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For four years follow-

ing the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001,
relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
appeared to be on a steadily rising course. As U.S. decisionmakers turned their
attention to the urgent dangers of terrorism and proliferation, they seemed less
inclined to view China as an actual or potential strategic competitor and more
hopeful that, in the postSeptember 11 world, all the great powers would be
united by common dangers . . . [and] increasingly . . . by common values.
1
As President George W. Bush began his second term in ofce, however,
there were signs of mounting friction between Washington and Beijing and in-
creasing skepticism, on the U.S. side at least, that the relationship was as har-
monious, and the interests (still less the values) of the two parties as
compatible, as had often been claimed. Alarm over the possible lifting of the
European arms embargo helped to draw renewed attention to the pace and
scope of Chinas military buildup. Frustration with stalled negotiations over
North Koreas nuclear weapons program caused some observers to question
whether Beijing truly shared the U.S. commitment to halting proliferation. Re-
ports of a PRC diplomatic charm offensive in Southeast Asia stirred fears
of waning U.S. inuence and incipient Chinese regional hegemony. Mean-
while, evidence that China was expanding its interactions with Europe, Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East raised the specter of a new global rivalry
for power and inuence. To this combustible mix was added an ofcial spat
over trade balances and currency values, as well as a urry of sensational
news stories about the impact of Chinas extraordinary demand on world
prices of energy and materials and the planned purchases of U.S. companies
by their newly ush Chinese rivals.
2
The old China bet is off, announced one
Aaron L. Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. From June
2003 to June 2005, he served as Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy
Planning in the Ofce of the Vice President. The views expressed here are his alone.
1. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:
White House, September 2002), p. 5.
2. For an overview of these developments, see Bonnie S. Glaser, Rice Seeks to Caution, Cajole,
and Cooperate with Beijing, Comparative Connections, Vol. 7, No. 5 (April 2005), http://
www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0501Qus_china.html.
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 745
2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The Future of U.S.-China Relations
The Future of
U.S.-China Relations
Aaron L. Friedberg
Is Conict Inevitable?
7
observer in mid-2005, while another (surveying the economic scene) pro-
claimed the end of the China love affair.
3
Recent events may prove to be little more than a passing chill. Whatever
their ultimate signicance, however, these developments raise fundamental
questions about the future direction and underlying determinants of U.S.-
China relations. What is likely to be the character of the relationship between
the United States and the PRC over the next two or three decades? Will it be
marked by convergence toward deepening cooperation, stability, and peace or
by deterioration, leading to increasingly open competition, and perhaps even
war?
The answers to these questions are of enormous importance. If tensions be-
tween the two Pacic powers worsen, the whole of Eastern Eurasia could
become divided in a new cold war, and the prospects for confrontation and
conict would seem certain to rise. On the other hand, a deepening U.S.-China
entente could bring with it increased possibilities for sustained worldwide
economic growth, the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional disputes,
and the successful management of pressing global problems, including terror-
ism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Whether for good or
ill, the most signicant bilateral international relationship over the course of
the next several decades is likely to be that between the United States and the
PRC.
As far-reaching as its impact may be, however, the future character of the
U.S.-China relationship is also profoundly uncertain. Most experts have opin-
ions about this question but, if pressed, few would claim to be sure about what
lies ahead. Such modesty is entirely appropriate. Not only are the answers to
the questions posed here unknown; they are also, at present, unknowable.
Twenty years ago, few people foresaw that the confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union was about to undergo a radical transforma-
tion, and fewer still imagined that the latter might soon cease to exist. As re-
gards their ability to anticipate events, todays observers are no better
equipped than their counterparts of the early 1980s. At this point, scholars and
analysts lack the kinds of powerful predictive tools that would allow them to
say with any degree of assurance what the state of relations between the
United States and China will be in ve years time, to say nothing of ten or
International Security 30:2 8
3. Amity Shales, U.S. Begins Rethink on China, Financial Times (London), June 26, 2005;
and Jonathan Anderson, The End of the China Love Affair, Far East Economic Review, May 2005,
http://www.feer.com/articles1/2005/0505/free/p020.html.
twenty. And although opinions vary about what kinds of analytical advances
are possible, there are good reasons to believe that such instruments are, in
fact, unattainable.
4
While they differ in their degree of condence, and in their willingness to
make explicit predictions, most of those who think and write about the U.S.-
China relationship nevertheless have beliefs and expectations about where it is
headed and about the factors that will be most inuential in determining its
course. Not all of the participants in this discussion are theorists of interna-
tional relations, to be sure, and many would eschew the labels and language of
academic debate. To the extent that they have coherent and internally consis-
tent views, however, most analysts deploy arguments that derive from one or
the other of the three main camps in contemporary international relations the-
orizing: liberalism, realism, and constructivism. To make matters more inter-
esting, and more complicated, those whose basic analytical premises place
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 9
4. For the best brief overview of the difculties involved in trying to predict the future, see Robert
Jervis, The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past? International Security, Vol. 16, No.
3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 3946. Among other problems, Jervis notes that international relationships
are likely to be characterized by what he has elsewhere termed system effects. Systems com-
posed of densely interconnected units are often characterized by feedback loops and nonlinear in-
teractions. In such circumstances, small causes will often have large effects that are difcult to
predict or to control. Although efforts to anticipate the future trajectory of complex political sys-
tems may not be an utter waste of time, Jervis concludes that the interactive, strategic, and con-
tingent nature of systems limits the extent to which complete and deterministic theories are
possible. Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1997), p. 295. Another useful examination of the difculties of prediction, occasioned
by the evident failure of most analysts to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War, is John Lewis Gaddis, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold
War, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 558. Gaddis reaches conclusions
that are similar to Jerviss. He surmises that many important political phenomena and historical
events are actually the product of nonlinear processes that cannot be adequately modeled using
existing analytical techniques. The social sciences, Gaddis argues, have embraced the traditional
methods of the physical and natural sciences. But they did so at a time when physicists, biologists,
and mathematicians, concerned about the disparities between their theories and the reality they
were supposed to characterize, were abandoning old methods in favor of new ones that accommo-
dated indeterminacy, irregularity, and unpredictabilityprecisely the qualities the social sciences
were trying to leave behind. Ibid., p. 54. Gaddis elaborates on these observations in The Landscape
of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), especially
pp. 53128. See also Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber,
God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World, Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 4376. For earlier discussions
of these issues, see Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of
Politics, World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 1977), pp. 489522; Stanley H. Hoffmann, Interna-
tional Relations: The Long Road to Theory, World Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (April 1959), pp. 346377;
and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Art of the Social Science Soothsayer, in Nazli Choucri and Thomas
W. Robinson, eds., Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects (San
Francisco, Calif.: W.H. Freeman, 1978), pp. 2334.
them in one of these three broad schools of thought do not necessarily have
similar views regarding the future of U.S.-China relations. On this issue, it is
possible to identify liberals who expect confrontation and conict, realists who
believe that the relationship will basically be stable and peaceful, and
constructivists who think that events could go either way. Each of the three
theoretical schools, in sum, has two variants, one of which is essentially opti-
mistic about the future of U.S.-China relations, the other distinctly pessimistic.
Perhaps the most common manifestation of the debate over the future of
U.S.-China relations is the disagreement between liberal optimists and realist
pessimists. Following an examination of the views of those who reside in these
contending camps, I next turn to a discussion of their somewhat less familiar
cousins: the realist optimists, on the one hand, and those who can best be de-
scribed as liberal pessimists, on the other. An exploration of the assertions
made by adherents of constructivism rounds out this survey. Although schol-
ars who fall into this broad category have tended to be optimistic about U.S.-
China relations (and about East Asian international politics more generally),
the perceptual and ideational factors they emphasize could just as easily be in-
voked to arrive at considerably gloomier conclusions, a fact that some self-
avowed constructivists have been at pains to point out.
Each of the positions elaborated below makes claims about the importance
of a particular causal mechanism or a set of similarly aligned causal forces. It is
possible that, in the real world, one set of forces will be so powerful in its ef-
fects as to overwhelm the rest. It may turn out, in other words, that one of the
six camps identied here is basically right and the others wrong. But it is
also conceivable that the future will be shaped by a conuence of different
forces, some mutually reinforcing and others opposed. Indeed it may be that
all of the arguments examined here are in some sense correct, at least to the ex-
tent that they identify causal mechanisms that are actually at work, albeit
perhaps with less ultimate impact than their analytical advocates expect.
Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara have observed that intellectual dis-
course in the eld of international relations has come increasingly to be domi-
nated by paradigmatic clashes in which champions extol the virtues of a
specic analytical perspective to the exclusion of others. Driven by the desire
to construct parsimonious theories and to establish the preponderance of one
paradigm or school, scholars have often been inclined to adopt an all-or-
nothing attitude, asserting the overwhelming importance of the causal mecha-
nisms central to their preferred paradigm while downplaying or ignoring the
possible signicance of others. Katzenstein and Okawara argue that, whatever
International Security 30:2 10
else can be said for it, this approach ultimately hinders efforts to understand
the complexities of the real world. In its place they urge a posture of analyti-
cal eclecticism and an awareness that important empirical puzzles in interna-
tional relations can often best be explained by a combination of forces and
factors, including those highlighted by paradigms that are typically regarded
as being diametrically opposed to one another.
5
If such an approach is helpful in explaining past events and emerging pat-
terns, it is absolutely essential to any attempt to think about the longer-term
future of U.S.-China relations. As Robert Jervis pointed out in his postCold
War meditation on the future of world politics, Only rarely does a single fac-
tor determine the way politics will work out.
6
Instead, signicant outcomes
are invariably shaped by what John Lewis Gaddis describes as the convergence
or intersection of complementary processes [and] . . . the potential fratricide of
contradictory ones.
7
Having catalogued a wide array of such processes, I then
speculate on the various ways in which they could converge and combine to
mold the future of U.S.-China relations.
Before turning to the present and the future, it is helpful for a moment to
reect on the past. In his brilliant analysis of the rise of the Anglo-German an-
tagonism, Paul Kennedy describes how an assortment of factorsincluding
bilateral economic relations; shifts in the global distribution of power; devel-
opments in military technology; domestic political processes; ideological
trends; questions of racial, religious, cultural, and national identity; the actions
of key individuals; and the sequencing of critical eventscombined to lead
Britain and Germany to the brink of World War I.
8
Whether the story turns out
well or poorly, tomorrows historians will have to do something similar if they
are to construct satisfactory explanations for the evolution of U.S.-China rela-
tions in the latter part of the twentieth century and the early decades of the
twenty-rst. As they try to peer into a future that is necessarily obscured from
their view, todays political scientists and foreign policy analysts also need to
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 11
5. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacic Security, and the Case for Ana-
lytical Eclecticism, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), p. 154. See also Peter J.
Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism, in
J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity,
Power, and Efciency (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 133.
6. Jervis, The Future of World Politics, p. 40.
7. Gaddis, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, p. 44 (emphasis in
original).
8. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 18601914 (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1982).
try to nd ways of apprehending the full array of causal forces that are at
work, assessing their relative strengths and thinking about the ways in which
they are likely to combine with one another. This is not an easy task and, in-
deed, it is impossible to accomplish with any degree of assurance or precision.
Nevertheless, it is an important exercise to attempt.
Liberal Optimists
In foreign affairs, most Americans are liberals.
9
As regards the prospects for
peace, cooperation, and understanding among nations, most liberals are opti-
mists. It should therefore come as no surprise that liberal optimists are com-
mon and probably, in numerical terms, dominant among U.S. analysts,
policymakers, and China watchers. On the question of the future of U.S.-China
relations and, more generally, regarding the future of world politics, liberal
optimists believe in the pacifying power of three interrelated and mutually
reinforcing causal mechanisms: economic interdependence, international insti-
tutions, and democratization.
10
economic interdependence
Liberal optimists believe that bilateral economic exchange creates shared inter-
ests in good relations between states. The greater the volume of trade and
investment owing between two countries, the more groups on both sides will
have a strong interest in avoiding conict and preserving peace.
Liberal optimists note that economic exchange between the United States
and China has increased dramatically since the onset of market reforms in
China in the late 1970s. From the start of reform in 1978 to the end of the twen-
tieth century, the value of the trade moving between the two countries grew by
more than two orders of magnitude, from $1 billion to almost $120 billion an-
nually.
11
By 2004 that gure had doubled to a reported total of $245 billion.
12
International Security 30:2 12
9. This is a fact lamented by U.S. realists. See, for example, the writings of George Kennan, Henry
Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau and, most recently, John Mearsheimer.
10. For an examination of the original formulation of these arguments by Immanuel Kant, see Mi-
chael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton,
1997), pp. 251300. For an overview of recent evidence regarding the existence of what liberal opti-
mists describe as the Kantian triangle, see Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: De-
mocracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
11. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, The National Security Implications of the Economic Rela-
tionship between the United States and China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofce,
July 2002), pp. 3839.
12. U.S.-China Business Council, U.S.-China Trade Statistics and Chinas World Trade Statistics,
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html, updated February 28, 2005.
Capital ows have also risen, with U.S. investors pouring signicant resources
each year into China.
13
As China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and opens its markets even wider to foreign goods and capital, the density of
commercial linkages between the United States and the PRC will increase.
14
Economic interdependence has already helped to create a strong mutual inter-
est in peace between the two Pacic powers. Barring some major disruption,
economic forces will probably continue to draw them together, constraining
and damping any tendencies toward conict.
15
international institutions
In addition to their faith in trade as an instrument of peace, liberal optimists
place great store in the role of international institutions of various kinds. These
can help to improve communication between states, reducing uncertainty
about intentions and increasing the capacity of governments to make credible,
binding commitments to one another. By so doing, they can help to ease
or counteract some of the pernicious effects of international anarchy, clearing
the way for higher levels of cooperation and trust than would otherwise be
attainable.
16
As regards U.S.-China relations, liberal optimists note that since the end of
the Cold War there has been a proliferation of regional institutions in East
Asia. Included among these are APEC (the Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation
forum); the ARF (the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Re-
gional Forum); ASEAN 3; the East Asia Summit; an expanding network of
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 13
13. According to U.S. government gures, U.S. foreign direct investment in China increased from
$354 million in 1990 to $9.58 billion in 2000. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, The National
Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China, p. 47.
14. See Robert D. Hormats, Elizabeth Economy, and Kevin Nealer, eds., Beginning the Journey:
China, the United States, and the WTO (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001); Shuxun
Chen and Charles Wolf Jr., eds., China, the United States, and the Global Economy (Santa Monica, Ca-
lif.: RAND, 2001); and China and the WTO: The Real Leap Forward, Economist, November 20,
1999, pp. 2528.
15. For a statement of the argument regarding the pacifying effects of trade in Asia generally, see,
for example, James L. Richardson, Asia-Pacic: The Case for Geopolitical Optimism, National In-
terest, No. 38 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 2839. Regarding trade and U.S.-China relations in particular,
see, for example, the remarks of President Bill Clinton at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced In-
ternational Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., March 8, 2000, in Public Papers of
the Presidents, William J. Clinton: 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofce, 2001),
Vol. 1, pp. 404408.
16. The classic statement of many of these arguments is Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Coop-
eration and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
For a summary of the literature, see Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, Theories and Empirical
Studies of International Institutions, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998),
pp. 729757.
bilateral military-to-military talks; and an even wider array of quasi-ofcial
track-2 security dialogues involving scholars, analysts, and bureaucrats from
countries in the region. Over the course of the last decade, China has also
sought entry into several important global institutions, including the WTO
(which it entered in 2001) and the nuclear nonproliferation regime (which it
joined in 1996). In addition, it has begun to play a more active and prominent
role in the United Nations. By one count, the PRCs membership in formal, in-
ternational governmental organizations more than doubled between 1977 and
1997 (from 21 to 52), while its membership in international nongovernmental
organizations soared during the same period from 71 to 1,163.
17
The growth of international institutions in Asia and the expansion of both
U.S. and Chinese participation in them are drawing the United States and the
PRC into a thickening web of ties that liberal optimists believe will promote
contact, communication and, over time, greater mutual understanding and
even trust, or at the very least, a reduced likelihood of gross misperception.
Aside from whatever direct effects it may have on bilateral relations with the
United States, Chinas increasing participation in international institutions
should also give it a growing, albeit more diffuse, stake in the stability and
continuity of the existing global order. The desire of Chinas leaders to con-
tinue to enjoy the benets of membership in that order should make them less
likely to take steps that would threaten the status quo. This, in turn, should re-
duce the probability that the PRC will act in ways that could bring it into
conict with the United States, which is, after all, the principal architect, de-
fender, and beneciary of the contemporary international system.
18
International Security 30:2 14
17. David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 19892000
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 163. For a brief summary of the recent mutual
entanglement of China and the United States in institutions and regimes, see ibid., pp. 161188.
18. Making the case for the stabilizing effects of Chinas increasing participation in international
institutions are (among many others) Michael Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy, eds., China Joins
the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 141; Paul Ev-
ans, The New Multilateralism and the Conditional Engagement of China, in James Shinn, ed.,
Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
1996), pp. 249270; and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, Chinas Engagement with Multi-
lateral Security Institutions, in Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management
of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 235272. Belief in the virtues of institutions
has had a real impact on U.S. policymakers. See, for example, the discussion in an article by a for-
mer commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacic and his top strategic adviser. Dennis C. Blair
and John T. Hanley Jr., From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacic Security Arrange-
ments, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 717.
democratization
Above all else, liberal optimists believe that democracy is a force for peace. Re-
gimes that rely for their power and legitimacy on the consent of the governed
are less likely to enter lightly into military adventures or to engage in wars
whose true purpose is to line the pockets, and satisfy the vainglory, of their
leaders. Although democracies may at times behave belligerently toward
nondemocracies, they have rarely, if ever, gone to war with one another. As the
number of democracies in the world increases (as it has quite dramatically, al-
beit at an uneven pace, over the course of the last two centuries), the likelihood
of international conict should diminish.
19
Liberal optimists believe that, although it is still far from nished, the pro-
cess of democratization is already well under way in China.
20
This process is
being driven largely by economic development, which, in turn, is being accel-
erated by Chinas increasing openness to trade. Rising per capita incomes are
creating a growing Chinese middle class. In Europe and North America, and
more recently in Asia, those whose rising incomes allow them to do more than
attend to the struggle for daily existence have been the prime movers behind
progress toward democracy, and there is every reason to hope that they will
play a similar role in China.
21
Liberals also believe that, in addition to stirring the desire for political
rights, economic development creates an objective, functional need for politi-
cal liberalization. Without courts, contracts, and a reliable rule of law, eco-
nomic progress will surely falter. Moreover, in an era in which sustained
growth depends increasingly on free ows of information, regimes that seek to
restrict speech and control communications will be at a fatal disadvantage.
Over time, if it wishes even to approach the levels of well-being already at-
tained by its advanced industrial counterparts (all of which are democracies),
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 15
19. The literature on this subject is vast. For useful overviews, see Miriam Fendius Elman, The
Need for a Qualitative Test of the Democratic Peace Theory, in Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is De-
mocracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 157; and Russett and Oneal, Trian-
gulating Peace, pp. 81124.
20. See, for example, Minxin Pei, Creeping Democratization in China, Journal of Democracy, Vol.
6, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 6479; and Minxin Pei, Chinas Evolution toward Soft Authoritarian-
ism, in Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, eds., What If China Doesnt Democratize? Im-
plications for War and Peace (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 7498.
21. For the most clear-cut statement of this argument, see Henry S. Rowen, The Short March:
Chinas Road to Democracy, National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 6170. For a somewhat more
cautious, but still basically optimistic assessment of likely near-term developments, see George
Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, Chinas Coming Transformation, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 4
(July/August 2001), pp. 2639. See also Elizabeth Economy, Dont Break the Engagement, For-
eign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3 (May/June 2004), pp. 96109.
China too must become democratic.
22
As it does, the liberal optimists expect
that its relations with the United States will stabilize and that, ultimately, it
will enter into the democratic zone of peace. Although the process may take
time fully to unfold, before too long open conict between the United States
and a democratic China will be as improbable as war among the members of
the European Union appears to be today.
Since the mid-1990s the presumed links between trade, growth, democracy,
and peace have been staple features of ofcial U.S. rhetoric regarding relations
with China. President Bill Clinton began to make these arguments after aban-
doning his initial irtation with the idea of linking Chinas access to the U.S.
market to its performance on human rights issues.
23
Despite his harsh criti-
cisms of some aspects of the Clinton administrations policy of engagement,
candidate and later President George W. Bush embraced the basic logic of the
idea that trade promotes democracy, and, ultimately, peace. Thus in a 1999
campaign speech, Bush declared, Economic freedom creates habits of liberty.
And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy. . . . Trade freely with
China, and time is on our side.
24
Realist Pessimists
In contrast to liberals, most realists are pessimists. Where liberals see progres-
sive forces leading the world ineluctably to ever-higher levels of prosperity
and peace, realists see inescapable laws of nature compelling a recurrent strug-
gle for power and survival. For liberals, history is a smoothly ascending curve;
International Security 30:2 16
22. Thus, according to one study, The rule of law, public disclosure of nancial data, and mana-
gerial accountability corrode command economies. These liberal practices are necessary for sus-
tained growth in a market economy and . . . will inevitably spill over into civil society and the
world of politics, thus leading to a more moderate China. Shinn, Weaving the Net, p. 40. Similarly,
one of the arguments in favor of the incorporation of China into the WTO was that it would pro-
mote domestic economic change and hence political reforms. In the words of a former Clinton ad-
ministration national security adviser, To enter the WTO, China must speed the demise of the
state-run economy through which the Communist Party has wielded much of its power. . . . Just as
NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] membership eroded the economic base of one-
party rule in Mexico, WTO membership . . . can help do the same in China. Samuel R. Berger, A
Foreign Policy for the Global Age, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000),
pp. 2829.
23. Regarding the shifts in Clintons policies, see James Mann, About Face: A History of Americas
Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), pp. 274
314.
24. Governor George W. Bush, A Distinctly American Internationalism, Ronald Reagan Presi-
dential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/
intrel/bush/wspeech.htm.
for realists, it is a vicious circle. The reason, most contemporary realists claim,
is the persistence of international anarchy. In the absence of any higher author-
ity to resolve disputes and impose order, peace has usually proved eeting
and conict has been the norm. Under conditions of anarchy, it is the material
power and, in particular, the military strength of the various units in an inter-
national system that has typically been decisive in shaping the patterns of rela-
tions among them.
25
chinas power: rising
For realist pessimists, the single most important feature of the PRC today is its
rising power. Everything else, including the likely character of the U.S.-China
relationship, follows from this fact. Taking aggregate economic capacity as a
rough surrogate for overall national power, it is apparent that Chinas growth
has been extraordinarily rapid. Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, the
PRCs gross national product (GNP) is thought to have increased by a factor of
four and, according to some estimates, it could double again by the middle of
the second decade of the twenty-rst century.
26
What is especially impressive
about the Chinese economy is not only the speed with which it appears to be
expanding but its growing mass and enormous potential. Given the sheer size
of its population and the rising productivity of its workers, China may one day
regain its historic position as the worlds largest economy. Although such pro-
jections are fraught with difculties and uncertainties, some experts have cal-
culated that Chinas economy could overtake that of the United States as early
as 2015.
27
The combination of the speed and the magnitude of Chinas growth
in recent decades appears to be unprecedented. The closest analogy is proba-
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 17
25. Regarding the impact of anarchy, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Read-
ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 8993; and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 2954.
26. For an estimate of Chinas past growth, see Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, 2005,
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ, updated July 28, 2005. For
other assessments of Chinas past performance and future prospects, see K.C. Yeh, Chinas Eco-
nomic Growth: Recent Trends and Prospects, in Chen and Wolf, China, the United States, and the
Global Economy, pp. 6997; and Angang Hu, The Chinese Economy in Prospect, in Chen and
Wolf, China, the United States, and the Global Economy, pp. 99146.
27. See Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long-Run (Paris: Development Cen-
ter of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998), pp. 9599. See also the
projections in Yeh, Chinas Economic Growth, p. 110. These estimates are all based on optimistic
projections of Chinas future growth rates and the use of purchasing power parity (as compared to
exchange rate) conversion methods that tend systematically to increase the apparent size of the
Chinese economy in relation to that of the United States. For an estimate that shows Chinas gross
domestic product exceeding that of the United States in current dollar terms by 2039, see Dominic
bly the emergence of the United States as the worlds preponderant economy
over the course of the nineteenth century.
As was true of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, so too is Chinas rapidly growing economy bringing expanding mil-
itary capabilities in its train. A fast-growing GNP has made it comparatively
easy for the PRC to sustain a large and expanding military effort and, in recent
years, Chinas spending on arms and military equipment has grown at an im-
pressive pace.
28
The rising levels of productivity, per capita incomes, and tech-
nological competence that accompany economic growth should also translate
into an increasing ability both to absorb sophisticated weapons imported from
foreign suppliers and eventually to develop such systems indigenously.
29
Al-
though the picture is mixed, and the PRC continues to lag in many areas, these
expectations too are borne out by the general pattern of Chinese military de-
velopment over the last several decades. There are good reasons to expect that
China will be able to build and deploy more increasingly capable military sys-
tems in the years ahead.
30
chinas aims: expanding
Realist pessimists note that, throughout history, rising powers have tended to
be troublemakers, at least insofar as their more established counterparts in the
international system are concerned. This is the case, in the realists view, re-
gardless of regime type; it was as true of a rising, democratic United States as it
was of a rising, autocratic Germany. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out,
International Security 30:2 18
Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, Goldman Sachs
Global Economics Paper No. 99 (New York: Goldman Sachs Group, 2003).
28. For estimates of Chinas defense spending, see U.S.-China Security Review Commission, The
National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China,
pp. 167177.
29. For an analysis of Chinese military imports, see Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, Chinas Arms Acqui-
sitions from Abroad: A Quest for Superb and Secret Weapons (New York: Oxford University Press,
1995). Regarding Chinas protracted and painful efforts to develop its own ballistic missile subma-
rines, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Chinas Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modern-
ization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).
30. Regarding the progress of Chinas military modernization efforts, see Annual Report on the Mil-
itary Power of the Peoples Republic of China, May 28, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/
d20040528PRC.pdf. See also Mark A. Stokes, Chinas Strategic Modernization: Implications for the
United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999); James R.
Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinas Military Faces the Future (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1999); Col. Susan M. Puska, ed., Peoples Liberation Army after Next (Carlisle,
Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing
Chinas Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet
Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization
and economic development.
31
There appear to be a number of reasons for this pattern. As a states capabili-
ties grow, its leaders tend to dene their interests more expansively and to
seek a greater degree of inuence over what is going on around them. Rising
powers seek not only to secure their frontiers but to reach out beyond them,
taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials, and transportation routes;
to protect their citizens far from home, defend their foreign friends and allies,
and promulgate their values; and, in general, to have what they consider to be
their legitimate say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. This
correlation between growing power and expanding interests has been suc-
cinctly summarized by Robert Gilpin: A more wealthy and more powerful
state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less
wealthy and less powerful state.
32
As they seek to assert themselves, rising powers are often drawn to chal-
lenge territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hier-
archies of prestige that were put in place when they were relatively weak.
Their leaders and people often feel that they were unfairly left out when the
pie was divided up, and may even believe that, because of their prior weak-
ness, they were robbed of what was rightfully theirs. Like Germany at the turn
of the twentieth century, rising powers tend to want their place in the sun,
and this often brings them into conict with more established great powers,
which are typically the architects and principal beneciaries of the existing in-
ternational system.
33
The collision between the expanding interests of a rising power and those of
its more established counterparts can be dealt with in a number of ways, but
the resulting disputes are seldom resolved peacefully. Recognizing the grow-
ing threat to its position, a dominant power (or coalition of status quo powers)
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 19
31. Samuel P. Huntington, Americas Changing Strategic Interests, Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Janu-
ary/February 1991), p. 12.
32. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1981), pp. 2223. On the links between growth and expansion, see Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to
Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1998).
33. Regarding the connections between national growth, expanding interests, and international
conict, see Robert North and Nazli Choucri, Nations in Conict: National Growth and International
Violence (San Francisco, Calif.: W.H. Freeman, 1975).
may attempt to use force preventively to destroy a rising state before it can
achieve its full potential. Less bellicose, established powers have also at times
sought to appease emerging states, looking for ways to satisfy their demands
and ambitions without conict and to engage them and incorporate them
peacefully into an existing international order. However sincere and well in-
tentioned these efforts may be, they have usually failed. Sometimes the reason
is clearly the character of the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf
Hitlers Germany, for example, a rising power may have ambitions that are so
extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effec-
tively committing suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are
less extensive, the status quo powers may be too reluctant to make reasonable
concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising
power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and leading to escalating
demands. Successful policies of engagement/appeasement are certainly possi-
ble in theory, but in practice they have proven to be difcult to implement.
34
Looking at the raw facts of its expanding economy and growing military ca-
pabilities, most realist pessimists would be content to conclude that China is a
rising power and that, as such, it is unlikely to behave differently than have
others of its type throughout history. Thus Huntington, after describing the
correlation in past cases between rapid internal growth and external expan-
sion, predicts that China too will undoubtedly be moving into such a phase in
the coming decades.
35
Similarly, according to John Mearsheimer, so long as
Chinas power continues to grow, China, like all previous potential hege-
mons, [will] be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon.
36
Some analysts go a step further, arguing that China is especially likely to be-
have assertively, even at the risk of coming into conict with others. Recent
Chinese history, the century of humiliation that began with the Opium Wars
of the 1840s and ended only with the nal expulsion of foreign powers from
the mainland after World War II, appears to have left Chinas leaders and its
people acutely sensitive to perceived slights to national honor and prestige
International Security 30:2 20
34. For an overview of the various alternative strategies states have used to deal with rising pow-
ers, see Randall L. Schweller Managing the Rise of Great Powers: Theory and History, in
Johnston and Ross, Engaging China, pp. 717. For an analysis of the unhappy history of past efforts
to incorporate rising powers peacefully into existing international systems, see Michael D. Swaine
and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, Ca-
lif.: RAND, 2000), pp. 197229.
35. Huntington, Americas Changing Strategic Interests, p. 12.
36. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 400.
and especially alert to threats around their periphery.
37
As a result of the pain-
ful experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, contemporary
Chinese strategists may be even more eager than they might otherwise be to
establish a sphere of inuence or zone of control that would prevent such
threats from reemerging in the future.
38
Reaching even further back into the past, other observers point to the fact
that, before its decline and domination by outside powers, China was for
many centuries the preponderant force in Asia and the hub of a Sinocentric
Asian international system. As they adapt to the reality of their growing
power and look for models to guide their behavior under increasingly favor-
able conditions, the leadership in Beijing could hearken back to this earlier era
of glory and seek to reestablish China as East Asias preponderant power.
39
Some U.S. government agencies have concluded that Chinas current leaders
aim to maximize [Chinas] inuence within East Asia relative to the U.S. or,
more bluntly, to become the preeminent power in Asia.
40
If this is true, and
assuming that the United States continues to adhere to its century-old policy of
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 21
37. See Peter Hays Gries, Chinas New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2004), pp. 4353.
38. For an analysis that stresses the connections between the past two hundred years of national
decline and Chinas likely goals in a renewed period of international strength and power, see
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1997), especially pp. 5181, at p. 53. Although they reach different conclusions about the likely im-
plications for Chinas external behavior, Sinologists Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross also
place considerable emphasis on Chinas comparatively recent experiences of vulnerability and
weakness. See Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: Chinas Search for Security
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 1934.
39. One observer goes so far as to suggest that, at the time of the Qing dynasty, a tendency toward
authoritarianism and imperialism entered Chinas cultural DNA and continued to replicate itself
down through the centuries and the dynasties. Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: Chinas Plan to Domi-
nate Asia and the World (San Francisco, Calif.: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 26. In this view, China is
essentially hardwired by its history and culture to seek domination. For a more measured at-
tempt to draw links between Chinas distant past and its possible future behavior, see Swaine and
Tellis, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy, especially pp. 195. See also Ross Terrill, The New Chinese
Empire: And What It Means for the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2004). Regarding the possi-
ble reemergence of a Sinocentric system in Asia, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civiliza-
tions and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 218238; and
David C. Kang, Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations, in G. John Ikenberry
and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacic (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2003), pp. 163190.
40. These statements are taken, respectively, from Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet,
The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World, February 11, 2003, http://
www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html; and Annual Report on
the Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China, p. 10.
opposing the dominance of either half of Eurasia by a hostile power or coali-
tion, the stage will be set for an intense and possibly protracted strategic com-
petition between the two Pacic giants.
41
the security dilemma: intense
Even if one does not accept the view that the PRCs goal is to displace the
United States as East Asias preponderant power, it is still possible to reach
fairly pessimistic conclusions about the likely future character of the U.S.-
China relationship by invoking the mechanism of the security dilemma.
42
In
other words, even if the larger political goals of both sides are, in some sense,
purely defensive, the measures that each takes to secure its position and
achieve its objectives may still arouse alarm and stimulate countermeasures on
the other side. Such processes appear to be at work in several aspects of con-
temporary U.S.-China relations.
As regards Taiwan, Chinas goal may be only to prevent that island from
sliding toward independence. The PRCs leaders may be perfectly willing to
live with the status quo indenitely, but they may believe that they have to is-
sue periodic threats to prevent Taiwan from breaking free. The U.S. objective
may be only to prevent forceful reunication. But Chinas threats and ongoing
military buildup may increase fears that Beijing will eventually feel capable of
achieving its objectives through the use of force. To maintain deterrence, Wash-
ington may then feel compelled to increase military assistance to Taipei and to
take other measures designed to make it appear more likely that the United
States would intervene if Taiwan were attacked. But these steps will almost
certainly make the PRC more fearful of a Taiwanese bolt for independence,
which will cause Beijing to further intensify its military efforts and heighten its
rhetoric, and so on.
43
International Security 30:2 22
41. For a restatement of the view that Americas geopolitical objective must remain to prevent
Asias domination by any single power or its coalescence into an unfriendly bloc, see Henry A.
Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Towards a Diplomacy for the Twenty-rst Century (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), pp. 110163, at p. 112.
42. The distinction here is between so-called offensive realists, who believe that states necessarily
aim to enhance their power to the greatest extent possible, and defensive realists, who believe
that most states seek security. See Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World
Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167174; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 58113. For an insight-
ful application to the East Asian context, see Thomas J. Christensen, China, the U.S.-Japan Alli-
ance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999),
pp. 4980.
Chinas aim in deploying large numbers of theater ballistic missiles may be
primarily to deter Taiwan from declaring independence. But those deploy-
ments inevitably appear threatening not only to Taiwan but also to Japan, the
United States, and others in the region. Conversely, the U.S. aim in moving to-
ward deployment of some kind of theater missile defense (TMD) system may
be to provide a measure of protection to U.S. friends and allies and to its bases
and forces in the Western Pacic. But the possibility of such a deployment is
obviously deeply threatening to the Chinese, who see it as undermining their
ability to prevent unfavorable regional developments, especially if a U.S.-
orchestrated TMD system is extended to include Taiwan. Beijings concerns
about TMD will be further heightened by the deployment of a U.S. national
missile defense system, which the Chinese could see as reducing their ability
to deter an attack on their own territory. The Chinese response to these
developments is likely to include steps to augment both their theater- and
intercontinental-range strike forces, which will tend to heighten U.S. anxieties
about their intentions.
44
U.S. government ofcials see regional alliances as defensive bulwarks of sta-
bility and bend over backward to disclaim any intention of encircling or con-
taining China. Not surprisingly, however, Chinese strategists tend to see U.S.
behavior in a less benign light. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States
has been busy trying to strengthen and solidify its ties to its traditional re-
gional allies (including Japan, South Korea, and Australia) in large part out of
concern over the growth of Chinese power. Especially since the latter part of
the 1990s, the United States has also been working to expand its network
of alliances and quasi alliances in Southeast, South, and Central Asia. The
September 11 terrorist attacks have only intensied this trend. Whatever U.S.
spokespeople may say, Chinese observers are likely to view much of this activ-
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 23
43. On this issue, see, for example, Denny Roy, Tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Survival, Vol. 42,
No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 7696; June Teufel Dreyer, Flashpoint: The Taiwan Strait, Orbis, Vol. 44,
No. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 615629; and Andrew J. Nathan, Whats Wrong with American Taiwan
Policy, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 93106.
44. See, for example, Michael McDevitt, Beijings Bind, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3
(Summer 2000), pp. 177186; Evan S. Medeiros, rapporteur, Ballistic Missile Defense and North-
east Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo, report of the Stanley Founda-
tion and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of
International Studies, April 2001); Kenneth W. Allen et al., Theater Missile Defense in the Asia-
Pacic Region, Working Group Report No. 34 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, June
2000). On the links between the TMD and Taiwan issues, see Thomas J. Christensen, Theater Mis-
sile Defense and Taiwans Security, Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 7990.
ity as directed at China and as hostile to its interests. Should China seek to op-
pose U.S. actions, however, by criticizing the persistence of American
alliances, or by attempting to bolster its own relationship with Russia or with
the Central Asian republics, its actions will be seen by many in the United
States as evidence of hostile, expansionist tendencies.
45
Realist Optimists
Although most realists are pessimists, it is nevertheless possible to arrive at
fairly optimistic conclusions about the future of U.S.-China relations on what
are essentially realist grounds (i.e., having to do primarily with the distribu-
tion of material power and without invoking the Kantian trinity of trade, insti-
tutions, and democracy). As discussed earlier, most realist pessimists see
Chinas power growing and its aims expanding. Even those who do not be-
lieve that the emergence of a rising power must lead inevitably to conict
worry about the pernicious workings of the security dilemma. Still, some real-
ists maintain that Chinas power is not increasing as rapidly as is often claimed
and that its ambitions are, and are likely to remain, modest, even conservative.
As to the security dilemma, optimistic realists argue that there may be a vari-
ety of other factors at work that will mitigate its effects and help keep relations
between Washington and Beijing from spiraling out of control.
chinas power: limited, and likely to remain so
All realists would agree that the balance of power between the United States
and China will be critical in determining the character of their unfolding rela-
tionship. Most would also acknowledge that, at the moment, the United States
is vastly more powerful than China, but that, at least in some respects, over the
last several decades the PRCs power has been increasing relative to that of the
United States. Where disagreements arise is over the slopes of the two power
curves.
Optimistic realists believe both that China is weaker today than it is some-
times made to appear and that the growth of its power over the next several
International Security 30:2 24
45. Regarding Chinese concerns over U.S. alliances and, in particular, its alliance with Japan, see
Christensen, China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia. See also Da-
vid Shambaugh, Chinas Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security, International Security,
Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 5279, especially pp. 6567. Chinese assessments of U.S. ac-
tions in Asia since September 11 are discussed in Aaron L. Friedberg, 11 September and the Fu-
ture of Sino-American Relations, Survival, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 3350.
decades is likely to be a good deal slower than the pessimists assume.
46
Both in
the economic and military domains, there are substantial obstacles to be over-
come if recent rates of growth are to be sustained. In fact, there is a signicant
probability that Chinas power will not continue to grow at anything resem-
bling the pace of the past two decades. The process of economic expansion, in
particular, may well be disrupted by domestic social and political turbulence.
Moreover, even in the absence of major upheavals, growth could be sig-
nicantly slowed by difculties in creating efcient, equitable, and open legal
and nancial institutions.
47
Substantially slower or more uneven economic
growth will make it more difcult for Beijing to fund a sustained expansion in
military capabilities. Noneconomic factors, such as shortcomings in organiza-
tion, education, training, and doctrinal development, may also impede Chinas
emergence as a rst-class military power.
48
Far from drawing closer to the United States in most measures of national
power (to say nothing of surpassing it), China will most likely continue to lag
and may fall even further behind. The likelihood that Beijing will want (or be
able) to mount a serious challenge to the United States is therefore small. To
the contrary, assuming that they are rational, Chinas leaders will try to lie low
and to avoid tension or confrontations with the United States, more or less as
they are doing today. Chinas continuing weakness, in short, will help to keep
the peace.
49
Some realist optimists argue that the United States is now so overwhelm-
ingly powerful that its position is essentially unassailable. For the rst time in
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 25
46. For the argument that Chinas power and importance have been greatly overstated, see Gerald
Segal, Does China Matter? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September/October 1999), pp. 2436.
47. For a useful survey of Chinas economic challenges, see Nicholas R. Lardy, Chinas Unnished
Economic Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998). Some observers believe that the pace of
Chinas recent economic growth has been considerably overstated. See Thomas G. Rawski, China
by the Numbers: How Reform Has Affected Chinas Economic Statistics, China Perspectives, No.
33 (JanuaryFebruary 2001), pp. 2534. Making the case that Chinas growth continues to be robust
is Nicholas R. Lardy, Chinas Economy after the WTO, paper presented to the Thirty-rst Sino-
American Conference on Contemporary China, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan,
June 24, 2002. For the argument that China is on the brink of collapse, see Gordon G. Chang, The
Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001).
48. On Chinas present and likely future military shortcomings, see, for example, Solomon
Karmel, China and the Peoples Liberation Army: Great Power or Struggling Developing State? (London:
St. Martins, 2000); Michael G. Gallagher, Chinas Illusory Threat to the South China Sea, Interna-
tional Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169194; Bates Gill and Michael OHanlon,
Chinas Hollow Military, National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 5562; and Michael
OHanlon, Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000),
pp. 5186.
49. For a statement of many of the arguments laid out above, see Michael R. Chambers, Rising
modern history, the structure of the international system is truly unipolar. As a
result, many traditional assumptions and expectations regarding the conduct
of international politics no longer apply. Neither China, nor any other poten-
tial rising power, nor any plausible combination of potential opposing nations
has sufcient resources to match those of the United States. Instead of balanc-
ing against American power, most other states will seek to jump on the U.S.
bandwagon, or at least to stay well out of its way. Moreover, the very size of
the power gap separating the United States from the rest of the world is so
large as to diminish the prospects for misperception or miscalculation. Fine-
grained calculations of relative capabilities will not be necessary to determine
the likely outcome of any direct confrontation with the United States. This fact
should help to reduce the likelihood that Chinas leaders or those of any other
country will be able to convince themselves that they stand to gain by chal-
lenging U.S. interests.
50
chinas aims: limited
Realist pessimists tend to infer intentions from capabilities, and they generally
assume the existence of certain universally applicable principles of interna-
tional behavior: China is a rising power; rising powers tend to have expanding
interests and to be prone to assertive or aggressive behavior; and therefore
China will very likely behave in similar fashion.
Not all realists are willing to follow this chain of reasoning to its conclusion,
however. Even those who accept that Chinas power is growing, and who be-
lieve that rising powers tend to be dissatised, do not necessarily believe that
China will behave in an especially assertive or aggressive fashion. This may
not simply be a function of Chinas capabilities but a reection of its underly-
ing intentions. As Randall Schweller notes, rising powers can differ in the ex-
tent of their dissatisfaction with the status quo, and hence in the scope of their
ambitions. Some rising powers have truly revolutionary objectives; they seek,
in other words, to overthrow an entire system of international rules and insti-
tutions. But others may have more modest, limited aims; they may be revision-
International Security 30:2 26
China: A Threat to Its Neighbors? in Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia: Security
Implications (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), pp. 6591. See
also Patrick E. Tyler, Whos Afraid of China? New York Times Magazine, August 1, 1999, pp. 46
49.
50. See William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security, Vol. 24,
No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 541; and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, American Pri-
macy in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 2033.
ists rather than revolutionaries, states that seek marginal adjustments to the
status quo rather than fundamental change.
51
In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, China today does not appear to be a revo-
lutionary power in any sense of the term. It has abandoned its earlier goal of
spreading communism throughout Asia and, indeed, is no longer itself an ad-
herent to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. The concrete changes to the status
quo that Chinas leaders seek are, arguably, comparatively limited: the reinte-
gration of Taiwan with the mainland, rectication of some disputed borders,
and the acceptance by the international community of its claims to portions of
the South China Sea. If these issues can be peacefully resolved, China could
well enter the ranks of the satised states.
52
Chinese spokespeople assert (and
many American China-watchers agree) that China has no modern history of
extensive territorial conquest and, with the few exceptions already noted, no
visible desire to expand. China may not yet be a status quo power, but it is a
cautious power with limited aims, a conservative power, in the words of one
leading American China expert.
53
Putting aside the question of the rate at
which its capabilities are growing, Chinas ambitions are such that the pros-
pects for conict with the United States should be limited.
the security dilemma: muted
Even those observers who accept the realist optimists judgments about
Chinas true power and capabilities might still be concerned about the work-
ings of the security dilemma. Whatever the objective realities, mutual fear and
suspicion can still fuel arms races and trigger downward spirals. Realist opti-
mists respond to this concern by pointing to the existence of several counter-
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 27
51. In addition, Schweller points out that rising powers may vary in their propensity to take risks,
with some risk acceptant and others highly risk averse. See the discussion in Randall L. Schweller,
Managing the Rise of Great Powers: Theory and History, in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China,
pp. 1822.
52. For the argument that China is neither a fully satised power nor a revolutionary threat to the
status quo, see Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress. See also Alastair Iain
Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power? International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5
56. Other recent assessments that describe Chinas strategic aims as limited include Avery
Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: Chinas Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 2005); and David Shambaugh, China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Re-
gional Order, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 6499.
53. Robert S. Ross, Beijing as a Conservative Power, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/
April 1997), pp. 3344. In 2004 Chinas leaders introduced (but later abandoned) a slogan meant
to convey a reassuring message about its intentions. See Robert L. Suettinger, The Rise and
Descent of Peaceful Rise, China Leadership Monitor, No. 12 (Fall 2004), http://www
.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20044/rs.html.
vailing mechanisms that they believe will tend to reduce the danger of
misperception and conict.
First, some realist optimists argue that the structure of the emerging post
Cold War East Asian system is essentially bipolar. The Soviet Unions collapse
and Japans prolonged economic stagnation have left the United States and the
PRC as the two leading regional powers. Assuming that the United States re-
mains engaged and that Chinas power continues to grow at least to some de-
gree, the basic trend toward bipolarity should become even more pronounced
over the next several decades. Following the logic developed by Kenneth
Waltz, and drawing on the experience of the Cold War, realist optimists believe
that a bipolar Asia is likely to be tense but basically stable. Under conditions of
bipolarity, the two preeminent powers will eye each other with mistrust. In
part because they focus so intently on each other, however, they are less likely
to make misjudgments about their respective capabilities and intentions. The
huge gap between the two poles and other states in the system also reduces
the possibility of sudden shifts in the balance of power resulting from changes
in the allegiance of third parties.
54
As during the Cold War, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons by the
two polar powers should serve as an additional source of constraint on their
behavior. This factor is stressed, for example, by Avery Goldstein who argues
that it provides the strongest reasons to expect that the dangers associated
with Chinas arrival as a full-edged great power will be limited. Goldstein
suggests that, as participants in what Robert Jervis has called the nuclear rev-
olution, the United States and China have already entered into an easily es-
tablished [relationship] of mutual deterrence that provide[s] not only a robust
buffer against general war, but also a strong constraint on both limited war
and crisis behavior.
55
Finally, realist optimists such as Robert Ross and Michael McDevitt believe
that geography will greatly enhance the stability of the emerging U.S.-China
International Security 30:2 28
54. For the general argument that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems, see
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 161193. On the supposed emergence of bipolarity in
Asia, see Robert S. Ross, The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-rst Century, In-
ternational Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81118. Because it focuses only on East Asia,
this view does not take into account the possible role of India.
55. Avery Goldstein, Great Expectations: Interpreting Chinas Arrival, International Security, Vol.
22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 70. For general arguments regarding the presumed stabilizing ef-
fects of nuclear weapons, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the
Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
relationship. The United States, in this view, is a maritime power. Its interests
and sphere of inuence are, and likely will remain, centered offshore in North-
east and maritime Southeast Asia. China, by contrast, is and has historically
been primarily a land power. Its natural sphere of inuence will include
Central Asia and continental Southeast Asia. Ross maintains that these spheres
of inuence do not overlap, with the possible exceptions of the Korean Penin-
sula, Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands. Provided that the issues relating to these
three areas can be properly managed, there should be little reason or occasion
for the United States and China to come into direct conict. These circum-
stances stand in marked contrast to those that prevailed during the Cold War,
when the United States and the Soviet Union had overlapping, physically con-
tiguous spheres of inuence in Central Europe, a situation that produced
much tension and considerable danger, especially during the initial stages of
the superpower competition.
56
Liberal Pessimists
Just as there can be optimistic realists, so also it is possible to be pessimistic on
what are essentially liberal groundsthat is, with reference primarily to the
internal structures and domestic political dynamics of the United States and
Chinaand to the interactions between them that may arise as a result of their
very different regimes.
57
china: an authoritarian regime in transition?
Whatever it may eventually become, most observers would agree that China
today is neither a totalitarian state nor a democracy, but rather an authoritar-
ian regime of dubious legitimacy with an uncertain grip on power. Its leaders
are the inheritors of an ideology that has lost most of its appeal and, far from
being able to rely on the freely given support of their people, they are heavily
dependent on the military and domestic security services for the preservation
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 29
56. On the impact of geography, see Ross, The Geography of the Peace; and Michael McDevitt,
Roundtable: Net AssessmentObjective Conditions versus the U.S. Strategic Tradition, in Paul
D. Taylor, ed., Asia and the Pacic: U.S. Strategic Traditions and Regional Realities (Newport, R.I.: Na-
val War College Press, 2001), pp. 101105.
57. For a similarly broad use of the term liberal, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Se-
riously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Au-
tumn 1997), pp. 513553.
of domestic order. The Beijing government now bases its claim to rule less on
communist principles than on the promise of continued increases in prosperity
(and the avoidance of social chaos), combined with appeals to nationalism.
This is a dangerous and unstable mixture. If economic progress falters, the
present government will have little choice but to lean even more heavily on
nationalist appeals as its sole remaining source of support. It may also be in-
clined to resort to assertive external policies as a way of rallying the Chinese
people and turning their energies and frustrations outward, most likely to-
ward Taiwan or Japan or the United States, rather than inward, toward Beijing.
Indeed, many analysts believe that Chinas rulers have already shown an in-
creased inclination to behave in this way over the course of the past decade.
58
These tendencies toward hypernationalist rhetoric and action may actually
be made worse by movement toward a more open and competitive political
system. Based on a statistical analysis of historical cases, Edward Manseld
and Jack Snyder have concluded that it is precisely when nations are in
transition from authoritarianism toward democracy that they are most likely
to initiate conict with their neighbors. Both stable autocracies and stable de-
mocracies are generally less war-prone.
59
The reasons for this pattern appear to
lie in the internal processes of societies in which the pressures for political par-
ticipation are increasing, but in which effective democratic institutions have
yet to emerge. Elites in such societies often use militant nationalist appeals in
an attempt to mobilize and channel mass support without surrendering their
grip on power. In Snyders words, the resort to nationalism has often been ac-
companied by militarism and by the scapegoating of enemies of the nation at
home and abroad.
60
If past patterns hold, and if China is indeed in the early
International Security 30:2 30
58. On the role of nationalism in shaping Chinese foreign policy, see Allen S. Whiting, Chinese
Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng, China Quarterly, Vol. 142 (June 1995), pp. 295316; Da-
vid Shambaugh, Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijings Responses, Inter-
national Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180209; Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C.
Saunders, Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands, International
Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 114146; and Suisheng Zhao, We Are Patriots First
and Democrats Second: The Rise of Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s, in Friedman and
McCormick, What If China Doesnt Democratize? pp. 2148.
59. See Edward D. Manseld and Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of War, Interna-
tional Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 538; and Edward D. Manseld and Jack Snyder,
Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2
(Spring 2002), pp. 297337. For the most recent and comprehensive version of Manseld and
Snyders argument, see Edward D. Manseld and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging De-
mocracies Go to War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).
stages of democratization, the road ahead may well be bumpy. Ironically, the
prospects for a worsening in U.S.-China relations may actually be greater than
they would be if China were to remain a stable autocracy.
Suppose that China does come to more closely resemble a fully functioning
democracy, with elections, competing political parties, and an open press. Will
this lead to a transformation in relations between it and the United States? Lib-
eral pessimists might agree that, in the long run, this will probably be the case.
But they would also point out that even a much more democratic China may
still be prone to behave in ways that could bring it into conict with the United
States. Democracies are not always placid or peaceful, especially in the early
stages of their political development. Some observers have suggested that, at
least for a time, a democratic government in Beijing could well be more nation-
alistic and assertive than the present regime. According to one scholar, such a
regime free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but likely
driven by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese power a much
more assertive, impatient, belligerent, even aggressive force, at least during the
unstable period of fast ascendance to the ranks of a world-class power.
61
the united states: a crusading liberal democracy?
Changes in Chinese political institutions may increase the likelihood that
China will collide with the United States. If China does not change, however,
certain persistent features of Americas domestic regime appear likely to in-
cline the United States toward conict with the PRC. This conclusion follows
rst of all from the obverse of the democratic peace argument. Democracies
may be less likely to come into conict with other democracies, but they have
historically been more prone to be suspicious of, and hostile toward, what they
perceive to be nondemocratic regimes. As Michael Doyle has pointed out,
The very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and interna-
tional respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 31
60. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conict (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2000), p. 158.
61. Fei-Ling Wang, Self-Image and Strategic Intentions: National Condence and Political Inse-
curity, in Yong Deng and Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman and Littleeld, 1999), p. 35. For the contrary argument, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The
Prospects of Political Liberalization in China, paper presented at a seminar of the Project for the
New American Century, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1999. See also the provocative analysis in
Bruce Gilley, Chinas Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2004), pp. 227241.
can exacerbate conicts in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.
Relations between liberal and nonliberal states are always conducted in an
atmosphere of suspicion in part because of the perception by liberal states
that nonliberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own
people.
62
Whatever it may ultimately become, China is not now a liberal democracy. It
should therefore come as no surprise that many Americans regard it with sus-
picion and a measure of hostility. Seen in this light, disputes between the
United States and China over human rights (for example) are not just a minor
irritant in the relationship. They are instead symptomatic of a deeper difculty
that cannot easily be smoothed over. From the U.S. perspective, human rights
violations are not only intrinsically wrong; they are also a sure sign that a re-
gime is evil and illegitimate, and therefore cannot be trusted. The possibility of
a stable relationship with such a regime is remote, at best.
If the United States is more likely to be hostile toward China because it is not
a democracy, it is also more inclined to assist polities that it perceives to be
democratic if they are threatened by China, even if this is not what a pure
realpolitik calculation of its interests might seem to demand. Thus it was one
thing for Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon to distance the United States
from Taiwan when it was widely perceived by Americans to have a corrupt,
authoritarian government. It will be considerably more difcult for future U.S.
leaders to do so to the extent that the American people come to regard Taiwan
as a functioning fellow democracyeven if U.S. support for Taiwan risks a
worsening in relations with the PRC and perhaps even if it threatens to lead to
war. For better or worse, the United States is a profoundly ideological country,
and its foreign policy has always been shaped by its ideals, even when those
might appear to conict with its material interests.
63
International Security 30:2 32
62. Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2, Philosophy and Public Af-
fairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 325326.
63. The inuence of ideology on U.S. foreign policy is well analyzed in two recent surveys. See
Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since
1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifin, 1997); and Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American For-
eign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001). Regarding shifting
U.S. perceptions of Taiwan and their impact on U.S. policy, see Mann, About Face, pp. 315338. For
a recent Chinese assessment of the alleged messianic and aggressive tendencies in U.S. foreign
policy, see Lanxin Xiang, Washingtons Misguided China Policy, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Au-
tumn 2001), pp. 723.
interactive effects
Liberal pessimists worry that the disparate character of the U.S. and Chinese
regimes could produce a vicious cycle of mutually reinforcing suspicions and
fears. As has already been suggested, many Americans regard China as a re-
pressive, authoritarian country. Actions that the present Chinese regime has
taken in the past and may take in the future to retain its grip on powersuch
as cracking down on dissidents, persecuting religious groups, restricting ac-
cess to the internet, or issuing blood-curdling threats against Taiwanare
merely going to bolster this view. For its part, no matter what the U.S. govern-
ment says, the present Chinese leadership is likely to remain convinced that
the ultimate goal of the American policy of engagement is to undermine
their legitimacy and to overthrow them through a process of peaceful evolu-
tion.
64
Actions that the U.S. government (or simply the Congress or even
private American citizens) have taken and are likely to take to express disap-
proval of Chinese behaviorsuch as criticizing Beijing on human rights, fund-
ing Radio Free Asia, issuing statements of support for Taiwan, or displaying
sympathy for the Dali Lamawill inevitably conrm some Chinese leaders
darkest view of U.S. intentions. Ideological differences, and ideologically
rooted animosities, may thus tend to reinforce the dynamics of mutual insecu-
rity at work in the U.S.-China relationship in ways that an exclusively realist
analysis would tend to downplay or ignore.
Even though the domestic structures of the Chinese and U.S. regimes are ob-
viously profoundly different, their internal workings may be similar in certain
respects. Some liberal pessimists would argue that, just as there are groups in
China whose narrow political or bureaucratic interests may be served by a
competitive relationship with the United States, so also there may be groups in
the United States whose members believe they will gain from U.S.-China ten-
sion. Such groups will naturally be inclined to favor more confrontational poli-
cies, and they will point to each others utterances as evidence of the need for
such policies. In short, there may exist a tacit, mutually reinforcing alliance of
hawks that will make it much harder to achieve better, more stable relations.
Assessments that overlook the existence of such factors will overstate the pros-
pects for harmony between the United States and the PRC.
65
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 33
64. Regarding Chinese suspicion of engagement, see Shambaugh, Containment or Engagement
of China? pp. 206207; and Wu Xinbo, China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending
Power, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Inuences (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 132133.
65. Although his conclusions are not entirely pessimistic, David Lampton describes how domestic
Constructivist Optimists
Constructivists believe that international relationships (like all political rela-
tions) are socially constructed. The nature of the interactions between two
states is not simply the product of objective, material factors, such as the bal-
ance of trade or the balance of military power or the structure of domestic in-
stitutions. Interstate relations are also shaped to a considerable degree by
subjective factors, by the beliefs and ideas that people carry around in their
heads and that cause them to interpret events and data in particular ways. The
most important of these can be grouped into three categories: identities (i.e.,
the collective self-perceptions of political actors and their shared perceptions
of others); strategic cultures (i.e., sets of beliefs about the fundamental char-
acter of international politics and about the best ways of coping with it, espe-
cially as regards the utility of force and the prospects for cooperation); and
norms (i.e., beliefs not only about what is efcacious but also about what is
right or appropriate in the international realm).
66
Identities, strategic cultures, and norms are strongly shaped by the prevail-
ing interpretations of a societys shared historical experiences. They are trans-
mitted across generational lines by processes of education and acculturation
and, though not cast in stone, they do tend to be highly resistant to change.
The primary mechanism by which widely held beliefs evolve and are some-
times transformed is through interaction with others. Such interactions convey
new information and ideas that can help to displace prevailing conceptions.
67
Because their theoretical perspective causes them to be attentive to the po-
International Security 30:2 34
political processes in both the United States and China can make it extremely difcult for them to
improve their bilateral relationship. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, pp. 279309. A number
of analysts have emphasized the role of domestic political incentives for hard-line policies in both
countries in explaining specic incidents, such as the 199596 downturn in Sino-American rela-
tions. See, for example, Phillip C. Saunders, Chinas America Watchers: Changing Attitudes to-
wards the United States, China Quarterly, Vol. 161 (March 2000), p. 59.
66. For statements of the constructivist approach to the study of international relations, see Alex-
ander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 391425; Alexander Wendt, Con-
structing International Politics, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 7181; and
Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, Norms, Identity, and Culture in
National Security, in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 3375.
67. See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, American
Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384396.
tential malleability of social relationships, constructivists tend to be optimists.
If international politics is truly governed by scientic laws rooted in material
reality, like the laws of physics, then what people believe about how the world
works will matter only to the extent that it conforms to or deviates from reality.
Aman who chooses to step off the roof of a tall building because he prefers not
to believe in the force of gravity will nevertheless fall quickly to the ground.
Similarly, in the view of the pessimistic realists, the leader of a dominant state
who does not believe that his countrys position will be challenged by a rising
power (or who believes that such a power can be dissuaded from pursuing its
ambitions by gentle diplomacy) is destined to be disappointed. But if relations
between nations are shaped above all by beliefs, rather than objective material
factors, there is always the possibility that people can change the world by
changing how they think. At the most general level, constructivists assert that
international politics tends to be competitive and violent, not because some
immutable principles of human behavior require that it be so but rather be-
cause, across the centuries, national leaders have tended to believe this to be
the case. By acting in accordance with their pessimistic expectations, leaders
have helped to make them come true. As Alexander Wendt puts it, Realism is
a self-fullling prophecy.
68
Provided that it was widely shared among the
worlds most powerful nations, a more optimistic assessment of the prospects
for, and benets of, international cooperation could achieve similar status.
As regards the U.S.-China relationship, optimistic constructivists generally
emphasize the possibility that Chinas increasing participation in international
institutions of various kinds will lead to shifts in its strategic culture, in the
norms of international behavior accepted by its leaders, and ultimately in their
conceptions of national identity. In contrast to liberal optimists, who stress the
role of institutions in altering the narrow cost-benet calculations of rational
decisionmakers, constructivists believe that repeated interactions can actually
change the underlying beliefs, interests, and mental categories of those who
participate in them. Thus it may be true that some signicant fraction of
Chinas rulers are still in the grips of old-fashioned ideas about the zero-sum
character of international relations and about the potential utility of deception,
surprise, and force in resolving interstate disputes. These ideas may appear to
be deeply rooted in traditional Chinese statecraft, as passed down in ancient
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 35
68. Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It, p. 410.
texts, taught in military academies, and absorbed through the skin, as it were,
by anyone raised in Chinese culture. But what Iain Johnston has referred to as
the parabellum paradigm can be softened over time by repeated contacts be-
tween Chinese statesmen, scholars, and soldiers and their less fatalistic foreign
counterparts.
69
Optimistic constructivists believe that it was exactly these
types of interactions between Soviet and Western scientists and arms control
experts that helped to alter the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s and
to bring the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion.
70
A similar process of exter-
nally induced intellectual evolution is certainly possible in China and indeed,
in the view of some optimists, it may already be well under way.
At the same time as Chinas strategic culture is shifting, its leaders may be
moving toward a much broader embrace of what are essentially liberal norms
and expectations regarding international behavior. Again, the mechanism at
work here is not merely a calculation of material benets but a process of so-
cialization that reects Chinas profound desire to be accepted as a modern,
advanced country and a citizen in good standing of the world community. Ac-
cording to Johnston and coauthor Paul Evans, Chinas recent willingness to en-
ter into multilateral international institutions such as the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty reects the fact that its leaders are becoming more sensitive to so-
cial incentives and more fearful of appearing to be the pariah.
71
Whereas
only a few years ago Chinas rulers would have shunned participation in inter-
national institutions in the belief that it would impose unacceptable con-
straints on their freedom of action, today they are increasingly ready, even
eager to join up. Participation and norm change are thus mutually reinforcing
mechanisms: the more deeply embedded China becomes in the web of re-
gional and global institutions, the more the beliefs and expectations of its lead-
ers will come to conform to the emerging universal consensus that those
institutions embody.
72
International Security 30:2 36
69. This is the term that Alastair Iain Johnston uses to describe the long-standing, dominant Chi-
nese approach to the conduct of international affairs. See Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Cul-
ture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
Regarding the persistence of realism in China, see also Thomas J. Christensen, Chinese Realpoli-
tik, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 3752.
70. See, for example, Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the
Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
71. Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, Chinas Engagement with Multilateral Security Insti-
tutions, in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China, p. 265.
72. For a careful assessment of what he describes as Chinas gradually increasing comfort level
with regional security institutions, see Alastair Iain Johnston, The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Ex-
Constructivist Pessimists
Optimistic constructivists hope that repeated interactions with the outside
world will cause the beliefs of Chinas leaders and its people to evolve in ways
that are conducive to and, indeed, productive of, long-term improvements in
U.S.-PRC relations. But there is no reason why this must necessarily be the
case and several reasons to fear that it might not be. First, as constructivists of
all types would be quick to point out, existing mental constructs and the social
structures to which they give rise are deeply rooted.
73
Even under the best of
conditions, positive change is likely to be a long time in coming; it may be the
product of years, even decades of dialogue and exchange. In the meantime it
may well be, as Thomas Berger claims, that the chief source of instability in
[Asia] today lies in the peculiar construction of national identity and interest
on the part of the chief regional actors.
74
Scholars have noted the intensity
and persistence of the hostile images that Chinese and Korean observers have
of Japan.
75
The mutual perceptions of Americans and Chinese are not nearly so
problematic, at least at present. As has already been noted, however, there is a
signicant measure of suspicion on both sides. Pending some truly dramatic
shift in the character of the Chinese regime, many Americans are likely to con-
tinue to regard it as illegitimate and potentially dangerous and to see them-
selves as the defenders of freedom in Asia. Unless the United States draws
back from its present position of preponderance in the region or simply
changes its policies on Taiwan, many Chinese are likely to continue to regard it
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 37
plaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum, in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane,
and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 287324. For a general argument about the role of institu-
tions and dialogue in promoting the evolution of security practices throughout Asia, see
Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations, in Alagappa,
Asian Security Practice, pp. 611676.
73. Indeed, as Wendt notes, Sometimes social structures so constrain action that transformative
strategies are impossible. Wendt, Constructing International Politics, p. 80.
74. Thomas Berger, Set for Stability? Prospects for Conict and Cooperation in East Asia, Review
of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July 2000), p. 420.
75. See, for example, Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1986); Robert Manning, Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in
the Emerging International System, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 4558;
and Nicholas D. Kristof, The Problem of Memory, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/
December 1998), pp. 3749. See also Gerrit Gong, ed., Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War
and Peace in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996).
as an intrusive bully and to see themselves as the aggrieved victims of yet an-
other aggressive foreign power.
Repeated interaction can erode old identities and transform existing social
structures, but it can also reinforce them. Indeed, as Wendt notes, the tendency
of any structure of beliefs and expectations, once established, is to become an
objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others.
Thus, in situations characterized by intense competition and minimal trust,
self-denying gestures intended to reduce tensions are prone to misinterpreta-
tion or exploitation, thereby making them less likely to be repeated. Partici-
pants in an established social system may also have a strong desire to maintain
relatively stable role identities, in part because of the psychological need to
minimize uncertainty and anxiety. Frequent contact with others, especially
those who challenge existing identities, can lead to perceptions of threat and
these may cause resistance to transformations of the self and thus to social
change.
76
It is not difcult to imagine how such processes might be at work in the cur-
rent U.S.-China relationship. Ritualized U.S. criticism of the PRCs human
rights practices probably reinforces the impression that the United States seeks
to undermine the current Chinese regime. Repeated instances of what the
United States regards as cheating or evasion on agreements intended to limit
the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction give credence to
the view that Chinese and U.S. interests on this important issue do not truly
coincide. And despite all that has been claimed for them, there is no guarantee
that repeated contacts between U.S. and Chinese military ofcers will build
trust or make either side regard the other as less threatening.
77
In addition to regular, sustained, and institutionalized contact, existing be-
liefs can be shaped, and sometimes either transformed or strongly reinforced,
by more dramatic forms of interaction. Intense, often unanticipated crises, in
particular, can be dening moments that leave people on one side or the other
(or both) convinced that those they are confronting are good (or bad), friends
(or foes). So, for example, the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Serbia in 1999 during the Kosovo conict may appear, in retrospect, as one
such moment. Future historians may come to regard it as a critical turning
International Security 30:2 38
76. Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It, p. 411.
77. See the discussion of U.S. suspicions in David Shambaugh, Sino-American Strategic Rela-
tions: From Partners to Competitors, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 110.
point at which a rising generation of Chinese leaders were conrmed in their
realpolitik view of the world; militant, assertive forms of nationalism began to
dominate Chinese political discourse; and public perceptions of the United
States became harsher and less favorable.
78
Such negative shifts in attitude are
not inevitable, but they are possible. A hardening of hostile images and atti-
tudes would make it that much more difcult to steer U.S.-China relations
onto a peaceful path, whatever the objective balance of factors and forces
might be.
Synthesis
Each of the six sets of arguments reviewed here and summarized in Table 1 is
at least supercially plausible; each is logical and can be bolstered with empiri-
cal evidence from contemporary U.S.-China relations or from the history of
great power politics. It may be, in fact, that each of the six positions surveyed
captures some aspect of reality and that most, and perhaps all, of the causal
mechanisms that they describe are at work simultaneously. The real questions
concern the comparative strength and combined effects of those mechanisms.
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 39
78. Similarly, the April 2001 EP-3 incident, in which the crew of a downed U.S. spy plane was de-
tained for several days by the Chinese authorities, appears at least temporarily to have had a
strong negative impact on perceptions in each country. See Craig S. Smith, Chinese Youths Adopt
a Darkening View of U.S., New York Times, April 22, 2001; and Poll Shows Americans Think Less
of China after Spy Plane Incident, CNN.com, April 23, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/04/
23/poll.china.us/index.html.
Table 1. Optimists, Pessimists, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations
Theorists Optimists Pessimists
Liberals Interdependence
Institutions
Democratization
PRC regime:
Authoritarian/insecure
The perils of transition
U.S. regime:
A crusading democracy
Interactive effects
Realists PRC power: limited
PRC aims: constrained
Security dilemma: muted
PRC power: rising
PRC aims: expanding
Security dilemma: intense
Constructivists Identities, strategic cultures, norms: flexible
and softening via institutional contact
Rigid and hardening via
shocks and crises
A simple physical metaphor can help in thinking through this issue. The
contemporary U.S.-China relationship is clearly mixed, consisting of an array
of cooperative and competitive elements. At any given moment, the relation-
ship can be pictured as residing somewhere along a spectrum that extends
from pure cooperation at one extreme to unrestrained competition and conict
at the other.
There are causal forces at work today that are pushing the relationship to-
ward conict (those identied by the pessimists) and other, countervailing
forces (emphasized by the optimists) that, operating alone, would tend to pro-
mote peace. The future of the U.S.-China relationship will be determined by
the collision between these two opposing sets of forces; where matters stand in
ten or twenty years will depend either on the relative strength of those two
causal vectors over time or on the shifting size and direction of the resultant
vector that is produced by their collision. In Figure 1, by way of illustration,
the forces tending toward cooperation are pictured as stronger than those that
point toward competition. As a result, the relationship improves with the pas-
sage of time, moving from a state in which the competitive aspects dominate
(x
t
) to one in which there is a larger element of cooperation (x
t 1
).
How might the assortment of causal mechanisms discussed earlier combine
to shape the future of U.S.-China relations? There are three broad categories of
answers to this question. I discuss each briey below, concluding with the one
that, for reasons I suggest later, seems the most plausible.
simple preponderance
The rst possibility is the one asserted or implied by the advocates of what
might be termed simple paradigmatic preponderance. Such individuals
(usually either liberal optimists or realist pessimists) believe that the mecha-
nisms they have identied are so powerful as to outweigh the effects of any
International Security 30:2 40
Figure 1. Contending Causal Forces
other forces, whether opposing or reinforcing. Thus a true realist pessimist
would argue that, assuming Chinas power continues to grow, the PRC will be
led inevitably into conict with the United States, regardless of whatever
changes may occur in the character of its domestic regime. The mutual hostili-
ties and suspicions that liberal and constructivist pessimists point to as con-
tributing causes to possible conict are, in this view, mere by-products of the
shifting power relations between the United States and the PRC; they lack in-
dependent causal signicance. The allegedly peace-producing mechanisms
emphasized by the optimists, on the other hand, are, at best, weak reeds and
more likely illusions. Optimistic realists who believe that Chinas ambitions
will be limited (assuming, again, that the PRCs power grows), or who put
their faith in the possibility that geography or technology (or arms control
treaties) can mute the security dilemma, are misguided and perhaps should
not even be considered realists. As in the past, the liberal panaceas of interna-
tional trade and institutions will prove insufcient to keep the peace between
contending great powers. The notion that dialogue between U.S. and Chinese
government ofcials will lead to a convergence of norms, identities, and strate-
gic cultures is laughable, if not downright dangerous. To return to Figure 1, if
these assertions are correct, the vector pointing toward conict will be far
larger than the one opposing it, and it will derive most, if not all, of its strength
from the causal forces identied by the realist pessimists.
A thoroughgoing liberal optimist would follow a similarly linear chain of
reasoning to arrive at opposite conclusions. Thus even as China becomes
wealthy and powerful, the attractive force of shared economic interests and
the soothing effects of institutional integration will be sufcient to forestall any
prospect of direct conict. Chinas inevitable transition to democracy will ef-
fectively eliminate the possibility of a U.S.-PRC war and smooth the way for a
lasting accommodation between the two great powers. All the forces that
might seem to oppose this development will appear in retrospect to have been
weak and, in the grand sweep of history, insignicant.
additive effects
A second possibility is that the future will be determined by the combined ef-
fects of similarly aligned causal forces. Thus, the deepest and most fundamen-
tal cause of an emerging U.S.-China competition may well be the kind of raw
power political competition emphasized by the realist pessimists. As has been
suggested, however, the dynamics of power politics can be amplied by other
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 41
types of forces that fall outside the realists ken. As some liberal pessimists
suggest, the evolution of the U.S.-PRC relationship may be strongly shaped by
ideological factors. Certainly if China were a liberal democracy instead of a
one-party authoritarian state, it would be easier to imagine that Americans
would not feel as threatened by a continuing expansion in its national power.
For as long as they persist, the differences in ideology and regime type that
presently separate the United States and China will make it far more difcult
for the two countries leaders to work out some kind of mutually acceptable
modus vivendi. The reinforcement of hostile images and opposing identities
that pessimistic constructivists worry about could also play a critical role in
this process. If Americans or Chinese (or both) become convinced that their
counterparts are implacably hostile and that conict is therefore inevitable,
they will no doubt act in ways that make it far more likely.
The factors stressed by the different brands of optimism could also act in
mutually reinforcing ways. It may be the case, for example, that the processes
of economic growth, institutional entanglement, and domestic liberalization
on which liberal optimists pin their hopes will exert profound, albeit gradual,
effects on U.S.-China relations. The softening of strategic cultures and the nor-
mative convergence that optimistic constructivists believe to be possible could
also take years, if not decades, to make their impact felt. In the meantime,
however, if Chinas power grows relatively slowly, if its ambitions stay
constrained, and if the security dilemma is muted, the prospects for direct con-
frontation with the United States could remain limited. Absent the mecha-
nisms identied by the realist optimists, the prospects for peace might not be
very good, especially in the near term; once they are factored into the equation,
the chances for an eventual stable, cooperative outcome appear much better. In
this case, the vector pointing toward peace will be the product of several con-
tributing forces, and it will be all the more potent as a result.
offsetting effects
There is, nally, the strong possibility that, in addition to amplifying one an-
other in certain respects, some of the forces catalogued above will prove to be
mutually offsetting. The future of U.S.-China relations is likely to be deter-
mined, in short, by what John Lewis Gaddis calls the fratricide of contradic-
International Security 30:2 42
79. Gaddis, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, p. 44.
tory tendencies as well as the convergence of complementary ones.
79
Indeed,
it may be the case that the two opposing vectors pictured in Figure 1 are now
of roughly equal strength and that they will remain so for some time to come.
If so, then the fundamentally mixed character of the U.S.-China relationship
will not change very much, perhaps oscillating within a fairly narrow range,
with periodic shifts toward greater cooperation or increased competition, but
without a clear trend in either direction. This is a plausible characterization of
the course of events since 1989, and there are reasons to believe that the pat-
tern will be sustained in the immediate future and perhaps well beyond.
In the near term, as in the recent past, the competition-inducing mechanisms
identied by the pessimists will continue to exert a strong inuence. The two
most important factors on this side of the equation will be the rate of growth of
Chinas material power and the developmental trajectory of its domestic polit-
ical institutions. If the PRC continues to grow wealthier and stronger without
signicant political liberalization, the tendencies toward competition with the
United States will remain and will likely become more intense, amplied by
the workings of the security dilemma, by mutual, ideologically rooted fear and
suspicion, and, perhaps, by the expanding ambitions of Chinas autocratic rul-
ers. Even without a major, transformative crisis, under such circumstances
hostile images of the other side could become more pervasive in both societies,
and the domestic political incentives for tougher, more confrontational policies
may also grow.
Fortunately, a number of the factors to which the optimists point seem likely
to continue to act as a brake on what might otherwise be an unchecked slide
toward mounting competition and increasingly open confrontation. Assuming
that they persist and grow, the mutual gains from an expanding economic rela-
tionship will remain the single most important peace-inducing force at work in
U.S.-China relations. The potential costs of a conict between the two powers,
especially given that both possess nuclear weapons, should also help to keep
competitive impulses within bounds and to make both sides very wary of em-
barking on any course that could risk direct conict. The emergence of a group
of Chinese new thinkers could also contribute to a less zero-sum, hard real-
politik approach to relations with the United States. As with the Soviet Union
during the era of perestroika, so also in this case changes in high-level thinking
could have a calming effect on bilateral relations, even if they were not accom-
panied immediately by more profound and far-reaching domestic political
reforms.
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 43
The collision between these opposing sets of forces will produce a U.S.-
China relationship that continues to be characterized by constrained, or
bounded, competition. As they do today, the two countries will trade, talk, and
cooperate on some issues, but they will still regard each other with profound
mistrust, maneuvering for diplomatic advantage and developing their military
capabilities with an eye toward a possible future confrontation. This kind of
ambivalent situation will be different from those the United States has gener-
ally had to deal with over the past half century, a period during which the
world tended to be divided neatly between major U.S. allies and economic
partners, on the one hand, and open enemies (with whom the United States
traded and talked relatively little, if at all), on the other. Mixed relations are,
however, far more typical of the history of great power politics.
Could the competition-enhancing tendencies inherent in the growth of
Chinas wealth and power eventually be overcome by the cooperation-
inducing tendencies produced by the liberalization of its domestic political
system? This is a possibility, but it is by no means a certainty. If the realist pes-
simist purists are right, the policies pursued by a rising, democratic China will
not differ greatly from those of a rising, authoritarian state. Even if this turns
out not to be the case in the long run, there may well be an uncomfortable in-
terval during which (as the liberal pessimists predict) a more open Chinese po-
litical system gives rise to more nationalistic and assertive foreign policies. In
short, relations between Washington and Beijing may worsen before they im-
prove. Navigating the dangers of a transitional period in China could well be
among the greatest geopolitical challenges facing the United States in the years
ahead.
The physical image of roughly balanced opposing forces suggests a degree
of tension and potential instability. In such circumstances a change on one side
or the other can yield dramatic, discontinuous shifts. Such possibilities exist in
the political world as well. With reference once again to the end of the U.S.-
Soviet Cold War, it is possible to imagine that a sudden breakthrough toward
domestic political reform in China could open the way for radically improved
relations with the United States. At the same time, however, it is conceivable
that an unanticipated or mismanaged crisis (over Taiwan, for example, or
North Korea, or in South Asia) could lead to the opposite result. If the United
States and China were somehow to lurch from constrained competition to di-
rect confrontation, their relationship would be transformed overnight. Trade
and diplomacy would be disrupted; hostile images would harden; domestic
International Security 30:2 44
political reform in China might be derailed; and the prospect of a genuine en-
tente between the two Pacic powers could be put off for a generation or even
more.
Here again the history of the Anglo-German relationship comes to mind. At
the turn of the twentieth century, many observers in both Britain and Germany
predicted that the two powers would be drawn together ineluctably by their
growing economic links and societal connections, by a recognition of the un-
derlying compatibility of their strategic interests, and by the eventual conver-
gence of their domestic political systems. Such hopes were eventually borne
out, of course, but only after the passage of another half century and two
horric wars. There is every reason to hope that U.S.-China relations will fol-
low a smoother and more peaceful course. But neither history nor theory can
provide any assurances that it will be so.
The Future of U.S.-China Relations 45