Realism

Only if we think it is
Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer School of Politics and Professor of International Relations
University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-69)
This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political
ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and
violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable.
Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose
conditions might be understood and policed; they condition politics as such, forming a permanent
ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation
seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and
thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent
and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I
hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on
insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a
deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security
cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political
forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be
a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and
depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under
critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have
to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines
the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel,
wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed
force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in
the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the
remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy
and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and
alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics
based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-
states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both
distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of
interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by
endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.
Defense

More evidence international complexity proves and other things solve
Preble 12 (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato
Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University
and Temple University, 6-28-12, The Critique of Pure Kagan,
http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ

Kagan returns to both this theme and Adamss quote in The World America Made. Americas
conception of itself as the reluctant sheriff, unwilling to go out in search of trouble but willing to
defend the town only when called upon, bears no relation to reality, he explains. Americans
have used force dozens of times, and rarely because they had no choice. But the world is too
complex to be policed by a single global sheriff, and it need not be. Instead, the many
beneficiaries of the current order should contribute to the preservation of that order at a level, and
in a manner, that is consistent with their interests. By that standard, the United States would
retain military power that was at least three or four times greater than that of its closest rivals, but
it would no longer presume to be responsible for countries that can take care of themselves.
Americans must learn to embrace their relative security and face down their lingering fears. Until
they do so, the fear of the unknown works in Kagans favor. It is difficult to disentangle the many
different factors that have contributed to relative peace and security over the past half century,
and it is impossible to know what would have happened in a world without America. The future is
even more inscrutable. In this latest book, Kagan surveys all the explanations for what may have
contributed to global peace and prosperityincluding the spread of democracy, liberal
economics, nuclear weapons, and evolving global norms against violence and warand returns
to his refrain from sixteen years earlier. American hegemony, he and Kristol wrote in 1996, is
the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. Fast-forward to
2012, and nothing, it seems, has changed: There can be no world order without power to
preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system,
and keep the peace. . . . If the United States begins to look like a less reliable defender of the
present order, that order will begin to unravel. He didnt prove that case before, and he doesnt
now.

Decline is smooth
Preble 12 (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato
Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University
and Temple University, 6-28-12, The Critique of Pure Kagan,
http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ

The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States
does not need to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations
would envy. Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human
rights hinge on U.S. power, contrary to Kagans assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable
allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power
in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and
values. Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure, it is difficult to sustain public
support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongering and threat inflation. Indeed, when
Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nations power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign policy has
contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national securitythe very state of affairs
that Kagan celebratesthey grow even less supportive.

No impact to heg
Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard,
The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-
Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed,
because of Americas unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals
as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States
is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For
decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself
as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to
maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining
elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic
human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture
the enduring tensions of Americas role in the world. The absence of constraints and
Americas overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall
position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the
president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the states enduring
national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside
influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and
misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used
its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish Americas long-term material and
strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has
found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and
values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The
United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western
Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its
preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in
increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of
the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a
troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to
overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the
considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few
external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can
serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This
gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to
shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests,
preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with
foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great
lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal
democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing
transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both
theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking
and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers
in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence.
One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers control.
Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in
the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological
benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of
threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with.
To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to
take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the
international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to
overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and
societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost
a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world
politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for ones role and
purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration
adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating
threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on
claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to
al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in
political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American
military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15
At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the
Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq,
President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan.
Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental
ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources,
attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily
disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs
in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are
required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has
such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that
could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments
on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active
in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russias doorstep;
waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic
principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against
transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear
programs; undertaken nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile
defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United
Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so
involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The
United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them
simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that
may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and
resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union,
are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the
Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining
the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open
markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule
of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of
reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S.
preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly
to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that
preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules
and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be
frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the
United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little
incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public
goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial
crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial
and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes
the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The
United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The
United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly
compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of
countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American
security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense,
they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments,
the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole
superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is
expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The
United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting
settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to
contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases
its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded
role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This
is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of
collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used.
Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire
the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of
power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of
mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States
to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as
legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the
decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and
hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and
place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American
sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a
response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking
satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In
societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to
Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing
ones own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence
enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific
American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes.
Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived
unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of
the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a
governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant
and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what
conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the
George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of
anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular
animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from
voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate
change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and
what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a war on terrorism and the
division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and
politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of
anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other
governments that the U.S. own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of
emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that Americas
unprecedented power decreases its allies dependence on it. During the Cold War, for
example, Americas allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security.
The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed
these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades
following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat
posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous
courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could
change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security.
Russias reemergence could unnerve Americas European allies, just as Chinas continued
ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in
Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades.
New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for Americas allies to reduce the
disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the
United States.

Seriously there is no possible scenario where heg could solve war
Friedman 10 Ben, research fellow in defense and homeland security, Cato. PhD candidate in
pol sci, MIT, Military Restraint and Defense Savings, 20 July, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-
07202010.html

Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our
forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from
fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical
foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution
to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces
now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where
there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military
deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable
balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more
unrestthan they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons. Even when wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be
limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers
elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we
need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misunderstanding the Cold War. People tend to
assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's collapse but is obviously a good thing even without such a rival.
Forgotten is the sensible notion that alliances are a necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy. The main justification for
creating our Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by
insurrection the industrial centers in Western Europe and Japan and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us either directly or by forcing us to become a
garrison state at ruinous cost. We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwise overrun it. But these alliances outlasted
the conditions that caused them. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and
South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them. These alliances
heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.

K Cards

prefer our uniqueness evidence because it deals with the overarching
theory of sustainability rather than simple snapshots in time
Gulli 13. Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough
College in New York, For the critique of sovereignty and violence,
http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 14

Although the United States remains by far the worlds most powerful state, its relationship to the
rest of the world is now best described as one of domination without hegemony (1994/2010:
384). What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance. In the last few years,
we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that
action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a
suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill all the
bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony. In fact, this killing, just like
G. W. Bushs war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than
any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman
al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin
(killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one
that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss
of hegemony, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is
what should replace hegemony, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighis optimistic
view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China:
probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit,
the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather a radical alternative in
which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care in other
words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.

Hegemony doesnt exist and the attempt to ensure it causes blowback and
failure
Doran 9 (Charles F., Prof @ Johns Hopkins U, Fooling Oneself: The Mythology of Hegemony,
International Studies Review 11.1, p. 177-181)//LA ***We dont endorse ableist language.
More than a catalogue of techniques other governments use to resist U.S. titular hegemony, this book informs an important question, long-debated, about the
concept of hegemony. If the United States is a hegemon, why does a balance of power, composed of
rivals that severely disagree with hegemonic domination, not form against the dominant United
States? Building on the guidelines pro- posed by Wohlstetter (1964, 1968) and Elmore (1985) for the making of sound
policy, namely, to see the world through the lens of the other so as to anticipate what others might conclude and do, the book critiques the
very notion of hege- mony. In this review, I argue from the perspective that the current conception of hegemony has
neither historical nor theoretical justification (Doran 1991, pp. 117-121), and that many of the categories and examples assessed here
bear wit- ness to this reality. Joseph Nye (1990) distinguished between hegemony based on domination and control and a state carrying out a leadership role.
Historically, as Doran (1971) argued, all military attempts at hegemonic domination in the central sys- tem failed;
other members of the system rolled back these bids for hegemony forcefully, and the subsequent
peace was neither designed nor governed (Iken- berry 1989; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Gaddis 2002) by any single
state. Hegemony therefore involved attempts at centralized control, but never realized control.
Instead, equilibrium among highly unequal states (Kissinger 2005) pre- served the de-centralized nature of
the international system (Vasquez 1993). Mearsheimer (2001) concurred that, as opposed to regions (Hurrell 2004) such as Eastern Europe under
the Soviet Union or as opposed to the relationship between colonies and mother country (Mckeown 1983), hegemony in the central system
never existed. The central international system is pluralistic, de-centralized, and subject to the
rules of balance. Across long periods of history, the structure of the system changes as states follow their respective trajectories of relative power,
reflecting their ability to carry out a variety of foreign policy roles. And at any point in time, states are located at highly unequal
positions on these evolving power cycles. But a hegemon, a single all-powerful state, has never dominated
and con- trolled; nor does it today; nor will it in the future. The United States is an ordinary
power (Rosecrance 1976) like others, just more powerful, and, accordingly, more capable of providing certain leadership functions in the
sys- tem. The choice of global leadership is far different from that of global dom- ination (Brzezinski 2004). Failure to understand this reality has gotten the
United States into the situation that is described in this book. The articles in Hegemony Constrained provide strong evidence in support of the claim that the reason
a balance of power of disaffected states has not formed against the US is that, in other than defensive terms (Keohane 1984), hegemony does not
exist except in the minds of a few theorists of international relations and influential advocates in
policy circles. Not unexpectedly, other governments have discovered tactics to elude and to minimize the
effect of such applications within US foreign policy. The excesses of application in the George W.
Bush administration are the out- come of a mythology long in the making, extending from E.H. Carrs
extrapola- tion from British colonialism, and nurtured through American theorizing about the existence of
a hegemon that dominates the system until a new rising state defeats and replaces the prior
hegemon in a systems transforming war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski and Thompson 1989; Kugler and Lemke
1996; Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Stam, Abdol-Lahian, Alsharabati, Efird, and Organski 2000). In the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarity, the belief that
uni- polarity meant such hegemony began affecting foreign policy decision-making and rhetoric
during the Clinton administration (when America was proclaimed the biggest bulldog on the block). Quite in contrast is the argumentation of
all prior administrations, going back to the Eisenhower administration, a time when America enjoyed greater relati ve power differentials (Pollins 1996) than those
existing today. Yet, led by a groundswell of neo-conservative foreign policy thought (Kraut- hamer 1991; Mastanduno
1997; Wohlforth 1999; Kagan 2002; Barnett 2004), intellectual elites have so committed themselves to the hegemonic
thesis that they have blinded themselves to the consequences of their own speculation. Should
they be surprised when the hierarchy of international relations turns out to be non-existent, or the
capacity to control even very weak and divided pol- ities is met with frustration? Americans have invented a mythology of
hegemonic domination that corresponds so poorly to the position they actually find them- selves
in that they cannot comprehend the responses of other governments to their actions. Bobrow and his
fellow writers show the dozens of ways that other governments find to evade, and to subvert, the proscriptions and
fulminations emanating from Washington. By creating a mythology of hegemony rather than
learning to work with the (properly conceived) balance of power, the United States has
complicated its foreign policy and vastly raised the costs of its operation (Brown et al. 2000; Brzezinski 2004). By
destroying a secular, albeit brutal, Sunni Arab center of power in Iraq, the United States must now contend with a far greater problem (Fearon 2006) of itself having
to hold the country together and to balance a resurgent Iran. Bogged down in Iraq, it is unable to deter aggression against allies elsewhere such as Georgia and
the Ukraine, or to stop the growing Russian penetration of Latin America. By waving the flag of hegemony, the United States
finds that very few other governments see the need to assist it, because hegemony is supposed
to be self-financing, self-enforcing, and self-sufficient.
Even if they win hegemony is real, the universalization of hegemonic
ontology makes violence through backlash the only possible response
theyre in a double bind
Mouffe 7 Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of
Democracy, University of Westminster, 2007, Carl Schmitts warning on the dangers of a
unipolar world, in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and
Petito, p. 152

I submit that it is high time to acknowledge the pluralist character of the world and to relinquish
the Eurocentric tenet that modernization can only take place through Westernization. We should
relinquish the illusion that antagonisms could be eliminated through unification of the world,
achieved by transcending the political, conflict and negativity. It is also necessary to abandon the
idea that the aim of politics is to establish consensus on one single model. The central problem
that our current unipolar world is facing is that it is impossible for antagonisms to find legitimate
forms of expression. It is no wonder, then, that those antagonisms, when they emerge, take
extreme forms, putting into question the very structure of the existing international order. It is, in
my view, the lack of political channels for challenging the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of
globalization which is at the origin of the proliferation of discourses and practices of radical
negation of the established order. In order to create channels for the legitimate expression of
dissent we need to envisage a pluralistic world order constructed around a certain number of
great spaces and genuine cultural poles. The new forms of terrorism reveal the dangers implicit
in the delusions of the universalist globalist discourse which postulates that human progress
requires the establishment of world unity based on the adoption of the Western model. This is
why, against the illusions of the universalist-humanitarians, it is urgent to listen to Schmitt when
he reminds us that [t]he political world is a pluriverse, not a universe (Schmitt 1976: 53). This is, I
believe, the only way to avoid the clash of civilizations announced by Huntington (1996) and to
which, despite its intentions, the universalist discourse is, in fact, contributing.