The Supreme Court of the Philippines heard the appeal of Victorio Pagkalinawan, who was convicted by the trial court of violating drug laws. The trial court found him guilty based on the testimony of police officers who conducted a buy-bust operation, in which Pagkalinawan allegedly sold and possessed methamphetamine. Pagkalinawan claimed denial and presented witnesses who said the police barged into his home and arrested him without cause. The Supreme Court analyzed both versions of events and the evidence presented.
Descrição original:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICTORIO PAGKALINAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines heard the appeal of Victorio Pagkalinawan, who was convicted by the trial court of violating drug laws. The trial court found him guilty based on the testimony of police officers who conducted a buy-bust operation, in which Pagkalinawan allegedly sold and possessed methamphetamine. Pagkalinawan claimed denial and presented witnesses who said the police barged into his home and arrested him without cause. The Supreme Court analyzed both versions of events and the evidence presented.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines heard the appeal of Victorio Pagkalinawan, who was convicted by the trial court of violating drug laws. The trial court found him guilty based on the testimony of police officers who conducted a buy-bust operation, in which Pagkalinawan allegedly sold and possessed methamphetamine. Pagkalinawan claimed denial and presented witnesses who said the police barged into his home and arrested him without cause. The Supreme Court analyzed both versions of events and the evidence presented.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. VICTORIO PAGKALINAWAN, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J .: The Case This is an appeal from the May 9, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 02648 entitled People of the Philippines v. Victorio Pagkalinawan, which affirmed the January 16, 2007 Joint Decision 2 in Criminal Case Nos. 13624-D and 13625-D of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 267 in Pasig City. The RTC found accused-appellant Victorio 3 Pagkalinawan guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Facts The charges against appellant stemmed from the following Informations: Criminal Case No. 13624-D (Violation of Sec. 5, paragraph 1 [Sale], Art. II of RA 9165) That, on or about the 20th day of July 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver, and give away to another 0.28 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, which was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Php500.00, and violation of the above-cited law. Contrary to law. 4
Criminal Case No. 13625-D (Violation of Sec. 11, par. 2 [Possession], Art. II of RA 9165) That, on or about the 20th day of July 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess 0.13 gram and 0.08 gram, respectively, or a total of 0.21 gram of white crystalline substance separately contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, which substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law. Contrary to law. 5
On August 9, 2004, appellant was arraigned. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. During the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Police Officer (PO1) Rey Memoracion and PO3 Arnulfo Vicua, both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit, Taguig Police Station, Taguig City. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses appellant Pagkalinawan, Paula San Pedro, and May Pagkalinawan. The Prosecutions Version of Facts On July 20, 2004, at around 11:00 p.m., a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the Taguig City Police and reported the illegal activities of a certain "Berto," a resident of Captain Ciano St., Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City. The leader of the group, Police Senior Inspector Romeo Paat, immediately formed a buy-bust team with PO1 Memoracion as the poseur-buyer and the rest of the group as back-up. The buy- bust money was then marked and recorded in the blotter. Afterwards, the team, along with the police informant, proceeded to where Berto lives. Upon reaching the place, PO1 Memoracion and the informant alighted from the service vehicle and walked towards Berto, who was leaning against a wall, while the rest of the team positioned themselves in strategic locations from where they could see clearly what was going on. The informant introduced PO1 Memoracion to Berto as a taxi driver who wanted to buy shabu. Berto immediately took the PhP 500 buy-bust money from PO1 Memoracion and showed three (3) plastic sachets containing shabu in his palm, and asked the poseur-buyer to pick one. Once PO1 Memoracion took hold of the shabu, he took off his cap, which was the pre-arranged signal for the rest of the team to close in and arrest Berto. Berto suddenly became suspicious of PO3 Vicua, who was coming up to them, so he attempted to flee the scene. PO1 Memoracion was able to stop him and ordered him to empty his pockets. The other two (2) sachets of shabu were recovered from him and the appropriate markings were made on them. Berto was identified later on as appellant Pagkalinawan. Afterwards, the team brought appellant to its headquarters in Taguig City for investigation. After the police investigator made the request for laboratory examination of the confiscated transparent plastic sachets of suspected shabu, PO1 Memoracion brought these to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Southern Police District Crime Laboratory Office. Police Inspector (P/Insp.) May Andrea A. Bonifacio, Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. She issued Physical Science Report No. D-546-04S dated July 21, 2004, which showed the following results: SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Three (3) heat-sealed transparent sachets each containing white crystalline substance with the following markings and net weights: A ("SAID-SOTF" VSP) = 0.28 gram B ("SAID-SOTF" VSP) = 0.13 gram C ("SAID-SOTF" VSP) = 0.08 gram x x x x PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION: To determine the presence of any dangerous drug. x x x FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x CONCLUSION: Specimen A to C contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 6 x x x Version of the Defense Appellant, on the other hand, interposed the defense of denial. Appellant recounted that, on July 20, 2004, he was watching television inside their house at No. 10-D Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City. His granddaughter Paula San Pedro and sister-in-law May Pagkalinawan were with him in the house at the time. Suddenly, armed men barged into the house and introduced themselves as policemen. One of them pointed a gun at him and asked where he was keeping the shabu. He denied having what the policemen were looking after. Despite his denial, the policemen still searched his house. When they could not find any prohibited drugs there, the policemen brought him to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Taguig City Police Station. At the police station, he was told by the policemen to amicably settle the case with them. But because he did not heed their order, cases for violation of RA 9165 were filed against him by the policemen. May Pagkalinawan testified that, on July 20, 2004, she was resting inside their house at No. 10- D Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City after selling her wares, while appellant was watching television. Between 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., however, she went to the house of her sister-in-law Zenaida for about ten minutes, but when she returned home, she saw policemen apprehending appellant. She asked the policemen where they were bringing appellant and they told her to follow them at the police station in the Taguig City Hall. She also averred that the policemen did not present any document giving them authority to search their house and arrest appellant. She further claimed that the police officers did not apprise appellant of his constitutional rights during and after the arrest. Defense witness Paula San Pedro, who claimed to be appellants granddaughter, also corroborated the stories of both May Pagkalinawan and appellant. In her testimony, she stressed that her grandfather was apprehended but not bodily frisked by the policemen inside their house; hence, it was not possible for an illegal drug to be found in the possession of appellant. Ruling of the Trial Court After trial, the RTC convicted appellant. The dispositive portion of its Joint Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused VIRGILIO PAGKALINAWAN y Silvestre alyas "Berto" in Criminal Case No. 13624-D for Violation of Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENTand ordered to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500,000.00). Moreover, accused VIRGILIO PAGKALINAWAN y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 13625-D for Violation of Section 11, 2nd paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002". And since the quantity of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) found in the possession of the accused is only 0.21 gram, accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum -to- FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS as maximum. Accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is further penalized to pay a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300,000.00). Accordingly, the Jail Warden of the Taguig City Jail where accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is presently detained is hereby ordered to forthwith commit the person of convicted Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" to the New Bilibid Prisons, Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila. Upon the other hand, the shabu contained in three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with a total weight of 0.49 [gram] which are the subject matter of the above-captioned cases are hereby ordered to be immediately transmitted and/or submitted to the custody of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its proper disposition. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal to the CA, appellant disputed the RTCs finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. He argued that the presumption of innocence should prevail over the principle of regularity of performance of the police officers. Further, he contended that what actually happened was an instigation and not a buy-bust operation. Lastly, he claimed that there was no compliance with the law as to the proper requirements for a valid buy-bust operation. Ruling of the Appellate Court On May 9, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It ruled that the prosecution was able to discharge the statutory burden of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It also dismissed the allegation of instigation, saying that what happened was actually an entrapment, to wit: x x x It should be noted that the accused-appellant was neither cajoled nor seduced into peddling drugs. In fact, when he was told that the poseur buyer wanted to score shabu, the accused-appellant had several sachets of shabu ready in his pocket. This means that even without the slightest prodding from the police officers, the accused-appellant already harbored the intent to commit the crime of drug pushing. The feigned offer to buy on the part of the poseur-buyer was merely a ploy to entrap a drug peddler who was about to actualize his felonious intent. 8
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussion, the appealed Joint decision dated 16 January 2007 is perforce affirmed in toto . SO ORDERED. 9
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the decision of the CA. The Issue Appellant assigns the following errors: I. The trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the incredible testimony of the prosecution witnesses while totally disregarding the evidence adduced by the defense. II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Our Ruling We sustain appellants conviction. Buy-Bust Operation Is a Form of Entrapment Appellant argues that the buy-bust operation conducted was invalid and that what really happened was instigation, not entrapment. Such contention lacks basis and is contrary to jurisprudence. Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. 10
In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, the Court laid down the distinction between entrapment and instigation, to wit: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a spotter, detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. 11
One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. 12
In order to determine the validity of a buy-bust operation, this Court has consistently applied the "objective" test. In People v. Doria, 13 this Court stressed that in applying the "objective" test, the details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. It further emphasized that the "manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense." 14
In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment, not instigation, to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug. It was the confidential informant who made initial contact with appellant when he introduced PO1 Memoracion as a buyer for shabu. Appellant immediately took the PhP 500 buy-bust money from PO1 Memoracion and showed him three pieces of sachet containing shabu and asked him to pick one. Once PO1 Memoracion got the shabu, he gave the pre-arranged signal and appellant was arrested. The facts categorically show a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The police officers conduct was within the acceptable standards for the fair and honorable administration of justice. Moreover, contrary to appellants argument that the acts of the informant and the poseur-buyer in pretending that they were in need of shabu instigated or induced him to violate the Anti-Drugs Law, a police officers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy- bust operation invalid. 15 This was clarified by the Court in People v. Sta Maria: It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.lavvphil As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him. 16
It bears stressing that what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. In other words, the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug. 17 All these elements were satisfactorily proved by the prosecution in the instant case. Appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP 500 to PO1 Memoracion posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally, appellant was fully aware that he was selling and delivering a prohibited drug. Likewise, the prosecution was also able to prove with moral certainty the guilt of appellant for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It was able to prove the following elements: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 18
In the case at bar, appellant was caught in actual possession of prohibited drugs without showing any proof that he was duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on appellants part. 19
As a matter of fact, the trial court, in disposing of the case, said: The substance of the prosecutions evidence is to the effect that accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" was arrested by the police because of the existence of shabu he sold to PO1 Rey B. Memoracion as well as the recovery of the buy-bust money from his possession together with the other two (2) plastic sachets similarly containing shabu. To accentuate, the prosecution witnesses in the person of PO1 B. Memoracion and PO3 Arnulfo J. Vicua positively identified accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" as the person that they apprehended on July 20, 2004 at Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City. That they arrested accused Virgilio S. Pagkalinawan within the vicinity of a store because their team was able to procure shabu from him during the buy-bust operation they purposely conducted against the aforementioned accused. The buy-bust money recovered by the arresting police officers from the possession of the accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" as well as the shabu they were able to purchase from the accused sufficiently constitute as the very corpus delicti of the crime of "Violation of Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165", and the two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu that were recovered from the same accused Pagkalinawan similarly constitute as the corpus delicti of the crime of "Violation of Section 11, 2nd paragraph, No. 3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165". As already established, corpus delicti has been defined x x x as the body or substance of the crime and refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime. The testimony of PO1 Rey B. Memoracion that was corroborated by PO3 Arnulfo J. Vicua, who have not shown and displayed any ill motive to arrest the accused, is sufficient enough to convict the accused of the crimes charged against him. x x x As law enforcers, their narration of the incident is worthy of belief and as such they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. To stress x x x testimony of arresting officers, with no motive or reason to falsely impute a serious charge against the accused, is credible. 20
This Court has consistently relied upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 21 In this case, appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated the application of any of the aforementioned exceptions. Sec. 21 of RA 9165 Provides for Exceptions Additionally, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to show compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules regarding the custody and disposition of the evidence against him. He contends that absolute compliance is required and that anything short of that renders the evidence against him inadmissible. We are not persuaded. Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 provides: SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non- compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) As can be gleaned from the language of Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with it is not fatal. It does not render appellants arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. 22 What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." 23
Here, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after PO1 Memoracion seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, appellant was immediately arrested and brought to the police station for investigation, where the sachets of suspected shabu were marked appropriately. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance, with a letter of request for examination, was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination to determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Physical Science Report No. D-546-04S dated July 21, 2004, the specimen submitted contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by one P/Insp. May Andrea A. Bonifacio, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Therefore, it is evidently clear that there was an unbroken chain in the custody of the illicit drug purchased from appellant. Presumption of Regularity of Performance Stands Notably, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any improper motive, this Court will not appreciate the defense of denial and instead apply the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. In the instant case, the defense of appellant consists of bare denial. It is considered as an inherently weak defense, for it can easily be concocted and is a common standard line of defense in drug cases. Furthermore, as found by the trial court, the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police officers: Such allegation of the accused that his apprehension was just a result of a frame-up, as he was not really engaged in peddling shabu when he was arrested, cannot be given credence because he was not able to offer and show proof of any previous disagreement between him and the arresting law officers that may lead the police officers to concoct and hatch baseless accusations against him, or the presence of any other circumstances that may have fired up the ire of the police officers against him. 24 x x x For this reason, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 02648 finding appellant Victorio Pagkalinawan guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Chairperson ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Chairperson C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 2-11. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Pampio A. Abarintos. 2 CA rollo, pp. 11-22. Penned by Judge Florito S. Macalino. 3 Also referred to as "Virgilio" and "Victorino" in some parts of the records. 4 Records, p. 1. 5 Id. at 11. 6 Id. at 8. 7 CA rollo, p. 22. 8 Rollo, pp. 9-10. 9 Id. at 10-11. 10 People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 741; citing People v. Gatong-o, No. L-78698, December 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 716, 717. 11 56 Phil. 44, 52-53 (1931). 12 People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, August 21, 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439; People v. Tadepa, G.R. No. 100354, May 26, 1995, 244 SCRA 339. 13 G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668. 14 Id. at 698-699. 15 People v. Bayani, supra note 10. 16 G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 628. 17 People v. Pendatun, G.R. No. 148822, July 12, 2004, 434 SCRA 148, 155-156; citing People v. Cercado, G.R. No. 144494, July 26, 2002, 385 SCRA 277; People v. Pacis, G.R. No. 146309, July 18, 2002, 384 SCRA 684. 18 People v. Del Norte, G.R. No. 149462, March 29, 2004, 426 SCRA 383. 19 U.S. v. Bandoc, 23 Phil. 14, 15 (1912). 20 CA rollo, pp. 19-20. 21 People v. Julian-Fernandez, 423 Phil. 895, 910 (2001). 22 People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 448; citing People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627. 23 Id.; citing People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421. 24 CA rollo, p. 62.
G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants. Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuao, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. VILLA-REAL, J .: The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional costs. In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its judgment to wit: The lower court erred: 1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since been dismissed from service. 2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru the customhouse without the knowledge of the customs secret service." 3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service. 4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused. 5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while other prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu. 6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson. 7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from Hongkong. 8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng. 9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu. 10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source. The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial: About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium. About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the customhouse. Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on board. The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was good business, because opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000. In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those " pointing towards the customhouse. The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally promised to pay him that amount. The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness for the Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end. With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842). Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes of the defendants' statements, since they contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements. As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information, we find that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully imported. But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers. The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal. Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter. By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-46638 July 9, 1986 AQUILINA R. ARANETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J .: This is a petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, finding the accused appellant guilty of the crime of bribery. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of conviction, We hereby find the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code; and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, We hereby impose upon her the penalty of imprisonment consisting of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days and a fine of P 100.00. The defendant shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification from holding office. With costs. Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3, Subsection B of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" in an information which reads: That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed as Hearing Officer in the Department of Labor, with station at Cabanatuan City, and therefore, a public officer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand and receive for herself the amount of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency, from one Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco, as a condition and/or consideration for her to act on the claim for compensation benefits filed by the said Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco pertaining to the death of her husband, which claim was then pending in the office wherein the abovenamed accused was employed and in which, under the law, she has the official capacity to intervene. The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the respondent appellate court in its decision as follows: Complainant Gertrudes M. Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an employee of the National Irrigation Administration assigned as instrument man at the Upper Pampanga River Project. Upon the death of her husband on April 27, 1971, she approached the appellant, a hearing officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning the requirements, she prepared the application forms and attachments and filed them with the Workmen's Compensation Unit at San Fernando, Pampanga. (pp. 213, TSN, October 3, 1973). After a few days, the complainant went back to San Fernando to verify the status of her claim. She was informed that the death certificate of her husband, their marriage contract and the birth certificates of their children were needed. She secured these documents and brought them to San Fernando. She was told that her claim papers had been forwarded to Cabanatuan City, particularly to the appellant, for consolidation of the requirements. So she went to see the appellant. (pp. 13-18, TSN, October 3, 1973). When she saw the appellant, the complainant was told that she had to pay P 100.00 so that her claim would be acted upon. The complainant told the appellant that she had no money then, but if the appellant would process her claim she would give her the P100.00 upon its approval. The appellant was adamant. She would not agree to the complainant's proposal. According to her, on previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but they failed to live up to them. (pp. 18-24, TSN, October 3,1973). The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, erstwhile chief of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, to inform him of the demand of the appellant. Col. Yoyongco gave the complainant two 50-peso bills (Exhibits B and B-1 ) and instructed her to go to Col. David Laureaga, Provincial Commander of Nueva Ecija, for help. (pp. 24-25, TSN, October 3, 1973). After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap the appellant. The two 50-peso bills were marked with the notations 'CC- NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder. With this preparation, Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno, CIC Balcos and the complainant proceeded to the office of the appellant. When they arrived thereat, the appellant was talking with three persons who had a hearing before her. They allowed the three persons to finish their business with the appellant. After the group had left, the complainant and CIC Balcos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the appellant. Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno stationed themselves outside the room and observed events through a glass window. Aside from the appellant, the complainant and CIC Balcos, there were three other persons inside the office. These were Atty. Herminio Garcia, Renato de Lara and Gregorio Ocampo. The complainant again requested the appellant to process her claim. The appellant countered by asking her if she already had the P100.00. In answer, the complainant brought out the two 50-peso bills from her bag and handed them to the appellant. As the appellant took hold of the money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand and told her she was under arrest. Whereupon, Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno immediately entered the room and helped in the arrest of the appellant. (pp. 3-12, TSN, November 6, 1973). The appellant was brought to the PC headquarters where her hands were examined with a special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The examination was witnessed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Talavera. The result was positive. (pp. 12-13, TSN, November 6, 1973). On the other hand, the petitioner presented her own version of the facts: On her part, the appellant testified that there was indeed an offer of P 100.00 by the complainant. She declined the offer and never touched the bills when they were laid on her table. If she was found positive for ultra-violet powder, it was because CIC Balcos rubbed the bills on her hand and dress. He did it four times once at her office, once at the Milky way Restaurant and twice at the PC Headquarters. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Annex "A", p. 5) When the complainant went to the office of the appellant in Cabanatuan City, she demanded the release of the decision of her case, but appellant told her that she cannot do so for the reason that she is only a hearing officer to receive evidence about the claim for compensation due to the death of her husband, and the real office to decide the case is that Workmen's Compensation Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga. The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, Chief of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, Cabanatuan City to inform him of the demand of the appellant for P100.00. Col. Yoyongco gave complainant two fifty (P50.00) peso bills. After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap appellant by the use of fifty (P50.00) peso bills which were marked with the notation 'CC-NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder, the two fifty- peso bills. After this preparation Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno and the complainant proceeded to the office of the complainant. When they arrived in the place the complainant was talking to the 3 persons who had then a hearing before her. After the appellant finished the hearing the complainant and the CIC Balgos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the appellant. Then the complainant again requested the appellant to process her claim by this time the complainant took the 2 fifty-peso bills from her bag and gave to the appellant but the appellant pushed the money, and CIC Balgos grabbed her hand and told her appellant was under arrest. The appellant was brought to the headquarters where her hands were examined with special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The examination was witnessed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cabanatuan City and the result was positive. (TSN, pp. 12- 13, November 6, 1973) On the other hand, Renato de Lara, a witness for the appellant testified that he was in the office of the appellant at the time the incident took place and he saw the amount of P100.00 being offered by the complainant to the appellant but the latter refused to accept the money. When appellant refused, CIC Balgos took it, rubbed it on the hand of the appellant and announced that he was arresting her. Appellant further testify (sic) that complainant offered P100.00 to her to expedite the preparation of the decision of her claim and said complainant put two fifty peso bills in her table after which she was arrested and investigated and a complaint was filed against her for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After trial, the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Atty. Aquiline R. Araneta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment for ONE (1) YEAR, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and to pay the costs. The P100.00 consisting of two fifty-peso bills which were marked as Exhibits 'B' and 'B-l' are hereby ordered returned to Mrs. Gertrudes Yoyongco who owns them. As indicated earlier, the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court and convicted the petitioner instead of the crime of bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner now assigns the following errors: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE DEVISED BY MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY IN CABANATUAN CITY. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER OF BRIBERY WHERE SUCH CRIME WAS NOT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE FISCAL AGAINST THE PETITIONER. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Relative to the first error, the petitioner submits that the criminal intent originated in the mind of the entrapping person and for which reason, no conviction can be had against her. This argument has no merit. The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation, We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that: xxx xxx xxx ... There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the crime (People vs. Galicia, [CA], 40 OG 4476). The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The Idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the Idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also different. As already stated, entrapment does not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. Even more emphatic on this point is People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng (56 Phil. 44) where this Court ruled that the mere fact that the Chief of Customs Secret Service pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customs house, in order to assure the seizure of the said opium and the arrest of its importers is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter. In that case, this Court quoted with approval 16 Corpus Juris, p. 88, Sec. 57, which states that: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence of the instigation of the detective. ... Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that she was denied due process of law because she was not charged with bribery in the information but for a crime falling under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Again, this argument is erroneous. The contention of the petitioner was squarely answered in United States vs. Panlilio (28 Phil. 608) where this Court held that the fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. To the same effect is our ruling in United States vs. Guzman (25 Phil. 22) where the appellant was convicted of the crime of estafa in the lower court, but on appeal, he was instead convicted of the crime of embezzlement of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and the facts proved during the trial show its having been committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error in the designation of the crime's name is not a denial of due process. In United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. 740), this Court held that: The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as defined in article 387, in connection with Article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code. Our review of this decision shows that the crime for which the petitioner was convicted has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED without costs. Considering however, that this case has been pending since 1971, that the amount involved is only P100.00 and that the defendant-appellant is a mother of four, it is recommended that the petitioner either be granted executive clemency or be given the privilege of probation if she is qualified. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for appropriate action. SO ORDERED. Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 146309. July 18, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS, appellant. D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J .: Entrapment is a legally sanctioned method resorted to by the police for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plans. Bare denials by the accused cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the arresting officers performance of official functions. The Case Roberto Mendoza Pacis appeals the August 18, 2000 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 265) in Criminal Case No. 6292-D, in which he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua after being found guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425 (RA 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659). The Information dated June 3, 1998, and signed by State Prosecutor Marilyn RO. Campomanes, charged appellant as follows: That on the afternoon of April 07, 1998, inside Unit #375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and dispatch 497.2940 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as SHABU, a regulated drug to undercover NBI agents who acted as poseur-buyer[s], without the corresponding license, and/or prescription to sell, distribute and dispatch the aforementioned regulated drug, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines. [2]
During his arraignment on July 30, 1998, appellant refused to plead despite the assistance of counsel. [3] Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered for him. [4] After due trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the [a]ccused, ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 15, Article III [of] Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No, 7650, and hereby SENTENCES him to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), plus the cost of suit. The Shabu, subject matter of the Information in this case, is hereby ordered FORFEITED in favor of the [g]overnment and ordered TURNED OVER to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal as provided by law. [5]
The Facts Version of the Prosecution The prosecutions version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as follows: [6]
On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the Dangerous Drugs Division-National Bureau of Investigation, received information that a certain Roberto Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half (1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu for the amount of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram or a total of four hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P475,000.00). The NBI Chief of the Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and Senior Agent Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case. In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and the informant went to the house of appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to appellant as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2) kilogram of shabu. The total price was reduced to four hundred fifty thousand pesos (P450,000.00). It was agreed that payment and delivery of shabu would be made on the following day, at the same place. On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the informant went to appellants house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag with markings yellow cab. When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found a transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While examining it, appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior Agent Congzon to get the money from the car. When Senior Agent Congzon returned, he gave the boodle money to Atty. Yap who then handed the money to the appellant. Upon appellants receipt of the payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him. Per instruction of Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon transmitted the shabu to the Forensic Chemistry Laboratory for examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosales testified that on April 8, 1998, she received the specimen from Senior Agent Congzon together with the letter request. The specimen weighed 497.292940 grams. After examination, the specimen was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (Citations omitted) Version of the Defense Appellant, on the other hand, presents the following version of the facts: [7]
Accused-appellant, ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS is a legitimate businessman having been engaged in the sale of imported automotive for quite a long time. On April 6, 1998, he was in his house at 375 Caimito Street, Caimito Ville, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. In the afternoon of April 6, 1998, he was in Caloocan City in Dome Street, in the house of defense witness Ramon Ty. He was there to pick-up witness Ty because they had an agreement that he was to bring him to far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They left right after lunch at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. Witness Ty mentioned to him that they were to meet Mr. Andrada and Dr. Lachica. They reached Pangasinan at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon. They saw the persons they were supposed to meet in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and after seeing those persons, they stayed overnight. In his address at Valle Verde II, accused-appellant had a live-in partner named ANNIE GONZALES. He was a car owner and had a former driver named Rey, who drove for him for less than a year. He had to dismiss his driver Rey because he was always late or would be absent for work without informing him ahead of time. After staying overnight in far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, they left for Manila on April 7, 1998 at 7:00 oclock in the morning. When they reached Manila proper, he dropped off witness Ramon Ty in his house at Caloocan. Then, he went straight home to Valle Verde to take a nap. At more or less 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 7, 1998, he was at home at Valle Verde, together with his live-in partner, ANNIE GONZALES. Later that afternoon, three (3)-armed persons entered his condominium unit. There was a commotion downstairs and his live-in partner Annie Gonzales opened the door and he was awakened. Annie told him that there were three (3) people with guns looking for him and they went up to the room right away. The three-armed men told him that they were NBI agents but did not show any identification. Agent Justo Yap, Jr. was one of them. Agent Congzon Jr. was also one of them, but NBI Special Investigator Larosa was not one of them. When they entered the room, the gun of NBI Agent Yap was already pointed at him while the two (2) other agents were holding the butts of their guns. They were in civilian clothes. They told him to step-out and that they were looking for [s]habu. They were not able to find any in his room or downstairs. When they were looking for the [s]habu, the accused appellant responded WHAT SHABU? What [s]habu are you looking for? When he stepped out of the room to go down to the living room, he saw his former driver Rey together with his father. Rey[,] as stated before was his former driver and he had seen the father of Rey once or twice before. Rey and his father were also in the living room. A paper bag with the lettering CAB was presented to the accused appellant in his house. He noticed that the bag came from Rey and was hiding it behind him when he gave it to agent Yap. Agent Yap got it from the cabinet near the kitchen. Agent Yap wanted him to admit that it belongs to him and that it came from his condominium. Agent Yap also showed him the bag with white powder and what was shown to him was a white substance in powdery form. After it was shown to him and he was asked to admit that it was taken from his place, he and his live-in partner ANNIE GONZALES were brought to the NBI at Taft Avenue. He did not see Rey and his father anymore at the NBI Office. When they were at the NBI, the Agents asked the accused-appellant to admit that the shabu was taken from his apartment. He told them that it was not from his apartment. Agent Yap told him that if he will not admit he will stay in jail longer or will be put behind bars. The accused appellant was brought to the NBI Headquarters on April 7, 1998. When he was taken from his house by the three NBI Agents, he was not informed or appraised of his constitutional rights such as the right to counsel and to remain silent. The same thing is true when he was brought to the NBI Headquarters, where he was not appraised of these basic rights. When he was asked to admit that the shabu was taken from his place, he told them that it was not from him and asked why [they were] doing [this] to him. The NBI Agents insisted that he is hard-headed and if he would just follow them he will be free if he will tell the source of the shabu. There were no statements taken from the accused-appellant in the afternoon of April 7, 1998; no statements were also taken from him in the morning of April 8, 1998. The agents were trying to negotiate with him. The negotiation was such that if he cannot produce the source of the contraband, then he had to produce P200,000.00 in order to get himself free. The NBI Agents agreed to let Annie Gonzales go and look for money. Annie Gonzales was able to produce only P40,000.00. It was brought back by Annie Gonzales to the NBI on April 8, 1998 and gave the sum to Agent Yap. Agent Yap looked very disappointed when he received the money. He said that it was not the agreement that was made. That, the agreed price ofP200,000.00 was short of P160,000.00. The accused- appellant requested again if he could use the phone to call up his cousin J-C Mendoza. He got in touch with his cousin, who said that he will try to get the amount. He again requested Agent Yap if he could allow Annie Gonzales [to] go to his cousin and see if there was cash that she can get. Annie Gonzales was allowed to leave again but the P160,000.00 was not produced. Annie Gonzales did not come back anymore because she was not able to produce the money. She did not show up anymore at the NBI Headquarters because she will be detained together with him (accused-appellant). Defense witness Ramon V. Ty corroborated, on all material points, the testimony of the accused-appellant. He was the driver of Joey Albert, the singer, for three (3) years more or less. He knows accused-appellant because he is the brother-in-law of Joey Albert. He first met Roberto Mendoza Pacis at his house, when he together with Vicente Pacis, husband of Joey Albert, went there. In the morning of April 6, 1998, he was at home. In the afternoon, they left his house at around 2:00 oclock. They were bound [for] far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, because his physical therapist, Dr. Lachica who resided in Pangasinan, was supposed to buy some instruments from him. He needed the instruments to help him exercise his body even without therapy because he had a stroke in 1993. When they reached Urdaneta, Pangasinan, he did not see his therapist because the latter was at his cousins house. After being told where Dr. Lachica was, they went to see him. They were able to get the gadget from him. They went to Manila the following morning. They left at about 7:00 oclock in the morning of April 7, 1998 and reached his house in Caloocan City at around 10:30 oclock in the morning. Whe[n] they reached Caloocan, he went home and Roberto Mendoza Pacis said that he will also go home. Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, noting that they testified in a clear and straightforward manner. It debunked appellants defense of frame-up as it was neither substantiated nor proven. It held that affirmative testimony, especially when it came from the mouth of a credible witness, was far stronger than a negative one. Hence, this appeal. [8]
The Issues Appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration: 1. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended, despite the inherent incredibility of the NBI (National Bureau of Investigation) version of the manner the alleged buy-bust operation was conducted. 2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving too much weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution when their testimonies were shot with material discrepancies and inconsistencies. 3. The lower court erred when it failed to accord full significance [of] the fact that the informant was not presented in court when circumstances demand for his presentation. 4. The lower court erred when it failed to give weight and credence to the alibi offered by the accused as a defense. [9]
These issues may be summed as follows: (1) whether the buy-bust operation that led to appellants arrest was valid, (2) whether the presentation of the informant was necessary to prove appellants guilt, and (3) whether the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to appellants alibi. This Courts Ruling The appeal is not meritorious. First Issue: Validity of the Buy-Bust Operation Claiming that he was framed by the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), appellant assails the validity of the buy-bust operation that led to his arrest. Entrapment Distinguished from Instigation In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. [10]
A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not. [11] In the present case, the RTC noted that the prosecution witnesses testified in a clear and straightforward manner in narrating the events that had transpired before and during the buy-bust operation. Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. [12] Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary. [13]
No Proof of Ill Motive on the Part of NBI Agents It is not unusual in criminal cases of this kind to have a version of the prosecution so diametrically opposed to that of the defense. However, upon a careful perusal of the records, we find the evidence presented by the defense to be unsound and self-serving. Appellant did not submit any plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely impute to him a serious and unfounded charge. Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved, and that their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [14] The records show that appellant had a ready supply of shabu for sale and disposition to anyone willing to pay the right price. Elements of Crime Duly Proven Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. [15] These elements were duly proven in the case herein. The records show that appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers. It was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence. Appellant was likewise shown to be aware that what he was selling and delivering was a prohibited substance. Second Issue: Identity of Informant Not Necessary With respect to the informants identity, we hold that it may remain confidential. There are strong practical reasons for keeping its secrecy, including the continued health and safety of the informant and the encouragement of others to report any wrongdoing to police authorities. [16] This is settled jurisprudence and we will not belabor it here. Third Issue: Alibi as a Defense On April 6, 1998, NBI agents, acting as poseur-buyers of illegal drugs, allegedly went to the house of appellant to discuss with him preliminary arrangements for the sale. However, Pacis disputed this allegation. To bolster his claim, he presented his sister-in-laws driver, Ramon V. Ty, who testified that he was with the former in Urdaneta, Pangasinan on that same day; hence, appellant could not have been with the poseur-buyers in Manila to discuss the quantity and the price of the shabu to be delivered the next day. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The excuse must be so airtight that it admits of no exception. [17]
In the present case, however, we agree with the RTC that the claim of Ty was not substantiated by the testimonies of the persons he and appellant were supposed to have met in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Hence, appellant was unable to disprove the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that on April 6, 1998, he was discussing the terms of the sale with the poseur-buyers. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive identification of the accused -- when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses -- prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law. [18]
Compared with the detailed, convincing and well-documented Decision of the trial court, appellants denial and alibi pale into insignificance. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Written by Judge Edwin A. Villasor; rollo, pp. 16-44; records, pp. 259-287. [2] Rollo, p. 5; records, p. 1. [3] Atty. Ernesto O. Pua. [4] Order dated July 30, 1998; records, p. 38. [5] Assailed Decision, pp. 28-29; rollo, pp. 16-44; records, pp. 259-287. [6] Appellees Brief, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 137-140. The Brief was signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Associate Solicitor Elmira S. Cruz. [7] Appellants Brief, pp. 5-11; rollo, pp. 63-69. The Brief was signed by Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino. [8] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 4, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of appellees Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none had been submitted within the reglementary period. [9] Appellants Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 59. Original in upper case. [10] People v. Lapatha, 167 SCRA 159, November 9, 1988; People v. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635, July 31, 1987; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483, November 13, 1986. [11] People v. Ruedas, 194 SCRA 553, February 27, 1991. [12] People v. Lamog, 172 SCRA 342, April 17, 1989. [13] People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263, July 23, 1987. [14] People v. Sanchez, 173 SCRA 305, May 12, 1989. [15] People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561, 579, September 5, 1997; People v. Manzano, 227 SCRA 780, 785, November 16, 1993. [16] Ibid. [17] People v. Barera, 262 SCRA 63, September 19, 1996. [18] People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February 13, 2002.
Third Division (G.R. NO. 184037: September 29, 2009) Antonio Lopez Y Dela Cruz, Petitioner, V. People of The Philippines, Respondent. Decision Nachura, J.