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1.HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C.

DAILO
GR No. 153802, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 283

FACTS:
Respondent Miguela Dailo is married to Marcelino Dailo Jr. and during their marriage they acquired a
certain parcel of land. Unknown to the respondent, her Spouse authorized somebody to loan it to Petitioner. A Real
Estate Mortgage was executed without the consent and knowledge of Miguela Dailo. When the loan was not settled,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and it was transferred to its name being the highest bidder.
Respondent instituted an action before the RTC to nullify the mortgage and sale. The trial court decided the case in
favor of the Miguela C. Dailo ruling that the plaintiff, herein respondent, have proved her case by preponderance of
evidence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Who has the burden of proof in debt cases?

RULING:

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the dead
husband to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade the Supreme Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation,
there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by Marcelino Dailo
Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
payment of the loan. Nowhere in the records show that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY ERGUIZA
GR No. 171348

FACTS:

Appellant Larry Erguiza was charged and convicted of the crime of rape he committed against AAA. The
version of the Prosecution is that when AAAs short pant was hooked on the fence, she was grabbed and raped by
the accused. On the part of the defense, he claimed that he never leaved their house and his wife will give birth, his
claimed was corroborated by his witnesses.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Aggrieved by the decision, appellant appealed to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Larry
Erquiza.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court finds that there is testimonial evidence that contradicts the findings of the RTC
and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable doubt could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of
a credible defense witness. The testimony of Joy Agbuya casts doubts as to the possibility of rape having taken place
as narrated by complainant. In addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita Angeles
corroborated the alibi of appellant. The testimony of Joy will show that complainant could not have been raped
because Joy waited for complainant when her shorts got hooked to the fence and thereafter both went home
together and separated at their Aunt Beths house. It shows that no untoward incident, much less rape, was
committed by appellant at the time and place that complainant had testified on. Unfortunately on the part of the
prosecution they failed to rebut the testimony of Joy. The failure on the part of the prosecution to rebut the
testimony of Joy bolsters the defense evidence, that no rape happened. As to the testimony of the hilot, Juanita
Ageles, that appellant was with her from 5:10 PM and never left his house from that time until his wife gave birth
will also substantiate by clear and convincing evidence the alibi of the appellant.

The Supreme Court facing with two conflicting versions I guided by the equipoise rule. Thus, where the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a
criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.

3. EMELITA NICARIO vs. NLRC
GR No. 123540, September 17, 1998/ 295 SCRA 619

FACTS:

Emelita Nicario was employed by Mancao Supermarket, Inc. as a salesgirl and was later on promoted as
sales supervisor. However, Mancao Supermarket terminated her servicers. A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed
by petitioner before the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, Fifth Division, in its resolution it set aside the labor arbiters decision for
lack of due process. It ruled that since petitioner assailed her supposed signatures appearing on the payrolls
presented by the company as a forgery, the labor arbiter should not have merely depended on the xerox copies of
the payrolls, as submitted by the Supermarket but ordered a formal hearing on the issue. Thus, the Commission
ordered the case remanded to the arbitration branch. The Labor Arbiter partially granted the case but denied the
other claims for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reliance of NLRC on the daily time records submitted as evidence by the Mancao
Supermarket is misplaced.

RULING:

Yes. Generally, findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded great respect and at
times even finality if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. However in cases where there is a conflict
between the factual findings of the NLRC and the labor arbiter, a review of such factual findings is necessitated.
In the present case, Mancao Supermarket submitted daily time records (DTR) of the petitioner to show that
she rendered work for only eight (8) hours a day, it did not refute nor seek to disprove the judicial notice taken by
Labor Arbiter that Mancao establishments opens twelve (12) hours a day, opening at 8:00 A.M. and closing at 8:00
PM. The Supreme Court, ruled that daily time records (DTR), especially those which show uniform entries with
regard to the hours of work rendered by an employee, such unvarying recording of a daily time record is improbable
and contrary to human experience. It is impossible for an employee to arrive at the workplace and leave at exactly
the same time, day in day out. The observations made by Solicitor General regarding the unreliability of the daily
time records would therefore seem more convincing. On the other hand, respondent company failed to present
substantial evidence, other than the disputed DTRs, to prove that petitioner indeed worked for only eight hours a
day.

It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee.

4. HABAGAT GRILL thru LOUIE BIRAOGO vs. DMC-URBAN PROPERTY
GR No. 155110, March 31, 2005

FACTS:

DMC filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered the
subject lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill. In his Answer Louie Biraogo denied illegally entering the lot in
question. He claimed that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside a Municipal Reservation and so DMC has no cause
of action against him. The MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. The RTC
affirmed the decision; however, on appeal the CA reversed the decision. The CA gave greater weight to the
testimony of Bienamer Garcia, respondents real property manager, that Habagat Grill had been built on 1993. The
appellate court said that his testimony was credible, because he had personal knowledge of the facts he had testified
to. On other hand, it was not clear in what capacity petitioners witness, Samuel Ruiz, came to know of the facts he
had testified to. Furthermore, the CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary evidence to
establish the date of Habagat Grills construction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct relying to the testimony of Bienamer Garcia.

RULING:

Yes. Garcias testimony, if clear and positive, may be sufficient to establish DMCs claim. Under Section 1
of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the court in determining
which of the presented evidence has superior weight is the witnesses means and opportunity to know the facts to
which they testify. The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following considerations:

First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons recollection of his own acts and of the
attendant circumstances is more definite and trustworthy that another persons recollection of it, especially if it was
an act done in the performance of a duty, or if the other persons testimony is little more than an expression of
opinion or judgment.
Second, the witness who had greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts are to believed in
preference to the one that had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent.
Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely
states the fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was particularly called to
it.
Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing accurately.
Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness.
From the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater weight, considering that it was
his task, as the real property manager of DMC, to know about matters involving the DMCs properties.

The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia solely on the ground that he was not a disinterested
witness. True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship, however, will not by itself determine the true worth
of ones testimony. The essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with
human experience.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAULINO SEVILLENO
GR No. 152954, March 10, 2004/ 425 SCRA 247

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Paulino Sevilleno was charged and convicted with rape with homicide. Sevilleno raped
and killed Virgina Bakia, a minor. During the arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea. Trial proceeded to
determine the voluntariness and full comprehension of the plea. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty as
charged by the RTC. On automatic review before the Supreme Court, it was found out that the trial court failed to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the appellant of the consequences of
his plea of guilty. Thus, it remanded the case to the trial court for proper proceeding. Appellant was re-arraigned
and this time he entered a plea of not guilty.
The version of the prosecution is that the victim and her younger sister Norma met accused-appellant and
offered them bread and ice candy then invited the victim to watch a beta show which she acceded. Her companion
decided to go home. Rogelio,Virginias father was looking for her when she was informed by Norma that Virginia
went with appellant. Rogelio met appellant but he denied any knowledge of Virginias whereabouts. Rogelio noticed
fingernail scratches on appellants neck and a wound on his left cheek. The prosecution presented several witness
testifying that Virginia was with appellant; they saw the appellant emerge from the sugarcane field alone and without
the victim, with fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms.
Appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. No other witness for the defense was presented. The
trial court convicted accused-appellant for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court the guilt of the accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes. The prosecution was able to establish guilt of the accused through circumstantial evidence. To justify a
conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable
doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant.

The argument of the accused-appellant that the scratches on his face do not prove that they were inflicted
by Virginia, much less that he committed the crime. Indeed, the scratches, by itself, may not prove that he
committed the crime. Nonetheless, he explained that the scratches were caused by a galvanized sheet which hit his
face. This claim, however, was contradicted by the three prosecution witnesses, they testified that accused-appellant
admitted to them that the scratches were from the victim Virginia.
As to the argument of Appellant that if he was indeed guilty, he would not have gone to the victims
residence. The Supreme Court ruled that appellants act of going to the house of the victim may not be consistent
with ordinary human behavior, but is nevertheless possible. While an appellants post-incident behavior is never
proof of guilt, neither is it of innocence.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. While it is established that
nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not
preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available.

6. GREGORIO V. TONGKO vs. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO.
GR No. 167622, June 29, 2010

FACTS:

This is case arising from an employer-employee relationship. The contractual relationship between Tongko
and Manulife had two basic phases. The first or initial phase is under a Career Agents Agreement that provides,
among others, it is understood and agreed that the Agent is an independent contractor and nothing contained
herein shall be construed or interpreted as creating an employer-employee relationship between the Company and
the Agent. The Second Phase when Tongko was named Unit Manager.

Tongko was terminated by way of Notice of Termination, in response; he filed an illegal dismissal complaint
with the NLRC Arbitration Branch. He essentially alleged despite the clear terms of the letter terminating his
Agency Agreement that he was Manulifes employee before he was illegally dismissed. In general Tongko was an
employee of the Manulife being a Unit Manager, on the other hand Manulife claimed that Tongko had no fixed
wage or salary, Tongko was paid commission of varying amounts. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no
employer-employee relationship. However, the NLRC reversed the decision and ruled that there was employer-
employee relationship existed between Tongko and Manulife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manulife has control over Tongko to establish employer-employee relationship.

RULING:

No. The conclusion with respect to Tongkos employment as a manager is, of course, unacceptable for the
legal, factual and practical reasons. In brief, the factual reason is grounded on the lack of evidentiary support of the
conclusion that Manulife exercised control over Tongko. Tongko was appointed as unit manager, inexplicably,
Tongko never bothered to present any evidence at all on what this designation meant. The best evidence of control
the agreement or directive relating to Tongkos duties and responsibilities was never introduced as part of the
records of the case. What, to Tongko, serve as evidence of labor law control are the codes of conduct that Manulife
imposes on its agents in the sale of insurance. The mere presentation of codes or of rules and regulations, however,
is not per se indicative of labor law control as the law and jurisprudence teach us.

7. MERCEDES DUDUACO vs. JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM
AM No. MTJ-05-1601, August 11, 2005/466 SCRA 428

FACTS:

Complainant Mercedes Duduaco charged respondent judge with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office
and/or gross ignorance of the law.
This case stemmed from the motor vehicle of the respondent judge being repaired by the Toyota shop,
wherein herein complainant is the manager, wherein respondent judge refused to pay the cost of the repair and
instead told that it will be the insurance that will pay the cost. Complainant claimed that respondent judge have a
heated argument with the Service Department Manager and shouted that she was a judge. Respondent judge asked
for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, she paid the deductible franchise stated therein under protest.
Respondent judge left the shop without the car, later on she filed case for Replevin.
The report of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed that respondents refusal to pay the
deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) adopted the
findings of the investigating officer. The OCA ruled that complainants insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated
charges despite lack of personal knowledge wasted the timed and resources not only of respondent but also of the
Investigating Justice and the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complainant have the burden of proof in administrative proceedings.

RULING:

Yes. In administrative, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
their complaints. Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be
governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative
charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the
demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to
grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising her legal right. Had
respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the
right to claim for refund.

The Supreme Court agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this
unfounded complaint. During the investigation, the complainant admitted that she was absent when the event
transpired, which means that she has no personal and direct knowledge of the incident. Yet, in the verification
portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the allegations therein were true and correct of her own knowledge
and belief.
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA
GR No. 171271, August 31, 2006

FACTS:

Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder he committed against Evelyn Kho. Accused
was employed as a family driver by the victim. Marrissa, housemaid, heard the victim screaming and she saw the
accused stabbing her with a kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting Kuya Robert, but the accused
continued to stab the victim. Another housemaid, saw what happened.

Accused raised the defense of self-defense. He testified that the victim, his employer, had an illicit
relationship another man, Phillip Robinson and threatened him that something bad will happen to him if her
husband will learned about the illicit relationship. As the victim and accused argued about Phillip Robinson, the
victim got a knife and stabbed the accused, accused managed to wrest control of the knife and with it, stabbed the
victim. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes. The claim of the accused-appellant of self-defense is self-serving hence should not be given credence.
One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the killing. The burden of proof shifts to the accused who
must then prove the justifying circumstances. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted
in self-defense. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self-defense must be established:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.

In the case, the appellants version of the stabbing incidents does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was
the victim who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. His alleged use of reasonable means to repel the
aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim which
demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself. The victim also had incised wound
which were inflicted while she was parrying the blows coming from the appellant. In fact, the accused testified that
the victim was running away from him but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds.

9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO CONCEPCION and HENRY CONCEPCION
GR No. 178876, June 27, 2008

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged and convicted with the Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The accused-appellants were caught through buy-bust operation
through the help of an informant.
The version of the defense is that, the accused appellants were arrested by the elements of PDEA when
they were about to rest. Appellant Alfredo said he had no knowledge about the police officers allegation that he
and his co-accused sold shabu to a poseur-buyer. All the witness of the defense denied the complaint against the
accused-appellants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellants were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court found out that, indeed, there was a buy-bust operation involving the appellants.
The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the
photograph pursuant to Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165 will not exonerate appellants. Non-compliance with
said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is important is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and WILFREDO
TANYAG DEL ROSARIO
GR No. 112262, April 2, 1996

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged with Special Complex Crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide. The victims were robbed and killed and injured by the accused-appellants.

The prosecution presented the lone witness Penalver who positively identified appellants as the person who
robbed and killed the victim.

The accused-appellants interposed the defense of alibi and denied any participation in the commission of
the crime. Accused Camat testified that he was at his house when the crime happened and his statement was
corroborated by his mother-in-law. As to accused del Rosario, he was at home and never leave his house when the
crime happened.

After trial, the trial court convicted the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt is well established by virtue of
the testimony of only single witness.

RULING:

Yes. It is a rule that the testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and trustworthy by the trial court,
is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case, there is no reason to deviate the observation of the trial court that Penalvers, the witness,
testimony bore the attributes of truth, having been delivered in a candid and straightforward manner. The testimony
of the single witness is to be categorical and candid, untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It
creditably chronicles the material details in the commission of the crimes and should accordingly be given full
credence.

It bears repeating that findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses deserve great
respect since it had the opportunity to hear and observe their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand, and
therefore, it was in a better position to discern if such witness were telling the truth or not based on their
deportment while testifying.

There was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of the witness that might led him to give
fabricated testimony against appellants. In fact, the witness and Camat declared in court that they did not know each
other before the commission of the crime. As observed by the trial court, Penalver positively identified appellants as
the person who robbed and killed and injured the victims. He could not be mistaken in identifying appellants as the
scene of the crime was sufficiently illuminated and he even remembers that appellant del Rosario was wearing faded
camouflage clothing at the time of robbery. His narration of the incident and his identification of the accused are
direct and definite.