SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152411. September 29, 2004]

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. PHILAB
INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as well as its Resolution
[2]
denying the petitioners
motion for the reconsideration thereof. The Court of Appeals set aside the Decision
[3]
of
Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the
complaint of the respondent against the petitioner for sum of money and damages.
,
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an
integrated system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of
the project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute
of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos.
Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed
to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to
BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr.
William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine
Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the
same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the FEMF. Lirio
directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of the
laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the contract of the project to
FEMF for its approval.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the
purchase order and downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project,
thus:
1. Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention: Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or P1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1
st
Avenue, Bagumbayan
Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment : 50% or P286,687.50
[4]

Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible
before the issuance of the purchase orders and the downpayment for the goods, and
would be transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President
of PHILAB, to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of
FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for copies of the shop
drawings and a sample contract
[5]
for the project, and that such contract and drawings
had to be finalized before the down payment could be remitted to the PHILAB the
following week. However, PHILAB failed to forward any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to
BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF
Executive Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the
laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt
No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of
P800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The
remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB,
through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos
and FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support
and donate sums of money to UP for the construction of buildings, installation of
laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to exceed P29,000,000.00. The
obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the following:
ARTICLE II
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting
philantrophic and scientific projects through financial support to such projects that will
contribute to the countrys economic development, shall grant such financial support
and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX as may be necessary
for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratories, setting up of offices and
physical plants and facilities and other capital investment of the RESEARCH
COMPLEX and/or any of its component Research Institutes not to exceed P29 Million.
For this purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH
COMPLEX; and
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of
TWENTY-NINE MILLION PESOS (P29,000,000.00) for the construction of the
buildings of the National Institutes of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology
(BIOTECH) and the installation of their laboratories and their physical plants
and other facilities to enable them to commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of
Trustees of the FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH
COMPLEX by way of recurrent additional grants and donations for specific research
and development projects which may be mutually agreed upon and, from time to time,
additional grants and donations of such amounts as may be necessary to provide the
RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research Institutes with operational flexibility
especially with regard to incentives to staff purchase of equipment/facilities, travel
abroad, recruitment of local and expatriate staff and such other activities and inputs
which are difficult to obtain under usual government rules and regulations.
[6]

The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25, 1982.
[7]

In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of
laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do
so. In a Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of the need to
submit the contract so that it could be submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and
approval.
[8]
Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an
accomplishment report on the project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment
thereon.
[9]
By May 1983, PHILAB had completed 78% of the project, amounting to
P2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of P2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty
percent (40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio and
furnished him the progress billing from PHILAB.
[10]
On August 11, 1983, the FEMF made
another partial payment of P836,119.52 representing the already delivered laboratory
and office furniture after the requisite inspection and verification thereof by
representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB. The payment was made in the
form of a check, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through
Padolina.
[11]

On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the amount
of P702,939.40 for the final payment of laboratory furniture. Representatives from
BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the
accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same. BIOTECH forwarded the invoice
to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its payment.
[12]
Lirio, in turn, forwarded the invoice to
Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part of 1985. However, the FEMF failed to
pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated its request for payment through a letter on May 9, 1985.
[13]

BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the payment of PHILABs
bill.
[14]
It sent another letter to Gapud, on November 22, 1985, again appealing for the
payment of PHILABs bill.
[15]
In a Letter to BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB
requested payment of P702,939.40 plus interest thereon of P224,940.61.
[16]
There was,
however, no response from the FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH,
appealing for the payment of its bill even on installment basis.
[17]

President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution. On March 26, 1986, Navasero wrote BIOTECH requesting for its much-
needed assistance for the payment of the balance already due plus interest of
P295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of laboratory furniture.
[18]

On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to
secure the payment of the amount due from the FEMF.
[19]
The letter was referred to then
Budget Minister Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP President Edgardo
Angara on June 9, 1986. On September 30, 1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor
of UP Los Baos, wrote then Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting PHILABs claim to be officially entered
as accounts payable as soon as the assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.
[20]

In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract
and the MOA for its perusal.
[21]

Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract
executed between PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter dated October 20, 1987, Navasero
informed De Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding
the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP.
In the complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE &
40/100 (P702,939.40) plus an additional amount (as shall be determined during
the hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction the
value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (P11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%)
percent interest on the total amount from August 1982 until fully paid;
(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (P50,000.00) as and for attorneys fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.
[22]

PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM
PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff to supply and install several laboratory
furnitures and equipment at BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein defendant
located at its campus in College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS: TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100
(P2,939,058.90);
4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said laboratory furnitures and
equipment at defendants BIOTECH Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on
installment basis:
a) P600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;
b) P800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;
c) P836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE & 40/100 (P702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years, defendant
arrogantly and maliciously made plaintiff believe that it was going to pay the balance
aforestated, that was why plaintiffs President and General Manager himself,
HECTOR C. NAVASERO, personally went to and from UP Los Baos to talk with
defendants responsible officers in the hope of expecting payment, when, in truth
and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay whatsoever right from the start on a
misplaced ground of technicalities. Some of plaintiffs demand letters since year
1983 up to the present are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H
hereof;
6. That by reason of defendants malicious, evil and unnecessary misrepresentations
that it was going to pay its obligation and asking plaintiff so many red tapes and
requirements to submit, compliance of all of which took plaintiff almost eight (8)
years to finish, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay,
defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) exemplary damages, so that other government
institutions may be warned that they must not unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the people they serve.
[23]

In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action
against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the
BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for
the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to
pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
without prejudice to PHILABs recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice
to plaintiff's recourse to the assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance of
P792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.
[24]

Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the trial
court erred in finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory furniture and
equipment was between PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable to pay the
respondent the balance of the purchase price.
[25]

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was
never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be
bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto. The
appellate court ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay for the laboratory
furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: No one should unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision,
UP, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON
CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE
MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB.
[26]

Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the subject of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of
appeal is generally restricted to questions of law.
[27]
However, this rule is not absolute.
The Court may review the factual findings of the CA should they be contrary to those of
the trial court.
[28]
Correspondingly, this Court may review findings of facts when the
judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts.
[29]

On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked the
evidentiary effect and substance of the corresponding letters and communications
which support the statements of the witnesses showing affirmatively that an implied
contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the FEMF. The petitioner furthermore
asserts that no contract existed between it and the respondent as it could not have
entered into any agreement without the requisite public bidding and a formal written
contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not applying
the law on contracts between the respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it
was never privy to the MOA entered into between the petitioner and the FEMF. The
respondent adds that what the FEMF donated was a sum of money equivalent to
P29,000,000, and not the laboratory equipment supplied by it to the petitioner. The
respondent submits that the petitioner, being the recipient of the laboratory furniture,
should not enrich itself at the expense of the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondents cause of action is one for sum of money
predicated on the alleged promise of the petitioner to pay for the purchase price of the
furniture, which, despite demands, the petitioner failed to do. However, the respondent
failed to prove that the petitioner ever obliged itself to pay for the laboratory furniture
supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not entitled to its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the
petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts take
effect only between the parties and their assigns.
[30]
A contract cannot be binding upon
and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.
[31]
Likewise admitted by the parties, is
the fact that there was no written contract executed by the petitioner, the respondent
and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and laboratory furniture to the
BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the
respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties
are in accord that the FEMF had remitted to the respondent partial payments via checks
drawn and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the total amount
of P2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the project of P2,934,068.90 and that the
respondent received the said checks and issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is
also no controversy that the petitioner did not pay a single centavo for the said furniture
delivered by the respondent that the petitioner had been using ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact contract
of sale was entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is
one implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. It
arises where the intention of the parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact
creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and terms of which are manifested
by conduct and not by direct or explicit words between parties but is to be deduced from
conduct of the parties, language used, or things done by them, or other pertinent
circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact,
circumstances must warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to
pay.
[32]
An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties intent to enter into a
contract; it is a true contract.
[33]
The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a
reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not of an implied-in-fact
contract.
[34]
The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to
determine their intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of
minds is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.
[35]

In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it for the
fabrication and supply of the laboratory furniture until the go-signal was given to it to
fabricate and deliver the furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that the FEMF was to pay
for the same. Indeed, Padolina asked the respondent to prepare the draft of the contract
to be received by the FEMF prior to the execution of the parties (the respondent and
FEMF), but somehow, the respondent failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that
the petitioner was merely the donee-beneficiary of the laboratory furniture and not the
buyer; nor was it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the
inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for
which the latter unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the FEMF.
Indeed, witness Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware that it was the
Marcos Foundation who would be paying for this particular transaction for the
completion of this particular transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there were occasions
during our inspection in Los Baos, at the installation site, there were occasions,
two or three occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the President, I
think, or manager of PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really between the
foundation and him to which includes (sic) the construction company constructing
the building. He is fully aware that it is the foundation who (sic) engaged them and
issued the payments.
[36]

The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner and
sought its assistance for the collection of the amount due from the FEMF:
Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance still
due us on the laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as possible to
keep up our operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.
[37]

The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance for the
payment of the amount due, in which the respondent admitted it tried to collect from her
predecessor, namely, the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
At the,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures
were supplied by our company to the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of the Philippines, Los Baos, Laguna, in 1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-
NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (P2,939,058.90), the previous
administration had so far paid us the sum of P2,236,119.52 thus leaving a balance of
PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100 (P1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per annum and
30% exchange rate adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your predecessor, the
latest of which was subject invoice (01643) we submitted to DR. W. PADOLINA,
deputy director of BIOTECH. But this, notwithstanding, our claim has remained
unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto attached for easy reference.
Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that
payment of this obligation will soon be made as this is one project the Republic of the
Philippines has use of and derives benefit from.
[38]

Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of accounts
for the payments of the laboratory furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the
petitioner, through Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment. However, the
FEMF failed to pay the last statement of account of the respondent because of the
onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only when the respondent lost all hope of collecting
its claim from the government and/or the PCGG did it file the complaint against the
petitioner for the collection of the payment of its last delivery of laboratory furniture.
We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of the
respondent based on the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of
another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the
efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly
enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
[39]

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must
unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which
he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the
person to keep the benefit.
[40]
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect
of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under
circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be
entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or
request.
[41]
Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite
for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.
[42]

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be
present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a
loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that
the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-
delict.
[43]

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available
onlywhen there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict.
If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action
must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.
[44]

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not
obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action
based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim.
The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF;
hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision
[1]
dated October
21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment
[2]
dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4,
in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven
(7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution
[3]
of the appellate
court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years
(from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to
join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and
to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago
[4]
at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information
[5]
filed
by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
[6]

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil
case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in
the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case
No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[7]

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,
[8]
the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in
a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,
[9]
which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,
[10]
everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[11]

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that
the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
349
[12]
of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the
first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy
case.
The Court of,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 15
[13]
of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary
to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17
[14]
of the Civil Code, a declaration of
public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending
that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,
[15]
allows mistake upon a difficult question of law
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good
faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.
[16]

However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original
decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak
of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE
OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
[17]

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon
the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack
of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good
faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies
upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
[18]
which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40
[19]
of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone
is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he
was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
[20]
we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.
[21]

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 3
[22]
and 4
[23]
of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin
with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
[24]
The records
show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the
instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.
[25]

In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted.
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;, , ,.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.
[26]

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate
was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial , ,
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present
case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners
motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo
y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not
been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.



[1]
Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate
Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.
[2]
Records, pp. 114-119.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and
Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.
[4]
Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of their
marriage contract. Records, p. 10.
[5]
The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:
That, on or about the 4
th
day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful
marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the
amount to be proved during trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 38-40.
[7]
Records, p. 119.
[8]
G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
[9]
42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).
[10]
58 Phil. 817 (1933).
[11]
Rollo, p. 43.
[12]
ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
[13]
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
[14]
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed
in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
[15]
G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.
[16]
Rollo, p. 51.
[17]
Id. at 20-21.
[18]
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
[19]
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
[20]
Supra.
[21]
CA Rollo, p. 38.
[22]
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
[23]
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
[24]
Rollo, p. 54.
[25]
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
[26]
Id. at 124.



[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria (retired), with Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas,
Jr. (retired) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Oswaldo Agcaoili (retired) and
Sergio L. Pestao, concurring.
[3]
Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
[4]
Rollo, p. 104.
[5]
Exhibit I.
[6]
Rollo, p. 65.
[7]
Exhibit 24.
[8]
Exhibit 2.
[9]
Exhibit 3.
[10]
Exhibit 4.
[11]
Rollo, p. 109.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Exhibit 8.
[14]
Exhibit 7.
[15]
Exhibit 9.
[16]
Exhibit 10.
[17]
Exhibit 11.
[18]
Exhibit 12.
[19]
Exhibit 14.
[20]
Exhibit 15.
[21]
Exhibit 16.
[22]
Rollo, p. 45.
[23]
Id. at 43-44.
[24]
Id. at 58.
[25]
Records, p. 52.
[26]
Rollo, p. 11.
[27]
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, 359 SCRA 608 (2001).
[28]
Tando v. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 321 (2001).
[29]
Spouses Constante Firme and Azucena E. Firme v. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 146608, October 23, 2003.
[30]
Article 1311, New Civil Code.
[31]
Manila Port Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214 (1967).
[32]
17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contract, pp. 559-560.
[33]
G. T. Fogle & Co. v. United States, 135 F.2d 117 (1943).
[34]
Roebling v. Dillon, 288 F.2d 386 (1961).
[35]
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592 (1923).
[36]
TSN, 17 August 1992, p. 14.
[37]
Exhibit 12.
[38]
Exhibit 14.
[39]
Mon-Ray, Inc. v. Granite Re, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 434 (2004) citing First National Bank of St. Paul v.
Ramier, 311 N.W. 2d 502, 504 (1981).
[40]
ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Bus. Services., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 306 (1996).
[41]
Callaway Golf Company v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas, Inc., 318 F.Supp.2d 216 (2004);
Dinosaur Dev., Inc. v. White, 216 Cal.App.3d 1310, 265 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1989).
[42]
Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 926 P.2d 1130 (1996).
[43]
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, pp.
77; In Albrecht v. Walter, 572 N.W.2d 809 (1997), it was held that:
(1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) some connection between enrichment and
impoverishment; (4) the absence of justification for enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) the absence
of a remedy provided by law.
[44]
Id. at 82.