Terrorism has assumed serious dimensions after the September 11 attack on the twin towers of World Trade Centre in United States of America. The full blown up pictures of the abrupt vertical collapse of the commercial might of USA was witnessed world over. Since then the periodical attacks are aimed at various targets by the radical groups in various parts of the globe. Stringent 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 2
laws vis--vis non-political swift handling of the terrorist attacks in some countries has yielded deterrent results and the countries where able to overcome this menace. However, contrary to this, India which has belatedly converted into the epicentre of terrorism, is dealt with casual approach and resulted into heavy mortality and gave a setback to the growing economy. Another attackmore than a couple of hundred dead and several hundreds injured in the recently Mumbai terrorist attack. The regular phenomenon of terrorist attacks in India are keeping everyone guessing as to who could be next victim of the flow of terror. Security forces did a splendid job in evacuating every possible hostage but could not save many as they were caught unaware but shown below is some strategic pattern by which we can actually earmark where the next attack would be and when. This has been analyzed in the case study which follows later in this research paper.
Introduction: On the evening of November 26, 2008, a number of well-trained militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 165 people, along with nine terrorists, had been killed and hundreds more injured. Among the Multiple sites attacked in the peninsular city known as Indias business and entertainment capital Were two luxury hotelsthe Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Tridentalong with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural centre, a caf frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. Indian officials have concluded that the attackers numbered only ten, one of whom was captured. The investigation into the attacks is still in preliminary stages, but press reporting and statements from U.S. and Indian authorities strongly suggest that the attackers came to India from neighbouring Pakistan and that the perpetrators likely were members and acting under the orchestration of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group. The LeT is believed to have past links with Pakistans military and intelligence services. By some accounts, these links are ongoing, leading to suspicions, but no known evidence, of involvement in the attack by Pakistani state elements. The Islamabad government has strongly condemned the Mumbai terrorism and offered New Delhi its full cooperation with the ongoing investigation, but mutual acrimony clouds such an effort, and the attacks have brought into question the viability of a nearly five-year-old bilateral peace process between India and Pakistan. Three warsin 1947-48, 1965, and 1971and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of the border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan. Such bilateral discord between two nuclear-armed countries thus has major implications for regional security and for U.S. interests. The Administration of President-elect Barack Obama may seek to increase U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving conflict between these two countries. The Mumbai attacks have brought even more intense international attention to the increasingly deadly and destabilizing incidence of Islamist extremism in South Asia, and they may affect the course of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, especially. The episode also has major domestic implications for India, in both the political and security realms. Indian counterterrorism capabilities have come under intense scrutiny, and the United States may further expand bilateral cooperation with and assistance to India in this realm. The unprecedented terror attacks in Mumbai by highly motivated militants armed with sophisticated weapons on November 26, 2008 dramatically demonstrated the susceptibility of modern cities to terrorist attacks. Although terrorists have attacked New York (2001), Washington D.C (2001), Madrid (2004), and London (2005), the Mumbai assault has proved that cities in the developing world experience terrorist acts with greater frequency and often with more devastating effect than in economically advanced countries. One major reason for this is the lack of effective urban governance institutions in many developing countries. Using the experience of Mumbai, this 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 3
essay argues that there is a strong relationship between the quality of urban governance institutions and the number of terrorist attacks and causalities. Therefore, there is a strong need to make urban governance institutions more credible, worthy and smart in fighting terrorism against cities. This report is divided into three parts: the first part discusses the main elements of terrorism and mentions how the new age terrorism differs from the old one, the second part explores why terrorists target urban centres, the final part analyses the importance of smart urban governance in new age terrorism with a special focus on Mumbai.
Attack Overview: At approximately 9:30 p.m. local time on the evening of November 26, 2008, a number of well trained militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 174 people, including nine terrorists, had been killed and hundreds more injured. Among the multiple sites attacked in the peninsular city known as Indias business and entertainment capital were two luxury hotelsthe Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi- Tridentalong with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural centre, and a caf frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. Six American citizens were among the 26 Foreigners reported dead. Indian officials have concluded that the attackers numbered only ten, one of whom was captured. Some reports indicate that several other gunmen escaped.
According to reports, the militants arrived in Mumbai from sea on dinghies launched from a larger ship offshore, then fanned out in southern Mumbai in groups of two or three. Each was carrying an assault rifle with 10-12 extra magazines of ammunition, a pistol, several hand grenades, and about 18 pounds of military-grade explosives. They also employed sophisticated technology including global positioning system handsets, satellite phones, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service, and high-resolution satellite photos of the targets. The attackers were said to have demonstrated a keen familiarity with the Taj hotels layout in particular, suggesting that careful advanced planning had been undertaken.
Home Minister Shivraj Patil (who resigned in the wake of the attacks) reportedly ordered Indias elite National Security Guard commandos deployed 90 minutes after the attacks began, but the mobilized units did not arrive on the scene until the next morning, some ten hours after the initial shooting. The delay likely handed a tactical advantage to the militants.4 According to a high ranking Mumbai police official, the militants made no demands and had killed most of their hostage before being engaged by commandos on the morning of November 27.5 Two full days passed between the time of that engagement and the episodes conclusion when the two hotels were declared cleared of the several remaining gunmen.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh apologized to the Indian people on behalf of his government for being unable to prevent the attacks. He said his government will pursue a three level response to include (1) seeking to galvanize the international community to deal sternly with what Singh labelled the epicentre of terrorism, which is located in Pakistan; (2) taking a strong posture toward the Islamabad government in pressing it to end the use of Pakistani territory for staging terrorist attacks, and (3) recognizing that self-help measures to improve Indias own domestic security are required. On December 11, the countrys new home minister, P.Chidambaram, announced major reform efforts for the countrys security infrastructure to include the establishment of a new national investigative agency, a new Coastal Command, 20 new counter terrorism schools, and new regional commando bases. 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 4
Understanding Terrorism: While examining the incidence of terrorism in urban centres, it is important to understand the meaning of terrorism. J. Barker (2003, p.24) has mentioned three main elements of terrorism: a) violent acts threatened or employed b) violent acts directed against civilian targets and c) violent acts threatened or perpetrated for political objectives. Unlike some other characterizations, this definition embraces acts of terror committed by states because although state terrorism and group terrorism have different features, their effects on people and politics are similar and they are often closely related. The close connection between the Pakistani Amy and its intelligence agency called the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Pakistan based deadly terrorist organisations such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (widely believed to have masterminded the recent Mumbai attacks) is a case in point. It is also important to mention that while terrorism is not a new phenomenon; some aspects of terrorist activity today are certainly new. Brian Michael Jenkins (2006, p.185) has identified the following features of the New Age Terrorism. First, terrorism has become bloodier. Second, terrorists have developed new financial resources so that they are less dependent on state sponsors. Third, terrorists have evolved new models of organization. Fourth, terrorists can now wage global campaigns. Fifth, terrorists have effectively exploited new communication technologies. Sixth, some terrorists have moved beyond tactics to strategy, although none of them have achieved their stated long-range goals. Finally, terrorists ignore existing global norms, especially those intended to protect innocent civilians.
Lessons from Mumbai: The Mumbai terror attacks have brought the short-comings inherent in most urban governments in the developing countries: the gap between the promise of public service and its delivery that lies at the root of their inability to respond swiftly and effectively to the challenge of terrorism that has appeared in their cities with horrifying regularity. Mumbai is the best case. The city as the countrys financial and business centre has always been an obvious target for terrorists and terrorist assaults have been occurring in the city with a distressing frequency in the recent past. For instance, in March 1993, simultaneous attacks on a number of targets resulted in over 270 fatal causalities. Similarly, the multiple bomb blasts on Mumbai trains killed 200 people in July 2005. Yet the city administration has miserably failed to develop the right kind of infrastructure or has any crisis management protocols in place to deal with the frequent terrorist onslaught. This was demonstrated in the November 2008 terrorist attack. The terrorists were able to inflict severe causalities in Mumbai because the city police, the first responders, did not engage them. Their weapons were not sufficiently powerful and they were not trained in that type of conflict. Moreover, the city firemen were slow to respond. They failed to coordinate their actions with both the local police and national paramilitary forces and suffered from inadequate equipment. Similarly, Mumbai, with 18 million people and the fourth largest Metropolitan region in the world, did not even have a single Special Weapons and Tactics Team nor a helicopter to carry SWAT teams sent from New Delhi to Mumbai. The commandos who ended the siege had to wait for hours to be transported from the Mumbai airport. The terrorists had hotel floor plans, but the commandos did not; terrorists used GPS & Blackberries and monitored news coverage, while the commandos did not have advanced communications. Terrorists even monitored civilian cellphone and text message traffic to glean information about what the police were doing. 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 5
Sadly, during the attack, there was no powerful official representing Mumbai citys administration simply because the administration has no power to speak of. The responses in the immediate aftermath of the attacks---orders to the police and military, evacuation operations flowed from the above. An entire tier of the government at the local level was non-existent (Nilekani, 2008). Now compare that with America. New York City, like the rest of the USA, prides itself that it has been able to prevent another terrorist attack after 9/11. A key factor that has helped is the effort put in by its police force to anticipate threats and try and stay one step ahead of potential attackers. Moreover, the way the city administration had responded to the 9/11 terrorist strike is also praiseworthy. Rudy Giuliani, the New York mayor, was highly visible in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and coordinated the response of various city departments while organizing the support of state and federal authorities for the attack site, for city-wide anti-terrorist measures, and for restoration of destroyed infrastructure. He made frequent appearances on radio and television on September 11 and afterwards and was hailed by many for his leadership role during the crisis. Unlike New York, Mumbais problems are deeply structural. Although the 74th constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 formally gave constitutional recognition to urban governance in India, decision-making on financial and governance matters concerning the city is split in a haphazard manner within the countrys three tiered structure of governance (Federal, State and the City Government). This results in a diffused responsibility, lack of coordinated action and disjointed planning as well as lack of financial autonomy for the city. Ironically, even municipal services in cities are fragmented across many different corporations, agencies and local government bodies resulting in what can be called too many cooks in the urban kitchen scenario with conflicting lines of accountability. What is more painful is that the city mayors in India largely hold ceremonial positions. Their indirect election combined with short-one year tenure deprives them with any real authority. And all this had repercussions in the speed and efficiency with which Mumbai responded to the attacks. Besides revealing the serious deficiencies of urban governance system in India, the Mumbai attack also showed the larger mood of anger and disappointment of the public against the political class whether they occupied governing slots in New Delhi or Mumbai and remains satisfied with its minimalist performance. Within days of the terrorist attack, billboards were set up in the city with messages that are worthy to mention; that the political class has failed us, so please do not vote (those who come in through our vote are more dangerous than those Pakistanis who came through the boat), no security, no taxes etc. Some have even filled public interest litigation against the government charging that it failed to discharge its constitutional duty to protect the countrys citizenry and uphold their right to life. It is understandable that the public that feels it deserves better insists on some semblance of accountability and responsive governance from those who claim to represent and speak for the masses. But it is also worth mentioning that the questioning of the process of elections-the very exercise that is fundamental to democracy and the erosion of the peoples faith in democratic institutions has serious implications. It could not only embolden the authoritarian figures and their anti-democratic ambitions but might end up with no institution retaining credibility or respectability to stand up to the practitioners of violence. While anger can replace governments with another, it does not bring change. This can come through the democratic process. With all its distortions, there is no alternative to democracy and elections.
Disaster at Various Places: 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 6
1) Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus: The Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) was attacked by two gunmen, one of whom, Ajmal Kasab, was later caught alive by the police and identified by eyewitnesses. The attacks began around 21:30 when the two men entered the passenger hall and opened fire, [38] using AK-47 rifles. [39] The attackers killed 58 people and injured 104 others, [39] their assault ending at about 22:45. [3][38] Security forces and emergency services arrived shortly afterwards. The two gunmen fled the scene and fired at pedestrians and police officers in the streets, killing eight police officers. The terrorists passed a police station. Many of the outgunned police officers were afraid to confront the terrorists, and instead switched off the lights and secured the gates. The terrorists headed towards Cama hospital intending to kill patients, but the hospital staff locked all of the patient wards. The two men reached the hospital and attempted to enter the patient wards. They demanded a glass of water from the hospital staff. They asked the man who gave it to them what his religion was, and shot him dead when he said he was a Hindu. When local police arrived, Kasab and Khan threw grenades and shot a police officer dead before fleeing. A team of the Mumbai Anti-Terrorist Squad led by Police chief Hemant Karkare searched the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and then headed out in pursuit of Kasab and Khan. Kasab and Khan opened fire on the pursuing vehicle, and the police returned fire. Karkare and four of his officers were killed, and the only survivor was wounded. However, the terrorists ran into a police roadblock, which had been set up after the wounded police officer radioed for help, leading to a gun battle in which Khan was killed, and Kasab was wounded. Kasab struggled with police as they arrested him.
2) Leopold Cafe: The Leopold Cafe, a popular restaurant and bar on Colaba Causeway in South Mumbai, was one of the first sites to be attacked. [40] Two attackers opened fire on the cafe on 26 November night, killing at least 10 people (including some foreigners), and injuring many more. [41] The terrorists fired into the street as they fled the scene. 3) Bomb blasts in Taxi: There were two explosions in taxis caused by timer bombs. The first one occurred at 22:40 at Vile Parle, killing the driver and a passenger. The second explosion took place at Wadi Bunder between 22:20 and 22:25. Three people including the driver of the taxi were killed, and about 15 other people were injured.
4) Hotel Taj and Oberoi Trident : Two hotels, the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower and the Oberoi Trident, were amongst the four locations targeted. Six explosions were reported at the Taj hotel and one at the Oberoi Trident. At the Taj Mahal, firefighters rescued 200 hostages from windows using ladders during the first night. CNN initially reported on the morning of the 27 November 2008 that the hostage situation at the Taj had been resolved and quoted the police chief of Maharashtra stating that all hostages were freed; however, it was learned later that day that there were still two attackers holding hostages, including foreigners, in the Taj Mahal hotel. During the attacks, both hotels were surrounded by Rapid Action Force personnel and Marine Commandos (MARCOS) and National Security Guards (NSG) commandos. When reports emerged that attackers were receiving television broadcasts, feeds to the hotels were blocked. All attackers were out of the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels by the early morning of 29 November. Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan of the NSG lost his life as a result of a gun shot during the evacuation of Commando Sunil Yadav who was hit in the leg by a bullet during the rescue operations at Taj. 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 7
A number of European Parliament Committee on International Trade delegates were staying in the Taj Mahal hotel when it was attacked, but none of them were injured. British Conservative Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Sajjad Karim (who was in the lobby when attackers initially opened fire there) and German Social Democrat MEP Erika Mann were hiding in different parts of the building. Also reported present was Spanish MEP Ignasi Guardans, who was barricaded in a hotel room. Another British Conservative MEP, Syed Kamall, reported that he along with several other MEPs left the hotel and went to a nearby restaurant shortly before the attack. Kamall also reported that Polish MEP Jan Masiel was thought to have been sleeping in his hotel room when the attacks started, but eventually left the hotel safely. Kamall and Guardans reported that a Hungarian MEP's assistant was shot. Also caught up in the shooting were the President of Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, while checking in at the Oberoi Trident,[59] and Indian MP N. N. Krishnadas ofKerala and Sir Gulam Noon while having dinner at a restaurant in the Taj hotel.
5) Nariman House: Nariman House, a Chabad Lubavitch Jewish center in Colaba known as the Mumbai Chabad House, was taken over by two attackers and several residents were held hostage. Police evacuated adjacent buildings and exchanged fire with terrorists, wounding one. Local residents were told to stay inside. Terrorists threw a grenade into a nearby lane, causing no casualties. NSG commandos arrived from Delhi, and a Naval helicopter took an aerial survey. During the first day, 9 hostages were rescued from the first floor. The following day, the house was stormed by NSG commandos fast-roping from helicopters onto the roof, covered by snipers positioned in nearby buildings. After a long battle, one NSG commando and both terrorists were killed. Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his wife Rivka Holtzberg, who was six months pregnant, were murdered with other hostages inside the house by the attackers. The terrorists "would be told by their handlers in Pakistan that the lives of Jews were worth 50 times those of non-Jews." They were tortured very badly.
Disaster Management: Disaster Management Information System must be built in every district of the country linked with each other, available on the web and also in public libraries. We should know where the inventories are available of critical equipments, skills; resources and information and how can one access them on voluntary or payment basis. The database of various services and infrastructure in private, public and voluntary sectors should be updated regularly. Every college should take responsibility for collecting and updating information about certain categories of services or equipments. Simple information such as about ham radio operators can be put on the web without fail. Just as we have national services scheme, we must now think of national disaster management volunteers who would receive training and be empowered to organize themselves as effective teams for helping local communities around them. No amount of state help can substitute for community based structures for self help. Supreme Court had passed judgments and given advice for starting courses on disaster management in various educational institutions. Have we ever monitored how many such courses exist and what quality of preparedness has been achieved? The major tragedy will begin when the media will get interested in new issues, fight among some other politicians or corporate games. Resources would be required for repairing and building 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 8
the primary school buildings, primary health centres, livestock, clinics, tree climbing devices for palm workers, herbal and other medicines, mat making machines, and machines which can use materials from damaged trees and bio waste, old bamboo scrap, processing machine for various edible and non-edible oilseeds, etc. A proper rehabilitation plan will have to be built for each village affected by the disaster with proper accountability structure. The accounts of every investment must be made public and people should be able to know how much funds were mobilized by which NGO or government agency and how were they used for the purpose. In cases where fishing communities or island based indigenous / tribal communities have been affected very severely, long term rehabilitation plans have to be initiated. These plans must learn from the mistakes made in earlier rehabilitation projects. There is very important need to document the experience of the damage caused and ensuing suffering along with the coping strategies of local communities and administration. Some novel lessons would emerge. One of the major problems in relief is that what is needed where is often not known to the people who want to provide support. The result is that lot of materials get wasted or misdirected. We need to put a spreadsheet immediately on the web pointing out village wise needs, contact persons names and addresses so that civil society efforts can be targeted more efficiently. We had tried to put an inventory management system in place after Gujarat earthquake with the help of our students and faculty. The students had stacked the relief material received from all over the country in Kutchh and given assorted sheets to the Relief Commissioner. Where we failed was to link this system with GIS so that one could track the deliveries, collect the response and also avoid pilferages. It will be useful if some of the IT firms in Chennai would volunteer to create such a GIS so that people can update the demand and supply information and every unit of material is optimally utilized. The psychological rehabilitation is no less important. The children affected the by the shock and tragedy are particularly vulnerable. The arrangements for adoption of orphan children with proper community care have to be put in place. It is very disheartening to hear that in large number of cases of dead people, the Public Health authorities have been reportedly hesitant in maintaining proper records. It might save the state and central governments some money from the compensation fund but it would certainly inflict damage on the social conscience of the society. If the rehabilitation funds reach late, they are as good as not given. Unless central government ensures delivery of compensation through community control systems within next 24 hours, the fairness in the system will become more and more difficult to achieve with every passing day. While we still need immediate help, the long term rehabilitation must be simultaneously planned. Crisis Management at National Level:
Crisis management is a critical organizational function. Failure can result in serious harm to Stakeholders, losses for an organization and its very existence. A crisis is defined as a significant threat to operation that can have negative consequences if not handled properly. It can create three related threats 1) Public safety 2) Financial loss 3) Reputation loss. It damages the organization in terms of finance. The primary concern in a crisis has to be public safety. If failure to address public safety intensifies the damage from crisis reputation and financial concern are considered after public safety has been remedied.
26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack Page 9
In India, it is apparent that Crisis Management has never been given any serious thought taking into consideration our knee jerk reactions to crises situations. There is therefore a need to address impediments in the way of ensuring an effective crises management structure in India and arrive at possible solutions.
Crisis Management at Mumbai:
In 2008, 26 November, 9 terrorists attacked Taj hotel, Oberoi Hotel and Nariman House at Mumbai and killed almost 200 people and about 300 were seriously injured in these three places. It took three days for NSG commandos to overcome these terrorist. In the three days long fight, the commandos were able to kill 8 terrorists and captured one injured. Despite the terror attack, the basic feature of Mumbai as a safe and secure city for everyone, whether he is living in a slum or is the CEO of a corporate giant, has not changed. Parents in the city don't worry about their young professional daughters coming home late at night in public transport. Having said that, there is no guarantee that this -- a better law-and-order situation in the city compared with other metros -- will protect you from a terror attack.
One of the key conclusions of this report is that "Effective management of the consequences of Catastrophes would appear to be a more significant factor than whether catastrophe insurance hedges the economic impact of the catastrophe". While there are technical elements to this report it is highly recommended to those who wish to engage their senior management in the value of crisis management.