The United States main interest in the Middle East

This essay serves to explain what the United States main interest in the Middle East was and
how this shaped its relationship with other countries. It will do this by explaining how the
relationship between the United States and the Middle East changed from 1945 to 1990 and
how it made its interest with the Middle East clear.

The relationship between the United States and the Middle East hasn't always been as violent
and negative as it is being portrayed in todays media; the two used to be close allies and it all
started when the United States withdrew its forces from Middle Eastern countries and even
forced Soviet Russia and Britain out Iran. These actions by the United States were viewed
positively by Iran and the rest of the Middle East. America continued to be viewed positively
by Middle Eastern people after World War 2 ended in 1945 and was even viewed as a
possible ally against colonial powers such as Britain and the Soviet Union whose only
interest was to enrich themselves off the resources of the Middle Eastern region.
1


The United States was the first country to recognise Israel as a state in 1948; this would later
prove to be a worthy one on the side of the United States as its relationship with Israel would
prove to be complementary with the United States interests with the Middle East. It was only
in 1967 that the executive branch diplomatic and defence establishment, impressed with
Israel's military prowess, and Arab weakness, was finally persuaded that Israel might be
something other than a burden on the US national Interest.
2


Today Israel has managed to become a superpower within the Middle Eastern region and has
a world-class military establishment
3
which helps it defend itself from its enemies and

1
Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire-Western Footprints and Americas Perilous Path in the Middle East,
Chapters 1 & 4. 20
2
Micheal C. Hudson, To play the hegemon: Fifty years of US policy towards the Middle East in The Middle East
Journal, Vol.50, No.3, 1996
3
Ibid., 44
helps maintain order within the region, which is beneficiary to the United States as its
interests within the Middle East remain secured due the power that Israel possesses.

The United states lived up to this ally role by helping the Middle East fend off its colonial
oppressors; for example between 1950 and 1951 the United States helped Libya defend itself
from its old colonial powers all the way up to the Suez War of 1956. However the United
States wasn't helping the Middle East defend itself from Soviet Russia and Britain out of
kindness but because it had a profound interest which was oil. The U.S had to involve itself
within the internal affairs of Middle Eastern state of Iran so as to contain Soviet expansion
which was seen as a threat or rather an obstacle in the United States efforts of securing oil in
the region
4
. This posed as a real threat as the outbreak of the Korean war had demanded an
increase of oil supply; the United States feared that Soviet Russia would seek to capitalize on
the Iranian oil for its own interests in the Korean War. This became an imperative task on the
American agenda as it posed to be contradictory to their interests.

Furthermore the thought of a possible Soviet annexation of Iran was alarming for the US
government and this led to John Foster Dulles the secretary of state under Eisenhower to
advice the US Security Council in July 1953
5
that if a Soviet domination of Iran was to
occur the Western world was going to be deprived of large amounts of revenue that were
represented in the oil production of Iran. In addition to this Russia's position within the
international system would be of an advantage as it would become a key player in the oil
sector and lubricate the industrialisation of the Soviet Union.

In that same year of 1953 serious concerns were displayed over Iranian oil as Iran disclosed
plans pertaining nationalising the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which Britain had a large share
in and feared a loss of profits on its side; because of this Britain went to seek the help of the

4
Eric Watkins, The unfolding US Policy in the Middle East International Affairs, vol.73,no.1 January 1997
5
Ibid., 30
United States in this matter, but the Truman administration was alarmed by British plans to
invade Iran, fearing that they were going to pitch the country straight into the Soviet camp
6
.

The United States being a strategic country advised Britain to negotiate a peaceful deal with
Iran and avoid military confrontation. The deal would make sure that both parties Britain and
Iran would split the profits evenly but such an agreement didn't suit neither of the two
countries. As a result Iranian prime-minister Muhammed Mussadiq began to actively court
the Soviet Union in 1953
7
which drove the United States to act due to its interests of
securing oil were threatened by this. The United States' CIA in association with the British
M16 engineered the overthrowing of Mussadiq in the August of 1953 which ended the Soviet
threat.

However these events proved to the Iranian people that the United States had no interests
in their welfare but only cared about its oil interest in the region and was willing to keep its
interest secured even if it meant overthrowing the Iranian government and distort its
sovereignty. Furthermore the relationship between Britain and the United States seemed to
have weakened because the United States didn't permit Britain to engage in a military
confrontation with Iran as it wasn't in the interest of the U.S to do so but only worked with
them when their interests were threatened by Mussadiq.
8


Furthermore it had made enemies with Soviet Union as it had blocked any form of Soviet
expansion within the Middle Eastern region killing the spirit of communism that came with
it.

In 1969 oil was becoming the number one issue on the American political agenda
9
, the
main concern was that importation of oil in America had rapidly increased over the years, this
increase in oil importation was said to have been caused by the Mandatory Oil Import

6
Ibid., 30
7
Ibid., 30
8
Ibid., 31
9
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for oil, Money and Power, Pocket Books, New York, 1991, Chapter 29
Program which had been created by ex-president Eisenhower ten years earlier and was
operating under rising strain causing gross-disparities among companies. Oil consumers
wanted oil restrictions removed so that they could purchase cheaper oil supplies; however
domestic independent oil producers were defending quotas as they guaranteed them higher
prices than that of the world market which meant high profits for them.

George Shultz recommended that all quotas be removed and replaced by a tariff instead so
that oil users could have the option of purchasing cheaper oil but the response to this
recommendation was overwhelmingly negative as hundred congressmen denounced it as they
perceived it as a threat to local industry. As a result of this Nixon who by those times was
president of the United States kept the quotas.
10


The Shah of Iran wrote to President Nixon arguing that Iran's security and economic
development required it to surmount the quota barriers and sell larger volumes directly into
the U.S, however regardless of this request by Iran the Nixon Administration did not remove
the quotas.
11


Furthermore the beginning of the 1970's marked a time where U.S oil reserves were
diminishing as the oil industry allocated all the barrels it could acquire to meet increasing
power demands as blackouts and brownouts where beginning to occur in the United States,
for example during the summer of 1970 brownouts occurred in the Atlantic Coast due to
declining oil supplies. Approaching the year 1973 it was quite clear that the quotas were
failing America and in April that year president Nixon abolished quotas as the domestic
industry could no-longer meet local oil demand even with quotas present.
12


The removal of quotas/import barriers placed the United States into the oil world market as a
thirsty member of countries that were importing their oil from the Middle East. The Shah of

10
Ibid., 129
11
Ibid., 129
12
Tobey Shelley, Oil: Politics, Poverty and the Planet, Zed Books, London, 2005, Chapter 3
Iran could now import barrels of oil into the United States freely
13
(Daniel Yergin: 133). As
the summer of 1973 approached the United States was importing more than 6 million barrels
a day. According to the trade journal Petroleum Intelligence Weekly reported in August
1973 the near panic by U.S. And European independent oil refiners as well as the Japanese
14
, was causing oil prices sky-rocket more than their official prices. This prospect of high
prices would have had a negative backlash on the American political and economic scenery

Due to the high demand of oil by developed countries such as the U.S, Britain etc. exporters
sought to gain as much as possible from this oil rush by revising their participation in the oil
market, the relationship between the United States changed for the worst as Libya decided to
nationalise over fifty percent of foreign companies within its territory including American
owned companies. President Nixon responded to this by issuing a warning to Libya stating
that: Oil without a market, as Mr. Mossadegh learned many years ago, does not do a country
much good
15
. Libya ignored this warning and still made high profits because unlike the
years of Mossadegh the market was now present and Libya had no difficulties selling its oil.

The 1990's saw instability falling into Saudi Arabia, due to the invasion of neighbouring
state Kuwaitis by Saddam Husayn in the early August of 1990. The Saudis felt threatened by
this and the United States got involved because because it could not rule out the possiblity of
military action near the important oil fields of the Eastern province
16
which the United
States held great interests in. Saudi Arabia provides a continuous cheap supply of oil to the
United States. Saudi Arabia was a very strong state with military investments that were said
to be worth $14 to $24 billion a year but was still said to be weaker than that of Saddam.
Hussain. Fahd was aware of this reality and he asked the United States for assistance in the
matter and in no time five hundred thousand troops were deployed in Arabian territory.
17



13
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for oil, Money and Power, Pocket Books, New York, 1991, Chapter 29
14
Ibid., 133
15
Ibid., 134
16
Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Chapter 6 (The Gulf War
and its aftermath, 1990-2000)
17
Ibid., 91-92
However as positive as America's assistance was in the matter many didn't like the fact that
Saudi Arabia couldn't handle its own matters, they felt that such dependency made them
appear weak. Many Saudis saw the arrival of U.S troops in their country as being humiliating
furthermore a substantial minority regarded it as a violation of Islamic principles
18
. The
Gulf war would further bring a lot of changes to the tradition of the Saudis as a sense of
infitah meaning openness reigned in the country, this acted as motivation for the local
population to voice up their opinions for change.

An example of this can be that of the Riyadh women who had driving demonstrations in the
city which was against the law and tradition as women weren't allowed to drive or do
anything that was regarded manly; according to their religion a women's place was within the
household nowhere else. The women wherever prosecuted and punished for their defiance
but this is evidence that instability was occurring due to the West's influence in the religion
secularisation was beginning to rise and this threatened Islamic religion; but relations
between the United States and Saudi Arabia are still as intimate as they were before today.
19


In conclusion this essay clearly explained the evolution of the relationship of the United
States and the Middle East from 1945 to 1990 and also identified what the United States'
interests were in the region and how it secured them by means of foreign policy and
diplomatic relations.








18
Ibid., 92
19
Ibid., 92
Reference List

1. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 2002,
Chapter 6 (The Gulf War and its aftermath, 1990-2000)
2. Hudson, Micheal. To play the hegemon: Fifty years of US policy towards the Middle
East in The Middle East Journal, Vol.50, No.3, 1996
3. Khalidi, Rashid .Resurrecting Empire-Western Footprints and Americas Perilous Path in
the Middle East, Chapters 1 & 4. 20
4. Shelley, Tobey Oil: Politics, Poverty and the Planet, Zed Books, London, 2005, Chapter 3
5. Watkins, Eric. The unfolding US Policy in the Middle East International Affairs,
vol.73,no.1 January 1997
6. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for oil, Money and Power, Pocket Books, New
York, 1991, Chapter 29