Raquepo, Veronica

Festin, Aegina Joy

Donila, Karen Joy
University of the Philippines Manila
October 2012


ANDERSON GUERRILLAS
I. Table of Events
P
H
I
L
I
P
P
I
N
E
S

D
E
F
E
N
S
E

C
A
M
P
A
I
G
N

(
D
E
C
.

8
,

1
9
4
1

M
A
Y

6
,

1
9
4
2
)


WHAT WHEN WHERE WHO WHY HOW
Governor Vinzons
rallied the scattered
USAFFE remnants
December
1941
Bicol Region Governor
Wenceslao Q.
Vinzons
To recapture the
provincial capital
Vinzons reinforced
the scattered
remnants with civilian
volunteers,
established radio
contact with the
USAFFE
headquarters and
prepared offensive
operations
Almost successful
plan to attack the
enemy from the
rear
27 January
1942
Pampanga
side of Mt.
Pinatubo
Lt. Col. Claude A.
Thorpe, with
Capts. Ralph
McGuire and Dave
Milles, Lts. Robert
B. Lapham and
Charles Cushing,
To attack the enemy They sneaked out to
Zambales and set up
headquarters in
Pampa-ga side of Mt.
Pinatubo and were
later on joined by
Barbers group
several American
soldiers, and ten
Filipinos
Landing of
commando team as
part of launching
guerrilla warfare
(failed due to a
Japanese war
vessels
interception)

27 March,
1942

Balayan,
Batangas

Col. Narciso
Manzano and his
team

To attack the enemy
The group would
proceed overland to
strike at the rear of
the Japanese artillery
positions before firing
at Corregidor

P
H
I
L
I
P
P
I
N
E

G
U
E
R
R
I
L
L
A

M
O
V
E
M
E
N
T

(
M
A
Y

6
,

1
9
4
2

O
C
T
O
B
E
R
,

1
9
4
4
)


First General Order
assuming
command of all the
Guerrilla Forces in
Luzon
15 May 1942 Luzon Lt. Col. Claude A.
Thorpe
To unite all Guerrilla
forces in Luzon
Thorpe issued his first
General Order
Conference
between
HUKBALAHAP and
Captain Barker
June 1942 San Luis area
in Pampanga
Captain Barker,
Captain Bernard
Anderson, 2
nd
Lt.
Bert E. Pettitt;
To absorb the
organization into the
USAFFE guerrillas
Barker, Bernard and
Pettitt travelled to the
Central Plains of
Luzon
HUKBALAHAP
representatives
Juan Feleo, Casto
Alejandrino,
Sampang,
Armando Castillo,
Luis Taruc
Organization of
squadrons of
guerrillas
July 1942 Highlands of
Biak-na-Bato,
San Miguel
Anderson and
some of the towns
leading
personalities
Cabo Chan, Jose
Maniquez,
Evangelistam
Gonzales,
Hernandez, etc.
To convince the
people to create
groups that would be
of assistance during
the war
Anderson travelled to
San Miguel and
persuaded the
leading personalities
of the area; the group
expanded their efforts
to nearby Tayabas
province
Activation of the
29
th
Guerrilla
Squadron
3 July 1942 East Central
Luzon Area
Barker, Jaime H.
Manzano
To participate in the
war
Barker officially
activated the 29
th

Guerrilla Squadron
even though it was
already active two
months back
Report to Thorpe 4 July 1942 Zambales Barker To report the results
of his contacts with
other guerrilla groups
Barker went back to
Zambales, left behind
Anderson ad Pettitt to
organize additional
units
Three Sorties /
Raid
11 July 1942 San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija
29
th
Guerrilla
Squadron
To rid the area of
weapons / to
confiscate weapons
Some of them
disguised as
Japanese soldiers,
others as farmers and
established a
checkpoint on the
highway near Gapan
Offensive initiation
by the Japanese to
the 29
th
Guerrilla
Squadron
1 September
1942
Near Bantug Japanese soldiers,
29
th
Guerrilla
Squadron
members
To relieve the area of
Guerrilla force
Some 1500 enemy
troops attacked the
29
th
s position
Thorpes Capture
by the Enemy
October 1942 Santa Juliana,
Tarlac
Thorpe, Japanese
soldiers
Thorpe was betrayed
by three of his men
probably because
they disliked him
Three of his trusted
men betrayed Thorpe
29
th
Guerrilla
Squadrons attacks
October to
November 1942
Along
Bongabong-
Laur-Dingalan
highway
29
th
Guerrilla
Squadron
members
To harass the enemy
and somehow
weaken them
They destroyed as
many bridges as
possible.
Formation of the
Andersons
Guerrilla
April 23, 1943
December 1943


Mauban

Bernard Anderson

Anderson was
impressed by the
loyalty of the people
and temporarily gave
up on his trip to
Australia
Anderson assigned
Capt. Domingo Reyes
as commanding
officer for Mauban,
Capt. Primo Algaga
for Lucena, major
Nonito Alonso for
Tayabas and Lucban,
and Capt. Domiciano
Ramiro for Pagbilao.

Arrival of Col. Jay
D. Vanderpool
and Major George
Miller (with a
demolition group, a
signal group, and a
November 2,
1944

Rizal, Tayabas
Rizal
boundary
Col. Jay D.
Vanderpool
And Major George
Miller
To coordinate
guerrilla activities
between warring
guerrilla units on
Luzon.
Vanderpool set up
his headquarters
with the HUNTERS
ROTC in Rizal
while Miller located
himself with the
weather group) Markings guerrillas
in the Tayabas-
Rizal Boundary

Operations of
the First
Anderson
Battalion during
the liberation
campaign

Filipinos
liberated the
country




January 1945
December
1945










East coast of
Luzon
Andersons
Guerrillas

The lie low order
issued by GHQ
SWPA was lifted
and the general
instructions of
GHQ, SWPA
could be
summarized in
three words :
combat, sabotage,
and intelligence
Anderson deployed
troops in Infanta,
Dingalan Area and
Polillo Island; Enemy
garrisons were
subjected to
continuous air
bombardment; 7000
civilians were
transported from
Polillo to Infanta;
Attacks were initiated
on Infanta, Palanan
(Isabela), Casiguran
and Mauban


II. Events
Thorpes Attempt in Uniting all Guerrilla Forces in Luzon
Isolated USAFFE units in Northern Luzon had been in contact with Gen. MacArthurs headquarters. These units were
instructed to conduct full-scale warfare behind enemy lines. These attempts were done before Bataan and Corregidor passed into
history. The spirit of resistance was made known all over Luzon.
While fighting was going on in Bataan, Gen. MacArthur thought of launching guerrilla warfare and soon, plans were made for
the landing of a commando team under Col. Narciso Manzano at Balayan, Batangas. This team left Cabcaban, Bataan on 27
March, 1942 but was interrupted by a Japanese war vessel which forced them to return.
Another plan almost succeeded in attacking the enemy from the rear. On 27 January, 1942, Lt. Col. Claude A. Thorpe, with
Capts. Ralph McGuire and Dave Milles, Lts. Robert B. Lapham and Charles Cushing, several American soldiers, and ten Filipinos
sneaked out to Zambales and set up headquarters on the Pampanga side of Mt. Pinatubo. Soon, they were joined by another
group under Major L. E. Barber. While these parties were still organizing their guerrilla units, Bataan fell. During the surrender of
Corregidor, Thorpe issued orders to disband the units but fortunately, most of the members decided to take part on the war.
Officers and enlisted men who managed to escape from Bataan found their way to various points in Luzon and reached
Thorpes headquarters. Among them were Capts. Joseph R. Barker II and Bernard L. Anderson and Lts. Edwin P. Ramsey and
Bert E. Pettitt. Thorpe was induced to reorganize his unit and on 15 May, 1942, he issued his first General Order wherein he
assumed command of all the Guerrilla Forces in Luzon. Luzon was then divided into four major military areas with squadron as the
smallest unit (equivalent to 125 men). The areas with their commanding officers were:
North Luzon Area (consisting of the areas north of Pangasinan, Tayabas and Nueva Ecija) Major Ralph Praeger
South Central Luzon Area Capt. Jack Spies
East Central Luzon Area (consisting of the areas between North Luzon and South Central Luzon Areas including Manila,
and bounded on the East by Tayabas and on the West by Zambales) Capt. Joseph R. Barker II
West Central Luzon Area (consisting of Zambales and Bataan provinces) Captain Ralph McGuire
The selection of commanding officers was a mistake committed by Thorpe. Only Praeger and Barker proved to be a
splendid, professional soldier and were appreciated and loved by the Filipinos they worked with. The other two deemed themselves
of higher priority than the Filipinos and were very high-handed in dealing with their comrades. Another mistake was Thorpes
attitude which was lack of interest in the resistance movement. Barker turned out to be the moving-spirit of the movement.
In October 1942, while in Tarlac, Thorpe was betrayed by three of his men and he was caught by the Japanese and his
execution followed afterwards. Even Barker was captured by the enemies in early 1943 which was considered as the greatest blow
to the movement. The loss of Barker resulted to the division of the USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces to move in various
independent operating groups.
Organization of Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces / Contact with other Units
When Capt. Barker proceeded to the Central Plains of Luzon to organize guerrillas, he brought with him Capt. Bernard L.
Anderson and Lt. Bert E. Pettitt. Their first contact was with the Hukbalahaps who refused to be under or included in Barkers
organization though they promised optimal cooperation.
The three proceeded to Manalili where Capt. Barker came across a guerrilla group of 300 USAFFE personnel under Capt.
Jaime H. Manzano. They were the established 29
th
Guerrilla Squadron designated as the combat team for East Central Luzon
Area. Barker officially activated them on 3 July, 1942 though they had been working for two months already. Before leaving, Barker
ordered the 29
th
s to raid all municipalities and confiscate all weapons. The 29
th
s raided San Ildefonso on 3 September and San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija on 11 July. However, on the first day of September that year, the Japanese initiated an offensive against them
and 29
th
s were greatly outnumbered so they withdrew to the mountains of Sta. Rose and established headquarters at Tabuating,
Nueva Ecija. Here, they received orders from Anderson to harass the enemy along the Bongabong-Laur-Dingalan highway and to
destroy as many bridges as possible. From October to November, they did so with success but in the process, incurred casualties
due to malaria. Finally, in December, Anderson ordered them to his units for recuperation and reorganization.
Formation of Anderson Guerrillas
The tragedy of Capt. Barkers capture by the enemy resulted to Andersons assuming command of the USAFFE Luzon
Guerrilla Forces by virtue of his seniority. The responsibility left behind by Barker came to the hands of Anderson in February 1943.
Soon enough, Anderson realized that it is impractical to pursue a unified command due to lack of communication, and he
only found himself in control only of the guerrilla forces in Bulacan and part of Manila. Lts. Lapham and Ramsey recognized his
authority and turned over their commands to him. However, contact was not permanent and was not established and they remained
as independent commands. Anderson designated Capt. Manzano as his Executive Officer and Lt. Pettitt as his adjustant.
On 23 February, 1943, the Japanese attacked Andersons camp but he was able to withdraw into the interior with his men all
thanks to he heroism of the men under Capt. Manuel Cabo Chan.
Anderson moved to the Angat Iron Mines where he was contacted by Alberto Guerrero who offered his unit operating in
Dingalon-Sabani area in Nueva Ecija, and Pedro Viudez who was given command of new units in the San Ildefonso Sector.
Guerrerro was designated as commanding officer of some 400 troops in his area.
In this period, the Japanese were very active in the Anggat Area and they succeeded in capturing 500 guerrillas. Because of
the gravity of the situation, provisions for one week supply were gathered and accompanied by Capt. Manzao, Lt. Pettitt and Sgts.
Joyo and Gono. Anderson left for the east coast of Luzon hoping to proceed to Australia by hopping from island to island.
The group left the Angat Iron Mines on 19 March, 1943 and stayed at Redors headquarters for 2 days. Anderson still
persisted with the idea of going to Australia. After procuring guides, he then headed for Mauban, reaching Luya-luya by sailboat on
8 April, 1943. While staying at Roman Almeras house, he was contacted by Capt. Domingo A. Reyes who urged him to organize
guerrillas in that area with claims of loyalty by the people. Impressed with the picture presented by Reyes, Anderson agreed and
temporarily gave up going to Australia.
Anderson assigned Reyes as commanding officer for Mauban, Capt. Primo Algaga for Lucena, Major Nonito Alonso for
Tayabas and Lucban, amd Capt. Domiciano Ramiro for Pagbilao. The peoples response to the movement was extraordinary.
Anderson was able to re-establish contacts with Manila units in no time. He also succeeded in launching liaison with the guerrilla
leaders in Sorsogon and Bicol Area and the leaders of the ROTC, PQOG and Hukbalahap. Representatives of guerrilla groups
reported to Anderson and new units were activated.
A Southern Nueva Ecija Sector was formed and subdivided into the San Isidro, Sta. Rosa, and Cabanatuan Sectors. On 7
August 1943, a unit in Batangas was activated under the command of Major Nicasio Mascenon.
On 1 November 1943, Lt. Ramsey was assigned by Anderson as the Commanding Officer of the Pangasinan-Tarlac area.
The constabulary troops in Nueva Ecija under Col. Godofredo Monsod asked to join Andersons guerrillas on 4 December, 1943.
On 21 December, 1943, Capt. Alejo Santos was assigned to the Bulacan Military Army as Commanding Officer with Lt. Pedro
Viudez as his Chief of Staff. BMA claimed to have 20 000 members.
By the end of 1943, Anderson had a considerable force that was effective in assisting any liberation force that the Allies may
send to the country.
Contacts with Australia and a mysterious CIO-12
In November 1943, Lt. Edgardo del Castillo reported that he had contacted a person claiming to be a representative of Gen.
MacArthur. This person was allegedly an intelligence operative called CIO-12 with the mission of coordinating the intelligence
network of the various units operating in Manila. Since he claimed to have contact with GHQ, SWPA, Anderson was elated thinking
that he had finally set up contact with Gen. MacArthur. He exchanged communications with CIO-12 who seemed to have a good
knowledge of the guerrilla affairs in the Philippines. CIO-12 readily sent funds and supplies on several occasions when Anderson
would ask for aids. What impressed Anderson was a tabloid written by CIO-12 that attacked the Japanese vehemently.
Anderson was convinced that CIO-12 was of good intention and he even had occasional meetings with him. This proved to
be disastrous when CIO-12 was captured by the Japanese and tortured for information. CIO-12 broke down and gave information
about the guerrillas which led to the suffering of many people.
Until the end of 1943, Anderson had no contact with GHQ, SWPA. His organization of about 15 000 combat troops and 40
000 civilian home-guards, though valuable in terms of intelligence unit, was pretty much useless since they dont have enough
equipment. Since weapons and equipment were in short supply, the best place to obtain needed materials was from the enemy so
men from the guerrilla bands worked for the Japanese and would steal radio and generator parts, piece by piece. They would then
reassemble these pieces in the mountains. Their first objective was to contact Allied Forces. They used a generator fuelled with
coconut oil and Anderson was able to send out his first message to be received in Australia. However, the Allies did not believe him
and assumed it was just the Japanese playing tricks on them. Anderson used his most foul words to convince the Allies that he was
not the enemy but they did not believe him still.
On 13 February 1944, Col. Wendell W. Fertigs liaison officer Capt. Antonio Montalvan arrived at Andersons headquarters
and arrangement was made for Anderson to send representatives at Fertigs headquarters. He sent a group composed of Lts.
Schoffer and Pettitt and Sgt. Maruo Prieto in April 1944 and the group left for Mindanao. While waiting for his representatives
return, Anderson received lie-low orders of Gen. MacArthur through Lt. Antonio C. L. Bello who arrived from Fertigs
headquarters.
The message served as guidance for Andersons troops to concentrate on intelligence gathering and operations. No combat
was to be executed except for defense and for the combat troops to act as security guards. Trainings will be continued and
procurement of food supply was also given priority.
Anderson learned about the radio station set up by an Allied Intelligence Bureau team under Lt. Robert Stahl in the Bondoc
Peninsula and he dispatched post haste couriers to Bondoc with messages for GHQ, SWPA, and Col. Fertig in April 1944. At long
last, communication and contact was established with Australia. This was made easier when Anderson received a trans-receiver
radio set in May 1944 from Lt. Col. Jurado in Mindanao. About this time, an AIB team from Australia arrived and established
themselves at Andersons headquarters. The radio sets brought by the two AIB groups gave Anderson all the equipment needed
for communication and contact with GHQ, SWPA.
Once radio contact was established, the Allies started delivering supplies and materials to Andersons camp by submarine,
surfacing off deserted beaches for the guerrillas to obtain and pick up weapons, food and medicine.
The Guerrillas are Unleashed
Under the control of Gen. MacArthur, guerrilla organizations were considered independent. The bigger units include
Andersons Command.
Anderson was in charge of commanding guerrilla units in Tayabas, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, Manila, Nueva Ecija and the
Bicols as of 1 January 1945. The BMA, although considered as an independent entity continued receiving orders from Anderson.
Andersons guerrillas in Tayabas and Laguna were commanded by Lt. Antonio C. L. Bello; Capt. Conrado Limjaco in
Batangas, Major Antonio Brosas in Rizal; four separate Manila units were under Capts. A. E. Francia, Jr., Rufino Antonio, Armando
Flores and one jointly commanded by Capts. Edgar Bond, Agustin Patricio; and Amado V. Hernandez and Capt. Conrado Ileto in
Nueva Ecija. Bulacan remained under Alejo Santos command.
On January 3, 1945, the long-awaited orders for armed conflict against the enemy were given. The guerrillas have now been
unleashed. Sabotage was to be carried out extensively on every possible target except places specified by GHQ, SWPA.
On January 5, 1945, three rifle companies with elements of Heavy Weapons company proceeded to Infanta to engage the
enemy. These companies were under Capt. Romeo M. Maghirangs command. Under Capt. Alvin J. Farrettas command, two rifle
companies with elements of Heavy Weapons proceeded from Prueba Point to the Dingalan Area. Reconnaisance troops sailed to
Polillo Island under the command of Lt. Francisco Asis; a company of combat troops under Lt. Paterno Abcede operated at
Mauban; and a combat company was assigned on Alabat Island under the command of Capt. Eliseo Lemi.
On January 6, reports from different units to Anderson designated that the guerrilla machine had started to move at full
steam. Major Barros reported the destruction of railroad tracks and bridges in the Bicol area. Lt. Hope destroyed highway bridges
along the Candelaria-Lucena highway. On Polillo, Lt. Asiss had attacked and enemy signal station. In Lucena, Capt. Primo B.
Alzaga had, with the help of US bombers, destroyed 4 enemr transports. In Dingalan, Capt. Farreta had laid mines which blew up
bridges.
On January 9, instructions were received from Gen. MacArthur about the passing of command of Andersons Guerrilas from
GHQ, SWPA to the US Sixth Army with Gen. Walter Reneger as the commander. Upon radio contact with the Sixth Army,
Andersons headquarters and headquarters troops were officialy attached to the Sixth Army. The headquarters troops were
activated as the First Anderson Battalion with 2 227 officers and men. Other units under Anderson were attached to the US Army
elements. Units in Tayabas and outside of the First Anderson Battalion were attached to the 1
st
Cavalry Division; unit in Laguna
operated with the Alamo Scouts; those in Batangas were attached to the 112
th
Regimental Combat Team; and units in Manila and
Rizal were attached to the 37
th
Infantry Division.
The First Anderson Battalion was composed of the original men of the 29
th
Guerrilla Squadron. It was a combination of
USAFFE and trained reservists, ifficered by combat veterans. The battalion commander was Lt. Col. Jaime Manzano and his
executive officer was Major Felix Flores, a Bataan veteran.
Although designated as a battalion, it actually consisted of 7 rifle companies, a Heavy Weapons company, two Military Police
Companies, one Medical Company, one Signal Company, one Engineer Company, one Motor Transport Company and one
Ordinance Section. Heavily equipped with weapons, this battalion had an attached 105-mm artillery battery.
Companies A and B and elements of the Heavy Weapons Company under the commands of Capts. Isaac Ortiz and Fruto T.
Olivera respectively were assigned to the Infanta area.
The disposition of troops was effected on Compliance to orders of the Sixth Army headquarters.
Company C under Lt. Paterno Abcede was assigned in Mauban and its vicinity.
Company D which was under Capt. Eliseo Lemi continued their operations on Alabat Island.
Company E under Capt. Pedro Alvaran was assigned to Laur-Dingalan area.
Company F under Capt. Inocencio de Guzman was sent to the Bongabong-Sabana area.
Company R under Capt. Ponciano Redor was assigned to cover the Agos Area in Infanta.
An all-out assault against the Japanese garrison at Infanta was decided on 31 January 1945. When the three days of
continuous shelling, troops of the First Anderson Battalion crossed the Agos River, while a special team led by Manzano and
Maghirang crept up the enemy building. This resulted to the complete annihilation of the entire garrison. Meanwhile, Companies E
and F were reducing Japanese garrisons ar Laur, Bongabong, Sabai and Dingalan. Not a single Japanese had been left alive.
In February 1945, orders on liberating Polillo Island were given by the Sixth Army headquarters. Troops in the Infanta area
had to be withdrawn which allowed the re-occupation of the Japanese. On February 10, the entire First Anderson Batallion except
Companies A, E and F embarked on all type of boats for the Polillo operations. Hook Bay was the selected point of landing, roughly
15 miles from Solanga Point across Polillo channel. On February 19, the town in Hook Bay was promptly occupied and liberated.
The units led by Manzano proceeded to the town of Bordeos on the east coast the next day. Before the dawn of the next morning,
hand to hand combat ensued but the Filipinos had to withdraw due to heavy casualties. The attack was resumed the next day by
Capt. Maghirang and in the end; the Filipinos had outfought the much vaunted suicide fighters of Japan.
February 24, the island of Polillo was officially liberated.
Andersons Guerrillas in the Liberation Campaign
Company D successfully occupied Alabat Island. An airfield was immediately constructed and by March 1945, C-47s were
landing there. Company C under Lt. Abcede occupied the town of Mauban.
From March to April 1945, enemy garrisons along Tayabas coast were continuously subjected to air bombardment. In late
March, Company A was landed at Salanga Point and the Japanese troops immediately moved north to Dingalan. The Japanese
were surrounded by the enemies.
On April 15, 1945, the attack on Infanta was was initiated by the landing troops under Capt. Bello at DInahican Point. A week
later, Lt. Manzano landed with additional troops at Abiawin. Meanwhile, the 7
th
Cavalry Regiment or the US army had been pushing
against strong enemy opposition from Tigiuan Point. It was a race for Infanta between US army and First Anderson Battalion.
On April 25, 1945, the Filipino guerrillas held surprise assaults from two directions and seized the town of Infanta and the
Port of Misua. The 7
th
Cavalry moved into Infanta five hours after the place had been liberated by the Filipinos. Mopping-up
operations that followed the capture of Infanta lasted up to June 30, 1945. During this time, the First Anderson Battalion accounted
for 1623 enemy death in action and 770 prisoners.
On July 21, 1945, two companies led by Capt. Ortiz and Lt. Schoffer landed at Tuno, five miles from Bambanan where
reports of Japanese force holding position came from. The next morning, the enemy tried to escape westward but ran into Filipino
troops who mowed them down. By 2 in the afternoon, the enemy battalion was wiped out.
On the same month, a similar event was conducted at Casiguran. The enemy was annihilated between Dibetand Debutunan
Point. On 22
nd
of July, another two companies left Infanta for Salanga Point to drive out the enemy troops who dug in at the former
submarine base of Anderson. After a naval bombardment, the troops advanced north and south. Not one enemy escaped
destruction. 500 Japanese dead bodies were left rotting in the jungles. On the 29
th
of July, Capt. Ortiz and Lt. Schoffer led a
company at Lagyang-Bayan between Mauban and Infanta. The enemy decided to flee than to fight. Before the end of the month,
another amphibious operation was conducted on Fuga Island in the Batanes Group.
For the conduct of such operations, the First Anderson Battalion was cited by Maj. Gen. William B. Chase and Brigadier
General Robert Soule of the US 38
th
Division. By the time the entire operations ended, the First Anderson Battalion had inflicted on
the enemy 4 891 killed and had taken 2 953 prisoners. The battalion, on the other hand, lost 112 killed and 3 missing in action and
suffered 348 wounded.
Elements of Andersons Guerrillas remained in Infanta up until December 1945. On December 15, the First Anderson
Battalion was activated into the 1
st
Infantry Battalion, Separate (PA) (Composite) and a platoon was inducted in the Malacaang
Palace Guard Battalion.









III. Way of Life
The members of the Anderson Guerrillas were Filipinos and Americans, with the Americans who served as the head in most
cases since they were more knowledgeable in terms of strategic movement in warfare. The Filipinos still had vague ideas on the
most effective way of fighting and the help given by these foreigners were very much appreciated.
In the years of the Japanese invasion in the Philippines, Filipinos teamed with their other brothers and formed guerrillas.
With the help of the Americans, they were able to defeat the antagonists. The strength and bravery of the Filipinos coupled with the
techniques by the Americans resulted to the victory of the Philippines against the Japanese.
Bernard Anderson, even before he became a part of the guerrillas, has had his fair share of poor experiences. With a
companion, he escaped into the mountains when the order to surrender was given. They hid in the jungle and wandered around all
the while starving and thirsty until they discovered a hidden mountain camp of Filipinos. These Filipinos took care of them and
shared everything they had with them. Several other American officers and men escaped from Bataan and guerrilla groups began
to form throughout the 40 000 square mile island.
When Anderson became in-charge of the guerrilla units left behind by Barker, he was appointed with the tasks a leader had
to persist on. Probably the greatest drawback to the members of this guerrilla was that they had communication devices at a later
time. Had they established an earlier and stable radio contact with the GHW, SPWA, they could have had better conditions in those
years.
The members of the Anderson Guerrilla had to make do with what they have. The units under the command of Anderson
showed remarkable talent in the pursuit of intelligence or information. But since there was no contact between Andersons
headquarters and GHQ, SWPA, they were clearly lacking in equipment and supplies.
Filipinos worked for the Japanese, hiding their identities as part of guerrilla groups for protection. On the process, they steal
parts of radio equipment and generators, only to re-assemble them back in their hideouts in an attempt of recreating ways for
communication and contact.
For the first time, Anderson was able to contact the Allies through a generator fuelled with coconut oil. The Allies, however,
did not believe that it was Anderson and were under the impression that the Japanese were just fooling them. Anderson had to use
his best foul language to coerce them into believing that he was not Japanese but this ended in vain.
Only when tools for radio contact were given and provided to Andersons headquarters had they finally established contact
with the GHQ, SWPA. With this, they were able to gather supplies and ammunitions from them. Submarines sent their basic needs
and warfare needs.
Unfortunately, there was a time when their supplies became insufficient. With the members of the units and some thousand
of injured people they had to take care of, food became one of their major problems. Even when they contacted the Allies, they
garnered unfavourable response since it was also difficult for the Allies to bring them their needs when the Japanese came at an
advantage. All they had to do was wait and endure their pain until provisions will be available to them again.
Upon establishing contact with the GHW, SWPA, they had to await orders from Gen. MacArthur regarding their moves and
actions in the war. The first one was for them to lie low. At this phase, they had to gather more intelligence while giving more
focus on food storage and warfare practices. The second was for them to destroy targets as assigned. With this, they fought with all
their might, killing and driving away the cruel Japanese. Amphibious operations were done, leaving no Japanese alive in whichever
town they had to liberate.
In the end, the Anderson Guerrillas contributed to the most number of enemies killed and injured.
Sources:
(2012, April 18). Retrieved August 23, 2012, from Reedsburg History: http://reedsburghistory.blogspot.com/2012/04/bernard-l-
anderson.html
A. C. Lantin-Bello, A. E. (1999). The Story of thr Anderson Guerrillas. Manila: Veterans Federation of the Philippines.
Baclagon, C. U. (1966). The Philippine Resistance Movement Against Japan. Quezon City: Munoz Press.
Generoso Salazar, F. R. (1995). Manila, Bicolandia and the Tagalog Provinces. Manila: University of the Philippines Press.
Nuval, L. Q. Pass in Review.
Willoughby, C. A. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941 - 1945.