Scott Hickie

Chris Abbott
Raphal Zaffran
October 2014
Trends in remote-control
warfare
March-September 2014



Published by Open Briefing, 13 October 2014
Open Briefing
27 Old Gloucester Street
Bloomsbury
ondon !"1# 3$%
&nited 'ingdom
(el )44 *0+20 71,3 ,-0.
info/openbriefing0org
www.openbriefing.org

"opyright 1 Open Briefing td, 20140 Some rights reser2ed0
(his briefing is licensed under 3 "re3ti2e "ommons B45#"5#6 300 licence, 7hich 3llo7s copy 3nd
distribution for non5profit use, pro2ided the 3uthors 3nd Open Briefing 3re 3ttributed properly 3nd
the te8t is not 3ltered in 3ny 73y0

Commissioned by the Remote Control project
remotecontrolproject.org

Scott Hickie is 3 senior 3n3lyst 3t Open Briefing0 9e is 3 l37yer 3nd former politic3l 3d2iser in the
#e7 South !3les p3rli3ment0 9e h3s 7or:ed on clim3te ch3nge 3d3pt3tion for the "ity of (oronto,
3nd is currently 3 policy officer 7ith the #e7 South !3les go2ernment0
Chris Abbott is the founder 3nd ;8ecuti2e 6irector of Open Briefing0 9e is 3n 9onor3ry <isiting
=ese3rch >ello7 in the School of Soci3l 3nd ?ntern3tion3l Studies 3t the &ni2ersity of Br3dford 3nd
73s the 6eputy 6irector of O8ford =ese3rch Group until 200,0
Raphal Zaffran is 3n 3ssoci3te rese3rcher 3t Open Briefing0 9e is 3n 3n3lyst 3nd politic3l scientist
rese3rching 3nd te3ching intern3tion3l security issues0 9e is currently pursuing 3 Ph6 3t the
Gr3du3te ?nstitute of ?ntern3tion3l 3nd 6e2elopment Studies in Gene230

Open Briefing is the 7orld@s first ci2il society intelligence 3gency0 ?t is 3 uniAue not5for5profit soci3l
enterprise, 7hich pro2ides intelligence 3nd rese3rch ser2ices to ci2il society org3nis3tions 3nd
concerned citiBens0

Open Briefing td is 3 not-for-profit social enterprise run ne3rly entirely by 2olunteers0
=egistered in ;ngl3nd C !3les 3s 3 comp3ny limited by gu3r3ntee, #o0 07D4,D.D0




























ren!s in remote-control warfare

E3rch5September 2014






























Scott 9ic:ie, "hris $bbott 3nd =3ph3Fl G3ffr3n






























Contents
Preface i
I. Special operations forces 1
United States and European countries increases special operations
forces footprints across Africa 1
Significant developments in special operations forces technology 3
Russia coordinates special forces operations and cyber offensives
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine 4
II. Private military and security companies 5
rivate military and security companies play increasingly important
roles in Afghanistan and !ra" #
States attempt to regulate private military and security companies
internationally through domestic legislation $
Allegations of private military and security company use by Ukraine
and Russia play out in battle of narratives %
III. Unmanned vehicles and autonomous weapon systems 9
&ebate over unmanned aerial vehicles shifts to "uestions over
effectiveness and developing international norms '
U( bodies consider implications of lethal autonomous )eapons as
defence industry focusses on lo)er*level systems automation 1+
,roader range of states actively deploying unmanned aerial vehicles
and developing indigenous technologies 11
IV. Cyber warfare 1
United States seeks international cyber*security norms )hile
clashing )ith China over cyber espionage 13
Cyber attacks being deployed in conflicts in !srael- Syria and !ra" 1#
Cyber confrontation in Ukraine pushes (A./ to consider cyber
mutual defence doctrines 10
V. Intelli!ence" surveillance and reconnaissance 1#
(SA leaks force 1ive Eyes partners to reconfigure and 2ustify
surveillance activities 1$
&efence ministries building capabilities for information
operations across social media 1'
Subversion of encryption standards part of intelligence toolkit 3+








Preface
Remote-control warfare is an emerging military and political framework that allows for warfare to
be actioned at a distance by relying on smart technologies and light-footprint deployments, such as
armed drones and special forces. While in some respects it is more attractive than traditional
military approaches, it has two significant disadvantages. irstly, it allows actions to be approved
that would never be considered using conventional military means, yet the conse!uences and risks
of those actions are not being ade!uately considered. "econdly, it removes policymakers and
military planners one step further from the realities of war fighting for both the military operators
and civilian casualties. #owever, these downsides are being ignored as policymakers struggle to
respond to multiple conflicts and security threats around the world.
"ince $pril %&'(, )pen *riefing has produced a series of monthly intelligence briefings on remote-
control warfare. +hese briefings were commissioned by the Remote ,ontrol pro-ect, which was
initiated by the .etwork for "ocial ,hange and is hosted by )/ford Research 0roup. +hese briefings
focus on five key areas of remote-control warfare1 special operations forces 2")34 private military
and security companies 2P5",s34 unmanned vehicles and autonomous weapons systems4 cyber
warfare4 and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 26"R3. +hese are the areas that )pen
*riefing considers central to the development and application of remote-control warfare.
)ver the course of the past si/ months, it has become apparent that in some areas there is a
disconnect between civil society perception and the actual intentions and capabilities of
governments and militaries. +his is due, in part, to a lack of detailed understanding of ongoing
technological, political and doctrinal developments in certain key areas, including lethal
autonomous weapons systems and cyber warfare. )pen *riefings monthly briefings address this by
providing comprehensive but concise e/planations and analysis of such developments.
,onversely, in other areas, civil society is driving the debate and forcing governments to enact
reforms. +his is particularly so in the cases of armed drones, mercenaries and mass surveillance. 6n
such instances, )pen *riefings monthly briefings bolster civil society efforts through the provision
of timely and reliable intelligence, which allows organisations to develop more-effective advocacy
strategies.
+his publication differs from the usual monthly format in that it provides a detailed overview of the
key trends in remote-control warfare that have emerged during the period covered by the previous
five briefings 25arch to "eptember %&'(3. "uch developments include the 7nited "tates and
8uropean countries increasing their ") footprints across $frica, P5",s playing increasingly
important roles in $fghanistan and 6ra!, the debate over unmanned aerial vehicles shifting to
!uestions over effectiveness and developing international norms, the 7nited "tates seeking
international cyber-security norms while clashing with ,hina over cyber espionage, and ."$ leaks
forcing ive 8yes partners to reconfigure and -ustify their surveillance activities. +hese, and the
other events analysed in the following pages, are significant developments in remote-control
warfare that warrant the deeper look provided in this briefing.
London
22 September 2014



Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 1
Section I
Special operations forces


United States and European countries increases special operations
forces footprints across frica
The footprint of special operation forces !S"#$ across frica% especiall& in the Sahel and Sahara% has
recei'ed sustained attention o'er the last si( months% e'en as the insecurit& in Ira) and S&ria has
dominated securit& debates* Special forces from the United States and EU countries ha'e been
in'ol'ed in +e& securit& de'elopments on the continent% includin, operations trac+in, down the
-ord.s /esistance rm& in U,anda% a,reement o'er the continued US S"# presence in 01ibouti at
2amp -emonnier% pressure for S"# assistance in freein, hosta,es ta+en b& 3o+o 4aram in 5i,eria
and multiple militar& and law enforcement counterterrorism trainin, pro,rammes*
The 6uadrennial 0efence /e'iew 2014 pro'ided the domestic 1ustification for the focus of US S"#
on the Ma,hreb% Sahel and 4orn of frica*
1
The precise reasons for an increased US special
operations forces presence across these re,ions were hinted at in comments made to the New York
Times in 7une 2014 b& the commander of US Special "perations 2ommand frica% 3ri,adier 8eneral
7ames 3* -inder% who ar,ued 9frica is the battle,round of the future. and 9the future of war is
about winnin, people% not territor&.*
2
Such sentiments are indeed consistent with the operational
and tactical philosoph& of US Special "perations 2ommand !USS"2"M$* This be,s two +e&
)uestions: wh& is frica the battle,round of the future% and is S"# trainin, of indi,enous% national
forces sufficient preparation for this percei'ed future conflict:
There are clearl& re,ional dri'ers of the US preoccupation with frican securit& hotspots that are
related to the strate,ic desire to den& 1ihadist ,roups and insur,ents operational opportunities in
wea+ and failin, states and the need to se'ere the connections that are li+el& to de'elop across the
continent between such or,anisations* The US defence establishment has not for,otten "sama bin
-aden.s formati'e &ears in Sudan between 1;;1 and 1;;<% and is not +een to allow terrorist ,roups
the space to de'elop into transnational threats*
4owe'er% a more si,nificant dri'er for the United States is the opportunit& countries li+e =en&a%
U,anda% 5i,er and 01ibouti pro'ide in terms of more-accommodatin, launch pads for S"#
operations in the Middle East and Southwest sia% particularl& unmanned combat air 'ehicle !U2>$
and intelli,ence% sur'eillance and reconnaissance !IS/$ operations*

1
http:??www*defense*,o'?pubs?2014@6uadrennial@0efense@/e'iew*pdf
2
http:??www*n&times*com?2014?0<?1A?ma,aBine?can-,eneral-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-ne(t-terrorist-
threat*html
2 "pen 3riefin,
#urthermore% from a US perspecti'e% a more ,eo,raphicall&-dispersed force pro1ection and li,hter
S"# footprint ser'es as a sal'e for domestic war fati,ue and accommodates pressure for defence
spendin, austerit& after more than a decade in Ira) and f,hanistan*
number of re,ional partner ,o'ernments are pressurin, the United States% #rance and other
special forces trainin, partners% includin, 2anada and the United =in,dom% to loo+ be&ond trainin,
and +nowled,e transfer* l,eria% Mali% U,anda% 5i,eria% 5i,er% 01ibouti and =en&a ha'e all shown a
desire for ,reater access to US and European militar& and securit& e)uipment% with l,eria.s re)uest
for US unmanned aerial 'ehicles !U>s$ the most public* #urthermore% a number of frican countries
ha'e lon, ad'ocated for ,reater fle(ibilit& on usin, aid bud,ets for securit&% and ha'e ardentl&
rebu+ed critics who su,,est too much national re'enue is spent on militar& procurement and
securit&*
4owe'er% pro'idin, e)uipment that creates an independent indi,enous capabilit& presents a
si,nificant ris+ for some US and European militar& planners and securit& polic&ma+ersC there are%
after all% numerous e(amples of the allies of toda& becomin, the enemies of tomorrow* #or special
operations forces trainers% there is also a si,nificant difference between mission support and
temporar& access to technolo,& and the full-scale transfer of S"# e)uipment to local partner
countries*
The challen,e is that e'en the li,ht-footprint approach is limited b& resources% and indi,enous
special operations forces and law enforcement a,encies will be without US or European support at
times* Dithout modern weapons% e)uipment and technolo,&% man& local forces will lose an&
strate,ic ad'anta,e o'er domestic militant ,roups* The failure of US counterterrorism trainin, for
the Malian militar& due to problems around e)uipment pro'ision and lon,-term en,a,ement with
S"# trainin, is a prime e(ample of this*
Some countries ma& not be in a position to demand ,reater support from their US and European
S"# trainin, partners% and will ,ladl& accept an& assistance on offer to confront terrorism and
insur,enc&* "thers% such as 5i,er% 5i,eria and U,anda% will li+el& de'elop hi,her e(pectations of
what their forei,n partners should be deli'erin,* These ele'ated e(pectations will come at a time
when Ira) and S&ria will be ta+in, up more and more US and European S"# resources* The decisions
o'er where to allocate limited S"# resources will clearl& be ta+en in li,ht of Destern securit&
concerns not frican% and will li+el& mean frican countries will continue to stru,,le to ade)uatel&
confront insur,ent and terrorist ,roups within their borders*

Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 3
Si,nificant de'elopments in special operations forces technolo,&
The emer,in, technolo,ies de'eloped for special operations forces use pro'ide an insi,ht into the
future force capabilities militar& planners desire in li,ht of pro1ected conflict theatre needs* In Ma&
2014% the then commander of US Special "perations 2ommand Europe !S"2EU/$% Ma1or 8eneral
3rad Debb% ,a'e stron, indications that +e& areas of need for US S"# were in intelli,ence-,atherin,
and communication s&stems that can withstand the e(treme climatic conditions of frica and the
rctic*
E

There is an undoubtedl& stron, focus on intelli,ence collection tools* /ecent e(amples include
ad'anced satellite communications% impro'ed ,eo,raphic information s&stem !8IS$ data on
intelli,ence blind spots and enhanced sensiti'e site e(ploitation !SSE$ biometric and 05 testin,
techni)ues* The new capabilities are 'er& much ,eared towards hi,hl&-tar,eted% micro-scale conflict%
includin, tar,etin, indi'iduals% and are li+el& desi,ned to ,ain ad'anta,e o'er non-state actors who
emplo& non-con'entional means* The e(pandin, focus on biometrics and SSE% which ha'e been
widel& used in f,hanistan% is becomin, an important component of identit& dominance% emplo&ed
b& special operations forces as a means to undermine the anon&mit& of terrorist and criminal
networ+s*
2ombat hardware has not% howe'er% been for,otten in this rush of inno'ation across intelli,ence
and communications technolo,&* #rench compan& >a&lon is de'elopin, a combination han, ,lider-
dune bu,,& for #rench special forces after a need for stealthier air transport was identified durin,
missions in Somalia* The US 0efence d'anced /esearch Fro1ects ,enc& !0/F$ has funded
research on a h&brid-powered motorbi+e to assist special operations forces to penetrate remote
areas and stealthil& e(ecute rapid raids in e(treme terrain conditions and contested en'ironments*
USS"2"M.s GH0 million Tactical ssault -i,ht "perators Suit !T-"S$ effort% collo)uiall& referred to
as the new .Iron Man. suit% has captured the public ima,ination* 4owe'er% )uestions about the
pro,ramme from the US 4ouse rmed Ser'ices 2ommittee su,,est that the h&pe around T-"S is
un1ustified and that the suit will not be useful across a broad ran,e of battlefield scenarios*
"ne of the most si,nificant de'elopments in US S"# capabilities is the con'ersion of the maritime
support 'essel M> 2ra,side into a special operations base for up to 200 troops* Such a maritime
base% to,ether with the increased le'el of trainin, of US special operations forces commands in
amphibious operations !endin, the historical monopol& of this area b& US 5a'& SE-s$% will pro'ide
substantial fle(ibilit& for US S"# operations% particularl& in the Middle East and 5orth frica* The
con'ersion of maritime support 'essels or container ships to S"# maritime bases could lessen the
dependence of special operations forces on aircraft carriers and terrestrial bases% and therefore
sidestep host countr& support* It would also increase the arra& of manned and unmanned aircraft
a'ailable for S"# missions under certain circumstances% as some ma& pre'iousl& ha'e been
inappropriate due to ran,e limitations*

E
http:??www*e(ecuti'e,o'*com?2014?0A?special-ops-leaders-outline-troop-re)uirements-for-intell-,atherin,?
4 "pen 3riefin,
/ussia coordinates special forces operations and c&ber offensi'es in
2rimea and eastern U+raine
/ussia.s anne(ation of 2rimea and elements of their on,oin, acti'it& in eastern U+raine has
re'ealed the importance of SpetsnaB !special purpose forces$ to /ussia.s force pro1ection* Indeed%
/ussian Fresident >ladimir Futin.s strate,& in U+raine can be characterised as somethin, closer to
paramilitar& co'ert action than wholesale militar& attac+* Unconfirmed reports su,,est that se'eral
hundred members of the 4Ath 8uards SpetsnaB /e,iment !a special reconnaissance unit within
/ussian irborne Troops% >0>$ went into 2rimea without insi,nia and attempted to ,arner enou,h
support for a ci'ilian-led popular uprisin, I or at least the appearance of it* Their acti'ities are
thou,ht to ha'e included bribin, +e& institutional fi,ureheads% acti'atin, local pro-/ussian militias%
co'ertl& mo'in, weapons and co-optin, some of the 2A%000 U+rainian militar& personnel based in
2rimea*
The tactics used in 2rimea and eastern U+raine are not dissimilar to those /ussia applied somewhat
more haphaBardl& durin, their 200H war with 8eor,ia% where the& were mi(ed with tried and tested
So'iet-st&le strate,ic operations used effecti'el& durin, their conflict in f,hanistan in the 1;H0s* In
2rimea% the principle of maskirovka I camoufla,e or denial and deception I allowed /ussia to
maintain a de,ree of plausible deniabilit& and swiftl& carr& out the operation before 5T"% the
European Union and the United States could properl& respond* s such% the SpetsnaB units
demonstrated an abilit& to carr& out politicall&-sensiti'e operations*
Dhat is different in 2rimea and eastern U+raine is the coordination of special forces operations and
c&ber offensi'es* Dhile c&ber offensi'es b& /ussia and non-state actors did not in'ol'e full-scale
c&ber warfare% distributed denial-of-ser'ice !00oS$ attac+s and the Sna+e malware disrupted
U+rainian communication networ+s and enabled si,nificant /ussian sur'eillance of those networ+s*
It is not clear how SpetsnaB troops le'era,ed this intelli,enceC howe'er% the timin, of
confrontations with U+rainian soldiers and the isolatin, of those soldiers from =ie' 'ia the bloc+in,
of communications would su,,est a le'el of cooperation between /ussian c&ber offensi'es and
special forces operations*
The emer,in, importance to /ussia of coordinatin, special operations forces with c&ber operations
is e'ident in a 7une 2014 2ollecti'e Securit& Treat& "r,anisation !2ST"$ announcement% which
noted that the or,anisation was creatin, 1oint special operations force to counteract c&ber attac+s
and use special means to intercept si,nals and information messa,es*
4
It ma& also in'ol'e
information and ps&cholo,ical operations subdi'isions* 2TS".s preeminent member% /ussia% is hi,hl&
li+el& to ha'e used the announcement as strate,ic counter response to recent 5T" c&ber-
preparedness acti'ities% which were rein'i,orated b& the /ussian occupation of 2rimea and its c&ber
campai,ns a,ainst U+raine*

4
http:??www*eurasianet*or,?node?<HJA1
Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 5
Section II
Fri'ate militar& and securit& companies


Fri'ate militar& and securit& companies pla& increasin,l& important
roles in f,hanistan and Ira)
The upcomin, drawdown of international forces from f,hanistan has been challen,ed on se'eral
fronts durin, the past si( months* Specificall&% two ma1or de'elopments% namel& the dela&ed
finalisation of the bilateral securit& a,reement !3S$ and the disputed presidential election% are
li+el& to contribute to the creation of a political and securit& 'acuum* s such% it li+el& that pri'ate
militar& and securit& companies !FMS2s$ will continue to pla& a central and increasin,l& important
role in f,hanistan past the 0ecember 2014 mar+*
The supremac& of FMS2s in conflict and post-conflict situations is also apparent in Ira)% where
securit& has deteriorated si,nificantl& with the ad'ent of the Islamic State* In #ebruar& 2014% the
Wall Street Journal reported that A%000 contractors were wor+in, in Ira) as intelli,ence anal&sts%
securit& ,uards and militar& trainers or in ci'ilian 1obs% such as translators and coo+s*
A
8i'en the
current securit& situation and the imminent threat posed b& the Islamic State% it is hi,hl& li+el& that
contractors will continue to ta+e on +e& securit& responsibilities in Ira) durin, the ne(t few months*
#or one thin,% FMS2s ha'e the ad'anta,e of bein, readil&-a'ailable militar& resources% with
personnel not needin, to be recruited or trained*
"'erall% e'ents durin, the past si( months su,,est two +e& and interlin+ed trends* #irst% FMS2s are
further consolidatin, their presence in fra,ile settin,s% where ,o'ernments are unwillin, or unable
to pro'ide troops and supplies* Second% national ,o'ernments% and especiall& the United States%
ha'e contributed to the pre'alence of FMS2s b& hea'il& rel&in, on them for a si,nificant proportion
of their militar& missions abroad% includin, securit&% post-conflict reconstruction and trainin, duties*
n pril report from the Special Inspector 8eneral for f,hanistan /econstruction !SI8/$
confirmed this o'erreliance with the disclosure that <;K of the G4 billion the US state department
spent on reconstruction pro1ects in f,hanistan from 2002 to March 201E went to a sin,le pri'ate
militar& contractor% 0&n2orp*
<

Ultimatel&% FMS2s prosper in those countries presentin, particularl& wea+ and unstable structural
conditions% includin, a contested ,o'ernment and unclear 1urisdiction o'er forei,n soldiers% and
particularl& fra,ile settin,s% includin, lo&alt& and desertion issues within a new national arm&%
deepl&-embedded ethnic issues and securit& 'acuums created b& an out,oin, inter'enin, force*

A
http:??online*ws1*com?news?articles?S3100014240A2J02E04HA1104AJ;E<11J0141J0A420
<
http:??www*si,ar*mil?pdf?specialK20pro1ects?SI8/-14-4;-SF*pdf
6 "pen 3riefin,
The apparent trends that ,o'ernments are increasin,l& rel&in, on FMS2s and that FMS2s are
successful in fra,ile settin,s su,,est that Ira)is and f,hans are li+el& to see lar,e numbers of
pri'ate securit& contractors on their soils for the foreseeable future* This poses a number of issues*
8i'en e(istin, le,islati'e ,aps and the difficulties inherent to the tas+ of prosecutin, pri'ate
securit& contractors% FMS2s tend to operate with impunit&% which can be hi,hl& destabilisin, for
post-conflict countries that are slowl& reco'erin, from &ears of fi,htin, and the presence of forei,n
militaries* Foliticall&% the predominance of FMS2s in Ira) and f,hanistan is thereb& li+el& to
undermine the democratic process and ,o'ernment accountabilit&% while wea+enin, formal securit&
actors% such as the f,han 5ational rm& and the national police*
#rom a securit& standpoint% lea'in, FMS2s as central securit& pro'iders in Ira) and f,hanistan is
also problematic* 8i'en the business-oriented nature of FMS2s% securit& will li+el& become
concentrated on those areas of political or financial importance where securit& contracts are
a'ailable% such as re,ional capitals and the oil producin, re,ions% thus lea'in, other areas
completel& at the merc& of armed ,roups dri'en b& political% ethnic or ideolo,ical a,endas% such as
the returnin, Taliban and e(tremists ,roups li+e al-6aeda and the Islamic State* This would further
threaten the alread& fra,ile territorial inte,rit& of both Ira) and f,hanistan* If the Dest deserts
both f,hanistan and Ira)% this could lea'e FMS2s as the sole forei,n securit& pro'iders attemptin,
to fend off e(tremist ,roups alon,side host countries. militaries*
In f,hanistan% US Fresident 3arac+ "bama has declared that unless the f,han ,o'ernment si,ns
the 3S% the United States will pull all its troops out of the countr& b& the end of 2014* US e(it
strate,ies ha'e tended to rel& hea'il& on pri'ate contractors in order to protect its troops durin,
withdrawal processes* 8i'en that it was the out,oin, president% 4amid =arBai% who had refused to
si,n the 3S% f,hanistan.s presidential election ,enerated considerable hope for new be,innin,s*
4owe'er% the election was contested b& both second-round candidates% bdullah bdullah and
shraf 8hani% amid accusations of widespread fraud* 3oth candidates ha'e a,reed to abide b& the
outcome of the internationall&-super'ised recount% and ha'e promised to form somethin, a+in to a
unit& ,o'ernment* E'en if a unit& ,o'ernment were to be formed% it will ha'e to deal with the
presence of FMS2s on f,han soil% wor+in, not onl& in securit& 1obs but also contracted b&
diplomatic missions and for ci'il reconstruction efforts*
In Ira)% despite apparent unit& amon, international actors on the need to address the spread of the
Islamic State% it is li+el& that an& inter'ention will onl& in'ol'e limited airstri+es and not troops* s a
result% FMS2s are bound to pla& a role in on-the-,round securit& duties% possibl& alon,side limited
numbers of special operations forces and 2I operati'es*
Ultimatel&% the ,radual withdrawal of international forces will undoubtedl& create a securit&
'acuum% which is li+el& to benefit pri'ate militar& and securit& companies* Dhile such companies
ha'e a role to pla&% ,o'ernments will ha'e to miti,ate their influence% especiall& when it comes to
securit& pro'ision*

Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 7
States attempt to re,ulate pri'ate militar& and securit& companies
internationall& throu,h domestic le,islation
There ha'e been continuous efforts o'er the last si( months to better re,ulate FMS2s% both
nationall& and internationall&* The Montreux Document of 1J September 200H is one of the first
a,reements definin, how international law applies to the acti'ities of FMS2s in conflict Bones*
J

Since 200H% +e& sta+eholders% such as SwitBerland and the International 2ommittee of the /ed
2ross% ha'e been attemptin, to stren,then the a,reement b& pushin, states to ta+e measures so
that their national practices compl& with international law* Such efforts ha'e also ta+en place within
U5-or,anised wor+in, ,roups and forums*
In the United States% the US 4ouse of /epresentati'es passed the 201A 5ational 0efence
uthorisation ct !50$% which aims to impro'e the US defence department.s use% mana,ement
and o'ersi,ht of pri'ate contractors in frica* The 50 is an attempt b& US lawma+ers to ta+e
measures at home in order to constrain the influence and impunit& of those pri'ate securit&
companies it contracts abroad% particularl& in the Sahel and 5orth frica but also in Ira) and
f,hanistan* In contrast% South frican Fresident 7acob Luma has been dela&in, si,nin, an
amendment to his countr&.s Fri'ate Securit& Industr& /e,ulation ct !FSI/$* The amendment
in'ol'es far-reachin, international conse)uences for the re,ulation of FMS2s throu,h domestic
le,islation% as it will compel forei,n securit& pro'iders to hand o'er A1K of their businesses to
South frican citiBens* 4owe'er% it ris+s 1eopardisin, the renewal of the United States. frican
8rowth and "pportunities ct !8"$% desi,ned to assist the economies of sub-Saharan frica and
to impro'e economic relations between the United States and the re,ion*
In earl& 7une% a seminar was or,anised in Sene,al in order to help increase the number of states
supportin, the Montreux Document while offerin, a platform for discussion for all concerned parties
to e(chan,e best practices in the re,ulation of FMS2s in sub-Saharan frica*
H
Two ma1or challen,es
in the e(ecution of the Montreux Document appeared* #irst% it is crucial that a lar,e arra& of states
and companies be represented at such meetin,s for the document.s pro'isions to appl& effecti'el&%
as institutionalisation and institutional pressure are usuall& best at compellin, states to appl&
international le,al measures* Second% in the absence of authorit& abo'e their own ,o'ernments%
states are otherwise li+el& to fail to implement the document.s re,ulator& measures nationall&%
which defeats the o'erall document.s efforts*
The trend towards attempts to re,ulate FMS2s internationall& throu,h domestic le,islation
su,,ests that international re,ulator& efforts ha'e not been entirel& satisfactor& when it comes to
implementation phases* The Montreux Document is a seminal a,reement but is li+el& to become
obsolete if it does not continue to increase its support from states and companies* The ,reatest
dan,er to the a,reement comes from the ineffecti'e domestic implementation of the measures it
promotes% due to political unwillin,ness or inade)uate monitorin, and o'ersi,ht mechanisms*

J
https:??www*icrc*or,?en,?assets?files?other?icrc@002@0;;<*pdf
H
https:??www*icrc*or,?en,?resources?documents?news-release?2014?0<-04-sene,al-seminaire-entreprises-militaires-
securite-pri'ees*htm
8 "pen 3riefin,
lle,ations of pri'ate militar& and securit& compan& use b& U+raine and
/ussia pla& out in battle of narrati'es
"'er the past si( months% there has been much contro'ers& and accusations from both sides o'er
the alle,ed presence of pri'ate militar& and securit& companies in the U+rainian conflict* Each side
uses the supposed use of FMS2s and mercenaries b& the other side as propa,anda to discredit one
another* This su,,ests a 'er& interestin, dimension of FMS2s: the 'er& essence of FMS2s seems to
be at odds with the nationalistic and ethnic nature of the conflict% and their use is percei'ed as
unpatriotic* The& are seen as the last resort of cowards% and their use dele,itimises each side in the
e&es of the other* 3& and lar,e% the alle,ed presence of FMS2s in U+raine has led to a battle of
narrati'es between =ie' and the =remlin% in which both sides ha'e attempted to frame the use of
FMS2s as means to discredit the other side.s patriotism and le,itimac&*
Specificall&% =ie' was accused of contractin, US pri'ate militar& compan& 8re&stone to tac+le pro-
/ussian dissent in eastern U+raine* The former subsidiar& of 3lac+water?Me Ser'ices !now cademi$
is +nown to ha'e completed contracts in /ussia and 2entral sia but denied deplo&ments in U+raine*
In turn% there were suspicions that the unmar+ed troops who seiBed Se'astopol and Simferopol
airports in 2rimea in #ebruar& 2014 were from the Vnevedomstvenaya Okhrana% a )uasi-pri'ate force
within the /ussian interior ministr&* #urthermore% the Serbian authorities ha'e estimated that
doBens of Serbian nationals ha'e also been fi,htin, on both sides of the conflict in U+raine% with
Serbian Frime Minister le+sandar >ucic stressin, that in most cases these fi,hters are mercenaries
fi,htin, for mone& rather than ideolo,&*
"n 1J 7ul& 2014% the European parliament passed a resolution praisin, U+rainian Fresident Fetro
Foroshen+o.s 1A-point peace plan% which included the need to withdraw mercenaries from U+rainian
territor&* Foroshen+o has also offered amnest& to those mercenaries who ha'e not committed
,ra'e crimes* "'erall% the alle,ed presence of FMS2s within the U+raine conflict has had a
destabilisin, effect% and is li+el& to further dela& resolution amon, the warrin, parties despite the
peace plan*
Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 9
Section III
Unmanned 'ehicles and autonomous weapon s&stems


0ebate o'er unmanned aerial 'ehicles shifts to )uestions o'er
effecti'eness and de'elopin, international norms
number of +e& ,o'ernment in)uiries% thin+ tan+ reports and ci'il societ& re'iews on U>s ha'e
underscored a potential shift in polic& o'er 2014* The U5 special rapporteur on human ri,hts
published a report on ci'ilian deaths from US drone stri+es in MarchC
;
the /50 2orporation
published a report on unmanned aerial 'ehicle capabilities% arms control and proliferation in prilC
10

the Stimson 2entre.s Tas+ #orce on US 0rone Folic& reported in 7uneC
11
and the 3ritish 4ouse of
2ommons defence committee published a report on remotel& piloted air s&stems in 7ul&*
12
Ta+en
to,ether% there is increasin, e'idence of ,reater debate about proliferation% operational controls
and the need for international norms* #urthermore% after their use in f,hanistan% Fa+istan and
Nemen% some in the securit& establishment are )uestionin, whether counterterrorism ob1ecti'es
can actuall& be achie'ed usin, U>s !as current emplo&ed$% and indeed )uestionin, their
effecti'eness in a wider ran,e of missions% includin, IS/*
Increased interest from the US securit& establishment the creation of norms around the use of U>s
is li+el& dri'en b& concerns that US national securit& interests are not well ser'ed b& other state and
non-state actors adoptin, the same le,al% ethical and operational U> policies as the United States
has so far enacted* 2riticism of US drone stri+e practices from the U5 special rapporteur on human
ri,hts and the U5 4uman /i,hts 2ouncil has also ,i'en state opponents of such practices increased
international diplomatic opportunities to pursue stricter compliance with international
humanitarian law*
The /50 report hi,hli,hted that U>s are not transformati'e weapons% in part because most
current models ha'e limited use a,ainst enemies with air defences* In the conte(t of rapid militar&
modernisation sweepin, East sia and parts of the Facific% the current fleet of drones therefore has
limited applicabilit&% which /50 su,,ests will actuall& temper proliferation* 4owe'er% this
presumes state-le'el conflict in a multi-polar sia Facific as opposed to continual conflicts in
hotspots where lac+ of rule of law% infrastructure and securit& allow non-state actors and
insur,encies to proliferate*

;
http:??daccess-dds-n&*un*or,?doc?U50"2?8E5?814?11;?4;?F0#?81411;4;*pdf:"penElement
10
http:??www*rand*or,?pubs?research@reports?//44;*html
11
http:??www*stimson*or,?ima,es?uploads?research-pdfs?tas+@force@report@#I5-@DE3@0<2414*pdf
12
http:??www*publications*parliament*u+?pa?cm20141A?cmselect?cmdfence?<11?<1102*htm
10 "pen 3riefin,
The US national securit& communit& and con,ressional committee debates on the US 5a'&.s
re)uirements for the Unmanned 2arrier-launched irborne Sur'eillance and Stri+e !U2-SS$
pro,ramme ha'e t&pified the discussions on U> capabilities and future conflict needs% which must
balance the benefits of new technolo,& with the cost within ti,htened defence bud,ets* "ne 'ision
for U2-SS is to pro'ide the na'& with a carrier-'ersion of non-stealth& sur'eillance drones instead
of the na'&.s e(perimental M-4J3 U2>% which o'er the lon,er term is li+el& to ha'e stealth
capabilit&% lon,er ran,e and more si,nificant armament* "thers ar,ue that this 'ision pro'ides no
real strate,ic ad'anta,e for US sea power if confronted with 2hina.s nti-ccess?rea 0enial
!2?0$ capabilities% specificall& lon,-ran,e ballistic and cruise missiles*
Mar+et pro1ections su,,est that the ,lobal annual e(port mar+et for U>s is li+el& to ,row from
G;42 million to G2*E billion o'er the decade from 201E to 202E* 3& 201J% worldwide U> production
could a'era,e about ;<0 unmanned aircraft annuall&* This creates proliferation concerns% which%
to,ether with 2hinese ad'ancements in militar& U>s% is the li+el& dri'er behind some in the
defence industr& and securit& establishment tal+in, more openl& about international norms around
U> use* Indeed% the Stimson 2entre.s tas+force recommendations on a cost-benefit anal&sis of
drone use in counterterrorism operations and impro'ed public disclosure around U2> use show
that some in the securit& mainstream see the merit in ,reater e(amination and consideration of the
use of drones*
U5 bodies consider implications of lethal autonomous weapons as
defence industr& focusses on lower-le'el s&stems automation
four-da& meetin, in Ma& 2014 of e(perts from HJ countries part& to the U5 2on'ention on 2ertain
2on'entional Deapons !22D$ was the first multilateral discussion on lethal autonomous weapons
s&stems !-DS$* The meetin, pro'ided an opportunit& for +e& ci'il societ& ,roups and U5
institutions to hi,hli,ht the potential implications of -DS for international humanitarian law*
"nl& fi'e of the 22D dele,ates supported a moratorium on full&-automated weapon s&stems: 2uba%
Ecuador% E,&pt% Fa+istan and the 4ol& See* Man& dele,ates re1ected a moratorium on the basis that
it would undermine de'elopment of automation technolo,& in ci'ilian fields and stunt inno'ation in
non-lethal autonomous combat and militar& s&stems% such as intelli,ence collection% search and
rescue% lo,istics and transportation* 0espite disa,reement% comments made b& U5 hi,h
representati'e for disarmament affairs n,ela =ane to the secretar&-,eneral.s d'isor& 3oard on
0isarmament Matters seem to su,,est that a number of U5 bodies% such as the 22D% need to ha'e
on,oin, discussions around lethal autonomous weapons s&stems*
1E



1E
https:??sE*amaBonaws*com?unoda-web?wp-content?uploads?2014?0J?#I5-@4/@/emar+s@30M@<2@2-7ul&-2014*pdf
Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 11
The 22D meetin, demonstrated that confusion around definitions and the 'aried focus on different
s&stems mean that ci'il societ& ,roups are possibl& tal+in, about different technolo,ies to the
defence industr& and national militaries* Some ci'il societ& ,roups ha'e focused on autonomous
militar& hardware li+el& to replace infantr& weapons and combat s&stems* Some precursor
technolo,&% such as the 3E S&stems stealth and semiautonomous demonstrator U2> Taranis fit
this mould* 4owe'er% it is li+el& that defence companies and militaries are more focused on s&stem
automation of IS/% transportation% communication and c&ber protection rather than autonomous
lethal weapon capabilities* In fact% the automation of defence and militar& operations much earlier
in the chain of functions% such as tar,et identification and weapon selection% should raise concerns
of a similar ma,nitude as those related to full&-automated weapons*
The de'elopments around buildin, independence from human inter'ention appear more focused in
areas of c&ber defence and IS/% particularl& 'ideo sur'eillance s&stems* The recent re'elation b&
former 5S contractor Edward Snowden that the 5S has de'eloped an automated c&ber-attac+
pro,ramme codenamed MonsterMind is a case in point* Snowden.s 1ustification for disclosin, the
pro,ramme was based on the concern that as an automated counter-attac+ s&stem MonsterMind
posed inherent ris+s of miscalculation* The 0efence d'anced /esearch Fro1ects ,enc& !0/F$
has run a number of competitions see+in, software that implements autonomous c&ber-defence
action% su,,estin, that the US militar& is particularl& interested in this capabilit&*
3roader ran,e of states acti'el& deplo&in, unmanned aerial 'ehicles
and de'elopin, indi,enous technolo,ies
broader ran,e of states are acti'el& deplo&in, U>s and de'elopin, indi,enous technolo,ies%
challen,in, the international dominance of US and Israeli U> technolo,&* In 7ul& 2014% the #rench
and 3ritish defence ministers si,ned a O120 million feasibilit& stud& on an unmanned combat air
'ehicle% which is part of a broader #uture ir 2ombat S&stem where U2>s will be deplo&ed
alon,side #-EA 7oint Stri+e #i,hters* European defence companies% includin, ir 3us% ha'e made
o'ertures to the 8erman% Italian and #rench ,o'ernments to de'elop a European U> platform to
encoura,e EU and potentiall& 5T" interoperabilit&* 3E S&stems is de'elopin, the Taranis U2>
for the 3ritish Ministr& of 0efence% /ussian defence a,encies aim to test So+ol and TranBas U2>s
in 201J and l,eria is reportedl& +een to procure Mian,lon, !Soarin, 0ra,on$ U>s from the
2hinese militar&*
There are clear political indicators that EU members are not comfortable with the le'el of reliance
on US and Israeli U>s but are stru,,lin, to a,ree partnerships for the de'elopment of European
U> platforms* 8erman& cancelled its Euro 4aw+ order with 5orthrop 8rumman in 201E% thou,h
#rance was reported as mo'in, ahead with its ac)uisition of 8eneral tomics M6-; /eaper drones
for operations in Mali in addition to U2> de'elopment wor+ with 3ritain*
Europe% Israel and the US do not ha'e a total monopol& o'er U> de'elopment as Iran has recentl&
demonstrated* In Ma& 2014% Iran un'eiled its re'erse-en,ineered 'ersion of the US /6-1J0 Sentinel*
Iran was able to re'erse en,ineer the Sentinel after it was either compromised b& Iranian c&ber
forces and safel& landed or simpl& crashed in Iran*
12 "pen 3riefin,
/eports indicate that Iran.s maturin, drone de'elopment pro,ramme% which includes a number of
Iranian drones I the Shahed% Bem% Moha1er% 4amaseh and Sarir I is benefitin, from operational use
in S&ria and% more recentl&% Ira)* This all-important combat usa,e pro'ides ,reater opportunit& for
,o'ernments to assess the true capabilities of Iran.s U> pro,ramme* #or Israel in particular% it ma&
pro'ide some insi,ht into the technolo,& that Iran ma& ma+e a'ailable to 4amas*


Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 13
Section I>
2&ber warfare


United States see+s international c&ber-securit& norms while clashin,
with 2hina o'er c&ber espiona,e
Espiona,e% crime and attac+s in the c&ber realm ha'e been +e& diplomatic sore points in relations
between 2hina and the United States throu,hout 2014* t the rmed #orces 2ommunications and
Electronics ssociation on 24 7une% the commander of US 2&ber 2ommand !US2N3E/2"M$% dmiral
Michael /o,ers% warned that the United States will li+el& be tar,eted b& c&ber efforts desi,ned to
dama,e critical US infrastructure* t the spen Securit& #orum on 24 7ul&% the deput& director of
the 5S% /ichard -ed,ett% ad'ocated the need for international c&ber norms% and ar,ued that 2hina
poses the ,reatest c&ber threat to the United States because state actors share intelli,ence and
intellectual propert& with businesses*
14
In turn% 2hina has pointed to the 5S.s c&ber sur'eillance
acti'ities and the complicit& of US technolo,& companies in 5S pro,rammes*
In pril% US defence secretar& 2huc+ 4a,el sou,ht to open dialo,ue with Feoples. -iberation rm&
!F-$ commanders durin, a 'isit to 2hina in which he pro'ided some details of US c&ber capabilities
and emer,in, c&ber doctrines* The stated aim of this diplomatic candour was to ensure that 2hina
understood US c&ber red lines* 4owe'er% this approach chan,ed in the followin, months*
stream of reports from pri'ate information securit& companies on alle,ed 2hinese c&ber units and
9bad actors. ha'e pointed to F- units tar,etin, US and Israeli companies and ,o'ernment a,encies
to obtain confidential business and ,o'ernment information* US tar,ets ha'e included
Destin,house Electric% lcoa% lle,hen& Technolo,ies% the United Steelwor+ers Union% SolarDorld
and the United States Steel 2orporationC while Israeli tar,ets included defence contractors in'ol'ed
with Israel.s Iron 0ome air defence s&stem* "ther operations ha'e focused on US tar,ets with
specific sian ,eopolitical e(pertise and sub1ect matter +nowled,e and more recentl& US thin+ tan+
specialists on Ira)* The shift in hac+in, tar,ets is li+el& to stem from e(tensi'e Sino interests in Ira)i
oil production% with 2hina bein, the lar,est forei,n in'estor in Ira).s oil sector*
In Ma& 2014% the US 1ustice department named fi'e members of a 2hinese Feople.s -iberation rm&
ad'anced persistent threat !FT$ unit +nown as Unit <1E;H in an indictment for c&ber espiona,e%
which has put a diplomatic chill on continuin, ne,otiations between the two countries o'er c&ber
issues* This is the first criminal hac+in, char,e that the United States has filed a,ainst specific
forei,n officials*


14
http:??www*aspendail&news*com?section?home?1<E200
14 "pen 3riefin,
There is no e(tradition treat& between 2hina and the United States% which ma+es it hi,hl& unli+el&
indeed that the Unit <1E;H members will face a US court* Instead% the indictment seems in part
desi,ned to s&mbolicall& shame 2hina in international forums* In li,ht of e(tensi'e re'elations
about 5S interception and sur'eillance acti'ities% particularl& the installation of bac+doors in
routers scheduled for forei,n e(port% a ran,e of commentators and the 2hinese 2ommunist Fart&
ha'e su,,ested that the US indictment is h&pocritical* "thers speculate that the indictment is a US
strate,& to deflect attention from Edward Snowden.s lea+s on US c&ber sp&in, and intelli,ence-
,atherin, acti'ities*
nother moti'ation for the indictment ma& be internal pressure within the US administration to
pursue international norms for c&ber warfare and offensi'es% and the indictment is part of
de'elopin, le,itimac& around c&ber acti'ities* This re)uires the US administration to craft a
con'incin, and easil& understandable distinction between c&ber acti'it& for national securit&
purposes !the supposed 5S approach$ and c&ber espiona,e for the purposes of intellectual
propert& theft and commercial ad'anta,e !the focus of 2hinese efforts$* "therwise% 3ei1in, needs
do no more than hi,hli,ht the contro'ersial 5S acti'ities re'ealed b& Snowden and the complicit&
of US technolo,& companies in 5S sur'eillance pro,rammes*
3ei1in, cancellin, its participation in a US-2hina wor+in, ,roup on c&bersecurit& after the US
indictments raised 'er& little public criticism* Dith countries such as India% 3raBil and /ussia
harbourin, si,nificant ,rie'ances o'er 5S acti'ities% 3/I2S countries are unli+el& to ,i'e an&
si,nificant consideration to US pressure for international c&ber norms* 2hina.s a,reement to wor+
closel& with the EU on c&bersecurit& issues throu,h enhancin, the wor+ of the 2hina-EU 2&ber
Tas+force is li+el& to further isolate the United States and #i'e E&e partners from open dialo,ue and
c&ber-securit& confidence buildin, with 2hina* #urthermore% there is little strate,ic incenti'e for
less-de'eloped c&ber powers% such as 2hina% to disclose their current capabilities to a more
dominant c&ber power% such as the United States*
The 7ul& 2014 report of the state department.s International Securit& d'isor& 3oard recommended
that the US administration use bilateral dialo,ues and multilateral discussions establish a broad
multinational cooperati'e response mechanism to promote c&ber stabilit&*
1A
4owe'er% the limited
capacit& of the United States to influence or catal&se the settin, of c&ber norms is li+el& to reinforce
efforts to increase Fenta,on spendin, on c&ber operations I earmar+ed at G2< billion o'er the ne(t
fi'e &ears I and to build a <%000 stron, c&ber force b& 201<% ma+in, US2N3E/2"M one of the
lar,est c&ber forces in the world* s such% the United States is li+el& to continue to pursue both a
norm-settin, a,enda and offensi'e and defensi'e c&ber capabilities*


1A
http:??www*state*,o'?documents?or,aniBation?22;2EA*pdf
Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 15
2&ber attac+s bein, deplo&ed in conflicts in Israel% S&ria and Ira)
/ecent conflicts in Israel% S&ria and Ira) ha'e witnessed the c&ber dimension bein, more effecti'el&
inte,rated into +inetic warfare% insur,enc& and terrorism operations* 2laims such as those made b&
US ssistant ttorne& 8eneral 7ohn 2arlin that al-6aeda ha'e de'eloped c&ber capabilities% adopted
c&ber warfare as a strate,& and tested the feasibilit& of such operations ha'e captured media
attention*
1<
The threat of non-state actors initiatin, full-scale c&ber warfare on the critical
infrastructure of modern economies supports political 1ustifications for increased c&ber defences*
4owe'er% on the ,round reports indicate that the c&ber dimension of the ma1or Middle East
conflicts is more a+in to c&ber ,uerrilla warfare than sophisticated ad'anced persistent threats
!FTs$ and si,nals interception b& non-state ,roups*
In the conte(t of Israel.s "peration Frotecti'e Ed,e% c&ber attac+s and counter-attac+s ha'e spi+ed
durin, the conflict between 4amas and the Israeli 0efence #orce* 0istributed denial-of-ser'ice
!00oS$ and 0omain 5ame S&stem !05S$ attac+s were launched a,ainst Israeli ,o'ernment a,encies%
financial ser'ices and militar& websites% includin, Mossad and the prime minister.s office% with J0K
of attac+s appearin, to ori,inate or ha'e been routed throu,h 6atar* 0espite the scale and alle,ed
in'ol'ement of the Iranian 2&ber rm& and Tur+e&.s c&ber forces in attac+s% the actual le'el of
intrusion% disruption and dama,e to Israeli operations appears limited* Israel.s c&ber defence
capabilities are at this point in time much more ad'anced than those of 4amas or non-state hac+in,
collecti'es* More capable actors% such as Iran and Tur+e&% ma& ha'e shown strate,ic restraint in not
wantin, to raise the sta+es b& seriousl& attac+in, Israel% a countr& with mature c&ber offensi'e
capabilities*
In Ira)% si,nificant malware distribution and networ+ monitorin, is on the rise* Specificall&% the
popular remote access tool n1/T% commonl& used a,ainst S&rian opposition rebels% appears to
bein, widel& used across Ira)i internet ser'ice pro'ider !ISF$ networ+s* The tro1ans and malware are
distributed 'ia malicious web lin+s% most li+el& embedded in political material on social media% and
are li+el& bein, used to e(ecute screen ,rabbin, and +e&-lo,,in, acti'ities* In addition to the
remote access tools% anal&sts ha'e noted a sur,e in use of the T"/ anon&mit& networ+ in Ira) o'er
the last few wee+s% with internet users tr&in, to hide their ISF addresses when underta+in,
malicious acti'ities*
The increase in malware and the broad distribution of n1/T in Ira) raises the )uestion of whether
state-sponsored actors are in'ol'ed% usin, c&ber tools to either disrupt Islamic State
communications or ,ather intelli,ence on the militant 1ihadist ,roup.s mo'ements* There is the
possibilit& of S&rian Electronic rm& in'ol'ement in c&ber attac+s on the Islamic State for the
purpose of ,atherin, intelli,ence on behalf of the S&rian and Iranian ,o'ernments*


1<
http:??www*1ustice*,o'?nsd?pr?remar+s-assistant-attorne&-,eneral-1ohn-p-carlin-c&ber-crime-carne,ie-mellon-uni'ersit&
16 "pen 3riefin,
2&ber confrontation in U+raine pushes 5T" to consider c&ber mutual
defence doctrines
2&ber attac+s between /ussian and U+raine% which encompassed broad scale 00oS attac+s and
malware distribution for sur'eillance and sabota,e% ha'e spilt o'er into c&ber offensi'e a,ainst
5T"* 2&ber3er+ut% a ,roup of pro-/ussia hac+ers% were attributed with 00oS attac+s on 5T"
websites in March 2014 as well as malware distribution usin, 'ariations of Sna+e for c&ber-
espiona,e campai,ns* t this point% /ussian Fresident >ladimir Futin has not launched a full-scale
c&ber offensi'e a,ainst U+raine% and while it is unli+el& in the short term% 5T" members are now
much more co,nisant of the need for formal c&ber-defence doctrines*
The recentl&-appro'ed 5T" c&ber pol&,on base in Estonia and the e(istin, 5T" 2ooperati'e
2&ber 0efence 2entre of E(cellence !2202"E$ were ,i'en new rele'ance b& c&ber operations
between /ussia and U+raine* E(ercises% includin, the -oc+ed Shields c&ber-warfare drill in March
2014% also enabled 5T" to test its c&ber defences* 4owe'er% such 5T" acti'ities are unli+el& to
ha'e a si,nificant deterrent effect on the intended tar,et% /ussia% for a number of reasons* #irstl&%
/ussia has no need to intensif& the le'el of c&ber attac+ or push the offensi'e to a le'el that would
endan,er human life* Secondl&% challen,es around attributin, attac+s still pro'ide a temporar&
period of plausible deniabilit&*
5T" members are also considerin, c&ber offensi'es in relation to rticle A of the 5orth tlantic
Treat&% the collecti'e defence clause* In li,ht of /ussia.s anne(ation of 2rimea and pre'ious c&ber
attac+s on Eastern European countries% 5T" has been updatin, its c&ber defence polic& to clarif&
the implications of ma1or c&ber attac+s on member states* This update builds upon the wor+ of
appro(imatel& 20 e(perts who% at the behest of the 2202"E% e(amined the application of the laws
of armed conflict to c&ber warfare*
1J
The +e& principle to be established in the polic& is that a certain
intensit& of c&ber attac+ and malicious intention could be treated as the e)ui'alent of an armed
attac+* t the 5T" summit in Dales on 4 September 2014% members indicated support for an
enhanced c&ber defence polic& and made +e& announcements on c&ber defence% includin,
enhancin, the c&ber securit& of national networ+s upon which 5T" depends*
1H

The polic& is% howe'er% beset b& a number of political challen,es% and does not detract from the fact
that man& 5T" partners are not necessaril& comfortable with sharin, information on their c&ber
capabilities* =e& Destern European countries and the United States are li+el& to be concerned about
the c&ber 'ulnerabilities of 5T" partners in Eastern Europe who ha'e de'elopin, economies and
reduced le'els of c&ber maturit&* The US department of defence announced in 7une 2014 that the
United States and specific allies are wor+in, to bolster the c&ber offensi'e and defensi'e
capabilities of 'ulnerable US allies% which is a clear indication that there is a fear opponents ma&
focus their attac+s on c&ber-'ulnerable and strate,icall&-important partners in Eastern Europe%
includin, -at'ia and -ithuania*

1J
http:??www*cambrid,e*or,?,b?academic?sub1ects?law?humanitarian-law?tallinn-manual-international-law-applicable-c&ber-
warfare
1H
http:??www*nato*int?cps?en?natoh)?official@te(ts@112;<4*htm
Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 17
Section >
Intelli,ence% sur'eillance and reconnaissance


5S lea+s force #i'e E&es partners to reconfi,ure and 1ustif&
sur'eillance acti'ities
The release of information about 5S operations b& Edward Snowden has re)uired man& #i'e E&es
partners to publicall& defend and clarif& the nature of ,o'ernment sur'eillance acti'ities* Snowden
and media outlets holdin, his tro'e of 5S documents ha'e re'ealed a wide-spannin, intelli,ence-
collection networ+ spannin, multiple communication modes and countries* 5S pro,rammes% such
as F/ISM% MNSTI2% /ET/"% /MF/T- and S"M-8ET% ha'e allowed the a,enc& to collect 'ast
'olumes of communications intelli,ence and metadata% despite pushin, the le,al en'elope*
The international debate o'er the 5S.s acti'ities forced the United =in,dom.s si,nals intelli,ence
a,enc&% 8246% to re'eal its polic& on mass sur'eillance% which due to an interpretation loophole
defines communications 'ia social media networ+in, sites and search en,ines outside of the United
=in,dom as 9e(ternal communication. because the ser'ers are based outside 3ritain% usuall& in the
United States* The implication is that 8246 can appl& the sur'eillance standard for forei,n
communications in a domestic conte(t% enablin, a form of mass sur'eillance* n ustralian
constitutional affairs committee in)uir& into telecommunication data stora,e and interception has
showed a number of ustralian a,encies collectin, personal telecommunications information
without a warrant* 2anada is also e(periencin, an emer,in, debate o'er collection% stora,e and
access to personal telecommunications metadata* In response the 3ritish% ustralian and 2anadian
,o'ernments ha'e needed to formulate clear public polic& on mass sur'eillance*
The 5S.s intelli,ence% sur'eillance and reconnaissance !IS/$ acti'ities ha'e raised the ire of national
,o'ernments% includin, 8erman&% 3raBil% 2hina and India% international telecommunication
pro'iders% such as >eriBon% US IT companies and ser'ice pro'iders and ci'il libertarians* The US
4ouse intelli,ence committee chairman% Mi+e /o,ers% accused the companies of puttin, business
profits from European mar+ets ahead of US national securit&*
1;
4owe'er% the political and economic
implications of the 5S.s acti'ities are startin, to become more tan,ible for the US administration%
includin, direct economic costs to US businesses% the loss of credibilit& for the US internet freedom
a,enda and serious dama,e to internet securit& throu,h the wea+enin, of +e& encr&ption
standards% stoc+pilin, information about software securit& 'ulnerabilities and the insertion of
sur'eillance bac+-doors into widel&-used software and hardware*
20


1;
http:??www*politico*com?blo,s?under-the-radar?2014?0<?ro,ers-lashes-out-at-,oo,le-on-sur'eillance-stance-1;01;;*html
20
http:??oti*newamerica*net?sites?newamerica*net?files?polic&docs?Sur'eilance@2osts@#inal*pdf
18 "pen 3riefin,
-e,islatures in #i'e E&e 1urisdictions are ur,entl& considerin, re,ulator& reforms to address public
concerns o'er mass sur'eillance while still maintainin, e(istin, IS/ capabilit& and ensurin,
harmonisation and interoperabilit& between #i'e E&e partners* The US 2on,ress has alread& seen
two iterations of the US #reedom ct aimed at re,ulatin, 5S acti'ities* The bill initiall& passed
the 4ouse of /epresentati'es b& a mar,in of nearl& three to one% but the 0emocrat senator and
chair of the US Senate 1udiciar& committee% Fatric+ -eah&% introduced a re'ised US #reedom ct*
The new 'ersion is hailed as stren,thenin, pri'ac& pro'ision where the ori,inal 4ouse 'ersion of the
bill was too wea+*
In the United =in,dom the three ma1or political parties ha'e supported le,islation that re)uires
telecommunication companies to retain customer metadata for 12 months and reasserts the
application of data interception obli,ations on o'erseas communication ser'ices pro'iders
deli'erin, ser'ices to 3ritish citiBens* The 3ritish ,o'ernment ar,ued that the 0ata /etention and
In'esti,ator& Fowers 3ill is an emer,enc& response to the European 2ourt of 7ustice !E27$ rulin, in
pril 2014 that in'alidated a 200< EU directi'e allowin, telecommunication companies to store
customer metadata for up to two &ears* The E27 held that the directi'e disproportionatel&
interfered with the fundamental ri,hts of pri'ac& and protection of personal data*
ustralia and 2anada.s political establishments are also contendin, with contentious reforms to
sur'eillance and data-retention acti'ities* In ustralia% the director-,eneral of the ustralian
Securit& and Intelli,ence "r,anisation% 0a'id Ir'ine% made a rare media appearance to e(plain
proposed le,islation*
21
Ir'ine also told the ustralian senate.s le,al and constitutional affairs
references committee that it is appropriate that telecommunication companies retain metadata
upwards of two &ears* In 2anada% a Gloe and Mail article re'ealed that reforms to 2anada.s
electronic intelli,ence a,enc&% the 2ommunications Securit& Establishment 2anada !2SE2$% fla,,ed
as a critical le,islati'e priorit& b& then defence minister Feter Mac=a&% were derailed in 200;*
22

The 5ew Lealand parliament alread& passed reform to the 8o'ernment 2ommunications Securit&
3ureau ct in 201E* 4owe'er% re'elations on the e'e of the 5ew Lealand election b& the Intercept
show a de,ree of cooperation between 5ew Lealand and the United States to establish a le'el of
public communications sur'eillance in 2012 and 201E*
2E

In all 1urisdictions% the current concerns around the threat of fi,hters returnin, from S&ria and Ira)
are pro'in, an important catal&st for ,o'ernments to push ahead with reforms* In the case of the
United =in,dom% reforms were concurrent with the announcement of a O1*1 billion pac+a,e to
e)uip the armed forces for modern conflicts% which includes an o'er OH00 million boost to 3ritish
intelli,ence% sur'eillance and c&ber capabilities* Such mo'es are li+el& to be repeated across other
1urisdictions% despite an& pled,es for defence bud,et austerit&% to potentiall& offset an& operational
inefficienc& introduced b& political-acceptable IS/ reforms* #urthermore% there is li+el& a le'el of
coordination between the #i'e E&e 1urisdictions in order to ensure interoperabilit& and retain
e(istin, sur'eillance capabilities% e'en if those capabilities are distributed across the alliance*

21
http:??www*abc*net*au?news?2014-0H-0H?asio-chief-sa&s-securit&-plan-not-mass-sur'eillance-e(ercise?A<AHA2<
22
http:??www*the,lobeandmail*com?news?politics?wiretap-o'ersi,ht-bill-derailed-in-200;?article200A4;0J?
2E
https:??firstloo+*or,?theintercept?2014?0;?1A?new-Bealand-,csb-spear,un-mass-sur'eillance?
Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 19
0efence ministries buildin, capabilities for information operations
across social media
0efence ministries are increasin,l& interested in open source intelli,ence !"SI5T$ collectable from
social media networ+s* /ecent e(amples where "SI5T has pro'ided critical e'idence to e(plain
important ,lobal e'ents include NouTube 'ideos of a 3u+ missile launcher in eastern U+raine after
the downin, of Mala&sia irlines #li,ht 1J and Eliot 4i,,ins. wor+ under the pseudon&m 3rown
Moses on barrel bombs and other weapons used in the S&rian ci'il war*
8o'ernments% the pri'ate sector and 58"s are de'elopin, comple( research pro,rammes that use
bi, data for conflict prediction and pre'ention* These include the US defence departmentPs
Information >olume and >elocit& !I>2$ pro,ramme% the 2I.s "pen Source Indicators pro,ramme
and the United 5ationPs 8lobal Fulse initiati'e* Most intelli,ence ser'ices monitor social media
networ+s* The 8erman forei,n intelli,ence ser'ice% the 3undesnachrichtendienst !350$% recentl&
committed QE00 million to support real-time social media monitorin, to brin, it in line with the
United States. 5S and 3ritain.s 8246*
4owe'er% more recent announcements and re'elations about 5S acti'ities indicate that
,o'ernments are also interested in social media networ+s as a social terrain on which information
operations and propa,anda campai,ns can be carried out with the aim of influencin, audience
responses* #or e(ample% 3E S&stems are e(pected to recei'e a total of OE0 million from the U=
Ministr& of 0efence for pro1ects to e(plore wa&s for the militar& to use social media and
ps&cholo,ical techni)ues to influence peoplePs beliefs* 0ocuments lea+ed b& Edward Snowden show
that 8246.s 7oint Threat /esearch Intelli,ence 8roup !7T/I8$ has alread& de'eloped a number of
information operation applications* The applications pro'ide 8246 with the abilit& to manipulate
and alter information presentation across social media platforms% bloc+ email and website access%
co'ertl& record real-time S+&pe con'ersations and retrie'e pri'ate #aceboo+ photos*
The US department of defence.s militar& research arm% the 0efence d'anced /esearch Fro1ects
,enc& !0/F$% pre-empti'el& released information on its Social Media in Strate,ic
2ommunication !SMIS2$ pro,ramme after re'elations about #aceboo+.s emotional conta,ion news
feed e(periment and the 7T/I8 applications* The ustralian 0efence #orce !0#$ has also re'ealed
that it has de'eloped offensi'e information operation doctrines* Media reports su,,est that the
/ussian ,o'ernment recruits an arm& of 9online patriots. who consistentl& post pro-/ussian
sentiment on Destern media websites% such as #o( 5ews% 4uffin,ton Fost and Folitico*
Such social terrain acti'ities are most li+el& ,oin, to be deplo&ed b& militaries durin, combat
operations or ci'il unrest to mana,e the social d&namics of conflict% and will be more ad'anced and
sophisticated than historical propa,anda campai,ns* 2onsistent with trends in other areas of
remote-control warfare% these information operations are li+el& to be hi,hl& tar,eted and based on
detailed intelli,ence on social networ+ structures% includin, +e& decision ma+ers and people of
influence*

20 "pen 3riefin,
Sub'ersion of encr&ption standards part of intelli,ence tool+it
0ocuments lea+ed b& Edward Snowden in September 201E implicated the 5S in the co'ert
underminin, of encr&ption standards throu,h a G2A0 million si,nals intelli,ence !SI8I5T$ enablin,
pro,ramme* In 0ecember 201E% information came to li,ht that re'ealed the 5S.s encoura,ement
of and support for tech-securit& compan& /S in ma+in, a now-discredited cr&pto,raph& s&stem
used b& a wide ran,e of companies and ser'ices* fter the fallout from the 4eartbleed "penSS- bu,
disco'ered in pril 2014 and the discontinuation of the freeware encr&ption tool True2r&pt in Ma&
2014 left consumers and businesses concerned about encr&ption securit&% pressure has built on the
US 2on,ress to address 5S e(ploitation of encr&ption bac+doors for sur'eillance and intelli,ence
collection*
0espite the director of national intelli,ence% 7ames 2lapper% ma+in, it clear in bud,et re)uests that
US a,encies need cr&ptanal&tic capabilities to defeat enem& cr&pto,raph& and e(ploit internet
traffic% more recent deliberations of the US 4ouse science and technolo,& committee adopted an
amendment from #lorida 0emocrat lan 8ra&son to remo'e the mandator& re)uirement for the
5ational Institute of Standards and Technolo,& !5IST$ to consult with the 5S when de'elopin,
securit& standards* The aim of the amendment is to pre'ent the 5S from influencin, the peer
re'iew process for encr&ption standards de'eloped b& the 5IST* The amendment% which is now part
of the 5IST /eauthorisation ct of 2014% was passed b& the 4ouse of /epresentati'es on 22 7ul&
2014*
The sub'ersion of encr&ption standards poses a 'e(in, challen,e for man& ,o'ernments* /ecent
anal&sis b& /ecorded #uture showed that a number of mu1ahideen fi,hters and operati'es are usin,
open-source% off-the-shelf encr&ption tools% which ma& ha'e in-built 'ulnerabilities that can be
e(ploited b& intelli,ence a,encies*
24
4owe'er% lea'in, in-built 'ulnerabilities ma& allow them to be
e(ploited b& non-state actors and c&ber criminals* 3oth le,itimate multinational companies and
terrorist ,roups such as al-6aeda use encr&ption tools for communication* s such% in-built
'ulnerabilities and bac+doors can be e(ploited for unauthorised sur'eillance% c&ber espiona,e and
intelli,ence% or can be used to tar,et terrorist or criminal ,roups*




24
https:??www*recordedfuture*com?al-)aeda-encr&ption-technolo,&-part-2?