Impact Defense - Baylor Debate Workshop

2014
Strategy Sheet
Arctic War Defense
1NC Arctic War
1. No arctic war, nations not willing to risk it
NATO 13 (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series Environmental security, Environmental
Security in the Arctic Ocean, Online Publication, Page 162,
http://link.springer.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-4713-5_14, hhs-nw)
Even the popular writers and journalists, who use dramatic images of resource wars and violent
clashes in the Arctic to draw attention to their work, tend to arrive at more sober conclusions after
they have examined the evidence regarding actual developments in the Arctic. The author who spoke
of the prospect of a brutal, bitter and bloody confrontation in the Arctic, for example, concludes that
this scenario is even less likely to happen in the Arctic than elsewhere [16] and that. . Governments are
most unlikely to want to risk losing a war over an area that may have nothing to offer them" [16]. The
author of another popular account concludes that. . the North Pole [is not] going to be the setting for a new kind of
Cold War - much as it might make for an easy headline" [13]. The author of a book entitled "Who Owns the Arctic?" ends
by arguing that the Arctic is a promising region for those seeking to encourage international cooperation,
because it is a vast, sparsely populated region with only a handful of nation-states; only a few,
relatively minor boundary disputes; and a pre-existing framework of universally accepted
international rules, centrally including the law of the sea " [9]. So, what is going on here? Why is the neo-realist
discourse so attractive to popular writers and journalists attempting to explain the transformation taking place in the circumpolar Arctic to a
broader public? There are bits and pieces of evidence that lend some credence to a neo-realist account,
especially when taken out of context. Although the Russians have forcefully and repeatedly denied it, those who view the world
through a neo-realist lens have tended to treat the planting of a Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007 as part of a
carefully planned operation to assert Russia 's claim over part of a region that seemed to belong to no one" ([16]: 3). Some observers attach
great importance to the rebuilding of the Russian Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula [17], despite the fact that this is almost certainly a
more general initiative designed to reassert Russia's claim to great power status at a global level in contrast to an effort to adopt an aggressive
stance regarding the Arctic. The bluster of Canada's prime minister in asserting that his country must adopt a
policv of "use it or lose it" in dealing with the Arctic.

No Arctic conflict your evidence is media hype
Mazo and French 12 (Dr. Jeffrey, IISS Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy
and Managing Editor of Survival, and Sara, Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, Arctic Security,
Arctic Summer College Policy Brief, 7-30, Issue No. 4,
http://arcticsummercollege.org/sites/default/files/Security%20Policy%20Brief_Arctic%20Summer%20C
ollege_July%2030%202012_0.pdf)
uman or environmental
An armed conflict or new cold war in the North is not imminent . NATO and Russian military forces
will play a future role in the Arctic, but rather as force providers for constabulary, surveillance, and SAR
operations. -making institution and forum for peaceful negotiation is of particular interest and
importance. The fourth session of Ecologic Institutes Arctic Summer College took place on July 30, 2012, looking at Arctic Security. Speakers Dr. Jeffrey Mazo
(Research Fellow, Environmental Security and Science Policy and Managing Editor, Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies), and Sara French
(Program Manager, Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation) joined the Arctic Summer College for a webinar on the
understanding of security, international security policy, and military presence in the High North. Military presence and traditional national security in the
North Understandings of security in the Arctic region vary depending on the context and views of individuals or institutions. Arctic security can therefore be
referred to as national, human, or even environmental security. Whenever the Arctic was of strategic interest during the last decades, it was generally
in terms of national security, as Jeffrey Mazo explained in his presentation: American, British, and Russian submarines operated
underneath the ice during the years of the Cold War, monitored by a network of acoustic sensors in the depth
of the sea, and overarched and surveilled by the integrated air defense of NATO and its Eastern counterpart.
While the global architecture of security has changed since 1990, and most of the former Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact have become NATO
allies today, the demarcation line between NATO and non-NATO in the north is still the same. Altogether, the Arctic Five (Russia, Canada, the United States,
Norway, and Denmark/Greenland) have more than 30 major military installations, whether naval bases, airfields, or army barracks, along the Arctic Circle. As
the Russian flag was planted underneath the North Pole in 2007, media predicted an uncontrolled gold rush or even a new
Cold War in the region. This interpretation of military presence in the North, in combination with diminishing sea ice and
territorial and resource claims of the riparian nations, created the image of imminent conflict. In fact, the probability of armed
conflict in the North was not significantly high er during the last years than it was from 1990 to 2007. The nations involved,
especially the Arctic Five, are affiliated with several overlapping international institutions , such as the United
Nations or the Arctic Council, which provide arenas for peaceful conflict management . Furthermore, all those
nations are aware that any armed escalation is counterproductive to their future interests and to exploitation
of Arctic resources. In the official Northern strategies or White Papers of the Arctic Five, the commitment to peaceful cooperation
and compliance with international law is a common and fundamental element. The current deployment,
modernization, and reorganisation of the military in the Arctic takes place mostly to support the constabulary
functions of those forces: Due to the harsh conditions of weather and terrain, it is foremost the military which has the equipment and personnel
capacities to operate in the North at all. This includes not only the sovereign rights of border patrolling, coast guarding, and air policing, but also the provision
of Search-and-Rescue (SAR) capabilities. Since an SAR agreement has been negotiated through the Arctic Council during the Conference of Nuuk in 2011, this
task is of particular importance.

2NC Ext #1
Extend 1NC 1, there is virtually no risk of an arctic war due to the lack of certainty of
actual reward. Prefer our evidence from NATO that indicates the arctic is only a site
for international cooperation and one that no rational government would risk the loss
of a war over.

Diplomacy Solves Arctic War
Masters et al 14 (Jonathan Deputy Editor of Council of Foreign Relations, on issues related to national
security and civil liberties, contributes to CFR's Renewing America initiative that focuses on the
economic underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy, Scott Borgerson CEO, CargoMetrics and Cofounder,
Arctic Circle, Lawson Brigham Distinguished Professor of Geography and Arctic Policy, University of
Alaska Fairbanks, Michael Byers Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law,
University of British Columbia, Heather Conley Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Marlene Laruelle Research Professor of International
Affairs, George Washington University, The Emerging Artic, Council of Foreign Relations, March 25,
2014, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/#overview)
Less than a decade ago, many geopolitical analysts warned that the Arctic had all of the makings for
great-power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War. However, the movement has gone quite the other
way. Despite a few remaining territorial disputes, the overwhelming majority of Arctic resources fall
within accepted national boundaries and all Arctic governments have committed to settling
disagreements peaceably. Notably, Russia and Norway resolved a decades-old maritime border
dispute in 2010, equally dividing some 67,600 square miles of water in the Barents Sea, and partnering
in the region on energy development. The historic deal is often cited as a model for future Arctic
diplomacy. The Arctic Council, the leading international forum for cooperation in the region, was
established by the eight Arctic states in 1996 with participation from indigenous peoples like the Inuit
and Saami, and all member states except the United States and Norway have appointed ambassador-
level diplomats to represent their interests in the region. With a secretariat in Troms, Norway, the
council is a forum that sponsors major assessments and studies, and develops policies and guidelines
that focus on environmental protection and sustainable development. Chairmanship of the council
rotates every two years. But Arctic cooperation takes place in a variety of other forums. Nordic
nationsDenmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Icelandalso partner on sustainability and issues
related to Arctic indigenous peoples via the Nordic Council. Nineteen countries are party to the
International Arctic Science Committee, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to research. The
nonprofit Arctic Circle, formed in 2013 by Icelandic president lafur Ragnar Grmsson, aims to provide
a setting for political and business groups, as well as other organizations from around the world, to
discuss Arctic issues.
No risk of Arctic military conflict business interests not state interests
Keil 13 (Kathrin, The Arctic Institute Opening Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic A Conflict and
Risk Assessment, 1/31/2013 http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/01/opening-oil-and-gas-
development-in.html)

Given that the US and Canada show little interest in Arctic hydrocarbons and Norway and Greenland
focus on their own national hydrocarbon base, this leaves Russia as the most prevalent location of
Arctic oil and gas development, which requires the involvement of foreign actors. In other words, if any
conflict over Arctic hydrocarbon development were to arise, it would most likely concern business
relationships between Russian (state) and foreign companies over access to Russias resources and the
cost-and-benefit sharing of joint ventures. Importantly, the interests of all actors involved point in the
same direction: Russia wants to develop its resource base and sell it to high-price-paying Europeans,
while foreign energy companies want a share in this profitable endeavour.
Russia wont start a conflictnot financially beneficial
Mattlack 14 (Carol Mattlack, correspondent for businessweek.com, Why Putin's Potential Retaliation
Against Western Oil Giants Could Backfire, April 30
th
, 2014, accessed on June 25, 2014, Available Online
at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-30/why-putins-retaliation-against-western-oil-
giants-could-backfire-in-a-big-way)

Under Soviet rule, Russia fell far behind the West in developing technology to tap new oil fields in
remote locales or squeeze hard-to-get deposits from older sites. ExxonMobil, for example, is providing
fracking technology to Rosneft in Western Siberia and furnishing the technical know-how and
financing for the joint Arctic venture. Disrupting such ventures is not in Russias interest, Henderson
says. It would set an appalling precedent for future investment in the countrys energy sector. Russia
really cant afford to mess this up. Revenues from oil and gas exports generate about half the
governments income.

2NC Ext #2

No arctic conflict
Dyer 12 (Gwynne Dyer, OC is a London-based independent Canadian journalist, syndicated columnist
and military historian., His articles are published in 45 countries, 8/4/2012, "Race for Arctic Mostly
Rhetoric", www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/race-for-arctic-mostly-rhetoric-
164986566.html)
Russian television contacted me last night asking me to go on a program about the race for Arctic resources. The ice is melting fast,
and it was all the usual stuff about how there will be big strategic conflicts over the seabed resources -- especially
oil and gas -- that become accessible when it's gone. The media always love conflict, and now that the Cold War is
long gone, there's no other potential military confrontation between the great powers to worry about.
Governments around the Arctic Ocean are beefing up their armed forces for the coming struggle, so where are the
flashpoints and what are the strategies? It's great fun to speculate about possible wars. In the end I didn't do the interview because
the Skype didn't work, so I didn't get the chance to rain on their parade. But here's what I would said to the Russians if my server
hadn't gone down at the wrong time. First, you should never ask the barber if you need a haircut. The armed forces in every country
are always looking for reasons to worry about impending conflict, because that's the only reason their
governments will spend money on them. Sometimes they will be right to worry, and sometimes they will be wrong, but right or
wrong, they will predict conflict. Like the barbers, it's in their professional interest to say you need their services. So you'd be better off to
ask somebody who doesn't have a stake in the game. As I don't own a single warship, I'm practically ideal for the
job. And I don't think there will be any significant role for the armed forces in the Arctic, although there is
certainly going to be a huge investment in exploiting the region's resources. There are three separate "resources" in the
Arctic. On the surface, there are the sea lanes that are opening up to commercial traffic along the northern coasts of Russia and Canada. Under
the seabed, there are potential oil and gas deposits that can be drilled once the ice retreats. And in the water in between, there is the planet's
last unfished ocean. The sea lanes are mainly a Canadian obsession, because the government believes the Northwest Passage that weaves
between Canada's Arctic islands will become a major commercial artery when the ice is gone. Practically every summer, Prime Minister Stephen
Harper travels north to declare his determination to defend Canada's Arctic sovereignty from -- well, it's not clear from exactly whom, but it's a
great photo op. Canada is getting new Arctic patrol vessels and building a deep-water naval port and Arctic warfare
training centre in the region, but it's all much ado about nothing. The Arctic Ocean will increasingly be used as a
shortcut between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, but the shipping will not go through Canadian waters.
Russia's "Northern Sea Route" will get the traffic, because it's already open and much safer to navigate. Then there's the hydrocarbon
deposits under the Arctic seabed, which the U.S. Geological Survey has forecast may contain almost one-fourth of the
world's remaining oil and gas resources. But from a military point of view, there's only a problem if there is some
disagreement about the seabed boundaries. There are only four areas where the boundaries are disputed. Two are
between Canada and its eastern and western neighbours in Alaska and Greenland, but there is zero likelihood of a war
between Canada and the United States or Denmark (which is responsible for Greenland's defence). In the Bering Strait,
there is a treaty defining the seabed boundary between the United States and Russia, signed in the dying days of the
Soviet Union, but the Russian Duma has refused to ratify it. The legal uncertainty caused by the dispute, however, is
more likely to deter future investment in drilling there than lead to war. And then there was the seabed-
boundary dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, which led Norway to double the size of its navy over
the past decade. But last year, the two countries signed an agreement dividing the disputed area right down the
middle and providing for joint exploitation of its resources. So no war between NATO (of which Norway is a member) and
the Russian Federation. Which leaves the fish, and it's hard to have a war over fish. The danger is rather that the world's
fishing fleets will crowd in and clean the fish out, as they are currently doing in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica. If the countries
with Arctic coastlines want to preserve this resource, they can only do so by creating an international body to regulate the fishing.
And they will have to let other countries fish there, too, with agreed catch limits, since they are mostly international waters. They will be
driven to co-operate, in their own interests. So no war over the Arctic. All we have to worry about now is the fact the ice is
melting, which will speed global warming (because open water absorbs far more heat from the sun than highly reflective ice), and ultimately
melt the Greenland icecap and raise sea levels worldwide by seven metres. But that's a problem for another day.
No opportunity and coop solves prefer experts
Young 11 (Oran R Professor Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions
@ UCSB, Arctic expert, PhD Yale, The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?
International Affairs 87:1, p. 185-193)
Popular accounts of the Arctics jurisdictional issues are regularly couched in terms of provocative phrases like
the afore-mentioned who owns the Arctic or use it or lose it. But these phrases turn out to be highly
misleading in this context. There are virtually no disputes in the Arctic regarding sovereignty over northern
lands; no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic with regard to the terrestrial
boundaries of the Arctic states. Most of the disagreements are to do with jurisdiction over marine areas where
the idea of ownership in the ordinary sense is irrelevant. While some of these disagreements are of long
standing and feature relatively entrenched positions, they are not about establishing ownership, and they
do not indicate that some level of use is required to avoid the erosion of sovereignty. There is little
prospect that these disputes will spawn armed clashes. As both Michael Byers and Shelagh Grant make clear in
their excellent analyses of Arctic sovereignty, recent efforts to address matters involving sovereignty in the
Arctic are marked by a spirit of rule-based problem-solving, rather than an escalating spiral of politically charged
claims and counterclaims. The process of delineating jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed beyond
the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is taking place in conformity with the rules and procedures set
forth in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia have signed an international treaty resolving their differences
regarding jurisdictional boundaries in the Barents Sea. There are signs that Canada and the United States
are interested in a similar approach with regard to the Beaufort Sea. The Russians, whose much ballyhooed
2007 initiative to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole is widely discussed in the books
under review, have acted in conformity with the relevant rules of international law in addressing
jurisdictional matters and repeatedly expressed their readiness to move forward in a cooperative
manner in this realm. There are, of course, significant sensitivities regarding the legal status of the
Northern Sea Route and especially the Northwest Passage. But given that commercial traffic on these
routes is likely to be limited during the near future, and that the use of these routes will require the active
cooperation of the coastal states, regardless of their formal legal status, opportunities arise for devising
pragmatic arrangements governing the use of these waterways. The progress now being made regarding
the development of a mandatory Polar Code covering Arctic shipping is good news. The fact that hot spots
in the search for oil and gas in the Arctic are located, for the most part, in areas that are not subject to
jurisdictional disputes is also helpful. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the Arctic states are living up to
their promises to deal with jurisdictional issues in the region in a peaceful manner.
Russia wont escalate Arctic conflict AND US wont get drawn in because of shale gas
RT 12 (Race for Arctic resources shouldnt spark new Cold War Russian official, TV-Novosti, 9-12,
http://rt.com/politics/arctic-resources-russia-gas-972/)
With global demand for energy resources surging, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed hopes that there will never be
a war for resources or an even hotter conflict in the Arctic Region. Foreign Ministry official Alexander Gorban
expressed confidence that no such conflict over resources would ever take place . "We are trying to
fight for the Arctic shelf, but in light of recent events involving the Shtokman field, [other sources of fuel] will prevail," Gorban told
Interfax on Wednesday. Gazprom announced last month that its foreign partners were withdrawing from the Shtokman project due to cost concerns. Other
reasons for the pullout include the shale gas revolution in the United States, which had been viewed as a primary export
market for Shtokman.


Biodiversity
1NC Biodiversity
Biodiversity loss is irrelevant- species will adapt

Willis 9
[Kathy J. Willis, Long-Term Ecology Laboratory, Oxford University Centre for the Environment and Department of Biology, University of
Bergen. Shonil A. Bhagwat, Long-Term Ecology Laboratory, Oxford University Centre for the Environment. Biodiversity and Climate
Change. Science 6 November 2009: Vol. 326 no. 5954 pp. 806-807. ETB]

Another complexity, however, is the impact of climate change on already highly altered fragmented landscapes outside of protected areas. Over 75% of the Earth's
terrestrial biomes now show evidence of alteration as a result of human residence and land use (10). Yet, recent case studies suggest that even in a highly
fragmented landscape, all is not lost for biodiversity. It has long been assumed that in a fragmented landscape, the fragment size
and its isolation are important factors in determining species persistence; the smaller and more isolated the fragment, the lower its occupancy. Yet few worldwide
studies have attempted to quantify this relation. Prugh et al. (11) compiled and analyzed raw data from previous research on the occurrence of 785 animal species in
>12,000 discrete habitat fragments on six continents. In many cases, fragment size and isolation were poor predictors of
occupancy. The quality of the matrix surrounding the fragment had a greater influence on persistence: When the matrix provided conditions suitable to live and
reproduce, fragment size and isolation were less important and species were able to persist. This ability of species to persist
in what would appear to be a highly undesirable and fragmented landscape has also been recently demonstrated in
West Africa. In a census on the presence of 972 forest butterflies over the past 16 years, Larsen found that despite an 87% reduction in
forest cover, 97% of all species ever recorded in the area are still present (12). For reasons that are not entirely clear, these
butterfly species appear to be able to survive in the remaining primary and secondary forest fragments
and disturbed lands in the West African rainforest. However, presence or absence does not take into account lag effects of declining
populations; a more worrying interpretation is therefore that the full effects of fragmentation will only be seen in future years.

Species loss wont snowball or threaten human life

Moore 98
(Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, Climate of Fear, Pg. 99)

Nevertheless, the loss of a class of living being does not typically threaten other species. Most animals and plants
can derive their nutrients or receive the other benefits provided by a particular species from more than a single
source. If it were true that the extinction of a single species would produce a cascade of losses, then the massive
extinctions of the past should have wiped out all life. Evolution forces various life forms to adjust to change. A few may not make the adaptation
but others will mutate to meet the new conditions. Although a particular chain of DNA may be eliminated through the loss of a species, other animals or plants adapting to the same environment
often produce similar genetic solutions with like proteins. It is almost impossible to imagine a single species that, if eliminated,
would threaten us humans.

Not key to ecosystem stability

Sasaki and Lauenroth, 11
* Graduate School of Life Sciences, Tohoku University. PhD from the Graduate School of Agricultural
and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo. Member of the Ecological Society of Japan, and Winner of
the Best Poster Prize in 2007 and 2008 at the Annual Meeting of Ecological Society of Japan (section:
Plant Community and Species Diversity) AND ** Professor at the Department of Botany at the
University of Wyoming. PhD in Range Science from the University of Colorado (1/11/11, Dr. Takehiro
Sasaki and Dr. William K. Lauenroth, Dominant species, rather than diversity, regulates temporal
stability of plant communities, Oecologia, 166(3):761-8 CS)

We found a significant negative relationship between temporal stability and species richness, number of
rare species, and relative abundance of rare species (Fig. 2a, d, h). This is counter to the growing body of
empirical evidence that suggests that the temporal stability of communities increases with diversity (Tilman
1999; Cottingham et al. 2001; Valone and Hoffman 2003; Tilman et al. 2006). Many theoretical studies have focused on the portfolio and covariance effects (see
Materials and methods) in demonstrating how increased diversity can confer increased temporal stability (Tilman 1999; Yachi and Loreau 1999; Hughes and
Roughgarden 2000). However, we found no significant relationships between summed variances and species
richness and number of rare species (Fig. 3a, b), and we found significant positive relationships between summed covariances and species
richness and number of rare spe- cies (Fig. 3e, f). Neither the portfolio nor the covariance effect contributed
significantly to temporal stability in our communities. Rare species that generally exhibit greater temporal fluctuations than
common species should more often exhibit years of zero abundance than common species because of their small population sizes (Lande 1993; Valone and
Schutzenhofer 2007), resulting in synchrony in response to high interannual variability in rainfall. This probably dampened the expected stabilizing effect of species
richness on temporal stability (Yachi and Loreau 1999). Valone and Barber (2008) also showed that covariances between most pairs of species in natural communities
were more often positive than negative, potentially because of shared responses of coexisting species to fluctuations in a common resource base, pos- sibly driven by
climatic fluctuations. Moreover, the rela- tionship between summed abundance and species richness was not significant (Fig. 3i), suggesting that overyielding was not
important in our communities. A previous study has indicated that functional diversity is a good predictor of the overyielding effect of species richness (Griffin et al.
2009). Our findings suggest that, although we do not know the explicit mechanism, the lack of change
in functional diversity, despite the increase in species rich- ness resulting from the removal of
dominant species, might explain the absence of an overyielding effect. Thus, there were no operational
stabilizing effects of greater diversity; rather, greater species richness supported by an increase in
the number of rare species destabilized the communities.

Many alt causes to biodiversity loss and nuke war turns the case

*the expansion of human settlement, hunting and farming, overharvesting invasive species, industrial
waste

Tonn 7
(Bruce, school of planning prof at U of Tenn, Futures Sustainability, Futures, November, lexis)

Threats to biodiversity are numerous and well known. Studies suggest that the number of species on earth is decreasing faster than the 'natural' rate
[19]. It can be strongly argued that the biodiversity of the earth is decreasing mostly as the result of human behavior. The relentless expansion of human
settlements has resulted in widespread destruction of habitats. The loss of tropical rainforests, estuaries and wetlands to
development have been particularly ruinous. Of course, over the course of history humans have also hunted numerous species into extinction [20] and
are threatening to over-harvest many aquatic species to extinction. Industrial waste also has the capability to kill
species outright and to prevent their reproduction. The transport of invasive species around the world is another near-term threat to the earth's
biodiversity. Human-induced climate change is threatening many species in the near-term, such as the polar bear. Rapid global climate change and nuclear
war could result in catastrophic species extinction similar to massive extinctions in the earth's geologic
past. There are also numerous natural threats to biodiversity. Naturally occurring viruses and other pathogens could become more virulent and uncontrollable and
could threaten numerous flora and fauna alike. However, long-term threats to biodiversity mostly stem from extreme climate change. Volcanic eruptions, collisions
with asteroids, plate tectonics, changes in ocean currents, and even minute changes in the energy output of the sun could cause rapid global cooling. Cooling could not
only spread ice over most of the earth's surface again, killing the majority of species outright, but could also lower sea floors enough to foster massive oxidation,
thereby reducing oxygen levels enough in the atmosphere to asphyxiate all oxygen breathing species [17].
2NC Ext #1
Their doomsday impacts are tautological and exaggerated- scientists manipulate the
data and use overly simplistic models to fit the catastrophe paradigm
Myers 12
[Todd Myers, Environmental Director of the Washington Policy Center.
http://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2012/07/03/to_predict_catastrophe_ignore_the_past_106314.html ETB]

The Nature article, however, suffers from numerous simple statistical errors and assumptions rather than evidence. Its authors do nothing to deal with the
fundamental mistakes that led Ehrlich and others like him down the wrong path so many times.
Instead, the paper simply argues that with improved data, this time their predictions of doom are
correct. Ultimately, the piece is a good example of the great philosopher of science Thomas Kuhns hypothesis, written 50 years ago, that scientists often attempt to fit
the data to conform to their particular scientific paradigm, even when that paradigm is obviously flawed.
When confronted with failure to explain real-world phenomena, the authors of the Nature piece have, as Kuhn described in
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, devised numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in
order to eliminate any apparent conflict. Like scientists blindly devoted to a failed paradigm, the Nature piece simply tries to force new data to fit a
flawed concept. A Paradigm of Catastrophe What would lead scientists to make such simplistic assumptions and flat-line
projections? Indeed, what would lead Nature editors to print an article whose statistical underpinnings are so flawed? The simple belief in the paradigm
of inevitable environmental catastrophe: humans are doing irreparable damage to the Earth and
every bit of resource use moves us closer to that catastrophe. The catastrophe paradigm argues a
simple model that eventually we will run out of space and resources, and determining the date of
ultimate doom is a simple matter of doing the math. Believing in this paradigm also justifies
exaggeration in order to stave off the serious consequences of collapse. Thus, they describe the United Nations likely population estimate for
2050 as the most conservative, without explaining why. They claim rapid climate change shows no signs of slowing without providing a source citation for the claim, and despite an actual
slowing of climate change over the last decade. The need to avoid perceived global catastrophe also encourages the authors to blow
past warning signs that their analysis is not built on solid foundations as if the poor history of
such projections were not already warning enough. Even as they admit the interactions between overlapping complex systems, however, are
providing difficult to characterize mathematically, they base their conclusions on the simplest linear mathematical estimate
that assumes nothing will change except population over the next 40 years. They then draw a straight line, literally, from today to the
environmental tipping point. Why is such an unscientific approach allowed to pass for science in a respected
international journal? Because whatever the argument does not supply, the paradigm conveniently
fills in. Even if the math isnt reliable and there are obvious counterarguments, everyone
understands and believes in the underlying truth we are nearing the limits of the planets ability
to support life. In this way the conclusion is not proven but assumed, making the supporting argument an
impenetrable tautology. Such a circumstance creates the conditions of scientific revolutions, where the old paradigm fails to explain real-world phenomena and is replaced
by an alternative. Given the record of failure of the paradigm of resource catastrophe, dating back to the 1970s, one would hope we are moving toward such a change. Unfortunately, Nature and
the authors of the piece are clinging to the old resource-depletion model, simply trying to re-work the numbers. Let us hope policymakers recognize the
failure of that paradigm before they make costly and dangerous policy mistakes that impoverish
billions in the name of false scientific assumptions.

Catastrophe predictions empirically false- inevitability claims are tautological

Eisen 11
[Ben Eisen, Senior Analyst @ the Frontier Center for Public Policy.
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0611/0611doomsdayenviron.htm ETB]

There is an element of the environmentalist movement that has been gripped for forty years by the conviction
that the activities of advanced, industrialized economies will lead to an apocalyptic environmental
collapse one way or another. This faction has worked backwards from this assumption, always seeking
causes that will trigger the cataclysm they believe is an inevitable consequence of the high levels of economic
production and consumption of a capitalist economy. Although we should take environmental risks seriously, we should also recognize
the environmentalist movement's track record of overhyping those risks, and consider that record as they continue to insist that
civilization will collapse if we refuse to enact their policy agenda. Given his track record, it's no wonder fewer people are taking Camping's
newest rapture timetable seriously. Radical environmentalists have also built a record of wrongly predicting massive
cataclysms, and we should be hesitant before enacting policies that entail enormous economic costs in reaction to their
latest set of doomsday predictions.




Competitiveness
1NC Competitiveness
Emerging economies make competitiveness decline inevitable and alt causes
overwhelm their internal link
CNN 10
[http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/10/01/david-rubenstein-u-s-is-losing-its-competitive-edge/?section=magazines_fortune]
Ever since China's economy surpassed Japan's this past summer, speculation has escalated over when
the country might take over the United States as the world's largest. The estimate has ranged from 2030 to 2035,
the latter date being the one Carlyle Group co-founder David Rubenstein highlighted at a forum Wednesday in Washington DC of some of the
day's biggest newsmakers. Rubenstein says the U.S. faces the harsh possibility of losing some of its competitive edge amid
the rapid rise of emerging economics in particular, China. The U.S. overwhelmingly dominates the private equity and
venture capital industries worldwide, the prominent investor notes. China and other emerging economies have become
eager players and companies such as private equity firm Carlyle have increasingly been spending more time in these regions. To date,
Carlyle has invested $3 billion in China, he says. But several pressing factors are threatening America's competitive
edge. Rubenstein lists huge deficits and government debt, high unemployment, and widening income
disparities. His remarks echo what other business executives have said recently. In a report released by the World Economic Forum in
August, the U.S. slipped a notch down the ranks of competitive economies falling behind Sweden and Singapore,
which rose to the No. 1 and No. 2 spots, respectively. The report, which combines economic data and a survey of more than 13,500 business
executives, commended the U.S. for its innovation, excellent universities and flexible labor market. But what has hurt America's
competitiveness, in particular, is the country's huge deficits and rising government debt. While China
ranked far below the U.S. at No. 27, the Asian powerhouse outperformed all major developing
economies. "We have to recognize as Americans that we're not going to be as dominant a force in the
global economy as we have been," Rubenstein says, adding that unless the U.S. lowers its debts and deficits, improves joblessness
and narrow widening income gaps, future generations will have a lower quality and less affluent lifestyle. Facing the inevitable decline
Rubenstein couldn't have been more straight-to-the point about the depths of America's economic turmoil. But perhaps more important, he
points out that it's virtually inevitable that China and even India might eventually surpass the U.S. economy
simply because they're just bigger, not necessarily richer.
No risk of economy or heg decline - competitiveness theory is false
Fallows 10
[James, correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, studied economics at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. He has been an editor of The
Washington Monthly and of Texas Monthly, and from 1977 to 1979 he served as President Jimmy Carter's chief speechwriter. His first book,
National Defense, won the American Book Award in 1981; he has written seven others. How America Can Rise Again, Jan/Feb edition,
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/201001/american-decline]

This is new. Only with Americas emergence as a global power after World War II did the idea of
American decline routinely involve falling behind someone else. Before that, it meant falling short of
expectationsGods, the Founders, posteritysor of the previous virtues of America in its lost, great days. The new element in the 50s was
the constant comparison with the Soviets, Michael Kazin told me. Since then, external falling-behind comparisons have
become not just a staple of American self-assessment but often a crutch. If we are concerned about our schools, it is because children are
learning more in Singapore or India; about the development of clean-tech jobs, because its happening faster in China. Having often lived
outside the United States since the 1970s, I have offered my share of falling-behind analyses, including a book-length comparison of Japanese
and American strengths (More Like Us) 20 years ago. But at this point in Americas national life cycle, I think the exercise is largely a distraction,
and that Americans should concentrate on what are, finally, our own internal issues to resolve or ignore. Naturally there are lessons
to draw from other countries practices and innovations; the more we know about the outside world
the better, as long as were collecting information calmly rather than glancing nervously at our
reflected foreign image. For instance, if you have spent any time in places where tipping is frowned on or rare, like Japan or Australia,
you view the American model of day-long small bribes, rather than one built-in full price, as something similar to baksheesh, undignified for all
concerned. Naturally, too, its easier to draw attention to a domestic problem and build support for a solution if you cast the issue in us-
versus-them terms, as a response to an outside threat. In If We Can Put a Man on the Moon , their new book about making government
programs more effective, William Eggers and John OLeary emphasize the military and Cold War imperatives behind Americas space program.
The race to the moon was a contest between two systems of government, they wrote, and the question would be settled not by debate but
by who could best execute on this endeavor. Falling-behind arguments have proved convenient and powerful in other countries, too. But
whatever their popularity or utility in other places at other times, falling-behind concerns seem too
common in America now. As I have thought about why overreliance on this device increasingly bothers me, I have realized that its because
my latest stretch out of the country has left me less and less interested in whether China or some
other country is overtaking America. The question that matters is not whether America is falling
behind but instead something like John Winthrops original question of whether it is falling shortor even falling apart. This is
not the mainstream American position now, so let me explain. First is the simple reality that one kind of decline is inevitable and
therefore not worth worrying about. China has about four times as many people as America does.
Someday its economy will be larger than ours. Fine! A generation ago, its people produced, on average, about one-
sixteenth as much as Americans did; now they produce about one-sixth. That change is a huge achievement for Chinaand a plus rather than a
minus for everyone else, because a business-minded China is more benign than a miserable or rebellious one. When the Chinese produce one-
quarter as much as Americans per capita, as will happen barring catastrophe, their economy will become the worlds largest. This will be
good for them but will not mean falling behind for us. We know that for more than a century, the
consciousness of decline has been a blight on British politics, though it has inspired some memorable,
melancholy literature. There is no reason for America to feel depressed about the natural emergence
of China, India, and others as world powers. But second, and more important, America may have
reasons to feel actively optimistic about its prospects in purely relative terms. The Crucial American
Advantage Lets start with the more modest claim, that China has ample reason to worry about its own future. Will the long-dreaded day of
reckoning for Chinese development finally arrive because of environmental disaster? Or via the demographic legacy of the one-child policy,
which will leave so many parents and grandparents dependent on so relatively few young workers? Minxin Pei, who grew up in Shanghai and
now works at Claremont McKenna College, in California, has predicted in Chinas Trapped Transition that within the next few years, tension
between an open economy and a closed political system will become unendurable, and an unreformed Communist bureaucracy will finally drag
down economic performance. America will be better off if China does well than if it flounders. A prospering
China will mean a bigger world economy with more opportunities and probably less turmoil and a China
likely to be more cooperative on environmental matters. But whatever happens to China, prospects could soon brighten for America. The
American cultures particular strengths could conceivably be about to assume new importance and give our
economy new pep. International networks will matter more with each passing year. As the one truly universal nation,
the United States continually refreshes its connections with the rest of the worldthrough languages, family,
education, businessin a way no other nation does , or will. The countries that are comparably openCanada, Australia
arent nearly as large; those whose economies are comparably largeJapan, unified Europe, eventually China or India
arent nearly as open. The simplest measure of whether a culture is dominant is whether outsiders want to be part of it. At the height
of the British Empire, colonial subjects from the Raj to Malaya to the Caribbean modeled themselves in part on Englishmen: Nehru and Lee
Kuan Yew went to Cambridge, Gandhi, to University College, London. Ho Chi Minh wrote in French for magazines in Paris. These days the
world is full of businesspeople, bureaucrats, and scientists who have trained in the United States.
Todays China attracts outsiders too, but in a particular way. Many go for business opportunities; or
because of cultural fascination; or, as my wife and I did, to be on the scene where something truly exciting was under way. The
Haidian area of Beijing, seat of its universities, is dotted with the faces of foreigners who have come to master the language and learn the
system. But true immigrants? People who want their children and grandchildren to grow up within this
system? Although I met many foreigners who hope to stay in China indefinitely, in three years I encountered only two people who aspired to
citizenship in the Peoples Republic. From the physical rigors of a badly polluted and still-developing country, to the constraints on free
expression and dissent, to the likely ongoing mediocrity of a university system that emphasizes volume of output over independence or
excellence of research, the realities of China heavily limit the appeal of becoming Chinese. Because of its scale and internal diversity, China (like
India) is a more racially open society than, say, Japan or Korea. But China has come nowhere near the feats of absorption
and opportunity that make up much of Americas story, and it is very difficult to imagine that it could
do sowell, ever. Everything we know about future industries and technologies suggests that they will
offer ever-greater rewards to flexibility, openness, reinvention, crowdsourcing, and all other
manifestations of individuals and groups keenly attuned to their surroundings. Everything about American society should be
hospitable toward those traitsand should foster them better and more richly than other societies can. The American advantage here is broad
and atmospheric, but it also depends on two specific policies that, in my view, are the absolute pillars of American strength: continued
openness to immigration, and a continued concentration of universities that people around the world want to attend. Maybe I was biased in
how I listened, but in my interviews, I thought I could tell which Americans had spent significant time outside the
country or working on international competitiveness issues. If they had, they predictably emphasized
those same two elements of long-term American advantage. My favorite statistic is that one-quarter of the
members of the National Academy of Sciences were born abroad, I was told by Harold Varmus, the president of the
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and himself an academy member (and Nobel Prize winner). We may not be so good on
the pipeline of producing new scientists, but the country is still a very effective magnet. We scream
about our problems, but as long as we have the immigrants, and the universities, well be fine, James McGregor, an American businessman
and author who has lived in China for years, told me. I just wish we could put LoJacks on the foreign students to be sure they stay. While,
indeed, the United States benefits most when the best foreign students pursue their careers here, we come out ahead even if they depart,
since they take American contacts and styles of thought with them. Shirley Tilghman, a research biologist who is now the president of
Princeton, made a similar point more circumspectly. U.S. higher education has essentially been our innovation engine, she told me. I still
do not see the overall model for higher education anywhere else that is better than the model we
have in the United States, even with all its challenges at the moment. Laura Tyson, an economist who has been dean of
the business schools at UC Berkeley and the University of London, said, It cant be a coincidence that so many innovative
companies are located where they arein California, Boston, and other university centers. There is
not another countrys system that does as wellalthough others are trying aggressively to catch up. Americans
often fret about the troops of engineers and computer scientists marching out of Chinese universities.
They should calm down. Each fall, Shanghais Jiao Tong University produces a ranking of the worlds
universities based mainly on scientific-research papers. All such rankings are imprecise, but the pattern is clear. Of the top 20 on the
latest list, 17 are American, the exceptions being Cambridge (No. 4), Oxford (No. 10), and the University of Tokyo (No. 20). Of the top 100
in the world, zero are Chinese. On paper, China has the worlds largest higher education system, with a total enrollment of 20 million full-
time tertiary students, Peter Yuan Cai, of the Australian National University in Canberra, wrote last fall. Yet China still lags behind
the West in scientific discovery and technological innovation. The obstacles for Chinese scholars and
universities range from grand national strategyopen economy, closed political and media environmentto the
operational traditions of Chinese academia. Students spend years cramming details for memorized tests; the ones who
succeed then spend years in thrall to entrenched professors. Shirley Tilghman said the modern American model of advanced research still
shows the influence of Vannevar Bush, who directed governmental science projects during and after World War II. It was his very conscious
decision to get money into young scientists hands as quickly as possible, she said. This was in contrast to the European Herr Professor
model, also prevalent in Asia, in which, she said, for young scientists, the main opportunity for promotion was waiting for their mentor to die.
Young Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Dutch know they will have opportunities in American labs and start-ups they could not have at home. This
will remain Americas advantage, unless we throw it away.

Deforestation
1NC Deforestation
Wiping out 99% of the forest wont destroy the forests biodiversity
Simon 98
[Julian Lincoln Simon was a professor of business administration at the University of Maryland and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute at the
time of his death, The Ultimate Resource II, www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR31.txt, ETB]

Projected change in the amount of tropical forests implicitly underlies the difference between past and
projected species-loss rates in Lovejoy's diagram. But to connect this element logically, there must be systematic evidence relating an
amount of tropical forest removed to a rate of species reduction. Against the theory, Ariel Lugo details the situation in Puerto Rico, where
"human activity reduced the area of primary forests by 99%, but, because of coffee shade and secondary forests,
forest cover was never below 10 to 15%. This massive forest conversion did not lead to a correspondingly
massive species extinction, certainly nowhere near the 50% alluded to by Myers."

Deforestation impacts are myth
Lind 11
Michael. policy director of the New America Foundation's Economic Growth Program and author of The American Way of Strategy. So Long,
Chicken Little The 9 most annoying sky-is-falling clichs in American foreign policy. Foreign Policy, online.

The rain forests are about to disappear. This is yet another case of exaggeration in defense of a good cause.
Remember the 1980s, when it seemed the Amazon rain forest wasn't long for this world -- and that humanity was threatened as atmospheric
oxygen levels correspondingly declined? The World Wildlife Fund's Thomas Lovejoy in 1980 predicted 50 percent deforestation in Latin
America by 2000. And Al Gore famously claimed in Earth in the Balance that rain forests "are disappearing from the face of the earth at the rate
of one and a half acres a second, night and day, every day, all year round." But as the New York Times reported in 2009, "new
'secondary' forests are emerging in Latin America, Asia and other tropical regions at such a fast pace that the
trend has set off a serious debate about whether saving primeval rain forest -- an iconic environmental cause --
may be less urgent than once thought." For every acre of rain forest chopped down annually, more than 50 acres are
growing back on previously ravaged tropical land, according to one estimate. Meanwhile, thanks to advanced agricultural
technology that permits more food to be grown on fewer acres, Northern Hemisphere countries like the United States, Canada, and the
nations of Europe are being regreened rapidly, as former farmland returns to forest.



Economy - General
1NC Economy- General
No impact to econ decline
Miller 2k
(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawas Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist
at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, Poverty as a cause of wars? p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing
disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events
leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a
violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by
finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and
Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After
studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the
Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong
... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the
collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and
semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).
Econ is resilient
Oliver 9
Business columnist for the Star, a Canadian newspaper, David Olive: Will the economy get worse?,
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/598050, AM

Should we brace for another Great Depression? No. The notion is ludicrous. Conditions will forever
be such that the economic disaster that helped define the previous century will never happen again.
So why raise the question? Because it has suited the purposes of prominent folks to raise the spectre of
a second Great Depression. Stephen Harper has speculated it could happen. Barack Obama resorted to apocalyptic talk
in selling his economic stimulus package to the U.S. Congress. And British author Niall Ferguson, promoting his book on the history
of money, asserts "there will be blood in the streets" from the ravages dealt by this downturn. Cue the famished masses' assault on a latter-day
Bastille or Winter Palace. As it happens, the current economic emergency Obama has described as having no equal since the
Great Depression has not yet reached the severity of the recession of 1980-82, when U.S. unemployment
reached 11 per cent. The negativism has become so thick that Robert Shiller was prompted to warn against it in a recent New York
Times essay. Shiller, recall, is the Yale economist and author of Irrational Exuberance who predicted both the dot-com collapse of the late 1990s
and the likely grim outcome of a collapse in the U.S. housing bubble. Shiller worries that the Dirty Thirties spectre "is a
cause of the current situation because the Great Depression serves as a model for our expectations,
damping what John Maynard Keynes called our `animal spirits,' reducing consumers' willingness to spend and
businesses' willingness to hire and expand. The Depression narrative could easily end up as a self-
fulfilling prophecy." Some relevant points, I think: LOOK AT STOCKS Even the prospects of a small-d depression
defined by most economists as a 10 per drop in GDP for several years are slim. In a recent Wall Street Journal essay, Robert J. Barro, a
Harvard economist, described his study of 251 stock-market crashes and 97 depressions in 34 nations dating
back to the mid-19th century. He notes that only mild recessions followed the U.S. stock-market collapses
of 2000-02 (a 42 per cent plunge) and 1973-74 (49 per cent). The current market's peak-to-trough collapse has
been 51 per cent. Barro concludes the probability today of a minor depression is just 20 per cent, and of a major
depression, only 2 per cent. LOOK AT JOBS NUMBERS In the Great Depression, GDP collapsed by 33 per cent,
the jobless rate was 25 per cent, 8,000 U.S. banks failed, and today's elaborate social safety net of state
welfare provisions did not exist. In the current downturn, GDP in Canada shrank by 3.4 per cent in the last quarter of 2008, and in the
U.S. by 6.2 per cent. A terrible performance, to be sure. But it would take another 10 consecutive quarters of that rate
of decline to lose even the 10 per cent of GDP that qualifies for a small-d depression. Allowing that
1,000 economists laid end to end still wouldn't reach a conclusion, their consensus view is economic recovery will
kick in next year, if not the second half of this year. The jobless rate in Canada and the U.S. is 7.2 per cent and 8.1 per
cent, respectively. Again, the consensus among experts is that a worst-case scenario for U.S. joblessness is
a peak of 11 per cent . There have been no bank failures in Canada. To the contrary, the stability of Canadian banks has lately been
acclaimed worldwide. Two of America's largest banks, Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., are on government life support. But
otherwise the rate of collapse of U.S. lenders outside of the big "money centre" banks at the heart of
the housing-related financial crisis has been only modestly higher than is usual in recessionary times.
LOOK AT INTERVENTIONS In the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover and R.B. Bennett, just prior to the appearance of the Keynesian
pump-priming theories that would soon dominate modern economic management, obsessed with balanced
budgets, seizing upon precisely the wrong cure. They also moved very slowly to confront a crisis with
no precedent. (So did Japan's economic administrators during its so-called "lost decade" of the 1990s.) Most earlier U.S.
"panics" were directly tied to abrupt collapses in stock or commodity values not accompanied by the consumer-
spending excesses of the Roaring Twenties and greatly exacerbated by a 1930s global trade war. Today, only right-wing dead-
enders advance balanced budgets as a balm in this hour of economic emergency. In this downturn,
governments from Washington to Ottawa to Beijing have been swift in crafting Keynesian stimulus
packages. Given their recent legislative passage indeed, Harper's stimulus package awaits passage the beneficial
impact of these significant jolts is only beginning to be felt. And, if one believes, as I long have, that this is a
financial crisis the withholding of life-sustaining credit from the economy by a crippled global banking system and not a crisis
with origins on Main Street, then the resolution to that banking failure may trigger a much faster and
stronger economic recovery than anyone now imagines. tune out the static It's instructive that there was
much talk of another Great Depression during the most painful recession since World War II, that of
1980-82. Indeed, alarmist talk about global systemic collapses has accompanied just about every
abrupt unpleasantness, including the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican default in
1995, the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s, financial havoc in Argentina early this decade, and even the
failure of U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in the late 1990s. Modern economic recoveries
tend to be swift and unexpected. The nadir of the 1980-82 downturn, in August 1982, kicked off the
greatest stock-market and economic boom in history. And no sooner had the dot-com and telecom
wreckage been cleared away, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average bottoming out at 7,286 in October 2002, than the
next stock boom was in high gear. It reached its peak of 14,164 2,442 points higher than the previous high, it's worth noting
just five years later. look at the big picture Finally, the case for a sustained economic miasma is difficult to
make. You'd have to believe that the emerging economic superpowers of China and India will remain for
years in the doldrums to which they've recently succumbed; that oil, steel, nickel, wheat and other
commodities that only last year skyrocketed in price will similarly fail to recover, despite continued
global population growth, including developing world economies seeking to emulate the Industrial Revolutions in China and South
Asia.

US not key to global economy decoupling is for real
Wassener 9
Wassener, MSC in IR, 9London School of Economics and Political Science, MSc , International Relations, Politics (Bettina, In Asia, a Derided
Theory Returns, 1 July 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEFDE163EF932A35754C0A96F9C8B63)
HONG KONG -- For a while, when the global economic crisis was at its worst, it was a dirty word that only the most provocative of analysts
dared to use. Now, the D-word -- decoupling -- is making a comeback, and nowhere more so than in Asia. Put simply, the term refers to the
theory that emerging countries -- whether China or Chile -- will become more independent of the ups and downs in the United States as their
economies become stronger and more sophisticated. For much of last year, the theory held up. Many emerging economies had
steered clear of investments that dragged down a string of banking behemoths in the West, and saw
nothing like the turmoil that began to engulf the United States and Europe in 2007. But then, last autumn, when the collapse of Lehman
Brothers caused the global financial system to convulse and consumer demand to shrivel, emerging economies around the world got caught in
the downdraft, and the D-word became mud. Now, the tables are turning again, especially in Asia, where many emerging economies are
showing signs of a stronger recovery than in the West. And economists here have begun to use the D-word in public once again.
''Decoupling is happening for real ,'' the chief Asia-Pacific economist at Goldman Sachs in Hong Kong,
Michael Buchanan, said in a recent interview. Or as the senior Asia economist at HSBC, Frederic Neumann, said, ''Decoupling is not a
dirty word.'' To be sure, the once sizzling pace of Asian economic growth has slowed sharply as exports to and investments from outside the
region slumped. Across Asia, millions of people have lost their jobs as business drops off and companies cut costs and output. Asia is heavily
dependent upon selling its products to consumers in the United States and Europe, and many executives still say a strong U.S. economy is a
prerequisite for a return to the boom of years past. Nevertheless, the theory of decoupling is back on the table. For the past couple of
months, data from around the world have revealed a growing divergence between Western
economies and those in much of Asia, notably China and India. The World Bank last week forecast that the economies of the
euro zone and the United States would contract 4.5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, this year -- in sharp contrast to the 7.2 percent and 5.1
percent economic growth it forecasts for China and India. Forecasts from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development that were also published last week backed up this general trend. Major statistics for June, due
Wednesday, are expected to show manufacturing activity in China and India are on the mend. By contrast, purchasing managers' indexes for
Europe and the United States are forecast to be merely less grim than before but still show contractions. Why this diverging picture? The
crisis hit Asia much later. While the U.S. economy began languishing in 2007, Asian economies were still
doing well right up until the collapse of Lehman Brothers last September. What followed was a rush of stimulus
measures -- rate cuts and government spending programs. In Asia's case, these came soon after things soured for the region; in the United
States, they came much later in the country's crisis. Moreover, developing Asian economies were in pretty good shape
when the crisis struck. The last major crisis to hit the region -- the financial turmoil of 1997-98 -- forced governments in Asia to
introduce overhauls that ultimately left them with lower debt levels, more resilient banking and regulatory systems and often large foreign
exchange reserves. Another crucial difference is that Asia, unlike the United States and Europe, has not had a banking crisis. Bank
profits in Asia have plunged and some have had to raise extra capital but there have been no major collapses and no
bailouts . ''The single most important thing to have happened in Asia is that there has not been a banking crisis,'' said Andrew Freris, a
regional strategist at BNP Paribas in Hong Kong. ''Asia is coming though this crisis with its banking system intact. Yes, some banks may not be
making profits -- but it is cyclical and not systemic.'' The lack of banking disasters also has meant that, unlike in Europe and the
United States, Asian governments have not had to spend cash to clean the balance sheets of faltering
banks. In other words, all of the stimulus spending is going into the economy. The effect is greater and more immediate. Add to that the fact
that companies and households in Asia are typically not burdened with the kind of debt that is forcing Americans and Europeans to cut back
consumption and investment plans. Asians are generally big savers; those in developing nations have limited health care and pension systems
to fall back on. So they put aside cash for retirement, sickness and their children's education, rather than maxing out multiple credit cards. Paul
Schulte of Nomura said this difference was leading to a long-term shift.



2NC Ext #1
Recent empirics go neg
Barnett 9, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/9
(Thomas P.M, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the-
new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary
predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to
world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging
markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first
truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of
the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global
recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the
economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts
listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August
was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most
important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade
long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most
familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements.
Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran)
are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic
trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-
into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following
the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across
Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it
burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example,
hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
History proves
Ferguson 6
Laurence A. Tisch prof of History at Harvard. William Ziegler of Business Administration at Harvard. MA and D.Phil from Glasgow and Oxford (Niall, The Next War of
the World, September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the_next_war_of_the_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great
Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi
Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by
the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general
relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came
after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic
crises were not followed by wars.
Econ collapse saps resources from military aggression
Bennett 2k
PolSci Prof, Penn State (Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Ebsco)

Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal
problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders
may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the
domestic economy. In a guns versus butter world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses
associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could
be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal
conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from
continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are
looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military
investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry.
Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

No impact Kerpens a joke and disproven by 2009 crisis
Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and
Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4,
p. 403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would
bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a
worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy
and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard
to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate
fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed
states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more
extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited , it is hard to see how
without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could
prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they
have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the
financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp
economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad
times bring about greater economic conflict , it will not make war thinkable.

Their historical examples are flawed - US dominance means no war
Ferguson 9
(Niall Ferguson, Prof. History @ Harvard,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090223.wferguson0223/BNStory/crashandrecovery/home/?pageRequested=all)

It's just that I don't see it producing anything comparable with 1914 or 1939. It's kind of hard to envisage a
world war. Even when most pessimistic, I struggle to see how that would work, because the U.S., for all its difficulties in the
financial world, is so overwhelmingly dominant in the military world.

2NC Ext #2

Empirics prove resiliency
Zakaria 9
Zakaria, PhD Poli Sci @ Harvard, Editor of Newsweek, 12/12/9 (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)

Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last
year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian
crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global
economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three
major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. The first is the spread of great-power
peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in
geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is
stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at
least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a
result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the
basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonderthree decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and
guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of
superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing
like that is happening today. Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you
can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade.
The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by
the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable
economic modelcapitalismalbeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong. This consensus
enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost
all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today,
while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon
free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of
this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the
current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections
throughout the West.

So does data
Globe and Mail 10
(5/31/10, BRIAN MILNER, "While gloom says bear, TIGER points to bull", lexis, WEA)

Even at the height of the remarkable rebound of 2009 that brought stocks back from the dead zone, the bears never
retreated to their lairs. Negative sentiment among investors remained stubbornly high, no matter how promising
the economic indicators looked. And then along came the Greeks and their little sovereign debt problem, the Chinese
and their public hand-wringing over asset bubbles and the North Koreans and their latest idiotic sabre-ratting to remind
nervous markets just how fragile the nascent global recovery could turn out to be. The latest survey of American investors last week showed bearish sentiment
hovering close to 30 per cent, with plenty of room for an uptick in the months ahead, as the optimists come to realize that a V-shaped recovery was never in the
cards after the worst global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. The world's most overexposed permabear, Nouriel Roubini, is still grabbing
headlines with his dire Greece-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg warnings. (Well, he does have a new book to sell.) And such high-profile Canadian bruins as gold-loving
money manager Eric Sprott and eminent strategist and data miner David Rosenberg have never veered from their sombre outlooks. The fact that May turned into a
particularly brutal month for just about everything but U.S. Treasuries - even after last week's modest rebound, the Dow posted its worst performance for the
month in 70 years - only added fuel to arguments that worse, much worse, is yet to come. I mention all this to Eswar Prasad, when I reach the Cornell University
economics professor at his hotel in Beijing. Prof. Prasad is a noted China watcher who once headed the IMF's China division and still keeps in close touch with top
government finance officials. But on this call, I'm more interested in one of his other hats as a shrewd analyst of global economic and market trends. "My
inclination also is to be a bear," the affable academic says. "But the data don't support my bearishness as much as I
would like. One has to be a little cautious, because these are based on a variety of indicators. Some of them certainly show more
strength than I had realized." The data he's talking about come out of his work on a new composite index derived from a broad set of economic,
market and confidence measures in the G20 countries and designed to provide a quarterly snapshot of the global recovery. "All signs are that the recovery has some
momentum," says Prof. Prasad, who developed the index at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank where he is also a senior fellow. "But I wouldn't call
it solid enough momentum that we can consider it 'in the bag.'" The new index, cutely named TIGER (Tracking Indices for the Global Economic Recovery), is
a joint effort by Brookings and the Financial Times. And TIGER shows that since the world began climbing out of the deep
trough about the middle of last year, big emerging economies have roared ahead, while the developed world has experienced much
more uneven results. Industrial production and trade have bounced back handsomely - total exports from the big emerging
countries now exceed pre-crisis levels - but the employment picture remains cloudy and consumption has yet to develop a new head of steam. "It's much
easier at this stage to list all the things that could derail the recovery," Prof. Prasad says. "But all of those things are still conjectural.
The reality, and the data, is that things are looking better."


Economy - Russia
1NC Economy - Russia

Russias economy is resilient strong foreign investment and reserves

Garrels 8
(Anne Garrels, Roving foreign correspondent for NPRs foreign desk. Russia Economy Strong Despite Commodity Fallout, NPR, September
20, 2008, page 1, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94647099)

For the past six years, Russia's economy has boomed in large part because of soaring prices for oil and metals. Russia is strong in these areas
too strong, though, for a balanced economy. Russian shares have bled almost 50 percent of their value since May, but
many analysts say Russia still remains a resilient economy. And after the Georgia invasion and weeks of harsh, anti-
western rhetoric, both Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have tried to reassure foreign investors. When
those commodities prices dropped, Russia's stock market was hit hard. "The question is if they fall significantly further," says James Fenkner
with Red Star Assets in Moscow. Fenkner is one of the more cautious voices in Moscow, and other analysts like Roland Nash of Renaissance
Capital look at other indicators, like direct foreign investment. "The level of foreign investment is twice the per capita of
Brazil, four times that of China, and six times that of India this year," Nash says. "The market
arguments for Russia are still very good and there is still a lot of money coming in." Too Dependent On
Commodities The Russia government recognizes it is too dependent on commodities, and while their prices
were high, it amassed huge reserves as a cushion. The country now has a balanced budget and
financial analysts predict its economy will continue to grow at about six percent.


Russia econ resilient- high biz con

Matlack 9
Carol. The Peril and Promise of Investing in Russia. Business Week.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_40/b4149048673765.htm

And yet many multinationalsbig, battle-scarred companies, veterans of coups in Brazil and hyperinflation in Turkey
refuse to pull out of Russia. Instead they're digging in for the long haul. John Deere (DE), Unilever
(UN), and HSBC (HBC) all have begun major Russian expansions in the past few months. Wal-
Mart Stores (WMT) has an advance team on the ground as it mulls opening a Moscow location, following French
hypermarkets Carrefour and Auchan. On Sept. 1, Topeka (Kan.)-based Collective Brands (PSS) announced it would open
90 Payless ShoeSource outlets across the country over the next five years. "Among emerging markets, Russia has moved
to the top of our list," says Chief Executive Matthew E. Rubel. Even companies that have been beaten up in Russia, like BP and Ikea, say
they'll keep investing. For major global corporations, Russia is simply too big and too rich to ignore. Abundant reserves of oil, metals,
and timber still lure multinationals eager to export those commodities, even though such investments are often fraught with difficulties.
But Russia is not just a play for resource companies. Eighteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union, 140 million voracious consumers
beckon. Demand for everything from kitchen cabinets to pharmaceuticals is still strongand Russians have the petrodollars to pay for
them. Disposable household income in Russia is 30% higher than Brazil's, almost four times China's, and 10 times that of India (chart).
The Kremlin's $280 billion stimulus plan, fueled by oil and gas money salted away in better times, is spurring demand. That's a boon for
companies such as Unilever, which reported "strong double digit growth" in Russia during the first half of the year. The Anglo-Dutch
company has eight factories in Russia and recently broke ground for a new $140 million ice cream plant and distribution center in Tula,
120 miles south of Moscow. Russia's Soviet tradition of educationsuperb in math and the hard sciences, excellent in languagesstill
produces plenty of brainy workers. About 20% of working-age Russians have university degrees, not far below the European Union
average of 24%. While Russian salaries had been rising sharply before the crisis, they've now flattened out, and multinationals can still
find workers for a fraction of the cost in the West. Consider IT giant Intel (INTC), which moved into Russia in 1999 and since then has
invested $800 million. It now employs more than 1,000 engineers at four research centers, including its largest software research and
development group outside the U.S.
A. No impactno change in foreign policy
Blackwill 2009 former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security
Advisor for Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic RecessionA Caution,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf, WEA)
Now on to Russia. Again, five years from today. Did the global recession and Russias present serious economic problems
substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press;
nothing fundamental will result from that visit). Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putins power and authority in Russia?
No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No.
Did it affect Russias willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends
to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as
follows: to resurrect Russias standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary influence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western eff orts
to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russias military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe,
Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, as
they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26 None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy
are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.
B. Its resilient
Heilprin 11 AP Report (John, Putin says Russia economy recovering, still below pre-global
financial crisis level June 15, 2011 http://www.startribune.com/world/123913759.html)
GENEVA - Russia's economy is recovering, but remains well below the level it was at before the global financial crisis, says Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin, addressing a U.N. labor meeting in Geneva on Wednesday. Putin said Russia has "managed to recover two-
thirds of our economy, but still we have not reached pre-crisis levels." The Russian economy contracted by almost 8
percent during the recession. He added that the economy the world's sixth-largest would reach pre-crisis levels by 2012,
eventually rising to become one of the world's top five. Putin also called for "a more fair and balanced economic model," as nations
gradually recover from the world financial crisis that hit in 2008. In April, Putin said in his annual address before Russian parliament that the
key lesson from the financial crisis was for the country to be self-reliant and strong enough to resist
outside pressure. He said Russia's economy grew 4 percent last year. Putin, widely seen as wanting to reclaim his nation's presidency, said
on Wednesday that his government is emphasizing social programs such as increasing aid for young mothers, disabled workers and people with
health problems as it recovers.
C. If not, collapse is inevitableplan cant solve.
KHRUSHCHEVA 2008 (Nina L. Khrushcheva is an associate professor of international affairs at the New School, Chronicle of Higher
Education, 9-5)
That scenario, however, is unlikely. The unstable conditions that are stoking Russia's current economic boom may soon
bring about a crisis similar to the financial meltdown of 1998, when, as a result of the decline in world commodity prices,
Russia, which is heavily dependent on the export of raw materials, lost most of its income. Widespread corruption at every level
of private and state bureaucracy, coupled with the fact that the government invests little of its oil money in fostering
areas like technological innovation, corporate responsibility, and social and political reform, could spin
the economic balance out of control. Rampant inflation might bring the Putin-Medvedev Kremlin down. Even if
Russia withstands that scenario, global forces will ultimately burst its economic bubble. The temporary
release of the U.S. oil reserves, and tough economic and legal sanctions against oil speculators around the
world, should end Russia's oil supremacy and hasten its economic collapse. And sooner or later,
alternative solutions to the world's dependence on oil and gas will be found.
D. Russia rebounds no impact.
Aslund 10 - Senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Anders, November
25, 2010 10 Reasons Why the Russian Economy Will Recover
http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1712)
While the energy curse is well understood, it tends to be over-emphasized. At one time, it was believed that energy-
rich countries were guaranteed stable growth; now oil and gas are considered absolute blockages to
growth. But neither is quite true. There are 10 main reasons why Russia is likely to turn around within the next couple of
years and enter a higher-growth trajectory: The root cause is the profound sense of malaise in the Russian elite. Nothing
is better for reform than malaise. Remember how former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze told each other before assuming power: "We cannot go on like this any longer!" Once again, Moscow is reaching this point.
Ideas are also crucial, and a new intellectual paradigm has taken hold. Since February 2008, President Dmitry
Medvedev has advocated modernization. While this ambitious idea has dominated the public discourse, little has been done. This contrast
between word and action is reminiscent of the Soviet Union in 1987, when Gorbachev had preached acceleration and perestroika for two years
but accomplished little. That year, he shifted gear to focus on democratization to shake society up. Russia is finally about to accede
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) within a year, which would be a game changer. The best available studies predict
enormous gains for the country. Economists Jesper Jensen, Thomas Rutherford, and David Tarr estimate in a World Bank study that Russia
should gain about 3.3 percent of GDP annually in the medium term and 11 percent of GDP in the long term. The gains would mainly
come from increased foreign direct investment and services. International integration and convergence
will drive the country's growth for a couple of decades. One of Russia's largest drawbacks and constant drags on growth is its
immense corruption, but Russia is simply too rich, well educated, and open to be so corrupt. As the country has failed to extend its road network
since 1997, something has to be done. Even former Mayor Yury Luzhkov the country's "ultimate traffic jam" has been sacked.
Significant progress in the fight against corruption can be made with relatively easy and small stepsfor example,
public procurement for key infrastructure projects can be significantly cleaned up if a few honest people
are appointed at the top. Money is no longer a free utility for the Kremlin. The price of oil has risen above $80 per barrel, but at that level
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin foresees a budget deficit in 2010 of 4.6 percent of GDP, and deficits will continue until 2014. Therefore, the
government can no longer simply throw money at problems. It has to actually solve some of them. Energy production has leveled off and is not
likely to rise significantly any time soon. Therefore, growth has to come from other sectors. Look at the composition of and trends among leading
companies on the RTS or MICEX and you will see how Russia has changed. The energy companies are now the laggards, while the many growth
companies are in consumer industries. In particular, Gazprom, the old cancer of the Russian economy, is in a serious
structural crisis. Its market value has fallen by two-thirds from its peak in spring 2008. As a high-cost producer, it is losing out to
independent producersnotably Novatekand liquefied natural gas in Europe. Gazprom represents the most pressing case for
restructuring. The company has to cut costs by reducing corruption and enhancing efficiency. This means that Gazprom must put an end to
its history of being the huge slush fund for Russia's rulers. Russia's greatest resource is its quickly expanding human
capital. According to UNESCO statistics, 51 percent of young Russians graduated from higher
educational institutions in 2008, placing Russia as the ninth-highest country in the world. Compare this figure
with the United States, where only 35.5 percent of the young population completed higher education in 2008. Admittedly, the Russian numbers
are swollen by corruption, plagiarism, and often low standards, but even with some deduction, the Russian figures remain
impressive. Everywhere you see young, ambitious, well-educated, and hard-working Russians who are
determined to succeed. The long absence of any significant reforms has left much low-hanging fruit, such as elementary deregulation.
Privatization is becoming inevitable, and it instantly reduces the corruption characteristic of Russian state corporations. Russia's leading
businessmen often talk about "the 2012 problem"that is, their uncertainty about the elite's presidential selection in March 2012, or probably in
December 2011, when a presidential candidate has to be nominated. The choice is becoming increasingly clear: Putin symbolizes corruption,
energy dependence, and stagnation, while Medvedev presents an image of modernization and reform. These alternatives are becoming as crystal
clear as in 1985, when the Soviet elite opted for change.

Hegemony
1NC Hegemony
Hegemony isnt key to peace
Fettweis, 11
Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand
Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S.
activism and international stability . In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be
true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United
States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense
hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible peace dividend endangered both national and global security. No serious analyst of American military capabilities,
argued Kristol and Kagan, doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace.52 On the other hand, if the pacific
trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one
would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is
fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to
believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any
action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums,
no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races , and no regional balancing occurred once
the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a
pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of
global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as
the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures
by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or
even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this
period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace.
Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending
account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the
alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand
strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must
be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment.
And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an
increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more
aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have
been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency
demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have
regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current
peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite
effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view
on faith alone.
Heg is unsustainable
Layne 10
(Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public
Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n5422359
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and
continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict
that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020.
Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--
and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers
tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to
become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger
debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial
dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives
are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been
accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably David
Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would
ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut
short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the
Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will
emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive
amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus
budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected
deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and
Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about
the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to
expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The
dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve
currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor
Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and
military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and
highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international
economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S.
protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish
over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated
dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be
under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose
fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that
the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be
almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense
expenditures. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the
United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are
"more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult,
and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced
with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.
2NC Ext #1
U.S. decline is not only inevitable, it has arrived. The U.S. must accept Chinas
ascendancy
Layne 12
Christopher Layne 2012 (is Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public
Service at Texas A&M University; ISQ* peer reviewed: ISI Journal Citation Reports Ranking: 2010: International Relations: 10 / 73; Political
Science: 18 / 139 Impact Factor: 1.523) This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana International Studies Quarterly, 1-11

The Cold Wars end stifled the burgeoning late 1980s debate about Americas relative decline while triggering a new debate about unipolarity.
In the Great Recessions aftermath, a verdict on those debates now can be rendered. First, it turns out the declinists were right after all.
The United States power has declined relatively. By 2014, the US share of global GDP will shrink to
18%, which is well below the normal postWorld War II share of 22% to 25% (Nye 1991, 2011). Just as the 1980s declinists predicted,
chronic budget and current account deficits, overconsumption, undersaving, and deindustrialization
have exacted their toll on the American economy. Judgment also now can be rendered on the debate between balance of
power realists and unipolar stability theorists. As balance of power realists predicted, one new great power already has
emerged to act as a counterweight to American power, with others waiting in the wings. In contrast to unipolar stability
theorists who said unipolarity would extend well into the twenty-first century, balance of power realists predicted that unipolarity would come
to an end around 2010. Instead of looking at the trend lines fueling Chinas rise and Americas decline, unipolar stability theorists were wrong
because they relied on static measures of national power and failed to grasp the velocity of Chinas rise. If, indeed, it has not already
done so, sometime this decadeperhaps as early as 2016Chinas GDP will surpass the United States. No
longer is China an emerging great power; it is a risen one. The debate about unipolarity is over. The
balance of power realists have won. The distribution of power in international political system is shifting
dramatically. The US grand strategy must respond to the emerging constellation of power. Yet, US policymakers and many
security studies scholars are in thrall to a peculiar form of denialism. First, they believe the world still is
unipolar even in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is not. Second, they believe that even if
unipolarity were to end, there would be no real consequences for the United States because it will still
be the pivotal power in international politics, and the essential features of the liberal orderthe
Pax Americanawill remain in place even though no longer buttressed by the US economic and military power that have undergirded it
since its inception after World War II. This is myopic. Hegemonic decline always has consequences. As the twenty-first centurys second
decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The world figures to become a much more turbulent place
geopolitically than it was during the era of the Pax Americana. Accepting the reality of the Unipolar Exitcoming to
grips with its own decline and the end of unipolarity symbolized by Chinas risewill be the United
States central grand strategic preoccupation during the next ten to fifteen years.
We will lose to China internal contradictions make US power unsustainable
Petras 10
http://www.globalresearch.ca/war-with-china-the-dangers-of-a-global-conflagration/
James Petras is a Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York. He is the author of more than 62
books published in 29 languages, and over 600 articles in professional journals, including the American Sociological Review, British
Journal of Sociology, Social Research, and Journal of Peasant Studies. He has published over 2000 articles in nonprofessional
journals such as the New York Times, the Guardian, the Nation, Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, New Left Review,
Partisan Review, TempsModerne, Le Monde Diplomatique, and his commentary is widely carried on the internet. His publishers
have included Random House, John Wiley, Westview, Routledge, Macmillan, Verso, Zed Books and Pluto Books. He is winner of
the Career of Distinguished Service Award from the American Sociological Associations Marxist Sociology Section, the Robert
Kenny Award for Best Book, 2002, and the Best Dissertation, Western Political Science Association in 1968. His most recent titles
include Unmasking Globalization: Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century (2001); co-author The Dynamics of Social Change in
Latin America (2000), System in Crisis (2003), co-author Social Movements and State Power (2003), co-author Empire With
Imperialism (2005), co-author)Multinationals on Trial (2006). He has a long history of commitment to social justice, working in
particular with the Brazilian Landless Workers Movement for 11 years. In 1973-76 he was a member of the Bertrand Russell
Tribunal on Repression in Latin America. He writes a monthly column for the Mexican newspaper, La Jornada, and previously, for
the Spanish daily, El Mundo. He received his B.A. from Boston University and Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley.

As in the past, a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances, a loss of
competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political
retribution, military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise.[49] Propaganda, whipping up chauvinist
emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to encircle China have
absolutely no impact. They have not stopped all of Chinas neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. There are no
prospects that this will change in the near future. China will push ahead with double digit growth. The US
Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation, unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political
subversion, promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. The US unlike the established colonial
powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. We
live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price.
China, unlike Japan, depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness market power not military conquest. Unlike
Japan it has a vast multitude of workers; it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. Chinas
market driven empire building is attuned to modern times, driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own
terms, unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy, ravaging industrial
centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots.
US hegemony structurally unsustainable
Petras 10
http://www.globalresearch.ca/war-with-china-the-dangers-of-a-global-conflagration/
James Petras is a Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York. He is the author of more than 62
books published in 29 languages, and over 600 articles in professional journals, including the American Sociological Review, British
Journal of Sociology, Social Research, and Journal of Peasant Studies. He has published over 2000 articles in nonprofessional
journals such as the New York Times, the Guardian, the Nation, Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, New Left Review,
Partisan Review, TempsModerne, Le Monde Diplomatique, and his commentary is widely carried on the internet. His publishers
have included Random House, John Wiley, Westview, Routledge, Macmillan, Verso, Zed Books and Pluto Books. He is winner of
the Career of Distinguished Service Award from the American Sociological Associations Marxist Sociology Section, the Robert
Kenny Award for Best Book, 2002, and the Best Dissertation, Western Political Science Association in 1968. His most recent titles
include Unmasking Globalization: Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century (2001); co-author The Dynamics of Social Change in
Latin America (2000), System in Crisis (2003), co-author Social Movements and State Power (2003), co-author Empire With
Imperialism (2005), co-author)Multinationals on Trial (2006). He has a long history of commitment to social justice, working in
particular with the Brazilian Landless Workers Movement for 11 years. In 1973-76 he was a member of the Bertrand Russell
Tribunal on Repression in Latin America. He writes a monthly column for the Mexican newspaper, La Jornada, and previously, for
the Spanish daily, El Mundo. He received his B.A. from Boston University and Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley.

The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is
embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict Chinas exports to the US will
only increase Washingtons deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China
will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter,
directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover,
third countries can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable position of starting trade wars across the
board or accepting the fact that a finance commercial led economy is not competitive in todays world economy.
Chinas decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive
investments in developing its hinterland and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually
force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may
benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing
weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a
sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk
of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill
over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable
in China than the US where they are running in the red[44]. A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it
adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic
policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU.
Trade protectionism may create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the
commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol
Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect
attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The
deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy
have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars,
deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new
competitive multi-polar world order, the US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial
powers access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such
as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the
US sphere of influence, like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that
of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain Chinas rise as a world
economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted in class divisions and class
exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but
cannot eliminate[45]. Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of social imperialism, distributing a portion
of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate
speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no
economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and
Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable to what England plundered from India, South
Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic
future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least
efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire
and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a new sort (sui generis).



Naval Power
1NC Naval Power
Naval power is resilient and inevitable --- multiple reasons
Robert Farley, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce @
University of Kentucky, October 23
rd
2007, The False Decline of the U.S. Navy,
http://prospect.org/article/false-decline-us-navy; hhs-ab

We live in strange times. While the United States is responsible for close to 50 percent of aggregate world military
expenditure , and maintains close alliances with almost all of the other major military powers, a community of defense
analysts continues to insist that we need to spend more. In the November issue of The Atlantic, Robert Kaplan asserts that United States hegemony is
under the threat of elegant decline, and points to what conventional analysts might suggest is the most secure element of American power; the United
States Navy. Despite the fact that the U.S. Navy remains several orders of magnitude more powerful than its nearest rival,
Kaplan says that we must beware; if we allow the size of our Navy to further decline, we risk repeating the experience of the United Kingdom in the years before
World War I. Unfortunately, since no actual evidence of U.S. naval decline exists , Kaplan is forced to rely on obfuscation, distortion,
and tendentious historical analogies to make his case. The centerpiece of Kaplans argument is a comparison of the current U.S. Navy to the British Royal Navy at the
end of the 19th century. The decline of the Royal Navy heralded the collapse of British hegemony, and the decline of the U.S. Navy threatens a similar fate for the
United States. The only problem with this argument is that similarities between the 21st century United States and the 19th century United Kingdom are more
imagined than real. Its true that the relative strength of the Royal Navy declined at the end of the 19th century, but this was due entirely t he rise of the United States
and Germany. But the absolute strength of the Royal Navy increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the United Kingdom strove to maintain naval
dominance over two countries that possessed larger economies and larger industrial bases than that of Great Britain. In other words, the position of the Royal Navy
declined because the position of the United Kingdom declined; in spite of this decline, the Royal Navy continued to dominate the seas against all comers until 1941.
Britains relative economic decline preceded its naval decline, although the efforts to keep up with Germany, the United States, and later Japan did serious damage to
the British economy. The United States faces a situation which is in no way similar. Returning to the present, Kaplan takes note of the growth of several foreign
navies, including the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese. He points out that the Japanese Navy has a large number of destroyers and a growing number of submarines. He
warns that India may soon have the worlds third largest navy without giving any indication of why that matters. Most serious of all, he describes the threat of a
growing Chinese Navy and claims that, just as the Battle of Wounded Knee opened a new age for American imperialism, the conquest of Taiwan could transform
China into an expansionist, imperial power. The curious historical analogies aside, Kaplan is careful to make no direct comparisons between the growing navies of
foreign countries and the actual strength of the United States Navy. Theres a good reason for this oversight; there is no comparison between the
U.S. Navy and any navy afloat today. The United States Navy currently operates eleven aircraft carriers. The oldest
and least capable is faster, one third larger, and carries three times the aircraft of Admiral Kuznetsov, the largest carrier in the
Russian Navy. Unlike Chinas only aircraft carrier, the former Russian Varyag, American carriers have engines and are
capable of self-propulsion. The only carrier in Indian service is fifty years old and a quarter the size of its American
counterparts. No navy besides the United States' has more than one aircraft carrier capable of flying modern fixed
wing aircraft. The United States enjoys similar dominance in surface combat vessels and submarines, operating twenty-
two cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifty-five nuclear attack submarines, and ten amphibious assault ships (vessels roughly
equivalent to most foreign aircraft carriers). In every category the U.S. Navy combines presumptive numerical
superiority with a significant ship-to-ship advantage over any foreign navy. This situation is unlikely to
change anytime soon. The French Navy and the Royal Navy will each expand to two aircraft carriers over the next decade. The most ambitious plans
ascribed to the Peoples Liberation Army Navy call for no more than three aircraft carriers by 2020, and even that strains credulity, given Chinas inexperience with
carrier operations and the construction of large military vessels. While a crash construction program might conceivably give the Chinese the ability to achieve local
dominance (at great cost and for a short time), the United States Navy will continue to dominate the worlds oceans and
littorals for at least the next fifty years. ADVERTISEMENT In order to try to show that the U.S. Navy is insufficient in the face of future threats,
Kaplan argues that we on are our way to a 150 ship navy that will be overwhelmed by the demands of warfighting and global economic maintenance. He suggests
that the 1,000 Ship Navy proposal, an international plan to streamline cooperation between the worlds navies on maritime maintenance issues such as piracy,
interdiction of drug and human smuggling, and disaster relief, is an effort at elegant decline, and declares that the dominance of the United States Navy cannot be
maintained through collaboration with others. Its true that a 600 ship navy can do more than the current 250-plus ship force of the current U.S. Navy, but Kaplans
playing a game of bait and switch. The Navy has fewer ships than it did two decades ago, but the ships it has are far more capable than those of the 1980s. Because of
the collapse of its competitors, the Navy is relatively more capable of fighting and winning wars now than it was during the Reagan administration. Broadly speaking,
navies have two missions; warfighting, and maritime maintenance. Kaplan wants to confuse the maritime maintenance mission (which can be done in collaboration
with others) with the warfighting mission (which need not be). A navy can require the cooperation of others for the maintenance mission, while still possessing utter
military superiority over any one navy or any plausible combination of navies on the high seas. Indeed, this is the situation that the United States Navy currently
enjoys. It cannot be everywhere all at once, and does require the cooperation of regional navies for fighting piracy and smuggling. At the same time, the U.S.
Navy can destroy any ( and probably all, at the same time ) naval challengers . To conflate these two missions is equal
parts silly and dishonest. The Navy has arrived at an ideal compromise between the two, keeping its fighting supremacy while leading and facilitating cooperation
around the world on maritime issues.



2NC Ext #1
Even if naval power will decline in the future, the threshold for minimum
deterrence is low --- other branches fill in
Taylor Marvin, Prospect Journal of International Affairs UCSD, 2011, CUTTING US DEFENSE SPENDING IS NOT A THREAT TO
AMERICAN SECURITY, http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu/index.php/2011/09/cutting-us-defense-spending-is-not-a-threat-to-american-security/

However, US military spending far exceeds the level necessary to deter foreign aggression, even against peripheral US
interests. Some of this excess is justified: if America wishes to fight long foreign wars and lead international humanitarian military interventions
the Pentagon budget must support these missions. Despite this, American defense spending is ultimately vastly disproportionate to its core
requirements. The US Navy is a good example of this excess. America currently fields eleven aircraft carriers. Russia possesses
one, a Cold War relic vastly less capable than its American counterparts. Despite Chinese naval ambitions in the western Pacific,
China has struggled to refit an abandoned Soviet carrier, the ex-Varyag, for combat, and the introduction of modern
indigenous Chinese carriers is likely decades off. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Americas deterrence value would not be diminished if
budget cuts forced the Navy to reduce the US carrier fleet. While a reduction in the number of US carrier battle groups would
significantly reduce the number of theaters the US could exert military control over at any given time, this would
likely not make US military threats less credible; that is, China would not be marginally more likely to invade
Taiwan if the US fielded only seven six billion dollar supercarriers. Because the capabilities of all US military
branches are so far beyond the minimum necessary to maintain an effective deterrence even if the US
government dramatically reduced the defense budget Americas overall security and ability to project power on a
global scale would remain far in excess of any potential rivals.


This controls the impact --- the risk of maritime conflict is low REGARDLESS of
US naval superiority
Goure 10 Vice President of the Lexington Institute (Daniel, Ph.D., 7/2/10, Can The Case Be Made For
Naval Power?http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171)

This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers . While China appears to be toying with the
idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others,
including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many
analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows.
Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other
navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much
naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures
capabilities than it currently possesses. More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed
dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be
considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant
contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administrations current plan is to rely on sea-
based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed.
The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers . The exception to this is the chronic but
relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own
shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively
unimportant in todays world .

US naval superiority is unmatchable --- overwhelming displacement statistics prove
Robert Work, VP of Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009,
Strategy for the Long Haul: the US Navy Charting A Course for Tomorrows; 2/17; Fleet,
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20090217.The_US_Navy_Charti/R.20090217.Th
e_US_Navy_Charti.pdf

On August 1, 2008, the TSBF numbered 280 ships of all types (see Figure One).3 Predictably, naval advocates fretted that the
smaller fleet posed a great risk to US national security. For example, Seth Cropsey, a Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the
Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, cautioned that, Without intending it, US policy is verging toward unilateral naval
disarmament.4 He went on to say: The Navys focus is [unclear]. Its [280] combat ships a number that House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Ike Skelton called shocking comprise a force that is less than half the size achieved during the
Reagan years . . . The last time the US possessed so small a fleet was sometime between December 1916 and April 1917, on the eve of the
nations entry into World War I. While technically true, these dire comments are misleading. Of the many ways to gauge
US naval power, comparing the size of the current US battle force to that of past US fleets is the least useful. Past
TSBFs are reflections of different strategic environments, federal budgets, national grand strategies, and stages of
technological development. They also reflect the state of the contemporary global naval competition. In 1916, although
the TSBF numbered only 245 ships of all types, the 36 battleships of the Navys battle line placed it second among world navies behind the
British Royal Navy. Despite having only 245 ships, it could safely assume it would never have to fight the Royal Navy, and be relatively
confident that it could fight and defeat any other navy in the world. During the 1980s, even as it grew to a post-Vietnam high of nearly 600
vessels, the Navy was fighting off a concerted effort by the Soviet Navy to knock it out of the top spot.5 In other words, whether todays TSBF is
as big as the US fleets in 1916 or 1987 is utterly irrelevant. Far more important is the answer to the following question: how does the US Navy
stack up against its potential contemporary competitors? And the answer to this question paints a very different picture than
comparing todays TSBF with that of past US fleets. SECOND TO NONE The first true indicator of US naval
dominance comes from comparing the size of the US battle force with other world navies. What alarmists over fleet size
fail to mention is that although the US TSBF is the smallest it has been in over ninety years, so too are the rest of the worlds navies.6 At the
height of its naval dominance, Great Britain strove to achieve at least a two-navy standard. That is, the Royal Navy aimed to maintain a fleet
and battle line that was as large as the combined fleets of the two closest naval powers. Today, counting those ships that can perform naval fire
and maneuver in distant theaters aviation platforms of all types, tactical submarines (nuclear and diesel-electric attack boats and conventional
guided-missile submarines), and surface combatants and amphibious ships with full load displacements greater than 2,000 tons7 the next two
largest contemporary navies belong to Russia and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Together, they operate a total of 215 warships of all
types. The US Navy alone operates 203 such warships, very close to, but not quite, a two-navy standard.8 However, when factoring in a second
important indicator of naval power aggregate fleet displacement (tonnage) the US Navy enjoys considerably more than a two-navy
standard. As naval analyst Geoffrey Till explains, [t]here is a rough correlation between the ambitions of a navy and the size and individual
fighting capacity of its main units, provided they are properly maintained and manned.9 Therefore, full load displacements and aggregate fleet
warship displacements are the best proxies available to measure a ships and a fleets overall combat capability, respectively. Accordingly, both
are useful measures for sizing up the contemporary global hierarchy of naval competitors.10 When considering aggregate fleet
displacements, the US Navys overwhelming advantage in combat capability is readily apparent. Besides the United
States, there are only twenty navies in the world that operate fleets with aggregate displacements of 50,000 tons or
more. In order of fleet displacement (largest to smallest), these navies are operated by: Russia, the PRC, Japan, the United Kingdom, France,
India, Taiwan, Italy, Indonesia, Spain, South Korea, Brazil, Turkey, Australia, Greece, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Peru, and Singapore.
Together, these twenty navies operate a total of 719 ships with a combined displacement of 3,632,270 tons.11 In comparison, the
combined displacement of the US Navys 203 fighting warships totals 3,121,014 tons which exceeds the total
tonnage of warships operated by the next thirteen navies combined. In other words, in terms of overall fleet combat capability,
the US Navy enjoys a thirteen-navy standard. However, it is important to note that of the twenty countries discussed above, eighteen are formal
US allies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom),
governments friendly to the United States, (Peru, Brazil, Indonesia, and Singapore), or emerging strategic partners (India). Moreover, all of
these nations are either full or partial democracies. The likelihood of the United States ever finding itself in a war or
naval confrontation with any of these countries is extremely remote.







Oceans
A2- Ocean BioD

Ocean species are resilient

Dulvy et al 3
(Nicholas, (School of Marine Science and Tech. @ U. Newcastle), Yvonne Sadovy, (Dept. Ecology and Biodiversity @ U. Hong Kong), and
John D. Reynolds, (Centre for Ecology, Evolution and Conservation @ School of Bio. Sci. @ U. East Anglia), Fish and Fisheries, Extinction
vulnerability in marine populations, 4:1, Blackwell-Synergy)

Marine organisms are perceived to be less vulnerable to extinction than terrestrial taxa for a number of reasons. However, many of
these perceptions were derived from experiences when populations were much larger than they are today, and consequently the comfort we take from them may no
longer be appropriate (Roberts and Hawkins 1999; Hutchings 2001a). Here, we examine the likelihood that marine fishes and invertebrates are less vulnerable
because (i) they have long fossil durations, (ii) they have high fecundity, (iii) they have large-scale dispersal, (iv)
they will be saved by economic extinction before biological extinction occurs, (v) they have high
capacity for recovery, and (vi) their populations are naturally highly variable.
<continued>
Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural
variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too
conservative for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace 1996; Matsuda et al. 1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the (1996)
IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of 'vulnerable', while declines of
50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively. These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal
and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see
Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations.
Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinops sagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold variation in northern
anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over the past two millennia to suggest that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively
common in exploited fish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be higher than unexploited
populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).


Ocean turmoil inevitable and wont threaten extinction

Jenkins 3
(Martin, conservation biologist, ECOLOGY: ON THE FUTURE OF BIODIVERSITY Science Week, Science 2003
302:1175, http://www.scienceweek.com/2003/sb031226-4.htm)

Assuming no radical transformation in human behavior, we can expect important changes in biodiversity and ecosystem services by 2050. A
considerable number of species extinctions will have taken place. Existing large blocks of tropical forest will be much
reduced and fragmented, but temperate forests and some tropical forests will be stable or increasing in area, although the latter will be biotically impoverished.
Marine ecosystems will be very different from today's, with few large marine predators, and freshwater
biodiversity will be severely reduced almost everywhere. These changes will not, in themselves, threaten the
survival of humans as a species.


Massive size of oceans checks snowball and ensures slow timeframe.

Lomborg 1
(Bjrn, Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, The Skeptical Environmentalist, p.189)

But the oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant - the oceans
contain more than 1,000 billion liters of water. The UNs overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: The open sea is still
relatively clean. Low levels of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable, are
biologically insignificant. Oil slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, a minor consequences
to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.


Deep sea floor checks.

South Bend Tribune 95
October 19, p. A10

Rough estimates for the number of species on the deep-sea floor have now soared to 10 million or
even 100 million, hundreds of times larger than the old projections of 200,000 species for all types of marine life. The new figures also
contrast starkly with the sum of the earth's plants, animals and microbes that scientists have so far named, about 1.4 million species in all. And
they match the 10 million to 100 million that experts had projected as possible totals for the number of terrestrial species. "It's changing
our whole view about biodiversity," said Dr. P. John D. Lambshead, a marine biologist at the Natural
History Museum in London who studies the abundance of deep ocean species. "The quantity of life we've found is
incredible," he added in an interview. "All sorts of ecologic theories that looked good, based on terrestrial
models, suddenly fall apart. We're having to change all our ideas."

Alt cause- overfishing

Craig 3
(Associate Law Prof -- Indiana, Winter, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155)

Overfishing as the Primary Cause of Marine Ecosystem Degradation
Declines in fishing stocks and the economic chaos that results when a fishery collapses have driven much of the interest in restoring the oceans -
or at least in restoring the fishing stocks. Restoration efforts, however, depend on identifying the cause of the degradation. Although
anthropogenic stresses to the oceans are many - pollution, destruction of habitat for coastal
construction, and global warming - scientists consistently identify overfishing as the primary cause of
[*163] both depleted fisheries stocks and destruction of ecosystem biodiversity generally. 27


A2- Ocean Acid
Adaptations solve ocean acid
Idso, director of envt science Peabody Energy, PhD Geography ASU, Idso, professor Maricopa
County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany ASU, 12
(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, The Potential for Adaptive Evolution to Enable the World's Most
Important Calcifying Organism to Cope with Ocean Acidification, CO2 Science Vol. 15, No. 28, July)

In an important paper published in the May 2012 issue of Nature Geoscience, Lohbeck et al. write
that "our present understanding of the sensitivity of marine life to ocean acidification is based
primarily on short-term experiments," which often depict negative effects. However, they go on to say
that phytoplanktonic species with short generation times "may be able to respond to environmental
alterations through adaptive evolution." And with this tantalizing possibility in mind, they studied, as
they describe it, "the ability of the world's single most important calcifying organism, the coccolithophore
Emiliania huxleyi, to evolve in response to ocean acidification in two 500-generation selection
experiments."
Working with freshly isolated genotypes from Bergen, Norway, the three German researchers grew them
in batch cultures over some 500 asexual generations at three different atmospheric CO2 concentrations -
ambient (400 ppm), medium (1100 ppm) and high (2200 ppm) - where the medium CO2 treatment was
chosen to represent the atmospheric CO2 level projected for the beginning of the next century. This they
did in a multi-clone experiment designed to provide existing genetic variation that they said "would be
readily available to genotypic selection," as well as in a single-clone experiment that was initiated with
one "haphazardly chosen genotype," where evolutionary adaptation would obviously require new
mutations. So what did they learn?
Compared with populations kept at ambient CO2 partial pressure, Lohbeck et al. found that those
selected at increased CO2 levels "exhibited higher growth rates, in both the single- and multi-clone
experiment, when tested under ocean acidification conditions." Calcification rates, on the other hand,
were somewhat lower under CO2-enriched conditions in all cultures; but the research team reports that
they were "up to 50% higher in adapted [medium and high CO2] compared with non-adapted
cultures." And when all was said and done, they concluded that "contemporary evolution could help to
maintain the functionality of microbial processes at the base of marine food webs in the face of global change
[our italics]."
In other ruminations on their findings, the marine biologists indicate that what they call the swift
adaptation processes they observed may "have the potential to affect food-web dynamics and
biogeochemical cycles on timescales of a few years, thus surpassing predicted rates of ongoing global
change including ocean acidification." And they also note, in this regard, that "a recent study reports
surprisingly high coccolith mass in an E. huxleyi population off Chile in high-CO2 waters (Beaufort et
al., 2011)," which observation is said by them to be indicative of "across-population variation in
calcification, in line with findings of rapid microevolution identified here."
Recent history disproves the impact
Idso, director of envt science Peabody Energy, PhD Geography ASU, Idso, professor Maricopa
County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany ASU, 12
(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, Two Centuries of Reef Growth in the Southern South China Sea, CO2
Science Vol. 15, No. 20, May)

The authors write that "rising atmospheric CO2 and global warming are regarded as fatal threats to coral
reefs," noting that "the IPCC has reported that by the end of this century, coral reefs will be the first
ecological system that will become extinct," citing Wilkinson (2004). However, they say "others contend
that rising seawater temperature is conducive to enhanced coral calcification, and increased calcification
will be higher than the decline caused by rising CO2," so that "coral calcification will increase by
about 35% beyond pre-industrial levels by 2100, and no extinction of coral reefs will occur in the
future," citing McNeil et al. (2004). So who's right?
What was done
In an attempt to shed some light on this important question, in late May of 2004 and 2007 Shi et al.
extracted core samples of coral skeletons from several massive live and dead Porites lutea colonies
comprising part of the Meiji Reef in the southern South China Sea, after which they analyzed their
skeletal calcification rates by means of X-ray photography, which enabled them to construct a nearly
three-century-long history of coral calcification rate for the period 1716-2005.
What was learned
The results of the six scientists' efforts are depicted in the figure below.
As best we can determine from the Chinese scientists' graph, over the period of time depicted - when
climate alarmists claim the world warmed at a rate that was unprecedented over the past millennium
or two, and when the atmosphere's CO2 concentration rose to values not seen for millions of years -
the two "fatal threats to coral reefs," even acting together, could not prevent coral calcification rates on
Meiji Reef from actually rising by about 11% over the past three centuries.
What it means
It certainly looks like the infamous IPCC has gotten it all wrong when it comes to predicting the effects
of rising temperature and atmospheric CO2 concentration on coral calcification rates ... because you
better believe that nature's got it right.

Framing issuegigantic uncertainties in ocean sciences mean default to zero risk
Idso, director of envt science Peabody Energy, PhD Geography ASU, Idso, professor Maricopa
County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany ASU, 12
(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, The Unsettled Science of Ocean Warming and Acidification, CO2
Science Vol. 15, No. 19, May)

In an eye-opening "perspective" article published a couple of years ago in the 9 December 2009 issue of
the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, three researchers
from the Marine Biogeochemistry Section of the Leibniz Institute of Marine Sciences in Kiel,
Germany, describe their assessment of various possible responses of the global ocean's seawater
carbonate system, plus its physical and biological carbon pumps, to ocean warming and associated
changes in vertical mixing and overturning circulation, as well as the closely-allied phenomena of ocean
acidification and carbonation.
All of these phenomena, many of which are nonlinear and extremely complicated, are interlinked; and
Riebesell and his colleagues thus conclude, from their objective review of the pertinent scientific
literature, that the magnitude and even the sign of the global ocean's carbon cycle feedback to
climate change are, in their words, "yet unknown."
They note, for example, that "our understanding of biological responses to ocean change is still in its
infancy." With respect to ocean acidification, in particular, they write that the impact it will have on
marine life "is still uncertain," and that the phenomenon itself is but "one side of the story," the other
side being what they call "ocean carbonation," which, as they describe it, "will likely be beneficial to
some groups of photosynthetic organisms." Thus, they write that "our present understanding of
biologically driven feedback mechanisms is still rudimentary," and that with respect to many of their
magnitudes, "our understanding is too immature to even make a guess." What is more, they imply that
even what we do think we know could well be wrong, because, as they elucidate, "our present
knowledge of pH/CO2 sensitivities of marine organisms is based almost entirely on short-term
perturbation experiments, neglecting the possibility of evolutionary adaptation."


Acidification wont kill ocean life

Idso et al 8
[Keith and Craig Idso - Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural
Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with
a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and
is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union,
American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American
Geographers, Ecological Society of America, and The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi. Ocean
Acidification and Jellyfish Abundance - Volume 11, Number 48: 26 November 2008,
http://www.co2science.org/articles/V11/N48/EDIT.php, Chetan]

In a paper recently published in Limnology and Oceanography, Richardson and Gibbons (2008) say there has been a drop of 0.1 pH
unit in the global ocean since the start of the Industrial Revolution, and that "such acidification of the ocean may make
calcification more difficult for calcareous organisms," resulting in the "opening [of] ecological space for non-calcifying
species." In line with this thinking, they report that Attrill et al. (2007) have argued that "jellyfish may take advantage of the vacant niches made
available by the negative effects of acidification on calcifying plankton," causing jellyfish to become more abundant; and they note that the latter
researchers provided some evidence for this effect in the west-central North Sea over the period 1971-1995. Hence, they undertook a study to see
if Attrill et al.'s findings (which were claimed to be the first of their kind) could be replicated on a much larger scale. Working with data from a
larger portion of the North Sea, as well as throughout most of the much vaster Northeast Atlantic Ocean, Richardson and Gibbons
used coelenterate (jellyfish) records from the Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR) and pH data from the International Council
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) for the period 1946-2003 to explore the possibility of a relationship between
jellyfish abundance and acidic ocean conditions. This work revealed that there were, as they describe it,
"no significant relationships between jellyfish abundance and acidic conditions in any of the regions
investigated." In harmony with their findings, the two researchers note that "no observed declines
in the abundance of calcifiers with lowering pH have yet been reported." In addition, they write that the
"larvae of sea urchins form skeletal parts comprising magnesium-bearing calcite, which is 30 times
more soluble than calcite without magnesium," and, therefore, that "lower ocean pH should
drastically inhibit [our italics] the formation of these soluble calcite precursors." Yet they report "there
is no observable negative effect of pH." In fact, they say that echinoderm larvae in the North Sea
have actually exhibited "a 10-fold increase [our italics] in recent times," which they say has been
"linked predominantly to warming (Kirby et al., 2007)." Likewise, they further note that even in the most recent
IPCC report, "there was no empirical evidence reported for the effect of acidification on marine
biological systems (Rosenzweig et al., 2007)," in spite of all the concern that has been raised by climate
alarmists claiming that such is, or should be, occurring. In light of this body of real-world evidence, or non-
evidence, Richardson and Gibbons conclude (rather generously, we might add) that "the role of pH in
structuring zooplankton communities in the North Sea and further afield at present is tenuous."

Coral is resilient and can adapt

Idso et al 8
[Keith and Craig Idso - Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural
Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with
a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and
is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union,
American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American
Geographers, Ecological Society of America, and The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi. High-
Temperature Tolerance in Corals - Vol. 11, No. 39: September 2008,
http://www.co2science.org/articles/V11/N39/EDIT.php, Chetan]

As for the significance of these and other observations, the Australian scientists say that "the range in bleaching
tolerances among corals inhabiting different thermal realms suggests that at least some coral
symbioses have the ability to adapt to much higher temperatures than they currently experience in
the central Great Barrier Reef," citing the work of Coles and Brown (2003) and Riegl (1999, 2002). In addition, they note that
"even within reefs there is a significant variability in bleaching susceptibility for many species
(Edmunds, 1994; Marshall and Baird, 2000), suggesting some potential for a shift in thermal tolerance based on
selective mortality (Glynn et al., 2001; Jimenez et al., 2001) and local population growth alone." Above and beyond that,
however, they say that their results additionally suggest "a capacity for acclimatization or
adaptation." In concluding their paper, Maynard et al. say "there is emerging evidence of high genetic structure
within coral species (Ayre and Hughes, 2004)," which suggests, in their words, that "the capacity for
adaptation could be greater than is currently recognized." Indeed, as we note in our Editorial of 20 February 2008,
quoting Skelly et al. (2007), "on the basis of the present knowledge of genetic variation in performance traits
and species' capacity for evolutionary response, it can be concluded that evolutionary change will
often occur concomitantly with changes in climate as well as other environmental changes."
Consequently, it can be appreciated that if global warming were to start up again (it has been in
abeyance for about the last decade), it need not spell the end for earth's highly adaptable corals.

The threat of ocean acidification is greatly exaggerated overwhelming scientific
proof

Ridley 10
[Matt Ridley was educated at Eton College from 1970-1975 and then went on to Magdalen College of the
University of Oxford and completed a Bachelor of Arts with first class honours in zoology and then a
Doctor of Philosophy in zoology in 1983. Threat From Ocean Acidification Greatly Exaggerated, June
15th, 2010, http://www.thegwpf.org/the-observatory/1106-matt-ridley-threat-from-ocean-acidification-
greatly-exaggerated.html, Chetan]

Lest my critics still accuse me of cherry-picking studies, let me refer them also to the results of Hendrikset al. (2010, Estuarine,
Coastal and Shelf Science 86:157). Far from being a cherry-picked study, this is a massive meta-analysis. The authors
observed that `warnings that ocean acidification is a major threat to marine biodiversity are largely based
on the analysis of predicted changes in ocean chemical fields rather than empirical data. So th ey
constructed a database of 372 studies in which the responses of 44 different marine species to ocean
acidification induced by equilibrating seawater with CO2-enriched air had been actually measured. They found that only a minority
of studies demonstrated `significant responses to acidification and there was no significant mean effect even in these
studies. They concluded that the world's marine biota are `more resistant to ocean acidification than
suggested by pessimistic predictions identifying ocean acidification as a major threat to marine
biodiversity and that ocean acidification `may not be the widespread problem conjured into the 21st centuryBiological processes can
provide homeostasis against changes in pH in bulk waters of the range predicted during the 21st century. This important paper
alone contradicts Hoegh-Gudlbergs assertion that `the vast bulk of scientific evidence shows that
calcifiers are being heavily impacted already.


Acidification is contradicted by chemistry and empirical data dont evaluate
pessimists

Ridley 10
[Matt Ridley was educated at Eton College from 1970-1975 and then went on to Magdalen College of the
University of Oxford and completed a Bachelor of Arts with first class honours in zoology and then a
Doctor of Philosophy in zoology in 1983. The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves 2010 (pg
340-341), Chetan]

Ocean acidification looks suspiciously like a back-up plan by the environmental pressure groups in case
the climate fails to warm: another try at condemning fossil fuels. The oceans are alkaline, with an average pH of
about 8.1, well above neutral (7). They are also extremely well buffered. Very high carbon dioxide levels could
push that number down, perhaps to about 7.95 by 2050 ...still highly alkaline and still much higher than it was for most of the last 100 million
years. Some argue that this tiny downward shift in average alkalinity could make it harder for animals
and plants that deposit calcium carbonate in their skeletons to do so. But this flies in the face of chemistry:
the reason the acidity is increasing is that the dissolved bicarbonate is increasing too .. and increasing the
bicarbonate concentration increases the ease with which carbonate can be precipitated out with calcium by creatures that seek to do so. Even
with tripled bicarbonate concentrations, corals show a continuing increase in both photosynthesis
and calcification. This is confirmed by a rash of empirical studies showing that increased carbonic
acid either has no effect or actually increases the growth of calcareous plankton, cuttlefish larvae and coccolithophorcs.
My general optimism is therefore not dented by the undoubted challenge of global warming by carbon dioxide. Even if the world
warms as much as the consensus expects, the net harm still looks small alongside the real harm now
being done by preventable causes; and if it does warm this much, it will be because more people are rich enough to afford to do
something about it. As usual, optimism gets a bad press in this debate. Optimists are dismissed as fools,
pessimists as sages, by a media that likes to be spoon-fed on scan' press releases. That does not make the optimists right, but the poor
track record of pessimists should at least give one pause.

A2- Methane Release
Methane release not happening and no impact
Archer, computational ocean chemist University of Chicago, 3/6/10
(David, Arctic Methane on the Move? http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/03/arctic-
methane-on-the-move/)

For some background on methane hydrates we can refer you here. This weeks Science paper is by
Shakhova et al, a follow on to a 2005 GRL paper. The observation in 2005 was elevated concentrations of
methane in ocean waters on the Siberian shelf, presumably driven by outgassing from the sediments and
driving excess methane to the atmosphere. The new paper adds observations of methane spikes in the air
over the water, confirming the methanes escape from the water column, instead of it being oxidized to
CO2 in the water, for example. The new data enable the methane flux from this region to the
atmosphere to be quantified, and they find that this region rivals the methane flux from the whole rest
of the ocean.
Whats missing from these studies themselves is evidence that the Siberian shelf degassing is new, a climate
feedback, rather than simply nature-as-usual, driven by the retreat of submerged permafrost left over
from the last ice age. However, other recent papers speak to this question.
Westbrook et al 2009, published stunning sonar images of bubble plumes rising from sediments off
Spitzbergen, Norway. The bubbles are rising from a line on the sea floor that corresponds to the boundary
of methane hydrate stability, a boundary that would retreat in a warming water column. A modeling study
by Reagan and Moridis 2009 supports the idea that the observed bubbles could be in response to observed
warming of the water column driven by anthropogenic warming.
Another recent paper, from Dlugokencky et al. 2009, describes an uptick in the methane concentration in
the air in 2007, and tries to figure out where its coming from. The atmospheric methane concentration
rose from the preanthropogenic until about the year 1993, at which point it rather abruptly plateaued.
Methane is a transient gas in the atmosphere, so it ought to plateau if the emission flux is steady, but the
shape of the concentration curve suggested some sudden decrease in the emission rate, stemming from the
collapse of economic activity in the former Soviet bloc, or by drying of wetlands, or any of several other
proposed and unresolved explanations. (Maybe the legislature in South Dakota should pass a law that
methane is driven by astrology!) A previous uptick in the methane concentration in 1998 could be
explained in terms of the effect of el Nino on wetlands, but the uptick in 2007 is not so simple to
explain. The concentration held steady in 2008, meaning at least that interannual variability is
important in the methane cycle, and making it hard to say if the long-term average emission rate is
rising in a way that would be consistent with a new carbon feedback.
Anyway, so far it is at most a very small feedback. The Siberian Margin might rival the whole rest
of the world ocean as a methane source, but the ocean source overall is much smaller than the land
source. Most of the methane in the atmosphere comes from wetlands, natural and artificial
associated with rice agriculture. The ocean is small potatoes, and there is enough uncertainty in the
methane budget to accommodate adjustments in the sources without too much overturning of apple
carts.
Could this be the first modest sprout of what will grow into a huge carbon feedback in the future? It is
possible, but two things should be kept in mind. One is that theres no reason to fixate on methane in
particular. Methane is a transient gas in the atmosphere, while CO2 essentially accumulates in the
atmosphere / ocean carbon cycle, so in the end the climate forcing from the accumulating CO2 that
methane oxidizes into may be as important as the transient concentration of methane itself. The other
thing to remember is that theres no reason to fixate on methane hydrates in particular, as opposed to
the carbon stored in peats in Arctic permafrosts for example. Peats take time to degrade but hydrate also
takes time to melt, limited by heat transport. They dont generally explode instantaneously.
For methane to be a game-changer in the future of Earths climate, it would have to degas to the
atmosphere catastrophically, on a time scale that is faster than the decadal lifetime of methane in the
air. So far no one has seen or proposed a mechanism to make that happen.


A2- Dead Zones

Species can adapt and survive in dead zones

Lewis 8
[Richard, Brown Scientist Finds Coastal Dead Zones May Benefit Some Species. ETB]

Coastal dead zones, an increasing concern to ecologists, the fishing industry and the public, may not be as devoid of life after all. A
Brown scientist has found that dead zones do indeed support marine life, and that at least one commercially valuable clam actually
benefits from oxygen-depleted waters. Andrew Altieri, a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at
Brown University, studied dead zones in Narragansett Bay, one of the largest estuaries on the U.S. East Coast. In a paper published this month in
the journal Ecology, he found that quahog clams (Mercenaria mercenaria) increased in number in hypoxic zones, defined as
areas where dissolved oxygen in the water has been depleted. The reasons appear to be twofold: The quahogs natural ability to
withstand oxygen-starved waters, coupled with their predators' inability to survive in dead zones.
The result: The quahog can not only survive, but in the absence of predators, can actually thrive. A recent study shows
that dead zones have been expanding rapidly along the coastal United States and worldwide due to climate change and human-caused pollution.
Scientists have typically focused on documenting the death of species and loss of fisheries in these oxygen-poor areas, but they havent looked at
how certain, hardy species such as quahogs can persist and thrive until now. There may be other commercially important species
that persist and perhaps benefit from dead zones in other regions. The research (listen to the podcast on the Ecological Society
of America Web site here) also underscores that some key species can be more adaptive and resilient than expected when
challenged environmentally, which could have important implications for conservation efforts.

Quahog clam proves that dead zones can increase populations of key species

Altieri 8
[Andrew Altieri, Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Brown University. Dead Zones Enhance Key Fisheries
Species by Providing Predation Refuge. Ecology 89(10) pp. 2808-2818. ETB]

Natural stress gradients can reduce predation intensity and increase prey abundances. Whether the harsh conditions of anthropogenic habitat degradation can similarly
reduce predation intensity and structure community dynamics remains largely unexplored. Oxygen depletion in coastal waters (hypoxia) is a form of degradation that
has recently emerged as one of the greatest threats to coastal ecosystems worldwide due to increased rates of eutrophication and climate change. I conducted field
experiments and surveys to test whether relaxed predation could explain the paradoxically high abundance of clams that have sustained a fishery in a degraded estuary
with chronic hypoxic conditions. Hypoxia reduced predation on all experimental species but enhanced the long-
term survivorship of only sufficiently hypoxia-tolerant prey due to periodic extreme conditions. As a consequence, only the harvested
quahog clam (Mercenaria mercenaria) thrived in hypoxic areas that were otherwise rendered dead zones with depauperate diversity and low
abundances of other species. This suggests that enhanced populations of some key species may be part of a predictable nonlinear
community response that sustains ecosystem services and masks overall downward trends of habitat
degradation.

Multiple comparisons prove ocean species can take advantage of harsh conditions

Altieri 8
[Andrew Altieri, Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Brown University. Dead Zones Enhance Key Fisheries
Species by Providing Predation Refuge. Ecology 89(10) pp. 2808-2818. ETB]

Despite this common focus on negative trends associated with degradation, some species could predictably benefit from the harsh
conditions of degraded habitats. Along gradients of natural environmental stress, tolerant species often gain a
refuge from their less tolerant predators that are either excluded or rendered less effective. For example, populations of sessile
marine invertebrates persist in hyposaline subtidal (Witman and Grange 1998) and in high wave-shock
intertidal (Menge 1978) environments. Water flow acts as an environmental stress to suppress the effectiveness of predators in both
tidal (Leonard et al. 1998) and freshwater (Peckarsky et al. 1990) rivers. In terrestrial environments, harsh conditions associated with increases in
altitude reduce herbivory on mountain vegetation (Louda and Rodman 1983). This general relationship between environmental
stress and predation has important consequences for the persistence of prey populations under naturally
stressful conditions, and was summarized and later refined in a series of conceptual models put forth by Menge and colleagues (Menge and
Sutherland 1976, 1987, Menge and Olson 1990).

Natural causes responsible for the dead zones

Avery 5
(Dennis, director of the Center for Global Food Issues at the Hudson Institute, Its Time To Tell The World How High-Yield Farming Saves
Nature, http://www.cgfi.org/2005/02/09/its-time-to-tell-the-world-how-high-yield-farming-saves-nature/)

Myth: Fertilizer from the Midwest Threatens the Gulf of Mexico During the Clinton Administration, a White House Task Force
recommended a 30 percent cut in Midwest fertilizer use because of a so-called dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico. Fortunately, the task force admitted in its
report that it could find no evidence of either ecological or economic harm to the Gulf from the summer algae bloom that
causes the dead zone. The first reports of such algae blooms in the Gulf go back into the 19th century. Fisheries experts say that most of the nutrients
for the Gulfs vast, rich fishery come down the Mississippi River. Such hypoxic zones are a common feature at the mouths of 40 major rivers
around the world, where fresh, nutrient-laden water hits salt water. Under such conditions, the laws of biology and physics
guarantee periodic algae blooms. Know also that Midwest fertilizer use has not risen since 1980, while the yields from
the corn that gets most of the N fertilizer have risen 25 percent. Obviously, more of the farm fertilizer is being harvested as corn. More of the Midwests
poultry and livestock have been moved indoors, where their wastes are carefully collected and spread on growing crops. If the dead zone is
expanding, which is in serious doubt, where is the additional N coming from? The sewage treatment plants of St.
Louis and Kansas City? Dont forget either, that before farmers settled the Great Plains, the grasslands there
had 60 million bison, 100 million antelope, billions of birds and grasshoppers, all eating the grass and defecating. The N may have
taken longer to reach the Gulf, but its likely that Cortez could have found an algal bloom in the Gulf of Mexico when he
invaded Mexico in 1520.


A2- Overfishing
The tech makes it inevitable

Vinson 06
[Anna, (JD Candidate, Georgetown University) 2006. "Deep Sea Bottom Trawling and the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Seascape: A Test Case for Global Action," Georgetown International Environmental Law
Review, Winter, 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 355]
In order to exploit the rich biodiversity of species in the deep sea and seamounts, the commercial fishing industry has enhanced trawl
capabilities. Vessels now employ more powerful engines and better sonar for enhanced efficiency, and
consequently can trawl the deep ocean floor to depths of up to 2000 meters. n17 Technology has made bottom trawling the
most commonly employed method of high seas bottom fishing, n18 accounting for eighty percent of the bottom
catch in the deep sea.

No depletion thriving in certain nations

GRYNBERG 03
[Roman (Commonwealth Secretariat, Economic Affairs Division, Marlborough House Pall Mall, London), "WTO fisheries subsidies
negotiations: implications for fisheries access arrangements and sustainable management," Marine Policy, Volume 27, Issue 6, November 2003,
Pages 499-511]

It is widely, though incorrectly assumed that fish stocks are in decline in all marine environments. This is not the case
and in those coastal states which have a substantial surplus fish stock in their exclusive economic zones and
which have practiced prudent fisheries management policies there are stocks in excess of the existing sustainable catch
capacity of the domestic fleets. In these countries, many of which are least developed countries, significant government revenue has been
generated from access fees from developed and developing country distant water fishing fleets.

Not enough information for determining the impact of ocean extinctions

KUNICH 05
[John Charles, (Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law) Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction
Now Threatening the World's Ocean Hotspots, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1]

With regard to extinction spasms, Earth's oceans, along with all other habitats, have been there, done that, long
before now. It is generally accepted that there have been no fewer than five mass extinctions in the earth's history, at least during the Phanerozoic Eon (the vast
expanse of time which includes the present day). [*5] These "big five" mass extinctions occurred at the boundaries between the following geological periods:
Ordovician-Silurian (O-S); near the end of the Upper Devonian (D) (usually known as the Frasnian-Famennian events or F-F); Permian-Triassic (P-Tr); Triassic-
Jurassic (Tr-J); and Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T). n4 In terms of millions of years ago (Mya), the mass extinctions have been placed at roughly 440 for O-S, 365 for F-
F, 245 for P-Tr, 210 for Tr-J, and 65 for K-T, n5 with the mass extinctions taking place over a span of time ranging from less than 0.5 to as long as 11 million years.
n6 There is some evidentiary support for other mass or near-mass extinctions in addition to the big five, including events near the end of the Early Cambrian (about
512 Mya) and at the end of the Jurassic and Early Cretaceous, among several others. n7 Although much has been written in the scientific literature about these
historical extinctions, relatively little attention has been showered on extinctions in the oceans. n8 For those areas that often
remain submerged under thousands of feet of sea water, the usually-formidable challenges of piecing together the ancient evidence are greatly magnified. It is
extremely difficult to arrive at a satisfactory estimate of the magnitude of the current extinction crisis, whether in
the marine realm or on dry land. One problem is that we know so little about life on Earth today in the first place, even in areas much
more accessible that the oceans' depths. If we do not know how many species exist, we cannot know precisely
how many are ceasing to exist; respectable estimates as to the number of species now extant vary by an order of magnitude. Moreover, for many
of the species we have identified, we know very little about their range, their [*6] habits, their life cycles, and
other details important to an understanding of their health or risk status.

Trawling being solved in the squo-

A. One quarter of the ocean is already safe

MONGABAY 07
[Mongabay.com May 7, 2007 Deal to end destructive bottom trawling reached. http://news.mongabay.com/2007/0507-trawling.html]

Governments have reached a landmark agreement to end high seas bottom trawling in nearly a quarter of
the world's oceans. Environmentalists say bottom trawling, which destroys reefs and depletes slow-growing fish species, is one of the
world's most destructive fishing practices. Green group WWF welcomed the news. "The agreement is a great leap forward for
halting the decline in ocean biodiversity and establishing good fisheries management on the high seas," said Alistair
Graham, High Seas Policy Advisor at WWF International. The new agreement bans "bottom trawling from high seas
areas where vulnerable ecosystems are likely or known to occur until an impact assessment is undertaken and until
precautionary measures to prevent destruction of marine life, such as vulnerable fish stocks, cold water corals and sponges, are implemented,"
stated WWF. The deal initially applies to a large part of South Pacific and Southern Ocean. Beginning September
30, 2007 observers will be required on all high seas bottom trawlers to ensure that regulations are followed. Fishing
vessels will be required to cover the cost of observers, a development that reduce the economic viability of trawling. Trawling is a method of
fishing that one or more boats involves towing a cone-shaped net across the sea floor. Conservation groups say the practice depletes marine life
and causes ecological damage to reefs and the sea floor.

B. Bering Sea in Alaska

PEMBERTON 08
[Mary, AP staff, August 25. "Long criticized, bottom trawling off-limits in parts of Bering Sea,"
http://www.adn.com/money/story/504398.html]

Large portions of the Bering Sea off Alaska's coast will soon be off-limits to bottom trawling, in which fishing vessels
drag huge, weighted nets across the ocean floor. As of today, nearly 180,000 square miles of the Bering Sea are closed to
bottom trawling, bringing the total in the Pacific Ocean to 830,000 square miles -- an area more than five times
the size of California. Other newly restricted areas are off Washington, Oregon and California.
Conservation groups have long fought the practice of bottom trawling, saying it is an outdated form of fishing that pulverizes delicate corals and
sponges living on the sea floor. Scientists say once bottom trawlers move through an area, it can take centuries for the slow-growing corals and
sponges to recover. "It basically is taking a net and raking it on the bottom and anything that sticks up from the bottom gets bulldozed over. It is
similar to forest clear-cutting," Chris Krenz, Oceana's arctic project manager, said Friday. In the northern Bering Sea, many animals, including
the endangered spectacled eider, rely on the crabs and clams that grow on the ocean floor for food, Krenz said. The North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, which advises the federal government on fisheries, unanimously voted in favor of the northern
Bering Sea regulation.

C. Greenpeace will stop them

UNDER WATER TIMES 08
[August 12. Greenpeace Builds Shield Against Bottom Trawling In The North Sea; Granite Boulders
Dropped On Seabed, http://www.underwatertimes.com/news.php?article_id=10059872643]

Greenpeace activists aboard the Beluga II sailed into the German North Sea today and began placing over 150 granite rocks,
each weighing 2-3 tonnes, on the seabed. The aim is to stop fishing in an area which on paper is protected under European law. The Sylt
Outer Reef is home to an abundance of sea life and is a popular fishing ground. Although the reef is designated as a Special Area of
Conservation by the EU, highly destructive fishing practices such as bottom trawling and sand and gravel extraction are permitted. This is
decimating the marine life that inhabits the area, including well known fish species such as plaice and sole, and destroying the reef. By
strategically placing granite rocks, Greenpeace intends to protect this ecologically diverse area from destructive practices
including bottom trawling. Greenpeace Germany oceans campaigner, Dr Iris Menn said: The fishing industry is not only pushing many fish
species to the point of collapse, but also their own future. If they carry on emptying the oceans of sea life then very soon there will be nothing left
for them to fish. We need the Sylt Outer Reef to truly be protected and not just on paper. That means an enforceable ban on fishing and sand
and gravel extraction in the area to create an effective marine reserve. Only this will give the area a chance to recover after
decades of exploitation. Greenpeace is calling on the German government to press the European Commission to implement new measures which
will prohibit fishing in the area by the beginning of next year at the latest, and is calling on the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK to support this.
Greenpeace is also demanding that the latter also takes steps to complete its own network of marine reserves. Dr Menn continued: If the German
government is not going to honour its commitments and give the Sylt Outer Reef the protection it so badly needs, then it is up to Greenpeace to
act. By placing these rocky obstacles to stop trawling in the area, we are sending a clear message that business as usual cannot continue.

A2- Horseshoe Crab

Horseshoe crabs arent necessary; scientists have already cloned their blood

Hooi 03
[Alexis (Staff Writer) June 29, 2003. Horseshoe Crab study pays soff for Singapore researchers. Strait
Times. l/n]

The husband-and-wife team who first genetically engineered a copy of an enzyme found in horseshoe crabs'
blood is set to profit from their creation, which is being marketed commercially as the diagnostic tool PyroGene. Until now, the crab
had been the only source of the enzyme Factor C, which is used to test for contaminants in every drug and
vaccine, every artificial limb, and every dialysis and intravenous drip. Now, Factor C's new substitute will earn royalties for the National
University of Singapore (NUS), where Professor Ding Jeak Ling works in the biological sciences, and Associate Professor Ho Bow, in
microbiology. Factor C, extracted from the crab's sapphire-blue blood, can detect the bacteria that causes cholera,
gonorrhoea and flu. In their presence, the crab's blood clots and turns jelly-like because of Factor C. Each year, up to 300,000 of the crabs
are caught, bled for the enzyme by the biomedical industry, and returned alive to the sea. The substitute, introduced to the
world recently by United States-based life-science company Cambrex Corporation, opens the door to a market said to be worth up to
US$100 million (S$176 million) a year.


A2- Salmon
Warming is main cause for salmon decline

Weiss 08
[Kenneth (LA Times Staff Writer) June 15, 2008. "Alaska salmon may bear scars of global warming". LA
Times l/n]

More Alaskan salmon caught here end up in the dog pot these days, their orange-pink flesh fouled by disease that scientists have
correlated with warmer water in the Yukon River. The sorting of winners and losers at Moore's riverbank fish camp illustrates what scientists
have been predicting will accompany global warming: Cold-temperature barriers are giving way, allowing parasites,
bacteria and other disease-spreading organisms to move toward higher latitudes. "Climate change isn't going to
increase infectious diseases but change the disease landscape," said marine ecologist Kevin D. Lafferty, who studies parasites for the
U.S. Geological Survey. "And some of these surprises are not going to be pretty." The emergence of disease in Alaska's most prized salmon
has come as a shock to fishermen and fisheries managers. Alaskan wild salmon has been an uncommon success story among over-exploited
fisheries, with healthy runs and robust catches that fetch ever higher prices at fish markets and high-end restaurants in Los Angeles, New York, Tokyo and London.
Fishermen and regulators who have cooperated to save species from overfishing and local environmental hazards have been caught unprepared
to deal with forces beyond their control: how to manage a fishery for climate change.

Salmon are resilient

Tacoma 08
(City of Tacoma 2008 Get to know the salmon http://www.cityoftacoma.org/Page.aspx?hid=928 )

Salmon are resilient, managing to survive cycles of drought, flood and changing ocean conditions.
They travel thousands of miles during their lifetime and still manage to make it back to their home stream or
lake to spawn. We can control how we take care of the water they live in if we dont they may not survive the influence of people.
Although a complicated system, the five Hs include the biggest challenges salmon face: Habitat degradation,
Harvesting, Hatchery production, Hydropower and Habits.

A2- Sea Turtles
Turtles are fine due to net upgrades, longlining bans; plan cant solve due to
swordfish and international fleets

Brown and Crowder 3
[Jessica (organizer for SeaWeb) and Larry (Professor of Marine Biology, Duke University) February 17, 2003. "Leatherback Sea Turtles
Careening Towards Extinction", Ascribe newswire. l/n]

Yet saving sea turtles is possible. International cooperation has worked before to reverse the decline of Kemp's ridleys - another species of sea turtle whose numbers
became dangerously low in the mid 1980's. Kemp's ridleys sank to about 300 nesting females per year before their decline was reversed by an international effort,
protecting them on their nesting beaches in Mexico and by requiring turtle excluder devices [TEDs] in U.S. and Mexican trawl fisheries.
TEDs are metal grids placed in the backs of trawl nets that allow the turtles to slip out of harm's way
instead of being entrapped in the net, then drowning. Since the implementation of these efforts in the late 1980's, Kemp's
ridleys have been increasing 11-13 percent per year, from a low of only 800 nests in 1986 to 6,200 in 2002. "People worked very hard for
over a decade protecting them on nesting beaches and in the water, and now we're seeing recovery. So there is a precedent for success. Saving
leatherbacks will be harder because of their range," says Crowder. "It will require even more international cooperation. There is hope, but we need to act now." Unlike
the Kemp's ridleys that stay in the coastal zone of the US and Mexico - leatherbacks roam the world. In the Pacific, leatherbacks are declining at
all major rookeries, primarily due to bycatch in longlines and gillnets. What can be done to save the Pacific leatherback? In order to save the leatherbacks and
other sea turtles, U.S. scientists and managers are examining three options: 1] Develop and implement a gear fix to reduce
bycatch in longlines and export this technology to other longlining nations, 2] Examine the spatial and temporal distribution of
turtles and fishermen internationally to determine the potential for time or space closures to reduce bycatch, and implement these measures
accordingly and 3] Consider trade or market-based approaches to reduce imports of target species in fisheries that take sea turtles. Critical
to the success of the first two options will be international cooperation, implementation, and enforcement from the major longlining nations.
Scientists have examined what best predicts bycatch. Is it where the hooks are set? Is it water temperature or bottom features? "Unfortunately the single best predictor
is swordfish catch - the more swordfish caught, the higher the rate of leatherback bycatch," says Crowder. To help
remedy this problem, U.S. longline fisheries already have been restricted or closed, but this will not adequately protect
leatherbacks. More that 90 percent of longlining effort in international waters originates from international fleets, primarily
from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and China. Finding a fix across a global ocean will require both international governments' and fishermen's buy-in.

Science Diplomacy
1NC- Science Diplomacy Frontline

Science diplomacy fails- it cant alter political dynamics

Dickinson 9
David Dickson, SciDev, The limits of science diplomacy, 6/4/2009,
http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html

But as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (12 June) using science for diplomatic
purposes is not as straightforward as it seems. Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working
together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether
scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less
evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace
to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is
resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even
suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful
thinking. Conflicting ethos Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science
diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the
developing world. There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership whether
between individuals, institutions or countries is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true partnership requires
transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And
that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own
countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a
diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet co-dependent The truth is that science and politics make an
uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or unfortunately military; scientists need political support to
fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another.
Science is or should be about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science
diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals,
such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences
acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is dangerous.

Their impacts are super long-term.

Leshner 8
[Alan I. Leshner, 08 Ph.D. Chief Executive Officer American Association for the Advancement of Science Executive Publisher,
Science July 15, 2008Written Testimony Before the Committee on Science and Technology Subcommittee on Research and Science
Education www.aaas.org/spp/cstc/LeshnerTestimony_S&TInt'l.pdf]

AAAS faces the same dilemmas that the U.S. government faces: how best to balance domestic versus
international interests, and how best to balance short-term versus long-term goals.
International cooperation takes time to develop and nurture, particularly if it requires
infrastructure development in one of the cooperating countries. The impacts of
science diplomacy also can take a long time to be realized, since the scientific work
must be done and trust must be nurtured over time.

Theres no impact or solvency for science diplomacy

Badger 9
(Badger, Emily, writer, Miller-McCune magazine, "Science diplomacy: Trading Frock Coats for Lab Coats" http://www.miller-
mccune.com/politics/science-diplomacy-trading-frock-coats-for-lab-coats-983 [CJL])

The activity's spin-off benefits for diplomatic relations, he says, are for others to judge. For that reason, he
never uses the phrase "science diplomacy," preferring instead people-to-people or scientist-to-scientist
exchanges. Berdahl's delegation similarly stressed on its trip that it did not wish to meet with
politicians. It was there to talk about science and education, with scientists and
educators. In a country historically suspicious of American motives, it may be best not to confuse the issue
especially when many of the different forms of "science diplomacy" the AAAS is advocating don't involve
scientists empowered to speak for their government. "I think the understanding of this term 'science
diplomacy' is kind of fuzzy here in the U.S., but it is really fuzzy overseas," Schweitzer later said. "'Diplomacy' has this foreign-
relations emphasis, and when you say 'science diplomacy' to someone from a different country, I think that person automatically
thinks about the ministry of foreign affairs and not about the ministry of science. I know that's true in Iran." The phrase
may be necessary, he concedes, for the State Department to justify funding science
overseas. And it does capture in Washington one of the many potential benefits to such programs. But the pitch is
different to citizens on both sides of any exchange: The idea is not that we'll influence each other's
behavior, but that we'll learn something in the process.

The federal government is ineffective at promoting science diplomacy
only civil society can take the lead

Lord and Turekian 7
[Kristin M - Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, and Vaughan C - Chief
international officer, AAAS, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: Time for a New Era of Science Diplomacy, Science
Magazine, Vol 315 no 5813 p 769-770, Feb 9
th
, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/315/5813/769]

Yet, in an era where international skepticism about U.S. foreign policy abounds,
government can only do so much. Ultimately civil society--including scientists and engineers--will
need to join in this diplomacy of deeds in order for the new science diplomacy to succeed. The fact
that science is, and should remain, outside the realm of politics only makes
scientists better suited for this task. How can the U.S. science community contribute to science diplomacy and remind the
world that Americans are defined by more than specific U.S. government policies? Individual scientists can contribute by realizing that they are
valuable ambassadors of goodwill. They can intensify their global activities and promote greater engagement with counterparts worldwide. They can
increase their efforts to invite foreign peers to review scientific articles and papers. Senior U.S. researchers can use their own international networks,
including former students and postdocs working outside of the United States, to reach out to junior scientists in other countries, to collaborate with
peers, and to promote broader international cooperation. U.S. scientists should make a special effort to engage with scientists from countries where the
United States is misunderstood or disliked--not to justify or promote any government policy, but to build bridges and trust. They can engage more with
university students and the general public overseas, not just other scientists, and let them know how scientists from all nations make a collective
difference in their lives. In so doing, U.S. scientists will make the world a better place, and perhaps improve foreigners' views of America along the way.
Scientists can also encourage their universities, research institutions, professional societies, and laboratories to adopt global engagement as a priority.
Although a large sum of individual efforts is important, effective global engagement will be most influential if it engages whole organizations as well.
Many of the major U.S. scientific and engineering societies already have specific offices or initiatives dedicated to international collaborations. To give
just one example, in January AAAS joined the U.S. Department of State, the Kuwaiti government, and a Kuwaiti science NGO to convene a conference
in Kuwait City to promote networks of women scientists and engineers in the broader Middle East (see figure above). AAAS has also recently started a
pilot program that remotely links U.S. researchers with university-level science students in developing and emerging countries in order to share and
discuss seminal papers across a range of scientific disciplines (13). Yet, despite current efforts, scientific organizations can do more. Of course, all this
assumes that scientists and engineers are willing to be ambassadors and to participate in the new science diplomacy. Why would they? The answer is
threefold. First, while science holds great benefits for diplomacy, diplomacy also benefits science. For instance, in large-scale programs such as
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) (14), scientists from major powers such as China, India, Russia, Korea, Japan, the
European Union, and the United States will work together in an unprecedented international agreement to develop fusion energy. Moreover, diplomacy
can create opportunities to conduct research in parts of the world critical to scientific advancement. Scientific research ranging from astronomical
observation in Australia to archaeological research in Libya depends on broader access, as well as diplomatic support. Second, the health of the U.S.
scientific community depends on the continued willingness of foreign scientists and students to come to the United States for study, research, and
work. Visa difficulties, combined with a perception that the United States does not welcome foreigners, reduced the number of foreign students coming
to the United States after 9/11. This trend is beginning to reverse, but negative perceptions persist and it is important to remain vigilant. The U.S.
economy benefits greatly from foreign scientists and science (15).We must ensure that the United States remains attractive and welcoming. Third,
scientists are citizens. Like their counterparts outside of the scientific community, many scientists and engineers share concerns about negative
perceptions of the United States. The good news is that scientists have some ability to change those perceptions for the better. The Way Forward
Who should lead a renewed effort toward science diplomacy? Unfortunately, there
is currently no ideal U.S. government agency to lead a sustained effort. Technical
agencies, such as the Department of Energy, National Institutes of Health, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration are (not
inappropriately) focused on their core missions and interested in international collaboration to the extent it advances those
missions. The National Science Foundation has a broader mandate than these agencies, but NSF's goal is to foster basic research. Consequently, its
international activities are designed to address specific research questions. The Department of State is designed to focus on diplomacy--but,
unfortunately, is not well equipped to engage in science diplomacy. With limited resources for S&T cooperation, limited scientific expertise, and
pressure to focus on the day's crises rather than long-term engagement, the department's efforts must be complemented by the work of other agencies.
Unless those resources increase dramatically, which we do not believe is likely, the Department of State will need much more support in the area of
science diplomacy. It is time for the scientific community to increase its role in diplomacy--and maybe even take the lead.
Nongovernmental scientific organizations are more credible, more nimble, and--as honest
brokers--in many cases more respected than the U.S. government overseas. They work at the grassroots level on global problems such as
energy, clean water, and health. A vigorous new science diplomacy, oriented to foreign citizens as well as their governments, will promote human well-
being, will benefit science, and will catalyze public diplomacy. Our country needs a new era of science diplomacy, and we need the
commitment of the U.S. science community behind it.



2NC Ext Science Diplomacy Fails

Science diplomacy fails- it cant alter political dynamics because the
fields are separate and countries will always put their own interests
first- thats Dickinson 9

Any impact takes forever to solve anyway- cooperation requires
lengthy infrastructure investment and trust takes forever to build-
thats Leshner 8
Science diplomacy fails-
a. too many barriers to effective usage

Dickinson 10
[David Dickson, Director, SciDev.Net http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/science-diplomacy-easier-said-than-done/]

Using science as a vehicle for international diplomacy has many clear attractions. Such is the case, for example, when it can be used to forge common
approaches to international problems (such as climate change), or appears to offer a way around divisive political disagreements. But, as rapidly
become clear in the opening session of the three-day meeting on science diplomacy being held at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK,
putting the principle of such diplomacy into action presents many practical problems, some of
which SciDev.Net aired last week (see Science diplomacy must be more ambitious). As several participants pointed out, this is particularly
the case at a time when science budgets are under pressure, and scientists are being
asked to justify their support from the public purse in terms of the practical
contributions they make to national rather than international well-being. The dilemma was
highlighted by the very first speaker at the meeting, Peter Fletcher, chair of panel that seeks to co-ordinate the international activities of Britains
research councils. Fletcher outlined the many ways in which science can be effectively used as a diplomatic tool. He pointed out, for example, that
scientific cooperation offered countries such as Britain an opportunity to establish good relations with the Muslim world in just the same way that it
had helped them build bridges with China in the 1990s. Science is a way of building relationships, sometimes even before politicians have agreed to
talk. Fletcher said. Researchers are used to working across national boundaries. They understand people who are thinking about the same things as
they are, and are used to working together in ways in which other people are not. But he also pointed out that, with the UK having just announced a
25% reduction in its science budget, governments were increasingly requiring scientists to demonstrate the
value of their work for those who paid for it. How much are we prepared to commit to solving
global challenges for mutual benefit [in this context]? he asked. Other challenges were highlighted by Vaughan
Turekian, director of the Center for Science Diplomacy, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Washington DC Turekian
pointed out that part of the attraction of using science for diplomatic purposes was its apolitical nature. In addition, the United States, for example, was
well placed to exploit the fact that its science was held in much higher regard around the world that many of its other activities. He quoted a recent visit
to Syria by a US scientific delegation that had met with President Assad an ophthalmologist as an example of how science diplomacy could help
promote political engagement in situations where official relations were limited. Science cooperation has provided a wonderful way to have a dialogue
on issues of mutual interest, Turekian said. But he also pointed to some of the barriers that prevent science diplomacy
from operating effectively, such as asymmetries in scientific capabilities, economic or
security concerns over providing access to certain types of key technologies, and a general lack of
funding.


b. distorts scientific and diplomatic concerns, undermining both

West 10
[Michael West is in his sixth year of a combined Bachelor of Science (Advanced) and Bachelor of Engineering. He is currently completing Honours in
Physics. The Sydney Globalist August 2010. When Geneva meets genetics]

However, where scientists begin to be drafted as soldiers on the battlegrounds of international
diplomacy, objections begin to be raised. Politics and science are two very different cultures.
Many researchers are cautious about diluting the distinguishing features of the
scientific method, such as objectivity, transparency and accepting uncertainty, in pursuing
diplomatic goals. David Dickson, the former news editor of the prestigious science journal Nature, has warned of the
danger of distorting the integrity of science itself. Two main notes of concern have been sounded. First, scientific
impartiality must not be undermined by political entanglement. If scientific advice is to be used
to inform foreign policy conclusions, it has to be unbiased or its value is lost. Scientific
credibility could vanish if political forces exert pressure on scientific institutions to produce
outcomes that are deemed politically convenient. Of course, governments may direct more funding to areas
that they consider to be of national concern; but attempting to control the conclusions of such
research, as the Bush administration did by rewriting reports from the Environmental Protection Agency, conflicts
with scientific values. Yet interference may occur even with the best of intentions. Bringing science and
politics closer together invites politicians into the realm of scientific debate. However,
there is a disconnection between politicians need for firm action and digestible sound bites,
and the hedged conclusions with which scientists are more comfortable. Even the many leaders who genuinely
value impartial scientific input may request more certainty than scientists can legitimately provide.
In 2009, the Danish Prime Minister Anders, Fogh Rasmussen, demanded a yes or no response from scientists on whether his
proposed cuts to carbon emissions would be adequate, thereby reducing a complex issue with significant uncertainty to an overly
simplistic answer. Second, the genuine pursuit of science must not be subordinated to international
showmanship. Although successful science can provide valuable soft power capital, it is vital that scientists are not
diverted into sham programs more focused on generating publicity than achieving scientific
progress. Equally, the influence of state disputes on international scientific exchanges should be
limited where possible, unlike situations in which national sporting teams are made to boycott disputant countries.
Discretion is required on the part of scientists, but heavy-handed direction from the state would
be detrimental to the free flow of ideas. An example from the Cold War illustrates the fact that past governments have
not always taken a hands-off approach. In 1955, the American physicist and Nobel laureate Richard Feynman was invited to a
scientific conference in Moscow. He sought the advice of the U.S. State Department because he had worked on the Manhattan
Project and was concerned about the possibility that he might be detained and questioned. The Department responded that they
believed that the Soviet Government was primarily motivated by the prospect of propaganda gains in the international political
field, and [had] little intention of establishing more normal scientific relations which would involve great exchange of mutually
beneficial scientific information, and urged him to decline the invitation. He did not attend. Clashes like this may strain
relationships between scientists and politicians, but should not prove intractable.

c. US bureaucracy prevents effective usage

Lord and Turekian 9
(Kristin, Vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, Vaughan, chief international officer for
American Association for the Advancement of Science, The Science of Diplomacy, Brookings, May,
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/05_diplomacy_lord.aspx)

Facing a complex set of foreign-policy challenges, the United States can no longer afford to overlook
such a useful instrument of statecraft. Regrettably, the U.S. government is not well
organized to take advantage of science diplomacy. The National Science
Foundation and technical departments (Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Defense)
apply their resources to science -- but not to its diplomatic use. Thus, the Obama administration
should appoint a senior-level ambassador for science and technology cooperation in the State Department. He or she could convene
an interagency group coordinating the strategic use of science diplomacy.

2NC Ext Cant Solve

Aff cant solve- 3 warrants from the Badger evidence
1. Scientists dont communicate with governments
2. Scientists arent empowered to speak for the government
3. Their evidence is propagansa to justify funding science (assumes
federoff evidence, its from the US govt)

Building US science diplomacy is impossible Bush squandered all
credibility on every issue

Blickstein 8
[Adam, Press Secretary for the National Security Network and regular contributor to DemocracyArsenal.org. former Congressional
press secretary and CNN political contributor, Science Diplomacy? August 19,
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2008/08/science-diploma.html]

The New York Times has an interesting interview with Nina Federoff, who holds the unique positions of Science Advisor to Secretary of State Condi
Rice: Q. WHY DOES THE SECRETARY OF STATE NEED A SCIENCE ADVISER? A. Because science and technology are the drivers of the 21st
centurys most successful economies. There are more than six billion of us, and the problems of a crowded planet are everyones: food, water, energy,
climate change, environmental degradation. Other nations, even those that have lost respect for our culture and politics, still welcome collaboration on
scientific and technological issues. She goes on to discuss how State opens the door to intrastate collaboration on science and research by negotiating
nation-to-nation science and technology agreements, bringing together scientists and engineers from across the world in some sort of bespectacled
rendition of "It's a Small World" in a laboratory. Of course, the rhetoric would be great if the Bush
administration didn't have a spotty to sub-par to wretched record on financing
science and research here in the U.S. Not to mention science education, in which
the U.S. has slipped far behind other industrial nations, ranking behind countries
such as Latvia, France and Croatia in the latest assessments. Federoff acknowledges the loss of U.S. prestige
around the world, but it doesn't help when the President routinely shrugs off
science (global warming, agriculture, NASA) for political reasons. In fact in nearly all
of the policy areas she names (food, water, energy, climate change, environmental degradation), America basically has no
credibility on which to lead let alone influence other nations with the Administration
having so completely squandered our moral authority. The bottom line is diplomacy of any kind
only works if American policies back-up our rhetoric, and the rest of the world can
trust our leadership. Sadly, with science, as elsewhere, the sanguine veneer the Bush
administration tries wash itself in fails to hide its reckless record and failed policies,
resulting in more hollow diplomacy abroad.

Alt-Cause - Funding barriers

Redden, 8
[Elizabeth, writer, July 16, 2008, Science Knows No Borders. But Funders Do., Inside Higher Ed.,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/07/16/science]

James A. Calvin, the interim vice president for research at Texas A&M University, referenced, by way of example, three different
summits that brought together Chinese and U.S. scientists, each conference a site of vigorous discussion and debate.
And then what? Everyones excited, but then after three conferences were still at the same phase, Calvin told the U.S.
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Research and Science Education during a hearing Tuesday on the role of non-
governmental organizations and universities in international science and technology cooperation What scientists have, Calvin
explained, are the international conferences to make the introductions. What they dont have is the mechanism
to take the next step. When pressed by the committee chairman, Rep. Brian Baird (D-Wash.), to offer an example of what such
a mechanism would look like, Calvin suggested that, in this context, a granting entity jointly funded by the Chinese and
U.S. governments could promote scholarly collaboration (he cautioned, however, that he wouldnt want to dilute
existing research funds available through the National Science Foundation). Calvin's suggestion got to the heart of two of
the challenges to international scholarly cooperation highlighted during Tuesdays hearing: the difficulty of
coordinating research when partners have different governmental agencies to ask of and answer to, and, at
least in the U.S. governments case, the legal limitations on funding foreign collaborators. (Although we do agree with
the view that U.S. taxpayer funds should be used primarily to support American science, there are instances, such as in international
science development activities, where we believe this limitation can impede the ability of the programs to achieve their goals, said
Alan I. Leshner, chief executive officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which publishes Science.)
Among the other barriers brought up were continuing challenges with visas, although, as Representative Baird pointed out,
witnesses at a February subcommittee hearing reported progress on that front.