TOM R O C K M O R E

Yale University
F I CHT E ' S I DE AL I S M AND MARX' S MAT E RI AL I S M
The inherent danger of distinctions is that if badly drawn or poorly ap-
plied they serve to obscure rather than to clarify. The aim of this paper is to
call into question a well-known example, the idealism-materialism distinction.
I shall argue, through a discussion of various ways in which it has been
drawn, that no central concept is discernible in the different definitions,
other than a distinction between thought and being. Through a comparison
of Fichte' s and Marx' s positions, I shall further argue that, however for-
mulated, this distinction does not help to distinguish Marx' s views from
those of the German idealists.
The distinction between idealism and materialism has long been in use in
philosophy. This distinction is commonly held to refer to a basic methodolo-
gical option or way of doing philosophy, and its use is still current. Although
the doctrine of idealism has enjoyed little support recently, at least not under
that name, attempts to demonstrate the validity of various forms of ma-
terialism are now in fashion.
Despite the attention ~evoted to the idealism-materialism distinction and
the extent to which it is often presupposed in doing philosophy, or perhaps
because of these reasons, no single way of drawing the distinction has
achieved anything approaching universal acceptance. A comparison of works
which attempt either to define or discuss idealism or materialism reveals the
diverse meaning accorded to these two terms. In most instances common
to their discussions is the presupposition of the incompatibility of idealism
and materialism, although it is apparent that unanimity is lacking on whether
these two theories divide the philosophical universe between them or must
in turn be distinguished from other alternatives.
To consider several representative examples, both the Dictionary of
Philosophy and the Philosophisches W&terbuch consider idealism and ma-
terialism as exclusive alternatives whose principle difference concerns the
relative priority accorded to consciousness or to matter.~ On the contrary,
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TOM ROCKMORE
the E n c i c l o p e d i a F i l o s o f i c a opposes idealism to realism and materialism to
both idealism and spiritualism. 2 In the "Refutation of Idealism" G.E. Moore
considers the opposition between idealism or spiritualism and common-sense
realism. 3 Kemp Smith '4 and H.B. Acton, following Smith, maintain that the
distinction refers to whether matter is primary to mind and spiritual values,
and both argue that idealism has to be distinguished not only from ma-
terialism, but from naturalism and subjectivism as well.
Other writers presume that the two positions in question are not mutually
exclusive. Santayana, for instance, argues that idealists are actually crypto-
materialists and that a self-consistent theory of idealism is not possible. ~
Rorty claims, in the context of a general discussion of alternative conceptual
frameworks, that the distinction cannot be defended, since it rests on a prior,
untenable distinction." On the contrary, Bosanquet opposes idealism to
realism and argues that they are not sharp contrasts, but positions which have
much in common. 7 Following Bosanquet, Urban maintains that a synthesis of
both views is possible. 8
Taken together, the two general approaches with respect to the idealism-
materialism distinction suggest there are questions which must be answered
prior to its use. Among these questions are the following : Are idealism and
materialism mutually exclusive or complementary theories ? Is there a
"normal" way of drawing the distinction, or can it only be drawn norma-
tively ? Can the different forms of the distinction be reduced to one another
or are they irreconcilably dissimilar ? In what contexts can the distinction be
used without fear of creating a distortion ?
Questions concerning the viability and applicability of the distinction
are of special interest since it has served historically as a watershed to
separate theories on methodological grounds. This is especially true for
discussions of continental philosophy. Wi t hout prejudging the merits of the
various views of the distinction, I shall argue that even if some form of
it is tenable, the distinction, as commonly drawn, does not help to dis-
tinguish Marx' s theory from classical German philosophy, which will here
be defined as the period from Kant to Marx. My argument will be similar
to that of Bosanquet in that I shall be concerned to show that the "idealist"
and "materialist" views of this perio d share a common approach which
makes it fatuous and misleading to separate them on methodological grounds.
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F I C HT E ' S I DE AL I S M AND MARX' S MAT E RI AL I S M
II
I n or de r t o make cl ear why t he appl i cabi l i t y o f t he di st i nct i on i n quest i on
is a t opi c i n need of discussion, a wor d shoul d be said about t he ma nne r i n
whi ch t he phi l os ophi c t opogr a phy of this per i od is somet i mes descri bed.
Classical Ge r ma n phi l os ophy is of t e n di vi ded i nt o t hr ee, t empor ar i l y un-
equal segment s : t he critical phi l os ophy, r epr es ent ed by Ka nt ; idealism, in-
cl udi ng Fi cht e, Schel l i ng and He g e l ; and mat eri al i sm, Ma r x' s a p p r o a c h ?
T h e resul t o f this di vi si on is t o " i d e n t i f y " a t r i pl e- met hodol ogi cal oppos i t i on
i n classical Ge r ma n t hought , whi ch compri ses t hree, met hodol ogi cal l y-
di st i ngui shabl e t ypes o f t heori es.
Thi s t r i par t i t e di vi si on is based on t wo assumpt i ons. On t he one hand,
Ka nt ' s st at ement s, as earl y as t he f i r st Critique and as l at e as t he Opus
Posthumum, t hat his t h o u g h t is an i deal i sm are unaccount abl y i gnor ed, t hus
est abl i shi ng an " o p p o s i t i o n " bet ween t he cri t i cal phi l os ophy and idealism.
On t he ot her hand, assertions by Fi cht e, Schel l i ng and He ge l t hat t hey are
idealists and by Ma r x t hat he is a mat eri al i st are accept ed as accurate, t her eby
gener at i ng an " o p p o s i t i o n " bet ween i deal i sm and mat eri al i sm.
No w one way t o answer t he quest i on, what ' s i n a name ? is t o r epl y t hat
t he i mpor t ance we accor d t o i t s choi ce s houl d in some sense be pr opor t i ona l
t o its i mpor t ance i n or der i ng our per cept i ons. Accor di ngl y, it is less
i mpor t a nt t o deci de i f it is correct t o call t he Ka nt i a n phi l os ophy a f or m
of i deal i sm t han t o deci de i f we may pr oper l y di st i ngui sh bet ween i deal i sm
and mat eri al i sm. I n t he f o r me r instance, al t hough Ka n t criticizes cert ai n
f or ms o f i deal i sm as unt enabl e, his cl ai m t hat his own t hought is i t sel f a
f o r m o f i deal i sm casts doubt on t he at t empt t o di st i ngui sh bet ween t he
critical phi l os ophy and i deal i sm.
I n t he l at t er case, bot h i n t he t hi nker s concer ned and i n t he secondary
l i t er at ur e, t he labels are t aken seri ousl y and t he cl ai m is ma de f o r a f unda-
ment al di f f e r e nc e i n appr oach. Hence, i n this i nst ance bot h t he vi abi l i t y
as wel l as t he appl i cabi l i t y o f t he di st i nct i on are i mpor t ant . Its use pr e-
supposes bot h t hat t hese t wo condi t i ons are f ul f i l l e d and t hat its empl oyment
is he l pf ul i n separ at i ng t heor i es as so t ype. But i f t he t heori es i n quest i on
do not d i f f e r wi t h respect t o met hodol ogy, t he di st i nct i on cannot be i nvoked
t o r e f e r t o such a di f f er ence and its appl i cat i on serves onl y t o creat e an
ar bi t r ar y or " u n n a t u r a l " and mi sl eadi ng separ at i on among met hodol ogi cal l y-
si mi l ar views.
1 9 1
TOM ROCKMORE
Th e r e are vari ous ways t o st udy t he appl i cabi l i t y of a di st i nct i on. One
mi ght , f o r i nst ance, envi sage d i f f e r e n t meani ngs it coul d be gi ven i n or der
t o f aci l i t at e its use. I n such an appr oach, i t is pr es umed t hat t he di f f er ence
t o be descr i bed i n fact obtains. I n t hat case, i t
t he di s t i nct i on accurately. An o t h e r appr oach,
t he vi ews i n ques t i on i n or der t o de t e r mi ne
di ssi mi l ar.
Obvi ous l y t oo much occur r ed i n classical
possi bl e a f ul l discussion o f even t he ma j or
is onl y necessary t o " c a pt ur e "
t hat used her e, is t o anal yze
i f t hey are met hodol ogi cal l y
Ge r ma n phi l os ophy t o make
t hi nker s o f this per i od. I t is
hence necessary
wi del y t hought
rialist, i t seems
respect i vel y, o f
t o choose t hi nker s t o serve as exampl es. Since Fi cht e is
o f as an i deal i st and Ma r x is usual l y cl assi fi ed as a mat e-
a ppr opr i a t e t o concent r at e on t hei r vi ews as r epr esent at i ve,
i deal i sm and mat eri al i sm. I t f ur t he r seems r easonabl e t o
s uppos e t hat i f t her e is a met hodol ogi cal di f f e r e nc e bet ween i deal i sm and
mat eri al i sm, i t wi l l be di scer ni bl e ei t her i n t he par t i cul ar t heor y each t hi nke r
advances or i n his vi ews on t he or y i n gener al , or met a- t heor y. Accor di ngl y,
I shal l begi n by a r evi ew o f t he respect i ve t heor et i cal posi t i ons and t hen
pr oceed t o an exami nat i on o f t he t wo met a-t heori es.
III
Th e i deal i sm- mat er i al i sm di st i nct i on is i mpor t a nt f or Fi cht e' s t hought .
Appr opr i a t e phi l os ophi c me t hodol ogy is a f r e que nt t opi c i n hi s wr i t i ngs
and he hol ds t hat cent r al t o t he pr obl e m o f me t hodol ogy is t he r el at i on o f
i deal i sm and mat eri al i sm, t wo basic ways o f doi ng phi l os ophy. I n this
r egar d Fi cht e of t e n comment s f avor abl y on i deal i sm as t he " c or r e c t " phi l o-
sophi c appr oach and unf a vor a bl y on mat eri al i sm, whi ch he describes vari ous-
l y as dogmat i s m or realism. But al t hough this mi ght lead one t o i nf e r t hat
Fi cht e rej ect s mat er i al i sm and embraces i deal i sm, I shal l ar gue t hat a close
r e a di ng o f t he t ext s wi l l show t hat his vi ew o f critical i deal i sm is an
at t empt ed synthesis o f bot h i deal i sm and mat eri al i sm.
Cri t i cal i deal i sm is a t heor y o f exper i ence. I t may be s ummar i zed as
f ol l ows : Accor di ng t o Fi cht e, all exper i ence can be anal yzed as a r el at i on
o f subj ect and obj ect or, i n his t er mi nol ogy, sel f and not - sel f . He exami nes
t hi s r el at i on i n t er ms o f a f i r st pr i nci pl e, namel y, t hat t he sel f is t o be
unde r s t ood i n t er ms o f its activity. 1~ T h e f i r st pr i nci pl e f unct i ons axi omat i -
cally i n Fi cht e' s system, since he uses i t t o " d e r i v e " t he rest of his posi t i on.
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F I C HT E ' S I DE AL I S M AND MARX' S MAT E RI AL I S M
I n par t i cul ar , t hr ough appl i cat i on o f t he f i r st pr i nci pl e t o t he r el at i on of
sel f and not - sel f , Fi cht e " de duc e s " a series o f pr opos i t i ons whi ch, he claims,
are sel f-consi st ent , f or m a coher ent whol e and whi ch, t a k e n t oget her , account
f o r t he condi t i on o f t he possi bi l i t y o f t he facts o f exper i ence.
Fi cht e expl i ci t l y di st i ngui shes bet ween t heor y and met a- t heor y. He bases
his own vi ew on met a- t heor et i c consi der at i ons whi ch concer n his nor mat i ve
vi ew of t he goal o f phi l os ophy as wel l as t he t ype o f t heor y adequat e t o
t hat end. Al t hough he cl earl y hol ds t hat t he goal o f phi l os ophy is t he
expl anat i on o f experi ence, it is easy t o mi s under s t and whi ch t ype of t heor y
he feel s is adequat e t o t hat end. Th e mi s under s t andi ng can be ascribed t o
a si mpl e reason, f o r al t hough Fi cht e of f er s at least t hr ee di f f e r e nt analyses
of t he pr obl em, f r o m t wo o f t he discussions one concl usi on f ol l ows, whereas
a d i f f e r e n t concl usi on f ol l ows f r o m t he t hi r d discussion. But one can,
nevert hel ess, speci f y t he t ype Of t heor y Fi cht e favors.
I n what may be cal l ed Fi cht e' s t wo s emi - popul ar discussions, he mai nt ai ns,
t hr ough separat e lines o f reasoni ng, t hat t her e are onl y t wo possi bl e
appr oaches t o phi l os ophy, i deal i sm and realism. I deal i sm is t he vi ew t hat
exper i ence is t o be account ed f o r t hr ough a t heor y of t he subj ect or sel f as
t he basis o f real i t y. Realism, whi ch Fi cht e also calls dogmat i sm, cor r esponds
t o wha t Ma r x calls mat eri al i sm. It is t he pos i t i on t hat exper i ence is t o be
expl ai ned i n t erms o f an i nde pe nde nt gi ven, t he real.
Fr o m this analysis, Fi cht e draws t wo separate, appar ent l y i ncompat i bl e
concl usi ons. I n a f i r st discussion, he argues t hat nei t her possi bl e appr oach
t o exper i ence can r e f ut e t he ot her. He concl udes t hat t he me t hod one elects
is a f unc t i on o f one' s i nt erest s :
Wh a t sor t of phi l os ophy one chooses depends, t her ef or e, on what sor t
o f man one is; f or a phi l osophi cal system is not a dead pi ece o f f ur ni t ur e
t hat we can r ej ect or accept as we wi sh; i t is r at her a t hi ng ani mat ed by
t he soul o f t he per s on wh o hol ds it. A per s on i ndol ent by nat ur e or dul l ed
and di s t or t ed by ment al servi t ude, l ear ned l uxur y, and vani t y wi!l never
raise hi ms e l f t o t he l evel of i deal i sm. 11
Th e evi dent weakness o f this " ps ychogenet i c" analysis is t hat , i f bot h vi ews
are o f equal val ue, no r eason can be gi ven t o opt f or one me t hod as oppos ed
t o a not he r but , as wi l l be seen, Fi cht e hol ds t hat t he vi ews are o f unequal
i mpor t ance and t hat ar gument can be advanced f or t he non- ar bi t r ar y choi ce
o f t he pr ope r appr oach.
193
TOM ROCKMORE
I n a second analysis, Fi cht e mai nt ai ns t hat al t hough nei t her appr oach
can r e f ut e t he ot her , real i sm is i nadequat e t o expl ai n exper i ence. But i f
real i sm is not a vi abl e t heor y, this leaves i deal i sm as t he sole possi bl e vi ew.
Th u s dogmat i s m can onl y r epeat its pr i nci pl e, and t hen r ei t er at e i t unde r
vari ous gui s e s : i t can st at e it, and t he n st at e i t agai n; but it cannot get
f r o m this t o t he e xpl a na ndum, and de duc e t he l at t er. Yet phi l os ophy
consists preci sel y o f this deduct i on. He n c e dogmat i sm, even f r o m t he
specul at i ve vi ewpoi nt , is no phi l os ophy at all, but mer el y an i mpot e nt
cl ai m and assurance. I deal i s m is l e f t as t he onl y possi bl e phi l os ophy. 12
So st at ed this i ndi r ect ar gument f o r i deal i s m is unsat i sf act or y f o r at least
t wo reasons. First, i t is not cl ear why t hese t wo posi t i ons are t he onl y ones
whi ch can be advanced. El sewher e Fi cht e, f o r instance, pr opos e d a t hi r d
vi ew, namel y critical i deal i sm. Second, even i f we gr ant Fi cht e' s poi nt t hat
r eal i sm cannot be an adequat e t heory, n o r eason has been advanced f o r t he
appr opr i at eness o f i deal i sm.
I n a t hi r d discussion Fi cht e gives t he analysis on whi ch he bases hi s own
posi t i on. Her e, as i n t he f i r st t wo analyses, i deal i sm and real i sm are separate,
consi st ent posi t i ons, nei t her o f whi ch can r e f ut e t he ot her since t he quar r el
is about f i r st pr i nci pl es. Fur t her , r eas on cannot choose bet ween t he m since
each pos i t i on concer ns a di f f e r e nt f acet o f exper i ence. Th e pr ope r vi ew is a
t hi r d al t er nat i ve whi ch combi nes t he vi r t ues o f t he a posteriori appr oach o f
r eal i sm and t he a priori appr oach o f i deal i sm. I n this way, real i sm is ex-
pl ai ned t hr ough i deal i sm, but i deal i sm is g r o u n d e d i n realism. Fi cht e wri t es :
Th e phi l os ophe r says onl y i n his own n a me : Ever yt hi ng t hat exists f o r
t he self, exists t hr ough t he sel f. Th e sel f, however , i t sel f says i n its own
p h i l o s o p h y : As surel y as I am and l i ve, s omet hi ng exists out si de me,
whi ch is not t her e by my doi ng. Ho w i t arri ves at such a claim, t he
phi l os ophe r expl ai ns by t he pr i nci pl es o f hi s phi l os ophy. Th e f i r st st and-
poi nt is t hat of pur e specul at i on; t he s econd t hat o f l i f e and sci ent i fi c
k n o wl e d g e . . . Th e second is onl y i nt el l i gi bl e on t he basis of t he f i r s t ;
real i sm has gr ounds , i ndeed, apar t f r o m t hat , f o r we are const r ai ned t o i t
by our own nat ur e, but it has no k n o wn and comprehensible gr ounds : yet
t he f i r s t s t andpoi nt , agai n, exists onl y f o r t he pur pos e o f ma ki ng t he second
i nt el l i gi bl e. I deal i sm can never be a mode o I t hought , i t is mer el y a
speculative poi nt of v i e w? a
Cri t i cal i deal i sm, t he pos i t i on descr i bed by Fi cht e, has vari ous synonyms
i n hi s wri t i ngs, such as r eal i deal i sm, i deal real i sm or t r anscendent al i deal i sm.
194
F I C HT E ' S I DE AL I S M AND MARX' S MAT E RI AL I S M
Thi s vi ew is a hybr i d, compos ed of rat i onal i st i c, i deal i st i c and realistic
el ement s. I t is rat i onal i st i c i n t hat , l i ke Spi noza' s posi t i on, it is model l ed on
geomet r y and is, Fi cht e claims, a science. I t is i deal i st i c i n t hat i t is a
specul at i ve, cat egori al analysis. I n par t i cul ar , Fi cht e makes use o f t he
hypot hesi s t hat t he sel f is act i vi t y i n or der t o f or mul a t e a t heor y o f ex-
per i ence. I t is realistic i n t hat it accepts as a gi ven t he real and i nde pe nde nt
wor l d. I n f i ne, Fi cht e' s publ i c oppos i t i on t o real i sm is mai nl y rhet ori cal ,
al t hough his pos i t i on has not always been under s t ood on this poi nt , since
his own vi ew is an at t empt ed synthesis o f bot h i deal i sm and realism. ~4
IV
Th e task o f ascer t ai ni ng Mar x' s met a- t heor et i c and t heor et i c vi ews is
compl i cat ed by t he i nabi l i t y o f many t o di st i ngui sh bet ween Ma r x and
Engel s. 15 But even i f we conf i ne our at t ent i on t o Mar x' s wr i t i ngs onl y, i t is
necessary t o bear i n mi nd t hat Ma r x does not always di st i ngui sh cl earl y
bet ween t heor y and met a- t heor y. Fur t her , as I shal l poi nt out , his comment s
on t he di st i nct i ons bet ween i deal i sm and mat eri al i sm, and bet ween his own
pos i t i on and me t hodol ogy i n gener al , are ambi guous. Thi s ambi gui t y r ender s
di f f i c ul t t he det er mi nat i on as wel l as t he eval uat i on o f his posi t i on.
Th e di st i nct i on bet ween i deal i sm and mat er i al i sm is p r o mi n e n t i n Ma r x' s
ear l y wri t i ngs. He r e " i deal i s m" is synonymous wi t h "s pecul at i ve phi l oso-
phy, " whos e c hi e f r epr es ent at i ve is Hegel , and " mat er i al i s m" is a doct r i ne
whi ch, i n d i f f e r e n t f or ms, has been put f or wa r d by, a mong ot hers, t hi nker s
as di verse as Democr i t us , Descart es, Locke, Hel vet i us , and l at t er l y Feuer -
bach. Ma r x f r e que nt l y ri di cul es i deal i sm, as i n t he f ol l owi ng, t ypi cal passage:
. . . f i ni t e under s t andi ng, s uppor t e d by my senses, distinguishes an appl e
f r o m a pear and a pear f r o m an al mond, but my specul at i ve reason decl ares
t hese per cept ual di f f er ences t o be unessent i al and uni mpor t ant . My spec-
ul at i ve reason sees in t he appl e the same thing as i n t he pear and in t he
pear t he same t hi ng as i n t he a l mond - - namel y, " t he Fr ui t . " Part i cul ar,
actual f r ui t s are t aken t o be onl y appar ent f r ui t s whose t r ue essence is
" t he Subst ance, " " t he Fr ui t . ''1~
Conversel y, Ma r x prai ses mat eri al i sm, especi al l y t he Feuer bachi an vari et y,
al t hough his appr eci at i on o f i t is not uncr i t i cal :
Th e hi ghes t poi nt r eached by cont empl at i ve [ i . e. , Fe ue r ba c hi a n] mat e-
rialism, t hat is, mat er i al i sm whi ch does not c ompr e he nd sensuousness as
195
TOM ROCKMORE
practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil
society. The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the stand-
point of the new is human society, or social humanity, iv
Marx's theory is easy to characterize. Its aim is to specify the conditions
of the possibility of human self-realization. The beginning point is the given
of experience or social reality, which is assumed to exist and whose existence
must be explained. The explanation takes the form of a genetic inquiry into
the nature and origin of social reality. Social reality is analyzed as an
ensemble of social relations which is generated through the manifestation
of human activity, for the most part in the process of production. Among
the results due to human activity are individuals, whose social roles deter-
mine their way of being, products, private property, particular social rela-
tions, and social reality in general.
The condition of self-realization is, according to Marx, a change in the
structure of social reality. Marx argues that in contemporary society or
capitalism the existence of the institution of private property has as its result
that the manifestation of human activity in the productive process takes the
alienated form of work or labor. Alienated activity is sufficient to meet
man's subsistence needs, although insufficient to permit man to develop his
human potentials or potentials qua human being. Such development will be
possible only if private property is aufgehoben, for instance, in communism.
Under communism participation in the process of production will take the
form of free human activity, through which man will be able both to meet
his subsistence needs and to develop his species being in his practice.
At the center of Marx's analysis is the conviction that there are two basic
forms of human praxis, namely, fulfilling and alienated types of human
activity. But the claim that there are basic forms of human activity is
intelligible only if grounded in the idea of activity itself which subtends
its various manifestations; this idea cannot be verified through discussion
since it is the hypothesis upon which the analysis is based. In fine, it
seems that in his inquiry into the conditions of human fulfillment through
an analysis of social experience, Marx makes use of human activity as the
category in terms of which man is to be understood.
Although in the passages cited above Marx apparently identifies with
materialism and ~egisters his opposition to idealism, it is not easy to grasp
what is at stake in this dichotomy. For Marx, unlike Fichte, there is no
text which gives a systematic discussion of the sense in which he under-
196
FI CHTE' S IDEALISM AND MARX' S MATERIALISM
stands the terms "idealism" and "materialism" and his use of them is
frequently ambiguous. The ambiguity extends even to the problem of
whether the opposition is one of two philosophic positions or that of
philosophy and science.
The term "idealism" apparently has at least two distinct meanings in
Marx' s view. In one sense, as already indicated, it is clear that by "idealism"
Marx means the speculative philosophy associated with Hegel. Marx's main
criticism of this approach is that it gives priority to thought as opposed to
being, and this in turn results in a fictitious view of social relations, which
appear incorrectly to be logically posterior to thought, although the reserve
is true. But in another sense, by "idealism" Marx means philosophy itself.
That this is Marx's view is implicit in his comments that philosophy is itself
self-alienated and naturally tends to misconstrue practical questions to which
practical solutions are appropriate as theoretical problems to be resolved
through theory alone.
Similarly, the term "materialism" seems to have two distinct meanings
for Marx. In simplest terms, materialism is that theory which gives priority
to being over thought. On this definition, materialism is the philosophic
view which is the opposite of idealism, and Marx is aware of the former' s
long philosophic lineage. The opposition between materialism and idealism
is therefore one between two philosophic positions distinguished by the
relative priority accorded to thought and being. But in his adherence to
materialism, Marx also believes that he is going beyond mere philosophy.
For if, as Marx maintains, the possibility of philosophy's internal self-
transformation depends on fundamental social change, then it is implicit
that materialism is not itself a philosophic position, but in some undefined
sense meta-philosophic, i.e., a position beyond philosophy. This conclusion
is suggested, for instance, by Marx's comment that Feuerbach's achievement
was, in part "t o have founded genuine materialism and positive science
[Wissen. schaft]. . . ''1~ But if by "materialism" Marx means "science," the
dichotomy is not between two kinds of philosophy, but between philosophy
and non-philosophy or science.
Although there are few explicit discussions of methodology in Marx's
writings, his theory of methodology is clear. 19 Marx holds that being is
prior to thought. This means that all discussion must start with the given
of experience, which is assumed to exist independently of the experiential
subject.
197
TOM ROCKMORE
The concrete subject remains outside the intellect and independent of it...
the subject, society, must always be envisaged therefore as the precon-
dition of comprehension even when the theoretical method is employedY ~
This position is both empirical in that it begins from an independent real
world or given and, in Marx's terminology, "dialectical," since the given
has priority over our thoughts about itY 1
Conversely, thought is posterior to being. The task of theory is to produce,
on the level of mind, a conceptually-articulated description of the given :
. . . the concrete totality regarded as a conceptual mental totality, as a men-
tal fact, is indeed a product of thinking, of comprehension; but it is by
no means a product of the idea which evolves spontaneously and whose
thinking proceeds outside and above perception and imagination, but is the
result of the assimilation and transformation of perceptions and images
into concepts. The totality as a conceptual entity seen by the intellect is a
product of the thinking intellect which assimilates the world in the only
way open to it...~2
The description differs from the independent given or real in that it occurs
only on the level of mind. But, if accurate, the description is similar to the
given in that the former reproduces and exhibits in conceptual form the
interconnections of the various elements which compose reality.
According to Marx, any theory must confront a crucial question, namely,
how to get from being to thought in a way which can result in an adequate
conceptualization in thought of being ? There are only two possible re-
sponses to this question : to begin from real, concrete elements in order to
proceed to abstractions; or conversely, to begin from one or more abstract,
general relations or categories in terms of which the given is to be "con-
stituted." Marx argues for the second approach :
The latter is obviously the correct scientific method. The concrete concept
is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing
the unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore in reasoning as a summing
up, a result, and not as the starting point, although it is the real point of
origin of perception and imagination. The first procedure attenuates mean-
ingful images to abstract definition by way of reasoning to the reproduction
of the concrete situationY ~
I f we turn now from Marx's theory of methodology to his comments
on his own theory, we shall see that his reflections on the latter are
198
FI CHTE' S IDEALISM AND MARX' S MATERIALISM
ambiguous, although any interpretation of it should attempt to reconcile
Marx's hints on this topic. There are passages, for instance, in which he
appears to describe his view as a form of philosophy, namely, that position
which synthesizes idealism and materialism in a third theory, which Marx
refers to variously as "humanism," "naturalism" and "non-contemplative
materialism. TM Other passages indicate that Marx sees his view as scientific,
in particular, a form of political economy. 25 This tension appaeent in Marx's
understanding of his theory as both philosophic and scientific parallels that
in his view of materialism as both philosophy and science and seems to
suggest that he views his theory as both rigorous philosophy and a form
of science, as Fichte viewed the Wissenschaftlehre.
V
To review the course of the discussion, we began by assuming t hat any
difference between idealism and materialism concerns methodology and
must be apparent on the level of .either theory or meta-theory. Taking
Fichte and Marx as representative, respectively, of idealism and of material-
ism, an attempt has been made to determine i f a difference exists. In
terms of the aim of their theories, both thinkers are concerned with the
problem of experience, which is taken as the given; in terms of their
approaches, each theory is an attempt to explain experience through a
regressive, categorial analysis of its conditions. It follows that there is a
parallel between Fichte's and Marx's views since both thinkers attempt to
attain similar theoretic aims in similar ways.
The existence of the parallel is surprising since it suggests that with
respect to methodology Marx can be considered a member ~ part entJ&e
of the classical German tradition and that this tradition possesses a unity
which precludes its description in terms of the idealism-materialism dis-
tinction. This claim is controversial and certain objections may be antici-
pated. One might, for instance, argue that in the distinction between theory
and meta-theory a distortion is introduced into the discussion. This objection
is based on the frequent observation that any dichotomy between theory
and practice is undesirable. Further, one could argue that Fichte and Marx
did not always observe the distinction in their own writings.
In response, one should note that i f the distinction was not consistently
observed, it was certainly familiar to both Fichte and Marx, as exemplified,
199
TOM ROCKMORE
for instance, in Kant. In the present discussion there is no reason to
believe that the distinction between theory and meta-theory obscures the
nature of the views in question; rather it is an aid in delineating them.
Further, in another sense there is no dichotomy here between theory and
practice, since theory appears as the philosophic practice in which an ex-
planation is advanced which corresponds to the meta-theoretic criteria devel-
oped on the theoretic plane.
Second, one could argue that the difference between idealism and ma-
terialism does not concern methodology, but something else, such as con-
clusions. But in this case, such an argument would be weak, since Fichte's
and Marx' s conclusions are demonstrably similar. For from their separate
analyses of experience each concludes that the subject of experience, namely,
the human individual, "generates," through the manifestation of his
activity, his social world and himself. Further, each argues that a condition
of self-realization is that the human individual manifests his potential in
and through his social activity. Hence, the conclusions are not dissimilar,
but even if they were one could not therefore infer the existence of a
dissimilarity between idealism and materialism. For, if we assume e x hypo-
t hesi that it is meaningful to distinguish between idealism and materialism,
it is certainly not necessary that representatives of each view reach identical
conclusions. In respect to conclusions, Schelling partially disagrees with
Hegel, as does Helvetius with Hobbes, yet the former are called idealists
and the latter materialists. It follows that even if Fichte and Marx had
come to disparate conclusions, this would not, of itself, have counted
against the claim that their positions are similar in a way which precludes
use of the idealism-materialism distinction to separate them.
Third, one might claim that Fichte's position is not representative of
idealism. Although one could answer this objection fully only by detailed
consideration of other positions within the tradition, it should be observed
that the above consideration of Fichte's position is very general; in fact, no
claim has been made in 'espect to Fichte's view which could not equally
well have been made about other "idealist" views. Further, even i f Fichte's
view were not typical of idealism, the demonstrated similarity between his
and Marx' s positions weakens considerably any claim that Marx's theory
can be distinguished on methodological grounds from ideatism in general.
Fourth, one might object that the approach employed here is reduc-
tionistic in that legitimate differences in the two approaches, such as
200
F I C H T E ' S I D E A L I S M AND MA R X ' S MA T E R I A L I S M
Ma r x ' s i nsi st ence on c ha ngi ng r eal i t y or t he emphas i s on economi cs, whi ch
gi ves hi s vi ew a quasi - sci ent i f i c f l avor , are not t a ke n seri ousl y. Th e f i r st
p o i n t is t he r esul t o f t he wi de s pr e a d mi s c onc e pt i on t ha t Ma r x al one was
i nt er est ed i n c h a n g i n g t he wor l d. Wi t h i n t he classical Ge r ma n t r adi t i on,
t hi s desi r e was cer t ai nl y s har ed by, a mo n g ot her s, Fi cht e a nd He ge l . T h e
f o r me r was a soci al i st and soci al act i vi st wh o was i nt er est ed i n " r a i s i ng"
soci al consci ousness in or de r t o change soci al r eal i t y; t he l at t er ar gued t hat
t heor y or t heor et i cal u n d e r s t a n d i n g is necessary pr eci sel y because i t is t he
necessary pr er equi s i t e t o b r i n g i n g a bout a change i n society. ~ Fur t her ,
even i f i t wer e not t he case t hat ot her s wer e i nt er es t ed i n p r o mo t i n g social
change, i t wo u l d ha ve t o be s hown why t he social i nt ent o f a gi ve n t hi nke r
is s i gni f i cant f or t he cl assi f i cat i on o f t hat t heor y i n or de r f or t hi s t o be
a s i gni f i cant cri t i ci sm.
Th e second poi nt can be i nt e r p: e t e d i n ei t her o f t wo ways, namel y as
t he cl ai m t hat Ma r x ' s t heor y is d i f f e r e n t me r e l y by vi r t ue o f hi s i nt er est
i n a second di sci pl i ne, namel y economi cs, or t ha t hi s t heor y is i t s el f in
s ome sense sci ent i f i c and not phi l os ophi c. I n r es pons e t o t he f i r s t i nt er -
pr et at i on, i t s houl d be i ndi cat ed t hat bot h Fi cht e and He g e l wer e i nt er est ed
i n economi cs, even i f not to t he s ame ext ent as Mar x. :~ He n c e t he me r e
f act t hat economi c cons i der at i ons are p r o mi n e n t in Ma r x ' s t h o u g h t does
not i t s el f me a n t hat his t heor y is t he r e f or e f u n d a me n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m
ot he r t heor i es i t ot her wi s e r esembl es.
Fur t her , i t s houl d be not e d t hat evi dence o f a t hi nke r ' s ser i ous i nt er est
in a second di sci pl i ne is not o f i t s el f r eason t o assert t ha t hi s wor k is
t he r e f or e non- phi l os ophi c . Ot h e r r ecent e xa mpl e s o f a cont i nui ng, quasi -
pr of e s s i ona l i nt er est i n a second di sci pl i ne i ncl ude t he wor k o f Col l i ngwood
a nd Di l t h e y i n hi s t or y and t ha t o f Sar t r e and Mu r d o c h i n f i ct i on. But i n
al l cases muc h o f t hei r wor k is, and p r o p e r l y so, cons i der ed t o be phi l o-
sophi c.
At this poi nt , one mi g h t agai n obj ect on t he gr ounds t hat f o r Ma r x
economi cs is cent r al t o hi s t hought , since wi t hout economi cs hi s pos i t i on
wo u l d be ot he r t ha n it is. On t hi s i nt e_' pret at i on Ma r x ' s i nt er est i n econom-
ics is not i n any sense a s econdar y cons i der at i on, whi l e t hi s is not t r ue
f o r a ny o f t he ot he r t hi nker s ci t ed, f o r each of wh o m t he second di sci pl i ne
r emai ns an avocat i on i n r espect t o phi l os ophy. My r e pl y is t ha t t her e is
doubt l ess a sense i n whi ch f o r Ma r x economi cs is cent r al t o t hi s t heor y.
For as a r esul t o f phi l os ophi c anal ysi s Ma r x concl udes t ha t t he economi c
201
TOM ROCKMORE
sphere is that part of the existing social structure which initially retards,
but ultimately makes possible, man's development. But it must be observed
that Marx's interest in economics and his analyses of economic phenomena
are posterior to a prior, independent and philosophic view of man as
activity. Concepts such as economic alienation, fetishism, surplus value,
exchange value, falling rate of interest, etc., in terms of which Marx dis-
cusses economic behavior, are relevant to the consideration of the possi-
bility of human self-realization only i f certain conditions are met : i f
participation in the economic process is a central form of social practice,
i f self-realization requires social practice, and i f man can be understood
through the activity he manifests in various forms of social practice, But
the claim that in some sense man can be considered in terms of his activity
is philosophic. In fine, although in one sense economic considerations are
central to Marx's theory of human self-realization, there is another sense
in which these considerations are secondary, since the general interest in
and critique of economics are both subtended by a prior, philosophic view
of man as activityd 8
The second interpretation, namely, the claim that Marx's theory is in
some sense scientific and not philosophic, deserves serious consideration.
This assertion is made by many writers including, as was seen above, by
Marx himself. ~ e r e this the case, there would be the double consequence
that a way had been found to transcend philosophy and that by virtue of
this discovery, qua non-philosophy, Marx's view might be immune to
philosophic criticism. Among recent critics, Luk~cs and Althusser, for in-
stance, expiidtly draw the first conclusion and imply the second one. ''29
Of course, the claim that Marx's theory is scientific in some sense is
consonant with his intentions, but that does not mean that the urge to
do "scientific" work necessarily carries with it the renunciation of philos-
ophy. The interest in rigorous or scientific theory is one of the dominant
themes of modern philosophy, since Descartes, as I understand it. A com-
mon, basic aim in, for example, the rationalist, British empiricist, German
idealist, phenomenological, language analytical and Frankfurt school move-
ments is to elaborate a theory which, qua critical, is more than philosophy
as currently practiced and in some sense "scientific." The belief that this
new philosophy will be scientific is common among Marx's predecessors
both in general and in the classical German tradition, as is apparent in
the titles of Vico's Ne w Science, Hegel's Sdence of Logic and Fichte's
202
FI CHTE' S IDEALISM AND MARX' S MATERIALISM
Science of Knowledge. Despite the fact that Marx sometimes sounds as if
he wants to abandon philosophy for science, it could be argued that his
real interest is in going beyond contemporary philosophy in order to
achieve a more rigorous approach.
But regardless of what Marx's intentions might have been, the issue of
the scientific status of his theory has to be faced. Implicit in this issue is
the question of the difference between philosophy and science in general,
which has been discussed recently, among others, by Popper. ~~ One way
in which to respond would be to develop a normative theory of philosophy,
science and their differences, but in this case that seems unnecessary. Rather,
it seems reasonable to suppose with Hegel that any general conceptual
consideration of the nature of reality which employs a categorial scheme
whose acceptance is based neither on empirical data nor faith, but on
argument, is philosophic. Judged by this criterion, both Fichte's and Marx's
theories are philosophic, and, I suggest, no analysis of these theories can
be given which will show either that the theories ought to be reclassified
i f this standard is utilized or that the classification is inadequate to describe
these views.
VI
In conclusion, I would like to suggest that the idealism-materialism
distinction is by means unproblematic. At the very least, those who would
use it need to address the problems concerning its tenability as well as the
ways in which it can or ought to be drawn, For even if it is concluded
that the distinction can or ought to be used, this should be done only
with utmost caution.
t n particular, I would like to warn against the use of the distinction in
order to distinguish Marx's view from the classical German tradition, in
which the terms "idealism" and "materialism" have been taken to refer to
separable and separate mini-traditions. This difference is uncritically as-
sumed in most of the secondary literature, al From the side of idealism it
is urged that as philosophy materialism is naive, and from the side of
materialism it is claimed that philosophy is a mystification which Marx
transcends. Nei t her side feels compelled to take the other seriously since,
by virtue of the idealism-materialism distinction which both sides accept, a
quasi-automatic objection is constantly available.
But the above discussion indicates that if the idealist-materialist dis-
203
TOM ROCKMORE
tinction is taken to refer to methodology, viewed either as theory or meta-
theory, there is no significant difference in Fichte's idealist and Marx's
materialist approaches to philosophy; and, by extension, to the extent that
Fichte is representative of the classical German tradition, this distinction
does not help to distinguish Marx's views from those of other German
idealists. For to the extent that Fichte and Marx represent opposing "ten-
dencies," the opposition is purely verbal, since discussion has failed to
elicit the difference and, on examination, purported distinctions were seen
to collapse.
There is an important corollary to this last point. From Marx's writings
and the secondary literature it might be inferred that the supposed distinc-
tion between idealism and his view is one between philosophy and some
other way of understanding reality. But if this distinction is not tenable,
it would seem appropriate rather to discuss Marx's view as one philo-
sophical position among others within the classical German tradition. Not
only is such an approach suggested by the above consideration of Fichte's
and Marx's positions, but it has the added advantage of enabling one to
bypass the sectarian and unproductive quarrel of whether Marx's thought
is generically different from that of his predecessors for the, I suspect,
more fruitful problem of the nature and range of Marx's contribution
through study of his view in respect to others in the general philosophic
tradition.
N O T E S
1 Cf . Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. D. D. Ru n e s ( Ame s , I o w a : Li t t l e f i e l d, Ad a ms , ~959)
arti cl es on " I d e a l i s m" a n d " Ma t e r i a l i s m" a n d Philosophisches W6rterbuch, ed. Ge o r g Kl a u s
and Ma n f r e d Bu h r ( L e i p z i g : VEB Bi b l i o g r a p h i s c h e s I n s t i t u t , 197o ) a r t i c l e s on " I d e a l i s mu s ' "
and " ' Ma t e r i a l i s mu s . ' "
2 Cf. EncicIopedia F-ilosofica ( Fi r e nz e : 9 a n s o n i , ~ 6 7 ) a r t i c l e s on " I d e a l i s mo " a n d " Ma t e -
r i a l i s mo . "
a Cf . G. E. Mo o r e , " T h e Re f u t a t i o n of I d e a l i s m" i n PhiIosophicaI Studies ( London : Ro u t l e d g e ,
Ke g a n a n d P a u l , 2965).
4 Cf . N. K. S mi t h , Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge ( L o n d o n : Ma c mi l l a n ,
19a4) a n d H. B. Ac t o n , a r t i c l e s on " Ma t e r i a l i s m, " " I d e a l i s m, " " Di a l e c t i c a l Ma t e r i a l i s m" i n
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Pa u l Ed wa r d s ( Ne w Y o r k : Ma c mi l l a n and Free Pr e s s , :t967).
5 Cf . Ge o r g e S a n t a y a n a , The Realm of Matter ( Lo n d o n : Co n s t a b l e , ~t93o), es p. Ch a p t e r R :
" T h e Latent Mat eri al i s m of I d e a l i s t s . ' " P r o f e s s o r J o h n La c h s cal l ed my a t t e n t i o n to t hi s
ref erence,
204
F I C H T E ' S I D E A L I S M A N D MA R X ' S MA T E R I A L I S M
6 Cf . Ri c h a r d Ro r t y , " T h e Wo r l d We l l L o s t " i n ]ournaI of Phi l osophy, vol . LXI X, no. 19 ,
Oc t o b e r x97 a. I owe t hi s r e f e r e n c e to Da v i d Lu b a n .
7 Cf . Be r n a r d Bo s a n q u e t , The Meet i ng of Ext remes in Modern Phi !osophy ( London : Ma c mi l l a n ,
~921).
8 Cf . W. M. Ur b a n , Beyond Real i sm and Ideal i sm ( L o n d o n : Al l en a n d Un wi n , :t949). Th i s
r e f e r e n c e wa s s u g g e s t e d t o me by P r o f e s s o r J o h n E. Smi t h.
9 Ex a mp l e s of h i s t o r i a n s of p h i l o s o p h y wh o d e s c r i b e t he c l a s s i c a l Ge r ma n t r a d i t i o n i n t hi s
ma n n e r i nc l ude Wi n d e l b a n d a n d Copl e s t on.
10 Fi c ht e , Fichtes Wer ke, ed. I . H. Fi cht e ( Be r l i n : de Gr u y t e r , ~q71) I , z S o : " D a s I c h i s t
s c h l e c h t h i n t h~t i g u n d b l e s s t h~i t hi g - - d a s i s t di e a b s o l u t e Vo r a u s s e t z u n g . " Cf . I , a 7 z :
" D a s We s e n d e s I c h b e s t e h t i n s e i n e r T h ~ t i g k e i t . "
11 Fi cht e, Sci ence of Knowl edge wi t h the First and Second Int roduct i ons, ed. a n d t r a n s .
Pe t e r He a t h a n d J o h n La c h s ( Ne w Yor k : Ap p l e t o n - Ce n t u r y - Cr o f t s , 197o), p. 16; Wer ke I , 434.
1.2 Fi c ht e , op. cir., p. I 9; Wer ke I , 433-434.
13 Fi cht e, op. ci t . , p. 31; Wer ke I , 455-
1.4 Al t h o u g h Fi c h t e ' s p o s i t i o n i s c r i t i c a l i de a ! i s r a , i t i s u s u a l l y g i v e n a s u b j e c t i v i s t i n t e r p r e t a -
t i on t h a t f a i l s to do j u s t i c e to t he o b j e c t i v i s t s i de of hi s t he or y. P a s s a g e s s uc h as t he
f o l l o wi n g ( Werke I , 281) cl ear l y i ndi c a t e t ha t hi s a i m wa s to s y n t h e s i z e bot h i d e a l i s m a n d
r e a l i s m i n a s i n g l e v i e w :
Di e Wi s s e n s c h a f t s l e h r e h~ilt z wj s c h e n b e i d e n Sy s t e me [i . e. d o g ma t i c r e a l i s m a n d t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l r e a l i s t d o g ma t i s m, or r e a l i s m a n d i d e a l i s m] b e s t i mmt di e Mi t r e , u n d i s t
ei n k r i t i s c h e r I d e a l i s mu s , d e n ma n a uc h e i n e n Re a l - I d e a l i s mu s n e n n e n k~Snnte.
For ot he r , s i mi l a r p a s s a g e s , cf . I , ~78 a n d I , 186.
15 Ma r x ' s a n d En g e l ' s p o s i t i o n s a r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t , as h a s be e n s h o wn , a mo n g o t h e r s , by
Luk, ~cs, P a n n e k o e k a n d Ko l a k o ws k i . Al t h o u g h f a i l u r e to o b s e r v e t he d i s t i n c t i o n ma k e s i t
d i f f i c u l t , a n d p e r h a p s i mp o s s i b l e , to u n d e r s t a n d Ma r x ' s p o s i t i o n , t hi s f a i l u r e i s e n d e mi c i n
t h e s e c o n d a r y l i t e r a t u r e , wh i c h i s c o n s e q u e n t l y of l i t t l e v a l u e f or t he i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
Ma r x ' s v i e w.
16 Ma r x , Wri t i ngs of the Young Marx on Phi l osophy and Soci et y, ed. a n d t r a n s . Loyd D.
Ea s t on a n d Ku r t H. Gu d d a t ( Ga r d e n C i t y : Do u b l e d a y , ~967), p. 370; Marx-Engel s Wer ke
( Ber l i n : Di e t z Ve r l a g , I 97o) , I I , 6o.
17 Ma r x , The German Ideology, ed. a n d t r a n s . C. J. Ar t h u r ( Ne w Yor k : I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pub-
l ' s h e r s , 197e), p. I a 3; MEW I I I , 555.
18 Ma r x , Karl Ma r x : Early Wr i t i ngs , ed. a n d t r a n s . T. B. Bo t t o mo r e ( Ne w Y o r k : Mc Gr a w
Hi l l , I q64) , p. I97; MEW Er g~i nz ungs ba nd : Er s t e r Tei l , 570.
19 Th e s i ngl e s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n of me t h o d o l o g y i n Ma r x ' s wr i t i n g s oc c ur s i n s e c t i on
of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t he Grundrisse~ e nt i t l e d " T h e Me t h o d of Pol i t i c a l Ec o n o my . "
2o Ma r x i n Ar t h u r , op. cir., p. x41; MEW XI I I , 632-6~5.
21 Cf . Ma r x , MEW XXI I I , 27 : " Me i n e d i a l e k t i s e h e Me t h o d e i s t d e r Gr u n d l a g e n a c h y o n d e r
He g e l s c h e n n i c h t n u r v e r s c h i e d e n , s o n d e r n i h r d i r e k t e s Ge ge nt e i l . Fi i r He g e l i s t de r De n k -
p r o z e s s , d e n e r s o g a r u n t e r d e m Na me n I de e i n ei n s el bs t ~i ndi ges Su b j e k t v e r wa n d e l t , d e r
De mi u r g de s wi r k l i c h e n , d a s n u r s e i ne a u s s e r e Er s c b e i n u n g bi l de t . Bei mi r i s t u mg e k e h r t
d a s I deel l e n i c h t s a n d e r s al s d a s i m Me n s c h e n k o p f u mg e s e t z t e u n d f i be r s e t z t e Ma t e r i e l l e . "
aa Ma r x i n Ar t h u r , op. t i t . , p. 14I; MEW XI I I , 63z. Th i s t ext i s a s t r o n g i n d i c a t i o n t h a t
Ma r x ' s e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c i n t e r e s t c a r r i e s t h r o u g h i nt o h i s l a t e r wo r k , as wel l as e vi de nc e
a g a i n s t a coupure b e t we e n t h e e a r l y mo r e p h i l o s o p h i c a n d l a t e r mo r e e c onomi c t ext s .
23 Op. t i t , , pp. x4o-~4x; MEW XI I I , 652.
24 For a t ypi c a l p a s s a g e , cf . ME W 1Er g}i nzungsband : Er s t e r Tel l 577 : " Wi t s e h n hi e r , wJe
d e r dur c hge f l . i hr t e Na t u r a l i s mu s o d e r H u ma n i s mu s , al s d a m Ma t e r i a l i s I n u s ~ant er schei det u n d
z u g l e i c h i hr e b e i d e v e r e i n i g e n d e Wa h r h e i t i s t . Wi r s e h n z u g l e i c h , wi e n u r d a r Na t u r a I i s mu s
f~ihig i s t , d e n Ak t t i er We l t g e s c h i c h t e z u b e g r e i f e n . ' "
2.5 Th e ma i n t ext i s t h a t a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d to i n t h e Grundri sse. Cf . al s o t he Pr e f a c e to t h e
Paris Manuscri pt s (:t844) i n MEW Er g / i n z u n g s b a n d - Er s t e r Tei l , 467.
26 I n a l et t er , He g e l w r i t e s : " D i e t h e o r e t i s c h e Ar b e i t , / i b e r z e u g e i ch r ei ch t a g l i c h me h r ,
b r i n g t me h r z u s t a n d e i n d e r We l t al s di e p r a k t i s c h e : i s t e r s t d e r Rei ch d e r Vo r s t e l l u n g
r e v o l u t i o n i e r t , s o h~I t di e "r n i c h a u s . ' " Qu o t e d by ed. Ni c o l i n a n d P/ J ggel er ,
2 0 5
TOM ROCKMORE
Enzykloplidie der philosophischen Wi~sensehaften im Grundrisse ( Hambur g: Meiner Verlag,
1959), p. xxii. This is also Marx' s position; although he wanted to change the world, he
never asserted that this could occur without the necessary theoretical grasp of it, In a-sense
his whole intellectual career was devoted to acquiring the understanding required to
accomplish this task.
:27 One need only recall Fichte' s book on Der gesehlossene Handelsstaat to appreciate the role
of economics in his thought. Economic considerations also deeply influenced Hegel' s position,
as Luk~cs has shown in Der junge Hegel.
28 In another paper, I hope to develop this point by arguing both that in the early "phi-
losophic" as well as later "economi c" writings Marx uses a single set of categories, and
that these categories are non-empirical, speculative, and based on a metaphysical view of
man as activity.
29 Cf. Luk~cs, Geschichte und KIassenbewusstein (Berlin : Malik Verlag, I927) and Althusser
and Baliber, Life Ie Capital (Paris : Maspero, 1968 ).
.~0 Cf. Popper, Coniectures and Refutations (New York : Harper, x968 ).
3t For a recent example, cf. Bloch, Das Materiatismusproblem (Frankfurt a.M. : Suhrkamp
Verlag, 2972 ).
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