Can Nietzsches Noble be Moral and Just?

ABSTRACT
Nietzsche endorses a positive value system rounded in his concept o! the "ill to po"er# a
$noble alternative to the $slavish# li!e%denyin values he believes characterize modern &uropean
morality' This value system is usually interpreted as an alternative to morality and social (ustice#
rather than as the basis o! a competin morality or conception o! (ustice' Because Nietzsche
!ounds his values in the a!!irmation o! po"er# they appear to be incompatible "ith the
responsibility to others that characterizes any authentic morality or theory o! (ustice' )n this
paper# ) arue# on the contrary# that Nietzsches values are not only !ully compatible "ith
morality# but also *"hether intentionally or not+ conducive to an ealitarian conception o! social
(ustice' ) de!end this vie" by re(ectin t"o common misconceptions, -+ the vie" that the "ill to
po"er is inseparable !rom domination and .+ the vie" that the noble mode o! evaluation
presupposes and promotes social hierarchy' ) arue that Nietzsches values do not promote
po"er in a sense that necessitates moral harm or social ine/uality# and that his analysis o! slave
morality entails that its overcomin is possible only throuh the achievement o! social e/uality'
0ey"ords, Nietzsche# morality# (ustice# domination# ealitarianism# e/uality
-' Introduction
)n On the Genealogy of Morals# Nietzsche distinuishes bet"een t"o !undamental types
o! value systems that he calls $noble morality and $slave morality' The Genealogy is a "or1
larely concerned "ith tracin the historical oriins o! one speci!ic instance o! the slavish type,
namely# modern &uropean morality# "hich Nietzsche believes oriinates "ith the birth o!
Christianity as a !orm o! spiritual revene aainst the political oppression o! the Roman &mpire'
&uropean morality# on Nietzsches vie"# is an indirect spiritual insurrection# made necessary by
the practical impossibility o! true political retaliation' )t is a revolt that ta1es the !orm o! a ne"
morality created throuh the inversion o! the oppressors value system# one that identi!ies the
noble class# and its values# as $evil rather than $ood'
2hile this account purports to be an historical in/uiry# it is also a criti/ue' Nietzsche
vie"s modern &uropean morality *and the slavish !orm o! values in eneral+ as essentially li!e%
denyin and detrimental to human !lourishin' 3o"ever# the Genealogy is not only a critical
"or1' )t also the beinnin o! a less e4plicit# and o!ten inored or dismissed# positive pro(ect in
Nietzsches "or1, to articulate alternative values to replace those that dominate the modern
"estern "orld# values that embody the li!e%a!!irmin character he attributes to the noble !orm o!
values' This is# it should be stressed# a demand !or a return to a form o! value%system5and not a
return to the speci!ic values o! any particular historical people'
6! course# Nietzsche is a sel!%proclaimed $immoralist' So the alternative to &uropean
morality he presents# a noble value system rounded in the primary values o! po"er and the "ill
to po"er# is not a morality in the conventional sense' 7et he does clearly endorse a ne" set o!
values' And "hile he has no intention o! producin a ne" morality# he need not# and never
e4plicitly claims to# re(ect morality as such' 3is criti/ue o! morality is# !irst o! all# a criti/ue o!
.
one particular historical morality and the !orm o! value%system it represents'
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)t is a criti/ue that
depends not on that value%systems status as moral# but upon its neative conse/uences !or
human !lourishin "hich# !or Nietzsche# is e/uivalent to the !lourishin o! humanitys hihest
individuals'
)n this paper ) "ill arue that Nietzsches alternative set o! values in the noble mode5
thouh rounded in the valorization o! po"er and not intended as a moral system5are
nonetheless compatible "ith morality and conducive to an ealitarian conception o! social
(ustice' That is to say# Nietzsches sel!%proclaimed noble values can round a morality that is
also conducive to the promotion o! social e/uality5a surprisin suestion# to be sure' And )
should stress that ) do not claim Nietzsche does or "ould endorse such a morality or such a
notion o! (ustice# only that he may consistently do so' My intention is !irst and !oremost to
de!eat the common assumption that Nietzsches philosophy is inherently anti%moral and anti%
ealitarian# and that# conse/uently# his principal interest to moral and political thouht is as
nothin more than a provocative critic aainst "hich our ethical intuitions and ideals are to be
tested' There are# beneath the cruel rhetoric and o!ten blind pre(udice o! Nietzsches moral and
political declarations# positive possibilities that have been overloo1ed not only by his
interpreters# but also by Nietzsche himsel!'
) "ill bein "ith a brie! e4planation o! Nietzsches distinction o! noble and slavish
values# !ollo"ed by a discussion o! Nietzsches suestion o! alternative values in the noble
mode# values !ounded in the a!!irmation o! po"er' ) "ill claim that Nietzsches noble# po"er%
a!!irmin values are compatible "ith morality and discuss t"o 1ey ob(ections to this claim, -+
the ob(ection that because po"er is inseparable !rom domination# values rounded in the
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8or e4cellent discussions o! the e4tent o! Nietzsches criti/ue o! morality# see 9eiter .::., ;<%;;# 8oot -==<# Clar1
-==<# and Bermann -=>>'
?
a!!irmation o! po"er are incompatible "ith moral concern !or others# and .+ the ob(ection that
noble values are inseparable !rom social hierarchy' ) "ill then propose that Nietzsches noble
values are both compatible "ith and conducive to ealitarian !orms o! (ustice' ) "ill !irst
respond to the possible ob(ection that ealitarian values are an e4pression o! slave values'
8inally# ) "ill sho" that Nietzsches conception o! (ustice provides a noble motivation to
promote e/uality# because it is only throuh the achievement o! social e/uality that slavish
values can be overcome'
2. Noble and Slavish Values and Nietzsches Value of Power
Throuhout his later "ritins# Nietzsche attempts to articulate a positive# evaluative
concept o! nobility# one that is independent o! political connotation# and desinatin a
psycholoical type rather than a social or political position' 2hile he !ails to clearly de!ine "hat
counts as nobility o! character5he usually relies on overly eneral# ambiuous re!erences to
spiritual strenth# !ree%spiritedness# responsibility and the li1e5he does /uite clearly identi!y the
oriin and !orm o! noble values'
The desination o! these values as $noble is not accidental since# !or Nietzsche# both the
noble as a psycholoical type# and the noble !orm o! values# oriinate historically in a politically
privileed people or class' A noble peoples values# he tells us# directly re!lect the success and
privilee o! that roup by havin sel!%a!!irmation as the !oundation o! their concept o! oodness'
These values simply celebrate the achieved "ell%bein o! a people# identi!yin# preservin# and
enhancin an already%attained level o! "ell%bein' Noble values are# then# primarily a!!irmative
in character' The noble concept o! the ood is a direct a!!irmation o! a positively%evaluated
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condition# producin "hat Nietzsche calls a morality o! $sel!%lori!ication *B@& .A:+'
.
Such a
morality beins "ith the nobles positive evaluation o! their o"n po"er# success# and happiness#
and secondarily derives its concept o! the $bad relative to that primary sel!%a!!irmin value' 6!
the noble mode o! evaluation he says, $)t acts and ro"s spontaneously# it see1s its opposite only
so as to a!!irm itsel! more rate!ully and triumphantly5its neative concept $lo"# $common#
$bad is only a subse/uently%invented# pale# contrastin imae in relation to its positive basic
concept *@M ), -:+' This noble !orm o! values and o! value creation is# in turn# directly opposed
to the !orm that values ta1e amon an oppressed class or people# the !orm o! value system that
Nietzsche labels $slave morality' )n slave morality# oodness is de!ined as the neation#
reduction# or elimination o! the bad or $evil,
2hile every noble morality develops !rom a triumphant a!!irmation o! itsel!# slave
morality !rom the outset says No to "hat is $outside# "hat is $di!!erent# "hat is $not
itsel!B and this No is its creative deed ' ' ' in order to e4ist# slave morality al"ays !irst
needs a hostile e4ternal "orldB it needs# physioloically spea1in# e4ternal stimuli in
order to act at all5its action is !undamentally reaction' *@M ), -:+
So# in Nietzsches attempt to trace the oriins o! modern &uropean morality# he has also
identi!ied t"o basic and opposed !orms that value%systems may ta1e, noble or slavish' These are
not speci!ic moralities# but basic cateories into "hich Nietzsche believes every value%system
must !all' Noble values have their !oundation in the identi!ication and promotion o! positive
conditions o! happiness# !rom "hich the concept o! the bad is then derived secondarily as the
privation o! the ood' Slavish values# in contrast# are !ounded in the identi!ication o!
unhappiness and conditions o! unhappiness# !rom "hich the concept o! the ood is then
secondarily derived as the neation o! evil' Nietzsche spea1s loosely o! these cateories as
.
All re!erences to Nietzsches "or1 use the standard abbreviations !or the &nlish titles, A - The Antichrist# BGE %
Beyond Good and Evil# C D Daybreak# &3 D Ecce Homo# @M On the Genealogy of Morality# @S - The Gay
cience# 33 D H!man All Too H!man# T) T"ilight of the #dols# and E Th!s $oke %arath!stra'
F
$noble morality and $slave morality5ho"ever# it should be noted that the basic distinction is
one o! values enerally# rather than speci!ically moral values'
This distinction o! noble and slavish values is the !oundation not only o! Nietzsches
criti/ue o! modern &uropean morality# but also o! his positive pro(ect o! producin an alternative
to those values' Althouh he does not e4plicitly present his alternative as a !ully !ormed value%
system# all o! his "or1 a!ter the Genealogy assumes a conception o! the human ood rounded in
the Genealogys criti/ue o! the harm!ul e!!ects o! slave morality upon human !lourishin'
Throuhout his later "ritins he ma1es consistent use o! an evaluative lanuae o! ood and bad#
healthyGstron and decadentG"ea1# noble and slavish#
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distinctions that reveal Nietzsches
commitment to a set o! primary values correspondin in !orm to those o! the noble type' 9i1e
the historical value%systems he associates "ith political nobility# Nietzsches positive values
bein "ith the identi!ication o! the condition o! human happiness as the ood# and the secondary
derivation o! the concept o! the bad as the privation o! that condition' 8or Nietzsche# that
condition and primary value is the value o! po"er'
This identi!ication o! Nietzsches values is most e4plicit in one o! his !inal ma(or "or1s#
The Anti-&hrist' There he presents a eneral claim about the human ood rounded in his
concept o! po"er *die Macht+' )t is po"er that rounds human "ell%bein# and it is the
promotion o! po"er that constitutes human !lourishin, $2hat is ood? Hg!tI D All that heihtens
the !eelin o! po"er Hdas Gef'hl der MachtI# the "ill to po"er Hden (illen )!r MachtI# po"er
itsel! in man' 2hat is happiness? D The !eelin that po"er increases D that a resistance is
overcome *A .+' The $bad *schlecht+# on the other hand# is simply the lac1 o! the ood as he has
de!ined itB it is $all that proceeds !rom "ea1ness' Conse/uently# the bad e4ists only relative to
?
6n ood and bad# see @M ), -;B on nobility# strenth# and "ea1ness# see B@& .::# .-.# and Chapter =# $2hat is
Noble?B on health# sic1ness# and decadence# see T) ., -%-.B F, .# <%FB A, .B ;, .B =, ?FB A -F%.:B and @M )), .<# ))),
-?%-;# and .-'
A
an independently determined# primary conception o! the ood' 2ithout the comparison to states
o! po"er and the !eelin o! po"er# there "ould be no basis !or the (udment o! $bad'
So the Nietzschean concept o! the ood is# enerally# the a!!irmation o! po"er as
intrinsically valuable and the promotion o! the increase o! the !eelin o! po"er' ) "ill no" arue
that this basic value identi!ication o! oodness "ith po"er is# in principle# compatible "ith
morality' Admittedly# Nietzsches conception o! the ood is not a moral one' )t is# !irst o! all# not
clearly normative' Nietzsche relies upon these values !or the evaluation o! persons and actions#
but does not claim that human beins have a moral duty to promote the ood or resist the bad'
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Second# Nietzsches values appear to concern only the "ell%bein o! the sub(ect or# at most# a
select roup o! e4ceptional individuals' Conse/uently# this concept o! the ood does not# as )
"ill assume any true morality must do# ta1e into consideration the "ell%bein o! the social roup
as a "hole'
F
8inally# Nietzsches noble values do include any notion o! moral responsibility5o!
praise"orthiness or blame"orthiness !or an action or character trait'
A
<
6n the non%moral status o! noble $morality# see Clar1 -==<, -A' Admittedly# Nietzsche miht have to re(ect any
normative theory o! value on a number o! rounds other than its compatibility "ith his po"er%a!!irmin value
system' As @euss has pointed out *.::?, ?=%<:+# Nietzsche re(ects the ethical conception o! obliation on a number
o! distinct rounds# includin his re(ection o! any stron conception o! aency or !ree "ill' 3o"ever# my present
purpose is only to establish the compatibility o! Nietzsches values "ith morality' ) do not claim that any morality is
consistent "ith Nietzsches philosophy as a "hole# nor "ith his speci!ic re(ection o! the traditional conception o!
moral aency' Nevertheless# @euss vie" overloo1s the !act that Nietzsche may support the possibility o! a broader
!orm o! moral normativity on the level o! human rather than the individual development, $The problem ) raise here
is ' ' ' "hat type o! human bein one ouht to breed# ouht to "ill# as more valuable# more "orthy o! li!e# more
certain o! the !uture *A ?+' 2hen he spea1s o! $species%enhancin (udments# or "hen he contrasts $tamin and
$breedin *die %'cht!ng* also $cultivation# $discipline# or $selection+ as !orms o! morality *B@& <B T) >B and A ?#
F;+# Nietzsche seems to accept the possibility that human values are conditions !or the cultivation o! di!!erin
human types# "hether desirable *$species%enhancin+ or danerous *as in the case o! the Christian $tamin
criti/ued in The Anti-&hrist+' 2hether or not Nietzsche has any particular aenda !or the normative production o!
any particular !orm o! humanity# he at least seems to clearly accept that our values determine "hat 1inds o! human
beins "ill thrive or not# and so e4press an e!!ective norm about "hat "e "ould li1e humanity to be'
F
That this is Nietzsches later vie" is uncontroversial' 3o"ever# as Richardson points out *-==A, -<=%F:+#
Nietzsche does brie!ly entertain a very di!!erent vie"' )n Daybreak# he considers the possibility that the hihest
ood miht re/uire sacri!icin personal po"er in order to $strenthen and raise hiher the eneral !eelin o! human
po"er as a $positive enhancement o! happiness *C -<A+'
A
Althouh Nietzsche very e4plicitly re(ects the third characteristic o! moral responsibility out o! commitment to a
!orm o! determinism *T) A, A%;+# this leaves him the possible option o! a consistent moral compatibilism'
Nevertheless# ) "ill leave this issue out o! consideration in "hat !ollo"s# as ) do not assume the assinment o!
individual moral responsibility to be a necessary !eature o! an authentic morality'
;
Nevertheless# it may be possible to modi!y Nietzsches conception o! the ood to meet
any or all o! these characteristics o! morality' A Nietzschean morality meetin these
re/uirements "ould, -+ treat the promotion o! po"er and the !eelin o! po"er as a moral duty# .+
demand the promotion o! every individuals po"er# not (ust ones o"n# and ?+ hold individuals
morally responsible !or actin in accordance "ith that duty' )s such a morality possible?
) believe there are t"o principal obstacles to such an attempt to conceive o! a Nietzschean
noble morality' 8irst# Nietzsches identi!ication o! po"er as the basis o! human "ell%bein# and
his identi!ication o! the $"ill to po"er as the principal motivation o! human behavior#
;
suests
that the human individual is sel!%interested in a "ay that is essentially at odds "ith moral concern
!or others' A sel!%a!!irmative morality that de!ines oodness in terms o! po"er "ill# then# be
internally inconsistentB !or it "ill re/uire the promotion o! incompatible oods' Second# because
Nietzsche associates the noble !orm o! values "ith the oppression o! a slave class by a noble
;
The vie" that the "ill to po"er has a primary place in Nietzsches psycholoical theory is a traditional one# thouh
it has been occasionally /uestioned in recent literature *Clar1 -==: and 9eiter .::.+' Clar1 *-==:, ..<+ appeals to
Nietzsches re!erence to the ancients $stronest instinct# the "ill to po"er *T) J, ?+ to arue that the "ill to po"er
is merely one drive amon many# rather than the eneral !orm o! every particular drive or a more primary drive'
9eiter *.::., -<.+ dra"s a similar conclusion !rom Nietzsches re!erence to $terrible aspects o! reality *in a!!ects# in
desires# in "ill to po"er+ *&3 )K, <+' These t"o brie!# passin comments are the only passaes that suest such a
readin' More importantly# they only indirectly suest a vie" that Nietzsche very directly contradicts in numerous
other passaes that emphasize the primacy the "ill to po"er and even identi!y it "ith the "ill to li!e# li!e itsel!# and
the $essence o! li!e' See# !rom the list in 9eiters o"n !ootnote, E )), -.B @S, ?<=B B@&, .F=B @M )),-.' See also A
AB T) -<B @M )), --%-.# ))), --B and B@& =# -?# .?# ?A# ->A# and .?:' The scarcity and indirect /uality o! the
evidence should alone be su!!icient reason to treat aruments !or this interpretation as inconclusive' )n any case# the
passaes in /uestion do not clearly necessitate the interpretation' The passae 9eiter points to only tells us that "ill
to po"er# a!!ects# and drives all !all under the larer cateory o! $terrible aspects o! reality# "hich is not
incompatible "ith the vie" that the a!!ects and drives are secondary to or mani!estations o! the "ill to po"er' ) can#
!or e4ample# meanin!ully say that !ear and su!!erin are both terrible aspects o! li!e# even i! !ear is itsel! a speci!ic
instance o! su!!erin' Moreover# the conte4t o! the cited passae is a criti/ue o! the traditionally $ood individuals
tendency to inore $ho" reality is !undamentally constituted# thus suestin that the $"ill to po"er is part o! the
!undamental constitution o! reality' As !or the passae Clar1 appeals to# Nietzsche may simply be emphasizin that
the mani!estations o! "ill to po"er that dominate @ree1 li!e and culture are particularly vivid and direct e4emplars
o! that more basic drive5in the same "ay that one can spea1 o! actin $naturally "ithout# !or all that# assumin the
e4istence o! any second# e/ually primary $nature' )ndeed# the possibility o! such a distinction bet"een basic#
primary tendency and speci!ic mani!estation# and o! a possible tension bet"een them# is the very possibility o! the
dilemma o! asceticism that Nietzsche addresses in @M )))# "here Nietzsche points out that the ascetics parado4ical
use o! his o"n "ill to po"er aainst itsel! must be a merely apparent contradiction' )! the "ill to po"er can be
e4pressed in the ascetic practice o! sti!lin the "ill to po"er# then Nietzsches identi!ication o! the ancients
stronest instinct as the "ill to po"er may mean little more than that their "ill to po"er mani!ested itsel! in speci!ic
!orms more in 1eepin "ith the most basic and direct mode o! the "ill to po"ers e4pression'
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class# it appears that value systems o! the noble !orm have social hierarchy as a precondition5a
precondition that is morally unacceptable' ) "ill arue that both o! these ob(ections are based in
a misinterpretation o! Nietzsches vie"s' The sense o! po"er at issue in Nietzsches de!inition o!
the ood does not entail an incompatibility o! individual oods# and the historical relation o!
social hierarchy to noble values is continent, noble values do not promote ine/uality'
3. The Comatibilit! of "oralit! and the #ffirmation of Power
A morality rounded in Nietzsches values must include a duty to promote the ood o!
every member o! the social roup' 3o"ever# it miht be ob(ected that such a duty "ould be
incompatible "ith the primary basis o! noble values in sel!%a!!irmation' )n other "ords# the
$sel!ishness that rounds noble values seems to be incompatible "ith the concern !or the "ell%
bein o! others that characterizes morality' )! so# then a Nietzschean concept o! the moral ood
is internally inconsistent, one cannot simultaneously promote the increase o! ones o"n po"er
and !eelin o! po"er as "ell as that o! every member o! the social roup'
This ob(ection rests on the assumption that the promotion o! ones o"n ood is
incompatible "ith the altruistic promotion o! anothers ood# a plausible one in Nietzsches case#
iven his association o! the ood "ith po"er'
>
3o"ever# it is based in a misunderstandin'
Nietzsche uses the "ord po"er *die Macht+ !irst and !oremost in the sense o! the po"er to act, to
realize or produce' )n his re!erences to the $"ill to po"er he emphasizes its $ositive and active
!orm' The "ill to po"er is described# !or e4ample# as $spontaneous# $!orm%ivin *@M ))'-.+#
>
See# !or e4ample# Canto -=AF, .-FB 3ollindale -=AF, -F>%A?B and 0au!mann -=F:, ->F%A' &ach vie"s the "ill to
po"er as intrinsically a !orm o! domination o! or violence upon the outside "orld' 2hile this is the common vie"#
the essential connection o! "ill to po"er to domination has usually been ta1en !or ranted "ithout e4plicit
arument# since Nietzsche o!ten spea1s o! the "ill to po"er in connection "ith violence and domination' This is no
accident, Nietzsche does indeed believe that these are common conse/uences o! the "ill to po"er# but the /uestion
!or our purposes is "hether or not they are a necessary conse/uence o! the "ill to po"er' ) arue belo" that they are
not'
=
$li!e%a!!irmin *@M ))),->+# and $creative *B@& .--+' )n every case the emphasis is upon
po"ers positive etymoloical oriin in the verb $to ma1e or $to do *machen+, po"er is
identi!ied and measured as the production o! e!!ects# not measured neatively as the limitation or
control o! other po"ers'
Admittedly# the !act that the "ill to po"er is !undamentally determined as positive
activity does not mean that it does not have neative e!!ects' &very e!!ective action is the
neation o! the conditions it chanes# shapes# or trans!orms# "hich is "hy Nietzsche !amously
claims that $li!e operates essentially# that is in its basic !unctions# throuh in(ury# assault#
e4ploitation# destruction and simply cannot be thouht o! at all "ithout this character *@M )),
-.+' $9i!e is# he claims# $essentially appropriation# in(ury# overpo"erin *B@& .F=+' Surely#
"e miht be tempted to conclude# this settles the matter, li!e is !undamentally at odds "ith
moralityB human nature must be so as "ell'
3o"ever# this apparently obvious in!erence5one "hich Nietzsche sometimes dra"s5is
simply !alse' 2hat !ollo"s !rom the claim that e4ploitation *to choose only one description !rom
Nietzsches provocative list+ is an essential !eature o! li!e is simply that $e4ploitation in some
sense is a necessary !eature o! every action' 3o"ever# this does not in turn entail an
incompatibility bet"een human nature and morality' 8irst# it does not mean that humans have a
!undamental drive# desire# or "ill to e4ploit persons or thins' Conse/uently "e cannot conclude
the moral restraint o! e4ploitation is also a !rustration o! human desire# nature# or happiness' )t
only tells us that every action "ill involve e4ploitation# reardless o! "hat drives or desires
motivate the action' Second# it does not !ollo" that the e4ploitation that essentially characterizes
every human action is $e4ploitation in an ethically problematic sense' Not only does this not
!ollo"B it is clearly !alse' 8or i! e4ploitation is an essential !eature o! li!e# then the sense o!
$e4ploitation *or $in(ury# $assault# $destruction# etc'+ that Nietzsche is usin must be broad
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enouh to describe every h!man action' Lnless "e are "illin to admit the absurd vie" that
every human activity is essentially immoral# then surely this is not $e4ploitation in a morally
relevant sense' Because Nietzsche is attemptin to characterize li!e as such# these descriptions
are so eneral as to be almost empty o! content "hen applied to the /uestion o! social and ethical
in(ury# violence# or domination amon persons'
Conse/uently# a "ill or tendency to heihten ones po"er is not necessarily a desire to
increase po"er relative to anothers po"er' Nor is it a desire to decrease anothers po"er, $the
state in "hich "e hurt others ' ' ' is a sin that "e are still lac1in po"er *@S -?+'
=
Rather# to
increase po"er is !undamentally to increase ones po"er in relation to ones o"n activity, to
enhance and e4ercise ones abilities# to increase ones ability to act# to do# or to produce# not
unli1e the contemporary usae o! the term $empo"erment' $&very animal# Nietzsche says#
$instinctively strives !or an optimum o! !avorable conditions under "hich it can e4pend all its
strenth *@M ))), ;+' The "ill to po"er is not# then# measured by the e!!ect o! ones po"er upon
others# but accordin to ones ability to act# to mani!est or e4pend strenth' )ndividual human
po"er is primarily the cultivation o! capability# independence o! action# and sel!%masteryB it is
not primarily or necessarily a matter o! havin more po"er than# or po"er over# someone else *o!
overpo"erin# dominatin# or e4ploitin+'
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=
That the increase o! the sub(ects $po"er in the sense o! relevant to $"ill to po"er does not necessitate a decrease
in anothers po"er should be evident !rom Nietzsches repeated suestion that relationships o! strule or
resistance are not obstacles to the "ill to po"er but rather its essence or precondition *@S -?# T) F,?# =,?>B A ?:# F;B
B@& <<# .::# .-.# ..F# .A:B &3 -, ;+' This is a point !ar too o!ten overloo1ed in ethical and political assessments
o! Nietzsches psycholoy# but one "hich John Richardson has admirably e4plained+ See Richardson -==A, -A.'
-:
Clar1 entertains a some"hat similar vie" o! the "ill to po"er *-==:, .-:%--+# but ultimately re(ects it' My
approach is su!!iciently di!!erent to avoid the rounds o! her ob(ections' Clar1 suests that the "ill to po"er# on
this vie"# must be a second%order desire to satis!y our !irst%order desires' She concludes that on this interpretation#
"ill to po"er cannot be a primary desire# since it presupposes !irst%order desires in order to be satis!ied' 2hile my
interpretation# li1e the one Clar1 considers# treats the "ill to po"er as a matter o! $ability or $e!!ectiveness# ) do not
suest that it is a second%order desire' The "ill to po"er is not a secondary desire to satis!y another more primary
desire# but rather the very possibility that there are desires, i! !irst%order desires are e!!ective at all# they must already
include the desire to act upon them, this may be the necessary condition o! any desire at all' Clar1s model o!
$orders o! desire relies on a misleadin treatment o! the "ill to po"er as a $"ill in the psycholoical sense o! a
conscious or unconscious volition to achieve some aim5an interpretation that is incompatible "ith Nietzsches
vie" since# as she hersel! points out *-==:, .-<%.F+# Nietzsche re(ects the notion o! the causality o! the "ill as a
mental !aculty' The "ill to po"er is not# on my interpretation# a volition or a mental act# but the very !act that
--
Moreover# "hen Nietzsche connects oodness to po"er# his stress is not on the increase
o! po"er simply but rather upon the increase o! the !eelin o! and "ill to po"er *$All that
heihtens the feeling of po"er# the "ill to po"er' ' ' ' The feeling that po"er increases+' Both o!
these conditions5the !eelin o! po"er and the "ill to po"er5can be increased independently o!
any increase in ones po"er measured in relation to anothers' That is# one can !eel po"er!ul#
and one can "ill or strive to be po"er!ul# "ithout possessin reater po"er than another' There
is no necessary inverse relationship bet"een the level o! ones o"n !eelin o! po"er and the
po"er o! another' This emphasis upon !eelin o! po"er rather than po"er is# then# a !urther
indication that !or Nietzsche po"er is primarily positive and productive5the measure o! po"er
is the positive criterion o! the ability to act# not the neative criterion o! the e!!ect o! ones
actions upon another'
--
Conse/uently# it is possible to enhance one sub(ects po"er or !eelin o!
po"er "ithout decreasin anothers'
-.
And i! the increase o! each sub(ects ood is in principle
compatible "ith the increase o! every other sub(ects ood# then it is possible !or a Nietzschean
morality o! po"er to consistently a!!irm and promote the ood o! every member o! the social
roup' A noble !orm o! morality is possible# because the promotion o! the others ood is not the
neation o! ones o"n' The basis o! noble morality5the primacy o! sel!%a!!irmation in the
desires lead to action# the very !orce or drive o! human action' )t does not presuppose !irst order desires but is the
condition !or their e!!icacy'
--
@olomb has made a similar point, $A man possessin a !ull sense o! positive po"er does not need to e4ploit others
to con!irm and enhance his o"n sel!' 3ence# only such an individual can allo" himsel! to reard others not as a
means only# but also as ends in themselves *-=>=, .?=+'
-.
Admittedly# Nietzsches psycholoy does suest the necessity o! aonistic relations o! tension and strule
amon sub(ects' 3o"ever# this crucial !eature o! Nietzsches understandin o! human motivation and activity has
usually been interpreted either in too voluntaristic a !ashion *as thouh the "ill to po"er "ere a conscious desire to
enter into con!lict+ or too moralistically *as thouh the "ill to po"er "ere a purely vindictive desire to decrease the
po"er o! another+' 3o"ever# Nietzsches identi!ication o! con!lict at the heart o! every action must be read
descriptively not moralistically, it does not re/uire that these aonistic relations ta1e speci!ically violent or
destructive !orms or have necessarily neative ethical conse/uences !or either party in a relationship' A!ter all# the
most stri1in aspect o! Nietzsches po"er psycholoy is that he interprets every human interaction# even the most
innocuous or apparently altruistic# as essentially aonistic5not (ust relations o! overt con!lict' 8or an e4cellent
e4planation o! the compatibility o! altruistic activity and eoistic motivation in Nietzsches psycholoy# see
Reinster .:::'
-.
conception o! the ood5remains intact even "hen Nietzsches po"er%centered conception o! the
ood is e4panded to include the ood o! others'
$. The Indeendence of Noble Values from Social %ierarch!
The conclusion that a noble morality based in the value o! po"er is possible miht seem
surprisin# and Nietzsche "ould surely not endorse such a morality' Nonetheless# such a
morality is thorouhly compatible "ith Nietzsches o"n account o! the oriin o! noble values'
This may not# at !irst# appear to be the case' Most interpreters assume# based on Nietzsches
description o! the oriin o! noble values in an aristocratic social caste# that social hierarchy and
domination are a precondition !or noble values' Conse/uently# noble values re/uire social
ine/uality either !or their production or their support5a re/uirement incompatible "ith morality'
This ob(ection is based on a mista1en e/uation o! the noble as a psycholoical type "ith the
$master# that is# "ith a social position o! po"er over others' Thouh Nietzsche historically
connects the development o! noble values to a position o! political privilee# ) "ill arue that
social hierarchy and political domination are not necessary to noble values' Moreover# any set o!
values that re/uires social domination "ill con!orm to Nietzsches description o! $slave values
rather than that o! $noble values'
Nietzsches discussion o! the historical oriins o! noble values in On the Genealogy of
Morality appears to suest that the creation o! noble values is a direct product o! the condition
o! belonin to a privileed and more po"er!ul social roup' This leads some commentators to
suest that noble values *and# conse/uently# a noble morality rounded in Nietzsches values+
are impossible "ithout the division o! the community into hiher and lo"er# more and less
po"er!ul# dominatin and dominated'
-?
But althouh Nietzsche does historically associate noble
values "ith a master class that dominates a "ea1er class# "e cannot directly conclude that social
-?
See# !or e4ample# Stron -=;F, .<>, $Master morality al"ays implies an oppressed class and Appel -==='
-?
domination is a precondition o! noble values' &ven i! social mastery can be the basis o! noble
evaluation# it need not be the only possible basis' More importantly# social mastery may not
directly be the basis o! noble evaluation at all'
Althouh it is a $master class that !ounds values o! the noble type# Nietzsche does not
ive any indication that this is only because it occupies the social position o! master' 3e does# in
contrast# ma1e it /uite clear that the slave class produces slavish values simply because o! its
social condition o! oppression' )n other "ords# social domination is indeed a direct basis !or the
production o! slavish values' The essentially neative nature o! slave morality directly re!lects
the misery o! the slaves actual condition, $Suppose the violated# oppressed# su!!erin# un!ree#
"ho are uncertain o! themselves and "eary# moralize, "hat "ill their moral valuations have in
common? Mrobably# a pessimistic suspicion about the "hole condition o! man "ill !ind
e4pression# perhaps a condemnation o! man alon "ith his condition *B@& .A:+' The slavish
concept o! the ood# as "e have seen# oriinates as a direct neation o! the hated other "ho
causes the slaves misery' )t is because the slave is dominated# or $denied the true reaction# that
o! deeds *@M ), -:+# that the slave ma1es its oppressor the neative measure o! moral value'
Slave values are characterized by a $lonin !or freedom# the instinct !or happiness and the
subtleties o! the !eelin o! !reedom *B@& .A:+ precisely because they have their basis in the
absence o! !reedom and happiness' Conse/uently# "e "ould be /uite (usti!ied in assumin that
slave values re/uire !or their e4istence the condition o! social hierarchy# domination# or
oppression' But this is not the case "ith noble values'
The primary conditions that ive rise to the noble !orm o! values are simply those o!
"ell%bein and happiness5in Nietzsches lanuae# po"er and the !eelin o! po"er' Nietzsche
says that the noble $honors himsel! as one "ho is po"er!ul and as one $"ho has po"er over
himsel! *B@& .A:+' The $basic concept o! noble evaluation# he tells us# is the assertion# $2e
-<
noble ones# "e ood# beauti!ul# happy onesN *@M ), -:+ But i! the only precondition o! noble
sel!%a!!irmation *and thus o! noble values+ is happiness# then "e cannot directly conclude that
social mastery is also a precondition and that# conse/uently# social domination is necessary !or
the possibility o! a noble morality' 8or the round o! happiness !or Nietzsche is the !eelin o!
po"er and# as ) have arued above# there is no necessary connection bet"een po"er# the !eelin
o! po"er# and social domination' Noble values presuppose happiness5they re/uire an achieved
state o! po"er# ability# and "ell%bein !or their support' But they do not presuppose a happiness
that must come at the e4pense o! other individuals or entire social roups' Conse/uently# the
po"er that rounds noble morality need not be political po"er' Social masters may# than1s to the
po"er that social domination brins# be noble in character and in the !orm o! their values'
3o"ever# nobles need not be social masters' Noble values are independent o! political status and
the speci!ic conditions o! social hierarchy'
2e cannot# then# directly conclude !rom Nietzsches description o! noble values that all
values o! this !orm re/uire social hierarchy as their basis' More importantly# there is a very
stron reason !or completely re(ectin that conclusion, namely# any set o! values that re/uires the
e4istence o! an oppressed or neatively%evaluated other "ill correspond to Nietzsches
description o! slave values rather than noble values' That is# any morality that re/uires or
promotes social hierarchy is a slavish one'
To establish this# let us hypothetically consider the case o! a noble value%system that
re/uires or promotes social ine/uality' 2e shall see that such a case is# in !act# impossible' 8or
i! these values presuppose the condition o! social mastery over other persons# then that condition
must be included in the de!inition o! the ood in that value system' The concept o! the ood in
this hypothetical hierarchical noble morality "ould still be de!ined as po"er and the increased
!eelin o! po"er# but "ith the added stipulation that po"er is to be measured neatively aainst
-F
anothers po"er' This concept o! the ood "ould not consist simply o! the a!!irmation o! the
nobles o"n happiness# but "ould instead include the devaluation o! the slaves happiness' )n
other "ords# the nobles superiority "ould be determined relative to the slaves in!eriority' The
ood "ould be determined not as po"er# happiness# or pleasure simply# but "ould instead
depend upon comparison'
This is completely at odds "ith Nietzsches account o! noble values5indeed# so much
so# that such an interpretation mirrors his description o! slave morality' Nietzsche tells us that
the noble simply $!eel themselves to be happyB they do not have to $establish their happiness
arti!icially by e4aminin their enemies *@M ), -:+' $The !ree man# accordin to Nietzsche#
$possess his measure o! value, loo1in upon others !rom himsel!# he honors or despises *@M )),
.+' 3o"ever# in any value system "here the ood re/uires the political subordination o! another#
the concept o! the ood is no loner primarily a!!irmative# as Nietzsche has claimed is the case
"ith noble values' 9i1e the slavish concept o! the ood# a hierarchical morality o! po"er beins
"ith a primary $No# a $need to direct ones vie" out"ard instead o! bac1 to onesel! *@M ), -:+'
Nietzsche describes this stratey o! value creation# one "hich a!!irms the sel! only in its
di!!erence !rom a devalued other# as $the essence o! resentment# "here resentment is the primary
characteristic o! the slave as a psycholoical type' The ood in this version o! noble morality is
little more than the neation o! the others e/uality and independence# or the neation o! ones
o"n "ea1ness as measured aainst the others strenth' 2hereas the noble type $e4periences
itself as determinin values and sees itsel! as $that "hich !irst accords honor to thins *B@&
?A:+# this conception o! the ood is one in "hich the sub(ect needs the other in order to
determine its o"n valueB its value is rounded in comparison' Admittedly# noble values also
include comparison# but in precisely the opposite "ay, the noble determines its concept o! the
bad throuh comparison to itsel! as the ood' )n the case o! values that include the position o!
-A
social privilee in their conception o! the ood# on the contrary# the bad is not derived
secondarily' Rather# the ood presupposes the identi!ication o! the bad "ith the others e/uality#
independence# or po"er' This hypothetical version o! noble morality turns out to be a thorouhly
slavish interpretation o! nobility in "hich the individual a!!irms her o"n po"er only throuh the
neation o! anothers po"er' )t is no coincidence that this slavish interpretation o! nobility leads
to a purely neative concept o! po"er# the very same understandin o! po"er that is assumed in
conventional readins o! the "ill to po"er as a desire to overpo"er or dominate'
Lltimately# "e cannot vie" social hierarchy as a precondition !or noble values "ithout
seriously con!usin# and ultimately invertin# Nietzsches primary opposition o! noble and
slavish values' Conse/uently# Nietzsches cateory o! noble values does not re/uire or
presuppose a state o! social hierarchy# and there is no incompatibility bet"een noble values and
morality' As much as Nietzsche may have "anted to be an anti%moralist# to re(ect morality in its
entirety# nothin about his conceptions o! po"er# human nature# or nobility# re/uires that he ta1e
such a position'
$. The Possibilit! of a Noble &orm of '(alitarian )ustice
)t is a surprisin enouh conclusion that# !or all his critical !ury aainst morality#
Nietzsche has !ailed to completely dispose o! it# even on his o"n terms' This compatibility
bet"een Nietzsches values and morality has even more stri1in conse/uences !or the issue o!
social (ustice' )! a Nietzschean morality o! po"er is possible# there are no obvious obstacles to a
noble !orm o! social (ustice rounded in such a morality' 8or the principal obstacles to such a
!orm o! (ustice are identical to those ) have already addressed in relation to morality' 3o"ever# )
"ould li1e to o !urther than simply suestin the compatibility o! Nietzsches noble values and
(ustice' ) "ill no" arue that Nietzsches values are compatible "ith speci!ically ealitarian
-;
conceptions o! (ustice and that# indeed# these values are even conducive to ealitarian
conceptions o! (ustice'
)t miht seem obvious that Nietzsches values cannot possibly be compatible "ith
ealitarianism in any !orm' 3is disdain !or the concept o! $e/uality is "ell%1no"n# and his "or1
is !ull o! criticisms o! ealitarian ideals and political movements'
-<
Aain# ho"ever# my /uestion
is "hether Nietzsche could consistently endorse such a conception "hile maintainin his
commitment to the a!!irmation o! po"er and to the noble mode o! evaluation5it is not a
/uestion o! "hether or not he "ould endorse it' Are Nietzsches radical immoralism and
vehement anti%ealitarianism a loical conse/uence o! his 1ey philosophical commitments# or are
they merely an e4pression o! personal pre(udices that have no necessary connection to the
principle !eatures o! his moral philosophy?
8or the present purposes# ) "ill de!ine $(ustice broadly as the use o! leal and political
institutions to protect the achieved ood o! every member o! a social roup' A conception o!
(ustice may also include the active promotion o! the social ood in addition to its protection' 8or
e4ample# an ealitarian conception o! (ustice# in addition to preservin the achieved ood o! its
members# actively see1s to produce e/uality amon its members' That is# it actively promotes
the ood o! its members# "here the individual ood is believed to include some !orm and deree
o! political or economic e/uality'
The most immediate ob(ection to my proposal o! a Nietzschean !orm o! ealitarian (ustice
"ill li1ely be the claim that ealitarianism is an e4pression o! slave morality' Nietzsche seems to
suest as much in his o"n criticisms o! the concept o! e/uality' Accordin to this ob(ection# the
demand !or e/uality is an e4pression o! slavish resentment# because ones o"n ood is de!ined as
the neation o! anothers po"er5in this case# the neation o! the others political or economic
superiority' Surely# this is incompatible "ith the primarily a!!irmative !oundation o! noble
-<
See# !or e4ample# @S ?;;B E )), ;B B@& <<# A.# .-.# .?># and .AFB and T) <>'
->
values' Moreover# since ealitarianism see1s to reduce the po"er o! the rulin classes# it is
clearly at odds "ith Nietzsches a!!irmation o! po"er and the !eelin o! po"er'
This ob(ection is a variation upon the earlier discussed ob(ection to Nietzschean morality'
9i1e that ob(ection# it depends on the assumption that po"er is e/uivalent to or inseparable !rom
domination5a sense o! po"er that ) believe Nietzsche cannot consistently endorse' The demand
!or e/uality is an e4pression o! slavish values only i! it is a demand to eliminate or reduce
anothers po"er' But the demand !or e/ual po"er is not necessarily such a demand *no more# !or
e4ample# than a demand !or e/ual pay is a demand that others salaries be reduced to the level o!
ones o"n+' )t is so only i! the increase o! my po"er comes at e4pense o! anothers' That is to
say# ealitarianism is slavish only i! "e assume that the individuals ood# as de!ined by
Nietzsche# is essentially incompatible "ith the ood o! others' 8or only then "ould social
e/uality re/uire the reduction o! anothers po"er' ) have already arued that this is not the case'
Nietzsche understands the human ood in terms o! po"er and the !eelin o! po"er# "hich can be
increased independently o! the po"er o! othersB it is measured primarily in relation to the
sub(ects ability to act rather than in relation to the e!!ects o! the sub(ects po"er upon others'
Conse/uently# the demand !or e/uality can be entirely a!!irmative5a demand !or the
ma4imization o! every individuals ood# since the ood o! every sub(ect can in principle be
bro!ght !$ to the same level' There are# "e miht say# slavish and noble conceptions o!
ealitarianism' The slavish !orm assumes the incompatibility o! human oods and demands
e/uality as mutual sacri!ice# "hile a noble !orm o! ealitarianism is characterized by the
assumption o! compatible oods and promotes the e/ual ma4imization o! po"er' These t"o
conceptions o! ealitarianism mirror Nietzsches o"n distinction bet"een t"o 1inds o! e/uality,
$the thirst !or e/uality can e4press itsel! either as a desire to dra" everyone do"n to onesel!
*throuh diminishin them# spyin on them# rippin them up+ or to raise onesel! and everyone
-=
else up *throuh reconizin their virtues# helpin them# re(oicin in their success+ *3A ?::+'
&/uality is not necessarily the neation o! the happiness or !lourishin o! those "ith reater
po"erB it can instead be the promotion o! the po"er and happiness o! the une/ual' Conse/uently#
a noble !orm o! (ustice can include the promotion o! social e/uality in its conception o! the ood'
*. '+ualit! as the Precondition of ,astin( Noble Value S!stems
) "ould no" li1e to ta1e the arument a !inal step !urther, ) "ill arue that Nietzsches
values are not merely compatible "ith# but also conducive to# ealitarian (ustice' Speci!ically#
because o! their noble !orm Nietzsches values provide individuals "ith a motivation to pursue
social e/uality' )t is not simply that one miht do so "ithout doin harm to ones o"n ood# but
that it is in the sub(ects best interest to promote social e/uality'
To clari!y this point# ) "ill turn to Nietzsches account o! the oriins o! (ustice and la"'
As it happens# Nietzsche has already implied that there is a non%slavish motive !or promotin
(ustice# thouh not ealitarian (ustice' There must be such a motive# !or Nietzsche believes that it
is the noble classes that oriinally !ounded (ustice' 3e adamantly re(ects the common vie" that
(ustice is primarily motivated by envy# resentment# or revene# as "e miht e4pect i! (ustice "ere
the invention o! the oppressed or politically disadvantaed' Justice is not rounded in these
$reactive !eelins# as he calls them' 6n the contrary, $the last sphere to be con/uered by the
spirit o! (ustice is the sphere o! the reactive !eelins' Accordin to Nietzsche# (ustice and la" are
the invention o! the noble class5precisely those "ho# iven their !ortunate position o! social
privilee# have little cause !or resentment# envy or the desire !or revene' Justice oriinates in
the nobles attempt to brin slavish resentment to an end,
8rom a historical point o! vie"# la" represents on earth ' ' ' the strule against the
reactive !eelins# the "ar conducted aainst them on the part o! the active and aressive
po"ers "ho employed some o! their strenth to impose measure and bounds upon the
.:
e4cesses o! the reactive pathos and compel it to come to terms' 2herever (ustice is
practiced and maintained one sees a stroner po"er see1in a means o! puttin an end to
the senseless rain o! ressentiment amon the "ea1er po"ers that stand under it' *@M
)), --+
This strule aainst resentment includes the introduction o! la"s desined to protect their
sub(ects and the introduction o! leal !orms o! compensation !or damaes5that is# it includes
measures desined to prevent and alleviate the conditions o! ine/uality and su!!erin that
produce reactive !eelins' The institution o! la" prevents such conditions by protectin sub(ects
!rom one another# "hile the establishment o! leal e/uivalents throuh "hich to compensate
sub(ects !or in(ury helps brin resent!ul !eelins to an end by eliminatin the need !or retribution
*@M )), --+'
So "hat speci!ically motivates this historical noble caste to initiate a "ar on resentment
in the !orms o! la" and (ustice? The motive !ollo"s !rom the primary opposition o! noble and
slavish values' The nobles values are an a!!irmation o! their o"n po"er and happiness' But the
slaves values are a direct reversal o! noble values# a direct neation o! the noble type and the
conditions o! its happiness' Because slave morality is nothin more than the inversion and
neation o! the nobles values# the sel!%a!!irmin nature o! noble values re/uires the active
suppression o! slave morality' That is# the nobles cannot consistently a!!irm themselves and
remain indi!!erent to a morality that has as its essence the neation o! noble values and po"er'
Conse/uently# the attempt to eliminate reactive !eelins throuh the institution o! (ustice is
motivated by the nobles desire to preserve and a!!irm their o"n values and conditions o!
happiness' )t is# in other "ords# motivated by a desire !or sel!%preservation'
This# in turn# suests a possible motive !or a Nietzschean !orm o! ealitarian (ustice'
9i1e the alleviation o! resentment# the promotion o! e/uality is a necessary condition !or the
preservation o! noble values' Nietzsches Genealogy5thouh o!ten read as a love letter to
aristocratic politics5miht instead be read as a cautionary tale about ho" social ine/uality leads
.-
inevitably to the cultural victory o! slave morality' )t is# a!ter all# social ine/uality that produces
slave resentment# "hich in turn ives birth to slave morality' )! it is ine/uality is the principal
basis o! slave values# then "hat better de!ense aainst slave morality than e/uality?
As Nietzsche describes the oriinal noble !orm o! (ustice# it alleviates only speci!ic
in(uries su!!ered by sub(ects# and only ac1no"ledes in(ustices "ithin a speci!ic social class,
$Justice on this elementary level is the ood "ill amon parties o! appro4imately e/ual po"er to
come to terms "ith one another# to reach an $understandin by means o! a settlement5and to
com$el parties o! lesser po"er to reach a settlement amon themselves *@M )), >+' So the
oriinal !orm o! (ustice as practiced by the nobles upholds the social hierarchy in "hich it "as
!ounded'
Because this oriinal !orm o! (ustice deals only "ith speci!ic in(uries in!licted by and
upon members o! a shared social class# it is ine!!ective at treatin the in(ury that is the very
!oundation o! all reactive social !eelins and# ultimately# o! slave morality, social hierarchy#
ine/uality# and domination' Justice cannot possibly succeed in its strule aainst resentment
and the rise o! slave morality i! it preserves class ine/uality'
-F
7et the noble values that round
the pro(ect o! (ustice cannot consistently allo" !or the e4istence o! a morality that has as its
-F
3or1heimer has made a similar point, $The overcomin o! this morality lies not in the positin o! a better one# but
in the creation o! conditions under "hich its reason !or e4istin is eliminated *-==?, -:=+'
..
essence the neation and overcomin o! noble values and po"er' Conse/uently# the consistent
a!!irmation and preservation o! noble values demands the elimination o! social hierarchy as the
very condition o! its success' The survival o! $master morality is possible only throuh the
sacri!ice o! the social%political position o! $master'
Conse/uently# a Nietzschean !orm o! (ustice5li1e any !orm o! noble values5can be
preserved !rom the threat o! slave values only on the condition o! achieved social e/uality# the
elimination o! the social condition that produces and promotes slave values' That is the
Nietzschean motivation to endorse an ealitarian conception o! (ustice' To do other"ise is to
uarantee the continued success o! slave morality' 2hile it sounds parado4ical to suest that a
noble !orm o! (ustice sacri!ices social superiority in de!ense o! its happiness# "e must remember
that this is the sacri!ice o! relative superiority in po"er# and Nietzsches conception o! the human
ood is !ounded in a very di!!erent understandin o! po"er' Conse/uently# this motive to
promote e/uality is not a matter o! acceptin a compromised happiness# o! sacri!icin some
portion o! happiness in e4chane !or protected happiness' )t is not# as in the slavish conception
o! (ustice# the promotion o! e/ually distributed sacri!ice' 6n the contrary# a noble ealitarian
(ustice "ould see1# in Nietzsches o"n "ords# to $share not su!!erin but (oy *@S ??>+'
R&8&R&NC&S
Appel 8 *-===+ Nietzsche contra democracy' Cornell# )thaca
Bermann 8 *-=>>+ Nietzsches criti/ue o! morality' )n, Solomon R and 3iins 0 *ed+
Readin Nietzsche' 64!ord# Ne" 7or1
8oot M *-==<+ Nietzsches immoralism' )n, Schacht R *ed+ Nietzsche enealoy morality,
essays on Nietzsches enealoy o! morals' Lniversity o! Cali!ornia# Ber1eley
Clar1 M *-==:+ Nietzsche on truth and philosophy' Cambride Lniversity# Cambride
Clar1 M *-==<+ Nietzsches immoralism and the concept o! morality' )n, Schacht R *ed+
Nietzsche enealoy morality, essays on Nietzsches enealoy o! morals' Lniversity o!
Cali!ornia# Ber1eley
Canto A *-=AF+ Nietzsche as philosopher' Columbia# Ne" 7ro1
@olomb J *-=>=+ Nietzsches enticin psycholoy o! po"er' )o"a State# Ames
.?
@euss R *.::?+ 6utside ethics' &uro J Mhilos -- *-+, .=%F?'
3iins 0 and Solomon R *ed+ *-=>>+ Readin Nietzsche' 64!ord# Ne" 7or1
3ollindale R *-=AF+ Nietzsche, the man and his philosophy' Cambride Lniversity# Cambride
3or1heimer M *-==?+ &oism and !reedom movements, on the anthropoloy o! the
boureois era' )n, Bet"een philosophy and social science, selected early "ritins' M)T#
Cambride
0au!mann 2 *-=F:+ Nietzsche, philosopher psycholoist antichrist' Mrinceton Lniversity#
Mrinceton
9eiter B *.::.+ The routlede philosophy uideboo1 to Nietzsche on morality' Routlede#
9ondon
Nietzsche 8 *-=AA+ Beyond ood and evil *trans, 0au!mann 2+' Kintae# Ne" 7or1
Nietzsche 8 *-=;<+ The ay science *trans, 0au!mann 2+' Kintae# Ne" 7or1
Nietzsche 8 *-=>A+ 3uman all too human *trans, 3ollindale RJ+' Cambride Lniversity#
Cambride
Nietzsche 8 *-=A;+ 6n the enealoy o! morals and ecce homo *trans, 0au!mann 2+' Kintae#
Ne" 7or1
Nietzsche 8 *-=F<+ Thus spo1e zarathustra *trans, 0au!mann 2+' Menuin# Ne" 7or1
Nietzsche 8 *-=A>+ T"iliht o! the idols and the anti%christ *trans, 3ollindale RJ+' Menuin#
9ondon
Reinster B *.:::+ Nietzsche on sel!lessness and the value o! altruism' 3ist Mhilos O -; *.+,
-;;%.::'
Richardson J *-==A+ Nietzsches system' 64!ord Lniversity# 64!ord
Shacht R *ed+ *-==<+ Nietzsche enealoy morality, essays on Nietzsches enealoy o!
morals' Lniversity o! Cali!ornia# Ber1eley
Solomon R and 3iins 0 *ed+ *-=>>+ Readin Nietzsche' 64!ord Lniversity# 64!ord
Stron T *-=;F+ 8riedrich Nietzsche and the politics o! trans!iuration' Lniversity o! Cali!ornia#
Ber1eley
.<