame
for [the] removal [of] children or sheltering them [by] neighboring
countries." Marshall suggested a less provocative way for bringing
the matter before the UN. He expected the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva to pass a resolution urging the return
of displaced children from all countries. If it did, such a resolution
would become a subject for discussion by the Assembly's Economic
and Social Committee. IfECOSOC in Geneva failed to adopt a reso-
Repatriating Greek Children 81
lution calling for the children's return, Marshall noted, the Greek
government could still take the issue before the Assembly's Political
Committee. In the meantime, he had received encouraging reports
about repatriation efforts by Red Cross societies. Should these
groups succeed, the Greeks might not have to take the matter before
the General Assembly (U.S., Dept of State, Foreign Relations 254-55,
Marshall to Embassy in Athens, 14 Aug. 1948).
Thus by the autumn of 1948 it was clear that the United States
would do no more than appeal for repatriation on the grounds of
humanitarianism. In August ECOSOC in Geneva did pass a resolu-
tion calling for reuniting "unaccompanied children" with their par-
ents, and for the repatriation of orphans and unaccompanied chil-
dren whose nationality was not clearwith the stipulation that "the
best interests of the individual child shall be the determining factor. ' '
This was somewhat different from the American position that "the
best interests of the child should be a guiding principle in determin-
ing final plans for the unaccompanied displaced child." There was
an irony. Depending on the definition of "best interests," the
United States could advocate repatriation of all children. Yet by the
same argument the East European governments could refuse to re-
patriate any of them. On 27 November the UN General Assembly
resolved that the International Red Cross agencies should seek the
return of those children whose "father or mother, or in his or her
absence, their closest relative, express a wish to that effect" (Rosen-
feld Papers, "Comment Paper"Refugees and Displaced Persons,
SD/A/C.3/112; UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB
Report A/935, Annex 1, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 21).
There would be another outburst of the controversy in the
spring of 1949, when the UN received reports that the Greek youths
were among the communist guerrillas fighting the Greek National
Army (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report
A/935, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 13-15). The British delegate to the
General Assembly, Hector McNeil, denounced the "satanic use" of
children in war. International organizations protected youths from
"harmful drugs, from indecent traffic, from pornography, from
hunger and from disease," he asserted; surely the General Assembly
could not be "uncritical of men who twisted a child's mind to throw
his body into a struggle of which he knew little, perhaps against kith
and kin" (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, 1st Committee, 4
sess., 1949, 304th Meeting, 31 Oct. 1949, 153). Despite the Polish
representative's denials, the Greek General Staff insisted that chil-
dren were among the 14,000 "fit" guerrillas in Yugoslavia, Albania,
82 Howard Jones
and Bulgaria (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, 1st Commit-
tee, 4 sess., 1949, 301st Meeting, 28 Oct. 1949, 131; Greek General
Staff cited in U.S., Army, History of JUSMAGG 52).
The end ofthe Greek civil war in August 1949 did not terminate
the issue involving the children. Few ofthe 28,000 evacuated Greek
youths returned to their homes soon after the war, although more did
so later on. In December 1949 the co-ordinator ofthe American aid
program in Greece, George McGhee, reported that most ofthe chil-
dren were now receiving "intensive communist indoctrination"
(U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, McGhee to Sec. of State, 29
Dec. 1949). The UN later received a report from the International
Red Cross that as of April 1951 requests had arrived for the repatria-
tion of only 10,344 Greek youths. Less than 300 of over nine thou-
sand Greek children in Yugoslavia had returned home by May; over
seven thousand lived in Yugoslavia with their parents, who were
mostly Greek Macedonians, the government in Belgrade empha-
sized (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report A/
935, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 13; A/1857, 6 sess., Suppl. 11, 1951,24;
Times (London), 16 Aug. 1948, 3d; 27 Nov. 1948, 5e; 29 Nov. 1948,
3b; 29 Jan. 1951, 3d). In November 1952 a high ranking British for-
eign affairs official told the House of Commons that the International
Red Cross had received no help from the governments "within the
Soviet orbit" and had temporarily halted efforts to secure the chil-
dren's return (Sweet-Escott, 71, 72, n. 1). For practical purposes,
the matter had been effectively closed.
The guerrillas' removal of the Greek children had posed a di-
lemma for the United States. Not only did the Truman administra-
tion have a public commitment to Greece, but it believed that stabil-
ity in that country was vital to the success of the Truman Doctrine in
preserving the Mediterranean from Soviet expansion. At the same
time, however, the administration in Washington sought to avoid
alienating Yugoslavia, which was, according to the Greek govern-
ment, a major perpetrator of the kidnappings. The State Depart-
ment was probably correct in believing that the child removals had
originated as evacuations of those Greeks in danger of war and star-
vation; it also seems likely that the rebels had expanded their initial
purpose in an attempt to undermine the Greek people's faith in their
government. But from there the matter became enormously compli-
cated. The Greek government charged that the removals were kid-
nappings designed to destroy Greece by genocide, leaving the Medi-
terranean and the Balkan Peninsula open to Slavic-communist
infiltration. Each side in the civil war, it appears, had exploited is-
Repatriating Greek Children 83
sues in an effort to put the other in the worst possible light. Whatever
the truth, in the emotional atmosphere ofthe late 1940s, reason had
given way to hysteria, making almost any charge credible.
Marshall believed, and probably correctly, that the overwhelm-
ing majority ofthe children were simply refugees. The chief supports
for his view were the low number of requests for repatriation and the
fact that seven thousand of the nine thousand Greek children in Yu-
goslavia were living with their parents. By the spring of 1951, as
shown, parents ofthe closest relatives ofthe children had filed for the
return of less than forty percent of those removed from Greece. This
figure suggests two probabilities: one, that at least a few children
were taken by force; and two, that a large number of the parents
themselves had fled from Greece. Furthermore, there is no proof that
even the remaining children had been kidnapped. It is likely that
many of these youths were children of either captured rebels or of
rebel sympathizers who chose to stay in Greece and believed their
offspring safer outside the country. Marshall was doubtless aware of
these considerations and therefore sought the return of only those
youths taken by force.
The Secretary of State had skillfully averted a touchy situation
partly brought on by the Greek government itself. He could not ig-
nore the matter because the evacuations endangered the credibility
of the Truman Doctrine by prolonging internal disorder, exposing
the inability of the Athens government to guarantee security for its
people, and making the country vulnerable to communist takeover.
But he also realized that the Greek government had not proved its
case for kidnapping, that its own relocation program was seriously
magnifying an already great refugee problem, that America's policy
toward the civil war was to restrict involvement to Greek domestic
affairs, and that there were advantages in establishing a relationship
with Yugoslavia. With UNSCOB itself unable to substantiate the
Greek government's accusations, Marshall had no choice but to call
for the return of only those children forcibly removed, and on the
morally impregnable grounds of humanitarianism. Such an ap-
proach was the only response that permitted the United States to
maintain prestige by meeting its commitments to Greece. Marshall's
restraint was unusual in an activist era marked by the Truman Doc-
trine, Marshall Plan, Berlin Airlift, and North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization; but he recognized that it was the only feasible escape
from a dilemma forced onto the United States by its Greek ally. His
adept diplomacy accomplished a stalemate in a no-win situation, left
America's options open with Yugoslavia, and permitted the admin-
84 Howard Jones
istration in Washington to concentrate on matters in West Europe
that were important to American security.
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
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