Summary: This paper examines

NATOs use of technology, partic-

ularly in an era when defense
budgets are contracting. From
decreased demand to pressures
on governments to curb defense
spending, the author comments
on the need for NATO to create
a cohesive framework and an
understanding of the impact of
acquiring and controlling new
defense technologies.
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
The Use of New Technology in Security
and Defense: The Impact of New Defense
Technologies on NATO
by Jamie Shea
German Marshall Fund of the
United States-Paris
71 Boulevard Raspail
75006 Paris
T: +33 1 47 23 47 18
E: infoparis@gmfus.org
October 2014
NATOs Strategic Concept of 2012
states that the Alliance has to ensure
that it is at the front edge in assessing
the security impact of emerging
technologies, and that military plan-
ning takes the potential threats into
account.
Indeed, throughout its history, NATO
has relied on its technological edge
to maintain deterrence and to ofset
dwindling numbers of soldiers in its
armed forces. In this context, quality
has been an ofset for quantity. Now,
in times of greater austerity, the focus
has been more on fnding innovative
and more diversifed uses for existing
technology to act as force multipliers.
One issue is that new military systems
are vastly more expensive than their
predecessors. Te U.S. Joint Strike
Fighter, for instance, will cost between
80-100 million per aircraf. Te F-16,
by contrast, was only one-tenth of this
price (in constant terms) when it
was developed 30 years ago. Infation
in defense expenditures is running
at between 20 to 30 percent per
decade. Platforms are becoming more
complex, with more technical require-
ments and a greater need for connec-
tivity and networking with other
systems. Inevitably, the numbers of
systems that can be procured in these
circumstances is falling sharply.
Another issue is the fragmentation
of demand. Te NH-90 helicopter,
for instance, has 20 diferent versions
currently more than the number
of countries that are acquiring this
helicopter. A separate production
line had to be created because one
procuring nation wanted the helicop-
ters cabin to be 20 cm higher than
standard. Te Dingo military vehicle,
built by Kraus Mafei, is a European
version of the U.S. mine resistant
armored personnel vehicle (MRAP).
It has 22 diferent varieties with some
nations wanting a diferent type of
armored windscreen. Tis traditional
problem of gold-plating in search of
the 100 percent solution or national
preference greatly increases the price
over a more standardized, 90 percent
solution.
A third issue concerns certifca-
tion. Te European Defence Agency
estimates that a single system of
certifcation for military equipment
within the EU (for instance a single
European sky for drones) would
reduce the price of equipment by
10-15 percent on average, as well
as speed up the entry into service
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
2
of new equipment through easier cross-border sales. Te
certifcation of the NH-90 helicopter has so far cost 4
billion within the EU a sum that could have allowed
many more to be procured. Tus, beyond the permanent
issue of how governments can fund enough research
and development and make new technology work, there
exists an urgent need within both NATO and the EU for
procurement reform at the policy and political levels. Such
reform should not only concern reopening specifcations,
as was once agreed, nor should it focus on re-negotiating
numbers, as this inevitably drives up the price for everyone
else. A strong case should be made for opening up the
European defense market to more competition and trans-
parency regarding long-term modernization and procure-
ment intentions. Currently, nearly 75 percent of defense
contracts within the EU are not subject to competitive
bidding, notwithstanding the good eforts of the Euro-
pean Defence Agency (EDA) to encourage more advanced
notice and transparency through its Code of Conduct.
Defense is expensive and waste has always been part of the
game (think of the billions of dollars worth of equipment
that is currently being lef behind in Afghanistan). Unsur-
prisingly, and at a time when it is spending 73 percent
of the total NATO budgets, the United States is pushing
European allies to meet the target of 2 percent of GDP
devoted to defense, and within this, the target of 20 percent
devoted to modernization and equipment. Tese calls are
all the more pressing in the wake of Russias annexation of
Crimea, which will increase the costs of NATOs conven-
tional defense in Europe. Tis will not only come from the
need to deploy combat forces and military infrastructure
on the territory of the Eastern European allies but also
from the much larger-scale exercises and rotation of forces
in and out of the region that NATO has already agreed to
for the reinforcement of deterrence. Russian probes along
NATO airspace, in the maritime domain of the Baltic and
Black seas and in the cyber domain, will also require the
allies to keep their forces on a much higher state of alert.
Te existing readiness levels for the NATO response force
(30+ days needed to deploy) will not meet the require-
ments of responding to Russias proven ability, by means
of constant snap exercises involving between 70,000 and
130,000 Russian troops, to mobilize within a matter of
days. Russia has already deployed substantial infrastructure
and command and control as well as staging posts along
its Western border with Ukraine, giving it a rapid power
projection capability throughout the region. Tis will
require NATO to at least pre-position (as during the Cold
War) substantial stocks of equipment on the territory of the
Eastern European allies and to build the requisite reception
facilities. Yet, even the shock of the Ukraine crisis may not
be enough to push the majority of allies to increase their
military defense spending. Only three European allies meet
the 2 percent target, and only eight the 20 percent target.
Fourteen currently spend below 1.5 percent and fve even
less than 1 percent.
Defense spending pressures on the Europeans will also
increase from actions likely to be taken by the U.S.
Congress. In Warsaw, U.S. President Barack Obama
pledged an extra US$1 billion for a European reassurance
initiative, and the Pentagon is currently looking at how this
package will be made up. But it will have to be approved
by the U.S. Congress, which will be looking for a quid-pro-
quo from the European side. With a U.S. defense budget
now going down from around $700 billion per year to
around $500 billion by the end of this decade, Congress
will not want to see the United States assume the burden
of reassurance and conventional defense at the expense
of the pivot to Asia and U.S. commitments in the Middle
East and elsewhere. A fact very symbolic of this tension:
afer President Obama cancelled the fourth tier of the
U.S. ballistic missile defense system in Europe, many in
Congress pointed out that this system benefts Europe far
more than the United States and that Europe should pay a
much greater share of the cost of the radars, interceptors,
and integrated command and control. A second example
concerns the modernization of the B-61 warhead for
NATOs sub-strategic nuclear deterrent, which could run as
high as $8 billion. Since this weapon largely benefts Euro-
pean deterrence and security (being based in fve European
A strong case should be made for
opening up the European defense
market to more competition and
transparency regarding long-term
modernization and procurement
intentions.
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
3
countries), many Congressional fgures will be calling for
Europe, again, to pay the lions share if it is not viewed as a
U.S. national priority.
Tis conjunction of factors makes it all the more urgent
to move ahead more boldly with multi-national coopera-
tion, known as Smart Defence at NATO and Pooling
and Sharing at the EU. Te idea is, of course, not new. For
many years already, NATO has maintained a feet of 17
AWACs aircraf, has procured three C-17 transport aircraf
on a leasing basis, and has rented Antonov AN-124s to
deploy its forces to Afghanistan. Allies have also taken, in
turn, the responsibility to provide air policing in the Baltic
States, which means that the Baltics themselves have been
able to spend on expeditionary forces rather than on fghter
jets and associated radars and air defense systems. Yet, it
is now the pace as well as the number of multi-national
projects that has to increase. So far, two Smart Defence
projects have been fnalized: the maintenance of helicop-
ters in Afghanistan and the dismantling of surplus mili-
tary equipment. Twenty-seven others are currently in the
pipeline concerning programs such as a universal system
for carrying diferent munitions on aircraf, user groups for
precision-guided munitions and for Reaper and Predator
drones; a pooling system for maritime patrol aircraf; or
common sofware for the simulation of training. Getting
some quick wins or exploiting the low-hanging fruit
of easily achievable projects can certainly do no harm in
validating the Smart Defence multi-national cooperation
approach.
However, public support for more military spending
will only be forthcoming if the public has a clear idea of
what the money will be spent on and how and why it will
substantially improve the Alliances military posture. Given
the legacy of cost overruns, cancelled programs, and long
delays in procurement in the defense sector, public skepti-
cism regarding the rationale for a European rearmament
program in the wake of Crimea is at an all-time high.
Moreover, many NATO countries see the future threats
as more coming from the South (in the form of a recon-
stituted al Qaeda network, illegal immigrants, organized
crime networks, and failed states) and will want a NATO
posture based on one single set of forces that is able to do
crisis management in the South, as well as conventional
defense in the East. Tis will place limits on how far Euro-
pean armies will be able to replace personnel with tech-
nology, as the South will clearly require multiple long-term
capacity building and security sector reform missions, as
well as deployments of forces to keep al Qaeda and other
insurgent groups at bay, as we have recently witnessed with
the deployment of France in Mali. Tis will place pressure
on Europes capacity to sustain forces. For instance, at the
beginning of the Iraq war in 2003, the U.K. was able to
deploy and sustain one division in the Middle East. Today,
the budget allows for sustaining only one combat brigade,
or about one-third of the former division. A country like
the Netherlands can now deploy and sustain only a rein-
forced battalion, a maximum of fve aircraf and a small
naval task force.
In this environment of austerity, it will be essential for
the Allies to have a common view of what they need on
a prioritized basis and then to be efectively organized
in clusters or framework nations to deliver those capa-
bilities. Instead of one European Army, in the future,
we are likely to see several European armies organized
around lead nations or in regional groupings, such as the
Benelux, Visegrd, or the Nordics. NATOs two strategic
commanders have recently come up with a list of 16 short-
falls, which also correspond to the vital enabling capacities
for all modern multi-national military operations. Tey
concern the lack of joint information surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities, which limit NATOs strategic
awareness at a time when early warning and good intel-
ligence are becoming more important to anticipate crises
and react in good time.
Other gaps concern deployable headquarters and
command and control for both ground and air opera-
tions and the need to better integrate air defense and
ballistic missile defense. At a time when major maneuver
operations are becoming more important, these can be
hindered through the lack of blue force tracking systems
and the absence of heavy armor (many allies have dramati-
cally decreased their holdings of tanks and heavy fghting
vehicles). Tere is also a lack of indirect fre support,
ground-based air defense, and combat engineering, as well
In the future, we are likely to
see several European armies
organized around lead nations or
in regional groupings.
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
4
as counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar systems. Cyber
defense continues also to be a concern, as allies try to keep
pace with the fast evolving technology and to develop
more ambitious capability targets as part of the Alliances
defense planning process. Special Operation Forces will
become more important both to prevent minor land grabs
by Russian forces on NATO territory as well as to intervene
against insurgent groups or in response to humanitarian
crises in the South. However, the Alliance lacks deploy-
able air-lif capabilities for these Special Forces, as well as
command and control structures. Finally, and at a time
when the maritime dimension is becoming increasingly
important to protect globalized supply chains, NATO needs
more maritime patrol aircraf to enhance the situational
awareness of its small naval task forces and anti-submarine
warfare capability.
It is not all bleak news. Te Europeans fnally have the
A-400M transport aircraf, more and better helicopters,
considerable technological expertise in combating impro-
vised explosive devices based on the ISAF experience, and
air-to-air refueling capacities, based on the EDA Pooling
and Sharing initiative. Te procurement of Global Hawks
by NATO and an EU common drone program will also
gradually improve Europes intelligence, reconnaissance,
and command and control capabilities. Tis said, the key
task for both NATO and the EU in the months ahead, and
particularly with NATOs Wales Summit in September in
mind, is to identify groupings to plug the 16 shortfalls.
Te initiative of Germany to form a Capability Develop-
ment Group, in combination with the British initiative to
create a group in order to develop an expeditionary force
represent the best way ahead, as they ofer the best chance
for medium and small countries to plug into a framework
organized by a major country and thereby provide essential
niche capabilities. Without this approach, the smaller Allies
would ofer almost no capacity at all in a few years time.
Although the defense debate is ofen dominated by a focus
on hardware, equipment, and platforms, there are two
other ingredients of a successful capability. Te frst one
concerns the training of an exercised manpower. Some of
the shortfalls identifed by NATO Strategic Commanders
are regarding medical units, the under-manning of the
new NATO Command Structure, and the lack of force
protection and life support assets to deploy elements of
this command structure as required. Te acquisition of
observation drones can be hindered by the lack of qualifed
analysts to interpret the data or the lack of standardized
and interoperable networks to distribute and exchange
correlated data among users. During the Libya operation,
the difculty of fnding trained targeting and battle damage
assessment personnel hindered NATOs air operations.
Tere is also a lack of sufcient humanpower resources
to augment NATO and national joint force air compo-
nents. Tis makes it all the more important to invest in the
Connected Forces Initiative and high-tech training and
education in tandem with the acquisition of new systems.
A further observation has to do with networks. Treats
such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghani-
stan could not ultimately be defeated through equipment
and technologies alone, whether in the form of jammers,
route clearance vehicles, or sensors. Success was based
on human networks. One of these concerned intelligence
gathering to identify the insurgents behind the production
and placing of IEDs and their command level and business
interactions. A second task was to build a network between
the intelligence services, Interpol, customs, industrial
producers of ammonium nitrate and potassium chlorate,
and legal and biometrics specialists on the NATO side to
efectively dismantle or frustrate the jihadist networks. In
similar vein, NATO deployments in the years ahead will
not just require a good mix of trained humanpower and
modern multi-use equipment but also such basic things as
good political relationships with partners, Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAs), basing and over-fight rights, and
intelligence-sharing arrangements. Te successful organi-
zation of technological and capability clusters within the
Alliance will ultimately rely on these political and diplo-
matic networks being maintained to bear its full fruit.
NATO deployments in the years
ahead will not just require a good
mix of trained humanpower and
modern multi-use equipment
but also such basic things as
good political relationships with
partners.
Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
Policy Brief
5
Finally, NATO needs to do a better job of tracking the
emergence of new technologies and assessing their military
implications, not just in terms of how NATO can exploit
these against potential adversaries, but also of how those
adversaries could acquire and use them successfully against
Allied forces. Te areas are well known, and cover a varied
set of technological advances and felds. One is information
technology and processing where non-state actors, such as
terrorists, universally exploit of the shelf IT and can use
cyber and jamming technologies to threaten global navi-
gation systems. Tis also concerns biotechnology, where
new developments in the feld of biosensors, bio-mimetics,
molecular electronics, and biochips are likely to asymmet-
rically change the balance of military power. Tese technol-
ogies are unlikely to be directly exploited by terrorists, but
they could conceivably fnd their way to low technology
forces. Other examples are chemical agents which even
produced in small quantities and using commercially avail-
able high toxic chemicals could be added to the capabilities
of non-state actors; laser technology, with the probability of
radio frequency weapons fnding their way into the hands
of terrorist or criminal networks; or radiological dispersal
devices that can have a psychological impact dispropor-
tionate to their physical damage. Drone technologies are
now expanding rapidly, including to non-state actors; other
technologies such as night vision goggles are no longer the
monopoly of advanced armies. Robotics will be an increas-
ingly important element of the battle feld, as will stealth
and counter-stealth technologies, hypersonic vehicles
and smart materials, not to speak of micro satellites, and
sensing and directed energy technologies. In the cyber
domain, cloud computing and virtualization technologies,
as well as autonomous artifcial intelligence technologies
will fnd military as well as civilian applications.
Figuring out which of these technologies are potential
game changers, and whether NATO needs to exploit their
use or try to use arms control and other means to limit
their worldwide distribution (along the lines of attempts
to constrain nuclear weapons) will need to feature more
on NATOs agenda. Te Alliance will need to acquire more
technical expertise in these emerging domains, as well as
devise realistic but coherent political strategies. Industrial
policy will also become more difcult. Should we export
these new technologies freely to others to compensate for
Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the
views of the author alone. Tis article also does not refect an ofcial
view of NATO.
About the Author
Since 2010, Jamie Shea has been the deputy assistant secretary general
for emerging security challenges at NATO HQ, the most recent in a
series of positions he has held at the organization. He holds a degree
in modern history from Oxford University (Lincoln College); his
thesis was entitled European Intellectuals and the Great War 1914-
1918.
About GMF
Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
Contact
Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Schefer
Director, Paris Ofce
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Tel: +33 1 47 23 47 18
Email: adehoopschefer@gmfus.org
declining markets at home; or impose new Cold War-style
export controls and technology transfer restrictions to
preserve our lead (where we still have it), and at a time
when Russia and China are increasingly basing their own
military modernization on Western technology (either
legally acquired or through cyber espionage)?