LIM vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

G.R. No. 102784 February 28, 1996

FACTS:
Rose Lim arrived in Manila from Cebu City sometime in October, 1987 with her friend Aurelia
Nadera. On October 8, 1987, they went to the Williams Apartelle in Timog, Quezon City, where they met
Victoria Suarez, a jewelry dealer. Suarez and Nadera knew each other since the latter often sold jewelry for
the former on commission basis. Nadera had previously introduced Rosa Lim to Suarez as a wealthy
businesswoman.
Lim was offered two pieces of jewelry by Suarez to wit: one (1) 3.35 carat diamond ring worth
P169,000.00 and one (1) bracelet worth P170,000.00. The pieces were to be sold by Lim on commission.
Accordingly, Lim signed a receipt prepared by Nadera for Suarez.
On October 12, 1987 before departing for Cebu, petitioner called up Mrs. Suarez by telephone in order to
inform her that she was no longer interested in the ring and bracelet. Mrs. Suarez replied that she was busy
at the time and so, she instructed the petitioner to give the pieces of jewelry to Aurelia Nadera who would in
turn give them back to the private complainant. The petitioner did as she was told and gave the two pieces
of jewelry to Nadera as evidenced by a handwritten receipt, dated October 12, 1987.
Petitioner maintains that she cannot be liable for estafa since she never received the jewelries in
trust or on commission basis from Vicky Suarez. The real agreement between her and the private
respondent was a sale on credit with Mrs. Suarez as the owner-seller and petitioner as the buyer, as
indicated by the bet that petitioner did not sign on the blank space provided for the signature of the person
receiving the jewelry but at the upper portion thereof immediately below the description of the items taken.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE APELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE WAS WAIVED WHEN THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR CROSS-EXAMINED THE
PETITIONER AND AURELIA NADERA AND WHEN COMPLAINANT WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY THE
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER AS TO THE TRUE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES WHEREIN IT WAS DISCLOSED THAT THE TRUE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS A
SALE OF JEWELRIES AND NOT WHAT WAS EMBODIED IN THE RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT "A"
WHICH WAS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER.
RULING:
The SC ruled that weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority
of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of
the judge trying the case. 17 In the case at bench, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave weight
to the testimony of Vicky Suarez that she did not authorize Rosa Lim to return the pieces of jewelry to
Nadera. The respondent court, in affirming the trial court, said:
. . . This claim (that the ring had been returned to Suarez thru Nadera) is disconcerting. It contravenes the
very terms of Exhibit A. The instruction by the complaining witness to appellant to deliver the ring to Aurelia
Nadera is vehemently denied by the complaining witness, who declared that she did not authorize and/or
instruct appellant to do so. And thus, by delivering the ring to Aurelia without the express authority and
consent of the complaining witness, appellant assumed the right to dispose of the jewelry as if it were hers,
thereby committing conversion, a clear breach of trust, punishable under Article 315, par. 1(b), Revised
Penal Code.
We shall not disturb this finding of the respondent court. It is well settled that we should not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. The reason is that the trial court is in a better position to
determine questions involving credibility having heard the witnesses and having observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial.
Thus the Supreme Court DENIED the petition and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.




SAPU-AN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
214 SCRA 701

FACTS:
The subject of this dispute is a 786 sq. m. lot situated in Valencia, Negros Oriental. It has been
occupied since the last World War by both the petitioners and the private respondents, who now mutually
assert adverse claims of exclusive ownership over the property.
The petitioners claim the land by virtue of separate sales made by the original owners, namely
Alfonsa Ohoy, Luciana Ohoy, Porfirio Ohoy and Maria Ohoy, to Candida Favor, Ceriaco Abiera, Josefa
Abiera, and Roberto (or Edilberto) Abiera, the petitioners predecessors-in-interest.
For their part, the private respondents claim the same land by inheritance from their mother,
Alfonsa Ohoy, who had in turn acquired it from her mother after the land had been partitioned among her
children.
Both the petitioners and the private respondents say they have occupied and farmed the disputed
land without objection from each other. The petitioners aver that it was they who gave permission to Calixto
Tingcay to build his house on the land after World War II. The private respondents contend that it was they
who gave permission to petitioner Marcelina Sapu-an to build her house on the land, also after World War
II.
In 1962, the petitioners allegedly demolished their old house and began constructing a bigger one
over the private respondents objections. When their protests were ignored, the private respondents sued
the petitioners for the recovery of the land, with damages.
At the trial, the plaintiffs presented four witnesses, among them Zacarias Villegas, who testified that
his mother, Maria Ohoy, did not own any share in the disputed lot and that it belonged exclusively to
Alfonsa. He also said that he lived with the Tingcays for some time and that it was really Marcelina Sapu-an
who requested permission to live on the land. RTC decided in favour of Tingcay and was affirmed by the
CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent court failed or refused to apply to the presence case the "equiponderance
of evidence".

RULING:
The SC said that in determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are
testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greatest number.
It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in better
position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of
witnesses who have personally appeared before him.
Significantly, both the trial court and the respondent court found the credibility of Josefa Abiera to
be highly questionable.
It is true that the genuineness and due execution of the two deeds of sale presented in evidence by
the petitioners were not denied by the private respondents under oath, and that under Rule 8, Section 8, of
the Rules of Court, the "genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless
the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them." However, this rule applies only to the parties to the
document and not, in the case at bar, to the private respondents. The reason is that they were not parties
to the deeds of sale but merely the heirs of the alleged vendors.
The SC concluded in favor of the private respondents based on the evidence of record and
affirmed the decision of the RTC and CA due to lack of a convincing showing that the challenged decision
was reached arbitrarily or in disregard of such evidence. Thus, the petition is DENIED, with costs against
the petitioners.