Afghan Crisis

Outline:
Historical Background
Incident Of 9/11 And End Of Taliban Rule:
Operation Against Al!aeda "et#ork$
%urging Of &orces In Afg'anistan
(akistan)s *o++it+ent In ,ar On Terror And A+erican Response
(reparing &or (ost -%Afg'anistan
After+at'. Once India ,ould %ei/e T'e Opportunit0 In Afg'anistan
A+erican)s 1istakes In Afg'anistan And Repetition Of Histor0*ritical Anal0sis
T'e Road To (eace*onclusion
Historical Background:
Afghanistan is an under-developed landlocked mountainous Muslim country of South
West Asia. Since ages tribal system had been the basis of its society. The Afghan people
are brave, peace-loving and devoted Muslims. They had been living peacefully under
princes and kings. This state of affairs continued till !"# $hen %ing &ahir Shah $as
deposed by Mohammad 'aud and the country plunged into civil $ar and disharmony is
continued to this day.
After the fall of monarchy in !"#, Afghanistan fell victim of chaos and confusion. The
Soviet (nion e)ploited this situation and establishes its control over %abul in !"! $hich
lasted till !**. After the $ithdra$al of (SS+, Afghanistan $as ravaged by civil $ar
$hich ended in !!, $hen Taliban became the master of this land. Taliban rule $as
marked by -slamic fundamentalism $hich led to the establishment of Al-.aeda net$ork
of /sama bin 0aden. The Taliban attracted the attention of the $orld by their
fundamentalism and strict policies to$ards $omen folk and the non-Muslims. -n the
meantime, (S and 1ritain charges Afghanistan $ith the acts of supporting Terrorism and
freedom fighters in 2hechnya. -n this connection, (S launched a 2ruise missile attack
against the bases in Afghanistan in August !!*.
Incident Of 9/11 And End Of Taliban Rule:
Afghanistan became the focus of the $orld after the terrorists attack on WT2 and
3entagon in 4e$ 5ork and Washington on September , 677. (S blamed Taliban-
sponsored al-.aeda for these attacks. As a result, (S-led (4 forces attacked
Afghanistan, and on #th 4ovember, 677 dislodged the Taliban rule. 0ater on, all the
factions of Afghan people participated in the 1onn meeting and on 8th 'ecember 677
signed an agreement to establish a #7-member -nterim 9overnment under :amid %ar;ai
$hich installed a democratic government through a 0oya <irga.
Operation Against Al!aeda "et#ork$
After establishing an -nterim Authority in Afghanistan, (S-led multi-nation forces began
operation against Al-.aeda net$ork and their supports. This operation has been
continued since <anuary 6776 in all parts of Afghanistan. +uthless force is being used to
kill or capture militants of Al-.aeda and their supporters. As Taliban forces are also
engaged in this operation, but so far the American forces have to failed to clear the land
from =)tremists. The Afghan people are the main sufferers because continuous state of
$ar has not only ruined their country but also deprived them of food, shelter and peace.
%urging Of &orces In Afg'anistan
(S forces in Afghanistan have surpassed those in -ra> since 677#. (S numbers in
Afghanistan are scheduled to peak at about !*, 777 after the first detachment of #7,777
reinforcement. /bama has given his senior commander, 9en. 3atraeus until <uly 67 to
turn the tide of insurgency and bolster forces.
(akistan)s *o++it+ent In ,ar On Terror And A+erican Response
3akistan has lost more soldiers than the combined loss suffered by foreign forces in -ra>
and Afghanistan and more civilians than lost in !? strikes $hich eminently reflect
3akistan@s commitment in the $ar on terror. 'espite 3akistan@s such commitment and
immense loss in the W/TA the (S is continuously threatening 3akistan $ith follo$ing
serious conse>uencesB
iC 2hocking the country economically
iiC -nvasion on DATA
iiiC 'rone strikes across the country
ivC Sei;ure of nuclear storage sites by special operations
vC Air blit; against these sites
-nstead of living in mortal fear the Americans should shed the paranoia that has gripped
them and the arrogance that characters their conduct $ith the $eaker states and sho$
some grace, serenity of mind, understanding and respect to 3akistan@s concerns and
constraints. Their uncalled for outburst against a Epartner@ $ould only serve to alienate
the 3akistani people even more.
(reparing &or (ost -%Afg'anistan
As a conse>uence of the rapid deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, 3akistan has
also preparing option in case the (S departs. 3akistani officials $ho speak of the (S-led
coalition as Foccupation forcesG in Afghanistan, are convince that history $ill repeat
itself and that the (S $ill sooner or later leave the region. /nce the Americans are gone,
4AT/ determination $ill fade and Afghanistan $ill be left to itself.
The Taliban tactics so far has been to attack $here 4AT/ presence is $eak, but they are
no$ able to mass more and more fighters and launch large-scale raids. They $ill most
likely take on 4AT/ troops directly, thus increasing the number of causalities.
Should Western troops leave the country or reduce their number to a symbolic presence,
the position of Afghan government could $ell $eaken. 3akistan $ould be faced $ith
political vacuum that it believe $ould have to fill to prevent any other po$er from
ac>uiring a predominate influence.
After+at'. Once India ,ould %ei/e T'e Opportunit0 In Afg'anistan
iC -ndia $ill try to sand$ich 3akistan bet$een the threats from both =astern and Western
borders.
iiC -t $ill e)ploit every possible opportunity to spark the flames of sectarianism and
ethnicity in 1aluchistan and %hyber 3ukhtunkh$a.
iiiC 3akistan@s economy $ill be strangulated by the -ndian blockade.
ivC The regional balance of po$er $ill be destabilised massively.
vC -ndian@s e)tended presence in Afghanistan $ill create problems for 2hina as $ell.
viC The (S $ill cash in the opportunity by selling military hard$are to -ndia in the name
of upgrading overhauling the -ndian Army to enable it to take on 2hinese forces.
A+erican)s 1istakes In Afg'anistan And Repetition Of Histor0*ritical Anal0sis
:istory is repeating itself in Afghanistan because America is repeating the mistake made
by the Soviets. They are being made to pay for their folly of overestimating themselves,
and understanding the skill and fortitude of the Afghan guerrillas. As a conse>uence, they
have put in place a ne$ strategy of $ithdra$al of -nternational Security Assistance
Dorces H-SADC from Afghanistan from <uly 67 on$ards.
The first mistake made by America $as to defy history. 1ut having chosen to do so they
should have assigned the resources needed to accomplish the mission. Thus, their main
effort should have been in Afghanistan not in -ra>.
Their second mistake $as to initiate the air-bombing campaign $ithout securing the
crossing sites on their sides of the 'urand 0ine to prevent the Taliban and Al-.aeda from
escaping to tribal areas of 3akistan.
Their third mistake $as not to end the Taliban domination in the mountains $here they
have their safe havens. 5et instead of taking corrective action they persisted $ith the
mismatch bet$een the mission assigned and resources given. 2onse>uently, they have
suffered operational setback and blamed 3akistan for them.
The additional (S forces sanctioned are still not enough to accomplish the mission.
:o$ever, the least that can be done is to employ the available forces Iudiciously. /ne, for
blocking at last those crossing sits $hich are used by the :a>>ani group to make forays
into Afghanistan from 4orth Wa;iristan and t$o for ending the domination of the
mountains by the Taliban.
T'e Road To (eace*onclusion
3akistan must learn from past and stay a$ay from a future role in Afghanistan or the
impeding civilian $ar in the ne)t round $ill enter our land and there $ill be no stopping
the national nosedive to e)tinction. (ltimately, the situation to the problem lies in sorting
out the people@s difficulties connected $ith governance and security in the first place.
The road to peace in Afghanistan lies in making a maIor governance overhaul that needs
to be administrated by someone $ho is acceptable to all the people. -n the e)isting
situation that someone could be from the former %ing &ahir Shah@s family-that person
can craft an e)it strategy through $hich Afghanistan could re-emerge as a peaceful
country under democratic constitutional monarchy $orking under parliament. This
formulation is likely to be acceptable to many ethnic nationalities in the country
including the Taliban. 3akistan could do $ell to encourage such move.
Pak-Afghan Relations
Outline:
Historical Background
*urrent %ituation
2eo%trategic %ignificance Of Afg'anistan
i3 4irect I+portance
ii3 Indirect I+portance
Interests Of &oreign (o#ers In T'e Affairs Of Afg'anistan
i3 -% Interests
ii3 Russian Interests:
iii3 *'inese Interests
i53 Indian Interests
53 Iranian Interests
5i3 (akistanis Interests
a3 (olitical Interests
b3 Econo+ic Interests
c3 %ecurit0 Interests
%ignificance Of Afg'anistan In (akistan)s &oreign (olic0
(akistan)s 4ile++as
*onclusion
Historical Background
3akistan and Afghanistan are t$o Muslim neighbouring countries having common border
and common history. Since !J", relations bet$een the t$o countries have seen many
ups and do$ns. -n the beginning from !J" to !"!, Afghanistan remained under the
influence of Soviet (nion and -ndia. As such, %abul adopted anti-3akistan policy. The
3akhtoonistan stunt and fre>uent border skirmishes resulted because of this attitude.
:o$ever, 3akistan sho$ed restraint to give peace a chance. -n !8J and !88, the
relations bet$een the t$o countries reached the lo$est ebb, $hen 3akistani consulate in
%abul and <alalabad $ere attacked by the Afghans. The relations bet$een the t$o
countries $ere strained, as result of these events.
-n !,#, relations $ere restored through the efforts of Shah +a;a Shah 3ehlvi of -ran.
'uring !,8 -ndo-3ak War, Afghanistan did not create any problem for 3akistan.
-n !"!, the scenario of this region under$ent a drastic change $hen the Soviet sent J7
thousand troops to support pro-+ussian %abul government. Actually, it $as a move to
capture Afghanistan like the =ast =uropean satellite states. The entire free $orld led by
(SA denounced +ussian military intervention in Afghanistan.(S supplied $eapons to
Afghan fighters so that they might $age guerrilla $ar against +ussians. Millions of
Afghan refugees took shelter in 3akistan. 'uring the nine year $ar H!"!-!**C, the
Afghan fighters inflicted heavy losses on the Soviet (nion troops. As a result, Soviet
forced $ithdre$ from Afghanistan.
After their $ithdra$al from Afghanistan in !**, Afghanistan plunged into a bloody $ar
form !** to !!,. 'uring this eight year period, 4aIib government fell on !!6 and a
provincial set up under Sibghat (llah MuIaddid took control of %abul. -n May !!#,
3resident +abbani and premier 9ulbaddin :ikmatyar came into po$er.
-n !!,, the situation changed again $hen Taliban under Mullah (mar took control of
%abul and e)tended their authority over !7 per cent area of the country. Taliban rule $as
marked by fundamentalism through $hich they enforced strict rules and regulations.
After the event of 4ine =leven, the (SA asked Taliban to handover /sama 1in 0aden,
but they refused to do so.
As a result, (S led multi-national forces attacked Afghanistan in
/ctober 677 and toppled the Taliban rule. :amid %ar;ai succeeded as provincial head
of the state and $as later on elected by a 0oya <irga comprising of 877 members. -n
<une 6776, 3akistan lent all sorts of support to the Afghani government. -n 'ecember
6776, si) states including 3akistan signed the %abul 'eclaration pledging that these
States $ould not interfere in Afghani affairs.
*urrent %ituation
2urrently, (S-led multi-national forces are operating in Afghanistan against Al-.aeda
and Taliban. 3akistan is non-4AT/ ally of (S against terrorism. Thus, it is assisting
%ar;ai regime as non-4AT/ ally of (SA. 3resently 3ak-Afghan relations have become
very delicate due to %ar;ai@s fre>uent allegations that Taliban@s are operating from inside
3akistan territory. :o$ever, 3akistan government has refused these charges that the #7
thousand troops have sealed the porous 'urand 0ine and no foreigner is allo$ed to use
3akistani territory.
2eo%trategic %ignificance Of Afg'anistan
4irect I+portance:
iC Afghanistan is located at the Iuncture of three strategic regions of 2entral Asia, South
Asia and West Asia.
iiC Sparse population, rugged terrain and $arrior tribes make Afghanistan a dumping
ground of superpo$ers of the times.
Indirect I+portance
iC Afghanistan is also called a region at the cross-roads of history. That is, in the 6st
century, Afghanistan is still keen to practice the medieval age customs and traditions.
iiC The potential land-bridge of oil and gas pipelines and trade route to and from 2entral
and West Asia.
iiiC The landlocked nature of 2entral Asia offers Afghanistan significance of a transit
route-to have access to sea ports of -ndian and Arabian sea.
Interests Of &oreign (o#ers In T'e Affairs Of Afg'anistan
i3 -% Interests:
aC =nergy resources of 2entral Asia
bC 2ontaining 2hina and -ran
cC 2ountering +ussian influence in the region
dC 2hecking the outflo$ of narcotics
eC 2hecking the e)port of religious e)tremism
fC 2losely monitoring the cooperative frame$ork bet$een 2hina, +ussia, -ran, 2A+s,
-ndia and 3akistan.
gC Supporting broad-based, moderate and (S-friendly government in Afghanistan.
ii3 Russian Interests:
aC +easserting itself in its backyard and avenge its defeat Hi.e. the collapse of former
(SS+C.
bC Securing control over oil and gas resources of 2entral Asia.
cC 2ountering (S influence and regional designs
dC 3reventing spread of e)tremism to 2hechnya
iii3 *'inese Interests
aC Duture energy re>uirement and possible supplies demand from 2entral and West Asia
including -ran.
bC :alting unrest in adIoining 2hinese territories Ho$ing to spill over effectC
cC 4eutrali;ing the influence of (S?4AT/ forces in the region.
i53 Indian Interests
aC 2reating friction bet$een 3akistan and Afghanistan to keep the former under pressure.
bC -nstigating the covert lo$ intensity conflict H0-2C against 3akistan to keep 3akistan
busy $ith conflict coming from Western border.
cC =)ploring the trade opportunities $ith the countries of 2entral and West Asia.
dC Watching its geo-strategic interests through empo$erment of the TaIiks, (;beks and
:a;aras against the 3ashtuns.
53 Iranian Interests
aC 4eutrali;ing the influence of (S?4AT/ forces in the region.
bC Securing its share in reconstruction of Afghanistan
cC Safeguarding the minority Shia population residing in Afghanistan
dC +eversing the tide of afghan refugees.
5i3 (akistanis Interests
a3 (olitical Interests
=nsuring peace and stability in Afghanistan
Supporting 3ak-friendly government in Afghanistan
4eutralising -ndian influence by setting the border issue
+eversing the tide of afghan refugees.
b3 Econo+ic Interests
Securing its share in reconstruction of Afghanistan
Securing a transit trade access to 2entral Asia
Securing an uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from the 2A+s and -ran
c3 %ecurit0 Interests
3recluding the Talbanisation in Afghanistan Hand thereby Talbanisation in 3akistanC
3reventing cross-border terrorism
3rompting departure of (S?4AT/ forces from Afghanistan.
%ignificance Of Afg'anistan In (akistan)s &oreign (olic0
As a neighbour of 3akistan, Afghanistan occupies a cultural place in the issues affecting
3akistan@s foreign policy. Afghanistan@s significance increases $ith the ongoing turmoil
on its land. The 4e$ 9reat 9ame being played in the region. 3akistan finds itself
intricately linked $ith the entire issue, the effects of $hich may have far-reaching
bearings on 3akistan.
Secondly, o$ing to geographical contiguity and ethnic sharing $ith Afghanistan, 3akistan
considers itself a natural player in the $hole scheme of affairs related to or going on in
Afghanistan.
Thirdly, o$ing to hosting a maIor chunk of afghan refugees, 3akistan is a maIor
stakeholder in $hatever situation emerges in Afghanistan.
Dourthly, ongoing WoT is affecting 3akistan both politically and economically thereby
making 3akistan a maIor regional player in settling a terror situation both in 3akistan and
across the Western border.
Difthly, 3akistan is keen to shun the ideology of -slamic Dundamentalism being e)ported
from Afghanistan to 3akistan, thereby making 3akistan conscious of preservation of its
democratic value.
Si)thly, 3akistan is keen to make it socially free from drugs and arms $hich is not
possible unless there is peace and order in Afghanistan.
(akistan)s 4ile++as
9eographically, 3akistan is sand$iched bet$een -ndia and Afghanistan. /ne is the
$orld@s biggest democracy and the e)panding economy and other is $orld@s crisis ridden
Hboth politically and sociallyC country and a shattered economy. The second aspect of
dilemma is that -ndia is bent on having strong relations $ith Afghanistan and that to the
detriment of 3akistan.
*onclusion
The $ar $aged by the (S in 677, in the name of War on Terror HWoTC is still ravaging
in devastated Afghanistan and yet no conclusive end is discernible.
Since 4ovember 677*, there have taken place developments. Dirst, the (S 3resident
1arack /bama, after getting elected, is intending a $ithdra$al from Afghanistan in a
manner that could be offering the (S ma)imum face-saving and could yield monopoly to
the (S in the region. Secondly, $ith the tacit approval of the (S, the Afghan 3resident
:amid %ar;ai is holding talks $ith Taliban to Ioin the government and offer the (S a safe
e)it-strategy. Thirdly, the (S has formally ackno$ledged that 3akistan play a significant
role in mitigating a near-disaster situation in Afghanistan. That is ho$, 3akistan@s political
significance vis-K-vis, other regional players including -ndia is automatically enhanced.
Pak-US Relations
Outline:
Introduction
4efence Alliance %EATO And *E"TO
Indo(ak ,ars Of 1967 And 1981
(ak-% Relations 4uring Afg'anistan *risis
Relations After 9/11
-% Reaction To (akistan)s "uclear Tests
,ar On Terroris+ And (akistan)s Role
*ritical Anal0sis
*onclusion
Introduction:
=ver since, 3akistan emerged on the map of the $orld, it has al$ays been in search of
alliance for its security, survival and sustainability. The history of 3ak-(S relations had a
history of roller coaster rider. 'uring the ties bet$een the t$o nations, there have been
more ebbs than fla$s. 'ue to trust deficit on the both sides, relations bet$een the t$o
nations have been tumultuous.
1eing a Muslim State and anti-2ommunist $hich had its roots from %hilafat Movement
and capitalist bloc. The (nited States policy is based on self-interest to$ards the $orld in
general and 3akistan in particular.
There is no permanent friend for the (S as saying goes FThere is no permanent friend
and permanent enemy in international politics, only interests are permanentG. The (S is
maIor player of this game among the nations of the $orld.
4efence Alliance %EATO And *E"TO:
-n !87s, 3akistan@s inability to match -ndia in military and economic spheres and for
search of security led it to enter into pacts like 1aghdad 3act or 2entral Treaty
/rgani;ation H2=4T/C and South =ast Asian Treaty /rgani;ation HS=AT/C. Although
these pacts actually $ere to contain Soviet (nion baked communism but this fact cannot
be altogether denied that these pacts really strengthened the relationship bet$een the t$o
nations. At that time relationships $ith the (S $ere so close and friendly that it $as
called the E(nited States allied ally@ in Asia.
Indo(ak ,ars Of 1967 And 1981:
The suspension of (S military aid during !,8 -ndo-3ak $ar generated the feeling in
3akistan that the (S $as not a reliable ally. We can take an e)ample of %ashmir form the
early periods of 3ak-(S relation n analyse the sincerity of the (S to$ards 3akistan.
Then, the $ars of !,8 and !" give clear indication of the (S dualism to$ards
3akistan. Although, the (S suspended, military aid to both countries involved in conflict,
the suspension affected 3akistan much more, and -ndia still received military aid from
Soviet.
9radually, relations improved and arms sales $ere rene$ed in !"8. 1ut again in April
!"!, the (S cut off economic aid, e)cept that of food assistance, as re>uired under the
Symington Amendment to the (S Doreign Assistance Act of !,, due to concerns about
3akistan@s nuclear programme.
(ak-% Relations 4uring Afg'anistan *risis:
The (S policy took a (-turn after Soviets intervention in Afghanistan and 3akistan
fought a pro)y $ar as a part of (S policy to contain Soviet backed communism. When
Soviet invaded Afghanistan in !"!, the convergence of interests bet$een the t$o nations
again brought them close to each other. With the (S assistance largest covert operation of
history, 3akistan trained, armed and supplied anti-Soviet muIahedeen to Afghanistan,
eventually defeating Soviets, $ho $ithdre$ in !**. After the disintegration of former
Soviet (nion and victory of Western bloc, 3akistan did not remain that much dear to the
(S and bright colours of their close relations got dim after Soviet $ithdra$al from
Afghanistan. -t $as the period $hen 3akistan remained under immense pressure due to its
ongoing nuclear programme to match $ith -ndia, to $hich 3akistan $as determined and
committed to its completion because it considered it as a $eapon for its survival.
Relations After 9/11:
To maintain its hegemony, the (S needed allies since the phenomenon of regionalism has
emerged. After tragic incident of !?, the (S started the so-called $ar on terrorism and
3akistan became its frontline and maIor non-4AT/ ally. When the (S geo-strategic
interests are so dictated, relations $ith 3akistan $armed up, follo$ed by military aid and
economic assistance.
/ne factor of mistrust has remained pinching though 3akistan armed forces through its
operations in the Tribal areas $hich are the sanctuaries of Taliban and al-.aida, still
3akistan and its premier intelligence agency -S- is accused of covertly supporting Taliban
and providing them assistance to launch their operations against the (S-led allied forces.
1ecause of the (S dualism policy, anti-American sentiments are found in both the
common people and even at government level.
Before 9/11. (akistan #as under four -% sanctions:
Dirst, 3resident 1ush HseniorC, under Section ,67.= of Doreign Assistance Act or the
3ressler Amendment, it is normally kno$n as the suspended economic assistance and
military sales to 3akistan in /ctober, !!7.
Second, after the nuclear e)plosion by 3akistan, another set of military and economic
sanctions $as imposed on 3akistan under Arms =)port 2ontrol Act.
Third, under the democracy la$, sanctions $ere applied on 3akistan, $hen 9eneral
Musharraf assume po$er in 3akistan on 6 /ctober, !!!.
Dourth, in 4ovember 6777, the (S applied t$o years sanctions on 3akistan@s Ministry of
'efence and 3akistan@s Space and (pper Atmosphere +esearch /rgani;ation, for
receiving nuclear technology and e>uipment from 2hina.
3akistan is perhaps the most important (S ally in the $ar on terror. 4ot only has 3akistan
lost more personals than any other ally, critical fuels for vehicles and aircraft used in the
$ar effort in Afghanistan moves through 3akistan $ithout difficulty. Without this
logistical support, bot operation =nduring Dreedom and 4AT/ operations in Afghanistan
$ould prove very difficult to sustain $ithout interruption. 3akistan is strategically very
important for the (S to sustain in Afghanistan. There->uarters of supplies for (S troops
in Afghanistan either move through or over 3akistan.
-% Reaction To (akistan)s "uclear Tests:
3akistan@s nuclear programme reached to its logical conclusion on 6*th and #7th May
!!* $hen it conducted si) nuclear tests to become the Seventh nuclear po$er of the
$orld. The nuclear capability gave 3akistan nuclear deterrent against -ndia $hich it
needed badly after !"J $hen -ndia had e)ploded its first nuclear device. The people of
3akistan in particular and the Muslim nations in general e)pressed their Iubilation over
3akistan@s nuclear achievement. 1ut the (S, <apan, 2anada, 4etherlands and Australia
e)pressed their indignation and at once announced the imposition of sanctions on military
and economic assistance.
,ar On Terroris+ And (akistan)s Role:
-n the $ake of $ar on terror, 3akistan has emerged to the (S. Since, then it has played a
critical role in helping g reduce the operational capabilities of Al-.aeda and Taliban
elements in and around its borders $ith Afghanistan.
3akistan has handed over more terrorists and suspects to (S than any other coalition
partner, though many >uestions have been raised regarding its interests. Thus it feels that
its concerns regarding -ndia have been undermined by the (SA. Thus combination of
several factors has created a situation in $hich many 3akistani are sceptical about the
need of combating militants and supporting the American cause. Although the ruling
political elite seem to be comfortable to $hat the (S has to offer, media and
parliamentary debate reflect an opinion more reflective of the general population i.e. the
(S is making unreasonable demands of the 3akistan@s governing and military structures.
*ritical Anal0sis:
Trust is the main factor for sustainable relations bet$een the States. This factor is
unfortunately missing in case of the 3ak-(S relations and both are suffering from the
disease of trust deficit. Drom the very beginning till the present time, Washington has
been using 3akistan as a tactical level instrument and never trusted 3akistan as its
strategic ally.
Throughout the history of their relations, the (S has never tried to build up long term and
e>ual bilateral relations $ith 3akistan. -t al$ays sa$ 3akistan as a tissue paper to use and
deposed at the time of need. 'ue to this policy of the (S, irreparable anti-American
sentiments e)ist among 3akistanis.
There are three main reasons behind negative feelings about America. /ne involves
American policies to$ards 3akistan such as its failure to 3akistan@s aid during !" War,
using 3akistan for its o$n interest, and opposing 3akistan@s peaceful nuclear programme.
Second reason deals $ith American global policy, including support of -srael, opposition
to -ran@s present government and the use of force against small third World nations.
Third reason deals $ith American involvement in 3akistan, for e)ample support to
military regimes and no$ violence of 3akistan@s integrity and accusing 3akistan for
playing dual game $ith (S despite the sacrifices given by its soldiers and civilians during
the War on Terror.
*onclusion:
Dirst of all, they should remove trust deficit and ensure full cooperation to e)terminate
this common enemy from the region $hich can hurt both (S and 3akistan@s interests in
this region of South Asia. Then the (S should also revie$ its policies to$ards the $eaker
Muslim States and should play a serious role in solving the issue of %ashmir. There is
need by the (S to remove the mutual trust-deficit $ith 3akistan and build a relationship
rooted in the ground realities and driven by the mutual benefit.
The (S should not e)tend its $ar on terrorism to the territory of 3akistan and let the
3akistani armed forces to do their Iob, as they are $ell trained to perform their duties.
According to recent reports, -ndia by using its secret agency +AW, is e)ploiting these
circumstances to destabili;e 3akistan, it@s crystal clear that a destabili;ed 3akistan is not
in the interest of (S as it $ill hamper efforts to $ipe out terrorism.
/n the other hand, the (S is e)tending its hands to$ards -ndia by signing the nuclear
deal $ith 'elhi. This discriminatory attitude of (S should be changed if it really $ants to
ensure 3akistan@s unrestricted and full cooperation in this ongoing $ar on terror. -f the
(S really $ants to minimi;e anti-(S sentiments in 3akistan, it must help -slamabad in
energy sector as a priority.
The (S really has to revise its policy to$ards South Asia region abandoning its
discriminatory attitude to$ards 3akistan as compared to -ndia. -t must consider
-slamabad re>uest for a civil nuclear deal similar to the one gifted to 'elhi (S must
respect 3akistan@s sensitivities.
Indo-Pak Relations:
Outline:
Background
Brief Histor0 Of 4ialogues
(eace (rocess In (ause After 1u+bai Attacks
Resu+ption Of *o+posite 4ialogue(resent *ondition
Benefits Of (eace &or India And (akistan
*ritical Anal0sis
*onclusion
Background:
Since !J", -ndia and 3akistan have $itnessed half a century long period of mistrust,
hostility and confrontation. They have fought three $ars during this period. At the time of
independence they inherited many problems like %ashmir issue, +ann of %utch dispute,
2anal $ater dispute, division of assets, refugee problem and the problem of accession of
states. /ut of theses, %ashmir has been on the top of the list of irritants.
Brief Histor0 Of 4ialogues:
The t$o countries have a history of unfruitful peace processes. -n the 87s, as a follo$-up
to the (4 Security resolution, the (4 special representative Sir /$en 'i)on tried to
negotiate a settlement on his Fpartial plebiscite and partition planG. Then in early si)ties
1hutto and Sar$an talks $ere held $ithout any significant head$ay.
After the !,8 $ar and in the post !", internal problems kept 3akistan focused
domestically. -n !"6, Simla Agreement $as concluded. (nder Simla Agreement the t$o
countries agreed to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral
negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon bet$een them.
-n the !!7s, %ashmir resistance added a ne$ dimension to the struggle there and
brought rene$ed international focus on this issue especially in the conte)t of human
rights issue. Drom !!7 to !!J, seven rounds of foreign secretary level talks $ere held
$ithout any maIor breakthrough. -n March !!", talks $ere again resumed at foreign
secretary level. -n all four rounds $ere held in $hich foreign secretaries reached an
agreement on 6# <uly !!", lying do$n an eight-item agenda. This $as the first time in
their 87 year history that the t$o countries had agreed formally on pursuing an integrated
and composite dialogue on all issues including outstanding issue of <ammu L %ashmir.
The period bet$een !!" and !!! sa$ a significant development in the -ndia-3akistan
peace process in the form of several summit level meetings bet$een the t$o countries on
the sideline of the (4 annual sessions and other regional and international conferences.
These high-level talks led to 0ahore Summit in Debruary !!! in $hich 3rime Minister
4a$a; Sharif and 3M MaIpayee signed 0ahore +esolution as a genuine breakthrough in
the history of the t$o countries. The t$o countries agreed Fto intensify their efforts to
resolve all issues including <L%. this indeed $as a high $atermark in -ndia-3akistan
bilateral relations. 1ut the peace process $as soon interrupted $hen the t$o countries
faced the %argil issue.
A ceasefire at 0o2 in 4ovember 677# $ith several mutual confidence building measures,
including 3akistan@s assurance of not letting its territory to be used by any terrorist
activity of cross-border infiltration as $ell as a constant pressure from influential outside
po$ers led to the resumption of the stalled -ndia-3akistan dialogue in <anuary 677J on
the basis of $hat is called E-slamabad <oint Statement of <anuary ,, 677JG.
3resident Musharraf made unprecedented but unreciprocated gestures of fle)ibility. :e
proposed a four-point Fout-of-bo)G solution of the %ashmir issue $hich involved
dividing %ashmir in ethnic regions, their demilitari;ation, self-rule and a Ioint
mechanism. 1ut none of his gestures elicited, at least publicly any matching response
from -ndia.
(eace (rocess In (ause After 1u+bai Attacks$
(nfortunately, the peace process $as stalled again, $hen after the 4ovember 6,, 677*
terrorist attack, -ndia suspended the F2omposite 'ialogueG process.
/n 4ovember 6,, 677* $hen some militants attacked multiple targets in Mumbai, in
$hich some *6 people $ere killed, including nine terrorists and 66 foreign nationals and
some further #6" received inIuries. +elations bet$een -ndia and 3akistan had already
been strained follo$ing a suicide attack on -ndian =mbassy in %abul on <uly ", 677*, in
$hich over J7 people $ere killed. The attacks in Mumbai served as a nail in the coffin as
all fingers pointed to 3akistan.
Resu+ption Of *o+posite 4ialogue(resent *ondition:
With the (S efforts, at a meeting bet$een the 3Ms of the t$o countries on the sideline of
the non-aligned summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh in <uly 677!, an agreement $as reached for
the resumption of dialogue.
:o$ever, the tha$ came finally $hen -ndia in Debruary J, 677 offered to resume talks
at foreign secretary level $ith 3akistan. Welcoming the move, 3akistan accepted the offer
and a delegation $ent to 'elhi on Debruary 6J, 677 $ith the hope of recreating an
atmosphere of friendship. The delegation had gone to 4e$ 'elhi $ith a roadmap of
guidelines leading to a potential resumption of 2omposite 'ialogue, including an
invitation for =)ternal Affair Minister S.M %rishna to visit 3akistan. 'uring the meeting
-ndia handed over three dossiers to 3akistan and demanded that thirty-three individuals,
including t$o serving 3akistani army officers and -ndian fugitive allegedly involved in
terror attacks, be handed over to -ndia. :o$ever, the talks failed to melt the ice due to
lack of trust bet$een the t$o countries.
The pressure from (SA as $ell as SAA+2 members played a vital role in bringing both
the countries to some sort of an agreement in 1hutan. The t$o countries agreed to resume
Doreign Minister as $ell as Doreign Secretary level talks as soon as possible. Taking the
spirit of 1hutan for$ard, 4irupama +ao visited -slamabad in <une 6J, 677 and met her
counterpart Salman 1ashir to set an agenda for Doreign Ministers in <uly 677.
+esultantly, -ndian Doreign Minister S.M %rishna visited -slamabad in <uly, but talks
could not bore fruit for paving the $ay for further composite dialogue due to -ndian usual
intransigence over the issue of terrorism.
Benefits Of (eace &or India And (akistan:
There are many broad benefits from peace accruing to both countries and this serves as a
motivation to$ards normalisation. With initiating peace process -ndia and 3akistan could
earn enough foreign e)change. /n trade, our market si;e $ill e)pand to N .6 billion
e>ual to 2hina. /pening vistas of trading opportunities $ithin the region, the foreign
direct investment $hich presently stagnates at # billion dollars could increase manifold.
2hina attracts J7 billion dollars. Access to alternate energy, natural gas from -ran and
2entral Asia $ill be available to this region, bringing do$n the energy cost by at least
fifty per cent. Tourism can flourish as the region has vast treasures of tourist attractions.
+eductions in defence e)penditure could take place. This $ill lead to availability of fund
for social sector and poverty reduction and lastly sports $ill be enhanced. Through
mutual sports -ndia and 3akistan can regain glory at least in cricket and hockey.
*ritical Anal0sis:
4o$ both the countries must come to grip $ith the fact that progress through incessant
discussion may, at first be slo$ but at least it $ill erase the high-levels of mutual
suspicion. The benefit could be long-lasting as far as the $ell-being of the people, $ho
share common history and culture, is concerned. The core issues as far as 3akistan is
concerned are %ashmir and Water. Dor -ndia the core issue is terrorism. %ashmir has been
hanging for the last ,# years, despite the three $ars fought bet$een the t$o countries.
Water issue is dragging from years no$ and terrorism is recent one. All these issues can
be hammered out only in the 2omposite 'ialogue $hich -ndia is avoiding so far.
-t is 3akistan that is paying heavy price due to terrorism. -ndia should reali;e that
-slamabad is doing all $ithin its approach. 3akistan Army has been successful in
dismantling Taliban@s dens and has $eakened the terrorist significantly. -ndia must
understand that terror $ar is also being fought by the (S and 4ato troops in Afghanistan
and terrorists have po$er to strike any$here in the $orld.
-ndian leader should reali;e that tough talks cannot help improve situation. Sincere
parleys can break the impasse. Driendly relations bet$een the t$o countries can help
improve economic conditions and trade $ill flourish along $ith people-to-people contact.
All intricate issues can be resolved if trust is built bet$een the t$o countries. There is
dire need to improve business relations bet$een the t$o countries. 3akistan and -ndia
pick up the cue from the fostering 2hina-(S relations despite Tai$an issue.
*onclusion:
3resent time is ideal for resolution of all disputes and ushering an era of peace, harmony
and prosperity. 3eople of our country $ant it. the influential business communities are
looking for$ard to it in both countries. Media also seems to favour it. 3akistan and -ndia
have lost half a century in mutual s>uabbles. 1oth have tried pressure tactics. 1oth have
fought $ars, tested nuclear $eapons and have remained engaged in hot confrontation
throughout. 1oth have applied coercive diplomacy but it has not $orked. 4othing side
has blinked. -t is time to give dialogue and negotiation chance once again. 4egotiating
from a position of strength is an old-age ma)im but no doubt in the case of 3akistan and
-ndia that has also been used and founded to be unsuccessful. Sincerity in living
peacefully side by side and solving all issues through negotiation seems to be the only
ans$er people of our countries $ant peace and are fed up of confrontation. The no-$ar
pact offer and the non-aggression pact issue can be reopened.
Kashmir Issue:
Outline:
Background:
India)s Reluctance To Abide B0 -" Resolutions:
a3 (lebiscite Ad+inistrator
b3 %ir O#en 4i9on)s Report
c3 &rank 2ra'a+)s Report
d3 2ene5a Talks
e3 Bogra"e'ru Talks
f3 "e'ru)s %tate+ent In :ok %ab'a
g3 2unner ;arring (roposals
1967 ,ar Of India(akistan O5er <as'+ir
"uclear Test<argil *las'es And <as'+ir Issue
Agra %u++it =>>1
<as'+ir Issue After 9/11
Effects Of 1u+bai Attacks on <as'+ir
<as'+ir(ossible %olution
*ritical Anal0sis
*onclusion
Background:
The valley of <ammu and %ashmir $hich covers an area of *J,J" s>uare miles has been
a bone of contention bet$een -ndia and 3akistan. 9eographically, politically and
economically %ashmir is closer to 3akistan than -ndia.
The %ashmir dispute originated on 6,th /ctober, !J", $hen :ari Singh, the MaharaIa
of %ashmir, against all his commitments and $ishes of the maIority of people signed
-nstrument of Accession in favour of -ndia.
2onse>uently, -ndian troops entered the valley and full scale $ar started. The 3akistani
troops and the frontier tribesmen aided by %ashmir people fought bravely and succeeded
in liberating a si;eable portion HA;ad %ashmirC from -ndia. Sensing defeat, -ndia
approached (nited 4ations for a ceasefire. As a result, the security 2ouncil passed a
resolution on " <anuary, !J* and asked both the countries to observe cease-fire.
:o$ever, the fighting continued and the (4 appointed (nited 4ations 2ommission on
-ndia and 3akistan H(42-3C to investigate and propose solution to the problem. The
2ommission passed a resolution on #th August !J*, - $hich it asked both countries to
observe ceasefire and directed 3akistan to $ithdra$ its troops from the valley. The
commission adopted another resolution on 8th <anuary !J*, in $hich it spelled in clear
language that the future of the valley $ould be decided through plebiscite. -n the
meantime, -ndia and 3akistan signed a ceasefire $hich came into effect on <anuary st,
!J!.
India)s Reluctance To Abide B0 -" Resolutions:
=ver since the partition of the sub-continent on Jth August, !J", -ndia has been
flouting the provisions of the instrument of Accession and resolutions of the (4/
regarding the %ashmir issue.
a3 (lebiscite Ad+inistrator:
The (4 Secretary-9eneral appointed Admiral Dleet 2hester 4imit; H(SAC as the
plebiscite Administrator in the %ashmir on March, !J!. 3akistan accepted the arbitration
of 2.W 4imit; but -ndia failed to do so. Thus, this move failed to bring any result.
b3 %ir O#en 4i9on)s Report:
-n March, !87, the (4 Security 2ouncil disbanded (42-3 and designated Sir /$en
'i)on, an Australian Iudge, to arrange the demilitari;ation in the valley. Sir /$en visited
-ndia and 3akistan and submitted his report in September, !87, but -ndia@s negative
attitude proved a hindrance in the $ay of a solution.
c3 &rank 2ra'a+)s Report:
-n March, !8, the (4 Security 2ouncil appointed Drank 9raham H(SAC as the (4
representative of %ashmir. :e visited -ndia and 3akistan and submitted his report on !th
/ctober, !8, in $hich he recommended the demilitari;ation of %ashmir. Again, in May
!86, he visited -ndia and 3akistan but as before -ndian intransigence o accept any
mediation prevented the peaceful solution.
d3 2ene5a Talks:
-n Debruary !8#, -ndia and 3akistan held discussion in 9eneva to resolve %ashmir issue.
:o$ever, -ndia refused to accept all proposals aimed at holding plebiscite in the valley.
e3 Bogra"e'ru Talks:
-n !8#, 3akistan 3remier Mohammad Ail 1ogra and -ndian 3rime Minister <a$ahar 0al
4ehru discussed the %ashmir issue in their meetings held in 0ondon, %arachi and 'elhi.
They could not achieve any result due to 4ehru@s delaying tactics in order to buy time.
f3 "e'ru)s %tate+ent In :ok %ab'a:
-n !8,, 4ehru in an address in 0ok Sabha sounded a changed -ndian policy on %ashmir
by declaring that the >uestion of plebiscite on %ashmir $as out of date because of
American military assistance of 3akistan, economic development of %ashmir, creation of
the 2onstituent Assembly in the valley and 3akistan@s membership of 2=4T/ and
S=AT/.
g3 2unner ;arring (roposals:
-n Debruary, !8", (4 Security 2ouncil appointed 9unner <arring 3resident of the
2ouncil to submit a report on %ashmir. :e visited -ndia and 3akistan and submitted his
report on 6!th April, !8". 3akistan accepted his proposals but -ndia reIected them $ith
its traditional obduracy.
1967 ,ar Of India(akistan O5er <as'+ir:
-ndia flouting all canons of -nternational 0a$ attacked 3akistan on ,th September !,8.
Thus full scale $ar started bet$een -ndia and 3akistan. Within days $ar spread from
%ashmir front in the 4orth to +ann of %utch in the South and =ast 3akistan in the =ast.
The valiant forces of 3akistan fought bravely and frustrated enemy designs at Sialkot,
0ahore, Da;ilka and +aIasthan. The $ar continued for " days till a (4 sponsored
ceasefire took effect on 6#rd September, !,8. 0ater on, in <anuary !,, -ndia and
3akistan signed the Tashkent 'eclaration in $hich the t$o countries declared to
$ithdra$ their troops from the valley in pre 8 August, !,8 position and resumed their
normal diplomatic relations.
"uclear Test<argil *las'es And <as'+ir Issue:
-n !!*, the t$o arch-rivals in South Asia conducted their o$n nuclear tests, since then,
the international community especially the great po$ers are really concerned about the
security of the region. The resolution of the %ashmir issue is earnestly felt, as it can
trigger nuclear debacle in the region. The %argil clashes further intensified the
apprehension and need to resolve the issue. The military stand-off bet$een -ndia and
3akistan in the $ake of terrorist attacks on -ndian 3arliament on 'ecember #, 677,
further increased the fear of nuclear $ar in the region. Since then, the role of international
community in resolving the %ashmir issue has come to the face.
Agra %u++it =>>1:
-n <uly, 677, Agra Summit bet$een 3M Atal 1ihari MaIpayee and 3resident 3erve;
Musharraf started $ith great hopes and e)pectations. 3erve; Musharraf visited -ndia on
the call of MaIpayee $ith confidence to resolve all the impeding issues to improve
relations bet$een the t$o arch-rivals of South Asia. (nfortunately, the summit ended
abruptly $ithout bringing any fruitful development for the peace - the region.
<as'+ir Issue After 9/11:
The events of !? brought over$helming conse>uences for both the global and the
regional politics. -ts impacts on %ashmir are not ignorable. The $hole international
community agreed on a one-point agenda to combat terrorism in its all forms and
manifestations, every$here in the $orld. The $orld is no more ready to tolerate any type
of insurgency in the name of self-determination and freedom. Terrorists and freedom
fighters are no more distinguishable to the $orld. -n such circumstances %ashmir
freedom fighters cannot maintain the status of their domestic insurgency against -ndia as
a legitimate freedom struggle. Most the %ashmir <ihadi groups are outla$ed and declared
as terrorists groups creating restlessness in %ashmir.
Effects Of 1u+bai Attacks on <as'+ir:
The attacks $hich took place in Mumbai on 4ovember 6,, 677* carry severe
implications for the %ashmir issue. After the attacks, the peace process bet$een -ndia and
3akistan suffered a setback. Although no direct link is established bet$een the terrorists
operating in %ashmir $ith those $ho carried out Mumbai attack, a case has been made by
-ndia that eventually all Iihadi groups are bound by a commo -slamist 3hilosophy.
<as'+ir(ossible %olution:
Dollo$ing steps are suggested to evolve an effective policy on %ashmir to achieve the
desired solutions.
iC =fforts to bring about a united -slamic stand.
iiC :olding international conference on %ashmir in the maIor capitals of the $orld $here
pro-%ashmiri international personalities be invited to address.
iiiC Supporting overseas 3akistanis and students in foreign universities of stage
demonstrations and influence the elected members of houses of government.
ivC =volve a Fthink tankG for formulating coherent guidelines on %ashmir.
vC Start a national Dund on %ashmir.
viC Most important of all, $e should take advantage of the revival of %ashmir issue at the
(nited 4ations through a united move by the Muslim (mmah and /rganisation of
-slamic 2onference.
viiC Approaching -nternational 2ourt of <ustice by 3akistan, for the issue of a Fcease and
desistG order to the -ndian forces in %ashmir $ho are ruthlessly persecuting, the %ashmir
Muslims and are violating the human rights.
*ritical Anal0sis:
Dor resolving %ashmir issue it is the time that international community must differentiate
bet$een the terrorism and freedom movement. The process of peace for normalisation of
relations bet$een the t$o neighbouring countries through negotiations and talks for
resolving all outstanding issues, irritants and problems and lingering issues have gained
boost recently. Musharraf repeatedly asserted that 3akistan is against $ar. F$e are for
peaceA $e are for deescalatingA $e are for reduction of tension.G :o$ever, the reduction
of tensions bet$een the t$o neighbouring countries could have been achieved only if the
confidence building measures agreed upon earlier $ould have been follo$ed. -n this
regard, there is a positive response from 3akistan but unfortunately a negligible one from
-ndia.
-f even no$ %ashmir conflict is left unresolved through the international efforts, then to
borro$ ->bal@s symbolism, Fthe time has come $hen the desperate sparro$ $ill pounce
upon the mighty falcon and overpo$er itG.
*onclusion:
Solution of the problem re>uires a change in the position adopted by all the three parties
involving--ndia, 3akistan and %ashmiris themselves.
2ertain developments at regional and global levels augur $ell for the peaceful solution to
the %ashmir problem. 3akistan must e)ploit the situation $ith a pragmatic policy on
%ashmir. 3lebiscite as the basic solution is not possible as evidenced in the past years.
3akistan must pressurise -ndia and bring (nited States to a mechanism to solve the
%ashmir issue.
-t is therefore essential that first step is to keep alive sustained dialogue bet$een the
leaders of the t$o countries. Step t$o is acceptance of %ashmir as issue that must be
resolved.
Step three $ould be to look at all possible solutions and agreed on $hich ones could be
mutually discarded as un$orkable. The fourth step $ould be to go on to further
discussion in involving the people of %ashmir from both sides of the 0ine of 2ontrol
H0o2C $ith a vie$ to arriving at some reasonable solution acceptance to all parties
concerned.
US-India Relations And Pakistan:
Outline:
Introduction
Indo-% %trategic (artners'ip And I+plications &or (akistan
(resident Oba+a)s ?isit To India
(akistan)s *oncerns
Indo(ak Tensions
<as'+ir Issue
*onclusion
Introduction:
The (S and -ndia have al$ays considered themselves a maIor strategic and political
po$ers. 1oth feel that the $orld must ackno$ledge this status. They have defined and
described the international peace and priorities $ithin their o$n norms and terms and
have developed their relations $ith the other states $ithin these parameters.
Indo-% %trategic (artners'ip And I+plications &or (akistan:
The (S is sing different means, methods, techni>ues, $ays, tools and linkages to advance
its policy goals in South Asia and its strategic agreement $ith -ndia signed in <une 6778
and <uly 6778 H(nclear dealsC are the most recent and the best e)amples of -ndo-(S
strategic partnership after !? events.
The indo-(S nuclear deal has much implication for the deterrence stability bet$een the
nuclear belligerents in South Asia as the nuclear facilities provided through this
agreement $ill spare many -ndian nuclear faculties $hich it has been using for civilian
purposes and -ndia $ill be able to manufacture abundant nuclear $arheads out of them.
/n the other hand, 3akistan found a straight for$ard negative response for civilian
nuclear deal despite the havoc created by the po$er shortage in the already thriving
industrial sector. Then (S and -srael backed -ndian missile defence system $ill be
another dent to 3akistan@s stability.
(resident Oba+a)s ?isit To India:
3resident /bama@s three-day visit to -ndia $as predicated on t$o maIor obIectives-(S
economic recession and $ar in Afghanistan.
'uring his visit, /bama signed 67 business deals $orth (S 7 billion dollars $ith -ndia.
:e also sent message to 3akistan during his visit that Fterrorists@ safe places in its
territory are unacceptableG. To appease -ndia, he also asked 3akistan to bring to Iustice
the perpetrators of the 677* Mumbai attacks. While addressing the -ndian 3arliament, he
supported -ndian desire to become the permanent member of (nited 4ations Security
2ouncil H(4S2C.
(akistan)s *oncernsB
After /bama@s support to -ndia on the (4 seat issue, 3akistan@s Doreign /ffice reacted
immediately and re>uested /bama not to back 4e$ 'elhi because of its role in
suppression of %ashmiri@s and its hegemonic designs in the smaller countries of the
region. -ndia has egregious track record of stranded relations $ith almost all its
neighbouring countries, not to say about 3akistan. -t has disputes $ith 1angladesh over
$ater, $ith Srilanka for tis backing of Tamils and 4epal for its interference in
%athmandu@s internal affairs.
/bama@s support for -ndia@s (4 bid has compounded 3akistan@s concerns over its rival
designs in Afghanistan. 3akistan is already an)ious at its nuclear-armed rival@s gro$ing
role in Afghanistan and fears -ndia is trying to gain a foothold along its Western borders.
Indo(ak Tensions:
3resident /bama during his visit also offered to play a role in reducing -ndo-3ak
tensions. The efforts of the sole superpo$er in reducing tensions bet$een the t$o nuclear
states can help maintain peace in the region. 1ut the problem is that (S is $illing to
mediate provided both -ndia and 3akistan re>uest. 1ut -ndia is not ready to accept any
third party mediation and insist all the issues including %ashmir $ill be resolved bilateral
negotiations as per Tashkent and Simla Agreement.
<as'+ir Issue:
Washington has been unsympathetic to appeals of help from the people of %ashmir. /n
%ashmir, /bama said, FWe $ill continue to $elcome dialogue bet$een -ndia and
3akistan, even as $e recogni;e that disputes bet$een your t$o countries can only be
resolved by the people of your t$o countries. (S could play role in resolving the dispute
if both the sides asked to do so but it could not impose any solution on the both sides.G
/bama kept >uiet about human rights violations by the -ndian occupation forces, contrary
to $hat human rights organi;ations have been saying against brutal killings in the valley.
*onclusion:
There are many in 3akistan $ho vie$ $ith alarm the gro$th in -ndia-(S ties that have
no$ been reinforced by /bama visit. 1ut, it is a mistake to regard the matter as a ;ero-
sum game. -f (S ties $ith -ndia gro$, it does not necessarily mean loss for 3akistan, or
vice versa. 3akistan-(S relations are based on their o$n rationale. -n fact, at time $hen
the primary (S security concern is the $ar against Al-.aeda and Taliban, (S considers
3akistan as a pivotal ally $ithout $hose support the $ar cannot be $on. /bama has
already confirmed that he $ill be visiting 3akistan soon.
Israel-Palestine issue:
Outline:
Background:
ArabIsrael (eace Accords:
i3 T'e %inai Agree+ent:
ii3 *a+p 4a5id Accord:
iii3 Oslo Accord
i53 ,0e Ri5er (eace Accord
Israel)s Intransigence:
Apat'etic Role Of Arabs:
*urrent %ituation:
:i+itations To 4irect "egotiations:
Onl0 A Regional Approac' *an Bring 1iddle East (eace:
*onclusion:
Background:
-t is a historical fact that the <e$ish came into e)istence in !J* $ith the blessings of the
(S, 9reat 1ritain and Drance. 0ater on, it succeeded in defeating the Arabs in the $ars of
!J*, !," and !"# $ith the active military and financial support of (SA and her allies.
America needed a vassal state in the heart of the Middle =ast to keep the oil-rich Arab
States under control. Drom the Sue; 2risis in !8, to the disintegration of (SS+ in !!,
the Middle =ast has been the hot spot in the 2old War bet$een the Soviet (nion and the
West. Since !J* -srael has played at the hands of America and in turn has received
billions of dollars $orth military and economic assistance.
ArabIsrael (eace Accords:
After the !"# Arab--srael War, -srael has signed the follo$ing peace accords $ith the
Arab States.
iC T'e %inai Agree+ent: =gypt and -srael signed t$o Sinai agreements in <anuary !"J
and September !"8.
iiC *a+p 4a5id Accord: =gypt and -srael signed the famous 2amp 'avid Accord in
September, !"*. According to this agreement, -srael $ithdre$ from 9a;a Strip and Sinai
peninsula. This pact ended confrontation bet$een t$o traditional rivals.
iiiC Oslo Accord: 30/ chief 5asser Arafat signed /slo agreement in !88 on interim
autonomy of the 3alestinians.
ivC ,0e Ri5er (eace Accord: 30/ signed the historic Wye +iver 3eace Accord $ith
-srael in /ctober, !!*. (nder this agreement -srael agreed to transfer 6" per cent
territory of West 1ank, 9a;a strip and <ericho peninsula to the 3alestinian Authority. -t
also provided safe passage to the 3alestinian from 9a;a to West 1ank and allo$ed the
opening of an airport at 9a;a.
Israel)s Intransigence:
So far -srael has in one $ay or other safeguarded American interests in the region.
Without (S support it $ould not have been possible for Tel Aviv to survive in the face of
bitter Arab opposition. 'ue to this factor -srael has been able to back out from its
commitments on several occasions. Dor e)ample, the !!#accord re>uired -srael pull out
from all of its West 1ank settlement and the occupied West 1ank areas. 1ut -srael did not
fulfil its commitments mainly due to American backing. Durthermore, -srael has
surpassed all limits of brutality by using military force against the unarmed 3alestinians.
-n addition -srael has accelerated its settlement e)pansion drive.
Apat'etic Role Of Arabs:
After the reverses suffered in the Arab--srael $ars of !J*, !," and !"#, the Arab
leaders $ere convinced that it $as not possible to $ipe out the -srael through $ar. Thus
3resident of =gypt An$ar Sadat signed 2amp 'avid Accord $ith -srael in September,
!"*. (nder this agreement =gypt got 9a;a Strip and Sanai 'esert back and felt
satisfied. 2onse>uently, the $ithdra$al of =gypt, the strongest nation from the theatre
betrayed the 3alestinian cause and made the issue more complicated. Similarly, <ordan
under Shah :ussain signed peace accord $ith -srael and pulled itself out of boiling pot of
the Middle =ast. This accord further $eakened the position 3alestine 0iberation
/rganisation. While after signing peace accords $ith =gypt and <ordan -srael attained a
strong position. The Arab States vi; =gypt, <ordan, Syria, (A= and Saudi Arabia have
adopted an apathetic role to$ards 3alestine. They have confined their role to passing
resolutions only. The 922 and Arab 0eague have no practical role to play for the
establishment of a free 3alestinian States.
*urrent %ituation:
The (S announced the resumption of direct negotiations bet$een -sraelis and
3alestinians in Washington on September 6, 677. :o$ever, the talks stalled $ithin four
$eeks $hen -srael refused to e)tend a self-imposed 7 month building free;e that e)pired
on September 6,, 677. Washington has since offered -srael a package of Iet fighters and
diplomatic guarantees in e)change for concession on settlements.
:i+itations To 4irect "egotiations:
As the rounds of talks move for$ard there are three basic limitations to direct
negotiations. Dirst, the 3alestinians are concerned that the talks $ithout deadline $ould
simply allo$ -srael more time to build more settlements, $hich $ould further undermine
any agreement.
The second problem is that a bilateral peace deal is no longer attractive to either side.
-srael $ould find it difficult to find stomach the painful concessions necessary to $in
peace deal $ith only some 3alestinians-:amas, $ho run 9a;a, are not involved-$hile the
3alestinians need cover from $ider Arab World to sell tough choices to their o$n people.
Dinally, and $orst of all, a t$o-state solution $ill no longer $ork. 'espite serious efforts
to build a 3alestinian State this option effectively disappeared as -srael settlers spread
throughout the West 1ank.
Onl0 A Regional Approac' *an Bring 1iddle East (eace:
9iven this trio of deficiencies, the bilateral approach alone should be abandoned. -nstead,
a comprehensive accord bet$een -srael and all Arab countries should be pursued. This
could build on the terms laid out in Arab 3eace -nitiativeA adopted during an Arab 0eague
in meeting in 1eirut in 6776. This offered -srael both normalised relations $ith Arab
countries and security guarantees, in e)change for agreements over borders and the
refugee problem. A further strength of the plan $as that it offered regional cover for both
sides.
*onclusion:
The conditions for bilateral settlement do not currently e)ist. +ene$ed talks bet$een
-srael and 3alestinians are unlikely to change this, no matter ho$ much the /bama
administration hope they might delaying difficult decisions in hope of better
opportunities tomorro$ $ill only make it harder to end conflict. 1ut a regional approach
is both possible and desirable as a $ay for$ard. And the time is to act no$.
Irans Nuclear Program
Outline:
Historical Background:
Turning (oint:
*urrent %ituation And -% %anctions On Iran:
Energ0 4e+and:
Iran And -% 4ouble %tandard OR *ritical Anal0sis:
*onclusion:
Historical Background:
-ran@s nuclear program can be traced to the !87s $hen, $ith strong (S support, -ran
began its efforts to develop nuclear technology. 1y !"8 the (' had entered into a
nuclear cooperation agreement $ith -ran for the sale of e>uipments and then in !",, the
(S offered -ran reprocessing facility for e)tracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel.
A nucleari;ed -ran, at that time, $as in the (S favour to contain Soviet backed
communism and Arab nationalism.
Turning (oint:
After the !"! revolution, during $hich Shah $as overthro$n, the relations bet$een -ran
and the (S changed dramatically, marking a turning point in the once robust international
cooperation and the (S involvement in -ran@s development of nuclear technology. The
issue became highly politicised precisely because the -slamic +epublic openly declared
its intentions to continue $ith a reinvigorated nuclear program using indigenously
manufactured fuel and sustain an ambitious agenda for developing nuclear po$er rector
and fuel cycle technologies.
*urrent %ituation And -% %anctions On Iran:
-n 4ovember 677,, the (4 Security 2ouncil voted unanimously to impose sanctions on
-ran for refusing to put an end to uranium enrichment, increasing pressure on the -ranian
government to prove that it $as not trying to make its nuclear $eapons.
2urrently -ran has again become the focus of (S attention because it is trying to build its
nuclear and missile capability -A=A has repeatedly e)pressed its fear that -ran is
enriching (ranium in order to make nuclear $eapons.
The /bama administrations is perturbed by -ran@s gro$ing nuclear po$er as $ell as its
long-range development. -n April, 677, (S increased pressure to impose sanctions on
-ran for its nuclear program. 2onse>uently, the (4 Security 2ouncil imposed a fourth
round of sanction on -ran on !th <une, 677 for nuclear program that West Suspect is
aimed at the development of atomic $eapons.
Energ0 4e+and:
-ran sees nuclear po$er as a means of moderni;ing and diversifying its energy supply,
since its large oil reserves $ill be depleted over the ne)t seven to none decades. -ts oil
reserves are estimated at #" billion barrel or the ., O of the $orld@s total reservesA and
it has 6!,777 billion cubic meters of natural gas or the 8.JO of the World@s total
reserves. :o$ever, given a doubling of -ran@s population to "7 million since !"!, energy
demand at home has risen e)ponentially.
Iran And -% 4ouble %tandard OR *ritical Anal0sis:
Since -ran is signatory to 43T, it legally allo$s -ran to build any nuclear facility. -t also
allo$ member-states to $ithdra$ from agreement, subIect to !7 days@ notice to -A=A, if
they believe that abiding by the terms of 43T threaten their national security. The crisis
bet$een -ran and the (S on -ran@s nuclear program e)posed a fla$ in the 1ush
administration@s understanding of $hy Tehran to be a nuclear po$er. The 1ush
administration $as $illing to negotiate the 4orth %orea that had to >uit the 43T and
$ent on for a civilian nuclear deal $ith -ndia but $as not ready to sho$ fle)ibly in case
of -ran.
*onclusion:
3resident /bama should take political risk of engaging in direct talks $ith -ran. At the
first stage, the process should start $ith persuasion of political factions inside the (nited
States and encouraging them to change their perception regarding aims and ambitions of
-ran@s nuclear program. A key step $ould be differentiating bet$een the themes of
nuclear energy and the issue of $eaponi;ation. Moreover, connecting -ran@s nuclear
program to issues of deterrence must be stopped. These are the important steps to$ards
confidence-building and to alleviate the perceptions of an -ranian nuclear threat mong the
American public and in 2ongress.
US-India Relations And Pakistan:
Outline:
Introduction
Indo-US Strategic Partnership And Implications For Pakistan
President Obamas Visit o India
Pakistans !oncerns
Indo-Pak ensions
"ashmir Issue
!onclusion
Introduction:
The US and India have always considered themselves a major strategic and political
powers. Both feel that the world must acknowledge this status. They have defined and
described the international peace and priorities within their own norms and terms and
have developed their relations with the other states within these parameters.
Indo-US Strategic Partnership And Implications For Pakistan:
The US is sing different means, methods, techniues, ways, tools and linkages to advance
its policy goals in South !sia and its strategic agreement with India signed in "une #$$%
and "uly #$$% &Unclear deals' are the most recent and the best e(amples of Indo)US
strategic partnership after *+,, events.
The indo)US nuclear deal has much implication for the deterrence stability between the
nuclear belligerents in South !sia as the nuclear facilities provided through this
agreement will spare many Indian nuclear faculties which it has been using for civilian
purposes and India will be able to manufacture abundant nuclear warheads out of them.
-n the other hand, .akistan found a straight forward negative response for civilian
nuclear deal despite the havoc created by the power shortage in the already thriving
industrial sector. Then US and Israel backed Indian missile defence system will be
another dent to .akistan/s stability.
President Obamas Visit o India:
.resident -bama/s three)day visit to India was predicated on two major objectives)US
economic recession and war in !fghanistan.
0uring his visit, -bama signed #$ business deals worth US ,$ billion dollars with India.
1e also sent message to .akistan during his visit that 2terrorists/ safe places in its
territory are unacceptable3. To appease India, he also asked .akistan to bring to justice
the perpetrators of the #$$4 5umbai attacks. 6hile addressing the Indian .arliament, he
supported Indian desire to become the permanent member of United 7ations Security
8ouncil &U7S8'.
Pakistans !oncerns9
!fter -bama/s support to India on the U7 seat issue, .akistan/s :oreign -ffice reacted
immediately and reuested -bama not to back 7ew 0elhi because of its role in
suppression of ;ashmiri/s and its hegemonic designs in the smaller countries of the
region. India has egregious track record of stranded relations with almost all its
neighbouring countries, not to say about .akistan. It has disputes with Bangladesh over
water, with Srilanka for tis backing of Tamils and 7epal for its interference in
;athmandu/s internal affairs.
-bama/s support for India/s U7 bid has compounded .akistan/s concerns over its rival
designs in !fghanistan. .akistan is already an(ious at its nuclear)armed rival/s growing
role in !fghanistan and fears India is trying to gain a foothold along its 6estern borders.
Indo-Pak ensions:
.resident -bama during his visit also offered to play a role in reducing Indo).ak
tensions. The efforts of the sole superpower in reducing tensions between the two nuclear
states can help maintain peace in the region. But the problem is that US is willing to
mediate provided both India and .akistan reuest. But India is not ready to accept any
third party mediation and insist all the issues including ;ashmir will be resolved bilateral
negotiations as per Tashkent and Simla !greement.
"ashmir Issue:
6ashington has been unsympathetic to appeals of help from the people of ;ashmir. -n
;ashmir, -bama said, 26e will continue to welcome dialogue between India and
.akistan, even as we recogni<e that disputes between your two countries can only be
resolved by the people of your two countries. US could play role in resolving the dispute if
both the sides asked to do so but it could not impose any solution on the both sides.3
-bama kept uiet about human rights violations by the Indian occupation forces,
contrary to what human rights organi<ations have been saying against brutal killings in
the valley.
!onclusion:
There are many in .akistan who view with alarm the growth in India)US ties that have
now been reinforced by -bama visit. But, it is a mistake to regard the matter as a <ero)
sum game. If US ties with India grow, it does not necessarily mean loss for .akistan, or
vice versa. .akistan)US relations are based on their own rationale. In fact, at time when
the primary US security concern is the war against !l)=aeda and Taliban, US considers
.akistan as a pivotal ally without whose support the war cannot be won. -bama has
already confirmed that he will be visiting .akistan soon.
4ice attempt but again many things are missing.
(S -ndia relations revolve around the tussle bet$een 0iberalism and Socialism, (.S
needs a strategic partner in Asia to challenge the hegemony of 2hina. And you canPt
ignore Afghan perspectiveA ho$ india can help (.S to $ithdra$ its troops peacefully and
ho$ -ndia can help (.S to stabili;e Afghanistan and combat terrorism . =conomy is
another important perspective . -ndia is the second largest market of Asia plus it provides
cheap labour as $ell. (.S can use -ndian tool any time to threat 3akistan and compel it to
fight (.S pro)y War H-f 3akistan refuses to fight the $ar for (.SC
Pak-Sino Relations:
Outline:
BackgroundRecognition Of (eople)s Republic Of *'ina:
&irst 1eeting Of T'e (ri+e 1inisters:
*'ina)s 1e+bers'ip Of -"O:
%inoIndia Border *onflict And (akistan:
1967 And 1981 Indo(ak ,ars:
(ak%ino Relations 4uring 198>s:
(akistan)s %upport To *'ina In "ational Issue$
*'ina)s %upport On Afg'an Issue:
*'ina)s %upport On (akistan)s "uclear Tests:
*'ina)s %upport 4uring <argil ,ar:
-%:ed AntiTerroris+ ,ar And (aki%ino Relations:
Reliance On %trong 1ilitar0To1ilitar0 Relations:
2ro#ing Econo+ic Relations:
(akistan)s Entr0 Into %*O:
1utual %trategic *oncern)s About India:
2ro#ing -% Regional Role:
*onclusion
BackgroundRecognition Of (eople)s Republic Of *'ina:
3akistan $as the first -slamic country and third non-communist state to accord
recognition to the people@s republic of china in <anuary !87. 2urrently 3akistan and
2hina are enIoying $arm and friendly relations $hich have gone from strength to
strength since their inception in !87s.
&irst 1eeting Of T'e (ri+e 1inisters:
The premiers of both the nations laid the foundation of these relations during 1andung
2onference. 2hinese premier 2hou =n 0ai and his 3akistani counterpart Mohammad Ail
1ogra $ere the architects of this historic relationship $hich $as destined to prove
unprecedented in the annals of international relations.
*'ina)s 1e+bers'ip Of -"O:
The actual consolidation bet$een relations started in the early !,7s, $hen 3akistan
changed its stance and supported 2hina@s seating in the (4/ in !,.
%inoIndia Border *onflict And (akistan:
-n !,6, during 2hina--ndia border conflict 3akistan had to face pressure from its $estern
allies (% and (S. :o$ever, 3akistan brushed aside the pressure and supported 2hina
$hole-heartedly. As a result, the t$o countries amicably negotiated and signed an
agreement on the demarcation of their common border in March !,#.
1967 And 1981 Indo(ak ,ars:
'uring !,8 -ndo-3ak $ar, 2hina played a commendable role in its support to 3akistan
in achieving ceasefire by issuing stern $arning to -ndia. Dollo$ing the $ar, 2hina also in
an attempt to compensate for $ar losses, supported 3akistan $ith military e>uipment
including tanks and aircraft. 'uring !,7s, 3akistan-2hina relations evolved on firm
footings of mutual trust and confidence.
'uring !" -ndo-3ak $ar 2hinese leaders in a message to 3akistan@s 3resident 5ahya
%han assured full support against -ndia and Soviet (nion. 2hina also openly declared
-ndia as an aggressor. 2hina also e)tended armed aid to 3akistan at this stage. Thus, the
relations further strengthened.
(ak%ino Relations 4uring 198>s:
-n the decade of !"7, 3ak reciprocated by supporting 2hina internationally. -t supported
2hina in its border confrontation $ith Soviet (nion, 3akistan $as instrumental in
'r.%isisnger@s visit to china in <uly !" and 3resident 4i)on@s visit to 1eiIing in Deb
!"6.
Durther, the -ndian nuclear e)plosion in !"J introduced a ne$ dimension in strategic
balance in the region and gave a fresh impetus to e)panding 3ak-2hina defence
cooperation. 1et$een !" and *"*, 2hina assisted 3akistan in building t$o defence
related mega-proIects, first, the :eavy +ebuild Dactory for T-8! tanks and the second,
and D-, Aircraft +ebuild Dactory.
(akistan)s %upport To *'ina In "ational Issue$
Throughout the !*7s, 3ak-Sino relations continued to develop in a comprehensive
relationship. 3akistan al$ays supported chian in all issues important to 2hinese national
interests such as sovereignty over :ong %ong, Tai$an and Tibet and issue relating
human rights and democracy.
*'ina)s %upport On Afg'an Issue:
The ne)t milestone in 3akistan-2hina relations $as the period bet$een !"! and !**,
$hen Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan and defied $orld demand to pull out its troops
from Afghanistan. Millions of Afghan refugees fled from their homeland and sought
refuge in the refugee camps on the 3akistan@s soil. :o$ever, Q3akistan faced the situation
bravely. -t not only provided to afghan refugees but also provided all assistance for the
training of Afghan MuIahedeen. -n this hour of need, 2hina e)tended moral support to
3akistan.
*'ina)s %upport On (akistan)s "uclear Tests:
Dollo$ing the $ithdra$al of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan in !!!-*!, the strategic
dynamics in the region changed once again. Throughout the !"7s, 3akistan remained
under the (SA sanctions and chian $as the primary source for military hard$are
procurements. After the -ndian nuclear tests, the strategic balance in South Asia $as
changedA 2hina e)pressed its understanding of 3akistan@s compulsion to go nuclear. -t
supported 3akistan to establish strategic balance in South Asia by conducting its o$n
nuclear tests.
*'ina)s %upport 4uring <argil ,ar:
-n !!!, during the %argil $ar bet$een the t$o nuclear states, -ndia and 3akistan, 2hina
adhered to a strict neutral position. 2hina $as concerned over the possibility of escalation
of the conflict, and asked both countries to defuse tensions. 'uring the -ndo-3ak military
stand-off in 6777-677, 2hina continued $ith its position of neutrality and played an
important role in defusing tensions bet$een -ndia and 3akistan through telephone
diplomacy.
-%:ed AntiTerroris+ ,ar And (aki%ino Relations:
3resident Musharraf@s visit to 3eople@s +epublic of 2hina on 'ecember 67, 677 as an
event of special importance bet$een the t$o countries as it conveyed a strong signal to
the $orld over that 3ak-2hina relations could not be affected by 3akistan@s Ioining (S-
led anti-terrorism coalition and its improved relations $ith the West.
3akistan@s side $as likely to rene$ its commitment that 2hina $ould continue to enIoy
the highest priority in the country@s foreign policy. 3resident@s visit gave a ne$ boost to
mutual beneficial relations and help strengthened traditional bonds of friendship and
cooperation bet$een the t$o countries. 2hina understood and supported 3akistan@s
decision made in the light of its national interests and that time situation.
3akistan@s emergence as a key partner to (S led anti-terrorism $ar did not affect 3ak-
2hina relations because at the political level both countries have unanimity of vie$s on
issues like the $ar on terrorism, -ra>, Afghanistan, and the -ranian nuclear program.
Reliance On %trong 1ilitar0To1ilitar0 Relations:
Military relations have long been the most important and vibrant component in 2hina-
3akistan relations. 1ilateral military 2ooperation is Fusually strongG and ranges from
naval cooperation to combined military and anti-terror e)ercises.
After the event of !?, anti-terrorism related cooperation bet$een the t$o countries has
consistently e)panding. /n August ,, 677J, 2hina and 3akistan conducted their first Ioint
military e)ercises named FDriendship 677JG in RinIiang. -n April 6778, during 3remier
Wen <iabao@s visit to -slamabad the t$o sides signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation
and good neighbouring relations as $ell as combating terrorism and e)tremism.
-n order to enhance military-to-military cooperation, both the countries conducted a Ioint
maritime search-and-rescue e)ercise in Shanghai. This $as the first time for the navy of
H30AC to conduct Ioint e)ercise $ith a foreign navy. Similarly, in 4ovember 6778, during
their visit to 3akistan, 2hinese naval ships conducted second Ioint maritime search-and
rescue e)ercise $ith 3akistan navy. This $as again the first time for the navy of 30A to
conducting a Ioint e)ercise in $aters abroad. 'efence production-related cooperation has
also e)panded.
2ro#ing Econo+ic Relations:
Today@s 2hina is an economic Iuggernaut. -t has $orld@s fastest gro$ing economy for
more than 67 years and continues to gro$ at a blistering pace of !O a year. 4early "7O
of 3akistan e)ports to 2hina are cotton yarn and cotton fabric. 2hina contributed N!*m
for the construction of 9$adar port@s N687m phase. The first phase, $hich $as built by
the 2hinese construction firm, $as completed ahead of premier Wen <iabao@s visit to
3akistan in April 6778. 2hina has also agreed in principles for funding for the second
phase of the port, $hich $ill have nine more berths, an approach channel cable for large
oil-tankers vessels, strong terminal and related infrastructure facilities.
Many proIects have been completed $ith 2hinese assistance and these include,
%arakoram high$ay, Dirst phase of the 9$adar port, 2hashma-- nuclear po$er station
and machine tool factory. The proIects no$ under$ay $ith 2hinese assistance include,
the second phase of the 9$adar port, 2hashma--- nuclear po$er plant, Saindak 2ooper
mines development, 9omal &am 'am, and several oil and gas e)ploration schemes.
1esides 2hina is investing in a number of other proIects like N 6.,bn %ohala proIect and
N*bn 1unIi 'am proIect. The bilateral trade bet$een 3ak and 2hian rise from Nibn in
6776 to N,.*bn in 677!. 2hinese 3remier desires this trade should be brought to the level
of N7bn.
The si;e of 2hinese business in 3akistan is gro$ing. The potential for gro$th of 3ak-
2hina economic relations is enormous, provided that the process remains on track and
certain enabling conditions for future gro$th are successfully created.
(akistan)s Entr0 Into %*O:
The overall geo-strategic environment for regional cooperation is gradually becoming
more favourable. 2hina supported 3akistan@s membership to Shanghai 2ooperation
/rgani;ation HS2/C. 3akistan@s entry into the S2/ as an observer and 2hina@s entry into
the South Asian Association for regional 2ooperation as an observer, $ould allo$ 3ak-
2hian bilateral economic relations to gro$ from a regional perspective. Also, there is a
convergence of economic interests at the strategic level, especially in the areas of energy,
security and communication net$orks. =conomic cooperation has taken centre stage,
$hile defence and security related cooperation has assumed a ne$ dimension. 3eople-to-
people contacts are increasing at all levels in the civil societies. All these indicators point
the fact that 3ak-2hina relations $ill remain on the track of constant gro$th in all areas
of mutual benefit.
1utual %trategic *oncern)s About India:
-ndia remains a central force of 2hina@s and 3akistan@s geographical concern, dating back
to a time $hen the Soviet (nion $as -ndia@s principle patron. 1oth 2hina and 3akistan
have similar geographical and historical concerns $ith respect to -ndia. These includeB
iC Shared borders $ith -ndia, in 3akistan@s northeast and in 2hina@s southeast.
iiC A history of hostility and confrontation $ith -ndia.
iiiC A mutual interest in manoeuvring to balance or contain -ndia@s po$er and influence in
the region.
1oth 2hina and 3akistan also have compelling reasons for cooperating $ith other to
avoid being a sole focus of -ndia@s strategic attention. 2hina and 3akistan appear to vie$
their political, military and economic cooperation as a tool $ith $hich they can counter
-ndia@s po$er by trying to bind -ndia@s activities $ithin a South Asia conte)t and to limit
-ndia@s connections $ith resource-rich 2entral Asia. Sino-3ak security cooperation also
helps to tie do$n -ndian troops in %ashmir, $hee -ndia, 2hina and 3akistan all have
territorial claims.
2ro#ing -% Regional Role And Its I+plications:
Since the !? terrorist attacks, the gro$ing (S role in 2entral and South Asia also has
troubled 2hinese leaders and raised many ne$ issues in 2hina@s relationship $ith
3akistan. This is a t$o-edge concern. /n the one hand, they noted, the (nited States and
2hina, share a common interests in $orking for 3akistan@s stability and political and
economic viability, and so 2hina is comfortable $ith (S actions $hich help support
3akistan@s economy and bolster the stability of its regime. /n the other hand, 2hina tends
to vie$ the (S $ar efforts in Afghanistan and its gro$ing involvement $ith 3akistan as a
catalyst for regional unrest, making 2hina uncomfortable $ith the (S role. A failure of
(S could lead at best to further instability in 3akistan, or at $orst to the installation of a
fundamental religious government in -slamabad.
*onclusion: A &uturistic %trateg0
-n vie$ of the regional situation and the impact of developments at the global level, a
proper strategy for security in the region should focus on the follo$ing facts.
There should be no doubt that the region has been in the throes of instability because of
mutual conflicts bet$een the states of the region as $ell as because of the pro)y $ars of
global po$ers. This region is one of the most back$ard areas in the $orld, in terms of
development of human resources. -t is, therefore, necessary to give attention to economic
and social development.
-n the present day $orld, $hich has shrunk to a global village, stability is impossible to
achieve $ithout preventing and eliminating the danger of aggression from any country.
Adoption of a common strategy for meeting the challenge of hegemonic designs, $hether
at regional or global level, is becoming inevitable. 2hina and 3akistan have e)hibited
e)emplary cooperation in this regard. Maintaining these good relations and keeping the
level of cooperation high, efforts should be made to include other countries of the region
in any such scheme of mutual cooperation and $orking together. -t is pertinent to note
here that relations bet$een 3akistan and +ussia have improved during the last fe$ years,
$hile the relationship bet$een 2hina and +ussia has become stronger. The need is to
come up $ith a common vision and a scheme for Ioint actions, taking along the 2entral
Asian states.
-nstability in Afghanistan gives rise to instability in the $hole region, besides being an
obstacle in the $ay of full use of resources in the region for economic development. 4o
doubt, this is a formidable challenge and interests of different countries even conflict $ith
each other, at times, the common destiny re>uires that Afghanistan@s neighbors should
increase mutual consultations and contacts and find out some common strategy. -t should
not be forgotten that instability in Afghanistan is e)ploited by the outsiders for their o$n
intervention and presence in the region.
A revie$ of the defense capabilities and technological development of the countries in
the region establishes that -ndia@s efforts about ac>uiring latest, sophisticated military
e>uipment along $ith developing its o$n nuclear and missile programs have 3akistan as
their first target, and 2hina as the second. :o$ever, defense strategies of both the
countries and their close relations have prevented it from committing any aggression. -t is
necessary to keep a check on -ndia@s gro$ing $ar capabilities.
1esides the hegemonic designs of -ndia, the prolonged %ashmir issue bet$een -ndia
and 3akistan poses a grave threat to regional security. 1ecause of deep public emotions
on both sides, the t$o countries cannot resolve the issue by themselves. All bilateral
efforts have invariably failed to produce any tangible results, let alone a lasting solution
of the contentious issue. -t is, therefore, inevitable for the international community and
the neighbors to play their role and try to enforce a Iudicious solution to it for the sake of
peace in the region. 1eing a maIor country in the region as $ell as being a neighbor of
both 3akistan and -ndia, 2hina can play a role in diffusing tension bet$een 3akistan and
-ndia. -t can play a better role than any Eoutside@ po$er. /bviously, no outside country
can be as sincere in, or in as much need of, peace in the region as those situated here.
Along $ith the %ashmir issue, the >uestion of 3alestine and other problems are symbols
of inIustices committed in the past, yet they are victims of indifference of the
international community and institutions. 2ontinued insensitivity of the international
community has turned political movements in these areas into armed struggles, $hich, in
return, has led to an unending chain of violence and counterviolence. 'oubts and
suspicions over the (S-led $ar against terrorism carry $eightB that it is more about
serving self-interests rather than elimination of terrorism, that this $ar has in fact
increased the dangers to $orld peace. 0est these suspicions come true and the situation
get further aggravated, the need is to make international institutions stronger and more
effective. Along $ith recogni;ing movements for right of self-determination and
distinguish bet$een freedom struggle and terrorism, these institutions should be able to
resist the (S unilateralism and the (S approach of bypassing international la$ and
norms. /ther$ise, $ide-spread anger and frustration $ould feed those $ho can go to any
e)tent of use of force for achieving their ends.
While terrorism is being condemned every$here, proper attention has not been paid to
its causes. Terrorist activities in $hich a human beings sacrifice their lives indicate to the
height of frustration. This frustration is there among the Muslim masses because their
genuine freedom struggles are being suppressed by repressive regimes, on the one hand,
$hile, on the other, their leaderships do not represent their sentiments, nor do
international institutions and po$ers e)hibit any Iudicious approach or inclination in
solving their problems.
Pakistan And The Central Asian
States:
Introduction:
3akistan@s relations $ith the 2entral Asian +epublics have made good progress during the
past fe$ years. The 2entral Asian States H2ASC, i.e., %a;akhstan, %yrgy;stan, TaIikistan,
Turkmenistan and (;bekistan are located on historical Silk +oute. The region has
adIoining borders $ith South Asia, West Asia, 2hina and +ussia and is of great geo-
strategic and politico-economic importance. -ts potential is attracting the attention of
e)tra regional po$ers.
3akistan-2entral Asian relations are based on geographical pro)imity, common history,
religion, culture, traditions, values and destiny. 3akistan and these states can $ork
together in matters of security, stability and development of the region.
They can collaborate in numerous areas such as scientific and technical fields, banking,
insurance, information technology, pharmaceutical industry, tourism and media. The
economies of 2AS and 3akistan are complementary to each other. There is cooperation in
several spheres notably, $ar against terrorism, combating religious e)tremism and drug
trafficking.
E*O. (akistan And *entral Asian %tates:
3akistan and 2entral Asian States are also the members of =conomic 2ooperation
/rgani;ationA it provides a good opportunity for the :eads of States and 9overnment to
meet.
1ilateral meetings on the sidelines offer a closer focus on bilateral relations.
*o++on %ecurit0 (olic0:
There is a desire in 3akistan that the =conomic 2ooperation /rgani;ation H=2/C of the
2AS, $hich is basically an economic grouping, should try to play to assume a political
role and in due course of time also aspire to the possibility of geopolitical and geo-
economic role.
=2/ may help in adopting a common security policy on similar grounds as pursued by
=( in the =uropean States combating religious e)tremism and Terrorism.
Trade And Econo+ic *ooperation:
3akistan should concentrate on the economic and trade ties $ith 2AS.
An important agreement has been concluded $ith 9ermany for a rail-road from
:amburg to ?Shanghai, through =astern =urope, Mosco$, Tashkent, %abul, 0ahore, 'elhi
and Shanghai.
This $ould open the rich mineral deposits of (;bekistan and %a;akhstan for
e)ploration and e)port by 3akistan and through the Arabian sea again, $ith a ne$ rail$ay
road from the %hyber 3ass to the +ussian land.
In5esting In -ntapped "atural Resources Of *A%:
The 2aspian Sea in 2entral Asia contains the $orld@s largest untapped oil and gas
resources.
All countries in the region are getting close to 2AS and they geared up their trade.
3akistan@s loans of N 7 to #7 million to each of the 2AS and its commitment to
cooperate in the building of N 877 m hydel po$er station in TaIikistan are some of the
many indicators of its keen $ish to assist them on their economic development.
4irect Air :ink:
The e)pansion of 3-A@s air net$ork to Tashkent in (;bekistan and Alma Ata in
%a;akhstan is a maIor step for$ard in cementing ties $ith these t$o states.
*ooperation In Ad+ission To OI*:
3akistan cooperated $ith 2AS in their admission to the organi;ation of the -slamic
2onference H/-2C.
*o++unication "et#ork And 1edia E9c'ange:
+adio 3akistan is $orking on proIects to strengthen its service for the 2entral Asian
region so that the people there can be informed and educated about 3akistan in their o$n
native languages.
An e)pansion of 3akistan Television@s Transmission facilities in 3esha$ar can enable it
to beam its TM programmes to the entire 2entral Asian region, covering all of
Afghanistan as $ell.
Establis'+ent Of ;oint Econo+ic *o++ission:
3akistan developed institutionali;ed arrangement to promote cooperation in the
economic and commercial fields.
Dor this purpose <oint =conomic 2ommissions H<=2sC have been established $ith all the
2entral Asian States.
Tec'nical Assistance (rogra++e:
(nder Technical Assistance 3rogramme initiated in !!6-!#, 3akistan provided training
facilities, $hich are fully funded.
The programme includes courses ranging from =nglish language, banking and
accountancy to diplomacy.
These have contributed to better understanding and closer cooperation. 3akistan $ishes
to keep up the momentum.
%uggestions:
Dollo$ing measures and implementations $ill improve the ties bet$een 3akistan and
2AS.
i3 (akistan An Attraction Of %'ortest :and Route:
3akistan $ould enIoy the role of middleman bet$een the SAA+2, =2/ and ==2 and the
attraction of the shortest land route to the Arabian Sea, 3ersian 9ulf and the 1lack Sea
$ould clearly irk +ussia.
ii3 Encourage 1utual Trade:
The government of 3akistan, despite its economic difficulties, should provide more credit
facilities to the 2entral Asian States to encourage mutual trade and the setting up of stable
banking channels.
iii3 Better (ort &acilities &or Handling T'e Transit Trade:
'espite their ethnic bonds $ith Turkey, -ran and Afghanistan, the 2A States can benefit
more from 3akistan@s port facilities, trade and commerce $ith the countries in entire
Southern :emisphere.
The port of Abadan and 1ader Abbas in -ran and %arachi port in 3akistan can handle this
transit trade by e)panding their facilities rapidly. The TaIik capital of 'ushanbe is about
#777 km from 1ander Abbas in -slam and about 6677 km from %arachi. While the 1lack
Sea port of /dessa for access to the Mediterranean is about J677 km a$ay.
i53 %peed0 I+ple+entation Of (ro@ects$
1ilaterally and through the =2/, many schemes and proIects are rapidly emerging,
$hose speedy implementation $ould be to their mutual advantage.
53 E9pertise in Banking %0ste+ To Be %'ared:
A strong modern banking system capable of operating internationally is a dire need of all
2entral Asian States and 3akistan has the e)pertise and the infrastructure to assist them in
this direction.
5i3 ;oint %'ipping *o+pan0 To Be Establis'ed:
The landlocked 2entral Asian States can even set up a Ioint shipment company $ith
3akistan under the aegis of the =2/ to handle a large port of their transit trade.
5ii3 2#adar (ort An Asset &or (akistan And T'e *A%:
-f 3akistan speeds up the development of the 9$adar port on the 1aluchistan coast into a
large-si;e modern port, it can be an asset for this province as $ell as for the 2AS.
5iii3 Trade ?ia T'e :and Route:
%a;akhstan@s ruling leaders, $ho are energetically improving their relations $ith 1eiIing,
have sho$n interest in building rail and road links $ith (rumchi, capital of the 2hinese
province of RinIiang, and thus using the %arakoram :igh$ay bet$een 3akistan and
2hina for trade via the land route.
i93 *'eap Air *argo %er5ice:
A cheap and regular air cargo service bet$een 3akistan and the 2AS is the need of the
hour.
93 40na+ic Rail#a0 "et#ork:
The 3akistan rail$ay net$ork should be linked via -ran $ith Turkmenistan.
9i3 (akistan TO In5ite %enior Editors Of "e#spaper Of *A%:
3akistan should invite senior editors of ne$spapers of the 2AS to 3akistan and provide
them $ith ample opportunities to kno$ facts about 3akistan@s economic development and
industrialisation.
9ii3 Business Encourage+ent Backed B0 T'e 2o5ern+ent Of (akistan In *A%:
With 9overnment encouragements, 3akistani entrepreneurs can set up industrial units in
(;bekistan, %a;akhstan and other 2AS.
9iii3 *ooperation Bet#een T'e -ni5ersities:
There is immense scope for cooperation bet$een the (niversities of 3akistan and those in
the 2AS. 3akistan can learn a great deal from the 2AS $hich have made nearly !8O of
their population literate.
9i53 Regional %ecurit0 Is TO Be I+pro5ed:
3akistan@s relations $ith the 2entral Asian +epublics have made good progress during the
past fe$ years. With improved regional security after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan,
Turkmenistan and 3akistan have decided to push ahead $ith plans for the ambitious 877
kms-long gas pipeline. The leaders of the three countries have signed a frame$ork
agreement HThe Trans Afghanistan 3ipelineC.
The Trans-Afghanistan pipeline $ould e)port Turkmen gas Hfrom 'ualtabad gas fieldC
via Afghanistan to 3akistan, from $here it could reach $orld markets. 3roponents of the
proIect see it as a modern continuation of the Silk +oad.
The Asian 'evelopment 1ank is the leading coordinating financial and technical partner.
*onclusion:
The stabili;ation and steady e)pansion of these relations may take time and $ould
re>uire deft, patient and $ise handling on the part of the States concerned. A time may
come, perhaps sooner than e)pected, $hen Turkey, 3akistan, -ran, Afghanistan and the
si) West and 2entral Asian StatesA having a population of nearly #77m and an area larger
than that of the SAA+2 region, may form a 2ommon Market.
-n the meantime, 2entral Asia and 3akistan must keep on vigorously pursuing the peace
option in Afghanistan. Mutual 3ak-Afghan trade is e)pected to reach +s. /ne billion in
this year.
-n the final analysis, it is the FAfghan corridorG that is still blocking 3akistan@s physical
access to the 2A+s, and vice versa, only its unblocking $ill materiali;e the connectivity
$ith South and Southeast Asia. (nfortunately, the $ar-torn Afghanistan remains a maIor
stumbling block. 5et it holds the ultimate key for 3akistan to gain access to the 2A+s.
Therefore, all efforts need to be focused to try opening this passage to gain access to the
e)-Soviet +epublics.
While regional and international circumstances have no doubt conspired against 3akistan,
the latter should have no stone unturned in combating international terrorism, building a
sound infrastructure along 3ak-Afghan border and cleansing its o$n fraction tribal belt of
foreign militants. At the same time, there is a dire need in setting its political house in
order by co-opting maIor political parties and regaining the trust and good$ill of Afghans
through trade assistance and policy of non-interference.
South Asian Association or
Regional Coo!eration "SAARC#:
&or+ation:
The South Asian Association for +egional 2ooperation HSAA+2C $as established in
'ecember *, !*8 at 'haka by 1angladesh, 1hutan, -ndia, Maldives, 4epal, 3akistan and
Srilanka. The obIective $ere to promote the $elfare and improve the >uality of life of the
people of South Asia by accelerating economic gro$th in the region and building up
mutual trust among the member states.
Ob@ecti5es:
The obIectives of the Association as defined in the 2harter areB
iC To promote the $elfare of the people of South Asia and to improve their >uality of life.
iiC To accelerate economic gro$th, social progress and cultural development in the region
and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to reali;e their full
potential.
iiiC To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia.
ivC To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another@s
problems.
vC Too promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social,
cultural, technical and scientific fields,
viC To strengthen cooperation $ith other developing countries.
(rinciples:
iC The principle of sovereign e>uality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states and mutual benefits.
iiC The cooperation is to complement bilateral and multilateral relations.
iiiC Such cooperation should be consistent $ith bilateral and multilateral responsibilities
of the member states.
ivC 'ecisions at all levels are to be unanimously taken.
vC 1ilateral and contentious issues $ould be e)ecuted from its deliberations.
1e+bers'ip:
iC 3akistan
iiC 1angladesh
iiiC -ndia
ivC Srilanka
vC 4epal
viC 1hutan
viiC Maldives
viiC Afghanistan
in April 677", at the Association@s Jth Summit, Afghanistan became its eighth member.
Obser5ers:
iC Australia
iiC 2hina
iiiC =(
ivC -ran
vC <apan
viC Mauritius
viiC Myanmar H1urmaC
viiiC (nited States
i)C South %orea
&ields/Areas Of *ooperation:
The areas of cooperation among SAA+2 members as decided at the time of its
establishment $ereB
iC Agriculture and Dorestry
iiC :ealth And 3opulation 3lanning
iiiC Meteorology
ivC +ural 'evelopment
vC Telecommunication
viC Transport
viiC Science and Technology
viiiC 'rug Trafficking And Abuse
i)C 3ostal Service
)C Women 'evelopment And
)iC Sports, Arts And 2ulture
%tructure:
The SAA+2 has four tier structure includingB
iC SAA+2 Summit 2onference
iiC 2ouncil of Minister
iiiC Standing 2ommittee
ivC Technical 2ommittees and Secretariat
%AAR* %u++it *onference:
The highest decision-making authority rests $ith the ESAA+2 Summit 2onference@
convened generally once in a year or t$o years, comprising :eads of State or
9overnments of SAA+2 countries.
*ouncil Of 1inisters:
The E2ouncil /f Ministers@ of SAA+2 countries formulates policies of the organisation.
The council appoints Secretary 9eneral of SAA+2 on the basis of rotation in
alphabetical order for a period of t$o years, upon nomination by a member state. -t meets
t$ice a year.
%tanding *o++ittee:
The FStanding 2ommittee of SAA+2G is composed of Doreign Secretaries of member
statesB -t approves proIects and programmes. The financing of such programmes and
proIect is also determined by the Standing 2ommittee.
%ecretariat:
The SAA+2 Secretariat $as established in %athmandu on , <anuary !*" and $as
inaugurated by late %ing 1irendra 1ir 1ikram Shah of 4epal. -t is headed by a Secretary
9eneral appointed by the 2ouncil of Ministers from member countries in alphabetical
order for a three-year term. :e is assisted by the 3rofessional and the 9eneral Services
Staff and also an appropriate number of functional units called divisions assigned to
'irectors on deputation from member States. The Secretariat coordinates and monitors
implementation of activities, prepares for and services meetings and serves as a channel
of communication bet$een the Association and its member states as $ell as other
regional organisations.
Ac'ie5e+ents:
T$enty-five years have passed since the establishment of SAA+2 in !*8.
When $e analyse its achievements disappointment prevails over us.
The SAA+2 has not many achievements at its credit.
:o$ever, it must be kept in mind that the Association consists of countries having
diversity in culture, religion, economic development, foreign policy etc.
-t is itself an appreciable thing that these countries have come on one platform for their
economic development.
4o doubt, SAA+2 performance is not good as $as e)pected, yet it has some
achievement at its credit.
T'e0 areA
iC -t has developed feelings of understanding among countries.
iiC -t signed SAA+2 +egional 2onvention of Suppression of Terrorism in !!*.
iiiC -t established SAA+2 Dood Security +eserve $hich is operational since !**.
ivC The SAA+2 has also signed South Asia 3rofessional Trade Agreement HSA3TAC in
seventh summit in !!# and SADTA Agreement, signed during the 6th Summit in
<anuary 677J.
vC SAA+2 Agricultural -nformation 2entre HSA-2C has been set up at 'haka to promote
cooperation in the field of agricultural.
viC A 2entre for :uman +esource 'evelopment H2:+'C has also been established.
viiC The member countries have devised modalities for confronting many important
issues such a poverty, terrorism, drug-trafficking etc.
viiiC -nstitutional arrangements such as South Asian 'evelopment 1ank, South Asian
'evelopment Dund etc. have been initiated.
*auses Be'ind %lo# (rogress:
A bird@s eye vie$ of the SAA+2@s achievements tells us that the performance of the
Association is not satisfactory. 9enerally speaking, follo$ing are the reasons for the slo$
progress of SAA+2.
iC -ndian aptitude is the foremost factor for the slo$ progress of SAA+2.
iiC There are fla$s in the charter itself. According to one principle, bilateral issues are
e)cluded from the activities of the Association.
iiiC Almost all the member countries are internally unstable and faced $ith internal
political tension.
ivC Many of many of the important sectors of economy $hich affect directly the lives of
the people of the region have not been included in the Association@s activity. The areas
includeB reduction in the defence e)penditure, po$er generation, improvement and proper
use of regional $ater resources, the use of SAA+2 for getting financial assistance from
donor agencies.
vC All the SAA+2 countries formulate their foreign policies according to their o$n
national interests and obIectives. This hinders to achieve any common ground and policy
to make Association successful.
viC The e)tra regional alignment of the member countries is also a hindrance in the
progress of the Association. Their alignment often $orks at cross purpose to the
obIectives aimed by SAA+2.
viiC There@s not the same level of economic development among countries. The
imbalance of economic development creates tendency of domination, doubts and
suspicions $hich create hurdles to achieve success.
(akistan)s Role In %trengt'ening %AAR*:
3akistan has been an active and enthusiastic member of the SAA+2. The t$elfth SAA+2
Summit in -slamabad has highlighted 3akistan@s contribution in making SAA+2 a highly
useful forum of South Asia. 3akistan@s tension ridden relations $ith -ndia has never
deterred it form playing an active role in the Association.
3akistan played a pivotal role in the formal launching of the SAA+2 at the first summit
at 'haka in !*8. After the formation of SAA+2, 3akistan has lived up to its
commitments by taking part in all the activities of the SAA+2.
The broad obIectives of the SAA+2 $ere to promote the $elfare of the people of South
Asia, accelerate economic gro$th, social progress and cultural development in the region.
-n all of SAA+2@s endeavours in the relevant fields, 3akistan has sho$n keen interest
and played an active role.
3akistan has al$ays played a leading role in both initiating and $elcoming visits and
e)changes $ith personalities from various fields of life in the member countries of the
SAA+2. -t has al$ays favoured the inclusion of mutual disputes and bilateral issues
bet$een member countries. 3akistan has argued that successful regional groupings like
=uropean (nion and AS=A4 use the mechanism of consultation for discussion that
promote conciliation and strengthen peace.
'uring the first Summit 3akistan gave a suggestion that $omen@s participation should be
increased in the SAA+2 related activities. The suggestion $as $elcomed and accepted as
the SAA+2 leaders agreed that meaningful progress could not be achieved $ithout the
active participation and enhancement of the status of $omen.
-n the fifth SAA+2 Summit meeting 3akistan vetoed Afghanistan@s application for
membership of SAA+2 because at that time it $as under the Soviet influence. -n
addition 3akistan condemned -ra>i occupation of %u$ait.
The si)th summit 2onference of SAA+2 $as held in 2olombo on 6st 'ecember !!.
'uring this meeting 3akistan proposed to make Asia a nuclear free ;one.
Similarly in the subse>uent SAA+2 Summits too 3akistan made positive proposals for
the promotion of political, economic and cultural cooperation among the states.
(olitical Issues:
SAA+2 has intentionally laid more stress on Fcore issuesG mentioned above rather than
more decisive political issues like the %ashmir dispute and the Srilanka civil $ar.
:o$ever, political dialogue is often conducted on the margins of SAA+2 meetings.
SAA+2 has also refrained itself from interfering in the internal matters of the member
states. 'uring the 6th and #th SAA+2 summits, e)treme emphasis $as laid upon
greater cooperation bet$een the SAA+2 members to fight against terrorism.
(olitical Econo+0 Of %out' Asia:
South Asia accounts for nearly 6#O of the total $orld population. :o$ever, its share in
the global 9'3 is less than #O. The region is home to the $orld@s J77 million poor,
$hich means nearly #7O of the region@s population lives belo$ the poverty line.
All SAA+2 countries have a rather lo$ raking on the :uman 'evelopment -nde) H:'-C,
$hich according to the :uman 'evelopment +eport 677"-7* isB Srilanka H!!C, the
Maldives H77C, -ndia H6*C, 1hutan H##C, 3akistan H#,C, 1angladesh HJ7C, and 4epal
HJ6C. The :'- ranking is based on achievements in terms of life e)pectancy, education
and real income. The lo$ :'- ranking reflects poorly on these vital indicators in the
region.
%out' Asian &ree Trade Agree+ent B%A&TA3:
-n order to achieve obIectives of SAA+2 and increase regional integration, the member
countries created South Asian Dree Trade Agreement HSADTAC in 677J at the t$elfth
SAA+2 Summit. This agreement $hich came into force on <anuary , 677, provides that
members $ill reduce their tariffs to 7.8 per cent by 'ecember #, 6778.
The success of SADTA, ho$ever, largely depends on normali;ation of 3akistan--ndia
relations. -n case the relations bet$een the t$o countries do not normali;e, SADTA, a fate
$ill not be different from that of its predecessor, South Asian 3referential Trade
Agreement HSA3TAC.
Reasons Of :o# Trade:
the maIor reason for meagre intra-SAA+2 trade is lo$ volume of trade bet$een 3akistan
and -ndia, the largest economies and trading nations in the region. Though formal 3ak-
-ndia trade Hthe t$o countries have informal trade of more than N #bn a yearC has
increased from N 6#, million in 677-6776 to N .!8 bn in 677"-7*, it still constitutes less
than per cent of the global trade of the t$o countriesS
3akistan has not even granted MD4 status, a basic re>uirement under WT/, to -ndia and
continues to conduct its imports from -ndia on the basis of positive list. /n its part, -ndia
maintains high tariffs and non-tariff barriers on products of e)port interest to 3akistan.
%AAR* And A%EA":
The poor trade performance of SAA+2 stands in marked contrast $ith that of the
neighbouring regional alliance-Association of South =ast Asian 4ations HAS=A4C. The
AS=A4 countries accounts for merely *.JO of the total $orld population.
:o$ever, their share in total $orld trade is nearly "O. AS=A4@s contribution to Asia@s
total trade is 6# per cent. -ntra-AS=A4 trade accounts for nearly #7 per cent of the global
trade of the 7-mmeber countries. AS=A4 countries have remained embroiled in
territorial disputes but that has not hampered their trade relations.
$rgani%ation $f Islamic
Coo!eration "$IC#
Outline:
Establis'+ent
Ai+s And Ob@ecti5es
%tructure
1e+bers
(akistan)s Role
Role of OI* &or 1usli+ %tates
*auses Of Its &ailure
a$ :ack Of -nit0:
b$ :ack Of Resources:
c$ :ack Of 1odern Tec'nolog0:
d$ Role Of A+erican And ;e#is' :obb0
OI* and 1odern *'allenges:
a$ 2lobalisation:
b$ %ecurit0:
c$ Econo+ic Integration Of T'e -++a':
d$ Hu+an 4e5elop+ent:
e$ 2lobal 1edia And Isla+p'obia:
%uggestions
*onclusion
Introduction:
/rganisation of -slamic 2ooperation is the association of Muslim countries. -t $as
established in September !,! in +abat HMoroccoC after the burning of MasIid-A>sa in
<erusalem. The inaugural $as attended by 6J heads of Muslim countries. -n this meeting,
the /-2 condemned the desecration of Al-A>sa mos>ue by the <e$s. 2urrently the
membership of this body had increased to 8".
The /-2 is the symbol of -slamic unity and integrity of the Muslim $orld. This
organisation provides the -slamic $orld a uni>ue forum to solve the problems faced by
Muslim $orld and to increase cooperation not only amongst the Muslim countries but
also bet$een other countries and -slamic states.
Ai+s And Ob@ecti5es:
iC To promote cooperation among Muslim nations.
iiC To protect rights of Muslims around the $orld.
iiiC To promote the spirit of brotherhood bet$een the Muslims.
ivC To eliminate all racial distinctions.
vC To promote economic, scientific, social and commercial links bet$een -slamic nations.
viC To assist 3alestinians for the establishment of a 3alestinian state.
%tructure Of OI*:
The /-2 comprises of follo$ing organs and affiliated bodies.
aC -slamic Summit 2onference
bC -slamic Doreign Ministers 2onference
cC Secretariat
dC Special 2ommittees
eC /ther Agencies
(akistan)s Role In T'e OI*:
With its deep commitment to the promotion of -slamic solidarity 3akistan has played a
significant role in the establishment of the /rgani;ation of the -slamic 2ooperation H/-2C
in !,!, and became an active member of the 2onference.
3akistan has the honour to host the second -slamic Summit 2onference in 0ahore in
!"J. The 2onference ackno$ledged $ith thanks the efforts of 3akistan for promoting
unity amongst the Muslim $orld. The first e)traordinary conference of Doreign Ministers
$as held in -slamabad, 3akistan, in <an !*7. 3akistan has also endeavoured to contribute
to the strengthening of various organs and agencies of the /-2, such as the -slamic
Solidarity Dund.
-n /ctober, !*7 the 3resident of 3akistan $as accorded the uni>ue honour of addressing
the (4 9eneral Assembly, on behalf of the entire -slamic World. The speech made by
9eneral &ia in the 68th Annual Session of the 9eneral Assembly, as a representative of
the -slamic World, $as not only hailed by the maIority of the Muslim countries but $as
also regarded as the -slam@s universal message of peace.
As 2hairman of the /rgani;ation of -slamic 2ooperation, 3resident 9eneral &ia-ul-:a>
undertook a good$ill mission to Tehran and 1aghdad, in September, !*7, in an effort to
bring to an end the unfortunate $ar bet$een the t$o -slamic countries. 3akistan attended
the 8th -slamic conference of Doreign Ministers at Sana@a in 'ecember, !*J. -t $as at
this 2onference that Mr. Sharifuddin 3ir;ada $as unanimously elected Secretary 9eneral
of the /-2.
Role of OI* &or 1usli+ %tates And *auses Of Its &ailure:
The /-2 aims at consolidating solidarity of Muslim $orld and the promotion of political,
economic, cultural and scientific cooperation among the member states. So far as the
manifests of the /-2 is concerned it offer many prospects for the solidarity of the Muslim
$orld and the resolution of issues faced by its members but practically the record of this
organisation is not very encouraging. This body has failed miserably to resolve the
problem faced by the Muslim $orld.
Dor e)ample, /-2 has not played its proper role to resolve the %ashmir issue bet$een
3akistan and -ndia, the 3alestine issue bet$een -srael and the Arabs, the 2hechnya issue
bet$een +ussia and the 2hechens, and the Shattul Arab dispute bet$een -ran and -ra>.
+ecently /-2 failed completely to prevent American invasions of Afghanistan and -ra>.
The limitations of this organi;ation $ere also e)posed during !*7 to !** $hen -ran
and -ra> $ere fighting an aimless $ar. 0ater on, in !!, /-2 failed to convince Saddam
:ussain to evacuate %u$ait before the (S-led coalition forces e)pelled -ra>i forces from
%u$ait and (4 imposed economic sanctions on 1aghdad.
The period from !! to 6776 marks another phase of utter failure of organi;ation of
-slamic 2ooperation because during this period this body failed to resolve problems
strained relations bet$een -ra> and its Arab neighbours, particularly %u$ait and Saudi
Arabia. 2onse>uently, (nited States $as forced to invent the hoa) of Weapons of Mass
'estruction in order to invade and capture -ra> in 677#.
The petty differences bet$een the Muslim States have not only $eakened the Muslim
nations individually but also have made /-2 an effective body. This organi;ation holds
summit meetings regularly $here resolutions are passed but no practical result is
achieved to$ards resolving the problems of the member states.
*auses Of &ailure:
The ground realities $hich inhibit the capacity of /-2 as an effective body to protect
legitimate interests of Muslim $orld are the follo$ing.
iC 0ack of unity among the member states
iiC 0ack of resources
iiiC 0ack of modern technology
ivC +ole of American and <e$ish lobby.
:ack Of -nit0:
(nfortunately, the Muslim states lack unity and cooperation $hich is the call of the hour.
Most of the Muslim countries are engaged in local rivalries and politics. Dor e)ample,
-ra> has some claims over %u$ait oilfields, -ran has to settle issue of Shtt-el-Arab $ith
-ra> and some African Muslim countries are involved in local disputes. =ven 3akistan
and Afghanistan has still to complete the demarcation of their boundary. This disunity
among the Muslim states has $eakened the apparatus of /-2 and hinders an effective
collective action.
:ack Of Resources:
Most of the Muslim countries are very poor and belong to the under developed third
$orld. These nations have limited resources of income and are overpopulated $ith
millions of illiterate unemployed people to feed. MaIority of the people of poor nations of
Asia and Africa are living under poverty line. Many land locked Muslim nations like
Afghanistan, (;bekistan, TaIikistan and other depend on others for their trade and
commerce.
:ack Of 1odern Tec'nolog0:
(nfortunately, maIority of the Muslim states lack modern kno$ledge and technology.
/nly 3akistan, Turkey and Malaysia are to some e)tent e)empt from this category. Thus
the Muslim $orld is entirely dependent on Western countries for their goods like
machinery, e>uipment, medicines, te)tiles and military $eapons. :us /-2 is basically a
body of under developed countries and thus cannot force other countries.
Role Of A+erican And ;e#is' :obb0:
The American and <e$ish lobbies are al$ays engaged in anti-Muslim activates. They
ensure that the Muslim $orld remains divided. Thus /-2 becomes an effective body.
OI* and 1odern *'allenges:
i3 2lobalisation:
The Muslim World stands at a historic crossroads and faces tremendous challenges $ith
immense repercussion for its future. With regard to the challenges posed by the process
of globalisation, the necessity for unity $ithin the (mmah has increased tremendously.
ii3 %ecurit0:
The maIor and current problems faced by (mmah are, the 3alestinian issue, terrorism, the
media and -slami;ation, dialogue among civili;ation, the political and human rights of
Muslim minorities in non-/-2 Muslim countries. 2oncrete efforts are re>uired for the
peaceful resolution of conflicts and /-2 can play an important role.
iii3 2lobal 1edia And Isla+p'obia:
The state of -slamphobia in the $est is alarming and in fact is a form of racism and
discrimination. 1eing a po$erful tool in the globalised $orld, the media can proIect a
positive image of -slam and can promote the interests of the (mmah.
i53 Hu+an 4e5elop+ent:
1eing a uni>ue Muslim international organisation, the /-2 has the potential to play a
maIor role in creating a brighter and prosperous future for the (mmah.
53 Econo+ic Integration Of T'e -++a':
At present, the figure of intra-(mmatic trade is not more than J per cent. This
proportionate must be enhanced by the creation of a Dree Trade Area leading to the
-slamic 2ommon Market in the long-run.
%uggestions:
There is no need to hugely reshuffle /-2@s organisational structure e)cept to force on the
follo$ing important points.
+eforming the 2harter and renaming the /-2 to the Muslim (nion HM(C.
Several members do not pay a financial contribution to /-2 but have high e)pectations
from it. this attitude must change as in such an environment the /-2 cannot $ork
efficiently.
Advancement in the fields of science and technology.
=stablishment of a sound central financial system for Muslim World, for $hich it
re>uire the establishment ofB
aC A Muslim Monetary Dund HMMDC
bC A :uman 'evelopment Dund H:'DC
cC A ne$ currency $ith the name of -slamic 'inar.
=stablishment of an -slamic 2ommon Market H-2MC for the promotion of mutual trade.
=stablishment of a strong Muslim 4e$ Agency HM4AC at par $ith 244 and 112.
=stablishment of t$o ne$ security institutionsB
aC Muslim Security 2ouncil HMS2C and,
bC Muslim 'efence Dorce HM'DC.
*onclusion:
The challenges and problems faced by the /-2 could be $eighed against a $ide range of
opportunities. The member countries possess resources as $ell as e)pertise $hich if
properly harnessed can transform the >uality of life of their people. The Muslim $orld
has a vast human and material resources and a potential for coordinating effort to
economically strengthen their countries vis-K-vis industrialised countries. -f such an
accomplishment could be made $ithin the Muslim countries, the /-2 $ould ac>uire a
leverage that $ould have a profound effect on international politics. 9iven the rich
heritage of shared religion, culture and commonality of aims and aspirations, /-2 could
potentially emerge as a maIor vehicle for economic progress and a potential force.
'espite e)isting diversity there are great opportunities to ma)imi;e development through
cooperation. -n this regard model for =uropean =conomic 2ommunity can be helpful to
revitali;e the /-2 for achieving the economic goals. There are a number of similarities
bet$een both the organisations. These similarities range from geographical contiguity
among the member states to the diversity in economic resources.
Druitful cooperation on the platform of /-2 can take place only if (mmah identity is
given priority by Muslims. This change, ho$ever, $ill not be easy to achieve. Dor
$orth$hile cooperation it is necessary to understand the challenges and problems of the
e)isting situation. /nce this is properly understood, it $ill be easier to determine a
realistic goal.
-nited "ations:
The (nited 4ations is an international organisation $hich $as established on 6Jth
/ctober !J8 in order to foster international cooperation in the resolution of economic,
social, cultural and humanitarian problems. The number of founder members in !J8 $as
J $hich has risen to !6.
-n the preamble to the charter of (4 the signatories pledged to practise tolerance and to
live together in peace $ith one another as good neighbours and to ensure by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods that armed forces shall not be
used. According to the article of the charter the (4 $orks to maintain international
peace and security to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to peace.
(eace 1aking Record Of -":
Since its inception in !J8, the (4 has met partial success in maintaining peace in the
$orld. 'uring maIor conflicts involving opposing ideologies the performance of (4 $as
influenced by the attitude and cooperation of the (SA and +ussia Hpreviously up to
!!C. -n addition to this handicaps this forum faces the limitation that according to the
charter all the disputes are not referred to (4 for immediate treatment.
According to an Article, 6B# all members are to settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and Iustice are not
endangered. /nly if parties have e)hausted all the means referred to in Article ## should
the matter be brought before (4.
:o$ever, despite all these hurdles the (4 offers numerous opportunities for peaceful
settlement through its machinery. -n addition, the Secretary 9eneral has proved to be an
effective arbiter of conflicting claims and in delicate matters $hich could be kept alive on
his initiative.
/n the $hole, so far, almost all the Secretary 9enerals have played important role in the
maintenance of peace in the $orld. Dor e)ample, :ammarskIold and (.Thant $ere
instrumental in resolving the complicated issues of Middle =ast H!8,C, 0ebanon, 2ongo,
2yprus and Mietnam. 0ater on, %urt Waldheim and 3ere; de 2uellar used shuttle
diplomacy successfully and contributed to$ards the solution of the Middle =ast crisis and
the Afghanistan issue. The 9eneva Agreement H!**C $as concluded under the auspices
of (4.
Ac'ie5e+ents Of -":
So far the achievements of (4 regarding the maintenance of international peace have
been as underB
a3 Indonesia:
-n !J", the (4 arranged a truce bet$een 4etherlands@ and -ndonesia. A year later in
!J* $hen :olland violet the truce, the Security 2ouncil asked the parties to stop
fighting and proposed an independent state of -ndonesia. 2onse>uently -ndonesia $as
granted independence in !J!.
b3 2reece:
-n !J,, 9reece charged (SS+ for organi;ing guerrilla activities on her soil. The (4
Security 2ouncil set up a commission $hich reported that 5ugoslavia, Albania and
1ulgaria $ere responsible for helping the communists in 9reece. 2onse>uently, (4
established a 3eace /bservation 2ommission in !8, $ith authority to continue
observation $ork in the region.
c3 <as'+ir:
-n <anuary !J*, -ndia complained to the Security 2ouncil that 3akistan has committed
aggression in %ashmir. The council immediately arranged a (4 2ommission for -ndia
and 3akistan H(42-3C and appointed many administrators to arrange for a plebiscite in
the valley. :o$ever, -ndia $ent back on her commitment. Since, then S2 has passed
several resolutions asking -ndia to comply $ith the earlier resolutions.
d3 <orea:
-n <une !87, 4orth %orea attacked South %orea and occupied substantial territory. As a
result the (4 forces led by (S helped the S.%orea to recover its territory up to #*th
parallel.
e3 %ue/ *risis:
-n <uly !8,, 1ritain and Drance felt grieved $hen =gypt nationalised the Sue; 2anal
because they o$ned shares in it. as a reprisal 1ritain, Drance and -srael attacked =gypt
and occupied the Sue; 2anal. (4 efforts together $ith pressure of (SS+ helped =gypt to
recover control of the canal.
f3 *ongo:
-n !,7, 1elgian intervention and cessation of %atanga threatened independence of
2ongo. The (4 force defeated Moise Tshombe@s cessionists and restored the solidarity of
2ongo.
g3 Arab Israeli ,ars:
The (4 has played a very constructive role in the Arab--srael $ars of !," and !"#.
The (4 =mergency Dorce H(4=DC played an important part in maintaining peace in the
region till !," $hen =gypt asked for its $ithdra$al. 'uring the Arab--srael $ars (4
passed resolutions calling for ceasefire and $ithdra$al of -sraeli forces from occupied
Arab territories.
hC AfghanistanB
Soviet (nion occupied Afghanistan in 'ecember !"!. The (4 condemned this
aggression and in the subse>uent years passed resolutions $ith over$helming maIority
calling for $ithdra$al of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. -n the meantime, (4 arranged
for 9eneva talks bet$een 3akistan and Afghanistan $hich resulted in the 9eneva
Agreement in April !**. 2onse>uently the Soviet troops $ere $ithdra$n from
Afghanistan by Debruary !*!.
%idelining Of -":
-nternational political scenario took a dramatic turn after the disintegration of Soviet
(nion in !!. The (S emerged as the only super-po$er of the $orld and took over the
role of sole policeman of the $orld community. (SA took full advantage of the situation
and promoted its interests in all continents.
-n Middle =ast, it supports the <e$ish state of -srael to maintain her hold on the Arab
territories occupied in !," $ar. The (4 $as not allo$ed to force -srael to accept (4
+esolution noB 6J6, $hich called for $ithdra$al of -sraeli troops from all Arab-
territories. The (S brokered land for peace accords bet$een 3alestinians and <e$s have
fallen short of the re>uirements of the problem. Still millions of 3alestinians are
languishing in refugees@ camps, the status of Al-.uds stands unresolved, maIority of West
1ank is under <e$ish control and more and more illegal <e$ish settlements are being
established on 3alestinian soil. -n late 677, (S vetoed an Arab re>uest to Security
2ouncil to send peacekeepers to Middle =ast. Thus (4 is not being allo$ed to play its
peacekeeping role in a free manner.
-n !!7, the 9ulf $ar gave a ne$ dimension to the (4 politics $hen (S formed a multi-
nation (4 force to defeat -ra>. Similarly, this idea $as put into practice again in /ctober
677 $hen a (S-led multi-nation force launched $ar against Afghanistan to destroy
terrorist camps there.
:enceforth began the era in $hich (SA gave its o$n agenda to the $orld body $hich
aimed at shaping the political, economic and military features of the globe. (S president
9eorge 1ush put for$ard his famous F1ush 'octrineG on 67th September, 6776, $hich
authorised (SA to launch pre-emptive strikes against hostile regimes $hich posed or
could pose threat to America. -n this connection, the regimes could be changed to protect
democracy and freedom in the $orld.
The first great practical demonstration of the 1ush 'octrine $as $itnessed in March
677# $hen (S-led forces invaded -ra> and toppled Saddam regime. (SA achieved this
target $ithout the help of Drance, 9ermany and +ussia. Thus ended the 8* year peace and
security role of (4 in 677# $hen (SA invaded -ra> $ithout its permission.
2urrently (S administration is $orking under active instructions of <e$ish lobby to fulfil
the agenda of Tel Aviv in the $orld. -srael@s policy of aggression and oppression against
the 3alestinians is a strong reminder of the end of (4 authority in peace and security
role.
-n the recent years, the (4 has become a tool in the hands of (S. The maIority of the
members of Security 2ouncil are economically and politically so dependent on (S that
they have no other choice but to support the policies of Washington. There is no doubt
that the technology advancement has reduced the $orld to a global village but under the
prete)t of 4e$ World /rder (S and its allies are busy in flouting all cannons of Iustice
and fair play. They are using (4 agencies of -MD and World 1ank to catch important
countries through debt trap so that they may not oppose their policies at the (4 platform.
All these factors have given (SA a free hand and limited the manoeuvrability of the
World 1ody. 2onse>uently, many international issues such as %ashmir, 2hechnya,
Tai$an and 3alestine are $ailing solution since decades. 1ig po$ers have found common
cause in using (4 for their o$n political interests.
Afghanistan& US !olicies and our
o!tions
America is going to face the $orst ever defeat of its history.
-f completes, it $ould be the second biggest after the Mietnam War, $hich shall be
regarded as the superpo$er@s another unparalleled.
Such a big humiliation the American are about to face in Afghanistan at the hands of the
Taliban.
Washington $ould run out of options of an honourable e)it, if it fails to find out an
amicable $ay out in order to avoid the great embarrassment.
The 2rusade that the (S launched against the Taliban-al-.aeda after !?, the much
desired victory has not fallen into its lap in accordance $ith its plan.
The Taliban proved to be a hard nut to crack for the American policymakers.
4o$ the defeat at the Taliban hands seems to be the $riting on the $all.
-nstead the (S reali;ed the realities on ground and formulated strategy to find out a
negotiated $ay out, it is constantly committing blunders, $hich are not only poised to
create problems for Washington, but also to have lasting impacts upon the regional
countries, especially 3akistan and -ran.
The rulers in 3akistan and the national security institutions need to keep a $atchful eye
on the situation unfolding out of the various steps taken by the (S in Afghanistan, and
take preventive measures to block negative impacts reaching 3akistan.
The negative impacts can result into gearing up of the acts of terrorism and violence
across the country.
America is committing the blunder of holding backdoor negotiations $ith the Taliban,
$ithout involving 3akistan.
Washington plans to pull out allied countries@ troops from Afghanistan by year 67# and
keep 7,777-8,777 Special Dorces or Marines present there $ith their bases in %abul
and %andahar.
Washington plans to $age a covert $ar against the Eterrorists@ using the drone strikes
and surgical operations.
Most of the operations, it is feared, $ill be conducted $ithin the 3akistani territory.
After the recent attack on the 4AT/ head>uarters as $ell as the (S embassy in %abul,
0eon 3anetta, the (S defence secretary, held in his press talk the :a>>ani 4et$ork H:4C
responsible and that F3akistan has failed to dismantle the net$orkG.
:e threatened of a unilateral surgical operation against the :4 inside 3akistan territory.
-f the (S continues to using drone strikes or conducts direct incursions into 3akistan
territory, then the anti-Americanism $ill rise in the hearts and minds of the people of
3akistan.
The 3akistan government and national security institutions $ill be left $ith no option
but to respond to the assault on its sovereignty and violations of its territorial integrity.
This $ould not only spoil the 3akistan-(S relationship, but also ravage the
achievements made so far in the W/T.
2onse>uently the $orld at large $ould suffer a lot in terms of benefiting the outcome of
W/T, putting further the $orld peace at stake.
3entagon must be a$are that the situation on ground is not conducive for surgical
operations, as in Afghanistan and other neighbouring countries, particularly 3akistan and
-ranA the hatred for Americans is at its height.
2hina and +ussia $ould also not like the (S to linger on the Afghanistan imbroglio for
a longer period of time.
The sooner the Americans leave Afghanistan, the better it $ould be for peace in the
region.
-f America militarily >uits Afghanistan, then there is a possibility that a broad-based
government is installed in %abul.
-f the e)it is delayed, then it is obvious that the Taliban $ould make their comeback
possible.
They have hardened in their e)perience of fighting the AmericansA they kno$ the
Americans have betrayed them many a time after using them against the Soviet (nionA
they left the Taliban in lurch and turned their guns on them terming the Taliban their
enemy.
4o$ the Taliban do not trust anybody, they trust only themselves.
-f the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan, then the covert $ar $ould be difficult for
American Special Dorces or Marines to continue.
This $ould result in an unprecedented defeat for the Americans, $hich $ould cause
them the neurosis to differentiate bet$een the friend and foe.
-f the Americans $ant a safe and sound honourable e)it from Afghanistan, the region in
particular and the $orld in general becomes safer place, then they must >uit Afghanistan
immediately.
They should follo$ the policy of consultation, taking all political po$ers and
neighbouring countries into confidence, and pave $ay for a broad-based government in
Afghanistan.
Washington, instead of keeping the negotiations $ith the Taliban secret, needs to reali;e
the vitality of -slamabad@s role in bringing peace and normalcy to Afghanistan.
The (S must not forget that 3akistan is directly affected to $hatever happens in
Afghanistan, as 3akistan is the party to the dispute.
-t should not make the mistake of direct unilateral attacks on 3akistanA it has to trust the
3akistan armed forces and their capability to fight.
/ur armed forces have proved by defeating the inimical forces in the asymmetrical
guerrilla $ar.
Such a victory is not even in the credit of the superpo$er of America.
Washington needs to facilitate the armed forces of 3akistan in moving ahead to defeat
terrorism keeping in vie$ its o$n ground realities.
1e it the terrorists belonging to :a>>ani 4et$ork or any other group, Washington
should not pressure -slamabad and instead reali;e the realities on ground.
4or should it stop the military and economic aid to 3akistan on the prete)t of
apprehensions or coercive conditions.
The country@s armed forces and its people have rendered countless sacrifices in this $ar.
-f the Americans fail to comply, then Afghanistan $ill not only prove to be another
Mietnam for them, but also the hydra-headed monster of terrorism $ill once again come
out to shatter the $orld peace.
Such a situation is posing grave threat and multiple challenges to 3akistan.
-t is hoped that Washington $ould follo$ the advice, other$ise if the surgical
operations intensify, and under-the-cover violations of 3akistan@s sovereignty are madeA it
$ould be construed that the strategic assets of the country $ould be targeted.
The possible takeover of the Taliban in Afghanistan and its impacts on 3akistan $ould
not be ignorable.
The closure of (S aid may cause economic repercussions in 3akistan, for $hich
-slamabad should get ready.
The (S incursions $ithin 3akistan territory $ill have to be stopped, the strategic assets
$ill have to preserved, -ndo--srael-(S intelligence agencies@ activities $ill have to be
countered, the presence and number of American officials $orking on various Ioint
missions $ill have to be reduced to a minimum levelA and the head$ay in the in the $ar
against terrorism $ill have to be made to an e)tent $here a Elive and let live@ environment
could be created.
4o$ the situation in Afghanistan should not be allo$ed to affect 3akistan so to stop
further destruction.
Ten +easons to =nd the /ccupation of
Afghanistan
. (S and 4AT/ occupation creates civilian casualties, angering Afghans.
6. Military occupation has hampered humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts.
#. Afghan $omen continue to face violence and oppression under the occupation.
J. (S policy has empo$ered $arlords, drug lords and the Taliban.
8. The occupation contributes to violence and destabili;ation for ordinary Afghans,
including refugees.
,. 4AT/ allies and military leaders are >uestioning the occupation.
". (S troop casualties in Afghanistan are on the rise.
*. Afghans are calling for a negotiated end to the $ar.
!. Military escalation $ill only increase the violence, and potentially lead to a $ider War
involving nuclear-armed 3akistan.
7. Military occupation of Afghanistan does not curb terrorism.
Recommendations for a Changed US
Policy
. Set a s$ift timetable for the $ithdra$al of (S and 4AT/ military forces, to be
substituted by (4 forces for short-term security.
6. -mmediately cease air strikes on targets in Afghanistan and 3akistan.
#. Support negotiations bet$een all parties involved in the conflict, including
Afghan Women leaders.
J. +eform humanitarian aid and reconstruction funding efforts to prioriti;e
Afghan organi;ations over foreign contractors. =nsure that funded proIects
address the needs and re>uests of Afghans and are not simply pet proIects of
foreign donors.
8. -nvest in long-term aid that increases self-reliance such as sustainable
agriculture efforts.
,. -mmediately discontinue the use of 3rovincial +econstruction Teams, $hich are
2ostly, inefficient, and have militari;ed the aid process.
". Standardi;e, increase, and publicly document compensation to Afghan families
And communities affected by (S military actions.
*. Sign the treaty to ban cluster bombs, pay for cluster bomb and landmine clean
up -n Afghanistan, and pledge never to use these $eapons again.
A-Pak !olic'
,'at is A&(ak polic0A 'o# to +anage its i+plication on (akistanC
AD-3ak policy is a ne$ American $ar scheme of an old $ar is Afghanistan.
-t is three-pronged strategyB military surge in AfghanistanA more participation of Afghan
civilian parts and involving 3akistan.
The AD-3ak policy has serious implications on 3akistan.
The increase in drone attacks, Pdo more syndromeP and American intelligence
involvement in 3akistan speak volumes.
3akistan has to bring all its diplomatic and political forces united to protect its national
and strategic interests.
The paper $ill define the angles of AD-3ak policy and some suggestions for managing
interests of 3akistan.
A&(A< (olic0
Three dimensions
a3 1ilitar0 surge in Afg'anistan$
C #7777 more troops Htotalling #",777C
6C Starting $ithdra$al from <uly 67
b3 1aking ci5ilian parts less d0sfunctional
C Dight against corruption.
6C 9ood and badP Taliban.
c3 To #ork #it' (akistani go5ern+ent$
C Aid HMilitary and non-militaryC.
6C 0ong-term cooperation promise.
%uggestion for (akistan
C 2hallenge drone attacks.
6C .uestion American >uick $ithdra$al.
#C 'urand 0ine infiltration check.
JC Working close $ith Afghan administration.
Afghan !ull-out: Pakistan needs to
re(ise its role
%o #'at +ust #e doC
3akistan must be on the right side of history.
That means that $e must consider and respect the needs and $ishes of the Afghan
people.
The Taliban may not be popular, but neither is :amid %ar;ai.
/ur negotiations $ith non-state actors and individuals are unsustainable in the long-
run, and risks inflaming public opinion against us.
=fforts should be made to resolve differences and grievances $ith non-3ashtun
groups.
-mportantly, $hat is often overlooked is the dispute over the 'urand 0ine.
Afghanistan still disputes the 'urand 0ine as a $orking international boundary.
+esolution of this issue once and for all, rather than brushing it under the diplomatic
table $ould help calm the 3akistani establishment@s fears of an unfriendly Afghan
government stirring up trouble along the border.
As for negotiations, it@s obvious that in the most conflict ridden parts of
Afghanistan, the east and the south east, local communities are bet$een a rock and a
hard place.
1oth -SAD and the Taliban are unpopular.
2ommunities $ant to see an end to violence.
3akistan should do $hat it can to facilitate this process, but do so $ithout taking
sides overtly or covertly.
-f not then $e $ill return to the early !!7s.
The West $ill pump money from a distance into a dysfunctional government in
%abul.
=thnic and regional factions $ill divide the country up, and 3akistan $ill be accused
of interfering and pushing its agenda in another country.
After all, treating the Afghan@s in the same $ay, $e accuse the (S of treating us, is
not going to $in us many Afghan friends.