92- GAMINDE vs.

COA

DOCTRINE:
Distinction between term and tenure. The term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office.
The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.

FACTS:
President Ramos appointed petitioner as Commissioner of the CSC on June
11. 1993 for a term expiring on February 2, 1999. She took her oath of
office on June 22, 1993 and was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on September 7, 1993.

On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request,
the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined
that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on
February 02, 1999.

Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February
02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote
the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid
their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on
February 02, 1999. The Commission on Audit issued a decision that her term
expired on Feb. 2, 1999.

ISSUE:
W/N the term of office of Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999/

HELD:
YES, the term of office ended on Feb. 02, 1999. The constitution adopted a
rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners
of the Constitutional Commissions. The operation of the rotational plan
requires that the terms of the first Commissioners should start on a common
date and any vacancy before the expiration of the term should be filled only
for the unexpired balance of the term. Consequently, the term of the first
Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions must start
on a common date, irrespective of variations in the dates of appointments
and qualifications of the appointees in order that the expiration of the first
terms should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between
the expiration of the terms. February 2, 1987 is the proper starting point of
the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commission,
as the beginning of the term of office is understood to coincide with the
effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.

In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the
terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a
staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX
(B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1
(2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of
office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-
appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five and three
years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to
expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to
coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on
February 02, 1987).


2
nd
member (5-yr
orginal)
TERM TENURE
Barlongay 1
st

appointee
02/02/87 - 02/02/92 03/04/88 - 03/04/93
Gaminde 2
nd

appointee
02/02/92 - 02/02/99 06/11/93 - 02/02/00
Valmores 3
rd

appointee
02/02/99 - 02/02/06 09/08/00 - 02/02/06

Note: Atty. Ereeta was a CSC Commissioner from 12/12/91 to 02/02/97.


93- JAVELLANA vs. DILG

DOCTRINE:
The Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of
administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the
enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Atty. Javellana was elected as councillor in Bago City, Negros Occidental.
Divinagracia filed an Administrative case against Javellana for violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) memorandum circular and the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
and fopr abuse of authority. Divingaracia alleged that Javellana, has while
serving as councillor he continupously engaged in the practice of law
without securing authority for that purpose as required ny the DLG
Memorandum.

Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that such memo was
ubconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sile and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law. Javellana's motion to dismiss was
denied by the public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.

Five months later, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was
signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. xxx
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case
wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an
officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except
when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.

Administrative Case was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991.
Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N the DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90
of the new Local Government Code (RA 7160) are unconstitutional and null
void.

HELD:
NO, said circulars and Section of law are valid.. Neither the statute nor the
circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe
rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public
officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public
duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where
the law allows it.

Complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the
performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for
by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City
Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of
Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman.
Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the
complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against
City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No.
74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government
official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such
practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against
lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the
professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that
sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are
some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the
professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or
affect, the area of public service.



95 NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION vs. COA

DOCTRINE:
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position."
Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than
that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is
a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment.

FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency
created by then President Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is
tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed
of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the
President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and
Local Government as ex officio members. After personally attending the
initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said
responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, a
few years after, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the
payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for a
3 year period, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. The NGAO upheld
the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued.
Meanwhile, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was
approved by then President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999. Section 1,
Rule II thereof provides:

Section 1, Composition The NAC shall be composed of seven (7)
members:
a) A Chairperson who shall be appointed by the President;
b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall be appointed by the President;
c) Three (3) Ex-officio Members
1. Secretary of Justice
2. Secretary of National Defense
3. Secretary of the Interior and Local Government

The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per
diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be
authorized by law.

Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the
rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment
of honoraria to the ex officio members representatives, to no avail.

ISSUES:
W/N COA committed grave abuse of discretion in:
(1) implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice
and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code;

(2) invoking paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution to
sustain the disallowance of honoraria under said Memorandum;

(3) applying the Memorandum to the NAC ex officio members
representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below that of an
Assistant Secretary;

(4) interpreting laws and rules outside of its mandate and declaring Section
1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 null and void, and

(5) disallowing the payment of honoraria on the ground of lack of authority
of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex
officio members.

HELD:
NO. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per
diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex
officio members official representatives.

The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the
funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently and
conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains the COA
to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities
or trustees, without any exception. It is in accordance with this
constitutional mandate that the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038.

The Commission received a copy of Senate Committee Report No. 509
urging the Commission on Audit to immediately cause the disallowance
of any payment of any form of additional compensation or
remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants,
or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple
positions, and to effect the refund of any and all such additional
compensation given to and received by the officials concerned, or
their representatives, from the time of the finality of the Supreme
Court ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary to the
present.

Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not
need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the
Civil Code. We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Six years prior to the issuance of COA Memorandum No. 97-038, the Court
had the occasion to categorically explain this constitutional prohibition
in Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary. The prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions
held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the
concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by
virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in
an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio
member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further warrant or appointment. The ex-officio position
being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that
these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. Ex-officio posts held by the
executive official concerned without additional compensation as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his
office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.

Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 is valid, as it merely
provides that:

The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances,
bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. The problem lies
not in the administrative order but how the NAC and the COA interpreted it.
First, the administrative order itself acknowledges that payment of
allowances to the representatives must be authorized by the law, that is, the
Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. However, as already discussed,
the payment of such allowances is not allowed, prohibited even. Second, the
administrative order merely allows the ex officio members to designate their
representatives to NAC meetings but not to decide for them while attending
such meetings. Section 4 of the administrative order categorically states:
Decisions of the NAC shall be arrived at by a majority vote in a meeting
where there is a quorum consisting of at least four members. Thus, although
the administrative order does not preclude the representatives from
attending the NAC meetings, they may do so only as guests or witnesses to
the proceedings. They cannot substitute for the ex officio members for
purposes of determining quorum, participating in deliberations and making
decisions.

Lastly, we disagree with NACs position that the representatives are de
facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances, pursuant to our
pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union. The representatives cannot be
considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were
merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to
something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can
they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and
the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of
such allowances.


96- DONATILLA NONES vs. VERONICA ORMITA

DOCTRINE:
Clerks of court perform only administrative, not judicial functions. Issuing
orders of release on bail is beyond their powers and administratively
sactionable as misconduct.

FACTS:
Nones alleges that respondent, who is a mere clerk of court, issued an
order directed the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology of Bangar, La
Union to Discharge from custody Mr. Alfredo Murao Y Olpindo for having
filed sufficient bail bond in the amount of P5,000 for his provisional liberty
relative to the charges of frustrated homicide against him.

Complainant alleges that the released prisoner is a relative of the
respondents husband and complainant also alleges that respondent
allegedly hurled scurrilous words against her. Nones prays that Ormita be
suspended ffrom office during the trial to prevent her from taking advantage
of her position.

Ormita claims that she released the prisoner for humanitarian reasons and
she honestly thought that this was the best thing to do under the
circumstances.

ISSUE:
W/N Ormita should be held administratively liable for releasing the prisoner
without authority.

HELD:
YES. Clerks of court are important functionaries of the judiciary. Their
administrative functions are vital to the prompt and sound administration of
justice. They are administrative assistants of judges however they must not
involve themselves when it comes to the matters involving discretion or
judgment because these tasks belong to the judges.

In the present case, respondent improperly clothed herself with judicial
authority. The issuance of a release order is a judicial function, not an
administrative one. By releasing the accused on account of the cash bond he
had posted, respondent arrogated unto herself the authority to exercise
judicial discretion. She overstepped the boundaries of her function by
undertaking an act that fell squarely within the discretion of Judge Samuel
H. Gaerlan. Her act constituted a serious infringement of and encroachment
upon judicial authority. Such usurpation was equivalent to misconduct.
Veronica M. Ormita is hereby found guilty of misconduct
and SUSPENDED for three (3) months and one day without pay with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.


97- PAGCOR vs. ANGARA

DOCTRINE:
The initial decision is made by the legislative body or by the executive
department, but the final decision is done by the court. The Supreme Court
has constantly held that whether or not a position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, it is determined not by the title but
by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it. These positions are covered
by security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive only in
the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive
examinations for purposes of determining merit and fitness.

The petitioner cannot claim it was deprived of due process of law when the
CSC granted respondents appeal without the comment of the petitioner or
the records before it. Petitioner was directed to file its comment but chose
instead to move for the dismissal of the appeal. It must be remembered
that the CSC, being an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers, is not
bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication
of cases, subject only to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due
process.

FACTS:
Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria (La Victoria) and Marita A. Angara
(Angara) were Slot Machine Roving Token Attendants (SMRTAs) of PAGCOR
assigned at its casino in Davao City.

In a letter, the PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissed them from service for
loss of trust and confidence. It appears that La Victoria was dismissed for
alleged short selling of tokens while Angara was dismissed for alleged token
passing and condoning or actively assisting La Victoria in covering up her
shortage. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their
motion was denied. Then they filed their appeal memorandum with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). In a resolution, the CSC directed the PAGCOR
Chairman to submit her comment on the said appeal together with the
records of the case within ten days from receipt of the resolution. Instead of
filing a comment, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
appeal was filed out of time. CSC issued Resolution No. 991110. It treated
petitioners motion to dismiss as its comment and, on the basis of
respondents appeal memorandum, ruled in the latters favor. It reversed
the respondents dismissal and ordered their reinstatement.

ISSUE:
W/N CSC Resolution is valid.

HELD:
Yes. While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather
than frustrate the ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court dockets
is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the expense of
substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine
that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the
attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application
of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary
objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the
other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints
of technicalities


100- BUKLOD NG KAWANING vs. ZAMORA

DOCTRINE:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried
out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.

The President is empowered by express provisions of law to reorganize
administrative agencies as he may see fit, in furtherance of a more efficient
governmental structure.

FACTS:
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, and others seek the nullification of EO 191 and
EO 223 on the ground that they were issued by the Office of the President
with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of their constitutional right to
security of tenure.

EO 127 In 1987 was issued by President Corazon Aquino establishing the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau as part of the structural
organization of the Ministry of Finance. EIIB was designated to perform
functions, among others, such as intelligence reports and information,
coordinate with external agencies in the monitoring of financial and
economic activities of persons and entities, oversee intelligence operations
of various ministries, investigate, hear and file anti-graft and corruption
cases against the personnel of the Ministry and its constituent units, and
such other appropriate functions as may be assigned by the Minister or his
deputies.

Subsequently, President Aquino issued Memorandum Order 225 providing,
among others, that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for
anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways
outside the areas of sole jurisdiciton of the Bureau of Customs

HOWEVER, 11 years thereafter, President Estrada issued EO 191
Deactivation of the Economic Intellogence and Investigation Bureau by the
fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by
the other existing agencies of the government and there is a need to
constantly monitor the overlapping functions.

Meanwhile, President Estrada created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task
Force Aduana

Subsequently, President Estrada issued EO 223 separating the personnel
occupying positions in EIIB from service pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization resulting to abolition, merger, division or consolidation of
positions.

ISSUES:
Does the President have the authority to reorganize the Executive
Department?

RULING:
YES!
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the
Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and
agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are
no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be
scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and
regulations. X x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the
activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President.

Said provision clearly mentions the acts of scaling down, phasing out and
abolition of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or
transfer of functions.
Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the
subsequent provision of Section 62 which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges.- Unless otherwise created by
law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or
changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in
their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations
by this Act.
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to
effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.

The law that gives the President the power to reorganize is PD 1416 which
expressly grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried
out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.


102- DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A.
VILLAR

DOCTRINE:
The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first
set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of
the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational
system prescribed by the Constitution.

FACTS:

Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A.
Villar as Chairman of the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the
fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on
April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as
expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to
his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue,
in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015,
or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that
position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated
February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified
his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his
replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan)
COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main
issue tendered therein moot and academic.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan
and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within
the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at
least four exceptions to the mootness rule:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of
paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the
following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act
obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy
before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party;
and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case

ISSUES:
WON Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the
circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

HELD:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission,
the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity
ab initio.

The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in
regarding the word reappointment as, in context, embracing any and all
species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional
provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be
appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served
the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a
term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served
the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either
the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers
is to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing
him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a
promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the
commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified
by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in
the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to
the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt
the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly
precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman,
provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his
promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7-
year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year
tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by
this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of
the word reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in
no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or
a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A
contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service
limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to
the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under
any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of
the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year
term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said
rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would
effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every
appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed
term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like
respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot
be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of
the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such
appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee
will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional
ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten
the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term
as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who
were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the
entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission
under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for
less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of
the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from
death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The
Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)
means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment
and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.


104- MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC

DOCTRINE:
Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 CANNOT exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that
the Commission on Elections, promulgate because it will VIOLATE the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual
and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner
filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

The Court granted it and set aside procedural rules as the constitutional
right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be
visited by the vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in
any tribunal, board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
dims in light of the importance of the constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner.

ISSUES:
WON Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that
the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.

HELD:
No. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is
an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution,
that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to
enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of
this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules
and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law
it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency
in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative
function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that
body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not
to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and
revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189,
Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to
withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.


105- PEOPLE vs TOLEDANO

DOCTRINE:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission.

FACTS:
Bunao, while a member of Sangguniang Bayan, entered into a lease contract
covering two public market stalls. Two administrative cases were filed
against against him violating RA3019 and R6713 with the Ombudsman.
However, said cases were dismissed. An information for violation of
Sec41(1) in relation to Sec221 of BP337 was filed against respondent before
the RTC of Iba, Zambales which prohibits government officials from
engaging in any business transaction with the local government unit. The
RTC, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the criminal case on the ground
of the dismissal of the administrative cases. In the memorandum filed by the
Solicitor General dated January 11, 1995, said order of dismissal on the
ground of extinction of criminal liability is assailed for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent judge.

ISSUE:
W/N the extinction of criminal liability results in the dismissal of the
administrative case. NO

HELD:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission.
Besides, the reliance made by respondent judge on the re-election of private
respondent as Kagawad, so as to warrant the dismissal of the information
filed against him, citing Aguinaldo vs. Santos is misplaced. The ruling in
said case which forbids the removal from office of a public official for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, finds no
application to criminal cases, pending against said public officer.

Finally, Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, which repealed B.P. Blg. 337 reenacted in its Section 89 the legal
provision of Section 41 of B.P. Blg. 337 under which private respondent
Bunao was charged and penalizes the same act previously penalized under
the repealed law, such that the act committed before the reenactment
continues to be a crime. Hence, prosecution will proceed under the
provisions of Section 89 in relation to Section 514 of R.A.7160.


108- VALLES v. COMELEC

DOCTRINE:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine
of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a
Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she
left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a
Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on
the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:
W/N Rosalind Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified to run for
public office

HELD:
YES. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine
of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed
to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in
force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship,
xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to
her possession of dual citizenship.


109- ABELLA vs. COMELEC

DOCTRINE:
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and
it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

FACTS:
(2 consolidated cases, Abella vs. COMELEC and Larrzabal vs. COMELEC)

Silvestre dela Cruz (Abella later intervened) filed a petition with the
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of
Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate
of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte.

It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband
who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.

The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when it granted the decision,
Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was
disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area,
sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.

Larrazabal, however, claims that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it
relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the she lacks the
required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte.

She argues that under the Election Law, the matter of determination of the
residence is more on the principle of intention, the animus revertendi rather
than anything else. She states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of
residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or
removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS
REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning
there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at
Ormoc City."

ISSUE:
1.) W/N the petitioner (Larrazabal) is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte.
2.) W/N the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed
as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified

HELD:
1.) NO. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from
highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province.
In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a
province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily,
component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities,
which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are
geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it
the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote
and be voted for the provincial elective offices.

Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional
provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being
voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the
COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the
provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one,
from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective
official."

2.) NO. The voters of the province voted for Larrazabal in the sincere belief
that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes
were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect
is that the Abella lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid
the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate
was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.