TA: robert.creamer@mail.mcgill.

ca
Office hours: Tuesday 1230-130pm LEA 112-A
Conference Notes:
Does democracy have deep roots in Europe?
o Howard: Party of order vs party of movement is the way that Howard
deals with democracy. Talks about it specifically in regards to the
French Revolution and then applies it to Europe as a whole. Not
necessarily to say that the two dont interact in some way, more
evident in Mazower stuff. Especially with the liberal authoritarian bit,
intellectual class of the 19
th
century. They see individual rights as an
important thing but not necessarily democracy.
o Retroactivity of law. It applies for the future
Government & Politics Notes:
Lecture #2:
European political development
Long 19
th
century:
o 1789-1945
o Makes a claim that there is an organized logic to this period.
o Begins in revolution (French) and ends in war.
o Period marked by domestic political instability across most of
Europe and recurring interstate wars/conflict.
o Some consequences of French Revolution having enduring
repercussions on European political history in 19
th
and 20
th

century.
o Central implications of FR:
Intent at reform begins the FR. Motives and goals of
those seeking to influence French politics. Revolution
begins as an attempt to constitutionally limit the power
of the absolutist monarch in France.
Early stages: goal is to not do away with the principle of
monarchy but to liberalize the monarchy and impose
constitutional limits on the powers of the French
monarchy.
Often the case in attempts at reform process that
cant be completely managed
In this instance, reform quickly becomes a
movement for deeper kinds of transformation
social and political.
Reform gives way to a more radical challenge to
the French regime.
That transition from reform to revolution is
associated with democratic republicanism
The introduction of republican ideas radicalizes
the movement in France and its from these ideas
that we get the full-blown FR.
Republican Ideas in the French context.
Distinguishing Republican commitments
o 1. Radical republicans are suspicious of
representative government.
o Favor direct democracy
o 2. Resistant and suspicious to
professional standing armies ideal is to
depend on citizen militias
o 3. Commitment to a form of patriotism
(civic patriotism)
6 things bout Republican movement in FR and why it
matters for all of Europe:
It was a challenge not just to French institutions
but to institutions across Europe.
Republicans in France dont just want to
constitutionally limit the French monarchy but
do away with it all.
o Moving towards in effect a republican
constitution.
o That does not recognize the priority or
superiority of a hereditary monarch.
o A liberal in the same circumstance may
not be inclined to do away with the
monarch together, a liberal seeks to
constitutionally limit.
o British monarchy is a classical liberal
monarchy (republicans in France could
not do with this)
2
nd
important feature antimonarchical and
anti-Catholic. Wanted to break social and
cultural hegemony in France, monarch and
church support each other and thus both have to
go. Theyre imagining French society and politics
centered on devotion to the republic as opposed
to the church.
Points 1 and 2 gives you 3: republicanism is
more than a liberal challenge
o Liberals can live with a constitutionally
limited monarch and make their peace
with their organized religion. Both of
which republicans cannot. Fearing the
social power of Catholicism.
4:
o French republicanism attempts to break
with the French past altogether.
o New calendar introduced for example and
attempt to introduce a new social
etiquette. All in the interest of
consolidating republican virtue.
o Distinction between virtue and
corruption. Virtue motivates and has to
be consolidated.
5
th
and 6
th
points:
o Projection of republican principles on
Europe as a whole in the revolutionary
and post-revolutionary period.
o European wide implicationsimplicit
attack on monarchy and Catholicism
wherever found in Europe. Important
organizing principles across Europe.
o 6
th
: French revolution and its republican
principles are modular something that
can be diffused through a process of
imitation.
o Think of Howards reading here.
o Republicanism:
French revolution is an incomplete revolution in terms
of French politics.
Revolutionary forces are powerful enough to push
institutions of old regime not completely off the
historical stage but towards the edge.
Not powerful enough to completely control French
politics. Powerful enough to change things, but not
powerful enough to instill republican ideas without
question.
Forces of order vs the forces of movement.
Polarizes French politics in French society.
Indication of polarization: Produces a long
history of domestic political instability. Never
completely solves the question about how
France would be governed politically.
How many regimes have their been? There have
been attempts to push back republican ideas.
Division in thought about how France would be
governed.
Highlights the challenges to and limits of
democratic republicans
o End of the long 19
th
century (1945)
End of WWII, why it matters?
Marks military defeat of fascism
Fascism was a political option that emerged in the
interwar period. A powerful and supported political
option. And appears could not be defeated domestically
through electoral politics or domestic challenges to
fascism. Fascism ended in Europe upon the defeat of the
Fascist powers, literally took a war.
Marks the rehabilitation of Germany: a leading kind of
issue going forward from 1945 onwards. Germany
mattered so much for 2 kinds of reasons leading in
different directions: Germany and France fought 3 wars,
Franco-Prussian, WWI, WWII, so Germany in a sense
had a history of aggressive foreign policy from its
origins. The success of Germany in the Franco-Prussian
war was closely associated with the formation of the
German state, relatively late in historical time. Yet
considered an aggressor and needed to solve the
German problem (aggressive foreign policy) onward.
Dilemma was that the German economy was the
linchpin, or industrial heart, of European economy.
Important for the economic reconstruction of Europe
post 1945.
So had to find a way to rehabilitate Germany and
encourage reconstruction in Europe given Germanys
importance in the European economy.
Cap German industrialization, keeping it weak as an
economic power, would be one solution to the
aggressor problem. But remember the dilemma of
European reconstruction.
To solve the dilemma: Allow reindustrialization, but
find ways of binding German economy to other
economies in Europe in ways unprecedented. Bringing
it into something larger than itself. --> Seed of the
current European Union.
What emerged in an institutional way known as the
European coal and steel community 1951seedbed for
European Economic Community and eventually the
European Union.
1945 onwardsconsolidation of democracy in 3
important cases:
Germany, Italy, France.
Important going forward from 1945 was
consolidating democracy precisely because it
had failed in the interwar period.
In all 3 cases, democratic consolidation was
associated with the creation of republican
constitutions.
Lecture #3:
Howard captures tension introduced in Euro politics as a consequence of
the French Revolution
o Party of order vs party of movement
o Associated with republican challenges to old regimes
o When Howard says party hes talking about the emergence of
tendencies in euro politics.
o Draws attention to the fact that this conflict is civil war
Consequence of this tension is domestic political instability.
What type of regime should we live under?
Contest between movement and order also influences foreign policies.
Forces of counterrevolution expressed in domestic politics and interstate
relations.
1789-1945 historical turning points within:
o tend to be connected to revolutions, wars and peace settlements
o 1789
o 1815 congress of Vienna
an attempt to contain the corrosive effects of democratic
republicanism on old regimes.
An expression of monarchial solidarity
2 functions: ends Napoleonic wars and peace settlement
controlled and organized by monarchs.
o 1848 Series of failed social revolutions across Europe.
Pickup certain themes introduced in FR period.
o 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War
Important why important part of the formation of the
German state in the early part of the 1870s.
Consolidates a place for Prussia in the newly formed Germany
state.
Marks the transition to the third republic in France.
And the Third republic will prove to be the most sustained
form of political regime in post revolutionary France for the
19
th
and most of the 20
th
century.
o 1917: Russian Revolution
o 1918- WWI ends
Begins the collapse of 3 important empires (important
imperial organizations)
Austro-Hungarian empire
Ottoman Empire
Russian Empire
Formation of new group of states in the remnants of the
empires.
o 1933:
Coming to power peacefully of Hitler in Germany
o 1945: WWII ends, long 19
th
century ends.
o Tremendous amount of challenge and discontinuity in this period.
o One enduring feature of European politics in this period:
How should European states be governed?
What form of democratic rule or autocratic rule? Autocracy vs
Democracy?
One constant is simply the importantce of territorial state in
European politics.
Most basic organizing feature in euro politics
Principal of the territorial state is consolidated
Emphasizing the distinction between state and regime.
Regimes are not states. States are more basic.
o Illustration: France and regime changes
characterizing France post 1789: several forms
of autocratic rule and 5 republics tremendous
change in terms of regime and political rules in
which the French live under.
o A regime provides the political rules of the
game distinction between autocracy and
democracy
o Despite all this, borders of the French state
remain relatively constant throughout the long
19
th
century.
o State is territorial, regime is a set of political
rules.
Consolidation of the state system:
Need to make distinction between domestic hierarchy
and interstate anarchy.
States are categorized and defined by concentrated
political power at their center.
States are sovereign at the apex of the state is
concentrated power associated with the legitimate use
of violence within territorial or state boundaries.
And we measure the success of the state to the extent of
maintain sovereign authority within borders.
States are sovereign actors/units, and thats what he
means by domestic hierarchy.
And we measure state capacity to the extent that its
able to extend control from the center to its borders
(periphery)
o What society looks like within a state
European society:
o Lacks a sovereign power at the European level
equivalent to sovereign power at the state level.
Thats the contrast between domestic hierarchy
and interstate anarchy.
o Interstate anarchy refers to a state in which no
sovereign power is present.
States are a constant feature of European political life.
Democracy is not a constant however.
Democracy only moves towards fairly full consolidation in
Europe in 1945. Under challenge from 1789-1945.
Mazerov points out that democracy is not a European birth
right, something that had to be achieved slowly over time.
Democratization as a kind of process thats only consolidated
relatively late in historical time.
Democratic forces for change are not powerful enough
to become hegemonic
o 1945:
Fascism is replaced by democracy in important cases but it
takes a interstate war to defeat fascism
Powerful enough domestically that it takes such a war.
Tells you something about the degree of its important in
interwar period.
Difficult to push off historical stage.
Occupation of Germany and entrenchment of the distinction in
euro politics between east and west.
Germany is occupied after 1945 by the Allied powers, it
is divided eventually along the lines of allied powers.
Soviet sector etc
Becomes the rough basis of division of west and east
Germany.
Occupation and eventual division is associated with the
cold war.
Why occupation and division between east and west
mattered going forward?
o Western pattern of political development post
1945:
Tend to see successful democratic
consolidation, pattern of development
centered around the importance of states,
states tend to have relatively stable
territorial boundaries (connected to 2
nd

point), economies of the west are market
economies, and for the most part these
are political systems in the west in which
radical politics tend to be mainstream and
disciplined. + 1945 will initiate long
peace period the elimination of
interstate wars, very few full blown civil
wars. incrementalism change that
occurs incrementally and peace built over
time.
o Eastern pattern of political development:
Democratic transition delayed and
consolidation of democracy incomplete.
Hybrid political regimes found in the
eastern side, not fully authoritarian nor
democratic, combining features of both.
Especially the case in the East after
the collapse of communism 1989-
1990
The regimes are hardly fully
consolidated democratic
regimes competitive
authoritarian regimes
Development tends to not be state led.
Soviet Union imperial structure.
States that were apart of the
empire, their interests and needs
tended to be subordinated to the
foreign policy interests of the USSR.
States in the soviet bloc tended to
lack internal and external
sovereignty just because of their
subordinated position.
Planned economies controlled by the
party state.
Model of change that characterizes
political development in the east, a
pattern of change in which we get long
periods of stability followed by a period
of rupture.
As a consequence of the collapse of the
USSR, you will see something very
unusual in post 1945 euro politics
ethnic wars emerging in Baltics.
New states emergetremendous
territorial change after 1989.
Formation of new states in a process of
succession.
State of still prime importance in Western Europe.

Lecture # 4:
Still following outline for lecture 1, still going on about the end of
the long 19
th
century.
Monday discussing about states and territory, meaning by Monday
to read Philpot under topic 1.
Should be through Howard and Mazower.
Democratic consolidation in the west: how politics in three
important cases changed going forward from 1945
What happened in the immediate aftermath of the end of WWII.
Democratic consolidation in the west:
o Why are we interested in these cases? Germany and Italy
Cases with complete democratic breakdowns in the 20s
and 30s. two classic cases of Nazism in Germany and
fascism in Italy
o France matters, allied side in the war and never completely
collapses in democratic terms, but experiences an
important degree of political instability in the 30s
connected to challenges from the extreme right to the
democratic institutions of the third republic.
o Cant say democracy completely collapsed for France then.
o Was a period in which France was occupied and the
occupied forces, the German, are working with the Vichy
government.
o There were significant forces in france who thought it was
preferable to live under nazi occupation, that under
institutions of a democratic republic.
o Must recognize the direction in which these three cases
move after 1945
o Process and pattern of consolidation points:
In all 3 cases, what emerges is a form of republican
government. France puts in place a new republican
constitution. 1946 marks the transition to the 4
th

republic in France. Short lived 4
th
republic though.
Italy puts in place the constitution of the first Italian
republic. From 1946 on, Italy is organized under a
republican constitution, big break from the past:
1870-1871 emerges as a state, organized as a
constitutional monarchy, a liberal one.
This is replaced in 1922 by Fascist
government
1946, the republican question in Italian
politics is resolved once and for all. They get
a republican constitution done as a result of a
national referendum
West Germany organized also as a republic
important break to some extent with the German
past.
Emerges as a state in latter part of 19
th

century imperial monarchy, a conservative
form of monarchial rule
Short period of republican government in
Germany in the 1920s, Weimar republic
short lived and collapses into national
socialist rule
The constitution of West Germany, the base
of law of 1945 entrenches a republican
political regime.
Republican question settled in all 3 cases.
These are the firsts set of points
o The modernizing coalitions that led this process of political
reconstruction in these 3 cases:
Italy and France modernizing coalition. The
political factions that contributed to political
modernization.
3 political coalitions in Italy and France:
Christian democrats
Socialists
Communists
Lead in initial phase of modernization
because: They have a lot of political
credibility because of the contribution they
made to domestic resistance to fascist rule in
Italy or nazi occupation and vichy
government in France.
Political fractions that were an important
part to the French and Italian resistance to
Authoritarian rule.--> able to cash that in at
the end of WWII.
Presence of Christian democrats in these
modernizing coalitions is very important for
both countries: provides some reassurance to
Catholics in both nations that the new
republican governments will not be anti-
Catholic: remember earlier point-describing
republicanism in Europe tended to have anti-
Catholic orientations. Helps reconcile
Catholics to republican government.
Socialists and Communists important
elements for the resistance, but the presence
of communists in the modernizing coalitions
in Italy and France is relatively short lived.
Late 1940s communist political party
excluded from political forces that are
pursuing an agenda of modernization.
Excluded politically, but never legally banned,
contrasting to west Germany.
o Means that for Italy and France going
forward, communism is a very
important political and social force
even if excluded from government in
these cases until the 1980s.
Communist party is so powerful in these
cases because it has deep roots in society and
economy in Italy and France, the communist
party in Italy and france is very closely
associated with powerful trading roots.
Why were they excluded so quickly though?
o Consequence of their exclusion, the
modernizing coalitions that result
after the communists are pushed off,
they are relatively moderate and
relatively centrist in political terms.
o 3 things that account for their
exclusion:
external pressure from
American interests and
American government.
Concerned with
encouraging political
moderation
Encourage both Italian
and French
governments to exclude
communists from
political power and they
have a tremendous
amount of influence in
terms of their
importance to economic
reconstruction post WII:
These domestic communist
parties became suspect as the
cold war deepened:
Exclusion to some extent in
part a consequence of self-
exclusion, important elements
within communist movement,
both trading in party, that saw
participation in bourgeois
government as apathetical to
the identity of communist
challenges to industrial
capitalism. The more they
cooperated/participated, the
radical commitments of
communism would be diluted.
The fear of cooption.
What you get going forward is
a typical modernizing coalition
thats relatively politically
centrist, and in Italy and
Germany and to some extent
France, the key party which
emerges, the party thatll
dominate Italian and German
politics inn particular, some
extent French politics, is
Christian democratic parties.
Dominating Italian
politics well into 1970s
as well
Influence of Christian
democratic party in
decline for France, in
1960s it is squeezed out,
a centrist party that gets
caught between the
polarization of French
politics on a left-right
kind of dimension.
Important point for now
is that Christian
democracy is a force for
moderation, reconciles
Catholics who had
feared republican
government and
dominates political
reconstruction in Italy
and Geramny.
o Communist party in Germany was
banned. even stronger commitment
to moderation and to some extent a
consequence of foreign pressure, and
consequence of the fact that Germany
was occupied by Allied powers and
had much greater interest in
intervening in the reconstruction of
Germany than they did in Italy and
France. What would be encouraged
going forward was political
moderation, allied powers made sure
of that.
By 1945: Western Europe in general is
democratically consolidated. Taken a long
time.
Process of democratization consolidated by
1945
Socialists not a force in German politics until
1960s (Answered question asked in class)
Exceptions to democratic consolidations:
France is only fully democratically
consolidated after the transition rom the 4
th

to the 5
th
republic. Tremendously important
phase in French political history.
o Formation of the 5
th
republic in France
which ends the republican question.
o 1958-1960s rocky road in politics, an
attempted coupdetat and whats
running through all of this is the crisis
of decolonization in Algeria. The
solution of the decolonization in
Algeria is closely connected to the
formation of the 5
th
republic
Spain and Portugal undergo transitions from
Authoritarian rule in the 1970s.
o Transition in Portugal connected to a
colonial crisis
o The transition in Spain is connected to
the death of a long-time dictator,
Franco.
o 3 features of the transitions in Spain
and Portugal from Authoritarian to
democratic rule.
Drawing a comparison with
democratic transition as a
consequence of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, these
transitions in Spain and
Portugal are fairly strictly
understood as political
transitions, not dual transitions.
Transition out of a form of
authoritarian rule but also an
economic transition from
planned to market economy.
More difficult to manage dual
transitions, in spain and
Portugal they were not dual
transitions. Their economies
were already capitalist
economies. Economies that
werent planned in the soviet
sense, corporatist economies.
2
nd
thing to say about these
transitions, comment about
Spain, these are democratic
transitions that occur without
any change to state boundaries.
Comparing to the collapse of
communism in USSR which
produced new states, and
didnt happen in Spain. And
interesting for Spain because
Spain is multinational, and the
course of 20
th
century Spanish
History is punctuated by
challenges from the Basques
and the Catalans to centralize
Spanish rule. Both Basques and
Catalans did not fundamentally
challenge the integrity of the
territorial boundaries of Spain
during the transition 1976-
1979 because it feared that
might make democratic
transition more difficult. They
are doing it now though.
Remember comparative
reference point here, collapse
of soviet union.
Third point: Portugal becomes
a democratic republic; Spain
will be organized as a
constitutional monarchy with a
limited practical role for the
monarch.
Vision of a federal Europe:
o Talking about the origins of the interests of economic and
political integration.
o 1
st
lesson involved trying to answer the question of what to
do with Germany. Three European wars involving Germany.
An interest in permanent settlement in the German
problem. Looking for a permanent solution to the
problem of Franco-German relations.
o 2
nd
lesson that some policy makers drew looking back:
1930s characterized by a series of trade wars
between and among European states. Increased
tariff protection.
Intuition going forward from that observation,
Europe has to find a way to encourage economic
independence, it has to be entrenched in some
fashion going forward to remove the ability or
incentive to use tariffs as an economic instrument of
foreign policy.
o 3
rd
lesson:
Argument about the downside of state sovereignty
the intuition is that state sovereignty should not be
absolute post 1945.
An argument that Europeans have to find a way to
weaken the distinction between interstate anarchy
and domestic hierarchy.
If you want to establish permanent peace, you have
to escape interstate anarchy.
And you do that by building supranational political
authority above states, the linchpin.
Very different way of political organization in
Europe.
The difficulty is that it might be desirable but it is in
the short term not feasible to directly move towards
supranational authority above states. And one of the
readings makes this point, no common language,
long history of national rivalries, and deeply
embedded national traditions. So how do you move
towards the construction of the appropriate type of
institutions at the supranational level?
Solution: You pursue political integration,
supranational political integration peacefully and
incrementally, not all at once.--> political integration
something to be accomplished over a long time
horizoin. It also implies you have to approach the
problem of integration indirectly. So what you do is
the third point:
You begin with small steps that involve
cooperation in relatively narrow economic
areas. What you hope for through time is the
emergence of political integration. Economic
integration is going over time to lock states in,
difficult to turn back, an argument of a kind
of path dependence. The more deeply
integrated economies are the more likely it is
they will buy political necessity and develop
an interest in sharing political authority.
visionary point of view held by those
imagined something different for Europe
politically in the future, basically a federal
Europe.
So pay attention to the lessons, and how
those lessons were applied + strategic
thinking of how economic integration was to
contribute to political integration.-->
European Coal and Steel community An
economic instrument with political goals in
mind, a step that will lock members into
deeper forms of integration, the seedbed for
the European Union.
END.
Lecture #5:
Midterm is October 15
th
, Wednesday after thanksgiving Monday. Short essay
format, hell give us more information later on.
Done with Howard and Mazower, Moving on to Philpott
Should be reading Philpott and Bunce this week.
Moving towards the end of Topic 1 and starting to leave behind the long 19
th

century.
Going to start to talk about the European state system. Today and
Wednesday, moving on to discussion of Bunce reading and division of east
and west in contemporary politics.
Taking the territorial state as the basic structure of European politics.
o To this point in the discussion of the long 19
th
century, we have talked
about how Europe might be politically organized, thought in terms of
different political regimes.
o Some form of autocratic, democratic regime or somewhere in
between.
o Under what were the regime alternatives for European politics?
o Democracy as a political regime was only fully consolidated in
Western Europe in 1945 w/ some exceptions.
o We can think about regimes as specifications of the rules of the
political game. While states refer to the territorial lines.
o But theres nothing in the definition of the political regime whom the
rules apply to
o Over whom will these rules hold?
o What type of political regime is most appropriate? We are asking a
question about how political relations should be organized within
states. States are a constant in European political life. There is lots of
churning European politics post 1789 around this question about
appropriate type of political regime. But theres one feature of
European politics that goes relatively unchallenged in the long 19
th

century importance of territory in politics and the importance of
the state as an expression of territorial politics. States are the basic
structure of European society, there will be limits or qualifications we
might introduce to that proposal of proposition. But they are
relatively marginal.
o When we say that the state is the most basic political structure in
Europe by extension implying that the state is the most basic
political structure in international society in general.
An argument that the state as a principal of political
organization is something that can be exported, imitated, and
replicated elsewhere.
The origins of the importance of the state in intl. society has its
own origins in the emergence of the territorial state in
European political history.
o States do have a historical origin- philpott argues.
o Once the state system is consolidated becomes kind of political
equilibrium suggesting that it becomes something relatively
difficult to change or challenge.
o This equilibrium ties political order to territory. A sticky
equilibrium very difficult to change, challenged at the margins only.
o Imagine what a political equilibrium would be like that supplied order
without states. We tend to take states as something natural and
associate with thte supply of order
o Territorial states have 3 important characteristics:
Centralized.
Specialized.
Monopolize the legitimate use of force within their territories.
o Some challenges to the importance of the principal of the state but as
he has indicated they have tended to be marginal.
o These challenges are:
One challenge is anarchism a political commitment to try to
find a way to supply political order without the centralize
specialized agencies of the state.
Of some historical importance in terms of radical
democracy and some forms of socialism in the 19
th

century
As a credible alternative to the challenge of the state has
withered away in European politics.
Commitment to pluralism a pluralist tries to hollow out the
state from within. To break the centralizing control of the state
within its borders, at least by limiting it or diluting it. Like
attempts to regionalize politics so that state authority and
power is devolved from special agencies at the center, to the
regional elected assemblies of some kind. That kind of
pluralism is associated with federalism a federal state is still
a state but a federal state is not characterized by a central
power at the apex of the state.
Another example of pluralism is attempts to preserve
the autonomy of associations in civil society= hollowing
out the state.
Forms of transnational organizations and institutions the
institutions of European integration. Especially those
institutions that we associate with supranational institutions,
institutions that exist above the member states of the EU and if
these institutions work successfully they limit the power and
capacity of member states. EU is just one.
One kind of challenge to the state system which isnt really
those movements within the peripheries of existing states that
seek through a process of succession to form a new state.
Succession is in some ways a politically conservative force as it
doesnt challenge the principal of the state, it simply
reproduces the organizing logic of societies of states.
o This is why states matter.
Philpott:
o Gives us an argument about the origins of the European system of
states.
o Interesting twist in what he wants to argue. Theres a conventional
part and one thats more original.
o First part of Philpotts argument:
Draws on whole book not just required reading
Origins of the system of sovereign states in Europe can be
found in the Peace of Westphalia series of peace treaties
signed in the middle part of the 17
th
century everyone has
argued that in some way
o 2
nd
part of his argument:
Westphalia is primarily a byproduct of the protestant
reformation.
No protestant reformationno peace of Westphalia no
consolidation of the state system in the middle part of the 17
th

century.
The peace of Westphalia is a real critical juncture, a before and
after. Not just an incremental mile markera fundamental
break from the past. Puts European politics on a new direction
not available before the peace treaty.
Westphalia is robust i.e. the provisions of the treaty continue to
endure today and to have consequences. 400 years after the
treaty was signed.
Peace of Westphalia is a peace settlement that ended wars of
religion, it removes religion as a cause of war between states in
Europe. A peace settlement which ends wars of religion. And
consists of three treaties signed in 1648, treaties that ended 3
wars, one between Spain and Netherlands, another between
holy roman emperor and Sweden and one that ended war
between France and holy Roman empire.
Peace of Westphalia has 4 important elements that organize
political life going forward in basic ways:
The principals of Westphalia are intended to apply to all
of Europe. Thats despite the fact that the signatories to
these treaties were major powers. The principals were
to extend to Europe as a whole.
It rejected universal papal and imperial authority in
favor of state authority.
Westphalia treats states as formally equal.
Westphalia contributes to the principal of non-
intervention of one state in the internal affairs of
another state.
In a nutshell what Westphalia entrenches is the distinction
between domestic hierarchy and interstate anarchy.
States are equal, autonomous and they are not subject to any
overarching authority or sovereign power.
From these principals, flow 2 basic questions that orient a
great deal of political through from 1648 going forward:
How in the absence of an overarching sovereign
authority can peace be maintained among states? It
removes religion as a cause of war but does not
diminish other causes of war precisely because of the
absence of sovereign authority between and among
states.
How in the presence of centralized political authority
within states might abuses of authority be limited?
Those are classic questions of normative and political
theory.
The peace of Westphalia is an event, an episode.
The peace of Westphalia is a result of a very specific quarrel
between Protestants and Catholics an argument about
doctrine and faith within the Catholic Church, an argument that
quickly becomes politicized. Its the ideas in dispute between
Catholics and Protestants, the protest propositions that
provide the connection between religious conflict and the
reformation and the principals of Westphalia as just outlined.
Theres something about the protestant challenge to
Catholicism that enabled the emergence of a system of states.
Important points:
Westphalia consolidates a process of historical change;
its an event that crystalized a long-term process of
historical change.
Its a settlement that comes after a series of wars. In a
sense t hats why I call it a political equilibrium,
consequence of negotiations among parties that
produced an agreement.
Westphalia elevates the state and diminishes empire.
Dooms the long-term longevity of the Holy Roman
empire.
Westphalia as a religious settlement non-intervention
principal of Westphalia had a very particular theological
meaning no intervention to contest religion within
another rulers territory non-intervention emerged as
a principal in a religious context. Thats the principal
Philpot argues that removes religion as a cause of war.
Next point is an extension of last point takes the
settlement to be a protestant victory because it allowed
wide parts of Europe to remain protestant. And the
political device that protected Protestants was the
principal of sovereign statehood (important point).
Qualification to Ps argument:
o Basic counterfactual argument of what would
happen historically under different
circumstances.
o What he is arguing is that without the
reformation, the principal of sovereign statehood
might well have become entrenched in European
politics but would have occurred much later in
historical time. The long run tendency of political
development in Europe was towards
convergence on the principal of sovereign states.
But this process was crystalized in a particular
way in the middle part of the 17
th
century as a
consequence of the terms of the settlement.
Point 8: the content of protestant theology counts in
understanding the origins of the state system, core
ideas in the reformation which connect it to the
reformation of Westphalia.
Leading to 9
th
point: when Protestants challenge
Catholicism, they challenge in part how Catholicism is
politically organized. The protestant heresy is a
challenge to universal religion and political form
associated with this universal religion. Challenge
theology of Catholicism and in doing so they challenge
the connection between Catholicism and a universal
empire. Do so in the following way: the reformation
implies a very different form of political organization
than the organization associated with the holy roman
empire, it implies national churches organized within a
territory, dependent upon a territorial government, and
it further implies the transfer of the churches temporal
powers to secular rulers. The reformation in other
words implies sovereignty of states. In an intrinsic
connection between reformation theology and an
interest in sovereignty.
10
th
point: this is a settlement of a war and wars have
winners and losers. So how do you understand the way
that forces broke politically during the war, and the
eventual outcome of the negotiations that we produced
the treaties that we associate with the peace of
Westphalia. They break in very clear ways. Those who
fought for Westphalia are uniformly protestant
Netherlands, German protestant states, and Sweden.
And important feature of these cases is that each
experienced a reformation crisis in the middle part of
the 16
th
century. These are the states that determined
the terms. Who fought against? Those parts in which the
protestant reformation were either unsuccessful or
eventually rolled back via a process of
counterreformation. Where the protestant challenges
was ruled back, including: those parts of German that
were catholic, Spain, Italy, and Poland. This is how the
forces lined up and they fought a series of sustained
wars around issues of religion as a consequence of the
protestant challenge to the old way.
The case or country who decided who would win:
where France would ally itself. France interesting case.
o France experiences the protestant reformation,
but attempt to rollback protestant reformation in
France. That counterreformation in France is
never as successful as it was in Spain, Italy and
Poland. And France is a sense divided, can go
either way but opts to support protestants in the
wars of religion because it sees advantage for
France unconnected to religion, an opportunity
to advance its interests if it plays its cards in this
way notions of raison detat
We have identified one important challenge to
organized Catholicism: the protestant challenge that
originates as a heresy. But there is a different kind of
challenge to Catholicism in a different context:
republican challenges.
o Republicanism becomes a way to challenge
organized Catholicism in those societies in which
the protestant reformation is unsuccessful or
rolled back. Think of the cases where
republicanism in the 19
th
and earlier 20
th

centuries where its a real challenge to
Catholicism. Catholics vs republicans especially
Catholics supportive of a monarchy of some kind.
Countries with deep division between Catholics
vs republicans. Three cases come to mind where
the republican question is very important in this
time period
France, Spain, Italy.
In all of these cases, cases in which
society still are predominately catholic
you get challenges to Catholicism that
dont take the form of protestant, but
republicanism.
Lecture #6: (September 17, 2014)
o Reading notes on mycourses and some lecture material from topic 1.
o Should be finishing Philpott and starting B hell be starting B on
Monday
o Recapping some bit from last class.
o Pursue a point made last class, a before Westphalia and after
Westphalia.
o An event centered explanation of the origin of the state system in
Europe, or an argument about how historical process crystalizes in
the middle part of the 17
th
century a capstone to a longer process to
historical change and political revolution in Europe. State formation
as a process and not event.
o Two different types of states distinction that matter in how we
interpret early modern European political history.
Rational/legal states and patrimonial states.
o East- West divide in political history and the way it ties into types of
states.
o Recap:
Core of Westphalia the importance of the sovereignty of
states. Have implications for how they are organized
domestically and how they interact in a society of states.
Emphasize that for P, state sovereignty is a protestant
device/invention. A commitment that protects the
organization of protestant churches and belief.
Emphasize the importance for P, of the timing of Westphalia
and by timing we mean the link of reformation and pece of
Westphalia. The conversion to the idea of sovereign state
comes shortly after the arrival of Protestantism.
The powers that fight for Westphalia are cases in which
reformation crisis is closely tied to their interest in
participation. German protestant states, NL, Sweden and
against that group of powers we have a series of powers
closely connected to the holy roman empire and Catholicism
Spain, Italy Poland. Catholic German principalities
Every polity that came to have an interest in a system of
sovereign state had experienced a strong reformation crisis.
And the powers that are pitted against these are cases in which
the reformation did not take deep rote or were pushed back by
counterreformation.
This is a political settlement of religious warsalso a political
equilibrium a result of interaction among states that
becomes very difficult to dislodge. Itll have knock-on
consequences for centuries. Very hard to imagine an
alternative to what this political equilibrium implies, it implies
that political order is going to be state centered moving
forward. States are critical to the supply of political order.
Exceptions to note about the centrality and endurance
of the principal of state centered political order
o 2 contemporary ways in which you might think
this principal is in some ways being challenged
or being limited in contemporary Europe.
o The institutions of the European Union can be
taken to be a kind of challenge to or limit to
sovereign state authority
Counter to that: simply to propose that
the institutions of the EU still depend on
states. In 2 simple ways: the dominant
actors that matter in the EU continue to
be states, and you can think of the
European Union as constituted by a series
of treaties signed by member states.
Not to say that the process of political
integration is simply a reproduction of
state power, there are ways in which the
EU limits the capacity of sovereign states.
So we should not exaggerate the limits
associated with the institutions of the
European Union.
State sovereignty is still such an
important principal in euro politics
challenge for depending of the EU
One thing to widen it by bringing
more states in but deepening
means imposing more limits on
sovereign power of states.
o The process of new state formation as a
consequence of succession:
Scotland, Catalonia, Basque, Flanders all
places in which there is some interest in
devolution of political power from central
authority to these regions or complete
withdrawal of territory to form a new
state.
These are cases that reproduce the
principal of the state. What they imagine
is an international society composed of
new states, not one organized around a
different set of constiuit principals.
Scotland for example reemphasizes the
importance of the state. Reorganizes the
logic.
Moving on to before Westphalia topic:
o Philpott:
What Philpott is interested in is emphasize the importance of
ideas in politics in general, and in international politics. By
doing so, hes trying to playdown the importance of structures,
enduring structures that shape political outcomes.
Ideas that matter to him are the ideas of protestant
reformation, but you cant explain all of politics in terms of
structures and institutions; you need to focus on ideas.
Giving us a counter to what Philpott is arguing both about the
reformation and ideas in abstract theoretical terms. Giving us a
sense of the origins and evolutions of the state system as a
process, an argument that pays attention to structure more
than ideas. In this perspective Westphalia matters, but it is a
capstone of a long process of historical change. You need to
grasp the logic of this process, but cant if you just focus on
ideas.
Before Westphalia:
Politically organized as an empire, the empire closely
connected to the catholic church, and in economic terms
this period of European History (12
th
century -17
th

century) organized in a futile system, futile mode of
production.
Why does this matter?
o Empire: Philpott argues that Westphalia
diminishes empire and elevates the state, Empire
as a principal of political organization is
beginning to be pushed off the historical stage.
What matters about Empire for philpott: it
doesnt have fixed territorial parameters + very
difficult to identify places where political
sovereignty is concentrated, hard to find
supreme center of political authority, a political
mosaic as Philpott describes metaphorically.
Implies a set of political jurisdictions that
tend to overlap
In other words: before states begin to
emerge, there is no effective distinction
between domestic and international
politics. And thats what changes with
Westphalia.
12thcentury-1648 and what we want to try to identify
are the forces of change and evolution that allowed
Westphalia to be such a critical point (capstone).
So we want to identify different forms of political
organization that began to emerge, ones that were
different from empire one of those forms would be the
state.
o Want to know the options/alternatives to the
state, then explain how the state came to
dominate.
o So we need to identify some kind of change in
this period, some macro change that allowed
new political options to emerge, options
organized differently than structure of an empire.
o What most identify as the shock that opened up
possibilities: a period or phase of economic
expansion in European economy. Trade
increases dramatically, period in which
economic division of labor becomes specialized
and differentiated, and third a process of change
that produces a much greater rate of urban
growth/urbanization. An exogenous change in
European economy that results in the growth of
towns.
o Urbanization occurs in three patterns in the
context of early modern Europe and its those
patterns that are associated with different forms
of political organization.
o There are polities usually connected to
commercially successful urban centers/cities,
polities that will pursue autonomy on their own,
these will be regions in which urbanization is
high and relatively concentrated. When
urbanization is high autonomous city-states.
Classic examples are the Italian city-states. No
central authority/coordination.
o Another pattern emerges where urbanization is
as important but not as concentrated as it is in
Italian city-states. Here we have regions or
territories that are not willing to risk autonomy.
What emerges in this pattern a series of states
that become organized in very loose
confederations. They coordinate among
themselves and form some kind of league or
confederation, a loose one of primarily urban
economies. And the important thing about this
pattern is that you dont get any significant
degree of political centralization in the league or
confederation. Here city states coordinate, but
the coordination is not substantial enough to
create a organized central authority within the
league.. example: the city states associated with
Germany.The Hanziatic league?
o Both of these options strictly speaking are not
territorial states, relatively small urban
economies though. Question is here is whether
they coordinate or they dont. That difference
present by the 14
th
and 15th century will have
important consequences going forward because
Italy and Germany in the modern period, post
1789, share one important political
characteristic theses states form relatively late
in historical time. Emerged through a process of
unification late in historical time, process in
becoming territorial states. Understandable
given how they started to gather concentrated
political authority.
o Third pattern which gives us the territorial state:
Urban centers ally with a political
authority that is in fact pursuing
territorial centralization.
Urbanization relatively lower than the
first two. And urban interests strike an
alliance with a political authority that is
extending control over territory. That is
the nucleus for the territorial state.
Example: first full blown territorial state,
the one that sets in motion a process
thatll be replicated is France.
What does this imply about French
exceptionalism? France is first
territorial state, decides how
religious wars would be settled,
and third is the home of the most
important republican challenge to
old regimes (FR).
State formation in france vs germany: the
process by which state forms in Germany
is in many ways a conscious process by
which particular elites and parts of
territory of Germany take the lead. For
France process by which states emerge,
but not as conscious as the German case.
We have 3 options and we know that the
principal of the territorial state dominates.
But not told why.
In a sense its a selection process
and the state emerges as the
winner.
Simplified: some extent
combination of survival of the
fittest, it has a competitive edge, +
deliberate imitation i.e. it is
diffused through a process of
imitation.
France illustrates how regimes and states are different.
Types of state:
Distinction b/w rational-legal states and patrimonial
states.
Why it matters? Argues that the patrimonial state is
characteristic of states in what we call for the moment
Eastern Europe. Most importantly the East is
represented by Russia, and the organizing principals of
the Russian empire are patrimonial principals. To
distinguish east and west we have to understand the
different types of states that emerged in the early
modern period in both east and western Europe.
Rational-Legal state most typically occurring in WE.
o Features: you have an independent state
bureaucracy, you can make a distinction
between state and society.. other words: a
differentiated public administration that has 2
important features individuals will fill these
positions chosen a basis of merit. Access to
positions in the state bureaucracy is not tied to
patronage. You cant build a family dynasty in the
public bureaucracy of a rational legal state.
Driven by merit. And non-elected and not
susceptible o patronage politics. (Ideally)
o These offices are very well defined in terms of
their duties and responsibilities. Individuals who
hold those offices can thus be held responsible
for their performance.
o 3
rd
feature: there is some kind of balance
between the resources that the state extracts
from society and the kinds of services it provides
for its population. A sense of reciprocity, states
do things essentially public goods in exchange
for the resources etracted
o 4
th
important principal: states have
infrastructural power. They penetrated society,
close relations between state and society.
o Rational legal states are the outgrowth of the
Westphalian state.
o This sets up a contrast with the patrimonial state
Patrimonial State:
o Difficult to establish a distinction between state
and society, between the private and public
sphere.
o The state and its territory is the private property
of the ruler or prince, part of his household and
administered as such.
o 2
nd
important feature: its public administration
is not differentiated. And offices are filled via
different mechanisms compared to a rational
legal state. Offices can be bought and sold like
property, even through inheritance/legacy.
Offices can be allocated via personalism
patronage much more important almost a
defining feature of administration in patrimonial
state.
o END.

Lecture September 22, 2014
Start reading topic 2 as topic 2 starts Wednesday.
The different types of states introduced as of last class, distinction between
rational legal and patrimonial state. It helps us understand the historical
origins between east and west.
Rational legal state:
o Most typically occurring state in Western Europe.
o Clear distinction between public and private here, between state and
society.
o Suggests that there is a public administration that is specialized and
differentiated from society.
o State bureaucracy here then have some important characteristics
outlined last class:
A bureaucracy that is staffed on principal of merit and
performance in office is connected to merit
The offices that define S-B are well defined in terms of
duties/responsibilities.
Patrimonial State:
o Distinction between private and public is difficult to draw.
o As is the distinction between state and society.
o Reason that a patrimonial state is like this in the context of a
patrimonial state, territory is essentially apart of the household
economy of the ruler or prince.
o Without this public private distinction and state and society, you get a
distinctive type of state bureaucracy. key contrast between the two.
o State offices can be considered a form of private property, can be past
on within family, can be bought and sold, and thus patronage politics
are much more important here.
o Tend to be associated with economies that have not made full
transition to industrialism. Economies that tend to continue to depend
on an agrarian sector. And economies that are usually not fully
monetized depend on barter is what that means.
o Patrimonial states may have tremendous despotic power over
subjects. But lack infrastructural power, states that have not really
deeply penetrated societies. Not intertwined with social organizations,
and as a consequence they tend to be organized exploitation of
resources from society, but provide relatively little in return for that
extraction. Contrast with RL states: tend to have infrastructural
power, they are not parasitic on society/economy, they have sunk
roots into social organizations, and delivers something in return in
terms of services. A reciprocal relationship between state and
society/economy. Another way to put the contrast: rational legal
states deliver public goods that are widely distributed, the goods
provided by patrimonial states tend to be more privatized and
personalized directed @ specific segments in the population. Political
patronage relied upon in patrimonial states.
East/West division:
o Bunce: makes the basic point that the distinction between east and
west is not the only distinction, but what she calls the most striking
contrast.
The contrast b/w E and W predates the period of state
socialism. The division between east and west is not just an
artifact of the cold war, the contrast predates the period of
state socialism (post-1945).
The differences between east and west are durable. i.e. still
important after the collapse of communism in late 80s early
90s. The historical mold is set relatively early in political
history and historical time and the differences are transferred
over time so to speak in political culture and institutions.
Rational legal vs patrimonial states: patrimonial states often
associated with the politics of empire, and imperial
organization occurs much more longer and later in time in
eastern Europe than it is in western Europe.
If the pattern is set early in time and reproduced through time
i.e. durable it implies a kind of determinism hard to get off
the path of development associated with E and W.
Russia will personify of the east in the east/west binary.
1945 is a very visible date in the history of the east and west.
Emphasized by K&K.
What historically lies behind the emergence of state socialism
in 1945 you are led back to 1917, no Russian revolution no
state socialism-> 1917 counts as it introduces state socialism
into the politics of Eastern Europe.
Bunce then implies, you have to ask: why was the revolution in
Russia that took a socialist form that led to a communist
regime? Argues about the distinctive feature of the political
institutions of the Russian Empire Russian Exceptionalism.
Something distinctive about it that enables social and
political revolution in ways that dont occur in the West.
And those distinctive features are those of a patrimonial
state
Type of institutional structure that will be vulnerable from
challenge from below.
Rational legal states are more difficult to overturn, the
patrimonial institutions of the Russian Empire are those types
of institutions radicals can imagine doing away with all
together, it is parasitical, penetrated society, and in that
context that a Marxist revolution occurs.
Russian Exceptionalism Political organization of Russian
state.
How did those three empires collapse in the aftermath of
WWI?
3 imperial structures that organized EE.
Ottoman, Hapsburg, Russian. All 3 collapsed.
1 reemerges as a new form of imperial structure
organized around a Russian core and committed to
socialist principles.
o Topic 2:
State and nation formation in our 4 major cases in Western
Europe.
Britain France Italy Germany.
Basic contrast drawn: early state and nation formation and late
state and nation formation.
2 cases of early state and nation formation: GB and France.
2 cases of late state and nation formation: Germany and Italy
We are going to compare the 2 early developers, GB and France,
with these questions:
To identify the different types of states which emerge in
both cases.
Rational Legal states distinction within, 2 types here:
o Unitary state or a state union/compensate state
Compensate state: GB
Unitary State: France
How territorial politics emerge in these cases?
o Argues that accommodation is characteristic of
how the British nation state was formed. In
contrast with France, the pattern is not
accommodation but assimilation.
o Assimilation vs Accommodation contrasts. And
paying attention to how closely each of these
cases matches the model or the idea of a nation
state.
o British state is a multinational state in a way
French are not. It recognizes regional differences
that historically the French have been unwilling
to do.
o Tremendous consequences for territorial politics
therefore. No coincidence that there was a
referendum in Scotland.
Contrast their political and religious settlements: point
being that there is a political and religious settlement
reached relatively early in GB, it accepts a liberal
constitutional monarchy, in GB political history the CM
is a very durable institutions that has not undergone
challenge in centuries. @ the same time there was a
religious settlement that emerged early in British
political history, it identified this CM as a protestant
monarchy. Exception of which is Ireland. It is isolated
and integrated in very different ways than the rest of
the protestant Britain because it is catholic.
Contrast is France: this settlement occurs much later in
time. Modern French political history categorized by
division and contestation about the political form of
regime, republic vs monarchy. France in some ways
may be a catholic society, but the republican dimension
of French political culture is in some ways hostile to
Catholicism. The importance of republicanism FR
political history meant that the settlement occurred
much later.
o Comparison between Germany and Italy:
Attention to the context to which the both emerged
To the fact that they emerged as late industrializers, GB and FR
had already begun to fully experience the industrial revolution
by the time that Germany and Italy are emerging as states. And
late industrializers tend to face some problems catching up.
Consequences of state emergence due to late industrialization:
States are fairly deeply involved in the mgmt. of the
economy.
State power is used in the process of catching up. But
why catch-up? To compete industrially b/c if you cant
compete industrially may not be able to preserve your
independence in anarchical state society.--> geo-
strategic context, a competitive state system.
States in Italy and Germany play a leading role in
encourage industrialization. Directly involved for
example in the financing of new industry. Theyll
become directly involved putting in place tariff barriers
that protect infant industries.
States that are emerging in the period of mass political
mobilization states emerging in a period In which the
working class is becoming politically active. Has to face difficult
of integrating the working class into political institutions.
Late 19
th
century Europe is entering the age of nationalism.
And an important impotence for the formation of these states
will be to link nations to states. More to say later.
These are states relatively early in their history thatll
experience the shocks of war and defeat.
Final point about state formation in terms of these late
developers: to some extent state formation is a kind of
conscious process, it is led by elites who are trying to create in
a relatively short period of time a set of institutions. Elite
politics and institution creation, and the contrast with early
developers, is state development much longer historical
process and not as subject to a before and after, a moment @
which states are crystalized.
Stepping back to talk about states and nations as organizing concepts:
o Middle part of the 19
th
century political ideal at which Europe was
imagined to be organized, the model i.e. of where states should be
moving through time in the middle of 19
th
century this ideal is the
nation state.
Its basically a form of political organization where the
boundaries of the nation match the boundaries of the state
o Arguments made for nation state as an ideal:
A NS is easier to govern as it is organized around a shared
sense of solidarity.
Because certain sorts of potential divisions are removed from
politics.
In fact a long-standing argument in 19
th
century that
liberalism was most compatible with the NS.
That liberalism depended on a shared sense of identity
2
nd
argument: NS have some comparative advantage in intl.
politics.
States with have nations in other words, are states with
populations that are willing to make sacrifices on behalf
of the nation state.
From 1850 to relatively recently, nationalism has been seen as
a civilizing and progressive force. Important in the context of
late 19
th
century. As well nationalism is associated with
unification and or expansion. National movements are
expected to be movements for national unification.
Final point: liberal nationalism is not a contradiction in terms.
Nationalism consistent with progress, and an expression of
political modernization.
The LR expectation is that borders of nations and states will
grow to align. And when they dont align, there is tension and
conflict thatll have to be reconciled. This LR tendency under
modernity is one in which nations and states come to be
recognized implies that nationalism will be associated with
assimilation
Nationalism in the modern period, another point: 1850 going
forward nation states will tend to be relatively large as a
consequence of the association between nationalism and
unification. But also because of certain features of European
politics in the late 19
th
and early 20
th
centuries.
They had to be large enough to survive, as small ones would be
perished incorporated and assimilated or exist simply at the
margins of European society.
Implies that optimal size of states from roughly 1850
from 1970/80 is large.
Why?
o 2 arguments connected to economies of scale
o Interstate anarchy in Euro society makes self-
preservation of states important and to an extent
difficult. And larger states have a better chance
of surviving than smaller states, and incentive
towards the process of unification.
o There are economic incentives to become parts
of larger economic organizations, because as this
happens you gain access to larger national
markets. Both military and economic incentives
therefore to become parts of larger holes.
o One implication of the argument: as those
incentives change, and they will, nationalism will
no longer associated with unification. Post 1945-
WE, with the absence of interstate war and
emergence of economic independence, you see
pressures of fragmentation for existing states in
places such as Scotland Catalonia etc.
o Interdependence means that the optimal size of
states can be smaller under the conditions of
economic competition.
Lecture September 24, 2014:
List of proposed essay topics should be up on mycourses by Friday +
guidelines of expectations.
All topics that need to be fine tuned, they have to be worked by us to become
suitable for a paper.
Outline up for topic II.
Running through some features of the British State:
o A composite state, in contrast to a unitary state (French)
Composite state captured in very notion of the United Kingdom,
emerges historically as a union of kingdoms and built
progressively from the extension of authority from central
core British state formed through a process of incorporation
and subordination of rival powers on the British Isles.
Key dates in process of incorporation:
1535
1707
1801
Dates that refer in sequence to the incorporation of
Wales, Scotland, and Ireland
In all of these moments, a common pattern exists: this
process is one in which these local communities give up
any kind of representative assembly that mightve been
characteristic of their politics at the moment of
incorporation true for Wales and more important in
terms of Scotland and Ireland.
Also a process of incorporation that recognizes certain
types of institutional differences in local communities-
Ireland a bit different.
In the case of Wales and then Scotland:
Wales:
o a separate religious organization is allowed to be
maintained in Wales emergence of Methodism
in Welsh society/culture.
o Attempts to limit the use of Welsh, but religious
difference are accepted. A variation of
Protestantism that is.
o Methodism is basically the place in which the
Welsh language is preserved. It is the language of
religious belief and practice.
o Wales goes forward politically without any
representative assembly, becomes more
important through time through the process of
democratization as assemblies become more
important for expression of political opinion and
places for political organizations to pursue
political agendas.
Scotland:
o Act of Union 1707 Scotland becomes fully
integrated into GB.
o 2 important features:
It gives up legislature or parliament as a
result. An expression of the importance in
British political culture of parliamentary
sovereignty located in Westminster.
It may give up its legislature, but retains
other forms of institutional
distinctiveness. Such as a separate legal
system, a separate education system
(especially at university level), and a
distinctive protestant church. Important
kinds of institutions that may contribute
to the maintenance of distinctive types of
cultural identities.
No attempt to completely eradicate those institutions or
cultural differences that differentiate the Welsh or
Scottish from the English.--> a practice of a kind of
accommodation.
o Type of territorial politics:
UK:
Associated with practice of accommodation, recognition
or acceptance of certain kinds of differences.
:
o So far described, is a composite state on the one
hand but in a sense an emerging multinational
social structure.
o In allowing differences to be preserved in Wales
and Scotland, it is to acknowledge that one can
be British and also Scottish or Welsh.
o A composite state is willing to accept a model of
nation and state in which that state contains
more than one nation to put it simply.
The British and the English can live with local
communities that can maintain some cultural
commitment to a distinctive identity.
Leaving Ireland aside, we can talk about the nation:
shared commitment amongst England, Wales, Scotland
to some version of protestant practice and belief
Britain
Ireland not integrated/accommodated in the same way
as Scotland and Wales
1801: act of union strengthens the ties between Britain
and Ireland by removing the Irish parliament. Ireland
becomes progressively incorporated in political terms,
like Wales or Scotland.
Important differences for Ireland:
o It will continue post 1801 to be governed by the
British as if Ireland was an internal colony.
o The institutional arrangements that link the
British government to Ireland, are much closer
than those relationships that would connect the
British government to parts of its blue sea
empire.--> Ireland as an internal colony.
o More difficult in other words for the British to
accept cultural differences in Ireland, because
Ireland is a catholic society from the POV of
British authorities.
o Administrative structure that emerges by which
Ireland is governed, and integrated, is similar to
that of those in the Blue Sea empire. 2 key offices
here:
Lord and Tennant.
Police force that is controlled by the
metropol i.e. by the British government.
1922:
o South of Ireland in effect breaks away from Great
Britain and forms the Irish Free State. Ireland
now divided between the North and South.
Northern Ireland a part of the UK, and 1922
onwards recognized as Great Britain & the
United Kingdom.
o Matters why? Here is a powerful territorial state
in Europe that gives up territory, very unusual in
European political history.
o Ireland is an exception in lots of ways, it is
catholic instead of protestant and by the latter
part of the 19
th
century it is beginning to break
with the liberal constitutional monarchy of Great
Britain.
o The movement of independence that results in
the Irish Free State is a movement organized
around a challenge not just to the territorial
structure of the British State, but to its regime
form as well.
o Irish revolutionaries are republicans, and they
are challenging not just territorial integrity of the
state, but rejecting the government
characteristic of GB.
o In Scotland and Wales same period: politics
becomes rationalized in Ireland (1850-formation
of Irish Free State). In Ireland first demand for
changes in the status quo doesnt take the form
of a claim to be completely independent, the first
goal is simply to be able to retrieve a
representative assembly or parliament. The
parliament given up in 1801. Demands for what
was known in the British context as home rule.
o Similar sorts of demands for home rule emerged
in Scotland, to a lesser extent in Wales. In Wales
and Scotland, the interst in home rule never
became radicalized into a demand for
independence. In large part because these are
societies that found a reasonable place of
accommodation in British politics, unlike the
Irish. Catholics were excluded from political
office and restrictions on the right to vote well
into the 19
th
century for example.
o And as demands for home rule were rejected by
the British government as being too extreme,
Irish nationalists increased their demands. The
more they refused, the more interest they had
going forward along the path of outright
independence.
o Ireland left Great Britain but remained a part of
the British empire, not a fully fledged
independent state in international society until
1949.
o 1922-1949 Irish free state retained the status
or rank of a dominion in the British Empire.
o 1949 when it declared itself a republic for the
first time, it left the common wealth.
o Its independence was achieved in progressive
stages therefore between 1922-1949.
o The Irish Free State was the result of two
important processes or interactions between
Irish politicians (republicans) and the British
government.
1. The Anglo-Irish war. Period in which
Irish republicans used force and coercion
in an attempt to induce concessions from
the British state. BS refused for quite a
long period of time to be pressured by
such means, and responded more or less
in kind with the use of force. But in
1921 British government decided to
some extent to cut its losses, to make
some concession. Conceded Ireland can
take up status of dominion, would not
allow Ireland to move directly to a
Republican form of government because
it was feared that if they conceded that it
would threaten the integrity of the British
Empire, encouraging other parts of the BE
to seek outright independence. Important
concession while still empire preserving.
2. Political motive to allow for dominion
status for Ireland: British PM at the time
wanted to remove Ireland from British
politics in order to remove the
importance of the territorial cleavage
from British politics. This was a way by
which the British PM sought to realign
British Politics. LT goal being to allow the
emergence of a party of the political
center, powerful liberal party.
Ongoing fear or paranoia or suspicion about what the
Irish were really up to, the possibility that this would be
a kind of Trojan horse within the British political
system for Catholicism. + Ireland was of some strategic
importance given the geopolitical location of the British
isles. The act of union 1801 followed after an attempt
for certain Irish politicians to find common cause or
alliance with France. But there is a multinational
structure described earlier. A sense of Scotland as a
subset nation by letting those institutions flourish, a
sense of cultural identity.
1997:
o we see the creation of legislatures in Scotland
and Wales via referenda in Scotland and Wales
o in Perspective: these are legislatures that are
relatively limited in terms of the capacities or
powers that they have. Important to emphasize
that these legislatures exist strictly speaking at
the behest of the British house of commons.
Strictly speaking they could be removed through
an act or statute of parliament, thats to say that
these are legislatures that do are not part of the
federation. This is a process of devolution of
political power and does not take the form of
creating federal institutions.
o What would a federation look like in the British
case? What would it have to have?
Federations divide power between levels:
the central level and federal level. To be
able to divide and separate powers
property, federations almost invariably
require a written constitution.
So a federation in Britain would imply a
change to a longstanding feature of
British political culture, i.e. a commitment
to unwritten constitution.
Federations, also because they divide
power, are incompatible with the notion
that sovereignty is located in a central
parliament such as the British House of
Commons.
If you move to a fully federal system, you
might also have to give up the
commitment in British political culture to
the importance of parliamentary
sovereignty. And parliamentary
sovereignty is important because its
through this notion that the British
imposed constitutional limits on
monarchial power.
These are relatively limited kinds of
concessions. Local legislatures in Scotland
and Wales come up after centuries.
At the top of all this continues to be the
British House of Commons until 2014 and
the referendum that just ended, which
was a NO.
So why would the British government
agree to put in legislatures in S and W?
Consequences?
These legislatures encouraged
Welsh and Scottish politicians to
demand more autonomy; it gave
them an institutional baseline in
which to build. If youre lucky
enough to get a parliament, of
course you want it to have more
power. It gave some light to
Scottish nationalists whom at the
end of the day dreamed of having a
state of their own.
With these 2 legislatures, if you
conceive more authority and
power to one, the other legislature
is going to expect and demand the
same.
It may be a no, but it is going to
potentially really change the
territorial structure of British
politics.
Third dimension of this comparison in the British case:
o The political and religious settlement in British
politics:
Basic historical point: the civil wars that
characterized British politics, the British
revolutions of the 1600s, were more
complete and durable than the political
and religious settlements that
characterized French politics. And also
occurred much earlier in time.
The religious settlement in some sense
was fairly simple protestant nation, but
still the exception of Ireland.
2
nd
point: the political settlement was
relatively early achieved, and
extraordinarily durable. The political
system was also relatively complete, and
again the only challenge to the political
settlement is Ireland (whom has interest
in republicanism).
Political settlement is organized around a
constitutional monarch limited by the
power of parliament.
It has never been seriously challenged
Different way to put that point: the
question of political regime in Britain was
settled relatively early, Ireland is the
exception (in terms of religious
settlement, territorial structure and in
terms of type of regime).

Lecture September 29, 2014
Next week conference no assigned reading, a chance to go over material for
the midterm.
Check my courses for information to be found on the midterm and on topics
for the essay
8-10 topics can choose topic of your own in consultation with the teacher or
the TA.
Topics 1 and 2, and some part of topic 3 will be covered. Completing topic 2
Wednesday, latest Monday of next week. Rule of thumb: you can tell what to
focus on in the readings by what he emphasizes on in the lecture.
Covering tail end of Britain, going to cover France according to the outline in
Topic II, then doing the late developers comparisons.
Early developers Britain and France:
o Recap about political and religious settlements associated with British
political development:
Both settlements are achieved relatively early in British
political history and relatively durable
By mid 17
th
century, Britain is effectively the protestant nation
What holds Britain together as cultural and political unity is
shared religion.
May be differences with Wales and Scotland and England but
they are variations on the protestant theme
Same can be said for political regime issue of how it will be
governed removed relatively early from political contestation
Emerges from civil wars in 1600s as a liberal constitutional
monarchy
Liberal and constitutional part is associated from that point on
to commitment to parliamentary sovereignty sense or
notion that parliament sets limits on the authorities or
prerogatives of the monarch. Important commitment is
basic british political culture going forward.
o Irish Exception:
Ireland is the exception in a sense in all terms
Challenge to religious settlement Catholicism
Challenge to territorial structure of British state emerges in
latter part of the 19
th
century and happens in 1921 in the
formation of the Irish Free State
IFS: remains a part of the British Empire, 1921-1949 has the
status of a dominion in the British common wealth, like Canada.
Not fully independent. Until 1949, all Irish politicians have to
swear an oath to allegiance to the British monarch
Unusual to see a state that consents to give up part of its
territory.
Ireland is an exception in terms of territorial politics that is.
Ireland is also an exception in terms of regime politics, or
political settlement its catholic, but organizes its
independence movement around an alternative to the
institutions that characterize the British state.
Irish independence movements wants to establish a republic in
Ireland
1921-1922 Ireland divided, south of Ireland predominantly
catholic, north is predominantly protestant. North of Ireland
will remain apart of GB and the UK.
o Legacies of British pattern of political development, legacies that
became visible in the relatively recent post-war history of GB. Post
1945 and post 1960 specifically.
The continuing problem of Ireland:
The issue of the division of Ireland is a relatively
dormant, or unimportant political issue in Ireland or
British politics from the moment that Ireland is divided
in 1921 until 1966
Government in the south from 1921-1949 when it
became a republic into the 50s and 60s, more
concerned with consolidating the institutions of the
Irish state in the south
Mid 1960s marks a change in the political importance of
the north.
mid 1960s, Catholics in the north of Ireland, whom are a
minority in the north but part of the majority in the
country as a whole, begin to mobilize politically.-->
mobilization takes the form of political mobilization
thats modeled on the American civil rights movement,
non violent i.e. done on the street/demonstrations,
nonviolent initially.
Why this choice of political tactics?
o The formal institutions of NI worked against
Catholics, they were established so as to
maintain protestant domination in the north.
o Mobilization prompted in the sense from a
feeling of exclusion from political institutions.
o Early part of 1970s for the first time a power
sharing government is formed, which includes
Protestants and Catholics. That government lasts
less than 2 years.
o It was actually brought down by the resistance of
Protestants from the prospects of sharing
political power with a catholic minority.
o When it collapses the political situation in NI
quickly becomes polarization
o What occurs in the politics of the north is a
downward spiral, power sharing breaks down,
polarization emerges, and forces used both sides.
o Formation of paramilitary forces emerges on
both sides.
o This polarization of politics in the north and
introduction of violence motivates the British
government to intervene with military force of
its own, sends army troops to attempt to achieve
and maintain peace in NI.
o This intervention occurs relatively shortly after
the failure of power sharing power sharing
fails in 1974 and 1976 troops are visible. From
1976 into early 1990s, relations between
Catholics and protestants in the north are very
difficult
o In the middle part of the 1990s, peace agreement
signed and relations return to somewhat normal
politics.
o Legacy of Irish politics division continues to be
a political problem in Ireland and in Irish
/British relations.
2
nd
legacy we talk about:
o NO w/ a 10point difference.
o Should Scotland be an independent state
o results of the referendum having a knock on
effects/political consequences on multinational
social structures.
o Wales and Scotland were well integrated when
Ireland withdrew in 1921-1922.
o Obvious that Scotland is no longer as integrated
as it once was.
o In the latter part of the 19
th
century and early of
the 20
th
, demand for home rule has become a
demand for outright independence.
o Raises the question: how should territorial
politics be organized to accommodate the
multinational characteristics of british society
and culture? What should british political
institutions look like going forward?
o Parliament achieved for Scotland in 1977 no
longer enough to satisfy Scottish nationalists.
o Part of the reason they voted no is because if yes
then institutional change.
o Why might nationalists who have an interest in
independence, why might they vote no?
o What explains the limits on the support on
independence?
2 kinds of limits:
independence is risky, uncertain, there
are transition costs involved in making
the transition from incorporation to the
formation of an independent state. And if
you vote yes in these kinds of contexts,
you have to be able to anticipate and bare
the costs.
A barrier associated with transition costs
that make it difficult to mobilize support
for a yes vote. Those transition costs
amount to: Scotland would not be
guaranteed continued membership in the
EU, they would have to enter the process
of accession and entry like any other
potential member state, thats a loss as
Scotland is part of the EU as part of the
UK.
The other limit: loss of business
investment, the economic cost of
independence. The transition costs to get
to that state of economic viability might
be too high for the country to bare.
Connected to the potential loss of
investment.
Bank leaders and business leaders
pointed to the kinds of economic cost to
be borne if independence was chosen.
o You would bare these costs if things were that
bad, there is no systematic oppression.
o British political authorities basically made a
series of promises in the ways in which the
political situation in Scotland would be improved
o So if the costs are relatively high, and you dont
want to bare those costs, and you got that
message from Westminster, it encourages a Yes
vote.
o You are making a decision on part on how
credible you find the promises of the British
government when it publically promises more
devolution in the relations that define the
Scottish parliament and British political
institutions.
o More authority and power for the S- Parliament
o Implications of the referendum being a start of a
longer process of change in British politics:
British government cant provide too little
change to Scottish political institutions as
they wont live up to promises
And may force another referendum in the
future.
But they cant deliver too much, as it
would alienate other parts of GB Basic
dilemma, have to find a point of
compromise, enough for Scotland and not
too much for the rest of GB.
Further problem: whatever you give to
Scotland would likely become the
Standard that Wales expect. Devolution to
S may mean devolution all around.
At some point this process of devolution
of power to the peripheries may
encourage the English to demand/expect
a parliament of their own.
3
rd
kicker thats most telling a
multinational structure, in ideal terms
lets say, if you were to design the ideal
political institutions for that social
structure what would it look like? It
wouldnt look like what we have now
where Scotland and Wales have
legislatures with limited capacities. It
likely would involve more than just giving
these legislatures more power and
prerogatives .what it implies in the form
of accommodation is a form of federalism.
A federation implies a lot more than
devolution; we have devolution now but
no federation in Great Britain.
The house of commons is strictly
speaking the agent that controls the kinds
of powers that Scotland and Wales will
hold in their legislatures
So heres the kicker, what does a
federation imply and when you take this
into account can this be put in place in
GB?
A federation, historically, implies a
written constitution, and the purpose of a
written constitution is to first of all
explicitly divide power between the
federal legislature and the legislatures at
the local level. Westminster at the center
and the Scottish and Welsh parliaments.
2
nd
the constitution in effect guarantees
the existence of the local parliaments i.e.
they cant be abolished at whim of the
central power.
3
rd
. a constitution usually sets out a set of
rules by which the constitution itself can
be changed. And those rules would often
set out further the conditions under
which a region or territory can
leave/secede.
Federal constitutions are very
complicated arrangements and often why
they are set out in writing historically.
Difficult here in British case because
British constitutional tradition is one of
unwritten constitution. An important part
of british political culture, so to take a
federation youd have to live with an
unwritten constitution.
Many brits value an unwritten
constitution because they take it as a
signal of being British or being English.
2
nd
implication of a federation:
A federation will break with the
tradition of parliamentary
sovereignty
3
rd
implication of federation: a federation
would mean that the house of lords would
have to be reformed. Upper houses in a
federation usually are used to provide
representation for regions. House of lords
too closely connected to the institutions
of the monarchy to act in that fashion, so
itll have to be reformed, once that
happens to the constitutional monarchy
Moving towards a federation in the
British case is going to imply that the
English in particular break with long
established traditions and customs in
their political culture.
Contrast with France:
Different types of states/different types of politics/religious settlements
Similarity b/w the two: France also built through a process of successful
incorporation of territory and subordination of political authority to a core
region. Modern France built around the kingdom of Burgundy. Differences
are more important than similarities though.
Key date that sets up the French pattern: 1789
Revolution divides France politically as it politicizes the question of regime,
but politics post 1789 are in many ways are an expression of territorial
consolidation and nation formation.
Post-1789 pattern of state and nation formation which is centralizing and
rationalizing
A process of development that is geared towards inducing uniformity across
the territory of France. Post 1789 it is administratively reorganized into a
series of uniform departments, which is an administrative territory, each
department administered by a prefect.--> this is a process of administrative
rationalization designed to induce administrative homogeneity and political
uniformity
Post 1789 across all regimes there is a policy of linguistic assimilation that
takes the form of what are called the education wars in French political
history. Education wars pit the state against the catholic church in terms of
schooling in primary and secondary levels especially. State has an interest in
controlling supply of education and it attempts to replace private schools
organized around the catholic church with public schools.
Finally, the education wars are one expression of the larger interest the
French had of subordinating the catholic church to the power of the French
state. that process of contestation with the church only ends in 1901. In
1901 Church and state are separated. Catholic religion no longer subsidized
by the French state.
All of this can be summarized in the phrase: France on and Idivisible
Implications and legacies: the expressions of substate nationalism in France
are thus much weaker in France than in Britain, identities not mobilized in
the same way politically as they are in Britain. Theres no challenge to the
territorial integrity of the state that emanates from minority nations.
Final point in this pattern of unitary state/assimilation in terms of territorial
politics:
o The French state has no interest in devolution of political power.
o When the talk about moving power and authority from the center to
the other regions, they use power that is Deconcentrated from
bureaucrats in the center to those in the peripheries. Deconcentration
rather than devolution, they dont get their own legislative assemblies
fore example.
Post 1789: a failure to achieve a political settlement, a story of regime
instability as we told before, political settlement in France comes late. Not
until post 1945 period.
2
nd
the religious settlement in France is not as successful as the religious
settlement in Britain. Because for a long period there is continued conflict
between Catholics and republicans post 1789
3
rd
: the territorial structure in France demonstrates more durability than the
territorial structure of GB, which has been challenged twice in the case of
Irish independence and going to remake the political institutions of the UK
going forward. No similar moment in the political history of France post
1789 with one exception: Algeria.
o Algeria was a colony but Algeria was at the same time part of the
French metropole and territorial state. Because citizens in Algeria
elected members to the chamber of deputies who were the national
assembly in Paris, in that sense the war of Algerian independence was
a challenge to the territorial integrity of the French state since the
French had politically integrated Algeria in an unusual way. Not often
that metropols integrate colonies politically by giving them
representatives in an elected assembly at the center or apex of the
metropole.





Land of War, Land of Peace (Howard):
Christendom aka Europe being a land of war.
o Warrior culture
o Families who ruled Europe during the millennium justified
their power and their privileges by their successful conduct of
war.
o Defended Christendom against invaders and consolidated
power against one another through the formation of states.
o 15
th
-20
th
century, extended European hegemony over the rest
of the globe
Europeans were at the cutting edge of militarily, economic, and
ultimately scientific and intellectual advance.
Militaristic Europe:
o John Keegan points out that war has been an innate and
continuous cultural activity Europe no exception.
o Looking for instead of avoiding it.
Why? Paid handsomely in power and territory for those
conducting it and in loot for those who fought.
If unsuccessful, burden was borne by people not so
important. Even so, villages rapidly rebuilt and crops
resown.
War as an avenue of social mobility.
o Thirty Years War highlighted the need for economic warfare.
o Enlightenment brought the antiwar movement
End of the 18
th
century saw war become
counterproductive (in Europe at least)
Territorial acquisition marginal
Taxpayer burden mounting
Excluding colonial conquests, it did nothing to
increase wealth and status of the rulers
o Why didnt war come to an end?
For the most rationalistic societies and democratic
leaders, the military culture transmitted irreplaceable
values and skills necessary for state survival.
War might be necessary if democracies and nation-
states were to promote and extend their values,
liberating people from the oppression of feudalism
The significance of extending loyalty towards a national
entity as opposed to a ruling dynasty embodied values
that were either unique or universal, and took on
quasireligious significance.
If war could be conducted economically, and in far away
regions of Asia and Africa, Europeans were content.
And this is how they entered 1914.
o Disenchantment of war (1945)
Wanted to live in a land of peace by 1945.
Disenchantment with war had less to do with the
spread of democratic values than with the development
of industrial warfare.
There was 1. The slaughter of conscripted armies and 2.
Economic havoc that brought misery to citizens on a
scale never seen before and that did not match the
comparable gains.
If it oculd be done cost-free, would garner public
support.--> British discovered this in the Falklands in
1982 and Americans in Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Importance of technology
War however can no longer be fought cost-free
in Europe itself.
o Democracy:
Child of the Enlightenment
Belief in innate natural rights, the recognition of which
should be the fundamental duty and justification for all
human government.
Uphill battle of democracy in Europe as opposed to the
United States.
19
th
-20
th
century civil war between the Party of
Movement and the Party of Order.
Democrats in large regions of Europe, west and east,
remained an embattled minority until WWII and in
places even later than that.
National socialism (Fascism) whether in combating the
barbaric egalitarianism of the eats or the materialistic
internationalism of the west was far greater throughout
continental Europe than it has been fashionable to
admit.
European culture inherited not synonymous with the
western values of the Enlightenment.
Something more ambiguous and complex
Aristo-monarchial militarism and of
authoritarian clericalism= Europe
o 2 targets in which the Enlightenment
directed its fire.
+ irrational populist nationalism (US also prone
to)
o Land of Peace:
Europeans want Europe to be a land of peace.
We may try to restore and retain traditional cultural
environments where we can ourselves live comfortably
and which will attract lucrative tourism, but such
cultural theme parks are in fact as alien to the mass of
our population as they are to visitors from Japan
Huge bulk of the population of Europe, modernized,
bureaucratized and bourgenoisfied, lives in conditions
indistinguishable form those of the US and shares
similar tastes and interests.
Security problems today are not of war but of peace, not
of the military that is but of the police. no different
from anywhere else.
Europeans facing a fundamental paradox: if we were to
become Europeans in the sense that some idealists
would wish, with single organs of government and
justice and above all a common working language, we
would cease to be the people, or rather the peoples, that
we actually are.
Societies are held together not by abstract rational
principles or convenient administrative arrangements
but by deeply held habits of consensus and belief.
An irrational element to all human relationships exist.
abstract principles applied to human affairs= dangerous
according to Edmund Burke.
Past regimes have exploited and recognized this
truth.
And by exploiting it they have tamed it and made
it social productive
Attempts to ignore it and lay out a new society
on just rational principles have only produced
wider and more terrible outbursts of
irrationalism.
o Europeans must understand the past to not repeat it
Understand why we have been a land of war if we are to
successfully remain a land of peace.
o Garden Analogy:
People of Europe and their institutions to be regarded
as distinct living organisms, rooted in the peculiar soil
of their regions, their communities and their cultures.
like all plantstheir institutions need manuring,
training and sometimes plucking (taking care of
essentially and doing whats necessaryand needs to
be done by the people themselves who have a feel for
their own soil and what will grow there and what will
not and as with all gardens, the work of cultivation is
never ending.

The Deserted Temple: Democracys Rise and Fall (Mazower)
After the collapse of the great autocratic empires of Russia, Austria-Hungry,
Hohenzollern Germany and Ottoman Turkey, the Paris peace settlement saw
parliamentary democracy enthroned across Europe.
New constitutions drawn up with the latest liberal principles.
James Bryce Modern Democracies: universal acceptance of democracy as the
normal and natural form of government
Liberalism triumph was short lived
o Russian Revolution and the specter of communist subversion.
o Democratic values disappeared as political polarization brought much
of Europe to the verge of civil war.
The Republic and the Veil Conference Reading