Vlpgo Electrical Power System Restoration

Very Large Power Grid Operators
VLPGO WG#2 Enhanced Security

SubTopic Electrical Power System Restoration

Survey Paper on
Electric Power System Restoration

DATE: April 2010 NUMBER OF PAGES: 54 (including this page)
Contents
2

Summary

1 Introduction and summary . 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 The questionnaire .. . 4
1.3 Summary .. 5
2 Major Blackouts in the world . 6
2.1 Introduction . 6
2.2 Summary of Major Blackouts in the World .... 6
2.3 Chapter Conclusions .. 12
3 Synthesis of the answers to the questionnaire . 13
3.1 Main Features of the Power Systems considered this report .... 13
3.2 The role of the National Grid Codes in order to prevent cascading events .... 13
3.3 Blackouts ... 14
3.4 Existing countermeasures to avoid/minimize blackouts 16
3.5 Details of monitoring and control systems 18
3.6 Post-mortem Disturbance Analysis . 25
3.7 Brief Restoration Philosophy Description ... 28
3.8 The Black Start-up Process .. 34
3.9 Switching strategies used during the restoration process . 36
3.10 Aspects Related to Load Pick-up ... 36
3.11 Operation problems and needs . 36
3.12 Generating units performance after load rejection .. 37
3.13 Operators Training Process and Testing . 37
3.14 Procedures (Operators Instructions) ... 38
3.15 Supervision and Telecommunication Requirements .. 39
3.16 Other needs during restoration process . 39
3.17 The influence of Market Liberalization on Restoration .. 40
4 General Conclusions ... 41
5 Criteria/Procedures to reduce restoration times .. 43
6. Best Practices for Restoration ... 46
7. Recommendations to Improve Power System Restoration 49

References

3

1. Introduction and Summary

1.1. Introduction
Todays bulk power systems provide a highly reliable supply of electric power. However, due to a combination
of unforeseen circumstances, there is a remote possibility of a system wide outage. It is therefore prudent to be
prepared for such an unlikely eventuality by developing an up-to-date, readly accessible and easily understood
power system restoration plan to allow a quick and orderly recovery from a system outage, with resultant
minimum impact on the public.
The bulk power system major disturbances are primarily caused by transient faults and mainly originate in the
transmission systems. A very large number of these initiating causes of supply interruptions are due to
temporary faults, such as lightning, which are immediately cleared by fast and selective protective relays,
leaving the system in an unfalted condition. In many cases, however, these temporary initiating causes produce
subsequent effects which are permanent, including loss of generation, load and interconnections. These
subsequent effects may result in a partial to complete collapse of unfaulted power systems. Thus, searching for
the originating fault in power system failures may be futile, although identifying the status of the collapsed
system components would enhance restoration.
Power Systems are planned considering the criteria (n-1), but during the operational time frame they are usually
submitted to extreme contingencies, that are usually started by multiple faults or by single faults associated to
multiple disconnections or by cascading disconnections of transmission components.
The level of meshing between interconnected areas of power systems has become increasingly tighter in the
recent years, due to the general trend of utilities and system operators to exploit the network as closely as
possible to their maximum transmission capacity and to the liberalization of the electrical industry.
In this growing interconnection scenario and in the presence of high levels of power exchanges, some network
operation problems may occur: increased active and reactive power losses, higher risks of voltage instability or
collapse, stronger requirements for the load following and, most critical and important, higher criticism
associated with possible grid contingencies.
Furthermore, the practice of optimizing the transmission assets is putting pressure on design reliability of
transmission systems.
Electric systems are inherently susceptible to the risk of disturbances, presenting various degrees of severity.
An increase in the level of risk results from the sparseness and geographic extension of an electric system as
well as from an excessive concentration of components in use at a single substation. An increase in severity is
commonly the result of the location of the fault that gives origin to the disturbance and the amplitude of the
event. These conditions, combined with a strong dose of unpredictability, determine the chances of a
disturbance being contained by control and protection procedures or turned into a general collapse of the
energy supply a blackout.
Further to the question of unpredictability, mention must be made again that there is no such thing as an electric
system that is entirely immune to major disturbances.
In the last years, the number of blackouts verified around the word has increased. This has led Cigr and IEEE
to organize a Large Disturbance Plenary Session that has been taking place during the last years, in order to

4

exchange knowledge about how they occur and try to learn how to anticipate the actions to face them or
minimize their consequences.
It is important to take into account the prolonged restoration periods as one of the immediate negative effects of
blackouts. The adverse consequences that are detrimental to the image of electric utilities under public
concerns are related to the restoration time.
Restoration is a difficult task, during which the operators are kept under pressure to restore supply quickly,
avoiding actions which could damage plants, keeping appropriate staff informed and, not least, being able, in
any subsequent enquiry, to justify the validity of their decisions. Coupled with the fact that the state of the
system will be abnormal, many times different from that forecasted by outstation and control staff, as well as
from the one drilled in training sessions, it is not surprising that problems occur in the restoration process like,
for example:
Repeated failures: there have been unfrequent disturbances in which system conditions that caused the
original failure have remained unexplained and a second (or more) failure has occurred. The immediate
consequence will be an error by the operator.
Overvoltages: the consequences can be over-excitation of transformers, generator under-excitation, or even
self-excitation, harmonic resonance, etc.
Insufficient knowledge of the system: one of the most important points is the knowledge of the circumstances
of the failure (overloading, weather conditions, human error, equipment failure, etc.).
Too fast restoration: when the operators attempt to pick-up demand too quickly, the generator x demand
balance cant be achieved. The frequency falls and subsystem collapses, leading to a delay in the overall
restoration process.
Unavailability of equipment after a disturbance: some equipment can be unavailable for operation, making the
restoration process more difficult.
Distribution utilities demand: many times there is a competition among distribution utilities to have blocks of
load reconnected that are bigger than it is possible during the restoration process. This can create new
difficulties.
Communications process: misunderstandings between control centers.
The reflection of blackouts in economical, social and political terms is intrinsically joined to the medium and total
time for the restoration of loads. In order to obtain concrete results on the minimization of restoration times,
several actions, involving distinct time-frames, should be undertaken.
It must be recognized that power system blackouts are likely to occur, so it is prudent to consider the necessary
measures in order to reduce their extent, intensity and duration.
Recognizing the mentioned facts and considerations, VLGPO Governing Board has established Power System
Restoration as one of the main objectives to the WG#2 for his 2009 Work Plan.

1.2. The Questionnaire
A Questionnaire was elaborated in order to obtain best practices to optmize the power system restoration
process, considering the peculiarities of different groups of TSOs.

5

The Questionnaire was focused on the criteria, procedures and organization to reduce power system
restoration times after disturbances.
The following issues were addressed:
How the restoration process is treated?
What kind of philosophies are used?
How this issue is considered in Grid Codes?
What kind of preventive measures are adopted in order to minimize the probability of blackouts?
Are the nowadays process considered adequate? What kind of improvements are necessary?
Lessons learned from blackouts analysis.
What is the role of National Agencies?
How black-start units are utilized in the restoration process?
Black start: is it is considered an Ancillary Service?
What kind of problems are verified during restoration process?
Operator training: how this issue is addressed?
Supervision & Telecommunication requirements.
Aspects related to Postmortem Analysis of Power Grid Blackouts.
Verified gaps in the short term planning studies related to restoration.
Identified Improvements.

1.3. Summary
The deliverable of this WG#2 (subtopic Electrical Power System Restoration) is a report containing
recommendations and best practices in order to improve the load pick-up process thus reducing the restoration
time focusing mainly on:
How power system restoration is approached?
The current organization, processes, criteria and practices for preventing system disturbances or for
reducing their extent, intensity and duration;
Which barriers are possibly limiting their full implementation?
What are the experience and lessons learned from the last large disturbances?
What are the ongoing projects for additional measures for system restoration time reduction?
What is the role/initiative of National Authorities in this field?
What method/approach is used to test and maintain Restoration Plans?

6

2. Major Blackouts in the World

2.1. Introduction
As modern power systems have been growing in size and complexity, the challenges for maintaining system
security have also become more involving. In this chapter, a brief description is given of several major blackouts
in recent history (the events that led to the blackout, their root causes and consequences), mainly focusing
system restoration.

2.2. Summary of Major Blackouts in the World
In this section a brief report is made covering some of the main blackouts that took place in the world in the last
years.
The table below shows, for each blackout, the root causes, number of affected people, the total amount of
interrupted load (MW), the total time of restoration process and some additional comments related to the
restoration phase.

To be completed by all

Major Blackouts in the World Summary

7

Blackout
Root Causes
Number of
Affected
People
Interrupted
Load (MW)
Total
Restoration
Process
Times
Comments
Date
Affected
Area
09/11/1965
USA /
Canada
New York,
Boston&
Toronto
Cities
- Inappropriated 230 kV transmission line
(TL) relay action followed by four 230 kV
TL tripping by overload
30 million
people
20,000
13 hours and
30 minutes
- This blackout emphasized the importance for an up
to date restoration process;
- Many steam plants at the time did not have Black
Start Capability.
13/07/1977 New York
- Multiple contingency provoked by severe
thunderstorms associated with critical
system conditions
9 million
people
6,000 26 hours
- System restoration procedures were found to be
inadequate;
- The restoration process was delayed by many
unexpected problems.
19/12/1978 France
- Collapse of most of the French network
provoked by cascade overloads due to
load escalation more rapid and higher
than forecasted
3,6 million
people
30,000 4 hours
- The disturbance occurred at 8:00 a.m. An initial
power restoration was too rapid and led to a further
collapse of the network at 9.08 a.m. A more careful
recovery, relying on hydro generation units and
imported power permitted almost complete network
restoration at about midday. Customers sustained
power cuts lasting between 30 minutes and 10
hours
12/01/1987 France
- Voltage collapse due to the brake down
of Cordemais generation units 1, 2 and
3. Action of automatic on-load tap
changers of the 225 kV/HV and HV/MV
transformers, triggered a rise in load and
the voltage again began to drop quickly,
leading to the tripping of nine thermal
generation units. Load shedding brought
the network voltage back to its normal
level.
10,500 8 hours
- Generation units close to Brittany and Normandy did
not trip to house load. It took until nighttime to fully
restore the power supply to these regions. The gene
ration outages reached about 8,000 MW .The main
cause of this incident was the lack of quality of
settings of some System components, in particular
of the AVR and associated protection devices of
generation units. The automation of some actions
(blocking of on-load tap changers), the reduction of
load shedding execution time (by means of remote
load shedding) also appeared indispensable


8

02/07/1996
West side
of USA /
Canada
- Multiple contingency (two 345 kV
transmission lines were disconnected :
one due to arcing to a tree and the order
to relay error) associated with critical
system operation conditions due to
environmental constraints (fish migration)
2 million
people
11,850 7 hours -
10/08/1996
West side of
USA /
Canada
- Multiple contingency
- Critical system operation by
environmental constraints
- Overgrown trees
7.5 million
people
30,000 9 hours -
14/08/2003
East side of
USA /
Canada
- Transmission overload (thermal cascade)
+ overgrown trees
50 million
people
61,800 4 days -

Blackout
Root Causes
Number of
Affected
People
Interrupted
Load (MW)
Total
Restoration
Process
Times
Comments
Date Affected Area
14/04/1984
Southeast of
Brazil
- Unexpected high load (low
luminosity) overload limits
Million people 15,762
4 hours and
40 minutes
- Need for improving maintenance routines;
- Staff training to improve operation safety.


9

18/08/1985
Southeast of
Brazil
- Multiple contingency provoked
by bushfires and incorrect
protection actuation
Million people 7,793
4 hours and
20 minutes
- Need for more power plants with black-start
capabilities.
11/03/1999
Southeast of
Brazil
- Multiple contingency (loss of
four 440 kV transmission lines
caused by a short-circuit at 440
kV busbar). Those TL were
tripped out by remote TL
protection
45 million
people
25,000
4 hours and
20 minutes
- Necessity for investment to modernize the
operation control centers;
- Implementation of a schedule of periodic testing
of black-start devices in power plants capable of
self re-energizing;
- Identification of the vital substations, from the
restoration point of view, which will be subjected
to differentiated maintenance plans.
21/01/2002
Southeast and
Midwest regions
of Brazil
- Multiple contingency
45 million
people
23,766 4 hours
- The need to reevaluate the criteria for
unattended substation;
- The need to elaborate specific studies to
determine additional resources for the
restoration process;
- Training programs for system operators must be
given high priority.


10

Blackout
Root Causes
Number
of
Affected
People
Interrupted
Load (MW)
Total
Restoration
Process
Times
Comments
Date
Affected
Area
23/09/2003
Sweden &
Denmark
- Multiple contingency;
- A severe grid fault that occurred only
a few minutes after significant unit
trip.
4 million
people
6,600
6 hours and
30 minutes
- The hydro power in Norway, northern Sweden and
Finland was fully available to pick up the recovery of
the load;
- Problems in energizing 400 kV line;
- Serious problems of voltage control due to the loss of
remote control of one important substation.
- In Denmark;
Problems in the black-start facilities in 2 power
stations.
28/09/2003 Italy
- Three events first occurred in Swiss
grid (flashover);
- Operation close to the limits led to
voltage collapse.
- non-respect of the N-1 security
criterion on the Swiss transmission grid;
- the lack of the sense of urgency in
the communication from the Swiss ISO.

55 million
people
25,000
(*)

50% in 6.5 hs
70% in 10 hs
98% in 13.5 hs
99% in 15 hs

The restoration process started immediately after the
blackout with the aim to re-energize the auxiliary
services of shut down plants, to reconnect the thermal
power plants that succeeded islanding or the load
rejection and to stabilize the load of such plants. The
Telecontrol Centres, under the Dispatching
coordination, performed the Restoration. The load was
progressively added to the islands resulting from the re-
energisation paths and then the islands were re-
meshed. Although some difficulties were encountered,
the performed restoration was satisfactorily successful
and timely. The main difficulties were due to:
failures in starting some black start generation units;
lack of enough generation units on in-house
operation;
high overvoltages and voltage phase displacements;
switching from Telecontrol Centres;
failures in data and/or voice communication services.


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04/11/2006 UCTE
- Non-compliance with (n-1) criterion
and insufficient coordination /
communication among the TSOs
- Due to less restrictive rules of the
distribution systems, wind generation
power plants were disconnected at
frequency threshold, aggravating the
situation.
Not
available
17,000
1 hour and 20
minutes
- Under-frequency load shedding and other actions
helped system to be restored quickly without a wide
spread blackout.
(*) As the blackout extended for 18 hours, the non supply load during peak load was about 55,000 MW

Blackout
Root Causes
Number of
Affected
People
Interrupted
Load (MW)
Total
Restoration
Process
Times
Comments
Date Affected Area
27/12/1983
Sweden &
Eastern Denmark
- Breakdown of a disconnector led
to the loss of one big substation
Not available
11,400
(Sweden) and
520
(Denmark)
2 hours and 6
minutes
-
13/07/1987
Tokyo
Metropolitan Area
- Voltage instability
2,8 million
households
8,000
3 hours and
20 minutes
-


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18/11/1998 Malaysia
- Inadequate right of way
maintenance caused a tree
flashover and unsatisfactory
protection design philosophy
1,4 million
consumers
1,771 3 hours
- Improvement in restoration plans after the
disturbance.

2.3. Chapter Conclusions
To be completed after receiving all the contributions

13

3. Synthesis of the Answers to the Questionnaire
The following TSOs fulfilled the questionnaire:
ONS
National Grid
TERNA
KPX
PJM
SO for UPS
3.1. Main Features of the Power Systems considered in this report to be completed by all
3.3.1 Technical characteristics
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3.3.2. Deregulation status
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3.3.3. Critical stability issues
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3.2. The Role of the National Grid Codes in Order to Prevent Cascading Events
All the TSOs adopt a Grid Code in order to guarantee system security, except SO for UPS, that used small
(local) separated documents regarding some aspects of network functioning.
In all TSO the Grid Code is written under authority directions. The Grid Code is issued by the TSO. In the
Brazilian case it is approved by the regulatory authority. In Italy it is preventively evaluated by the Regulation
and the Ministry for the Economical Development and in Russian, the Ministry and Government are also
involved.
ONS, Terna, National Grid, KPX, SO for UPS and PJM cover issues related to restoration processes in the Grid
Codes.
Grid Code covers duties and righs of all grid users. It is indentified TSOs authority and the responsibility of
relevant entities in the electric market.
The issues related to the activities of connection, management, planning, development and maintenance of the
national grid, security of the national electricity system as well as dispatching are normally TSO
responsibility. In Brazilian system, the activity of planning is responsability of Minas and Energy Ministery,
through the Empresa de Planejamento Energtico EPE.
ONS works together with EPE to make the final planning transmission arrangements for the 3 years ahead.
The Grid Codes are updated as required.

14

In the cases where there are interconnection with others TSO/SO, there are requirements on coordination. This
is the case of Terna, PJM and SO for UPS.
The Grid Codes of all TSO prescribes procedures/requirements in case of insufficient generating capacity. Load
shedding, is one operative resource normally used.
Except PJM, all TSO consider requirements to consumers in order to prevent cascading events, load-shedding
and short-time generation equipment overload are used.
Minimum requirements to generators units (AVR, PSS, Governor, power factor, etc) are described in the Grid
Codes. This is very important to enhance system security.

3.3. Blackouts
In this chapter a resume is presented of the answers to the questionnaire answered by ONS, TERNA, KPX,
National Grid, SO for UPS and PJM.

3.3.1. Status of a blackout
KPX and PJM dont have an explicit definition for blackout.
For ONS, the status of a blackout is characterized when a region, part of a state of the federation, a large capital
city, a major industrial center or all of the electric system is completely de-energized after a contingency.
TERNA defines blackout as the total absence of voltage in some plants or in an extended portion of the electrical
network, classifying it as total (involving all plants in the network) or partial. In case there are isolated supplied
islands inside the electrical system affected by the blackout it is also classified as total.
SO for UPS defines blackout as the total absence of customers power supply and/or voltage drop to zero on
power plants on some territory, thus not classifying it according to its extention.

3.3.2. How blackouts are identified?
For ONS and TERNA, the identification of a blackout is made by recognizing the complete absence of all electric
parameters for a time interval not lower than 5 minutes.
SO for UPS identifies a blackout when its above mentioned signs cant be corrected immediately and require
applying special (automatical or manual) restoration procedures.
For ONS, the main causes of blackouts are dynamic instability and voltage instability.
TERNA points out a steady-state overload, due to unexpected large power flows on the system or to large
incidents to generation units, as the most probable origin of a system separation. Dynamic instability and voltage
collapse are believed to be usually the consequences of separation or lines tripping.
In KPX case, the most probable origin of large disturbances is lines tripping (N-2, N-3) causing a system
separation or blackout at a specific area.

15

SO for UPS considers that, for the Russian power system, the most probable causes of system separation are
static and dynamic stability (in 330-750 kV grid) and steady-state overloads (mainly in 110-220 kV grid).
There are no mandatory durations of blackouts to be fulfilled but all the restoration procedures should be finished
as soon as possible. The end of the blackout is considered when practically all the load has been restored. As to
blackouts severity degree, 50% of the enquired System Operators have no indicator to assess the blackout
severity degree. Energy not supplied and the total amount of interrupted consumers (in MW) are considered for
this purpose. The others dont have any kind of index to evaluate the severity of blackouts.

3.3.3. Detection of blackout risk
All the enquired System Operators declared to provide their operators with software tools that monitor in real time
the weather conditions (temperature, wind, lightning and burning in progress) in order to adopt preventive
measures on the system to maintain security conditions.
KPX utilizes the CA function provided by EMS and, additionally, has developed an application called PSAauto
which assesses overloads, voltage problems and transient stability in real-time. Research to develop an
application using PMU is also in progress in order to enhance the ability of assessments in real-time.
National Grid uses both off line and on line computer tools to assess the ability of the GB Transmission System to
be robust against fault criteria, including the double circuit loss (n-2).
PJM does not make use of any tool for this purpose and SO for UPS intends to develop such software in the next
1 3 years.
As far as alarms generated for the operational crew by these tools are concerned, the software Organon,
developed by ONS, generates pictures/graphics that indicate the system security level, as well as alarms to the
system dispatchers.
TERNA and KPX applications ( some are under experimentation in TERNA ) display alarms on a screen to all
operators in duty, pointing out the contingency and the consequences to the systems (for instance: loading rate of
lines and transformers, risk of loss of load, quantifying lost MW, voltage collapse, identifying critical nodes, etc)
and suggest countermeasures determined on the basis of dynamic and static calculations.
In case of identification of blackout risks, all the enquired SYSTEM OPERATORS declared to apply specific
procedures, depending on the grid operation conditions expected or in progress ( generation re-dispatch,
topology changing, etc.) as well as developing operation rules and instructions.

16

3.4. Existing Countermeasures to Avoid/Minimize Blackouts
3.4.1. Preventive actions
Preventive actions comprise security monitoring, preventive control and demand side management.
Security monitoring is practiced by all the enquired System Operators in order to detect conditions that may lead
to small disturbance angle instability, transient instability, frequency and voltage instability, as well as thermal
overloading of elements of the system.
As far as small-disturbance instability is concerned ONS, TERNA and National Grid reported that the monitoring
of its signs is done through voltage monitoring at the main nodes, on-line contingency analysis, Wide Area
Measurement Systems that assess dynamic instability and dynamic waveform monitoring. KPX informed that
research is in progress, while SO for UPS and PJM did not mention any form of assessment of this kind of
instability.
Transient instability is avoided by ONS through the use of unequations for power flow monitoring, by monitoring
primary and secondary operating reserves, as well as utilizing Organon simulation tool. KPX assesses transient
instability utilizing its PSAuto simulation tool, while TERNA does it by means of Wide Area Measurement
Systems. PJM declared to assess transient instability, although not mentioning how it is done.
Frequency instability is alarmed by SCADA at KPX and SO for UPS. ONS evaluates frequency instability by
monitoring voltage at the main nodes of the system, making use of state estimation tools. National Grid
developed an on-line algorithm that monitors real time frequency response as compared to the scheduled.
Voltage instability is alarmed by SCADA at SO for UPS. ONS assesses voltage instability by means of on-line AC
load flow analysis utilizing the Organon simulation tool. KPX informed that research is in progress, while PJM
declared it does assess voltage instability, although not mentioning how it is done.
Abnormal voltage and frequency states are alarmed by SCADA at TERNA.
Thermal overloading of elements of the system is alarmed by SCADA at TERNA, KPX and SO for UPS. ONS
avoids thermal overloading through the use of unequations for power flow monitoring, as well as developing on-
line contingency analysis, utilizing Organon simulation tool. TERNA, National Grid and SO for UPS also do on-
line AC load flow analysis as part of the real time security assessment. PJM also monitors thermal overloading,
although not mentioning the way it is done.
In addition to security monitoring, preventive control is also exerted by the System Operators in order to
avoid/minimize blackouts.
Small-angle instability is preventively controlled at ONS, TERNA, National Grid and SO for UPS by the utilization
of Power System Stabilizers in some of the existing generators and mandatorily in all new generating units. ONS
Grid Code contains mandatory minimum requirements related to excitation systems, AVR and PSS
characteristics. Ons also reports the rigid control of voltage profile in the critical areas of the system (specially
when transmission elements are unavailable) and the synchronization of a minimum number of generators as
preventive measures to avoid small-angle instability. KPX added the importance of generation re-dispatching and
topological changes (looping of its 154 kV system), if available.
As far as transient stability is concerned, in addition to the already mentioned measures for small-angle instability,
other preventive actions where pointed out, like respecting stability limits previously determined, the use of

17

automatic generation control, fast acting AVR, redispatching to a more secure point of operation and the
interruption, when possible, of scheduled maintenance of transmission system elements and generators.
Frequency instability preventive actions reported by System Operators were the operation of generators as
synchronous condensers in order to increase system inertia, automatic generation control supported by a correct
quantification of the amount of spinning reserves and its proper location, the rescheduling of maintenance plans
for generators and the contracted demand of synchronous generators on underfrequency tripping.
As to preventive actions against voltage instability, a number of them were cited: the permanent control of voltage
profile, the use of thermal generation dispatch, the implementation of MVAr dispatch through the management of
capacitors/reactors banks, static var compensators, synchronous generators, mechanically switched capacitors
DAR and OLTC ( including block of the automatisms ), the re-dispatching of reactive power in situations of risk as
well as emergency control schemes.
Preventive actions for thermal overloading reported by System Operators were: on-line AC load flow analysis,
generation redispatch, use of thermal generation, security forecast analysis, topological changes, preventive load
shedding and the setting of admissible power flows.
Demand side management was also reported in the roll of preventive actions, going from voltage reduction
applied by Distribution Network Operators up to load cut by operators.

3.4.2. Corrective actions
As corrective actions for small-angle instability ONS mentioned system separation by out-of-step relaying and the
use of Special Protection Systems for load shedding and generation dropping.
In case of transient instability the main corrective actions adopted are the use of Special Protection Systems for
underfrequency load shedding and generation dropping and tripping of reactor banks.
In case of frequency instability the corrective actions described were the use of Special Protection Systems for
automatic underfrequency load shedding and/or generators starting and the automatic grid islanding in specific
areas of the system. SO for UPS added that in the Russian systems actions may be performed either
automatically or manually.
For voltage instability the corrective actions mentioned were undervoltage automatic load shedding (already used
by ONS and still under study by Terna), interruptibles manual load shedding, automatic switching on of capacitor
banks and the changing of reactive power compensators operation mode. SO for UPS added that in the Russian
systems actions may be performed either automatically or manually.
Corrective actions reported for thermal overloading were the use of Special Protection Systems for load shedding
(interruptibles or conventional) and generation dropping, automatic topology changes, generation re-dispatch and
the changing of reactive power compensators operation mode. Manual control actions are also used to control
thermal overloading and voltage reduction in case of slow evolving events.

18

3.5. Details of Monitoring and Control Systems
3.5.1. Security Monitoring

Security
Monitoring
Org Functions Capability Speed

Tele
comunication

Utilized
information
Vendor Challenges
Voltage
monitoring at
main nodes
ONS
State Estimation
Contingency Analysis
Organon
Main nodes of
the transmission
system from 138
to 765 kV
Every
few seconds
Organon: every
15 minutes
Dedicated Private
Channel
SCADA data

Terna
Steady State Analysis
congestion
management
short circuit
calculations
Optimal Power Flow
Optimal Reactive
Power Flow
Private LAN
Supplied directly by the
SCADA for real time
assessment.
It is used also for off line
evaluations (forecast of
post operation analyses).
CESI
To implement
advanced
dispatching
functions
EMS
KPX
short circuit
calculations
Optimal Power Flow
Optimal Reactive
Power Flow

Dedicated
Network
SCADA for real time
assessment.
It is used also for off line
evaluations (forecast of
post operation analyses).
AREVA
PJM
State Estimation 40 sec Siemens

19

Security
Monitoring

Tele
comunication

Utilized
information
Vendor Challenges
On line AC load
flow analysis for
security
assessment
National
Grid
State Estimation
Entire main
interconnected
transmission
system
Every 10 mins - SCADA data topology,
line flows, generators
outputs, etc, combined
with circuit parameters,
generator capabilities, etc.
GE Harris
ONS
State Estimation
Bulk power grid Every 1 min -
Network topology, SCADA
data and generators and
circuits parameters

PJM . 60 sec
RASTRWIN
SO for
UPS
Steady State
calculation
Local software
This program is used for
off line calculations
TSG
To off-line
power system
admissible
operation mode
estimation
Monitoring of
primary and
secondary
reserves
ONS
Frequency regulation
margins assessment
Optimization of the
economic dispatch
of generation units
Centrally
dispatched units
Every
15 minutes
Dedicated Private
Channel
Generators dispatches
and capabilities

20

Security
Monitoring

Tele
comunication

Utilized
information
Vendor Challenges

Terna
Operator
Training
simulator
Private LAN
SCADA.
It can be used also for off
line post operation
analyses.
CESI
Speed up the
preparation
process of
base cases.
Presently it
permits to
simulate the
380/220 kV
grid, in the
future also
the 150/132
kV grid could
be
represented.
DTS KPX
Dispatcher
training simulator

Dedicated
Network
Supplied by EMS
line post operation
analyses
AREVA
KOSMOS
(*)
State Estimator
SO for
UPS
State Estimation Private LAN
SCADA.
This software is used for
sate estimation and
preparation for the next
analysis.

State Estimator ONS State Estimation
Main nodes of
the transmission
system from 138
to 765 kV
Every
4 sec
Dedicated Private
Channel
SCADA data

21

Security
Monitoring

Tele
comunication

Utilized
information
Vendor Challenges
SRS KPX
Decision Supporter
for Finding Remedial
Action

Dedicated
Network
Supplied by EMS
It can be used also for
off line post operation
analyses
Power 21
Dynamic Wave
Form Monitoring
National
Grid
Detects low frequency
oscillations
2 measurement
points
Every 5 s Standard phone
line from Control
Room to remote
nodes
Oscillatory mode
frequency, amplitude and
decay constant
Psymetrix

PSAauto KPX
Transient Analysis

Dedicated
Network
Supplied by EMS
line post operation
analyses
Power21
Transient
Stability
PJM
Transient Stability 15 20 minutes
Voltage stability Voltage stability 3 5 minutes

Frequency
Response
Despatch
Algorithm
National
Grid

Considers
response
requirements and
response
capability of all
providers
Every 5 10
mins approx
-
Required response for
given loss criteria
Proprietary

22

Security
Monitoring

Tele
comunication

Utilized
information
Vendor Challenges

Terna
Time domain Analysis Private LAN
SCADA.
line post operation
analyses.
CESI
To be the
engine of a
computation
system for an
adaptative
protection of
the power
system

Steady State,
Time Domain and
Modal Analysis
Private LAN

Used for off line operation
analyses.
Supplied with operational
data in a specific format.

Power Quality
Evaluation

Private LAN
Used for off line operation
analyses. Supplied with
operational data in a
specific format.

23

3.5.2. Preventive control
System
Operator
Controller or
Safety net
Design and
installation by
Hardware
System
Architecture
Telecommunication
ONS
AGC ONS Custom designed controller De-centralized Dedicated
PSS
Design: ONS
Installation: Utilities
Strucutre defined by Grid Code
(Integral of accelerating
power)
De-centralized -
National
Grid
Generator
Operational
Tripping Schemes
National Grid &
manufacturers PLC Decentralised Intertrip comms

24

3.5.3. Emergency control
Org
Controller or
safety net
Design and
installation by
Hardware
System
Architecture
Telecommunication Utilized information Decision making logic

ONS

Special Protection
Systems
Design: ONS
- Programmable
microprocessor
Relay based
PLC: Centralized
Relay based: de-centralized
PLC: dedicated channel
- status of breaker and relative
protection devices allowed by
system operating conditions
Pre-contingency control
based on offline simulation
Load shedding
program
Design: ONS
- Programmable
microprocessor
Relay based
PLC: Centralized
Relay based : de-centralized
Frequency value or frequency
derivative
Voltage magnitude
Generation
Dropping Schemes
Design: ONS
- Programmable
microprocessor
Relay based
PLC: Centralized
Relay based: de-centralized
status of breaker and frequency
value
National
Grid
Automatic
underfrequency
load shedding in
stages
Installed by
Distribution Network
Operators
Low frequency load
shedding relays
Decentralised - System frequency
Distribution Network
Operator has the demand in
different load blocks defined
in Grid Code

Org
Controller or
safety net
Features
(1) Dependability (2) Security (3) Selectivity (4) Robustness
ONS
Load shedding
program

National
Grid
Automatic
underfrequency load
shedding in stages
x x

25

3.6. Postmortem Disturbance Analysis
The enquired System Operators were unanimous in affirming that postmortem disturbance analysis provides a
feedback for the restoration process.

3.6.1. Analysis approach
In case of system disturbances involving restoration actions, performances inside the overall restoration process
are analyzed ex-post. These analyses include the defense plan, the performance of protection relays and Special
Protection Systems, the operators behavior, efficiency and accordance to the instructions and standard rules, the
communication chain, the generation units and the grid equipment operation. In case of misoperation, corrective
actions are soon taken. As a result of the disturbance analysis operation instructions can be improved.
National Grid reported that although there have not been any major disturbances which have resulted in a total
system shutdown, since 1939, plans to cope with a complete system shutdown (a Black Start), are continually
kept under review.

3.6.2. Lessons learned
Terna
Terna reported that the most important experience it has had from a blackout refers to the events of September
2003 when an almost total blackout involved the overall national system, following disturbances originating from a
foreign neighboring grid. Lessons learned point out the criticality of the following items which should represent
priority needs for each TSO:
Coordination procedures with neighbouring TSO, in order to accomplish a coordinate operation of the
interconnected network under critical or emergency conditions. Such procedures have to deal with joint
countermeasures to be taken in maintenance scheduling, operational planning and real time control.
Joint operator training programmes among neighboring TSOs focused on contingencies identification and
congestion management, in order to improve, among operators, the reciprocal knowledge of technical
aspects. This naturally induces an improvement in operational communication between the Control Rooms.
In addition, reciprocal knowledge of aspects related to the partners power system operation makes easier
the reciprocal understanding during phone conversations.
Improvements in inter-TSOs forecast analyses to enhance the capability to predict the load-flow situation in
meshed, synchronously interconnected networks, to detect possible congestions in advance and to evaluate
the more appropriate countermeasures.
To achieve the visibility extension upon foreign networks by means of real time data exchange aiming to
improve real time security assessment and to ensure running the state estimators in a reliable way on a
wider topology basis.

26

Harmonization of security criteria applied by TSO as coordination among TSO contributes to prevent
disturbances, to provide assistance in the event of failures with a view to reducing their impact and to
enhance the common solidarity.
Enhancement of the telecommunication system by means of direct phone links, on dedicated channels
among neighbouring TSO Control Rooms.
Introduction of binding rules dedicated to the embedded generation on the distribution grid, with the aim to
avoid disconnections before the threshold of 47.5 Hz
Introduction of automatic systems for the grid islanding
Maximization of the number of black start generating units
Review and enhancement of the system remote control capabilities
Enhancement of the shunt compensation on the grid to mitigate voltage variations

KPX
For KPX, the most important experience it has had from a blackout refers to the events of April 2004 when a total
blackout involved the Jeju island following HVDC line tripping from mainland to Jeju island. Lessons learned point
out the criticality of the following items which should represent priority needs for KPX and participants:
Communication between Central Control Center in KPX and regional control center(RCC) in TO
Fully understanding of restoration procedure: dispatchers worked at RCCs and generation plants
Insufficient information to take action for restoration: training for dispatchers by periods
Updating the restoration procedure when there is change to field facilities such as circuit breaker,
transmission lines (predefined corridors). The updated information should be shared with participants
immediately.

SO for UPS
The main lessons learned from simple disturbances and from the Moscow blackout in 2005 point out the
criticality of the following items:
necessity of closer cooperation between SO for UPS and Grid and Generation companies
development and realization of training programs (inside SO for UPS, between SO for UPS and the SO of
neighboring countries, between SO for UPS and grid and generation companies)
clarification and more detailed explanation of the rules for the dispatcher activity in alarm situations
necessity for network enhancement (new lines, sources of the reactive power, generation units)
improvement of the maintenance quality
testing of the automatic devices and other devices involved into the alarm liquidation process

27

improvement of the telecommunications (raising the total amount of data and its quality)
development of the dispatcher adviser computer system to help the dispatcher choosing the most efficient
decisions
ONS
An analysis of the main blackouts suffered by the Brazilian electric system over the last 20 years has revealed
the following facts:

The traditional planning criterion used for expansion in Brazil is the widely known single contingency criterion
(N-1). However, it appears that in the majority of cases studied, the blackouts were caused by multiple
contingencies or single contingencies with multiple shutdowns not foreseen in the normal planning
procedures.
Special protection systems are acknowledged as the best way to improve performance of electric systems
during disturbances. This makes it necessary to use improved computational tools when conducting dynamic
studies and to enhance the communication media presently available for protection purposes.
It remains a difficult and rigorous task to identify the real causes originating blackouts.
The engineers responsible for system operation / restoration should not be submitted to hierarchical
pressures in the moments immediately subsequent to black-out situations. A regimen of isolation should be
observed similar to the protocol used in airport control rooms, nuclear plants, and hospital surgical centers.
Exposure to high-level management and to the press should be avoided or eliminated.
The processes of supervision and control of electric systems should be given absolute priority by the industry
itself and the government.
Training programs for system operators must be given high priority.
Simulations of disturbances conducted on digital computers are a good way to assure understanding of the
blackout phenomenon, enhanced by the use of mathematical models used as a complementary tool.
Clearly it is very important to have access to automatic control of the voltage profile during the dynamic
period. The protection settings against circuit over-voltage, the automatic insertion of reactors/disconnection
of shunt capacitors and the opening of circuits are all crucial elements in this process, not only to minimize
problems but to increase the speed of the restoration of the post-blackout system.

3.6.3. Recommendations
As to recommendations originated from the disturbances analysis process :
At ONS, Terna, National Grid and SO for UPS the disturbance analysis is developed by the operation staff. In
case of a relevant disturbance, the operation of the system is also investigated by the Regulator. At KPX the
disturbance analysis is in charge of a joint investigation team composed of the Regulator and related parties
such as KPX, participants, professors and researchers.
ONS addresses the recommendations to the companies involved in the disturbance and defines a time so solve
the identified problems.
ONS, Terna and SO for UPS reported that penalties might be imposed to the actors of the power system,
following the decisions of the Regulator.

28

3.7. Brief Restoration Philosophy Description
3.7.1. ONS-Brazilian ISO
In Brazil, restoration is based on a two-stage process: (i) fluent restoration and (ii) coordinated restoration.
The first stage is begun 5 minutes after the identification of the black out state, at the plants with black-start
capacity with the identification of the minimum configuration of the preferential restoration corridors. In this phase,
prioritary large load blocks of the system are restored utilizing only a minimum telephone communication between
the operators of the hydro plants and substations involved, according to pre-established procedures. The process
is managed without any interference from the Operation Control Centers, except in rare cases when this stage is
not successfully executed by the plants themselves. There are estimated restoration times for each restoration
path completion, which is characterized by 95% of load pick-up.
In the second stage, the operation centers coordinate the closing of parallels or rings between the subsystems
that have been formed in the first phase, as well as the supply to load that is still disconnected.
The Brazilian Bulk Power System is divided into four geo-electrical regions (North, Northeast, Southeast/Midwest
and South). The present restoration process implemented in the Brazilian Grid includes 34 fluent restoration
areas, defined by region (3 in the North, 6 in the Northeast, 16 in the Southeast and 9 in the South).
ONS, along with the utilities, defines improvement proposals for the restoration procedures in the National
Interconnected System. Work plans and chronograms are also elaborated to conduct studies in order to
contemplate the priorities of analyses of areas related to restoration of the four electric regions cited above.
Based on such studies, coordinated by ONS, new restoration corridors can be defined for fluent restoration or
alternatives for already existing areas can be established. The technical report related to the above mentioned
studies is approved by both ONS and the sectorial Agents, which constitute the basis for the elaboration of a new
priority procedure for fluent restoration or an alternative procedure, giving rise to ONS Operative Instructions. As
such, all key stages of this process are coordinated by the National Operator.

3.7.2. TERNA
The aim of Ternas restoration plan is the re-meshing and the stabilization of the 380 kV grid, the essential
backbone for the whole system recovery.
The restoration process is begun immediately after the identification of the black out state. Priority for the
restoration plan is the fastest possible restarting of the thermal power plant units, by means of predefined
corridors (re-energization corridors), which are energized by black-start units or islanded areas of the system still
in operation. In case of separation between the Italian system and the neighboring TSOs, the system restoration
close to the border is carried out by means of tie-lines re-energization from bordering TSOs.
The restoration process can be briefly described as follows:
5 minutes after the blackout state detection, all the remote control centers (of Terna, of Distributors, etc)
start the creation of the restoration paths, aimed to reach the HV busbars of thermal power units in the
fastest possible way. The restoration paths are stabilized, in terms of voltage and frequency, by the ballast

29

loads which are connected to them and by the automatic control systems of black-start units. The
restoration paths are then connected among them, until the overall 380 kV grid is re-meshed.
At the same time, hydro generation is started in order to create islands of load, which are gradually
enlarged, in order to create stable cores for the system restarting. These cores have to be connected to the
restoration paths as soon as possible.
The load is resupplied as soon as the essential skeleton is strong enough.
In case of separation between Italy and bordering TSOs, it is possible to restore Italian power system by the
creation of 380 kV corridors energized by the bordering systems and stabilized, in terms of voltage, by black-start
hydro units and shunt reactors which are connected to them.
The application of the restoration plan is supervised by the Regional Control Centers of Terna and coordinated by
the National Control Centre, which can decide, according to the specific situation, to derogate from the plan.

3.7.3. KPX
The aim of KPX restoration plan is the re-meshing and the stabilization of each of its 7 predefined regions,
including Jeju island. Each region has two paths, main and backup. Each path can be energized by hydro units or
gas turbine units. There are no mandatory restoration times to be fulfilled.
The restoration process is begun immediately after the identification of the black out state. Priority for the
restoration plan is the fastest possible restarting of the thermal power plant units, by means of predefined
corridors (re-energization corridors) which are energized by black-start units or islanded areas of the system still
in operation.
The restoration process can be briefly described as follows:
After the blackout state detection, all the regional control centers (of TO) with central control center (of KPX) start
the creation of the restoration paths, aimed to reach the HV busbars of thermal power units in the fastest possible
way. The restoration paths are stabilized, in terms of voltage and frequency, by the ballast (balanced) loads which
are connected to them and by the automatic control systems of black-start units.

3.7.4. National Grid
The main criteria in restoring the GB Transmission system is the restoration of the interconnected 400kV and
275kV networks (includes 132kV in Scotland). This will facilitate restoration of supplies to stations which do not
have Black Start capability. Restoration of demand is not in itself a Black Start priority. Restoration of demand will
follow from the restoration of the GB Transmission system and selected demands will provide stability to the
generation which has been restored. The aim is to charge the 400/275 kV network in 12 to 24 hours.
Selected Generating Stations are contracted to have a Black Start Capability. That is the ability to start a main
generating unit from its own internal resources, batteries, diesel and gas turbine generators, without any external
supply.

30

A power island will be established around the Generating Station which will be expanded and linked to adjacent
power islands to form zonal/regional islands. The zonal regional islands will be linked to eventually re-establish a
charged and functioning GB Transmission system. As further generation becomes available demand will be
restored. There is no autonomous restoration procedure.

3.7.5. SO for UPS
The restoration process is begun immediately after the identification of the black out state. There is not a concrete
time stated for the restoration process to be completed. The restoration procedure should be finished as soon as
possible.

3.7.6. RTE
Despite RTEs implementation of all means of action at its disposal, including safeguard and defence actions, an
exceptional combination of unfavourable events may lead to the total collapse of the network of a region, of the
whole country, or even beyond the countrys borders.
RTE must then restore normal System operation ("network restoration" action) with the aim of acting :
as quickly as possible, in order to limit to the utmost extent in time the impact of the blackout on the countrys
social and economic life,
and to do so in a controlled way, while respecting the security of people and property and especially by avoiding
any further collapse of the network, particularly fragile during the restoration phase. A second collapse, like the
one that France experienced on 19 December 1978, may lead to the disconnection of areas not affected by the
first incident and considerably extend the time required to restore the power supply that had been cut off.
Network restoration is based on a succession of complex and delicate operations which should be studied and
prepared beforehand.
The various actions to be carried out under such circumstance, along with their sequencing, are described in a
"network restoration plan" which lays down the strategy to be followed, the measures to be implemented, the
equipment to be installed or configured, the expected performances of this equipment and the respective
responsibilities of the various parties involved.
This plan is supplemented by all those concerned (RTE and users connected to the public transmission system)
by the drafting of operating instructions and setting up of the corresponding training actions.
System operators constantly make sure that the network restoration plan is always operational and do so with the
other players : monitoring of the performances of equipment taking part in the plan, regular updating of
instructions, etc
The voltage recovery scenarios are studied, simulated and validated by tests before they are declared
operational. Their availability is checked on a regular basis under operating conditions.

The aptitude for the successful tripping of thermal units to house load is checked on a regular basis by their
operators.

31

RTE organises distributor and consumer surveys periodically to make sure that the load shedding plan is
operational.
The aim of network restoration is to re-supply priority customers as soon as possible, then gradually all
customers, by supplying electrical sources of generating facilities that have tripped so that they can take part in
network restoration as soon as possible. If a sufficiently powerful network is available, service restoration gets
under way using that network. Otherwise, or as a supplement (if it serves to speed up service restoration in zones
remote from the network in question), RTE undertakes network restoration by main regional structures.
The principle is based on the independent and simultaneous constitution, in each of the seven regions, of
predetermined 400 kV structures called "main regional structures". These structures are designed so as to link, at
each regional hub level, the nuclear units and a number of large hydro generation sites to the supply substations
of the major load areas.
Under the supervision of the regional dispatching centre, each regional structure is re-energised step by step by
means of nuclear generation units which had tripped to house load and, if necessary, by using preestablished
"load pockets". These pockets must be large enough to ensure voltage control under steady and transient
operating conditions, while remaining compatible with the load restoration capacity of the generation units
connected to the main structure.

32

Once these regional structures have been re-energised, after any partial load restoration (fast restoration of
power to priority customers in particular), they are connected with one another or/and with foreign networks on
the initiative of the national dispatching centre. The resumption of load then continues depending on the
availability provided by the reconnected units and, if need be, on imports set up with foreign TSOs.

Resuming, the three following actions are to be carried out during a widespread incident:
network preparation and diagnosis of the situation,
network restoration by the main regional structures,
if necessary, voltage recovery to the nuclear units.
Concerning network preparation, the basic principle is that when loss of voltage occurs, the grid must be
prepared so that the restoration can be carried out under good conditions. In particular, this means :
avoiding overvoltage problems during the subsequent re-energising of network portions, while making sure not
to leave a large unbroken line of power lines or cables ;
preparing controlled load restoration by creating load pockets designed so that they are compatible with the
possibilities of restoring load on a single generation unit (about 50 MW for a 900 MW unit).
With this aim in view, upon loss of voltage automatic network splitting is carried out by specific programmable
logic controllers, called "zerovoltage automatic devices") ; if necessary, supplementary actions are performed by
the operators. All of the measures relative to the location of programmable logic controllers and the splitting into
load pockets of about 50 MW are known as the "zero-voltage plan".
In the case of a widespread loss of voltage, the national dispatching centre works closely with the regional
dispatching centres, to make an as diagnosis of the situation accurate-as-possible (dead zones, zones still
"sound" from the frequency and voltage standpoints, generation units operating on house load, possible need to
restore voltage to nuclear units). On this basis, it defines the general strategy of service resumption :
restoration on the basis of the French network that is still sound or/and restoration via foreign grids, or restoration
implemented by the main regional structures.
The pertinence and swiftness of the diagnosis (and, consequently, of service restoration) rely to a great extent on
remote information brought back from the field (transmission substations and network user installations) by the
telecontrol system, the reliability of which is essential.

33

As to voltage recovery, its importance stems from the fact that nuclear generation units are subjected to precise
rules relative to the power supply of their auxiliaries. These rules require the fast restoration of the power supply
of at least one of the two external sources supplying power to the auxiliaries of a unit that has tripped in case of
the outage of at least one of its internal sources.
In a widespread incident situation, RTE is therefore likely to make public transmission system components
available to permit requesting nuclear units to receive voltage either from a "strong" network in France or from
abroad, or if this is not possible, from another generation unit.
The "source unit - public transmission system components - target unit" combination constitutes a voltage
recovery line; all of the operations for line implementation are what is known as "voltage recovery scenario".
There are several scenarios for each nuclear generation site.
A nuclear generation unit requesting that voltage recovery be implemented transmits specific remote information
to the regional dispatching centre.
RTE chooses the scenario that is the best adapted and quickest to implement. The source unit in the line is then
called up according to RTE instructions to re-energise the recovery line followed by the powering of the auxiliaries
of the requesting nuclear generation unit.

34

3.8. The Black Start-up Process
3.8.1. Black start-up plan
All the enquired System Operators declared to have a Restoration Plan. As a general rule, all generation units
that are practically able to start without external energy supply (black start units) are selected to contribute to
restoration. Their location on the grid affect the definition of the restoration corridors, which are aimed primarily to
the re-energization of the thermal power plants. In Brazil, as its power system is predominantly hydrolectrical,
ONS objective is to restore as much load as possible in the fastest way.
In Brazil the black-start plan is designed by ONS based on system studies (steady-state, dynamic and
electromagnetic transients simulation). In the United Kingdom where black-start is contracted as a service, each
contracted generating station has a Local Joint Restoration Plan signed on to by National Grid, as the
transmission operator, the Generating Station and the local Distribution Network Operator. This is reinforced by
Zonal/Regional and National strategies.
All the enquired System Operators test their Restoration Plans, except SO for UPS.
ONS tests the main restoration corridors through desktop exercises (drills) utilizing a simulation tool specially
designed for this purpose, when the dispatchers are trained and restoration plan is discussed.
Terna tests its restoration plan 23 times a year and KPX does it twice, always involving different re-energization
corridors. Both System Operators test the re-energization corridors under realistic conditions scheduling ad hoc
grid conditions.
At National Grid there are three elements for testing the restoration plan:
An actual station test, to prove capability
Assurance visits (where black start maintenance and training are discussed).
Desktop exercises involving National Grid, the Generating Station and the local Distribution Network Operator
(where the restoration plan is discussed).
This means that each black start station of the National Grid is visited at least once every two years. Each
contracted Generating Station is required to demonstrate that it can restore a main unit from standstill within 2
hours without external supplies using its own internal resources (batteries, diesels and gas turbines).
PJM performs simulation of the identified critical conditions.
RTE fleet of power plants is characterised by the preponderance of nuclear generation, with its constraints and
specific performances; this characteristic has the following consequences :
the RTE strategy to restore all or part of the network after a widespread incident, in the absence of any possible
back-up from a powerful, still live grid (France or abroad), is mainly based on nuclear generation units that have
tripped to house load ;
the eventual availability of tripped thermal generation units (in particular nuclear sets), indispensable for fully
restoring power to consumers, depends on the rapidity of restoring the power supply of their on-line auxiliaries ;
any constraints may require fast restoration of voltage to the auxiliaries of nuclear units requesting such action.

35

3.8.2. Units with start-up capability
ONS starts the restoration process from hydro units, which are more robust to voltage and frequency variations.
Terna and KPX utilize both hydro and gas turbine units for black-start. The majority of the black-start units utilized
by National Grid are open cycle auxiliary gas turbine generation, although pumped storage, hydro power and
diesel generation are also used. SO for UPS doesnt have a great number of generating units with black-start
capability.
As to testing of the black start devices, the following answers were obtained from the enquired System Operators:
ONS requires all the owners of the units to test their black-start capabilities and record the outcomes, at
least once a year. Each black-start unit is tested under realistic conditions with part of its restoration path.
KPX requires 2 tests a year for the black start devices. For Terna there is no fixed deadline, mainly
depending on the results of the previous tests. The results of each test are communicated by Terna to the
Regulator.
National Grids contracted black start generating stations have their own maintenance and testing regimes
with a test frequency usually less than 12 months The black start start-up device is typically used for other
services (such as fast reserve etc) and so are often tested.
SO for UPS doesnt have a special testing schedule, but now some regulements and rules concerning this
problem are under construction.
As to redundancy for the black-start units, Terna, KPX, SO for UPS and PJM declared that all black start units
are supposed to be involved in the restoration plan, while ONS and National Grid have redundant units.
As far as black start units primary control is concerned, ONS requires proportional-integral control loops for their
governors. Terna and SO for UPS accept integral and proportional-integral control loops. National Grid demands
for the contracted black start generating units the normal requirements specified by the Grid Code.

3.8.3. Ancillary Service
For ONS, Terna, KPX and SO for UPS, the black start capability of generating stations is considered as a
mandatory service, not being remunerated.
ONS and KPX remunerates the costs of operation & maintenance of the black-start generating units.
For National Grid, black start capability is a commercial ancillary service whose costs are incorporated in an
incentive scheme which is managed by OFGEM (the Regulator).

36

3.9. Switching Strategies Used During the Restoration Process
The load rejection capability is tested by Terna twice a year, at full and reduced load (with prevalence
ONS, Terna and KPX use the all open switching strategy in their restoration processes, by opening circuit-brakers
of all plants involved in the restoration path before starting it, to prevent an unintentional energization.
National Grid informed that Local Joint Restoration Plans for each black start contracted generating station
include specific switching strategies for at least 2 scenarios. Each scenario will limit the part of the GB
Transmission system to be initially charged and will be disconnected from all other parts of the GB Transmission
System.

3.10. Aspects Related to Load Pick-up
As far as load pick-up is concerned, ONS, Terna, KPX and National Grid declared to pick-up fixed blocks of load
(not depending on daily load program), whose size are defined by the capabilities of the generating plants and the
equipment involved, in terms of the admissible voltage and frequency variations. National Grid stated that such
blocks of load are usually in the range from 20 to 50 MW. Those System Operators follow a priority scheme for
the restoration of costumers load. ONS defines this scheme in accordance with the utilities choice. Terna and
National Grid give a special attention to the restoration of major conurbations. ONS and KPX do not use pumping
units as ballast load, while Terna does it.
Terna was the only System Operator to report disturbances due to inrush currents during the restoration process.
At ONS, restoration conditions are previously studied through electromagnetic transients simulations in order to
avoid disturbances due to inrush currents.
ONS, Terna and KPX reported limitations in the restoration process due to overvoltages. ONS pointed out that
such limitations were recorded during circuits energization due to system conditions different from those studied.

3.11. Operation Problems and Needs
As for operators problems during the restoration process, the main bottle necks causing time delays were
grouped into 4 categories: equipment, information, system control and personnel.
As to equipment, ONS, Terna, KPX and OS for UES reported that, yet the restoration process in their systems
has already been affected by unavailability of equipment (reactors, transformers, malfunctioning of circuit
breakers) or inability for fast switching the transmission rapidly, it hasnt been in a decisive way.
The impact of lack of information on restoration was reported by ONS, at the time of the 2002 blackout, when one
of its regional operation centers lost all supervisory data. SO for UPS has also had some problems with
information support. Terna and KPX have not basically had problems of information during the restoration
process.

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In terms of system control ONS and Terna pointed out that the restoration process was already affected in the
past by problems in remote switching of circuit breakers. Terna also reported overloads while re-energizing the
grid.
Common personnel related problems that cause delays in restoration i.e. are: lack of co-ordination, deviations of
operator from the main focus to give information to high level persons, room crisis to co-ordinate the information
process during the blackout. As to lack of coordination, only SO for UPS has experimented it in its relation with
the Grid Company and the generation company. None of the enquired System Operators reported deviations of
the operators from the main focus, once it is agreed that restoration is the main priority.
Terna and US for UES have developed crisis management policies, which is mainly intended to manage the
information flow from the company to external parties under crisis conditions.

3.12. Generating units performance after load rejection
ONS and SO for UPS dont have any requirement for full load rejection capability (re-synchronization after full
load rejection). Terna requires load rejection capability for thermal units rated power larger than 100 MW. KPX
requires this feature for all kind of generation units larger than 20 MW. National Grid requires all generating units
subjected to the Grid Code to demonstrate that they are capable of full load rejection.
KPX and Terna dont have any requirement for the maximum time for the generators to recover load after full
load rejection. National Grid requires that all generating units which are subjected to full load rejection are
expected to be capable of immediate restoration.
Although not establishing a requirement for the maximum time for the generators to recover load, Terna requires
thermal units subjected to full load rejection to be able to supply their in-house loads for at least 12h.
The load rejection capability is tested by Terna twice a year, at full and reduced load (with prevalence of reduced
loads). KPX does this verification just once, during test operation, at full and reduced load. National Grid also
does it during commissioning, at full load, but may repeat it if significant plant modifications occur.

3.13. Operators Training Process and Testing
All the enquired System Operators provide system restoration training under realistic conditions for system
operations personnel in order to build confidence and optimize effectiveness.
Simulation tools are employed by some of the System Operators. Terna utilizes OTS (Operator Training
Simulator), developed by CESI. KPX utilizes DTS (Dispatcher Training Simulator), developed by AREVA.
National Grid has also developed its own Dispatch Training Simulator. SO for UPS doesnt provide special
training concerning all aspects of restoration process, but it provides training concerning alarm situation
liquidation using a special simulator which is close to the real power system. Such exercises include some
aspects of restoration.
As to the frequency of training sessions, ONS and PJM do it once a year, SO for UPS at least twice a year, KPX
three times a year and National Grid as required by the needs of the personnel. Terna does training through
realistic tests twice to three times a year and continuously by means of the OTS.

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ONS, Terna, KPX and SO for UPS have established routines, when disturbance analysis identify problems in
equipment during a blackout, to submit such equipment to a battery of tests, which may result in their repair and
re-test or replacement.
In general, no direct coordination/priority given by Civil Protection Authorities was reported by the enquired
System Operators. ONS declared that the priorities are given by the utilities, which must have agreed previously
with Civil Protection Authorities. SO for UPS and PJM stated that, although they are fully in charge of system
restoration process, from the technical point of view, its activities are informed to the Civil Protection Authorities
as needed. KPX informed that there is no coordination process with Civil Protection Authorities, but its
requirements are embedded in the priority list of loads to be restored.
National Grid has direct communication links with the appropriate government departments. Although there have
not been any major disturbances in Great Britain since 1939, which have resulted in a total system shutdown, it
would be seen as a Civil Disturbance and the appropriate Governmental Cabinet Co-ordination Committee would
be established.

3.14. Procedures (Operators Instructions)
Unless PJM, all the enquired System Operators adopt coded procedures for restoration. At National Grid each
contracted black start generating station has its own unique Local Joint Restoration Plan. SO for UPS has what is
called a Standard and Instruction for alarm situation liquidation.
The extent of autonomy of single players to start operation is variable among the System Operators. ONS gives
total autonomy to the Agents in the fluent restoration phase (unless otherwise stated by ONS Control Centers).
Terna and KPX permit, under their coordination, external players (producers, transmission operators and
distributors) to start autonomous operation. SO for UPS allows autonomous operation of external players, but not
during the restoration process. All restoration procedures should be started by SO, but inside separate steps
some players may have a permission to make operations, with the obligation to inform SO.
National Grid is expected to set up the isolated part of the GB Transmission to be charged and observe
successful initial charging for each Local Joint Restoration Plan. The generating Station and Distribution Network
Operator may then operate independently to load the unit up to approximately half to three quarter capability
without further reference to National Grid.
There is not a fixed update schedule for the operators restoration instructions among the enquired System
Operators. Procedures are updated as soon as the need arises, depending on the occurrence of topological
changes and/or when new power plants with black-start capability are added to the system.
Concerning confidentiality, the restoration plans are public for ONS, Terna and OS for UES (Terna even
publishes it in its web site). The operating instructions, however, are for internal use of the dispatchers and are
not disclosed. KPX shares the restoration plan only with the players (KPX and participants). In Great Britain, the
restoration plans are confidential between the three signature parties (National Grid, the contracted generating
station and the Distribution Network Operator).

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3.15. Supervision and Telecommunication Requirements
Concerning supervision and telecommunication (voice and data) performance, full reliability (redundancy) is
required by all the enquired System Operators. All of them utilize dedicated infrastructures (trunk communication
routes and fibers).
IT connections to generating units and control centers are dedicated (point to point) in all the enquired System
Operators. In Great Britain, in addition, each black start contracted generating station has a dedicated telephone
link between the generating station and the appropriate Distribution Network Operator control room which is also
provided and maintained by National Grid.
The cost for IT connections to ONS and KPX control center should be paid by participants.
As to the minimum availability time of supervision and telecommunication, ONS requires 99,98%, Terna, KPX
and SO for UPS demand 100% (considering main system and back-up systems) and National Grid demands a
minimum 24 hours resilience for operational telecommunications using contracted networks.
Concerning supervision philosophy, all the enquired System Operators utilize the hierarchical mode. At National
Grid, the communications are continually monitored by the contracted telecommunication company.

3.16. Other Needs During Restoration Process
The enquired System Operators were unanimous as to the need for real-time information on the directly involved
part of the network, as well as on the rest of the network. In Great Britain, National Grid SCADA should be
resilient for the restoration process, but all principal substations are also manned during a black start and local
indications can be relayed by telephone if required.
It was also considered important the need for real-time information from neighboring control centers (especially
when the interconnection is used for restoration), except for the case of ONS that doesnt interconnect
synchronously with neighboring systems. The National Grid Electricity National Control Center has dedicated
links to the two Transmission Owner Control Centers in Scotland.
Unanimity was also obtained as to the need for real-time information of the generators, as well as for computer-
based decision support tools, for aiding restoration. Other non computer-based decision support tools were not
considered as needed, except for PJM.
Other common opinion was the need for remote control facilities to aid restoration. For National Grid the normal
remote control facilities will be utilized backed up by an operator presence at all major substations. Distribution
Network Operators will have a greater reliance on remote control facilities.
Terna, SO for UPS and National Grid are in favour of operators back-up at the site. At National Grid all sites will
be manned.
The question of energy support from external neighbors divides the opinions. Terna and SO for UPS considers
it in their restoration processes, while PJM doesnt. Currently, all links to external neighbors of ONS and National
Grid are DC links which will not function during a Black Start. National Grid is investigating the feasibility of future
DC links to operate in Black start Mode.

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Terna, SO for UPS, PJM and National Grid consider necessary the access to sources of power with rapid
response. All the Local Joint Restoration Plans conducted with National Grid rely on fast start diesel or Gas
Turbine generation.
Terna, KPX and SO for UPS consider necessary the local automation of substations. For National Grid this is
mainly a Distribution Network Operator issue.
Terna, SO for UPS and National Grid considers necessary the automatic creation of balanced islands. Islanding
strategies and logics are under consideration in Terna. For National Grid, balanced islands should be created
manually. SO for UPS has already implemented such automatic islanding according to the frequency and/or
voltage levels.
Terna, KPX and SO for UPS agree as to the need for automatic switching of reactive power devices. For National
Grid these sources will initially be switched out and deployed as circumstances dictate.

3.17. The influence of Market Liberalization on Restoration
ONS, Terna and SO for UPS do not consider important the knowledge of contracts for the restoration process,
while PJM it necessary.
For National Grid, there are no further contractual arrangements other than the Ancillary Service Contracts for
Black Start. With the support of Government and the Regulator, any instruction given by National Grid during a
declared black Start will be an Emergency Instruction and must be obeyed irrespective of contractual obligations.
As to the need for real-time information from market during restoration, only PJM was in favour of it. Interactions
with the Market Operator are admitted only after restoration. National Grid pointed out that post event
reconciliation will be required.
There is an unanimous opinion among the enquired System Operators that no market, legal or organizational
constraints are admitted on restoration. The only constraints on restoration should be system and public safety.
The same is valid for the costs incurred during the restoration process. For National Grid such costs will be
assessed post-event.
The assessment of the impact of market liberalization on restoration were not considered critical by all the
enquired System Operators.

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4. General Conclusions
Critical availability of power supply
Electric energy systems have a very high degree of reliability as a consequence of the high level of
interconnection and the accurate management of components and plants in terms of inspection, operation
maintenance and planning. This is proven by the high level of service continuity, which is guaranteed to almost all
users, a level which can hardly be reached by any other service, especially if one thinks that power is not actually
storable as such, and transforming it into other forms of energy that may be compatible with storage is extremely
complex and expensive. This leads to an equally high level of customers reliance on the availability of power
supply. Today, according to the recent juridical doctrine, electric energy as a commodity meets needs that are by
now regarded as primary and inalienable, so the availability and supply of power look like a public service which
goes beyond the merely commercial and market aspects associated with the supply of such commodity.
Nevertheless, there is still some probability that, as a consequence of some unforeseeable event, a given number
of power units may be separated from the grid, and that large areas remain disconnected.
The issue of emergency management of the electric systems plays a primary role in the scenario of big national
energy facilities: particularly delicate is the definition of the objectives and priorities for defense and restoration
plans, because of the social and business aspects associated with an uninterrupted power supply.
Think, on one side, of the health and public security problems (power outage for such essential loads as
hospitals, food contamination, accidents due to poor visibility, stoppage of electrified transport, paralysis of
telecommunication systems, social disorders) and, on the other side, of the loss of production in the industrial
system, which, due to the complexity of many processing cycles, does not only affect the period directly
associated with the blackout.
Power Systems are several sources of vulnerabilities such as: equipment failures, loss off communications,
human errors, acts of vandalism, terrorists plots, natural disasters and operation close to its limits.
Cascading events can lead to catastrophic power outages.
In general, even though a power system is planned and designed to withstand any credible contingency, it can
also be affected by more severe disturbances than those for which it was concerned, and this can lead to a
partial or total frequency and/or voltage collapse.
It is unquestionable that blackouts cause great discomfort and generate financial losses for the nation not
mention the negative psychological effects on the populations in the affected areas.
In the aftermath, an unspoken feeling of fragility pervades society as a whole and a general lack of confidence
is government and the energy sector leaders. An analysis of blackouts associated with recommendations for
measures to reduce or eliminate this threat is of the most importance.
Recent blackouts in a number of countries have demonstrated the need for the actions to respond to extreme
contingencies.
Although action to minimize the occurrence of blackouts, due to measures to reduce the reverity of the events
and actions to minimize the propagation of unavailable disturbances, the system can lead to a partial or a
global blackout.

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In this way, it is fundamental to take special actions to optimize load restoration times. These measures should
be effective in reducing the load times to the limit acceptable from the consumers point of view.
Although TSOs process on restoration are usually system-specific, there is often some commonality between
the strategies adopted for large systems.

Criteria to check performance maintenance
The failure to supply the service guaranteed by a plant during the restoration causes remarkable damage to the
system structure, not only in terms of service quality, as it happened in the past, especially in a deregulated
scenario, in economic terms. In order to prevent such problems, compulsory tests on the reliability of the
restarting services are regarded as essential for those plants which will be called to serve such functions.
The tests should be carried out at first to certify that the plant is currently able to supply a given service and later
on to guarantee that such service is maintained over time.
Certification tests for the service supply and certification tests for the maintenance of service efficiency can
therefore be defined.
The analysis found potential tests, which have been divided into two groups according to their complexity in
relation to the cost, time, staff and grid disturbance that involve:
Tests on individual components of the network and equipment used for the arrangement of the restoration
paths. Such tests have the advantage that they are easy to perform and can be repeated at reasonable costs
in terms of human and/or plant resources (for instance, during a scheduled shutdown of the power unit
concerned). They are, for instance, the test of the load-rejection operation, the test of the operation of the
self-powering sources, the test of the self-starting capacity, the verification of the time it takes to perform the
tests as provided by the Restarting Plan, the verification of the initial loads planned for each restoration path)
Actual restoration tests for the paths or partial test, such as, for instance, test of the load-rejection operation if
disconnetcted for low frequency and voltage, test of line energization from a suitable unit to a restarting
path, test of the insulation of an arranged island connected to an isolable plant). Such tests are more
demanding in terms of human resources, coordinated use of the plants and involvement of utilities. The
restoration tests for the most important paths (those that are defined as higher priority ones) must be
carried out once a year.
In this respect, it is extremely important to arrange additional measuring systems for recording the electric
quantities, which are relevant to the test of the plant functionality.

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5. Criteria/Procedures to Reduce Restoration Times
Methods for classification and qualification of available resources
Plant classification
Even in deregulated electric systems one of the most delicate tasks that has been left to the System Operator is
the management of the operation of the system in an emergency, especially restarting system after a total or
partial blackout. In this plane, the system operator has to locate and coordinate the available resources,
according to pre-established strategies, so as to guarantee the restoration of the service.
In the light of international experiences, a general reassessment of the traditional strategies used for supplying
such service vertically-integrated systems or addition of new operations to such strategies is essential. To pursue
this goal, it is essential to have a production and grid plants classification system based on clear parameters that
give prominence to the current capacities offered by each plant for contributing to the restarting of the system at
varying levels.
Resource classification aims therefore at providing operators with a method that helps them collect and classify
the information they need for the correct specification of each power and grid plant in view to its qualification.
To be able to identify the really necessary information, it is important to define the main problems that each on of
such plants is called to respond to during the restoration process. In other words, information is collected in order
to ensure the minimum knowledge required to address the problems of the management of such plants in
emergency conditions. Such knowledge is essential to devise plants for the use or adaptation of the plants.

Power plants
The main problems associated with power plants concern:
Geographical location and connection to the grid.
Coordination with the interfaces that manage the units during the restoration process.
Self-restarting capacity.

Network systems
Power plants are the key factors of service restoration, as they provide the power and energy required to repower
the loads. In addition, they are often the most critical factors because of their complexity, especially
thermoelectric power plants, due to the vast number of their gears and components, with all their adjusting
systems and auxiliary services.

Plants qualification
Power plants
The main functions that have been found and which a power plant is called to serve during the restoration
process are:

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Black-start-up capacity, i.e. the ability to self-start without network contribution, and therefore the ability to serve
the first restarting function.
Ability to perform a load-rejection operation on its auxiliary systems and the attendant ability to quickly resume
production at the initial stage of the restoration plan.
Ability to keep working on separate portions of the network, automatically developed and built just before the
collapse of the system.

Based on their ability to serve these functions, five different qualification categories have been defined for the
different power plants:
1. Plants suitable for the first restoration of the system;
2. Adjustable plants, i.e. plants that can be transformed into plants suitable for the first restoration of the
system;
3. Plants that are usable as early as the first stages restoration plan, which cannot however be transformed (for
technical and/or economic reasons) into plants for the first restoration of the system;
4. Isolable plants that cannot however be transformed into plants suitable for the first restoration of the system,
but can be fitted for working as special islands;
5. Unfit plants, i.e. plants that cannot however be transformed into pants suitable for the first restoration of the
system and cannot quickly resume operation after a blackout.
Among these categories, it is important to highlight the usable one, since with small technical and economic
measures they can be transformed into suitable plants that can serve the important function of self-starting and
performing the line energization procedure.
By analysing the classification by plant types, a general survey of the current situation of the Italian generation
mix is provided.
The suitable plants category includes a large part of the hydroelectric power plants and some simple-cycle
tubogas units.
The adjustable plants category includes most hydroelectric power plants as well as the simple-cycle turbogas
plants which at present do not have a self-starting system yet, combined-cycle turbogas units, turbogas units
used in re-powering plants, geothermoelectric units. An approximate analysis has been carried out on a specific
plant from each type, in the attempt to estimate what needs to be done technically and economically to make
such plants suitable.
The usable plants category includes, instead thermoelectric units (steam, combined cycle or repowering) that
keep working on their ancillary systems after a successful load-rejection operation. Note that in this case the
better the units can perform a load-rejection, the more the system will be benefit from during the restoration
process, since it will already have at its disposal a good number of units ready to energize lines (load-rejection
was analysed for different plant types).

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The isoable plants category includes some plants which, due to their geographical location, the features of the
adjacent network area to which they are connected, the features of the plant itself, can be used for the planned
formation of load islands in case of blackouts through the use of suitably-calibrated minimum-frequency relays.
For unfit plants, largely consisting of plants that use renewable sources and distributed generating plants, the
relevant restarting problems should be addressed by the restoration plan when assessing how to connect them to
the network.
Grid restoration strategies
Restoration by path
The restarting by path technique gives priority to the re-powering of the backbone of the network using the
available power sources and a strictly necessary initial load, then all the rest of the load is gradually reconnected
to the system and the mesh is completed; the underlying idea is to open, first of all, some restarting paths that
connect the black-start unit with main thermoelectric power plants, by connecting the parts of the load which are
strictly necessary for stabilising these initial islands. In general, the main goal of the restoration plan is the re-
synchronisation of as many islands as possible, by mending the network backbone system before reactivate
most of the user-load.
In Italy, most paths are located in the north area, where the largest hydroelectric power plants are based, while
just a few are located along the peninsula, because of the low number of hydroelectric power plants powerful
enough to be used for the first restarting process. Some paths rely on the availability of foreign power sources or,
as in Sicily, Italian power sources. The building of these paths is considered a matter of priority and only after
they have been developed can service be restored through the building of secondary paths aimed at powering
those load areas that are far from the restarted power plants, which belong to the primary paths.
Such strategy, however, can result to be not too flexible as regards to possible available restarting resources that
are not those established in the Restarting Plan (plants that have remained on islands around their own auxiliary
services, network portions that have kept running) and hard to adjust compared to the new resources, which
could supply the first restarting service (turbogas sections of simple-cycle turbogas power plants, of combined-
cycle power plants and re-powering units).
Contribution of load to restoration
The role played the load in the Restoration Plans developed worldwide is a double one; for most of the worlds
System Operators, it is both a means and the aim of the restoration of the electric system after a blackout.
Especially in the first restoration stages, the load plays a key role as an instrument that enables the selected
procedures to come to a successful end. In the first restoration stages, when the interconnected capacity is low, it
is not always easy to maintain frequency within a suitable range.
The successful restoration of the service basically depends on the ability to keep a balance between power and
load. In particular, in the first restarting stages, the ability to control the power units is very low, especially during
the load ramp process.
Then, note that the value of the load that appears after a power outage can be significantly different from the
value before the blackout and can also depend on the length of the outage. In addition, depending on the type of

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utilities, the dynamic response of the load can lead to temporary increase in absorption, up to three or four times
the service value.

6. Best Practices for Restoration
Problems associated with the restoration of an electric system
The functions served by the components of the electric system, which play a key role in the restarting of the
service, are:
Supply of first start power (black-start plants and plants running on their ancillary systems following load-
rejection).
Execution of connections between first restart resources and the load to be supplied (whether it is a utility load
or ancillary services of the units with no independent restart capacities).
Keeping a balance between generated power and absorbed power in each island under construction.
Power plants, in particular thermoelectric and nuclear power plants, are now so huge that each production unit
can exceed 1000MW, as a compromise between scale economies (in both costs and efficiency) and the reliability
of systems in which generation is concentrated in few large-scale plants. As a consequence, in poorly
interconnected grids, the loss and restart of a high-capacity unit can turn out to be critical. Power plants cannot
actually self-restart; they always need an energy source to supply their auxiliary services, which are essential to
safely start the plant. For larger size plants, a few tenths of MW may be necessary. Then, the size of the plant
components involves huge energy volumes which are stored in thermal inertias of the process masses and fluids,
inertias which take a long time to recharge. The cold starting of thermoelectric power plant can take over 24
hours and its loading has often to be carried out a such a gradual rate that can only be possible in the presence
of a grid of suitable capacity with several interconnected plants.
The energizing of the grid in order to execute the required connections between the power units and the loads
and in order to restore the grid mesh requires the activation of high-voltage lines, which results in the supply of
plenty of reactive power, problems of grid over-voltage and under-excitation of the synchronous generators.
Then, the number of circuit breakers to be operated and the territorial extension of the electric systems requires
good coordination among the operators and a careful assessment of the actual functionality of the components in
an emergency condition.
Finally, the low interconnected generation capacity in the first restarting phases, the more or less stringent
constraints on the loading profiles of the units, the low regulation capacity of some units after heavy transients
sustained immediately before the blackout that demand special attention be paid to keeping a balance between
generation and load, otherwise some generation units could trip again and the grid would very likely collapse
again.
It becomes therefore essential to set up a procedure for restoring the electric system in the attempt to minimise
the time it takes to restore the utilities, while also determining priorities for such utilities.

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The recent changes in the juridical-contractual and technological scenarios, with the appearance of an increasing
number of turbogas units and the extension of remote control systems toward the power grids and the users,
require a reassessment of possibility of providing resources for serving the aforesaid three functions in a
deregulated market, but they also provide new technical and managerial means to improve the effectiveness of
the service restoration processes.
The current Restoration Plan (PdR) of the Italian Electric System is equipped for restarting by backbones, which
mainly start from the hydroelectric power units and reach the main high-capacity thermoelectric power plants.
Such Plan was devised in a vertically-integrated system, where one operator used to manage virtually all of the
generation, distribution and transmission plants and where the main first-start resource was the hydroelectric
units. In the light of the recent legal-contractual and technological progress, alternative or additional solutions can
be found, in the attempt to improve the effectiveness of the restoration service in the following four functions:
Supplying the first-restart capacity,
Making connections between first-restart resources and loads,
Keeping a balance between generated capacity and absorbed capacity,
Regulations.
The number of first-restart units, including non-hydroelectric ones, can be increased by means of technically
feasible and economically not much expensive adjustments, in order to obtain a more even distribution of the
resources on the national territory. In particular, if power units are installed, the following can be made available
as first-restart units:
Some turbogas units, either simple cycle, combined cycle or part of re-powered plants;
Some geothermoelectric power plants, which are generally very reliable and have no boiler problems, have very
quick response times and no ramp problems.
As well as the power units, resources also exist outside the system, including interconnections with neighbouring
systems, realized either by alternated current lines or direct current systems (HVDC). The latter, if provided with
suitable balancing and control systems, can re-power parts of the network.
Another possibility could be the use of electrochemical storage systems, which are currently available with
capacities up to 40 MW, mainly used for network stabilization and load leveling.
Great problems in the implementation of Restoration Plans concern the energization of very high-voltage lines
(380 kV) and the coordination of plants which are very far from each other.
For instance, the implementation of Restoration Plans based on islands at lower voltage levels (132 kV) optimizes
the management and reduces the need to energize long connections.
This also helps to quickly exploit any unit that has remained as an island on its own auxiliary services and that is
ready to energize the network without waiting for complex paths to be built.
The Italian System Operator (GRTN) intends to pursue new defensive strategies that could help the restoration
process such as the automatic formation of load islands in as emergency condition. A deterioration of frequency
to less than 47.5 Hz would cause the power units separation from a given electric area. In order to let some
power units keep working in the area, if the conditions are such as to cause a blackout, the formation of an under-

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frequency load island at 47.5 Hz has been analysed. In the case, the load island could be the starting point for
restarting the electric system of a given area.
In connection with the need to keep a balance between the generated power and the load, during the restoration
stages the control capacity of the units in relation to the substantial power steps at which the load can be
available can be available can be inadequate or at least a very critical factor. The current availability of remote
metering and remote control systems, if properly managed, can be very helpful in keeping this balance, especially
by monitoring the power supplied to the utilities.
The new legal and economical structure also demands a revision of the emergency management regulations, in
particular the rules with which I.S.O. takes total, direct or indirect control (through third parties) of interruptible
loads and all generation, distribution and transmission plants.
Finally, it is useful, for the System Operator to work in emergency conditions, to get equipped with part of the
physical resources required for the purpose. Such solution can be put in practice by installing synchronous
compensator in direct-current conversion stations, storage systems, equipment for the planned formation of
specific load islands during the restoration process and first-restart units. In addition, these plants can also be
helpful to improve the ordinary management of the system.

Systems for Self-Starting of Units and Network Energization
Systems for adaptation of units to first restart
Generally speaking, any plant can be enabled to self-start even without an external grid. However, because of the
type of operations, the capacities and the energy volumes it takes to restart and the criticality of the loading
phases, some solutions that involve some plant types are economically unfeasible.
Basically, the plants that are fit for being transformed into first restart units are those plants which were not yet fit
for which the main adjustment consists in the installation of a self-powering system for the auxiliary services and
which need just moderate starting capacities and time. Obviously, the starting procedures and the protective
devices, including the automation logics, need to be revised in any case. Two main types of operations can
therefore be defined:
Installation of self-powering sources for auxiliary services,
Revision of some logics and procedures involved in the restoration process.

Use of HVDC systems
In Italy, the use a naturally-switching direct-current system for restarting the electric grid on the inverter side
shows interesting prospects and opportunities, but also several problems.
The interesting prospects have to do with the presence, in the Italian electric system, of two HVDC connections
located in strategic positions, one of which has just recently been built.
The first one, which connects Sardinia to the Italian continent via Corsica, could re-power the ancillary services of
the power plant of Piombino and/or Rosignano, so that they could be restarted quickly.

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The second one, connecting Greece to Italy, could be used to restart a large thermoelectric power plant, such as
the one in Brindisi. In particular, the strategy for restarting such power plant from the connection with Greece
could remarkably reduce the time it takes to re-power southern Italy, since the area around Brindisi has a low
hydroelectric production and addition it is very far from any potential restarting from foreign AC interconnections
that could be used in the northern part of the country.
In principle, the HVDC connection could be reactivated to supply the capacity required for feeding the auxiliary
services of the thermoelectric power plant to be re-powered, sustaining at the same time the load variations
required during the loading ramp process.
The use of HVDC devices for restarting the network on the AC side immediately raises a few problems that
should be solved. One concerns the reactive power that the system needs to work (note that both converters are
fed by reactive power); the second one concerns the sinusoidal alternated voltage system which is needed on the
AC side of the naturally-switching inverter to work; in addition, the current should be adjusted (as the rectifier
usually does) by the inverter according to the required load variations.
The general idea behind the use of HVDC systems for restarting the electric system must however be carefully
assessed by looking into the peculiar features of the link concerned and by collecting specific and detailed
information on the system concerned, including the operating logics of the control and protective equipment, in
order to analyse the aspects and problems of using the system with direct current very differently from the normal
operating conditions. This could be useful to see, in a real and specific instance, what adjustments should be
made to the hardware and software to be able to use such HVDC connection as an essential part of the
restoration process of the electric system after a blackout.

7. Recommendations to Improve Power System Restoration
Gathering the propositions from the enquired System Operators aiming at the improvement of the restoration
process, the following aspects can be pointed out:
Improvements in Off Line Studies
The off-line studies during the operation planning process is complex and they take time due to the great number
of alternatives to be analysed. This has led to the need for reducing the excessive time spent in the manipulation
of files, in order to have free time to concentrate in the analysis task. With this objective improvements were
identified to be developed on the computational tool utilized, including features for data entry, interfaces for better
visualization of alternative restoration paths, coupling with other softwares, etc.
Implementation of new black-start power plants to increase operative resources during restoration.
Improvement in off-line studies, by upgrading criteria, data bases, softwares (new features, friendly interfaces).
Development of studies to improve system restoration by the determination of new corridors (new alternatives
of restoration).
Interaction between studies and real time operation (more detailed and precise operator instructions).

50

Elaboration of More Detailed and Precise Operation Instructions
The evolution of the studies is done with close and intense participation of real time staff, mainly in the phase of
definition of new alternatives to be analyzed, taking into account their knowledge on the existing
problems/constraints, as well as on the feasibility of certain maneuvers. The effective participation of real time
staff will avoid operational arranges substations mistakes and will permit the elaboration of more detailed and
precise operation instructions.
Analysis of system planning of the interconnected system from the restoration point of view (identification of
additional reactors to be installed in order to stabilize the voltage, making the restoration process more
flexible).

Identification of New Resources for the Energization Procedure
Studies are permanently being developed in order to evaluate the need for the installation of new reactor units
aiming to speed up the process of energization of circuits, with the control of the voltage profile, thus avoiding the
obligatory load pick up for the formation of restoration corridors. Periodic studies are realized to assess the need
for implementing black start capacity in other plants, already in operation. Here it must be pointed out that for new
plants the Operator should define which one must be equipped with such facilities.
Massive use of small and medium-sized hydroelectric power plants islanding with local loads based on under-
frequency relays (56Hz on 60Hz basis).
Identification of substations to be necessarily assisted in order not to compromise the restoration process in
case of command or automatism failures likely to occur in unmanned substations.
Identification of the strategic system substations for the definition of a differentiated maintenance plan.
Identification of new power plants for the installation of black-start devices.
Implementation of a periodical inspection plan for black-start devices at black-start power plants.
Intensification of training and qualification programs of restoration for station operators and dispatchers, under
realistic conditions, utilizing operator training simulation tools.

Operators Training
As to training of the operation personnel, the following steps are preceded:
Presentation of the off-line studies.
Technical support for the elaboration/revision of the operation instructions.
Operators training, consisting of: simulation on computers and drills on the real system.
Deploy advanced computer based tools for decisions support.
Keep high reliability of the telecommunications system and the quality of the feeding data.

51

Improvement of the coordination with the participants of the restoration process and with neighboring TSOs
(i.e. definition of agreements for mutual support in case of restoration via the interconnection, common
trainings and common education seminars).
Improve the quality of the telemetric information and the amount of such information.
Define tests for separate equipment involved into the restoration process.
Re-evaluated transmission lines over-voltage protection tuning in order to accelerate the load process
restoration.

Feedback From Disturbances Analysis
When extreme contingencies occurred in interconnected power systems, the post-disturbance analysis have led
to a number of distinct causes to system breakdown. In the great majority of cases the breakdowns were due to
transient instability, angular instability, system voltage instability, underfrequency or cascade line trippings.
In order to diminish the post-disturbance phenomena, it is vital to avoid the onset of dangerous uncoordinated
responses of the back-up devices. Prompt automatic responses of appropriate intensities in the disturbance
locality offer the approach that can best meet this goal.
When responding to extreme contingencies, the critical objective is to keep the power system, and especially the
EHV interconnected transmission grid, cohesive and in a functional state. Achieving this objective would limit the
number of consumers who experiment service interruptions and, at the same time, maintain a viable level of
system operation. In addition to the existing event-based control actions, there is also a need for response-
based actions.
There is still an activity, that constitutes the process known as Disturbances Analysis adopted normally, through
which it is possible to identify eventual problems, analyze The whole process is always analysed as part of the
disturbances analysis activity, aiming at the identification of possible improvements in the restoration procedures.

Installation of power sources
The types of power sources to be installed at the power plant in order to provide the service required for self-
starting in the event of a blackout are:
2-3 MW electro-diesel units, which can be fed with gas, so as to ensure higher reliability (this way, the maximum
time during which the ED unit can feed the auxiliary services is no longer restricted by the fuel tank storage
capacity);
A SWVC (Static Watt Var Compensator) device, comprising a bidirectional forced-switching inverter and an
electrochemical storage system.
In addition, any alteration of the electric bars, and the connected logics and protection devices, as required to
install these sources at the power plant, should be considered.

52

Use of storage systems
The use of energy storage systems, such as BESS (Battery Energy Storage Systems), in extensive electric
systems, is a recent application, although some extremely interesting examples can be found all over the world
today.
An energy storage device can actually be installed in an electric system to serve several functions. The main
ones can be summarized as follows:
Generation duties Ancillary services
Transmission and
Distribution
Users
Energy management Frequency response Voltage control Energy management
Load levelling Spinning reserve Power quality Load levelling
Peak generation Standby reserve System reliability Power quality
Ramping/Load following Black-start Black-start System reliability
The use of a storage system during the restoration process can differ with the type of system. With systems
designed to have a high capacity but a comparatively low energy (used, for instance, to adjust the system), they
can be used to power the ancillary service of a power plant, in order to restart it. If the system has been designed
for load-levelling, and has therefore more energy, it can be used for black-starting the power plant while
performing the ramping and load following of the power plant and adjusting the frequency (this could be extremely
useful, for instance, to restart the electric system in islands).

Use of local network to built up islands
Suitable units too can be use to power load islands rather than for building restoration paths. In this case, as
these plants have no particular problems with load ramps, they do not need any special care.
Finally, adjustable units too, once suitable altered, are available to power load islands.
Lastly, note that many suitable and adjustable units are comparatively small, and often they are directly
connected to the 132-150 kV grid rather than to the 380 kV grid. Using these units to start forming load islands
rather than for restoring the whole system structure can make procedure simpler by removing or reducing
problems associated with:
Need to energise long lines with no load and over-voltage problems at industrial frequencies,
Need to energise big autotransformers to move to higher voltage levels,
Limited under-excitation capacity of the machines to absorb the reactive produced by an unloaded network (65
Mvar/100km for 38 kV lines, 15 Mvar/100km for 220 kV lines),
Problems in coordinating plants located very far from each other.

Possible approach to service incentive
One of the first possibilities is that some basic services are viewed, in an emergency, as obligations of a public
service and included, as such, in the network access rules.

53

Another possibility is that the restoration service could be optional and remunerated according to a cost-based or
market-based approach; in the former case, the problem is to estimate the costs that have been actually incurred
by the operators and suitably push the subjects involved to find their own benefit in the supply of the service; in
the latter case, the black-start service becomes the focus of a special market, where the rules must boost the
development of competition among operators and oppose to any local monopoly of the restoration resources.
The third possibility is that the System Operator has its own equipments to restart system; such resources, as
well as in an emergency, could also be during the normal condition of the system for covering any loss of
distribution and for balancing the reactive power. This assumption belongs to a more general trend towards the
total transparency of the network in the exchanges between producers and loads, as the endpoint of that Third
Party Access approach that is behind the operation of the deregulated energy markets.

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54

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