1)

Republic vs Reyes
G.R. No. L-36610 June 18, 1976


ESGUERRA, J.:

This is an appeal via certiorari seeking to reverse the final order (decision) of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, approving the
registration of a parcel of land applied for by the herein private respondent and the setting aside of the order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of said decision.

Petitioners registered two assignments of error allegedly committed by the trial court, to wit:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPLICANT POSSESSED AN IMPERFECT AND INCOMPLETE TITLE THAT IS REGISTERABLE;

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE OPPOSITOR GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE THAT THE LAND APPLIED FOR WAS
INALIENABLE. 1

Arguing on these alleged errors, petitioners, in the first error averred that "By the decision of the Cadastral Court rendered before the last world
war, Lot 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land ... Such being the case, the lower Court is without jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496 filed by respondent Eliseo Palatino. The land subject thereof having been
subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act and declared public land per decision of the Cadastral Court, the same
land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary proceedings under Act 496 ... The ruling (of the court below) is plainly erroneous. It
ignores the conclusiveness of said judgment constituting res judicata. The previous cadastral proceeding was in rem, binding on the whole world."
2

As to the second error, petitioners argued: "... the lower court ruled that 'not the whole of Mariveles was declared a U.S. Military Reservation and
there is no evidence to show that the area in question, which is part of Lot 626 of the cadastral survey of Mariveles, is within the U.S. Military
Reservation."

Precisely, the lower Court deprived the oppositor Government of the opportunity to adduce evidence on the point by denying its motion for
reconsideration. True that the Solicitor General was given notice of the initial hearing set on December 21, 1972, but as the record was not
forwarded to him pursuant to law (Sections 50, 51, CA 141, as amended), he could not file a timely opposition to the application on or before the
initial date of hearing. 3

For his part, private respondent Eliseo Palatino answers that the aforecited assignment of errors alleged by the petitioners "... hinges upon the
determination of the following issues ... :

1. Whether the failure on the part of the petitioners to file a notice of appeal with the lower court and to serve copy of the same to the
respondent, as the original record, the petition, the motion to dismiss and the brief of the petitioners show, the judgment or order becomes final,
and as a consequence, this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to alter the same;

2. Whether this Honorable Court can consider petitioners' evidence in support of their assignment of errors, which evidence was not
formally offered during the trial as the petitioners were declared in default and did not introduce any evidence and they continue to be in default
since they did not appeal from the order declaring them in default; and,

3. Since the appeal raises questions of facts or even mixed questions of facts and law, whether under Section 2, Republic Act No. 5440,
approved on September 9, 1968, amending Section 171, Judiciary Act, the petitioners must appeal to the Court of Appeals and not to the Supreme
Court. 4

To understand these issues, We shall examine the facts of this case as they appear in the records, to wit:

1. On September 6, 1972, the herein private respondent Eliseo Palatino filed with the respondent court an application for registration of
title under Act No. 496, the Land Registration Law, of a parcel of land situated in Bo. Cabcaben, Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan Province,
containing an area of 22,744 sq. meters, more or less; 5

2. On October 20, 1972, notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration; 6

3. On December 21, 1972, respondent trial court issued an order of general default against all persons, including herein petitioner the
Director of Lands, for the failure of anyone, including the said Director of Lands or his representative, to appear and oppose the application; 7

4. Notice of this order of general default was received by petitioners on January 17, 1973; 8

5. On January 5, 1973, respondent court issued its order (decision) granting the application for registration, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the applicant is entitled to the registration of this parcel of land known as Lot No. 622-portion of the Mariveles Cadastre,
the Court hereby adjudicates said parcel of land subject matter of this application described on plan Sgs-4377-D and its technical description in
favor of Eliseo Palatino, of legal age, Filipino, married to Beinvenida M. Palatino and a resident of 13 San Vicente Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.

Once the decision becomes final, let corresponding decree of registration issue.

xxx xxx xxx 9



6. Notice of the order (decision) was received by herein petitioners on January 17, 1973; 10

7. On February 14, 1973, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to life order of general default and for reconsideration of the order
(decision) on the ground that ... contrary to the specific provisions of Sections 50 and 51 of C.A. No. 141 the original record of the case was not
forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General, which thus prevented him from investigating all the facts alleged in the application or otherwise
brought to his attention ... and that the order (decision) adjudicating the lot applied for by the applicant, respondent Palatino, is without basis in
fact because the applicant could not have possessed the land applied for at least thirty years immediately preceding the application for the reason
that the land was originally part of the United States Military Reservation reserved by the then Governor General under Proclamation No. 10 dated
February 16, 1925 and it was only on June 10, 1967 that the President of the Philippines by Proclamation No. 210-B revoked Proclamation No. 10
and declared such portion of the area therein embraced including the land applied for, as are classified as alienable and disposable, opened for
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act." 11

8. In an order dated March 26, 1973, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to lift the order of general default and for
reconsideration of the order (decision) on the ground that the same was without merit; 12

9. On April 5, 1973, the present appeal by certiorari was filed with this Court.

Of the points and/or issues raised by both parties herein those registered by the respondents appear to be in need of Our prior attention and
resolution because they involve jurisdictional questions. They are:

a) The appeal was filed outside the reglementary 30-day period from receipt of the order or decision;

b) The appeal was filed direct to the Supreme Court without riling a notice of appeal with the trial court;

c) Respondent had not been served copy of the appeal. 13

This Court had reviewed the records of this case and it is convinced that certain essential requisites of procedural law were not complied with by
the herein petitioners. There was a failure to perfect an appeal and consequently this failure had the effect of rendering final and executory the
judgment or final order of the trial court. This fact certainly deprives the appellate court, this Court, of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

In view of the consistent stand of this Tribunal that the perfection of an appeal in accordance with law is the only legal basis for an appellate court
to acquire jurisdiction and enter the appeal, this Court finds that the only issue to be resolved in this case, relegating all other questions raised by
both parties herein to the background, is the issue of whether or not an appeal had been perfected on time by the herein petitioners. This is a
jurisdictional question.

Since the rules in ordinary civil actions and those applied in land registration proceedings are the same, 14 Section 3 of Rule 41 of the new Rules of
Court, in relation with Section 17 of the same Rule 41, appear to be pertinent to the matter at hand. Said Section 3 reads:

Section 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from
notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal ...

On the other hand, Section 17 of the aforementioned Rule, dealing with appeal in certiorari, provides:

Section 17. Appeal in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and employers liability cases. In appeals in certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, workmen's compensation and employers' liability cases, the original record of th case shall be transmitted to the
appellate court in lieu of the record on appeal. The clerk of the trial court shall observe the provisions of Section 11 of this rule as far as practicable.

Section 17 of Rule 41 has not substantially changed the requirements of Section 3 of the same Rule in matters of appeals. The reglementary period
of 30 days from notice of the order or judgment for perfecting an appeal and the filing of the notice of appeal with the trial court, two essential and
jurisdictional requisites enjoined by the latter Section, have not been dispensed with even in Section 17 of said Rule.

The records fail to show that the herein petitioners have complied with these requisites for perfecting an appeal. As had repeatedly been declared
by this Court, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Failure to
perfect an appeal as legally required renders final and executory the judgment of the court below, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal. 15

Although it is true that the herein petitioners have filed a motion on February 14, 1973, to lift the order of general default and for reconsideration
of the order (decision) of the trial court, and, applying this Court's rule that where a motion for reconsideration is filed, the period for appeal
should be deemed suspended, 16 still by actual reckoning of time, it will be seen that the period for filing and perfecting an appeal had been past
overdue.

Commencing on January 17, 1973, the day petitioners had notice of the final order (decision) of the trial court to the day the running of the period
for appeal was suspended by the filing of the motion for reconsideration 17 on February 14, 1973 and started running once again on April 3, 1973,
the day the petitioners received the order denying their motion for reconsideration, 18 up to May 2, 1973, when the Deputy Clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, Branch II certified that as of said day petitioners have not filed notice of appeal or done any other act tending to show
their intention to appeal, 19 is a stretch of time far beyond the 30-day period allowed by law for perfecting an appeal. Petitioners herein have
procrastinated too long on their rights and on the duties imposed on them that this Court is now prevented from extending to them the relief they
are now seeking.

As We have observed in a similar case, 20 it is truly unfortunate that through inexcusable neglect and laches, the Government lost its case, as it is
once again losing this case now for the same avoidable cause. Section 13 of the aforecited Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is crystal clear in its
language and tenor: Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period so prescribed, the appeal shall be
dismissed. For all legal purposes, the State in this case has already lost its cause. As clearly and unambiguously declared by this Court in the past,
the judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the expiration of 30 days to be counted from the date on which the
interested party has received notice of the decision. 21 The decision or final order granting the registration of the parcel of land applied for by
herein private respondent Eliseo Palatino, having become final and executory, there now remains only the issuance of the decree and the
certificate of title over the property. Thus, this Court declares, following its time-honored dictum: After a decision has become final, the prevailing
party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its execution; 22 that it becomes merely the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of
execution. 23

Despite, however, this harsh stricture of our law which had, in many instances, worked against the State and had caused the loss of portions of the
national patrimony to those who may not in equity be entitled to a grant thereof, the State is not without remedy in recovering or seeking the
reversion of inalienable public lands unduly ordered registered.

This is based on the premise that our Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to land only. It was not established
as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, much less title to lands of the public domain. It is intended merely to confirm and register the
title which one may already have over the land. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one
under the Torrens System of registration.

In such action for reversion, petitioners may perhaps be permitted to raise the question belatedly sought to be raised herein that the private
respondent was not possessed of registerable title, on the strength of their allegation that Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre, alleged to be the
same lot finally awarded by the lower court to the herein respondent, is part of the Mariveles Military Reservation established by then Governor
General Leonard Wood under Proclamation No. 10 issued in 1925 and that it was only on June 10, 1967 that this Military Reservation area had
been declared as disposable and alienable land of the public domain by Presidential Proclamation No. 210-B. Should petitioners duly establish by
competent evidence these allegations, they may then raise the crucial question whether the private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest
may be deemed to have validly and legally commenced occupation of the land and physically occupied the same en concepto de dueo for thirty
years or more to entitle them to registration under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act a question which we cannot resolve now in view of our
finding that we are without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the decision or final order granting registrations has long become final and
executory besides the fact that petitioners' evidence has not been duly presented and admitted. Such questions as may be raised by the petitioners
in a separate case of reversion are of course understood to be subject to such counter-evidence and defenses as the private respondent may
properly put up including res judicata where applicable.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari to review the decision or order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and seeking to nullify all
proceedings had in connection with the application for registration of respondent Eliseo Palatino; to make the preliminary injunction granted
earlier by this Court permanent, and/or to grant new trial to the herein petitioners, is hereby denied. This is without prejudice, however, to
whatever separate action petitioners may take in the proper court for the annulment of the decision and/or reversion of the land involved to the
public domain and the proper defenses thereto in turn of the private respondent as indicated in the Court's opinion. This is further without
prejudice to the Solicitor General's institution of appropriate proceedings against those whose inexcusable neglect has prejudiced the State and for
indemnification of any consequent loss or damages incurred by the State.

SO ORDERED.

3)
Turquesa VS Valera
322 SCRA 573

"What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating
its limits. "

Facts:
Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in
her name for taxation purposes. Notice for the application for registration was published in the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of
Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of
the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the respondent. The lower court
decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioners motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA regarding
Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings
were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the
respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The
oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were erroneously included in the respondents land registration. CA modified the land
registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.

Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon
appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan, Baltar and oppositors
who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful and
registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area of Lot 1 including those owned by the oppositors?

Ruling:
The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon the applicant who must show he is the real and absolute
owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Because the land registration proceeding is an in rem proceeding, a default order issued by the court
binds the whole world except those appearing in court to file their opposition or pleadings in the registration case. Thus, the oppositors are
exempted from the general default order by the court. On the respondents motion for writ of possession on the lots occupied by Baltar and
Partolan, the court finds no merit in granting their motion. Respondent did not provide evidence on her rightful claim over these land areas.
Although Partolan was excluded in the general default issued by the court while Baltar did not appeal on the trial courts decision, respondent is
still required to prove and establish her registrable rights over the land even in the absence of opposition. The payment of tax by her predecessor-
in-interest is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.

Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to identify the land in dispute with the boundaries
comprising it. What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits. The writ of possesion sought by the private respondent against persons who are in actual possession under claim of ownership
and their possession of the land raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Therefore, the land areas to be registered to the respondent are
limited only to certain areas in the sketch that is annexed to the Commissioners report as the respondent failed to establish proprietary right over
the excluded areas.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area of Lot 1 including those owned by the oppositors?

Ruling:
The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon the applicant who must show he is the real and absolute owner in
fee simple of the land applied for. Because the land registration proceeding is an in rem proceeding, a default order issued by the court binds the
whole world except those appearing in court to file their opposition or pleadings in the registration case. Thus, the oppositors are exempted from
the general default order by the court. On the respondents motion for writ of possession on the lots occupied by Baltar and Partolan, the court
finds no merit in granting their motion. Respondent did not provide evidence on her rightful claim over these land areas. Although Partolan was
excluded in the general default issued by the court while Baltar did not appeal on the trial courts decision, respondent is still required to prove and
establish her registrable rights over the land even in the absence of opposition. The payment of tax by her predecessor-in-interest is not sufficient
evidence to prove ownership.
Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to identify the land in dispute with the boundaries comprising it. What
defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
The writ of possesion sought by the private respondent against persons who are in actual possession under claim of ownership and their
possession of the land raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Therefore, the land areas to be registered to the respondent are limited only
to certain areas in the sketch that is annexed to the Commissioners report as the respondent failed to establish proprietary right over the excluded
areas.



4)
Republic vs Lee
G.R. No. L-64818

In a land registration case, does the bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessors-in-
interest for more than 20 years constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in proceedings of this nature? This is
the issue to be resolved in the instant petition for review.

On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, an application 1
for registration in her favor of a parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.

The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that
neither she nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at
least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines. 2

After trial, the Court of First Instance 3 rendered judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 6236, the Court hereby confirms the
title of the applicants over the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-251940 and hereby adjudicates the same in the name of the herein applicants,
spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, both of legal age, Filipino citizens and residents of Dagupan City, Philippines, as their conjugal property.

Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title issue therefor.

SO ORDERED. 4

The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), which however affirmed the lower
court's decision in toto on July 29, 1983. 5

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds: 6

The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:

A. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P. LEE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HER FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR
IMPERFECT TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION EITHER UNDER ACT NO. 496, AS AMENDED (LAND REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48
(B), C. A. NO. 141, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC LAND ACT);

B. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY INCOMPETENT, SELF-SERVING AND UNRESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT
THAT THE SPOUSES URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS LEADING TO
REGISTRATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE STATE OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;

C. IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE, WHICH,
HOWEVER, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOFWHICH MUST BE CONCLUSIVEREQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;

D. IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESCRIPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND
BELONGING TO THE STATE.

Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in question through documentary evidence
consisting of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and receipts as well as her testimony that her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land in question for more than 20 years; that said testimony, which petitioner characterizes as superfluous and uncalled for, deserves weight
and credence considering its spontaneity; that in any event, the attending fiscal should have cross-examined her on that point to test her
credibility; and that, the reason said fiscal failed to do so is that the latter is personally aware of facts showing that the land being applied for is a
private land. 7

We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that the land in question was owned by the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan, who on
August 11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to Mrs. Laureana Mataban and Mr. Sixto Espiritu. On March 18, 1963, and July 30, 1963,
respectively, Mrs. Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold their half portions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private respondent had the property
recorded for taxation purposes in her name and that of her husband Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for
the same years.

At the time of the filing of the application for registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent had been in possession of the subject area for
about thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to her possession that of her predecessors-in-interest in order to comply with the
requirement of Section 48 (b) of commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title," except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter.

Private respondent's testimony on her predecessors-in-interest's possession is contained in a one-page declaration given before a commissioner on
December 22, 1976. It reads in full as follows: 8

Commissioner: Atty. Surdilla, you can now present your evidence.

Atty. Surdilla: I am presenting the applicant, your Honor.

Commissioner: Swearing under oath the applicant.

Atty. Surdilla:

Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

A Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Stephen Lee, proprietor, and resident of Dagupan City.

Q Are you the applicant in this case now?

A Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.

Q From whom did you acquire said property, subject of registration now?

A From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.

Q Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said property?

A Yes, sir.

Q Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1963 and also Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 30,
1963, what can you say to them?

A The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the conveyance to us by Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban over the 1/2 portion of the property and the
deed of sale dated July 30, 1963 likewise refers to sale of the 1/2 portion of the property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.

Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said Deeds of Absolute Sale adverted to above be marked as Exhibits "I" and "J", your Honor.

Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.

Q Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana Mataban (your vendors) acquired likewise the property sought by you
to be registered?

A Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan who possessed the same for more than 20 years.

Q Showing to you this document styled as Deed of Absolute Sale, dated August 11, 1970, is this the sale adverted or referred by you?

A Yes, sir.

Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said deed be marked as Exhibit "H", your Honor.

Commissioner: Please mark it.

Q Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature thereof?

A I and my husband are in possession of the property, which possession tacked to that of our predecessors-in-interest is adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, your Honor.

Q Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation purposes?

A We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.

Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that Tax Declaration Nos. 22253 and 24126, be marked as Exhibits "K" and "K-1", respectively.

Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.

Q Who has been paying taxes over the property?

A We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.

Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that Official Receipts Nos. H-6048922 and G-9581024, dated March 9, 1976 and March 25, 1975 be
marked as Exhibits "L" and 'L-1",' respectively.

Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.

Q Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or private person/persons?

A No sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.

That's all, your Honor.

The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he
is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons. . . . In order that
the petitioner for the registration of his land shag be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate
of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple." 9

Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from government. A grant is
conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 10 or prior thereto. 11

The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. As enunciated in the case of Santiago vs. de los Santos: 12

. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There
would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be
granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no
justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless
alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as dominus . . .

Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano
Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare
assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in
private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should
have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in
concept of owner" by which she described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which
require factual support and substantiation.

That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because the burden is upon her to prove by clear,
positive and absolute evidence that her predecessors' possession was indeed adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner.
Her bare allegation, without more, did not constitute such preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.

Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for is private land helpful to private respondent.
Suffice it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court which should be convinced, by competent proof, of private respondent's registerable right
over the subject parcel of land.

Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with the requirements of the law for confirmation of
her title to the land applied for, it was grave error on the part of the lower court to have granted her application.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

5)
Director of Lands vs MERALCO
153 SCRA 686

This is an appeal by certiorari of a decision of the respondent Judge in Land Registration Case No. N-10317 LRC Record No. N-54803 entitled "In Re:
Application for Registration of Title, Manila Electric Company, applicant," dated May 29, 1981.

The facts are not disputed. Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig, Metro
Manila on December 4, 1979. On August 17, 1976, applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad (Exhibit
E) who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28,
1970 (Exhibit E). Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The
property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the applicant (Exhibit 1) and the taxes due thereon have been paid (Exhibits J and
J-1).

On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the property in the name of the private respondent. The
Director of Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land. After
comments were filed by the respondents, the Court gave the petition due course. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands has
been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., etc., No.
L-73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509. The Director of Lands v. Hon. Bengzon and Dynamarine Corporation, etc., No. 54045 (July 28, 1987)],
and resolved in the affirmative. There can be no different answer in the case at bar.

In the Acme decision, this Court upheld the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

As the Court said in that case:

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "... shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected (sic) from the moment the required period of possession became complete.

Coming to the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does not apply.

Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the Public Land Act.

As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance,
"productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings." Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title confirmed, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the right to register its property which was validly acquired.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the respondent Judge is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
















6)
Director, Lands Management Bureau vs CA
324 SCRA 757

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in
LRC No. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration
of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger
tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2 and later
administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3

In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land
embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4

Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management), disclosed:

x x x x x x x x x

1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao,
province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is
agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant
made of light materials;

2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land is
free from claim and conflict;

3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing
public land application and no patent or title has been issued therefor;

4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his
deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested that said
instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in
the name of the petitioner;

x x x x x x x x x5

With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On
February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identifi ed as Lot 6, plan Psu-
108952, identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of
Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more or less, in favor of applicant
AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address at Bian, Laguna.

After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED.6

From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed
from.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF
POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A
PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application,
ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or
special grant, a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and "informacion possessoria" or
"possessory information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.10

In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title substantiate his claim of
ownership.11 The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act
496.

Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondent's
petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not
enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation
of imperfect title.

Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private
respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.13

Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the
imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:

. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his
title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the
absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition
offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the
facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.15

There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of
the public domain. As enunciated in Republic vs. Lee:17

. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There
would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be
granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no
justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless
alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as dominus. . . .18

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate of
title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30) thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19

In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same
was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private
respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration
thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However,
other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that his late mother
possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.1wphi1.nt

Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land
applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20

From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued
in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in
1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the
name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21

It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of
herein private respondent does not appear to have any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the
name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22

The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this
case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private
respondent's predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the Court ratiocinated
thus:

This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered would
affect the result of the case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on a
misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88;
Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.'

and

. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the
Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration
is necessary in arriving at a just decision.24

Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the original records of the case, the said court
could have verified that the land involved was never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 In Director of Lands vs. Santiago.26

. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared
for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the
property.27

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to
1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner", by which
characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and
substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged
possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant
evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.28

In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the
applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law; holding as follows:

Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano
Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare
assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in
private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should
have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. . . .30

In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to
wit:

We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-
B en concepto de dueo. Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is
not clear whether at the time they filed their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land.

They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to testify on his alleged possession of the land. They alleged i n their application that
they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners.

x x x x x x x x x

On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or
that they had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain.32

Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,33 amending Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a
certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the
conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by
law.

The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a public land and
has become private property.34 To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35 Unless alienated in accordance with law,
it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.36

Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for registration under the Land Registration Act
(Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de
dueo for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,37 the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6
surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the
Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more
particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau
of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
































7)
Binalay vs Manalo
195 SCRA 374

FACTS:

Judge Taccad owned a parcel of landon the west, bordering on the Cagayan River, on the east, the national road. The western portion
would occasionally go under the waters and reappear during the dry season. Manalo purchased the land. A relocation survey was conducted
during the rainy season, so the survey didn't cover the submerged land. The sketch would show that the river branches through the west and east,
leaving a strip of land. The land was then surveyed into two 2 lots. One of these is being claimed by Manalo through accretion.

HELD:

According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.

This being the case, the subject land couldn't have been sold to Manalo, being part of the public domain.

















































8)
DE BUYSER VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
121 SCRA 13

Case Doctrine: Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse
possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either the executive or legislative branch of the
government.

FACTS:
De Buyser is the registered owner of a lot contiguous to the lot subject of this dispute. On the other hand, defendant Tandayags have been
occupying this foreshore land under a revocable permit issued by the Director of Lands. Claiming ownership of the foreshore land, de buyser
plaintiff filed an action against spouses Tandayag to recover possession of this land and the Director of Lands for having illegally issued a revocable
permit to the Tandayags.
ARGUMENTS:
In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintiff invokes Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 which provides:
Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain, when they are
no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for
the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as an increment
thereof.

ISSUE/S: WON claim of ownership has legal basis.

HELD:
No.
Plaintiffs claim of ownership is bereft of legal basis.
Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private
persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either the executive or legislative branch of the government. 1
Notes (Case Digests Property)
Page2
State shall grant these lands to the adjoining owners only when they are no longer needed for the purposes mentioned therein. In the case at bar,
the trial court found that plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that the land in question is no longer needed by the government, or that the essential
conditions for such grant under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters, exists.
The revocable permit issued by the Director of Lands was not an implied declaration that the land is no longer needed for public use. In the letter of
approval by the Director of Lands, it has expressly reserved the right of the government to use it when it is deemed necessary. The state therefor
did not relinquish ownership over the land.