1. Manuel Japzon v.

COMELEC, January 19, 2009

FACTS:

Manuel Japzon and Jaime Ty ran for mayor in May 2007. Japzon filed a petition for
disqualification and cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy of Ty on the ground of
misrepresentation. Japzon averred that Ty was a US citizen and has been a resident
thereof for the past 25 years and that he falsely represented in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar for one year before the date of the elections. He further averred that
while Ty has reacquired his Philippine citizenship, he has not actually resided in
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and that reacquisition of
citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile in the said barangay. While
the case was pending, Ty won the elections.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Ty complied with the 1 year residency requirement.

RULING:

Yes.

In Election Law, the term residence is to be understood as "domicile" which is the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain.

Domicile of origin is acquired by every person at their birth, usually where the childs
parents reside, and continues until abandoned by the acquisition of a new domicile
that is the domicile of choice.

Acquiring Philippine citizenship does not abandon Tys domicile of origin in the U.S.
but the fact that after acquiring Philippine citizenship he applied for a Philippine
passport indicating his Philippine address, it became his domicile of choice.

Hence, the length of residence is counted from the time Ty made it his domicile of
choice. It does not retroact to the time of birth but it is still within the 1 year period
prescribed by the Local Government Code.














2. Dizon v. COMELEC, January 30, 2009

FACTS:

Roberto Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a petition to
disqualify Marino Morales as a mayoralty candidate for the 2007 elections. Dizon
alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 and thus
should not be allowed to run in the 2007 elections under the three-term limit.

On the other hand, Morales alleged that he did not win in the 1998 elections since the
RTC declared his opponent as duly elected mayor in the said elections.

The COMELEC ruled in favour of Morales citing the former decision of the Supreme
Court that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
notwithstanding the RTC Decision that the then proclamation of Morales was void.
Hence, Morales was not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify
for the 2004 elections is a gap. So Morales is qualified to run again for the same
position in 2007 elections.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Morales violated the 3 term limit.

RULING:

No.

There are 2 conditions for disqualification namely; (1) that the candidate was elected
for three consecutive terms for the same post, and (2) that he has fully served the
three consecutive terms. Involuntary severance from the office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of the continuity of
service no matter how short.

Notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered when the term was about to
be finished, the length of litigation was in good faith and there was no proof of political
manoeuvring in order to prolong his stay in office.

















2-A. Simon Aldovino v. COMELEC, December 23, 2009

FACTS:

Wilfredo Asilo was elected as councillor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms.
During his third term in office in September 2008, a 90-day preventive suspension
order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against Asilo in relation to a criminal case.
Said order was eventually lifted and Asilo resumed office.

In 2007, Asilo ran for the same position. His qualification was challenged as he
allegedly violated of the 3-term limit.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Asilo violated the 3-term limit.

RULING:

Yes.

Preventive suspension does not interrupt the term for the purpose of the 3-term limit.
If it were considered an interruption, there would be a risk of fabricating false
administrative charges to interrupt the term.






























3. Edgar Y. Teves v. COMELEC, April 28, 2009

FACTS:

In 2007, the COMELEC disqualified Edgar Teves as a candidate for Representative of
the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental on the ground that he was convicted in
the Sandigandbayan for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which was allegedly a crime
involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the violation of Teves constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.

RULING:

No.

Possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit license by the Local
Government is prohibited. But illegality does not mean that the violation involves
moral turpitude. Neither does it make it immoral. Moreover, Teves did not use his
power to gain pecuniary financial interest in the cockpit.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It
was held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other
branches of the government to deal with.



























4. Hermelina M. Abainza v. Ernesto Arellano and COMELEC, December 8, 2008

FACTS:

Ernesto C. Arellano and petitioner Hermilina N. Abainza were among the candidates
for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Jovellar, Albay, in the May
14, 2007 elections.

Abainza was one of the winners proclaimed on May 15, 2007. Arellano filed a petition
for correction of the number of votes in certain precincts due to erroneous tally. the
COMELEC 1st Division rendered a Resolution annulling the proclamation of petitioner
as councilor of the Municipality of Jovellar, Albay, due to erroneous tally of votes.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the COMELEC has original jurisdiction over the petition for correction of
manifest error.

RULING:

Yes.

The COMELEC is empowered by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. It exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials.

In relation thereto, it is empowered to promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Under
such rules the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results
during the canvassing may be filed directly with the Commission, even after a
proclamation of the winning candidates. While it deals with pre-proclamation
controversies, it has also been held applicable to cases when a proclamation had
already been made, where the validity of the candidates proclamation was precisely in
question.



















5. Indira R. Fernandez v. COMELEC, June 30, 2008

FACTS:
In the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections Mark Anthony Rodriguez emerged as the winning candidate for SK chairman
of Barangay Pandan del Sur, Pandan, Catanduanes. His opponent filed an election
protest at the MTC of Pandan-Caramoran which ruled in favour of the opponent.
Rodqiguez appealed the case to the COMELEC which reversed the decision of the
MTC. Fernandez filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Hence, Fernandez filed a petition to the Supreme Court alleging that the COMELEC
has no appellate jurisdiction over contests involving SK officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over contests involving SK
officials decided by the MTC.

RULING:

Yes.

The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Construed in relation to the provision in R.A. No. 7160 that includes in the
enumeration of barangay officials the SK chairman, the constitutional provision
indeed sanctions the appellate review by the COMELEC of election protests involving
the position of SK chairman, as in the instant case. Hence, there is nothing improper
in the COMELECs assumption of jurisdiction over respondents appeal.























6. Jose L. Atienza, Jr. v. COMELEC, February 16, 2010

FACTS:

On March 2, 2006 Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare
all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP
president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the
elections

COMELEC issued a resolution annulling the March 2, 2006 elections and ordering the
holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. Subsequently, the LP held a
NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before Drilons term expired where Manuel A.
Roxas II was installed as the new LP president.

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza et. al., filed a petition for mandatory and
prohibitory injunction before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and
J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general.

Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the
provisions of the amended LP Constitution and that the party deemed petitioners
Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP
officers.

On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
Atienza, et al.s petition.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners
Atienza, et al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party disputes.

RULING:

Yes.

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have
blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.
Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from
the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes only if it is necessary to the
discharge of its Constitutional function.

Sec. 2 Art. IX-C of the Constitution provides that the powers and functions of the
COMELEC include ascertainment of identity of political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts.

The COMELEC may resolve intra-party leadership disputes in a proper case brought
before it as an incident of its power to register political parties.


7. Jamelea Salic Maruhom v. COMELEC, July 27, 2009

FACTS:

Maruhom and Abinal are both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao,
Lanaodel Sur, for the the May 2007 elections. Abinal filed a Petition for
Disqualification and to Cancel the Certifiate of Candidacy of Maruhom alleging that
she was a double registrant since she supposedly registered first in Marawi and only
after 3 days, she registered in Marantao, without canceling her Marawi registration.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the controversy.

RULING:

Yes.

The Constitution extends to the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for
it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Under Sec. 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is
aground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must
pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election
for which he filed his COC. It is within the competence of COMELEC to determine
whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC.

If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, COMELEC is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC.

























8. Jeremias V. Esteves v. Rene V. Sarmiento, November 11, 2008

FACTS:

Jeremias Esteves and Reynaldo Teh Bitong were both candidates for Mayor of
Casiguarn, Aurora in the 2007 Elections. Bitong was declared the winner of such
election.

Esteves filed an election protest in the RTC. Bitong filed a motion to dismiss which
was denied by said court. Then he filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
issuance of a temporary restraining order with the COMELEC.

The COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining order directing the RTC to desist from
proceedings until further orders from the COMELEC and thereafter rendered a
decision nullifying the order of the RTC prompting Esteves to file a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Supreme Court can acquire jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme
Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of
petitioners own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. A litigant
should first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law before seeking
judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the
court. The premature invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to ones cause of
action.
















9. Eddie T. Panlilio v. COMELEC and Lilia G. Pineda, July 15, 2009

FACTS:

Panlilio and Pineda were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the
province of Pampanga during the 2007 elections. Thereafter, Panlilio was declared as
the duly elected governor of Pampanga.

Pineda filed an election protest and the COMELEC issued an order giving due course
to private respondents election protest and directed among others, the revision of
ballots pertaining to the protested precincts of the Province of Pampanga. Panlilio filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

He then filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration at
the COMELEC En Banc; and (2) to stay the COMELECs order directing the collection
of ballot boxes. Thereafter, he filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the retrieval
and collection of ballot boxes. Such motions were also denied by the COMELEC.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the COMELEC en banc properly denied the motion for reconsideration
assailing the interlocutory order of the second division.

RULING:

No.

The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that any motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc
except motions on interlocutory orders of the Division, which shall be resolved by the
Division which issued the order. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution also
mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by
the COMELEC en banc.

Since the COMELECs Division issued the interlocutory order, the same COMELEC
Division should resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. The remedy is not a Motion for
Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc or Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
















10. BANAT Party List v. COMELEC, August 7, 2009

FACTS:

BANAT filed a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9369 and enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the statute.

BANAT argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the
powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal since
under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of President and Vice President, and the COMELEC en banc as the National
Board of Canvassers for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-proclamation
cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Thus in
entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine
the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.


ISSUE/S:

Whether or not sections 37 and 38 impair the powers of the PET and SET.

RULING:

No.

Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET
and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the
COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are
exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or
Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and
the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.

On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall
determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.














11. Jovito Palparan, Jr. v. HRET, February 11, 2010

FACTS:

Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. was the first nominee of Bantay party-list group which received
the sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in
the 2007 elections.

Members of the other party-list groups filed with the HRET a petition for quo warranto
against Bantay and its nominee, Palaparan alleging that Palapran is not eligible to sit
in the House of Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and
underrepresented sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.

Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that HRET had no
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to
assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such
question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of
the party-list groups.

RULING:

Yes.

Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, there are two kinds of membership in
the House of Representatives namely; members who shall be elected from legislative
districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations Thus, it is the party-list
representatives who are elected into office. Although it is the party-list organization
that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes
member of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives and
district representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications.

Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.






11-A. ABC Party List v. COMELEC

FACTS:

A petition for cancellation of registration was filed against ABC party-list on the
ground that it was the front of religious organization Ang Dating Daan. The petition
was dismissed and ABC won a seat in the House of Representatives.

The COMELEC en banc reviewed the case and set a hearing stating that Mauricio was
not given the opportunity to present evidence. ABC averred that COMELEC has no
more jurisdiction since ABC was already proclaimed winner and COMELEC
committing grave abuse of discretion upon their holding of hearing/recognizing the
petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether COMELEC still has jurisdiction over ABC when it was already proclaimed a
winner of the elections.

RULING:

Yes.

The Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties,
organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on
legal grounds. It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List.

In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has
jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list
organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list
nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.




















12. Rodante Marcoleta v. COMELEC, April 24, 2009

FACTS:

The party-list group Alagad first won a seat in the House of Representatives in 1998.
Diogenes S. Osabel sat as the partys representative in Congress. In 2004 Alagad won
one seat and Rodante D. Marcoleta sat as Alagads representative.

Due to infighting within Alagads ranks, Osabel and Marcoleta parted ways, each one
claiming to represent the partys constituency. In the 2007 National and Local
Elections, Osabel and Marcoleta each filed a separate list of nominees for Alagad at
the COMELEC. Alagad won again. The Marcoleta and Osabel blocs contested the right
to represent the party in the 14th Congress. Osabel, purportedly the bona fide
president of Alagad, sought the cancellation of the certificates of nomination of the
Marcoleta group. The COMELEC division resolved it in favour of Osabel.

The controversy was then elevated by the Marcoleta group to the Comelec En Banc
which when voting, failed to reach the required number of votes and set a rehearing.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the COMELEC may call for a rehearing.

RULING:

Yes.

Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that a majority vote of all the
members of the COMELEC, and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or
ruling.

Alagads reasoning that a rehearing is unnecessary since it garnered a majority vote
of the quorum does not thus impress.

The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the
Resolution of the First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules
clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the
controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further
clarifying and amplifying their arguments.

Neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a majority in the En Banc Resolution of
November 6, 2007. The Resolution served no more than a record of votes, lacking in
legal effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the First Division Resolution.
Accordingly, the Comelec did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ordering a
rehearing.







13. Ricardo P. Presbeterio v. COMELEC, June 30, 2008

FACTS:

On May 10, 2007, the MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental rendered the municipal election officer of Valladolid to include the names of
946 individuals in the list of qualified voters of the said municipality for the May 14,
2007 elections. The acting provincial election supervisor directed the Election Officer
not to comply with the MCTC order. As a consequence, 946 voters were disallowed to
vote.

These 946 then moved before the MCTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to prevent the Municipal Board of Canvassers from canvassing the election
returns and from proclaiming the winning candidates. MCTC granted the motion and
issued the restraining order. Nonetheless, the Board of Canvassers continued with the
canvassing and subsequently proclaimed all the winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the turn of events, petitioners filed before the COMELEC a petition
for the declaration of failure of election and the holding of a special election which was
dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not a failure of election can be validly declared in this case.

RULING:

No.

Failure of election may be declared only in the three instances namely: (1)that the
election has not been held; (2)the election has been suspended before the hour fixed
by law; and (3)the preparation and the transmission of the election returns have given
rise to the consequent failure to elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner.


Furthermore, the reason for such failure of election should be force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. Finally, before the COMELEC can grant a
verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of 2 conditions
must be established, namely: (1) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned
on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted
in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes cast would affect the result of the election.

It is admitted by the petitioners that elections were held in the subject locality. Also,
the private respondents and four of the petitioners won in the elections and were
proclaimed as the duly elected municipal officials. There is nothing in the records
from which the Court can make even a slim deduction that there has been a failure to
elect in Valladolid, Negros Occidental. Absent any proof that the voting did not take
place, the alleged disenfranchisement of the 946 individuals and 2,000 more
supporters of the petitioners cannot even be considered as a basis for the declaration
of a failure of election.


14. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010

FACTS:

The COMELEC denied the registration of Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of
men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs) on the ground of morality quoting the Bible and the
Koran as basis.

Ang Ladlad filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the party-list system is a
tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are
also the nations. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. That
the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have seeped
into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad is qualified to run under the party-list system.

RULING:

Yes.

The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.

Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements
for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that
Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941.

Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve
to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
under-represented sectors.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to
elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.







14-A. BANAT v. COMELEC, July 15, 2009, April 21, 2009

FACTS:

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list election which was held in
May 2007.

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid and also questioned if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. BAYAN
MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether or not he 20% allocation for party-list representatives is mandatory or
merely a ceiling.
2) Whether or not the 3-seat limit is Constitutional.
3) Whether or not the 2% threshold is Constitutional.

RULING:

1) The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

2) Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.

3) There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of
the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain
the ideal 80-20 apportionment.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.















15. Mike A. Fermin v. COMELEC, December 18, 2008

FACTS:

Mike A. Fermin was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. Subsequently,
he applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to Barangay
Indatuan claiming that he had been a resident of said barangay for 1 year and 6
months. Meanwhile, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite
formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter,
Fermins application for transfer of registration was approved by the COMELEC.

Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May
2007 Elections. Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen filed a petition for disqualification for
not meeting the residency requirement. Elections were held without any decision being
rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and canvassing of
votes, Dilangalen won the elections. Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with
the RTC of Cotabato City.

COMELEC, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan.
Fermin argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the
creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for
the transfer of his voters registration record from Barangay Payan to Barangay
Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not
applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly created municipality, because the
length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the effective date of its
creation.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the COMELEC erred in declaring that Fermin failed to meet the
residency requirement.

RULING:

Yes.

The mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a candidate
does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the
cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. Convincing evidence must substantiate
every allegation.

A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is
sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case,
then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence and can be overthrown only by
rebutting evidence adduced on the other side.








16. Antonio B. Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC, February 23, 2009

FACTS:

On January 9, 2004, Datu Israel Sinsuat filed a petition for the denial of due course to
or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Gunsi for the May 2004 elections
alleging, that Gunsi was not a registered voter in the Municipality of South Upi,
Maguindanao, that Gunsis name was inserted illegally in the List of Applicants and
Voters and the unsigned application for registration has no legal effect.

Gunsi asseverated that his failure to sign his application for registration did not affect
the validity of his registration since he possesses the qualifications of a voter set forth
in the omnibus election code as amended by RA 8189.

Provincial Election Supervisor issued a resolution recommending Gunsis
disqualification to run for Municipal Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao on the ground
that he is not a registered voter of the municipality pointing out that the signature in
the application for registration is indispensable for its validity as it is an
authentication and affirmation of the data appearing therein. The COMELEC affirmed
the decision and Gunsis motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the failure to affix signature is material in voters registration.

RULING:

Yes.

Sec.10 of RA 8189 provides that a qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent
list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to
vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an
application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies
before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.

Moreover, the application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures
of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with
four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at
the expense of the Commission.














17. Romulo F. Pecson v. COMELEC, December 24, 2008

FACTS:

Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of
Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007 elections where Cunanan was
proclaimed the winning candidate. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position
of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest with the RTC
which rendered a decision in his favor.

Cunanan filed a notice of appeal while Pecson filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate
Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure
in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials[2] (Rules) allows this remedy.

The RTC granted Pecsons motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order
dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to the Rules, the
actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the remedy of execution pending appeal was valid.

RULING:

Yes.

On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while still
in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the
decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to
the following rules:

(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse
party. Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing.
There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special
order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal.
Such reasons must:

(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the
injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on
appeal; and

(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the
protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.

(b) If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty
working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining
order or status quo order from the Supreme Court of the Commission on Elections.
The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining
order or status quo order is issued. During such period, the writ of execution pending
appeal shall be stayed.


18. Joselito Mendoza v. COMELEC, March 25, 2010

FACTS:

Joselito Mendoza won as Governor of the province of Bulacan in the 2007 elections.
His opponent Roberto Pandanganan. filed an election protest anchored on the massive
electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner. The COMELEC annulled Mendozas
proclamation as governor and proclaimed Pagdanganan instead. The COMELEC en
banc affirmed such decision.

Mendoza questioned the COMELEC decision asserting that it exercised judicial power.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.

RULING:

No.

Under the Constitution, the judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and the
lower courts.

The COMELECs function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than
a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the
exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial
nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the
law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the
merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is
essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests,
COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a
court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative
function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-
judicial.