The Beginning of Ownership

Thorstein Veblen
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 4 !"#"$#%
&n the accepte' economic theories the groun' of ownership is
commonly conceive' to be the pro'uctive labor of the owner. This
is ta(en, without reflection or )uestion, to be the legitimate
basis of property* he who has pro'uce' a useful thing shoul'
possess an' en+oy it. On this hea' the socialists an' the
economists of the classical line $ the two e,tremes of economic
speculation $ are substantially at one. The point is not in
controversy, or at least it has not been until recently* it has
been accepte' as an a,iomatic premise. -ith the socialists it has
serve' as the groun' of their 'eman' that the laborer shoul'
receive the full pro'uct of his labor. To classical economists
the a,iom has, perhaps, been as much trouble as it has been
worth. &t has given them no en' of bother to e,plain how the
capitalist is the .pro'ucer. of the goo's that pass into his
possession, an' how it is true that the laborer gets what he
pro'uces. Spora'ic instances of ownership )uite 'issociate' from
creative in'ustry are recogni/e' an' ta(en account of as
'epartures from the normal* they are 'ue to 'isturbing causes.
The main position is scarcely )uestione', that in the normal case
wealth is 'istribute' in proportion to $ an' in some cogent sense
because of $ the recipient0s contribution to the pro'uct.
1ot only is the pro'uctive labor of the owner the 'efinitive
groun' of his ownership to'ay, but the 'erivation of the
institution of property is similarly trace' to the pro'uctive
labor of that putative savage hunter who pro'uce' two 'eer or one
beaver or twelve fish. The con+ectural history of the origin of
property, so far as it has been written by the economists, has
been constructe' out of con+ecture procee'ing on the
preconceptions of 1atural 2ights an' a coercive Or'er of 1ature.
To anyone who approaches the )uestion of ownership with only an
inci'ental interest in its solution as is true of the classical,
pre$evolutionary economists%, an' fortifie' with the
preconceptions of natural rights, all this seems plain. &t
sufficiently accounts for the institution, both in point of
logical 'erivation an' in point of historical 'evelopment. The
.natural. owner is the person who has .pro'uce'. an article, or
who, by a constructively e)uivalent e,pen'iture of pro'uctive
force, has foun' an' appropriate' an ob+ect. &t is conceive' that
such a person becomes the owner of the article by virtue of the
imme'iate logical inclusion of the i'ea of ownership un'er the
i'ea of creative in'ustry.
This natural$rights theory of property ma(es the creative
effort of an isolate', self$sufficing in'ivi'ual the basis of the
ownership veste' in him. &n so 'oing it overloo(s the fact that
there is no isolate', self$sufficing in'ivi'ual. All pro'uction
is, in fact, a pro'uction in an' by the help of the community,
an' all wealth is such only in society. -ithin the human perio'
of the race 'evelopment, it is safe to say, no in'ivi'ual has
fallen into in'ustrial isolation, so as to pro'uce any one useful
article by his own in'epen'ent effort alone. 3ven where there is
no mechanical co$operation, men are always gui'e' by the
e,perience of others. The only possible e,ceptions to this rule
are those instances of lost or cast$off chil'ren nourishe' by
wil' beasts, of which half$authenticate' accounts have gaine'
currency from time to time. But the anomalous, half$hypothetical
life of these waifs can scarcely have affecte' social 'evelopment
to the e,tent of originating the institution of ownership.
4ro'uction ta(es place only in society$only through the
co$operation of an in'ustrial community. This in'ustrial
community may be large or small* its limits are commonly somewhat
vaguely 'efine'* but it always comprises a group large enough to
contain an' transmit the tra'itions, tools, technical (nowle'ge,
an' usages without which there can be no in'ustrial organi/ation
an' no economic relation of in'ivi'uals to one another or to
their environment. The isolate' in'ivi'ual is not a pro'uctive
agent. -hat he can 'o at best is to live from season to season,
as the non$gregarious animals 'o. There can be no pro'uction
without technical (nowle'ge* hence no accumulation an' no wealth
to be owne', in severalty or otherwise. An' there is no technical
(nowle'ge apart from an in'ustrial community. Since there is no
in'ivi'ual pro'uction an' no in'ivi'ual pro'uctivity, the
natural$rights preconception that ownership rests on the
in'ivi'ually pro'uctive labor of the owner re'uces itself to
absur'ity, even un'er the logic of its own assumptions.
Some writers who have ta(en up the )uestion from the
ethnological si'e hol' that the institution is to be trace' to
the customary use of weapons an' ornaments by in'ivi'uals. Others
have foun' its origin in the social group0s occupation of a given
piece of lan', which it hel' forcibly against intru'ers, an'
which it came in this way to .own.. The latter hypothesis bases
the collective ownership of lan' on a collective act of sei/ure,
or tenure by prowess, so that it 'iffers fun'amentally from the
view which bases ownership on pro'uctive labor.
The view that ownership is an outgrowth of the customary
consumption of such things as weapons an' ornaments by
in'ivi'uals is well supporte' by appearances an' has also the
)ualifie' sanction of the natural$rights preconception. The
usages of all (nown primitive tribes seem at first sight to bear
out this view. &n all communities the in'ivi'ual members e,ercise
a more or less unrestraine' right of use an' abuse over their
weapons, if they have any, as well as over many articles of
ornament, clothing, an' the toilet. &n the eyes of the mo'ern
economist this usage woul' count as ownership. So that, if the
)uestion is construe' to be simply a )uestion of material fact,
as to the earliest emergence of usages which woul' in the
latter$'ay classification be brought un'er the hea' of ownership,
then it woul' have to be sai' that ownership must have begun with
the conversion of these articles to in'ivi'ual use. But the
)uestion will have to be answere' in the contrary sense if we
shift our groun' to the point of view of the primitive men whose
institutions are un'er review. The point in )uestion is the
origin of the institution of ownership, as it first ta(es shape
in the habits of thought of the early barbarian. The )uestion
concerns the 'erivation of the i'ea of ownership or property.
-hat is of interest for the present purpose is not whether we,
with our preconceptions, woul' loo( upon the relation of the
primitive savage or barbarian to his slight personal effects as a
relation of ownership, but whether that is his own apprehension
of the matter. &t is a )uestion as to the light in which the
savage himself habitually views these ob+ects that pertain
imme'iately to his person an' are set apart for his habitual use.
5i(e all )uestions of the 'erivation of institutions, it is
essentially a )uestion of fol($psychology, not of mechanical
fact* an', when so conceive', it must be answere' in the
negative.
The unsophisticate' man, whether savage or civili/e', is
prone to conceive phenomena in terms of personality* these being
terms with which he has a first$han' ac)uaintance. This habit is
more unbro(en in the savage than in civili/e' men. All obvious
manifestations of force are apprehen'e' as e,pressions of
conation $ effort put forth for a purpose by some agency similar
to the human will. The point of view of the archaic culture is
that of forceful, perva'ing personality, whose unfol'ing life is
the substantial fact hel' in view in every relation into which
men or things enter. This point of view in large measure shapes
an' colors all the institutions of the early culture $an' in a
less 'egree the later phases of culture. 6n'er the gui'ance of
this habit of thought, the relation of any in'ivi'ual to his
personal effects is conceive' to be of a more intimate (in' than
that of ownership simply. Ownership is too e,ternal an' colorless
a term to 'escribe the fact.
&n the apprehension of the savage an' the barbarian the
limits of his person 'o not coinci'e with the limits which mo'ern
biological science woul' recogni/e. 7is in'ivi'uality is
conceive' to cover, somewhat vaguely an' uncertainly, a pretty
wi'e fringe of facts an' ob+ects that pertain to him more or less
imme'iately. To our sense of the matter these items lie outsi'e
the limits of his person, an' to many of them we woul' conceive
him to stan' in an economic rather than in an organic relation.
This )uasi$personal fringe of facts an' ob+ects commonly
comprises the man0s sha'ow* the reflection of his image in water
or any similar surface* his name* his peculiar tattoo mar(s* his
totem, if he has one* his glance* his breath, especially when it
is visible* the print of his han' an' foot* the soun' of his
voice* any image or representation of his person* any e,cretions
or e,halations from his person* parings of his nails* cuttings of
his hair* his ornaments an' amulets* clothing that is in 'aily
use, especially what has been shape' to his person, an' more
particularly if there is wrought into it any totemic or other
'esign peculiar to him* his weapons, especially his favorite
weapons an' those which he habitually carries. Beyon' these there
is a great number of other, remoter things which may or may not
be inclu'e' in the )uasi$personal fringe.
As regar's this entire range of facts an' ob+ects, it is to
be sai' that the ./one of influence. of the in'ivi'ual0s
personality is not conceive' to cover them all with the same
'egree of potency* his in'ivi'uality sha'es off by insensible,
penumbral gra'ations into the e,ternal worl'. The ob+ects an'
facts that fall within the )uasi$personal fringe figure in the
habits of thought of the savage as personal to him in a vital
sense. They are not a congeries of things to which he stan's in
an economic relation an' to which he has an e)uitable, legal
claim. These articles are conceive' to be his in much the same
sense as his han's an' feet are his, or his pulse$beat, or his
'igestion, or the heat of his bo'y, or the motions of his limbs
or brain.
8or the satisfaction of any who may be incline' to )uestion
this view, appeal may be ta(en to the usages of almost any
people. Some such notion of a pervasive personality, or a
penumbra of personality, is implie', for instance, in the giving
an' (eeping of presents an' mementos. &t is more in'ubitably
present in the wor(ing of charms* in all sorcery* in the
sacraments an' similar 'evout observances* in such practices as
the Tibetan prayer$wheel* in the a'oration of relics, images, an'
symbols* in the almost universal veneration of consecrate' places
an' structures* in astrology* in 'ivination by means of
hair$cuttings, nail$parings, photographs, etc. 4erhaps the least
'ebatable evi'ence of belief in such a )uasi$personal fringe is
affor'e' by the practices of sympathetic magic* an' the practices
are stri(ingly similar in substance the worl' over$from the
love$charm to the sacrament. Their substantial groun' is the
belief that a 'esire' effect can be wrought upon a given person
through the means of some ob+ect lying within his )uasi$personal
fringe. The person who is approache' in this way may be a
fellow$mortal, or it may be some potent spiritual agent whose
intercession is sought for goo' or ill. &f the sorcerer or anyone
who wor(s a charm can in any way get at the .penumbra. of a
person0s in'ivi'uality, as embo'ie' in his fringe of
)uasi$personal facts, he will be able to wor( goo' or ill to the
person to whom the fact or ob+ect pertains* an' the magic rites
performe' to this en' will wor( their effect with greater force
an' precision in proportion as the ob+ect which affor's the point
of attac( is more intimately relate' to the person upon whom the
effect is to be wrought. An economic relation, simply, 'oes not
affor' a han'le for sorcery. &t may be set 'own that whenever the
relation of a person to a given ob+ect is ma'e use of for the
purposes of sympathetic magic, the relation. is conceive' to be
something more vital than simple legal ownership.
Such meager belongings of the primitive savage as woul' un'er
the nomenclature of a later 'ay be classe' as personal property
are not thought of by him as his property at all* they pertain
organically to his person. Of the things comprise' in his
)uasi$personal fringe all 'o not pertain to him with the same
'egree of intimacy or persistency* but those articles which are
more remotely or more 'oubtfully inclu'e' un'er his in'ivi'uality
are not therefore conceive' to be partly organic to him an'
partly his property simply. The alternative 'oes not lie between
this organic relation an' ownership. &t may easily happen that a
given article lying along the margin of the )uasi$personal fringe
is eliminate' from it an' is alienate', either by 'efault through
lapse of time or by voluntary severance of the relation. But when
this happens the article is not conceive' to escape from the
organic relation into a remoter category of things that are owne'
by an' e,ternal to the person in )uestion. &f an ob+ect escapes
in this way from the organic sphere of one person, it may pass
into the sphere of another* or, if it is an article that len's
itself to common use, it may pass into the common stoc( of the
community.
As regar's this common stoc(, no concept of ownership, either
communal or in'ivi'ual, applies in the primitive community. The
i'ea of a communal ownership is of relatively late growth, an'
must by psychological necessity have been prece'e' by the i'ea of
in'ivi'ual ownership. Ownership is an accre'ite' 'iscretionary
power over an ob+ect on the groun' of a conventional claim* it
implies that the owner is a personal agent who ta(es thought for
the 'isposal of the ob+ect owne'. A personal agent is an
in'ivi'ual, an' it is only by an eventual refinement $ of the
nature of a legal fiction $ that any group of men is conceive' to
e,ercise a corporate 'iscretion over ob+ects. Ownership implies
an in'ivi'ual owner. &t is only by reflection, an' by e,ten'ing
the scope of a concept which is alrea'y familiar, that a
)uasi$personal corporate 'iscretion an' control of this (in'
comes to be impute' to a group of persons. 9orporate ownership is
)uasi$ownership only* it is therefore necessarily a 'erivative
concept, an' cannot have prece'e' the concept of in'ivi'ual
ownership of which it is a counterfeit.
After the i'ea of ownership has been elaborate' an' has
gaine' some consistency, it is not unusual to fin' the notion of
pervasion by the user0s personality applie' to articles owne' by
him. At the same time a given article may also be recogni/e' as
lying within the )uasi$personal fringe of one person while it is
owne' by another $ as, for instance, ornaments an' other articles
of 'aily use which in a personal sense belong to a slave or to an
inferior member of a patriarchal househol', but which as property
belong to the master or hea' of the househol'. The two
categories, a% things to which one0s personality e,ten's by way
of pervasion an' b% things owne', by no means coinci'e* nor 'oes
the one supplant the other. The two i'eas are so far from
i'entical that the same ob+ect may belong to one person un'er the
one concept an' to another person un'er the other* an', on the
other han', the same person may stan' in both relations to a
given ob+ect without the one concept being lost in the other. A
given article may change owners without passing out of the
)uasi$personal fringe of the person un'er whose .self. it has
belonge', as, for instance, a photograph or any other memento. A
familiar instance is the mun'ane ownership of any consecrate'
place or structure which in the personal sense belongs to the
saint or 'eity to whom it is sacre'.
The two concepts are so far 'istinct, or even 'isparate, as
to ma(e it e,tremely improbable that the one has been 'evelope'
out of the other by a process of growth. A transition involving
such a substitution of i'eas coul' scarcely ta(e place e,cept on
some notable impulse from without. Such a step woul' amount to
the construction of a new category an' a reclassification of
certain selecte' facts un'er the new hea'. The impulse to
reclassify the facts an' things that are comprise' in the
)uasi$personal fringe, so as to place some of them, together with
certain other things, un'er the new category of ownership, must
come from some constraining e,igency of later growth than the
concept whose province it inva'es. The new category is not simply
an amplifie' form of the ol'. 1ot every item that was originally
conceive' to belong to an in'ivi'ual by way of pervasion comes to
be counte' as an item of his wealth after the i'ea of wealth has
come into vogue. Such items, for instance, as a person0s
footprint, or his image or effigy, or his name, are very tar'ily
inclu'e' un'er the hea' of articles owne' by him, if they are
eventually inclu'e' at all. &t is a fortuitous circumstance if
they come to be owne' by him, but they long continue to hol'
their place in his )uasi$personal fringe. The 'isparity of the
two concepts is well brought out by the case of the 'omestic
animals. These non$human in'ivi'uals are incapable of ownership,
but there is impute' to them the attribute of a pervasive
in'ivi'uality, which e,ten's to such items as their footprints,
their stalls, clippings of hair, an' the li(e. These items are
ma'e use of for the purposes of sympathetic magic even in mo'ern
civili/e' communities. An illustration that may show this
'isparity between ownership an' pervasion in a still stronger
light is affor'e' by the vulgar belief that the moon0s phases may
have a propitious or sinister effect on human affairs. The
inconstant moon is conceive' to wor( goo' or ill through a
sympathetic influence or spiritual infection which suggests a
)uasi$personal fringe, but which assure'ly 'oes not imply
ownership on her part.
Ownership is not a simple an' instinctive notion that is
naively inclu'e' un'er the notion of pro'uctive effort on the one
han', nor un'er that of habitual use on the other. &t is not
something given to begin with, as an item of the isolate'
in'ivi'ual0s mental furniture* something which has to be
unlearne' in part when men come to co$operate in pro'uction an'
ma(e wor(ing arrangements an' mutual renunciations un'er the
stress of associate' life $ after the manner impute' by the
social$contract theory. &t is a conventional fact an' has to be
learne'* it is a cultural fact which has grown into an
institution in the past through a long course of habituation, an'
which is transmitte' from generation to generation as all
cultural facts are.
On going bac( a little way into the cultural history of our
own past, we come upon a situation which says that the fact of a
person0s being engage' in in'ustry was prima facie evi'ence that
he coul' own nothing. 6n'er serf'om an' slavery those who wor(
cannot own, an' those who own cannot wor(. 3ven very recently $
culturally spea(ing $ there was no suspicion that a woman0s wor(,
in the patriarchal househol', shoul' entitle her to own the
pro'ucts of her wor(. 8arther bac( in the barbarian culture,
while the patriarchal househol' was in better preservation than
it is now, this position was accepte' with more un)uestioning
faith. The hea' of the househol' alone coul' hol' property* an'
even the scope of his ownership was greatly )ualifie' if he ha' a
feu'al superior. The tenure of property is a tenure by prowess,
on the one han', an' a tenure by sufferance at the han's of a
superior, on the other han'. The recourse to prowess as the
'efinitive basis of tenure becomes more imme'iate an' more
habitual the farther the 'evelopment is trace' bac( into the
early barbarian culture* until, on the lower levels of barbarism
or the upper levels of savagery, .the goo' ol' plan. prevails
with but little mitigation. There are always certain conventions,
a certain un'erstan'ing as to what are the legitimate con'itions
an' circumstances that surroun' ownership an' its transmission,
chief among which is the fact of habitual acceptance. -hat has
been currently accepte' as the status )uo$veste' interest $ is
right an' goo' so long as it 'oes not meet a challenge bac(e' by
irresistible force. 4roperty rights sanctione' by immemorial
usage are inviolable, as all immemorial usage is, e,cept in the
face of forcible 'ispossession. But sei/ure an' forcible
retention very shortly gain the legitimation of usage, an' the
resulting tenure becomes inviolable through habituation. Beati
possi'entes.
Throughout the barbarian culture, where this tenure by
prowess prevails, the population falls into two economic classes:
those engage' in in'ustrial employments, an' those engage' in
such non$in'ustrial pursuits as war, government, sports, an'
religious observances. &n the earlier an' more naive stages of
barbarism the former, in the normal case, own nothing* the latter
own such property as they have sei/e', or such as has, un'er the
sanction of usage, 'escen'e' upon them from their forebears who
sei/e' an' hel' it. At a still lower level of culture, in the
primitive savage hor'e, the population is not similarly 'ivi'e'
into economic classes. There is no leisure class resting its
prerogative on coercion, prowess, an' immemorial status* an'
there is also no ownership.
&t will hol' as a rough generali/ation that in communities
where there is no invi'ious 'istinction between employments, as
e,ploit, on the one han', an' 'ru'gery, on the other, there is
also no tenure of property. &n the cultural se)uence, ownership
'oes not begin before the rise of a canon of e,ploit* but it is
to be a''e' that it also 'oes not seem to begin with the first
beginning of e,ploit as a manly occupation. &n these very ru'e
early communities, especially in the unpropertie' hor'es of
peaceable savages, the rule is that the pro'uct of any member0s
effort is consume' by the group to which he belongs* an' it is
consume' collectively or in'iscriminately, without )uestion of
in'ivi'ual right or ownership. The )uestion of ownership is not
brought up by the fact that an article has been pro'uce' or is at
han' in finishe' form for consumption.
The earliest occurrence of ownership seems to fall in the
early stages of barbarism, an' the emergence of the institution
of ownership is apparently a concomitant of the transition from a
peaceable to a pre'atory habit of life. &t is a prerogative of
that class in the barbarian culture which lea's a life of e,ploit
rather than of in'ustry. The perva'ing characteristic of the
barbarian culture, as 'istinguishe' from the peaceable phase of
life that prece'es it, is the element of e,ploit, coercion, an'
sei/ure. &n its earlier phases ownership is this habit of
coercion an' sei/ure re'uce' to system an' consistency un'er the
surveillance of usage.
The practice of sei/ing an' accumulating goo's on in'ivi'ual
account coul' not have come into vogue to the e,tent of foun'ing
a new institution un'er the peaceable communistic regime of
primitive savagery* for the 'issensions arising from any such
resort to mutual force an' frau' among its members woul' have
been fatal to the group. 8or a similar reason in'ivi'ual
ownership of consumable goo's coul' not come in with the first
beginnings of pre'atory life* for the primitive fighting hor'e
still nee's to consume its scanty means of subsistence in common,
in or'er to give the collective hor'e its full fighting
efficiency. Otherwise it woul' succumb before any rival hor'e
that ha' not yet given up collective consumption.
-ith the a'vent of pre'atory life comes the practice of
plun'ering $ of sei/ing goo's from the enemy. But in or'er that
the plun'ering habit shoul' give rise to in'ivi'ual ownership of
the things sei/e', these things must be goo's of a somewhat
lasting (in', an' not imme'iately consumable means of
subsistence. 6n'er the primitive culture the means of subsistence
are habitually consume' in common by the group, an' the manner in
which such goo's are consume' is fi,e' accor'ing to an elaborate
system of usage. This usage is not rea'ily bro(en over, for it is
a substantial part of the habits of life of every in'ivi'ual
member. The practice of collective consumption is at the same
time necessary to the survival of the group, an' this necessity
is present in men0s min's an' e,ercises a surveillance over the
formation of habits of thought as to what is right an' seemly.
Any propensity to aggression at this early stage will, therefore,
not assert itself in the sei/ure an' retention of consumable
goo's* nor 'oes the temptation to 'o so rea'ily present itself,
since the i'ea of in'ivi'ual appropriation of a store of goo's is
alien to the archaic man0s general habits of thought.
The i'ea of property is not rea'ily attache' to anything but
tangible an' lasting articles. &t is only where commercial
'evelopment is well a'vance' $ where bargain an' sale is a large
feature in the community0s life$that the more perishable articles
of consumption are thought of as items of wealth at all. The
still more evanescent results of personal service are still more
'ifficult to bring in un'er the i'ea of wealth. So much so that
the attempt to classify services as wealth is meaningless to
laymen, an' even the a'ept economists hol' a 'ivi'e' opinion as
to the intelligibility of such a classification. &n the
common$sense apprehension the i'ea of property is not currently
attache' to any but tangible, ven'ible goo's of some 'urability.
This is true even in mo'ern civili/e' communities, where
pecuniary i'eas an' the pecuniary point of view prevail. &n a
li(e manner an' for a li(e reason, in an earlier, non$commercial
phase of culture there is less occasion for an' greater
'ifficulty in applying the concept of ownership to anything but
obviously 'urable articles.
But 'urable articles of use an' consumption which are sei/e'
in the rai's of a pre'atory hor'e are either articles of general
use or they are articles of imme'iate an' continue' personal use
to the person who has sei/e' them. &n the former case the goo's
are consume' in common by the group, without giving rise to a
notion of ownership* in the latter case they fall into the class
of things that pertain organically to the person of their user,
an' they woul', therefore, not figure as items of property or
ma(e up a store of wealth.
&t is 'ifficult to see how an institution of ownership coul'
have arisen in the early 'ays of pre'atory life through the
sei/ure of goo's, but the case is 'ifferent with the sei/ure of
persons. 9aptives are items that 'o not fit into the scheme of
communal consumption, an' their appropriation by their in'ivi'ual
captor wor(s no manifest 'etriment to the group. At the same time
these captives continue to be obviously 'istinct from their
captor in point of in'ivi'uality, an' so are not rea'ily brought
in un'er the )uasi$personal fringe. The captives ta(en un'er ru'e
con'itions are chiefly women. There are goo' reasons for this.
3,cept where there is a slave class of men, the women are more
useful, as well as more easily controlle', in the primitive
group. Their labor is worth more to the group than their
maintenance, an' as they 'o not carry weapons, they are less
formi'able than men captives woul' be. They serve the purpose of
trophies very effectually, an' it is therefore worth while for
their captor to trace an' (eep in evi'ence his relation to them
as their captor. To this en' he maintains an attitu'e of
'ominance an' coercion towar' women capture' by him* an', as
being the insignia of his prowess, he 'oes not suffer them to
stan' at the bec( an' call of rival warriors. They are fit
sub+ects for comman' an' constraint* it ministers to both his
honor an' his vanity to 'omineer over them, an' their utility in
this respect is very great. But his 'omineering over them is the
evi'ence of his prowess, an' it is incompatible with their
utility as trophies that other men shoul' ta(e the liberties with
his women which serve as evi'ence of the coercive relation of
captor.
-hen the practice har'ens into custom, the captor comes to
e,ercise a customary right to e,clusive use an' abuse over the
women he has sei/e'* an' this customary right of use an' abuse
over an ob+ect which is obviously not an organic part of his
person constitutes the relation of ownership, as naively
apprehen'e'. After this usage of capture has foun' its way into
the habits of the community, the women so hel' in constraint an'
in evi'ence will commonly fall into a conventionally recogni/e'
marriage relation with their captor. The result is a new form of
marriage, in which the man is master. This ownership$marriage
seems to be the original both of private property an' of the
patriarchal househol'. Both of these great institutions are,
accor'ingly, of an emulative origin.
The varying 'etails of the 'evelopment whereby ownership
e,ten's to other persons than capture' women cannot be ta(en up
here* neither can the further growth of the marriage institution
that came into vogue at the same time with ownership. 4robably at
a point in the economic evolution not far subse)uent to the
'efinitive installation of the institution of ownership$marriage
comes, as its conse)uence, the ownership of consumable goo's. The
women hel' in servile marriage not only ren'er personal service
to their master, but they are also employe' in the pro'uction of
articles of use. All the noncombatant or ignoble members of the
community are habitually so employe'. An' when the habit of
loo(ing upon an' claiming the persons i'entifie' with my
invi'ious interest, or subservient to me, as .mine. has become an
accepte' an' integral part of men0s habits of thought, it becomes
a relatively easy matter to e,ten' this newly achieve' concept of
ownership to the pro'ucts of the labor performe' by the persons
so hel' in ownership. An' the same propensity for emulation which
bears so great a part in shaping the original institution of
ownership e,ten's its action to the new category of things owne'.
1ot only are the pro'ucts of the women0s labor claime' an' value'
for their serviceability in furthering the comfort an' fullness
of life of the master, but they are valuable also as a
conspicuous evi'ence of his possessing many an' efficient
servants, an' they are therefore useful as an evi'ence of his
superior force. The appropriation an' accumulation of consumable
goo's coul' scarcely have come into vogue as a 'irect outgrowth
of the primitive hor'e$communism, but it comes in as an easy an'
unobtrusive conse)uence of the ownership of persons.