2006, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 80, No.

1
Scotus and Haecceitas, Aquinas and Esse:
A Comparative Study
James B. Reichmann, S.J.
Abstract. Tis study compares the teachings of Tomas Aquinas and John Duns
Scotus on the issue of being and individuality. Its primary aim is to contrast
Scotuss individuating principle, haecceitas, with Aquinass actualizing principle,
esse, attending both to their rather striking similarities as well as to their signicant
dierences. Te articles conclusion is that, while Scotuss crowning principle, haec-
ceitas, is the unique entity internal to each thing, rendering the nature complete and
singular as nature, Aquinass crowning principle, esse, actualizes the nature without
individualizing it. Tis is not to imply that Scotus overlooked the importance of
a things being, any more than Aquinas overlooked the importance of a beings
singularity. It does mean, however, that the primal integrating focus and the result-
ing philosophical synthesis of these two seminal thinkers of the Middle Ages did
signicantly dier. Te conclusion of the paper might be stated thus: what most
distinguishes their respective philosophies is that, while Scotuss primary concern
was with the existing individual, Aquinass was with the existing individual.
I.
I
ntroduction. Only a resolute idealist would deny the existence of indi-
vidual material things. Individuality ts into our everyday experience
as centrally and inevitably as does our awareness of time. Of the lat-
ter, Augustine famously asked: What is time? Who can explain this easily and
briey? Equally famous is his response: I know, provided no one asks me.
1

Augustines response seems applicable to the experience of individuality as well.
Who of us can explain easily and briey what an individual is?
As the title of this paper suggests, the present study aims at comparing
the thought of two leading thinkers of the high Middle Ages, Tomas Aquinas
1
Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), 1.
Axiiicax Caruoiic Puiiosoiuicai Quairiii\ o
and Duns Scotus, as it relates to questions concerning the existence of things
and their individuality. It attempts to uncover the interesting and startling
similarities as well as the dierences obtaining between Scotuss crown principle
of individuation, haecceitas, and Aquinass crown principle of being, esse. C.
R. S. Harris has characterized Scotuss teaching on individuality as forming
the copingstone of the Scotist logic,
2
while tienne Gilson has remarked: At
the heart of the real for Tomas Aquinas one nds the act of being, for Duns
Scotus one nds haecceity.
3
Our study will conclude with a reection on the
comparative merits of both.
II.
Aquinas and Esse. For Aquinas esse, while signifying a reality wholly internal
to the singular existent, accounts for the actual existence of everything within the
singularly existing thing. Hence, esse is the crowning act in which everything
shares but which itself does not share in anything.
4
Aquinas also states that the
actuality of form, matter and the composite is one and the same.
5
Doubtless Aquinass denitive conrmation of the above teaching is found
in his frequently cited statement: Hence it is clear that when I speak of esse,
what I refer to is the actuality of all acts, and, consequently, the perfection of
all perfections.
6
Tus for Tomas esse, while wholly internal to the existing
singular thing, is the actuality of everything within the being without at the
same time contributing in any way to the manner in which that being exists.
Esse is thus not identiable with the essence or nature of things that it actualizes,
since Aquinas considers essence precisely as essence to be in a state of potency
vis--vis the actuality of being.
7
As a principle, therefore, esse is unique in that
it gives actuality to everything within the being. Yet at the same time esse is not
found apart from the very entities it actualizes. It does not, therefore, exist in
2
C. R. S. Harris, Duns Scotus, vol. 1: Te Place of Duns Scotus in Medieval Tought (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1927; reprinted, New York: Humanities Press, 1959), 2445.
3
tienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot. Introduction ses positions fondamentales (Paris: Librarie
philosophique J. Vrin, 1952), 466.
4
Esse est actus ultimus, participabilis ab omnibus, nihil participans (Qu. un. de an., art.
6, ad 2). Also see De ente et essentia, chap. 2; ST I, qu. 75, art. 4 and 5. All translations are my
own, unless otherwise indicated.
5
Idem est esse formae, materiae et compositi (ST III, qu. 4, art. 5, ad 2); similarly, Esse
est formale omnium quae in re sunt (ST I, qu. 8, art. 1, resp.).
6
Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et proper hoc est
perfectio omnium perfectionum (Qu. disp. de pot., qu. 7, art. 2, ad 9). Basically the same is af-
rmed in Qu. disp. de an., art. 6, resp., and in ST I, qu. 4, art. 2, ad 3.
7
Ipsum esse comparatur ad omnes substantias creatas sicut actus earum (ScG II, chap.
53).
Scorus axo HAECCEITAS, Aquixas axo ESSE o
an isolated state as pure act, even though in and of itself it is act only. Were it
not limited by the essence or other principles internal to the individual being,
it would be innite, unlimited. As experienced, however, esse is always limited
by the very entities that it existentially actualizes.
8
Te entire function, then,
of the act of being, esse, is to actualize; not to limit or contract, for it does not
function as both act and potency, but as act only.
9
Tus Aquinas will insist that
esse considered in itself is neither nite nor innite.
10
From this it also follows
that being must be found to be analogous, for the esse that a being possesses
depends entirely on the essence or substance that it actualizes.
11
As a consequence, esse cannot for Aquinas function as the principle of
individuation of the singularly existing thing, for that principle will have as
its signal and sole function the individualization of natures or essences within
the being, thus making it possible for that same specic nature to be shared
by many individuals. Te principle of individuation contracts or limits gen-
eral or common essences, but as such does not add any positive reality to the
existing thing.
For Aquinas, then, the source of individualization of nature is traceable to
signate matter, that is to say, the accident of quantity, and in this view he is
following the position taken by Aristotle. At the same time, Aquinas holdsas
we have seenthat although esse is not the source of the particularization of
things, it is nonetheless that by which the principle of individuation (that is,
quantity) is actual, just as it is the source of actualization of every aspect within
the existing thing. As we shall see, Scotuss view regarding being and the prin-
ciple of individuation diers signicantly from that of Aquinas, although the
two positions exhibit interesting parallels.
III.
Scotus and Haecceitas. Scotus agrees with Aquinas in a rming the need for
an experiential basis to justify the objective origin of universal ideas in the mind.
He holds that such ideas are not mere mental creations or ctions, but have a
true basis in experience. Although acknowledging that all existing things are truly
8
Omne aliud esse quod non est subsistens, oportet quod individuetur per naturam et
substantiam quae in tali esse subsistit. Et in eis verum est quod est huius et aliud ab esse illius per
hoc quod est alterius naturae (Qu. disp. de pot., qu. 7, art. 2, ad 5).
9
Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus
per potentiam (ibid., ad 9).
10
In Phys., Bk. 8, lect. 21.
11
Nulla res est in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae quia esse cu-
juslibet est ei proprium et distinctum ab esse cujuslibet alterius rei (Qu. disp. de pot., qu. 7, art.
3, resp. in initio).
Axiiicax Caruoiic Puiiosoiuicai Quairiii\ oo
singular, Scotus also a rms that they are not singular by reason of what they are.
12

To maintain the contrary, he says, would clearly render incoherent any attempt to
defend the view that universal ideas have an experiential basis. In short, natures
or essences in themselves are, for Scotusas they are for Aquinasindierent
to being either singular or universal.
13
In and of themselves natures are common,
although they only exist actually in things as singular. Consequently, common
natures are found as common only in the intellect. Te entity Scotus assigns
as responsible for rendering the common nature singular is the principle of
singularity, haecceitas (thisness).
Haecceitas is a term that Scotus coined in his later writings to refer to the
internal principle of things that constitutes them as individuals. Although Scotus
employs it sparingly, haecceitas has historically come to be identied with his theory
of individuation. Haecceitas is synonymous with the more commonly occurring
terms, individuans entitas (individuating entity), principium singularitatis (prin-
ciple of singularity), and ultima realitas entis (ultimate reality of being).
14
Haecceitas as an individuating principle does not for Scotus have a merely
limiting function as does quantied matter for Aquinas. Rather, it performs a
positive function in that it completes the nature of a thing. He views haecceitas
as a positive entity that constitutes each existing thing an individual. Te role
of haecceity in Scotuss system is one of great import, rivaled only perhaps by
the other key Scotistic principle, the formal distinction.
What, then, for Scotus is the nature of this individuating entity? How
can it be dened? In responding to these queries Scotus is quick to deny that
haecceitas is an accident in the proper sense of that term; it does not belong to
any of the categories of accidents, such as quality, quantity, relation, and so
forth. Te principle of individuation cannot be an accident, he argues, because
an accident is radically incapable of modifying a nature precisely as nature,
since accidents depend for their existence upon the very substance they would
presumably be called upon to actualize. In atly denying a singularizing power
to any and all accidents with regard to substance, Scotus is opposing the view
adopted by Aristotle and later by Aquinas, for whom the accident of quantity
is the ultimate source of singularization in material things.
In rejecting Aquinass account of singularity, Scotus argues that it is im-
possible for an accident to be the source of a reality that exists on the plane
12
Ipsa natura de se est indierens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse
universale et particulare (sive singulare) (Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, qu. 1, n. 33).
13
[D]ico quod substantia materialis ex natura sua non est de se haec, quia tunc, sicut deducit
prima ratio, non posset intellectus intelligere ipsam sub opposito nisi intelligeret obiectum suum
sub ratione intelligendi repugnante rationi talis obiecti (Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, qu. 1, n. 29).
14
See Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, qu. 4, n. 111.
Scorus axo HAECCEITAS, Aquixas axo ESSE o;
of substance or nature. Tus I grant, he states, that it is impossible for any
substance to become individual by means of any accident; that is, that through
some accident it [the substance] becomes divisible into subjective parts, with
the result that because of the accident it has become incapable of being a not-
this (non-haec).
15
It is important to attend to the precise reason why Scotus rejects the
view according to which in material beings it is quantity that is the principle
of individuation, contracting the common nature to its singular status. Te
underlying reason is that Scotus views the principle of singularity as eecting
the individuation of the nature at two dierent levels: at the level of potency
or limitation, and at the level of act or completion of the nature. Tis point
is crucial to Scotuss argument, for it is a corollary of his theory of being and
nature, as I will explain presently.
It is the latter function of completing the nature in addition to contracting
it to this particular nature which leads Scotus to reject outright the idea of as-
signing the individualization of nature to an accident. Accidents can, of course,
modify natures, but they do not complete them as natures, and this for Scotus
is a quintessential prerogative of the individualizing principle, haecceitas. Con-
sequently, Scotus holds that the function of haecceitas is altogether unique, for,
while it is neither nature nor accident, it is nonetheless the entity accounting
for the ultimate perfection of that nature, causing it to be a this.
16
Tus for
Scotus the principle of individuation must transcend the category of accident, for
although accidents can contract the nature as well as modify it incidentally, they
remain powerless to bring about its completion. For Scotus, then, the actuality
of individualization entails more than the mere contracting and modication
of the common nature. It involves, additionally and more importantly, the
completion and perfecting of the nature as well.
Yet if one inquires into the precise nature of haecceitas, one is met only
with an imposing list of negations. We are informed that the individuating
principle is neither form, nor accident, nor matter. Te only positive a rma-
tion in this regard states that haecceitas is the ultimate reality completing the
specic nature.
17
Haecceitas is thus a neutral, indenable entity, since it is
neither form nor matter nor accident nor the composite resulting from any
combination of these. At the same time, haecceitas is intrinsic to the existing
15
Ibid.
16
Tis is the dening insight upon which Scotus is here relying, an insight that would his-
torically serve to occasion, at least in part, the meteoric rise of the nominalist view of Ockham, in
that it is the individual as individual that represents the apex of being of any existing thing.
17
Maurice J. Grajewski, Te Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics
(Washington, D.C.: Te Catholic University of America Press, 1944), 152.
Axiiicax Caruoiic Puiiosoiuicai Quairiii\ o8
thing, rendering it complete in its being and, consequently, irrevocably indivis-
ible and incommunicable.
18
However, although it is not identical with nature, haecceitas is similar
to nature in that it truly perfects and completes the latter. At the same time
Scotus views it as also being dissimilar to nature, since it cannot be likened
to a form of any kind which is, as it were, superadded to nature. Haecceitas
is therefore in every sense a unique entity, incapable of positive denition,
precisely because it is the principle of singularity, while denitions can only
be of that which is somehow common. Strictly speaking, therefore, Scotus
acknowledges that no proper knowledge of the singularizing principle is pos-
sible due to the imperfection of our intellect and the way it functions in our
present life.
19
It is important to emphasize that for Scotus the individuating principle
positively excludes all further division of the essence or nature. Te latter can-
not, therefore, be further contracted by any other entity, nor, contrarily, can it
be further perfected.
20
Moreover, if the nature in question is human, it is the
individuating principle, the ultimate reality of being (ultima realitas entis),
that formally constitutes the nature as person. Tis is an important corollary
of Scotuss teaching regarding personhood; it bears directly on his theology of
the Incarnation.
Scotus oers the following parallel between the individuating principle,
the nature it perfects, and genus and dierence: as dierence contracts genus
to this particular kind of existing thing, so similarly the principle of individu-
ation contracts the common nature to a singular thing. Tere is a notable
discrepancy, however, regarding the manner in which the post-predicament
of dierence relates to genus, and the manner in which the individuating
principle relates to the common essence: for haecceitas does not constitute a
thing into the kind of being it is, as does dierence, but rather lies entirely
outside the nature of what it is, its quiddity.
21
Haecceitas thus renders the
18
[E]t propter hoc illa [scil., entitas specica] non excludit omnem divisionem quae est
secundum partes quantitativas, sed tantum illam divisionem quae est partium essentialium, ista
[unitas entitatis individualis] autem excludit omnem [divisionem] (Ord. II, dist. 3, pars l, qu.
56, n. 177).
19
Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., John Duns Scotus, in Individuation in Scholasticism: Te
Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 11501650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994), 27198, at 298 n. 87. Wolter quotes the following text
of Scotus: [Q]uod [singulare] non intelligatur per se ab intellectu nostro, hoc non est ex parte
singularis, sed ex imperfectione intellectus nostri, sicut noctua non videat solem, non est ex parte
solis sed ex parte noctuae (Lect., n. 189).
20
Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, qu. 56, n. 177.
21
Lect., n. 171.
Scorus axo HAECCEITAS, Aquixas axo ESSE o,
nature singular, but does not in any way enter into the constitution of the
essence or nature that it singularizes. As a consequence, the nature of Socrates
is just as human as is the nature of Plato, even though the two are irreducibly
dierent persons.
Scotuss principle of individuation is indeed unique. It is not an accident
nor a form nor matter nor a composite. It is not intelligible in this life (although
it is known to God and will be known by the blessed in the life to come), nor,
nally, is it a reality that is capable of being sensed.
22
Haecceitas is, however, the
crowning perfection of each and every created thing.
IV.
Individuation in Aristotle and Aquinas. Turning now to Aristotles and
Aquinass account of the individuation of natures, we nd that it is the accident
of quantity which fullls that role. Te nature considered in and of itself is nei-
ther singular nor universal. To this extent the positions of Aquinas and Scotus
coincide. Were natures inherently singular, there would be, Aquinas argues, no
denition of universals, given that essence is what is signied by the denition.
Hence, when Aquinas distinguishes matter (which in and of itself is indetermi-
nate) from signate or designated matter, he does so in order to account for the
manner in which many individuals can share a common nature. Although the
individuating principle, signate matter, contracts the nature to a singular state,
it is this negative role alone that it plays relative to the nature it singularizes,
adding nothing positive to it.
23
Tus, although signate matter contracts the nature, it does not, on Aquinass
account, complete it as nature; it does not, that is, add anything positively real
to the essence or species as such. Consequently, for Aquinas quantity does not
play a dual role similar to that of Scotuss principle of individuation. It does
not, in addition to limiting the nature, at the same time complete it, bestowing
on it its nal perfection. Indeed, Aquinas rejects such a possibility. Te prin-
ciple of individuation cannot simultaneously contract the nature and give it a
positive perfection. It is here that Aquinass position regarding individuation
diers markedly from that of Scotus, and, as will be noted shortly, this seem-
ingly minor discrepancy will lead to consequences of major import for their
respective philosophies.
It is precisely because he has restricted the role of the principle of indi-
viduation to the contraction of the common nature that Tomas is able to
conclude that, even though it is only an accident, designated matter is capable
22
In Metaph., Bk. VII, qu. 13, n. 26.
23
See De ente et essentia, chap. 2, para. 4.
Axiiicax Caruoiic Puiiosoiuicai Quairiii\ ;o
of singularizing the nature, since in so doing it functions strictly as potency.
It does not complete or enhance the nature, because the latter is, as nature,
already complete. Since, then, for Aquinas signate matter does not perform
the dual role of both limiting and completing the naturea role that Scotus
regards as the crowning achievement of haecceityTomas can maintain
with consistency that an accident is capable of causing the common nature
to become singular. Yet even this contraction of the nature to singular status
is achieved indirectly, in that dimensive quantity contracts the potential es-
sential principle, matter, which in turn brings about singularity of the formal
essential principle.
Viewing the problem anachronistically, one might surmise that for Aquinas
the solution to the problem of individuation that Scotus advanced is unaccept-
able because it entails what would amount to a denial of a distinction between
actual and potential. Scotus assigns to the principle of individuation the dual
role of simultaneously contracting and completing the common nature. Te
same entity is thus called upon both to limit and to perfect the essence or nature,
and thus to function as both potency and act with regard to the same entity.
For Aquinas, assigning both these roles to the same principle simply involves a
contradiction.
24
Although signate matter contracts or determines the nature to
be this singular nature, it is not what bestows upon it its nal actuality. As we
have seen, the ultimate reality of each existing thing comes from the act of being,
esse, which in turn is individuated by the very nature it actualizes. Terefore,
the esse of any being whatever is proper to it and distinct from the esse of any
other being whatsoever.
25
V.
Does Esse Singularize? Te principle that perfects singular existence accord-
ing to Scotus is haecceitas. Aquinas assigns the perfection of singular existence
to a dierent entity altogether, but one that, like Scotuss haecceitas, is neither
accidental nor essential. It does not singularize the essence and the other enti-
ties within the being, but rather actualizes them. Indeed, it is itself singularized
by what it actualizes. As Aquinas states, Nothing is in a genus because of its
esse but by reason of its nature, since the esse of each thing is proper to it and
distinct from the esse of any other thing whatsoever.
26
In and of itself esse is
simply actuality. As distinct from any accident and from any nature, esse is, as a
consequence, unknowable in itself, just like haecceitas.
24
ST I, qu. 54, art. 2, resp.
25
Qu. disp. de pot., qu. 7, art. 3, resp.
26
Ibid.
Scorus axo HAECCEITAS, Aquixas axo ESSE ;1
Despite Tomass explicit teaching, as illustrated by the preceding reections
pertaining to the act of being, some contemporary Tomists have claimed there
are grounds for at least conjecturing that Tomas did indeed intend to assign an
individuating role to esse. Tus William OMeara opined that it is plausible to
interpret Scotuss position on individuation as approximating that of Aquinas.
27

More recently O. J. Browninuenced, as he acknowledges, by the thought
of tienne Gilson and Joseph Owensa rmed forthrightly that for Aquinas
it is the act of being that is the principle of individuation, although he granted
that Tomas did not say so expressly. Yet Brown concluded: I am nonetheless
impelled to the conclusion that, with due qualication, such a doctrine can
legitimately be imputed to him [that is, Aquinas] as a tacit but necessary corol-
lary of his profoundly existentialist metaphysic.
28
Joseph Owens himself supported the existentialist interpretation of
Tomass theory of individuation by maintaining that esse is the individuating
principle par excellence.
29
Tus, he wrote: A dominating conclusion emerges
from the ensemble of the texts in Aquinas on individuation. It is that in the real
order the basic cause of individuality for him is existence. Existence is what most
of all makes a thing a unit in itself and marks it o as distinct from all others.
Tat is the hallmark recognized by him rst and foremost for individuals.
30
In
support of this view Owens cited a brief statement found in Aquinass Disputed
Question on the Soul: . . . unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuatio-
nem.
31
Owens rendered this as, Each being possesses its act of existing and its
individuation according to the same factor. His comment is: Here the causaltiy
is meant to bear on both the things existence and the things individuation. Te
same cause is assigned to them both.
32
In a recent article Linda Farmer voiced support for this position: It
can only be our esse which is the cause of our being unum numero, that is to
say, distinctness as individuals within a species.
33
Timothy Noone, too, sees
certain advantages in subscribing to this interpretation of Aquinass view on
27
William OMeara, Actual Existence and the Individual According to Duns Scotus, Te
Monist 49 (1965): 65969, at 664.
28
O. J. Brown, Individuation and Actual Existence in Scotus, Te New Scholasticism 53
(1979): 34761, at 3567.
29
See Joseph Owens, Tomas Aquinas, in Individuation in Scholasticism, ed. Gracia,
17294, esp. 175.
30
Ibid., 188.
31
Qu. un. de an., art. 1, ad 2. Also see Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics
(Milwaukee: Te Bruce Publishing Co., 1963), 230 n. 16.
32
Owens, Tomas Aquinas, 177.
33
Linda L. Farmer, Te Individuation Debate, Te Modern Schoolman 53 (2002): 5563,
at 60.
Axiiicax Caruoiic Puiiosoiuicai Quairiii\ ;:
individuation. If this is so, he writes, Tomas escapes immediately from
the charge of failing to develop a general account of individuals as such. He
concludes: Furthermore, if Owens is correct, the principle Aquinas ultimately
appeals to bears remarkable similarities to Scotuss own haecceitas, the ultimate
actuality of the form.
34
Tat Owenss interpretation of the Tomas text is incorrect, however, can
readily be ascertained by considering its context. In responding to the objector,
Tomas is intent on a rming the need for distinguishing between universal ideas
and actually existing things. He wants, that is, to underscore the important truth
that actual being and individuality have the same source of their actuality, that
neither can exist independently of the other, precisely since the act of being gives
actuality to everything found within the thing existing. Terefore, the phrase
secundum idem ought not to be translated here as by the same factor or in
an identical way, if these expressions are taken as meaning that the act of being
is the cause of individuation as such. Rather, Aquinas wishes to emphasize that
existence and individuality are inseparable components of existing things, and
that, consequently, where one is found the other must also be, since nothing
can exist save through esse, the act of being itself. Tere can be no individuating
principle that is not actual, just as there can be no principle of actuality that is
not simultaneously and reciprocally individuated. Tus, Tomas is indeed af-
rming that only one reality, esse, is responsible for the actuality of being and
individuation, but not for the determining or limiting property of the latter,
any more than it would be correct to say that the act of being is the source of
the determination that essence exerts in limiting it.
Tis interpretation, it seems, is the only one feasible if one accepts Aquinass
apodictic a rmation that esse is the cause of the actuality of everything found
within an existing being. Tere is no actual principle of individuation that
has not received the reality of being individuated from the act of being itself,
nor is there an act of being that has not been individuated by the principle of
individuationif, of course, we are speaking of material beings. Since esse as
esse for Tomas names act alone, it has no determination in itself. If one also
assigns to it the function of limitation, then one has likely succeeded, though
inadvertently, in making Scotuss day, having by implication compromised the
grounds upon which Tomass very distinction between essence and being rests.
If esse is held to be the cause of the limitation of the individuating principle
itself,
35
could one not then draw the parallel conclusion that esse is also the cause
of the limitation that essence is held to exert on the act of being? If this be true,
34
Timothy B. Noone, Individuation in Scotus, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
69 (1995): 52742, at 540.
35
See Owens, Tomas Aquinas, 1759.
Scorus axo HAECCEITAS, Aquixas axo ESSE ;
has one not thereby by subtle implication also denied a real distinction between
created essence and the act of being?
It appears that Owens and the other supporters of the existentialist in-
terpretation of individuation in Aquinas have conated two closely related but
nonetheless clearly distinct issues: individuation and suppositality (or person-
hood, if the supposit is of a rational or intellective nature). As I have shown in
an earlier article, for Tomas esse is indeed the cause of personhood, but it is not
the cause of the human natures being individuated.
36
Suppositality involves com-
pleteness and hence the act of being, esse, but the act of being itself for Tomas
must receive its individuation from a principle distinct from itself.
Te claim, then, according to which in the real order existence was for
Aquinas the foremost and all pervading cause of individuality,
37
cannot be viewed
as being in accord with Aquinass own thought on this matter.
VI.
Esse and Haecceitas: Similarities. Esse and haecceitas are similar in that both
principles represent for their respective proponents that which is most perfect in
existing things, for each constitutes the ultimate reality of the existing singular
being. Each is thus the supreme principle within the singular existing thing,
rendering it fully actual and hence unalterable and incommunicable. Tey also
resemble each other in that esse, like haecceitas, is in itself unknowable to the
human intellect. Tis is so because, as we have seen, neither esse nor haecceitas is
form, matter, essence, or accident, although both represent the nal perfection
and completion of the form, essence, and all inhering accidents or properties.
Furthermore, both are known only indirectly through the natures they complete
and actualize. Just as esse does not exist apart from essence or nature, so neither
does haecceitas exist apart from the nature it completes and perfects, making the
latter to be this singular thing.
Esse and Haecceitas: Dissimilarities. Yet, the dierences between esse and
haecceitas are signicant. Esse bestows being absolutely; for without it nothing
has actuality or exists. Haecceitas does not bestow being absolutely, but rather
individually. It perfects nature in that it renders it individual, but it does not give
it the actuality of being as nature, for Scotus does not recognize a distinction
between nature and existence. Tis he a rms unambiguously: I know nothing
of the ction that esse is something following upon essence.
38
Scotus also denies
36
See James B. Reichmann, S.J., St. Tomas, Capreolus, Cajetan and the Created Person,
Te New Scholasticism 33 (1959): 131 and 20230, esp. 2831, 20914.
37
Owens, Tomas Aquinas, 188.
38
Ord. IV, dist. 11, qu. 3, n. 46.
Axiiicax Caruoiic Puiiosoiuicai Quairiii\ ;
that esse is something other than essence,
39
a rming that the proposition, esse
is related to essence as act is related to potency, is false, since esse is really the
same as essence.
40
For Scotus, then, the principle of individuation completes the nature it
actualizes, but only in the sense that it gives it singularity. As Scotus does not
recognize a real distinction between the nature and its existence, the ultima
realitas entis of Scotus does not actualize the essence by giving it existence as a
nature. Rather, what it does is contract the common essence, perfecting it, and
thereby raising it to the level of a singular existing thing. Tis contraction con-
fers on the nature its fulllment, making it a complete being. It is here that the
dierences between the positions of Scotus and Aquinas most clearly manifest
themselves. Ultimately, these dierences can be explained only by what each of
them understands by being. What is a being? How does one account for there
being many existing things?
Te Scotist scholar, Efrem Bettoni, appears to agree with this assessment.
After underscoring Scotuss rejection of the Aristotelian-Tomist notion of
potency as real, even though having no act of its own, he asks: May not Duns
Scotus perhaps be right when he says that such a notion involves a contradiction?
Whatever the case may be, one thing must be borne in mind: it is precisely in
this contrast of views that lies at the root of all the dierences that distinguish
Duns Scotuss metaphysics from the metaphysics of Aristotle.
41
At this point, it
seems, one arrives at an impasse. Te divergent positions of Scotus and Aquinas
rest on signicantly dierent views of the real.
VII.
Conclusion. Our study has sought to contrast Duns Scotuss ultimate prin-
ciple of being, haecceitas, with Tomas Aquinass ultimate principle of being,
esse. We have taken these two principles to constitute the fundamental insights
that govern the respective philosophical visions of these two galvanizing thinkers
of the high Middle Ages. For Scotus it is haecceitas, a unique principle internal
to each thing, which renders the nature complete and singular as nature. For
Aquinas esse remains distinct from the nature it actualizes and completes, not in
the order of nature but solely in the order of being. Tis is, surely, not to imply
that Scotus overlooked the importance of a things being, any more than Aquinas
overlooked the importance of a beings singularity. It does mean, however, that
39
Ord., IV, dist. 13, qu. 1, n. 38.
40
Ord., IV, dist. 13, qu. unica, n. 10.
41
Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M., Duns Scotus: Te Basic Principles of His Philosophy, trans. Bernadine
Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Te Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 66.
Scorus axo HAECCEITAS, Aquixas axo ESSE ;
the primal integrating focus and the resulting philosophical syntheses of these
two thinkers dier signicantly. To summarize the principal thesis of this paper
in a nutshell, we could say that, while Soctus focused primarily on the exist-
ing thing as individually existing, Aquinass primary focus was on the existing
thing as individually existing. Te dierent stances taken regarding the principle
of individuation can therefore be traced to a more fundamental dierence of
views on the nature of being itself. Indeed one might conclude that it is this
latter dierence that denitively serves as the linchpin of Aquinass and Scotuss
respective philosophical systems, shaping their responses to the most basic of
all questions, namely, What is being?
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