INFORMATION DOMINANCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE COUNTERMEASURE

AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

by

Peter Reynolds Stephenson, PhD, CISSP, CISM, FICAF

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Norwich University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts in Diplomacy Program.

June 2007

Copyright © 2006-2007 Peter R. Stephenson

All rights reserved
 Information Dominance as an Affirmative Countermeasure against International
Terrorism

by

Peter Reynolds Stephenson, PhD, CISSP, CISM, FICAF

Reviewed: Thomas C. Wingfield, Esq., Associate Professor, US Army Command and

General Staff College

Approved: ________________________________________________________
Name & Title of First Reader

Approved: ________________________________________________________
Name & Title of Second Reader

Approved: _________________________________________________________
Name & Title of Program Director

18 June 2007
Abstract

This thesis hypothesizes that it is possible and practical to apply information

dominance as an affirmative countermeasure against terrorism by non-state actors in
much the same manner that states use information superiority in the conduct of
international politics and economics. The issue that it addresses is whether or not there is
sufficient foundational information relating to terrorism, information science,
international law and information warfare to develop a generalized meta-framework for
applying concepts of information dominance in a counter-terrorism context much as these
principles are applied in modern state-on-state warfare.
The thesis examines all of these foundational areas and applies the findings to the
development of an information dominance meta-framework, or a “framework of
frameworks” applied specifically to the problem of counter-terrorism. The author
concludes that such a meta-framework is both feasible and practical. As a starting point
for further research (outside the scope of this thesis), the author proposes such a meta-
framework based upon established work of other researchers.
The meta-framework (The Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance
Framework, or “CTIDF”), is constructed based upon information, techniques and
technologies that are well established in their various fields. Simply put, the CTIDF is a
comprehensive, interdisciplinary, holistic approach to the application of elements of
information conflict to the problem of counter-terrorism.
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of my thesis advisor,

Thomas Wingfield. Not only is Tom the premier expert on the areas of international law

touched by the subject matter in this thesis, he is a terrific scholar, teacher and friend. As

well, no acknowledgement would be complete without mentioning Drs Kearsley and

Lerche for allowing me to perform research using the field of information science, which

I dearly love, and which is outside the mainstream of counter-terrorism and diplomacy.

Dr. Mich Kabay, who ranks among the most intelligent and educated people I

know (as well as the perfect gentleman), listened patiently to my theories and did not

hesitate to debate them with me. The value of those debates and his friendship cannot be

overstated. Phil Susmann and Eric Brahman at NUARI – The Norwich University

Applied Research Institutes –added numerous opportunities for me to apply my research

in a variety of interesting ways.

Finally, I must credit some people with adding moral support, even if it only

meant letting me vent my frustrations during the program. I found, well into the counter-

terrorism part of the program, that this can be a very unpleasant subject. They listened

even when I was, perhaps, less than clear about what was bothering me.

Those include Elizabeth Templeton, Sophia Bennett and Kris Rowley (all of the

Norwich School of Graduate Studies), and, of course, Deborah, my wife who would just

as soon have tossed the whole project out and got her husband back. No matter how

many times I do things such as this, though, she always seems to manage to suffer

through them. I’m done, Deb. This is my last degree (for a while, anyway).

ii
Contents

ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................................... I

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................II

CONTENTS.................................................................................................................................. III

FIGURES.....................................................................................................................................VII

TABLES..................................................................................................................................... VIII

1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................1

1.1 BACKGROUND .........................................................................................................................1

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................................................................................2

1.3 THESIS STATEMENT ................................................................................................................2

1.4 MOTIVATIONS .........................................................................................................................3

1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS ......................................................................................................................3

1.6 SUMMARY OF THE AUTHOR’S RESEARCH................................................................................4

1.7 SUMMARY OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................4

2. LITERATURE REVIEW...........................................................................................................6

2.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ...................................................................................................6

2.2 INFORMATION CONFLICT.........................................................................................................7

2.3 TERRORISM .............................................................................................................................8

2.4 IMPORTANT FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH .................................................................................9

iii
 2.6 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................12

3. THE NATURE OF INFORMATION CONFLICT ...............................................................14

3.1 THE INFOSPHERE: INFORMATION BATTLESPACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ...............14

3.2 INFORMATION THEORY .........................................................................................................19

3.3 SCALE-FREE NETWORKS .......................................................................................................22

3.3.1 Social Networks as Scale-Free Networks .....................................................................23

3.4 INFORMATION SUPERIORITY..................................................................................................24

3.4.1 Information Dominance Theory ...................................................................................25

3.5 THE COMPONENTS OF INFORMATION CONFLICT ...................................................................26

3.5.1 Active and Passive Information Conflict ......................................................................27

3.5.2 Information Warfare.....................................................................................................28

3.5.3 Cyber Conflict ..............................................................................................................29

3.5.4 Information Operations ................................................................................................29

3.6 CYBER CRIME AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INFORMATION CONFLICT .....................................30

3.7 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................32

4. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM ..........................................................................................34

4.1 GOALS OF TERRORISM ..........................................................................................................34

4.2 IMPORTANT TERRORIST GROUPS ...........................................................................................36

4.3 CLASSIFYING TERRORISM: A TAXONOMY .............................................................................36

4.4 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................42

5. THE LAW AND INFORMATION CONFLICT ...................................................................44

iv
 5.1 MUNICIPAL OR DOMESTIC LAW ............................................................................................44

5.1.1 Information Conflict and Cyber Crime.........................................................................46

5.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW ...........................................................................................................47

5.2.1 Jus ad Bellum – The Law of Conflict Management ......................................................48

5.2.2 Jus in Bello – The Law of Armed Conflict ....................................................................50

5.3 THE LAW AS IT IMPACTS TERRORISM ....................................................................................51

5.4 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................52

6. INFORMATION CONFLICT AND TERRORISM..............................................................53

6.1 THE TERRORIST BATTLESPACE .............................................................................................53

6.1.1 The Physical Battlespace..............................................................................................56

6.1.2 The Virtual Battlespace ................................................................................................56

6.2 INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM ...................................................57

6.2.1 Deliberate and Planned Application of Violence .........................................................58

6.2.2 Terrorist Acts and Insurgent Acts.................................................................................58

6.2.3 Ideological and Operational Imperatives.....................................................................59

6.2.4 Surprise, Violence, Intimidation Hostage-Taking, etc..................................................59

6.2.5 Availability of Targets Carefully Planned ....................................................................59

6.2.6 Communication Between Terrorists and Dissemination of Propaganda .....................60

6.2.7 Legitimize the Use of Violence, Recruitment ................................................................60

6.3 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................61

7. COUNTERING TERRORISM WITH INFORMATION DOMINANCE ..........................62

7.1 SHANNON INFORMATION THEORY AS A BASIS FOR INFORMATION CONFLICT .......................63

v
 7.2 KOPP’S THEORY OF INFORMATION CONFLICT .......................................................................63

7.3 APPLYING SCALE-FREE SOCIAL NETWORKS .........................................................................65

7.4 A META-FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM ...............68

7.4.1 What is meant by a “Meta-Framework” ......................................................................68

7.4.2 Constructing a Meta-Framework .................................................................................70

7.4.3 Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance Framework (CTIDF)..............................71

7.4.4 How the Framework was Constructed..........................................................................72

7.4.5 Meeting the Requirements for a Meta-Framework.......................................................73

7.5 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................74

8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ..........................................75

APPENDIX A – A TAXONOMY OF TERRORISM ................................................................77

WORKS CITED............................................................................................................................84

PRIMARY SOURCES .....................................................................................................................84

SECONDARY SOURCES (BOOKS) ..................................................................................................85

SECONDARY SOURCES (ARTICLES)..............................................................................................86

vi
Figures

Figure 1 - Information Continuum........................................................................ 15

Figure 2 - Second Dimension of Information Conflict: Criminal-Warfare

Continuum......................................................................................................................... 16

Figure 3 - Inclusion of Terrorism in the Graphical Representation of Information

Conflict ............................................................................................................................. 18

Figure 4 - Shannon's “Schematic Diagram of a General Communication System”

........................................................................................................................................... 19

Figure 5 - Shannon's “Schematic Diagram of a Correction System” ................... 21

Figure 6 - Link Analysis of "Terrorism" at the Sub-Class Level.......................... 38

Figure 7 - Relationships from Figure 6 Organized in a "Peacock" Display ......... 39

Figure 8 - Clustering of the Elements Shown in Figure 6 and 7........................... 40

Figure 9 – Mind-Map of an Informal Taxonomy of the Concept of Battlespace . 54

Figure 10 - A Map Showing Links Between al Qaeda and Associated Terrorist

Groups............................................................................................................................... 66

Figure 11 - Result of Performing a Clustering Operation on the Map in Figure 10

........................................................................................................................................... 67

Figure 12 - The Zachman Framework for Information Systems Architecture

Development ..................................................................................................................... 70

Figure 13 - The Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance Framework ........... 71

vii
Tables

Table 1 - Characteristics of the Terrorist Battlespace........................................... 55

Table 2 - Connections between Information Warfare and the Terrorist Battlespace

........................................................................................................................................... 58

viii
 1

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis breaks new ground in the application of several information

technologies. Some of these technologies are what the author refers to as hard

technologies and some are what the author considers soft technologies. Hard

technologies are those that lean towards application of computer and communications

systems to problems of information management. Soft technologies are those that lean

more towards sociology and information content. When these technologies combine,

they offer opportunities for the use of information both as an offensive weapon and as a

defensive tool.

In this thesis, the author explores one application of this approach that he refers to

as information dominance. Information dominance is a term that one generally sees used

in a state-on-state context. However, here the author attempts to generalize the term and

codify exactly what it means. In that regard, the concept of information dominance

theory allows broad application as a framework for more common techniques of

information warfare and information operations. Specifically, this thesis looks at the

potential application of information dominance in the context of counter-terrorism.

1.1 Background
THE UNITED STATES is gradually losing the online war against
terrorists. Rather than aggressively pursuing its enemies, the U.S.
government has adopted a largely defensive strategy, the centerpiece of
which is an electronic Maginot Line that supposedly protects critical
infrastructure (for example, the computer systems run by agencies such as
the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration)
against online attacks. In the meantime, terrorists and their sympathizers,
unhindered by bureaucratic inertia and unchallenged by Western
governments, have reorganized their operations to take advantage of the
Internet's more prosaic properties. (Kohlmann; 2004)
 2

Kohlmann goes on to say, “The U.S. government is mishandling the growing

threat because it misunderstands terrorists.” In these two comments, Kohlmann

summarizes an important issue for counter-terrorism operations. However, other writers

paint a somewhat gloomier picture: “information terrorism attack may be state-sponsored

and the first wave of a ‘digital Pearl Harbor.’” (Devost, Houghton, and Pollard; 2002)

While these two viewpoints frame the problem, they do not give enough

information to understand the issues fully. Neither does either statement describe, fully

and unambiguously, where information science fits in the overall spectrum of counter-

terrorism issues.

1.2 Problem Statement

The key convergence of counter-terrorism and information science is in

understanding how terrorist organizations use the entire spectrum of information both

strategically and tactically, and applying effective countermeasures, both offensively and

defensively. It is here, in this convergence of understanding and application that we see

the real problem. The challenge of implementing that convergence as an information

science discipline is the topic of this thesis.

1.3 Thesis Statement

It is possible and practical to apply information dominance as an affirmative

countermeasure against terrorism by non-state actors in much the same manner that states

use information superiority in the conduct of international politics and economics.

 3

1.4 Motivations

Since 9/11, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has cost hundreds of billions of

dollars and thousands of lives. Not only is the war no closer to being won, some might

say that it actually is being lost and may never be won. Public sentiment against the

GWOT becomes more and more negative with every US serviceperson killed and every

Congressional budget increase requested by the administration. Cries for a new direction,

while well meant, do not take into account that there are very few “new directions” left.

It is clear that along with what few strategies and tactics actually are working, we must

add some new weapons to our arsenal.

As the comments above show (section 1.1) there is a perception that the US is

behind in areas of information warfare. This is not because American strategists do not

understand the concept. Rather, it is because the GWOT is a different kind of war than

we ever have fought and we have yet to understand its deeper implications, both as a war

and as a set of enemy strategies. One area where we can improve our chances is by

wresting control of the infosphere from the enemy. If one takes Kohlmann literally, one

can see that this is a significant current vulnerability for the US and its Coalition partners

in the GWOT.

1.5 Contributions

The contributions that this thesis makes are the analysis of information conflict in

the context of terrorism, and the formulation and application of a set of tools that the US

and its partners can apply in the infosphere. These tools achieve the traditional goal of
 4

information operations: “actions taken to affect adversary information and information

systems while defending one’s own information and information systems” (Wingfield;

2000). However, unlike other current approaches, this thesis examines information

conflict in the context of the Global War on Terror.

1.6 Summary of the Author’s Research

The research for this thesis was conducted in several ways. First, traditional

literature searches provided a background and a context for the theory of Information

Dominance. A study of terrorism, terrorist groups and terrorist strategies in the

infosphere provided a context for the application of information dominance in the Global

War on Terror. During that research, the author applied several tools, some of which are

just coming into common use, to characterize the notion of terrorism and allow mapping

of terrorist organizations.

Concurrently, the author explored emerging techniques such as social network

mapping, scale-free networking (sometimes called “small world” networks) as well as the

application of both new and traditional aspects of knowledge science. Finally, the author

built up a theoretical “tool kit” of techniques with which to engage in information

dominance in a terrorism setting. It remains, as is discussed in Chapter 8, to test these

theoretical tools in a live environment.

1.7 Summary of Contents

This thesis is organized from the general to the specific. Chapter 1 opens the

discussion by framing the problem and presenting the thesis statement, which offers a

solution to the problem.

 5

Chapter 2 is a review of some of the more important literature forming the

background, both historically and currently, for information conflict, both state-on-state

(where practitioners of information warfare are most familiar) and in the context to

terrorism. The author explores the literature both of terrorism issues and of historical

issues of international relations as they apply to this problem.

Chapter 3 lays the foundation for understanding information conflict and its

components, as well as introducing some novel approaches using information science and

new views of where information conflict, especially cyber conflict, is headed. This

chapter is important because it is from these well-established core concepts that the

approaches outlined in the final chapter emerge.

Chapter 4 briefly introduces the cogent issues surrounding terrorism. These issues

frame the battlespace. The author describes the terrorist battlespace here and proposes the

aspects of that battlespace that may be vulnerable to information dominance, the key

theme of this thesis.

Chapter 5 is a brief review of applicable international law as it applies in

cyberspace and as it converges with laws of conflict. Chapter 6 begins the convergence

of the ideas in the rest of the thesis into a coherent approach. It lays the final level of the

foundation for Chapter 7, which describes a new approach to controlling the infosphere in

the context of terrorism. This approach the author refers to as Information Dominance.

Chapter 8 addresses the future and draws some conclusions from the author’s

research.
 6

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is ample literature on information conflict and a growing body of work on

terrorism. However, there is almost nothing that brings the two together. In this chapter,

the author explores applicable literature in three specific areas:

1. International relations

2. Information conflict

3. Terrorism

International relations (IR) forms a background for the effective use of

information superiority and for understanding the stage upon which information conflict

plays out globally. The many facets of information conflict are important to the theme of

this thesis. Finally, terrorism, not a new phenomenon certainly, is the target of the

author’s research and we will seek to understand it in this thesis in the context of

information conflict. This chapter begins with an overview of the writers that are

important to this thesis along with some examples of their work and then discusses

relevant contributions in the convergence of the three topic areas.

2.1 International Relations

The author has proposed, in a term paper for the Master of Arts in Diplomacy

program, a theory of information dominance (Stephenson; Feb 2006) as a lens through

which, in the information age, one may analyze international relations taking into account

the impacts of generally available global communications technology. That paper

references some of the primary contributors to the literature of international relations

from the perspective of developing such a theory. Relevant authors and examples of their
 7

work include:

• Mingst (Mingst; 2004)

• Morgenthau (Morgenthau; 1967)

• Nye (Nye; 1990)

• Slomanson (Slomanson; 2003)

• Waltz (Waltz; 1979)

• Haskell (Haskell; 1980)

2.2 Information Conflict

The literature on information conflict and related topics as a basis for international

relations is surprisingly rich. This literature falls into two distinct categories. First, there

is the theoretical literature. This explores various concepts of information conflict as they

apply to international relations in the information age. The second category comprises

operational treatises, often written by military authors. While this body of work does not

address terrorism directly, it does lay groundwork for further discussion in that context.

Important authors in information conflict and examples of their work include:

• Aldrich (Aldrich; 1996)

• Armistead (Armistead; 2004)

• Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1999, 1993)

• Cronin and Crawford (Cronin and Crawford; 1999)

• Denning (Denning; 1999)

• DiCenso (DiCenso; 1999)

• Donskov (Donskov; 2003)

 8

• Dunn (Dunn; 2002)

• Erbschloe (Erbschloe; 2001)

• Eriksson (Eriksson; 2004)

• Freakley (Freakley; 2004)

• Jones, Kovacich and Luzwick (Jones, Kovacich, and Luzwick; 2002)

• Kopp (Kopp; 2005)

• Naef (Naef; 2005)

• Rosenau (Rosenau; 1998)

• Schmitt (Schmitt; 1999)

• Shen (Shen; 1995)

• Thomas (Thomas; 2006)

• Wei (Wei; 1996)

• Wingfield (Wingfield; 2000)

2.3 Terrorism

There is a growing body of literature on terrorism. This literature addresses the

topic of terrorism in at least four distinct ways:

• Historical foundations for terrorism

• Terrorism motivations

• State sponsorship of terrorism

• Major terrorist groups, their histories, motivations, strategies and tactics

Major writers and applicable representative works include:

• O’Neill (O'Neill; 2005)

 9

• Sageman (Sageman; 2004)

• Hoffman (Hoffman; 2006)

• Byman (Byman; 2005)

• Gambill (Gambill; 1998)

• Laqueur (Laqueur; 1996)

• Ehrlich and Liu (Ehrlich and Liu; 2002)

• Mazarr (Mazarr; 2004)

• Bar (Bar; 2004)

• Crenshaw (Crenshaw; 1981)

• Guillaume (Guillaume; 2004)

• Evans (Evans; 2005)

2.4 Important Foundational Research

One of the earliest discussions on the convergence of terrorism and information

systems appears on the Information Warfare Site on the Internet. Galley discusses the

concept of “computer terrorism” and concludes that it is possible, even likely (Galley;

1996). He writes: “It would be suicidal for any dictator such as Saddam Hussein at the

present time to conceive a major offensive without benefiting of the advantages from the

principal Achilles' heel of the Western civilization: information systems.”

In retrospect, we know that Hussein did, in fact, attempt to manipulate

information systems but not quite in the manner that Galley suggests. Rather, Hussein

attempted to use propaganda, misinformation and disinformation to influence both his

own people and the rest of the world.

 10

The first cogent public discussion of information warfare in the context of

terrorism appeared in 1999 (Denning; 1999 pp 68-74). In her book Information Warfare

and Security Denning discusses several facets of information warfare that range from

cyber warfare (including what today is called computer network attack or CNA) to

misinformation and disinformation. She quotes Mark Pollitt, then a special agent in the

FBI but, ultimately, the chief of the FBI’s computer forensics laboratory, as defining

cyber terrorism as,

the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information,

computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.
(Pollitt; 1997 in Denning; 1999 p 69)

She further reports the first known instance of a cyber attack (1998) by terrorists:

[E]thnic Tamil guerrillas were said to have swamped Sri Lankan

embassies with thousands of electronic mail messages. The messages read
"we are the Internet Black Tigers and were doing this to disrupt your
communications." An offshoot of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
which have been fighting for an independent homeland for minority
Tamils, was responsible for the incident." (Wolf; 1998 in Denning; 1999 p
69)

However, Arquilla and Ronfeldt foresaw the emergence of cyber war as early as

1993 and described it as,

conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to

information-related principles. It means disrupting if not destroying the
information and communications systems, broadly defined to include even
military culture, on which an adversary relies in order to “know” itself:
who it is, where it is, what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threats
to counter first, etc. It means trying to know all about an adversary while
keeping it from knowing much about oneself. It means turning the
“balance of information and knowledge” in one’s favor, especially if the
balance of forces is not. It means using knowledge so that less capital and
 11

labor may have to be expended. ” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1993)

This description was important because it began the process of defining the notion of

information conflict. This early work evolved by 1999 to include a well-formed vision of

the realm of information conflict as we see it emerging today. Although they did not

connect cyber war with terrorism, their description in 1993 did not preclude later

application of information conflict in a terrorism context.

Jones, et al make a distinction between “cyber terrorism” and “techno-terrorism”

(Jones, Kovacich, and Luzwick; 2002 pp 109-113). They define a techno-terrorist as “...

those who use technology for terrorist activities....” This expanded the range of

possibilities for the technical aspects of cyber terrorism even though the authors viewed

the two (cyber terrorism and techno-terrorism) as separate and distinct.

Dunn was an early leader in expanding the notions of information warfare and

traditional international relations theory into a single, converged concept (Dunn; 2002).

Eriksson and Giacomello (Eriksson and Giacomello; 2004) expand independently on

Dunn’s theories (although they do not cite Dunn in their paper) and offer a superb

bibliography of supporting references.

Armistead (Armistead; 2004), however, took some of the most important steps in

converging international relations theory, information warfare and information operations

into a single set of converged concepts that supported practical application. Building on

Dunn’s work, he also expanded the seminal work of Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt; 1999).

Arquilla and Ronfeldt developed and expanded the notion of noopolitik which

included the notion of the noosphere. This was an important step forward because it
 12

recognized information, not simply information systems, as a key element of information

warfare and information operations. It built upon their earlier work (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt; 1993) and of others published in a book edited by them called In Athena’s

Camp (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 2003). From a theoretical perspective, the topics addressed

in this collection of essays were seminal in shaping thinking about information conflict

but still did not address terrorism directly.

Significant, though perhaps unintended, insight on the relationships of

information warfare and terrorist insurgencies comes from work by O’Neil (O'Neil; 205).

In his book, the author describes nine succinct insurgent types and a well-developed

discussion of effects of disunity within insurgent/terrorist groups. This discussion offers

insights into ways to use information warfare to disrupt terrorist groups and lessen their

effectiveness. One final important paper in this regard deserves our attention. The

“Militant Ideology Atlas” (Combating Terrorism Center; 2006) offers insights into

militant groups, their relationships and the nature and sources of their ideologies.

An important foundation for any discussion of conflict in cyberspace is

international law of conflict. The preeminent authority on international law in

cyberspace is Wingfield and his book The Law of Information Conflict (Wingfield; 2000)

is the authoritative reference on the topic.

2.6 Conclusions

While there is virtually nothing in the literature that addresses the convergence of

information conflict and terrorism directly in a useful manner, there is ample foundation

for extending existing thinking from conventional international politics to information

 13

conflict involving sub-national actors. The seminal works of Dunn, Arquilla and

Ronfeldt, Eriksson and Giacomello, Armistead, Wingfield and others offer an excellent

platform for understanding information conflict.

Hoffman, Byman, Laqueur, O’Neil and others address Terrorism in general.

These writers give us a solid basis for understand the motivations, politics, strategies and

tactics of terrorists and terrorist groups, both independently and in the context of their

state sponsors. Finally, the rich and extensive literature on international relations offers a

context upon which to build although in many regards that context is dated as it applies to

an information age.
 14

3. THE NATURE OF INFORMATION CONFLICT

Information conflict is not well understood and has not yet reached the level of a

formal discipline. Armistead, Dunn, and Arquilla and Ronfeldt are the primary direct

contributors, although supporting theories from such indirect contributors as Shannon

(information theory) are important. In this chapter, the author explores an emerging

theory of information conflict in the context of traditional information warfare and

information operations.

3.1 The Infosphere: Information Battlespace in the Twenty-First Century

One of the most important concepts when one considers information conflict is

the difference between hard and soft power. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt; 1999) introduced the concept of noopolitik. Noopolitik is defined by Arquilla

and Ronfeldt as “…foreign-policy behavior for the information age that emphasizes the

primacy of ideas, values, norms, laws and ethics—it would work through ‘soft power’

rather than ‘hard power’.”

The author discusses this notion in detail in a paper produced as part of the Master

of Arts in diplomacy program at Norwich University (Stephenson; 2006). Soft power, in

the context of noopolitik, is the power of information. However, information comes in

many guises. Even when one considers information, one may make a distinction between

the hard power end of the information continuum and soft power. Thus, we describe the

information continuum as bipolar—extending from the hard power pole in the context of

information (cyber conflict) to the soft power pole (pure information and thought). In the

center of the continuum is the space where hard and soft power converges. The soft
 15

power pole of the continuum we refer to as the noosphere. The convergence we refer to

as the infosphere. The hard power pole comprises cyber events (i.e., those actions that

predominantly involve technology). We may represent this bipolar information

continuum graphically as shown in Figure one.

Figure 1 - Information Continuum

Most information conflict takes place in the infosphere. However, certain forms

of information conflict operations may occur at either the hard or soft power ends of the

continuum. At the cyber end, we find computer network attack (CNA) and other

technical operations such as the development of web sites on the Internet. At the

noosphere end, we find pure information that may include propaganda, misinformation,

and disinformation, especially as web site content. Therefore, information conflict, and

especially information operations as waged by information warriors, 1 may occur in all

three areas of the continuum, but its results will be most observable in the infosphere.

We may break information conflict into the subsets of offensive conflict and

defensive conflict. While this thesis will address both of these subsets, the author is most

concerned with the application of offensive information conflict in the context of

counterterrorism.

1
“Information warriors” include those individuals with specialized capabilities such as experts in
cyber conflict, hackers, propagandists, public relations experts, intelligence analysts, and political analysts.
 16

We may apply the concept of the information continuum to describe the

interactions of hard and soft power within a second continuum: that of criminal activity

and warfare. Information conflict is present in contexts other than war. One can observe

the effects of information conflict even in the corporate world. For example, the

manipulation of information that positively portrays one organization and negatively

portrays that organization's competition is a form of information conflict.

Criminal organizations such as gangs may use elements of information conflict

for intimidation (e.g., gang graffiti) at the soft end of the continuum. The author has

direct experience with the use of information conflict in an attempt by a fraudster to

implicate his partner in a federal crime. In this example, the fraudster used a trivial

example of an information operation to penetrate his partner's computer and place

incriminating evidence in the form of documents on that computer.

Because information conflict can apply to the second continuum of criminal

activity to warfare, we may add a dimension to the graphical representation in Figure one.

We illustrate that additional dimension in Figure 2.

Figure 2 - Second Dimension of Information Conflict: Criminal-Warfare Continuum

 17

Any operation, tactic, or strategy that includes or depends for its success on the

manipulation of information in any form and the subsequent manipulation of individuals,

groups of individuals, or populations is an example of information conflict. For reasons

that this thesis will examine in a later chapter, the application of the tactics and strategies

of information conflict to the problem of counterterrorism may be promising.

It also is practical to superimpose the notion of terrorism upon the representation

in Figure 2. Some have suggested that terrorism has strong criminal elements associated

with it. For example, the Interparliamentary Union, an international organization of

parliaments of sovereign states:

Unequivocally condemns terrorism as a criminal act, noting that terrorism

endangers the territorial integrity of countries and their national and
international security, destroys innocent lives and the physical and
economic infrastructure, and destabilises not only legitimately constituted
governments but society as a whole. (Interparliamentary Union; 2003)

Terrorism, as well, is a criminal act as determined in the Article 155 of the

Criminal Code of the Republic Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan; 2005). Many other countries

including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United

States consider terrorism to be a criminal act (The Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs; 2005). With that characterization in mind, we can superimpose

the notion of terrorism as a criminal act on the graphical representation of Figure 2.

Figure 3 now shows a nearly complete graphical representation of information conflict.

 18

Figure 3 - Inclusion of Terrorism in the Graphical Representation of Information Conflict

From Figure 3 we can see that terrorism falls in the continuum between criminal

activity and warfare containing elements of both. We may also surmise that information

conflict relating to terrorism, as with the rest of the continuum between criminal activity

and warfare, appears largely in the infosphere. However, this is not to imply that there

are no elements of information conflict relating to terrorism at either of the opposite poles

of the continuum.

We could add a third dimension—a Z-axis—that relates to other uses of the

continuum, intelligence, for example. One might think of the Z-axis as consisting of

“slices” that mirror and are behind the continuum of Figure 3. We position these slices

along the Z-axis extending from operational intelligence (closest to the front) to pure

intelligence that consists largely of situation reports without any direct resultant action

implied. Each slice stands alone as an explicit definition of an intelligence goal within
 19

the overall continuum illustrated in Figure 3.

3.2 Information Theory

Claude E. Shannon first expounded the notion of information theory in 1948

(Shannon; 1948). According to Shannon: “The fundamental problem of communication

is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at

another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are

correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities.”

While Shannon concentrated largely on the engineering problems associated with

communication, the basic description of the communication problem leads to an

understanding of how one may apply elements of both offensive and defensive

information conflict to one's benefit. Shannon provides a graphical representation of a

generalized communication system. His representation is reproduced in Figure 4.

Figure 4 - Shannon's “Schematic Diagram of a General Communication System”

Shannon applies the notion of entropy to his theory of information systems.

Shannon's definition of information entropy is the measure of the average information

content that may be associated with a random outcome. If, probabilistically, there is an
 20

equal likelihood of all potential outcomes, the value of entropy is at the maximum. If, on

the other hand, the outcome is a probabilistic certainty, the value of entropy is zero. The

objective of the communication system is to achieve entropy of zero.

However, as we can see from Figure 4, the potential for the injection of noise in

the signal path between the transmitter and the receiver exists. By way of clarification,

the notions of an information transmitter and an information receiver do not necessarily

connote technical objects.

Consider the child's game of “telephone.” As a simple message passes from one

end of a line of children to the other, it is likely that the message received at the distant

end will not be the same message sent from the original transmitter. In this case, each

child with the exception of the first and last in the row is both a transmitter and a

receiver. Each child receives the message and passes it to the next child in line. The

process continues until the final child (receiver) receives the message. Because each

child is not only a transmitter and a receiver, but also a noise source, entropy generally is

greater than zero.

One might also interpret this process as consisting of a transmitter (first child in

the row), a receiver (last child in the row) and a noise source (all of the other children

between the transmitter and the receiver). This analysis allows us to hypothesize that by

controlling the noise source one might control the entropy of the information at the

receiver, achieving the level of entropy desired. This has interesting implications in the

use of information conflict as a countermeasure to terrorism.

For example, one might insert misinformation or disinformation (noise) in the

transmission path (web site, communications link, or other means of conveying

 21

information) from a terrorist leader (ideological leaders such as political theorists,

religious figures, etc.) to terrorist groups in the field. As well, one might reinterpret

ideological mandates. Transmitting credible analyses of fundamental ideological tenets

with the analysis slightly shifted (noise) to one's benefit might well have an impact upon

an ideologically driven enemy.

Additionally, when it is to one’s benefit, one might insure that there is no noise in

the transmission and that a clear message with entropy of zero arrives at the receiver.

Shannon graphically describes how to accomplish this. His representation appears in

Figure 5.

Figure 5 - Shannon's “Schematic Diagram of a Correction System”

Notice in Figure 5 that a correction System requires an observer, the role of which

is to (1) collect information from the source (prior to transmission) and the destination

(after receiving), (2) compare the two versions of the information and (3) submit the

corrected version to a correcting device that delivers the information to the destination.

Consider the following example.

 22

A terrorist group kidnaps an American soldier. The group kills the soldier and

beheads him while recording the entire process on video. The group delivers the video to

al Jazeera and eventually the video finds its way to CNN. CNN televises the video but

deletes the portion where the soldier is beheaded. The producer of the newscast (noise)

distorts the content of the video between the transmitter (the source of the video,

presumably al Jazeera) and the receiver (the newscast audience). A voyeuristic, and, one

might assume, sympathetic blogger (observer) obtains the original video, places it on his

web site (correcting device), and advertises it for all to see.

Considering figures 4 and 5 one might conjecture that the management of

information based upon Shannon information theory is not simply interesting but,

arguably, useful as a tool of information conflict. Managing information becomes an

exercise in managing entropy. One may manage entropy at multiple points on the

information continuum shown in Figure 3. This thesis explores these concepts in Chapter

7.

The mathematical analyses in the Shannon paper are rigorous and are beyond the

scope of this thesis.

3.3 Scale-Free Networks

Barabasi and Albert first described the concept of scale-free networks in 1999

(Barabasi and Albert; 1999). In their early descriptions, Barabasi and others demonstrate

the concept through examples including the Internet, World Wide Web, and certain types

of social networks (Barabasi, Ravasz, and Vicsek; 2001). These networks contradicted

earlier views of network growth (Erdos and Renyi; 1959, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1-25;
 23

2002) that viewed networks as growing like chains, stars or “all-channel” networks where

all nodes connect more or less randomly to each other. Erdos graphed these networks as

a typical bell curve while Barabasi, et al described them as power law networks.

An important aspect of scale-free, or power law, networks is the concept of

preferential attachments. These networks are characterized by growth (continued

expansion) and preferential attachment (new nodes prefer to attach to nodes with the

largest number of already connected nodes) (Barabasi and Jeong; 2003).

Besides a new view of the growth of scale-free networks, Barabasis and his

colleagues described another important factor. Scale-free networks are extremely

resistant to error and failure but are not resistant to attack (Barabasi, Albert, and Jeong;

2000). These factors (preferential attachment and error/attack tolerance) become

extremely important when using information superiority as a countermeasure against a

terrorist network.

3.3.1 Social Networks as Scale-Free Networks

While Barabasi et al described social networks in general as scale-free, other

researchers extended that concept to include, explicitly, terrorist groups and terrorist acts

(Matthew and Shambaugh; 2005, Clauset and Young; 2005, Stripling; 2007). Of these,

the Stripling paper may prove the most valuable in that it extends and updates Barabasi’s

theory relative, explicitly, to terrorist networks and, more specifically, to the al Qaeda

network.

In his paper, Stripling adds the notion of directed links between nodes showing

that not all terrorist links are two-way. This accounts for different types of interactions
 24

within the same network (financial support, logistical support, training support,

operational support, etc.). These interactions characterize the state of global terrorist

networks well. Since the early years of this century, terrorist networks have tended to

become far less centralized than they were in the 1990s and earlier.

Because a successful attack against a scale-free network depends upon disabling a

critical number of nodes, and because other nodes tend to attempt to rebuild the network

after a failure, two important points emerge. First, disabling links is not an effective way

to disable a scale-free network because the links will re-establish wherever possible.

Second, a critical mass of node destruction must occur before the network becomes

effectively disabled. Two groups of researchers have shown that careful selection

(“targeting”) of nodes can cause a cascading effect that will bring down the network

(Motter and Lai; 2002, Moreno, Gomez, and Pacheco; 2002). Inducement of a cascading

effect using information superiority may affect terrorist networks and may offer an

effective countermeasure against them.

Another strong proponent of the notion of scale-free social networks (although he

refers to them as “small world networks”) is Sageman (Sageman; 2004). Sageman has

taken the work of Barabasi et al and applied it to his seminal work on characterizing

terrorist networks.

3.4 Information Superiority

The notion of soft power is a staple in the writings of Dunn (Dunn; 2002) and

Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1999). Additionally, Armistead wrote an

entire book on the topic of soft power and its role in modern warfare (Armistead; 2004),
 25

building upon the work of Dunn and Arquilla and Ronfeldt. This author explored these

writers in the context of various lenses on international relations and proposed a theory of

information dominance that builds upon prior work in the field (Stephenson; 2007).

Armistead, however, did not expand extensively on why traditional views of

international relations are limited in the context of the information age. For that we must

turn to the writings of Eriksson and Giacomello (Eriksson and Giacomello; 2004).

Another challenge is that virtually all theories of international relations, including

those proposed by the above writers and researchers do well at analyzing events that have

passed but have proven, based upon this writer’s research, to be weak at anticipating

trends or events of interest. Thus, beyond providing basic understanding of why things

happened the way that they happened, virtually no current theory offers a direct path to

actionable intelligence.

3.4.1 Information Dominance Theory

This author proposed a theory of information dominance that takes into account

the need to anticipate the actions of an organization or state. Information dominance

theory uses Rosen’s definition of anticipatory systems for the purpose of expanding upon

the past and anticipating the future (Rosen; 1985). Rosen defines an anticipatory system,

“An anticipatory system is a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its

environment that allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model’s

predictions pertaining to a later instant.”

We also may turn to Rosen for a concrete description of complexity (Rosen;

 26

1998), “A system is simple if all its models are simulable. A system that is not simple,

and that accordingly must have a nonsimulable model, is complex.”

This is important because this author speculates (Stephenson; Feb 2006) that part

of the difficulty in developing an anticipatory international relations theory is the

complexity of such systems. This complexity increases when the target is not a well-

defined nation-state, but, rather, is a non-state entity such as a terrorist group or network.

However, the success of a program of information dominance as an affirmative

countermeasure against terrorism requires an anticipatory system to be useful. The

author’s paper proposes:

[A] theory of IR that views international politics viewed through the

lens of information operations as a Theory of Information Dominance. By
its name, one can see that this theory would share concepts with structural
realism in that it seeks to explain the relationship of an actor to its
environment from the perspective of power. This is consistent with
Dunn’s thinking.
Information Dominance Theory must account for a broad discourse on
international politics, economy, law, military power and other elements of
international relations. … It also would be useful if such a theory could
anticipate the behavior of actors on the international stage.

The application of Rosen’s theory of anticipatory systems to create appropriate

models, along with information dominance and social network theory may offer the

underpinnings of an actionable response to extremist terrorism using information warfare

and operations.

3.5 The Components of Information Conflict

Kopp defines information conflict as “… a more generalized term used to

describe what most of the literature calls ‘Information Warfare,’ ‘InfoWar,’ or ‘IW’”
 27

(Kopp; 2006). In turn, Wingfield gives the definition of information warfare as

“[i]nformation operations conducted during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or

promote specific objective over a specific adversary or adversaries.” To understand this

definition, Wingfield also provides a definition of information operations as “[a]ctions

taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s

own information and information systems.” (Wingfield; 2000)

If we look at a somewhat more generalized characterization of information

conflict, we find that it contains elements of information warfare, information operations

and cyber warfare or cyber conflict (information warfare restricted to cyberspace).

3.5.1 Active and Passive Information Conflict

We may characterize information conflict in other ways as well. One

differentiator is whether the operations involved are active or passive. Active

information conflict includes actions taken in the context of exploiting an adversary

directly. These are actions taken against the adversary.

Passive information conflict includes defensive action and actions taken against

an adversary without the intent of direct exploitation using those actions. An example of

such an action is reconnaissance or “spying.” This could involve such activities as

intercepting communications and breaking their cipher if necessary, monitoring public

information from and about the adversary. It might also include accessing information

provided by insiders and espionage agents placed inside the adversary’s ranks. Active

and passive information conflict may exist in the context of either offensive or defensive

information conflict.
 28

3.5.2 Information Warfare

Information warfare as a concept is not new. Several writers have attempted to

define it and the most common definitions combine the definitions of information warfare

and information operations in section 3.5. Conceptually, information warfare is

exploiting an adversary’s information systems while protecting our own. Information

warfare generally is thought of in terms of active, ongoing conflict the same as

conventional warfare.

However, information warfare is not always a “hot” war. For example, there are

writers who believe that China, although not engaged in a “shooting war” with the US,

none-the-less, believe that we are at war with China (Jones, et al; 2002, Exhibit 7). The

Chinese view of information warfare focuses, in part, upon preemption or, in terms used

by Sun Tzu, “winning war without fighting” (Yoshihara; 2000). Yoshihara describes six

pillars of information warfare:

1. Physical Attack/Destruction – Use of kinetic (physical) attack to render

offensive IW systems unusable.

2. Electro-Magnetic Warfare – Undermining the adversary’s IW

capabilities through use of electro-magnetic energy.

3. Computer Network Attack (CNA) – Using computers to attack

computers and computer systems.

4. Military Deception – Manipulation and falsification of information

misinformation, disinformation, etc.)

5. Psychological Operations – use of mechanisms such as propaganda to

influence perceptions.
 29

6. Operations Security – Defensive mechanisms that prevent the adversary

from collecting or analyzing your information.

3.5.3 Cyber Conflict

Rattray defines cyber conflict as “Efforts to dominate/gain advantage in

cyberspace to achieve objectives” (Rattray; 2006). In simple terms, cyber conflict is

information conflict in cyber space. Cyber conflict tends toward the technical end of the

information warfare spectrum.

3.5.4 Information Operations

Information operation is, arguably, the best understood of the terms related to

information conflict. However, it also is the least stable in terms of solid definitions

because the concepts that make it up are in a constant state of flux.

Generally, information operations are considered part of an information war. The

difficulty with this, however, is that a war implies an ongoing declared conflict with an

identifiable enemy. Information operations may or may not fit cleanly within that

paradigm. Information operations may be carried out as part of a war, to be sure, but they

also may be carried out as individual skirmishes in a propaganda war between states

where no declared “hot war” exists.

This should not be confused, however, with the notion that information operations

are a subset of information warfare. In fact, in today’s parlance, quite the opposite is

true. Information warfare grows out of information operations, not the other way round.

Armistead (Armistead, Chapter 1; 2004) describes information operations both

vertically and horizontally. Vertically, he describes “[c]apabilities and related activities

 30

for IO…” as:

• Civil affairs

• Computer network attack

• Deception

• Destruction

• Electronic warfare

• Operations security

• Public affairs

• Psychological operations

He differentiates information warfare and information operations based upon the

notion that a war is narrow while information operations are broad. Armistead’s

information warfare focuses upon a military infrastructure while information operations

generalizes across economic, political, information and military infrastructures. We may

say, however, that in the context of information conflict, an information operation may

be, but must not necessarily be, part of an information war.

3.6 Cyber Crime and its Relationship to Information Conflict

People often attempt to characterize cyber crime as a form of information conflict.

However, some distinguishing factors make this association inaccurate. First, one cannot

equate cyber crime to any type of war, formal or informal. Second, the notion of

information operations is inconsistent with the characteristics of cyber crime. Third, and

perhaps most important, no contemporary characterization of cyber crime addresses

either the six pillars of information warfare or the capabilities and related activities of
 31

information operations. Revisiting Rattray’s definition of cyber conflict, again, we see no

consistent connection.

One tends to think of cyber crime as actions in cyber space that support illegal

activities. This is inconsistent with all notions of information conflict.

Generally, one equates the notion of cyber crime with definitions of electronic or

computer crime. The national Institute of Justice provides a working definition of

electronic crime that one can use to compare cyber crime with information conflict:

Crimes including but not limited to fraud, theft, forgery, child

pornography or exploitation, stalking, traditional white-collar crimes,
privacy violations, illegal drug transactions, espionage, computer
intrusions, or any other offenses that occur in an electronic environment
for the express purpose of economic gain or with the intent to destroy or
otherwise inflict harm on another person or institution. (National Institute
of Justice 2; 2001)

From this definition and those of the various aspects of information conflict, one

can see that there is virtually no connection between the two concepts. However, as

shown in Figures 2 and 3, criminal activity is part of the information conflict continuum.

This is an important distinction because although information warfare, information

operations and cyber conflict are not directly considered to be criminal activities under

current definitions, if one approaches the problem in the reverse one sees that there is, in

fact, a connection.

The connection between information conflict and cyber crime (or “electronic

crime”) comes in the effect, not the cause. In other words, while current definitions

consider the motivation for a criminal act ( “…fraud, theft, forgery, child pornography or

exploitation, stalking, traditional white-collar crimes, privacy violations, illegal drug

 32

transactions…”) they do not consider the outcome (e.g., terrorist funding from illegal

drug trafficking) which may be both a criminal act and an act of information operations.

Consider the example of the Internet as a tool for raising money to fund terrorist

activities through the illegal production and sale of drugs. The Internet may be used as a

communications media—electronic mail, for example—between drug suppliers and

terrorist groups. Another example is the use of terrorist web sites to advertise the results

of a kidnapping for propaganda purposes, clearly an aspect of cyber conflict. However,

the kidnapping itself is a violation of law in most states. Thus, the continuum between

crime and war, especially where the traditional paradigms of war break down, is valid

and, beyond typical definitions of both one finds common ground that must be addressed.

3.7 Conclusions

Understanding information conflict requires an understanding of its components

and of theories that contribute to it. The components of information conflict include

information warfare, information operations and cyber conflict. However, new theories

are emerging that attempt to explain the environment in which information conflict

exists. The notion of information conflict policy seems, from the literature, to be

secondary to the theories of how information conflict “works..

The author takes the position that policy follows understanding. Operational

theories follow definitional theories. At this writing, definitional and operational theories

are just beginning to evolve into a state of usefulness. Additionally, an understanding of

various aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism are crucial to the development of a

meta-framework for the application of information dominance theory to counter-

 33

terrorism. Finally, contributing theories such as information theory, game theory and

scale-free social network theory may play a significant role in evolving such a meta-

framework. The rest of this thesis explores those contributions and develops a meta-

framework for using information dominance as a counter-terrorism tool.

 34

4. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

An understanding of terrorism in depth is beyond the scope of this thesis.

However, a few key elements determine how one might approach an effective use of

information superiority as a counter-terrorism tactic. The first of these elements is an

understanding of terrorist goals and objectives. This is an element that is not well

understood by most Westerners and it is key to any successful information warfare effort.

The second element is some detail as to the target. While there are hundreds of

terrorist organizations (over 70 in Iraq alone) ranging in size from a few members to al

Qaeda with over 50,000 members worldwide, only a few are of real consequence. As we

will discuss in Chapter 7, scale-free social network theory implies that by attacking some

key groups successfully, we can disable most of the terrorist infrastructure.

The third element is understanding the tools that terrorists use to plan and execute

their attacks. Finally, a concise characterization of terrorist tactics and motivations is

important. Sun Tzu said, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear

the result of a hundred battles.” 2 Understanding what drives terrorists, what their tools are

and how they operate will assist in understanding where their weaknesses are. In this

chapter, we consider these issues briefly.

4.1 Goals of Terrorism

Today’s terrorists have multiple goals and their goals have multiple aspects.

Sageman produced a concise study of why Salafist terrorists perform acts of terrorism

2
There are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of translations of this venerable classic on The Art of War.
This one is the 1910 translation from the Chinese by Lionel Giles. It may be found at
http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html.
 35

(Sageman; 2004). He characterized this group of terrorists, the most prominent of today’s

terrorist networks, in the preface to his book as the “global Salafi jihad.” Sageman’s

study was unique in that it drew from detailed first person information about more

than170 mujahadin. It also was unique in that it was the first to explore seriously the

notion of social networks based upon scale-free network theory (referred to by Sageman

as “small world networks”). This thesis explores that approach in more detail in Chapter

7.

Hoffman characterizes terrorist goals as political (Hoffman, 40; 2006). However,

when one examines contemporary terrorism and terrorist groups, one finds that

Sageman’s Salafists dominate them. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis we will focus

upon Salafists (or as some refer to them, “Islamist fundamentalists”) and their

motivations.

Islamist motivations are complex and are rooted in strict fundamentalist

interpretation of the Koran and the teachings of Muhammad. Various sects, such as the

Wahabist sect, interpret these teachings so strictly that they have added to and augmented

Islamic teaching to include the duty of jihad. In the early 1900s Sayyid Qtub took up the

Wahabist teachings and proclaimed that there must be jihad to establish a true Muslim

state, a departure from traditional Wahabist doctrine (Sageman, 10ff; 2004).

The duty of jihad consists of the “near jihad” and the “far jihad.” The far jihad

aims to create a global jihad with the goal of a global Muslim state. This fundamentalist

interpretation is at the heart of most of the Islamist terrorism seen today. There are other

aspects, such as poverty, a view that justice has bypassed Muslims and other socio-

economic factors. However, before one can address those factors using information
 36

warfare, one must understand the cultural underpinnings of Islamist terrorism. This issue

suggests one fertile target for information operations. Another fertile target, affected by

all of the other factors, is terrorist fund-raising and other support or sponsorship from

individuals, groups and states.

One observable facet of the jihad is its dependence upon communications.

Communications allow the jihadists to plan terrorist acts, obtain funding, spread

propaganda, proselytize, and recruit followers. These communications comprise every

type from “mouth-to-ear” conversations to sophisticated use of the Internet and the World

Wide Web. Clearly, Islamist communications fall well within both Shannon

communication theory and the political theories of Dunn, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and

others.

4.2 Important Terrorist Groups

Based upon the author’s research and open source data, there are over 70 terrorist

groups in Iraq alone. 3 Globally, there are at least 76 terrorist groups aligned in one way

or another with al Qaeda. This makes al Qaeda, with an estimated 50,000 members

worldwide, arguably the most important terrorist organization within the Islamist

terrorism networks (MITB; 2007).

4.3 Classifying Terrorism: A Taxonomy

The author published a paper that addresses in depth the topic of a taxonomy of

terrorism (Stephenson; Nov. 2006). Much of this section references that paper. The

3
One particularly useful open source for this type of information is MITB Terrorism Knowledge
Base - http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp
 37

complete taxonomy appears in Appendix A.1.

One of the key difficulties in developing a counter-terrorism strategy is

understanding terrorism itself. Simplistic issues such as a universally accepted definition,

obviously a requirement for beginning any sort of understanding, are problematic when

one discusses terrorism. Different states have different definitions for terrorism and its

associated concepts. Often these definitions aim to serve national, political or religious

objectives rather than contribute to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon. For

example, Jenkins addresses the problem repeatedly (Jenkins; 1986).

The author extracted definitions of terrorism from 33 international documents that

included laws, treaties and other defining information (JUSTICE; 2006) along with

definitions from some of the important writers on the subject. While there is no

universally accepted definition of terrorism, there are several defining characteristics. A

few of these characteristics, such as violence against non-combatants and ideological or

political motivation, seem to appear regularly in the literature. It was the author’s intent

to extract all of the relevant characteristics and, through a series of extractions,

refinements and analyses, develop a taxonomy that allowed a more useful analysis of

such things as terrorist acts and motivations.

Although the author describes the entire process in detail in his paper, it is useful

to summarize here. The steps involved in extracting and analyzing the characteristics of

terrorism are:

1. Extraction of key definitional elements from a variety of sources

2. Broad classification using CATA (Computer Aided Thematic Analysis)

(Kabay; 2006)
 38

3. Development of stratified ontology

4. Extraction as a taxonomy

5. Refinement into a paired representation

6. Link analysis to discover non-obvious relationships

The full taxonomy in Appendix A.1 reflects the extraction referenced in step 4.

The link analysis (step 6) appears in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6 - Link Analysis of "Terrorism" at the Sub-Class Level

Figure 6 represents the definitional elements of terrorism present in the literature

illustrated hierarchically. This is useful for demonstrating definitional dependencies. The

key elements of terrorism – those elements that provided a context for analysis – include:

• Internationally protected persons

• Justifiability

• Targeting aircraft and ships

• Hostage-taking
 39

• Means of invoking terrorist acts

• Targeting the general public (i.e., non-combatants)

• Causing damage to property or the environment

• Invoking a state of terror or fear

The individual relationships become more obvious if the link analysis is displayed

slightly differently as in Figure 7.

Figure 7 - Relationships from Figure 6 Organized in a "Peacock" Display

A yet more meaningful analysis emerges when we extract clusters from the

overall analysis. The author’s paper describes clustering in detail and illustrates the

clustering of the data at one level deeper then illustrated here. However, clustering of the

elements shown in Figures 6 and 7 is instructive. That clustering appears in Figure 8.

 40

Figure 8 - Clustering of the Elements Shown in Figure 6 and 7

Clustering analysis reveals those elements or groupings with the tightest

interconnections. Thus, we may think of a cluster as a representation of the important

relationships in a link analysis. As shown in Figure 8, there are six important

relationships to the core term: hostage-taking, damage to property or the environment,

targeting the general public, damage to aircraft and ships, the means of performing

terrorist acts, and the invocation of a state of terror in victims. This cluster aids in the

analysis of acts suspected to be of terrorist origin. However, it does less to help us

understand what, exactly, terrorism is.

The author’s paper goes into detail regarding the second level analysis of the

ontological data extracted in step 3 above. However, from that analysis eight core

characteristics emerged:

1. Threatens International Peace and Security

2. Effects Are Psychological

3. Threat of Violence
 41

4. Induces Fear

5. Use of Force

6. Conspiracy

7. Financing

8. Targets General Population

From these eight core determinants one begins to see the emergence of a

definition that addresses the most nearly universally accepted elements of terrorism. The

author, in his paper, proposed an axiom that is necessary but not necessarily sufficient to

characterize terrorism based upon this analysis:

Axiom 1 – Universal Characteristics of Terrorism

Terrorism must be comprised of at least all of the following

characteristics:

Consists minimally of acts that threaten international peace and

security, that depend upon psychological effects for their success and that

induce fear through the use of force or threat of violence against the general

population. Terrorism is financed and is characterized by conspiracy among

participants.

Here, then, we have the beginnings of a universally acceptable definition by virtue

of the strong interconnections between the most frequently appearing elements in the

literature. However, from the literature we also find that terrorism is ideological or

political in its underpinnings (appearing in the ontology as a slot under motive and not
 42

shown at the analysis level of Figures 6 and 7).

Therefore, in the context of this thesis, the author will use the following definition

of terrorism. This definition seems well supported by the literature.

Definition 1 - Terrorism

Terrorism consists of violent acts, ideologically or

politically motivated, that threaten international peace and

security, that depend upon psychological effects for their

success and that induce fear through the use or threat of

violence against non-combatants.

4.4 Conclusions

The nature of terrorism in today’s global environment is that it is, by a large

majority, Islamist in nature. While Islamist fundamentalism is at the core of global

terrorism, however, other socio-political-economic factors also offer opportunities for

applying information dominance as a soft counter-terrorism measure successfully.

A key factor in understanding the cultural and religious differences between

fundamentalist Islamists and the Western world in the context of terrorism is a clear

understanding of terrorism itself. There are no globally accepted definitions of terrorism

that are useful to us, but we can characterize factors and aspects of terrorist acts and

motivations. We have extracted a profile of terrorism from a variety of acceptable

 43

sources and from that, we have evolved a useful definition. Using that definition and the

taxonomy of terrorism, we can begin to address countermeasures in a meaningful way.

 44

5. THE LAW AND INFORMATION CONFLICT

In the context of this thesis, there is little need to explore this area in depth. Most

of the seminal work on this topic has been done by Wingfield (Wingfield; 2000).

However, it is useful to note where the law and information conflict either are adequate

or are inadequate to address terrorist activities.

Many analysts address terrorism and the law – both domestically and

internationally—by viewing terrorist acts as criminal acts. In this regard, it may be useful

to analyze the convergence of the law, information conflict and terrorism. To that

purpose, this chapter offers a brief discussion of the legal issues potentially involved in

the use of information warfare, information operations and cyber conflict as tools for

counter-terrorism.

The context for this chapter is counter-terrorism, terrorist groups and sub-national

actors. The question to be answered is, does international or domestic law prohibit the use

of elements of information dominance, especially cyber conflict, in the context of

counter-terrorism? The primary reference for this chapter is Wingfield; 2000.

5.1 Municipal or Domestic Law

Domestic law regarding cyberspace and the types of communications allowed

differs widely for country to country. We may consider domestic communications law

on two levels. The first is the level that pertains to international law and the second is the

purely domestic level.

International law as presented in the International Telecommunications

Convention of 1982 (ITC) simply bans communications by one state that would interfere
 45

with those of another (Wingfield, 473; 2000). According to Wingfield, not only are there

no provisions in international law prohibiting information operations, during a time of

conflict all international telecommunications laws are suspended for the belligerents.

While activities in cyberspace are not addressed specifically, there seems to be no

international component of domestic law that prohibits activities in cyberspace so we are

left to use telecommunications laws as our guide. Thus, we turn to domestic law

explicitly to understand prohibitions within countries.

When the author refers to activities “within countries,” the reference assumes that

the topic has no international implications and is strictly a domestic issue. For the most

part countries that do address cyberspace do so within their own borders. This, of course,

is problematic since cyberspace has no borders. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis,

and for consistency, we will assume that cyberspace issues within a particular country are

those whose source is that country. In that regard, most countries, if they address

activities in cyberspace at all, address it in terms of criminal acts not acts relating to war.

This can be a problem in some cases. In the United States, for example, there are

ample laws on the books, both state and federal, that prohibit hacking. These laws

generally refer to “unauthorized access to or use of a computer.” Most American

computer security experts agree that these laws explicitly prohibit the technique of “hack-

back” sometimes called “strike back.” However, in the spirit of the ITC lifting all

international bans on telecommunications activities during time of war, and a total lack of

international law directly addressing information operations, it would seem that lifting

such a ban during wartime and between belligerents is acceptable.

Where the use of this technique against terrorists is proposed, however, these
 46

questions remain open since terrorists usually are a sub-national group and the fight

against them may not be considered, legally, to be a war. Therefore, it becomes an open

question as to whether there actually are any prohibitions against performing attacks in

cyberspace relative to counter-terrorism operations.

5.1.1 Information Conflict and Cyber Crime

An important subset of information conflict is cyber crime. Cyber crime, or

computer crime, is defined as being a crime against a computer or computing system. All

other crimes, whether they use the computer or not, are traditional crimes, sometimes

called “computer related crimes” (Stephenson; 2000). There is considerable debate on

the topic of whether to handle terrorist activity as an act of war or as a traditional crime of

violence.

When a gang executes a reign of terror over a particular neighborhood in order to

gain control of it over a rival gang we generally consider that a law enforcement issue,

even though, in extreme circumstances, the acts may be quite similar to act of terrorism.

Nevertheless, this activity is gang-related street crime, not terrorism, because it is not

based upon the usual criteria for terrorism, especially motivation.

When crime occurs in cyber space, however, we have a much more complicated

problem. Because cyber space is not confined by borders, we are simultaneously

constrained and not constrained depending upon the circumstances. For example, some

US States have passed laws prohibiting on-line gambling. However, there are many on-

line casinos that operate outside of US borders and, thus, outside of US jurisdiction. In

response, many states have updated their laws against on-line gambling to mean that the
 47

gambler may not access these sites and gamble within the State’s borders regardless of

where the site actually is located physically. Laws such as this tend to characterize cyber

crime and, often, are completely unenforceable because they are, for practical purposes,

undetectable.

The difficulty with the use of cyber space as a battlespace in the war on terror is

that activities in cyber space may well be considered violations of applicable state laws.

Individual countries may have laws that would be broken should the US or any other

state opt to fight the war in cyber space instead of physical space. While physical

response, whether military or by law enforcement, to a terrorist event would be easily

explainable, as attack in cyber space likely would be considered a law enforcement issue.

5.2 International Law

Wingfield sets the stage nicely for a discussion on international law at the end of

his book (Wingfield, 370ff; 2000). Here, one finds a table of 23 “Use of Force

Principles.” This table, in summary, addresses all of the issues in the book and focuses

on the use of force. The most important point that Wingfield makes, and he makes it

both directly and indirectly throughout the book, is that hostilities in cyber space

constitute a use of force just as if there were an atomic bomb being used or its use

threatened. This extremely important principle—that hostilities in cyber space constitute

a use of force—underlies the whole of this thesis. This means that, in terms of

international law at least, there actually are some guiding principles against which one

can measure cyber space activities. Therefore, one can use cyber conflict (or information

dominance) as if they were weapons. One then may use the weapon of information
 48

dominance where the use of force is permitted (or not explicitly prohibited).

5.2.1 Jus ad Bellum – The Law of Conflict Management

Of all forms of violence, war is the only one that has, throughout history been

acceptable (Wingfield, 32ff; 2000). Wingfield further goes on to define the law of

conflict management: “The law of conflict management, jus ad bellum, is a set of rules

that govern the resort to armed conflict and determine whether the conflict is lawful or

unlawful in its inception” (Wingfield 33; 2000).

For the purposes of this thesis, this is an extremely important point because the

notion of the lawfulness of a conflict is at the heart of what one can do in pursuing that

conflict. For example, if the conflict is lawful, the combatants may resort to the use of

force and, as we have seen, that means that the tools of information dominance are not

prohibited.

Although the Charter of the United Nations applies to states, and not to sub-state

actors, one nevertheless may draw a bit of guidance from it regarding the use of force and

the legality of hostilities. Wingfield describes the paradox of articles 2(4), 39, and 51, 4

The Charter clearly outlaws the aggressive use of force while recognizing
a state’s inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in Article
51 and the Security Council’s obligation under Article 39 to maintain and
restore international peace and security. Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 of the
Charter now redefine and codify the contemporary jus ad bellum in its
entirety.” (Wingfield, 37ff; 2000).

It seems obvious that terrorist hostilities such as those seen in Iraq and

4
Wingfield offers the text of the salient sections of the UN Charter in his Appendix C. Thus, we
will not spend time here analyzing and citing the various sections and the author refers the reader to
Winfield’s book for a complete analysis, which, since it applies to states, is outside the scope of this thesis.
 49

Afghanistan are a threat to both local (state) and international peace and security. Osama

bin Laden has declared war in the name of al Qaeda, particularly on the United States, but

indirectly on the rest of the non-Muslim world (bin Laden; 2007). The American

administration has declared war on terrorism. Neither of these declarations fits

traditional concepts of declarations of war.

In the case of al Qaeda, we see a sub-state actor declaring war on a state. Not

only is al Qaeda a sub-state actor, it is, today, so loosely connected that it may be an

entity in name and concept only. There is no president, no commander-in-chief and no

congress or legislature. In legal terms, al Qaeda does not have the legal capacity to

declare war.

The declaration of war against terror proclaimed by the current American

administration is at least equally as weak as al Qaeda’s position. A declaration of war

against a concept (e.g., terror, drugs, poverty, etc.) can at best only be thought of as

rhetoric and saber rattling. Unfortunately, the administration has resorted to sending tens

of thousand of troops and spent hundreds of billions of dollars to fight this “war.”

However, for all of the political wrangling, sound bites, and media manipulation,

one very interesting concept may be emerging: the role of the sub-national actor, by this

precedent, may be expanded to coverage by the same principles of the UN Charter that

govern states. What this means, in simple terms, is that a state of war may exist between

a state and a sub-state entity such as al Qaeda and its affiliates. That being the case, the

concepts in jus ad bellum are likely to apply. That would include a nation’s right to use

force to protect itself and that force could include information operations.
 50

5.2.2 Jus in Bello – The Law of Armed Conflict

Wingfield gives a concise definition of the law of armed conflict that the author

will use as the working definition: “The law of war, jus in bello, also commonly referred

to as the law of armed conflict, governs the actual conduct of hostilities and had

developed as customary international law through the practice of almost all societies over

thousands of years…” (Wingfield, 57; 2000).

There are four primary concepts that define the conduct of war (Wingfield, 140ff;

2000):

• Discrimination—distinguishing between lawful combatants and non-

combatants, military objectives and civilian objectives

• Necessity—limits the degree and kind of force that may be used – often

applied to weapons of mass destruction

• Proportionality—requires attacks to be directed at military personnel and

targets only using a appropriate level of force as response to the level of

force used against them and avoiding, as much as possible, collateral

civilian damage

• Chivalry—the concept that belligerents be easily identified as such—

prohibits resorting to perfidy in order to affect an attack or operation

These four principles make legal war against a terrorist group quite difficult since,

by their stock-in-trade terrorists violate each one of these. That issue notwithstanding,

however, the United States at least, has recognized formally, that it must, under some

circumstances, do battle with terrorists. In defining a hostile act, the “Standing Rules of
 51

Engagement for US Forces” states:

A hostile act is an attack or other use of force by a foreign force or

terrorist unit (organization or individual) [emphasis author’s] against the
United States, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US citizens, their
property, US commercial assets, and other designated non-US forces,
foreign nationals and their property (Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff;
1994).

Thus, in the case of the United States, at least, there is no difference from a

practical perspective between declared war and a terrorist act. In fact, all that is required

to illicit a response is a hostile act. Given that the notion of anticipatory self-defense is

becoming more and more accepted internationally, the rules of engagement give a solid

guideline for information warriors.

5.3 The Law as it Impacts Terrorism

The application of both international law and domestic law to acts of terrorism is

fuzzy in that there is no law (generally speaking) constructed completely around

supporting the fight against terrorism. Laws as they exist today address what terrorism is,

a dicey proposition at best, and they make terrorism illegal under their definitions.

However, when it comes to fitting the actions that one may take in a war against

terrorism, we usually must depend upon other laws that address the problem less directly

such as criminal law and the law of war.

This does not mean that there is no legal basis for fighting a war against terrorism.

Clearly there is. However, because of the “neither fish nor fowl” nature of terrorism

(neither formal war nor wholly a criminal act) it is likely that lawyers and states will be

sorting out the legal details for some time to come. That does not preclude fighting such
 52

a “war.” There are ample precedents for such conflicts and, as time goes on, these

precedents assuredly will be refined.

5.4 Conclusions

Wingfield is very clear:

International communications law contains no direct and specific

prohibition against the conduct of information operations by military
forces, even in peacetime. The established practice of nations provides
persuasive evidence that telecommunications treaties are regarded as
suspended among belligerents during international armed conflicts.
Domestic communications laws do not prohibit properly authorized
military information operations. Accordingly, neither international nor
domestic communications law presents a significant barrier to information
operations by US military forces. (Wingfield, 473; 2000)

What is still unclear is how this affects the use of information operations against a

sub-state actor where there can be no official war in the traditional sense. In this case,

perhaps one must fall back on domestic law, because acts involving telecommunications

and cyber space, originating within that country’s borders, are controlled by that

country’s laws. However, in the absence of any direct prohibitions, we must accept for

now that there are no reasons, either in international or domestic law, why information

operations may not be used, by authorized military personnel, in a conflict against

terrorist groups.
 53

6. INFORMATION CONFLICT AND TERRORISM

This chapter begins the convergence of the issues of terrorism and information

dominance. It forms the basis for Chapter 7 where the author will present some potential

approaches to the exploitation of information conflict in a counter-terrorist setting

including a meta-framework for analyzing and applying information dominance in the

context of sub-national actors.

6.1 The Terrorist Battlespace

The Global Security website defines the term “Battlespace” as:

[T]he environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to

successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the
mission. This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and
friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum;
and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of
interest. (Global Security; 2001)

This definition comes directly from an older version of the Doctrine for Joint

Operations. The current version, 17 September 2006, replaces the term with the newer

term, “operational environment”, which it defines as:

[A] composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that

affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its
definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)”
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff; 2006)

Taken together, these two definitions – the older one and the current one – offer a

solid platform for analyzing the terrorist battlespace or operational environment.

Approaching the definition as this thesis has approached difficult or ambiguous

 54

definitions in earlier chapters (such as the definition of “terrorism”), the author takes the

approach of characterizing the term(s) in question in such a manner that the reader may

ask, “Does this characteristic of battlespace apply to terrorism and, if so, how does it

apply?” Characteristics, or, one might posit, an informal taxonomy illustrated as a Mind-

Map in Figure 9, of the concept of a battlespace based upon these two definitions consist

of:

Figure 9 – Mind-Map of an Informal Taxonomy of the Concept of Battlespace

Using this informal taxonomy, the author proposes the characteristics of the

terrorist battlespace or operational environment as a basis for analysis shown in Table 1.

The numbers in parenthesis indicate page references in Hoffman; 2006.

 55

General Battlespace Terrorism Battlespace

Taxonomy Characteristics

Environment Anywhere
Deliberate and planned
Factors application of violence (255)
Conditions Various
Circumstances Various
Ideological and operational
Influences imperatives (229)
Terrorist acts and insurgent
Apply combat power acts
Not necessary if martyrdom
Protect the force is a factor
Complete the mission in any
Complete the mission way possible
Surprise, violence,
Employment of capabilities intimidation, hostage-taking,
etc.
Bear on the decisions of Availability of targets,
the commander carefully planned (255)
Air N/A
Land Yes
Sea Yes
Space N/A
Included enemy forces Yes
Yes, including state sponsors
Included friendly forces and affiliated terrorist groups
Facilities Targets
Weather Not important
Terrain Not important
Communication between
The electromagnetic
terrorists and dissemination
spectrum of propaganda
The information Legitimize use of violence,
environment recruitment (197ff)
Operational areas Worldwide
Anywhere that does not
conform to the terrorist's
Areas of interest political or ideological
objectives

Table 1 - Characteristics of the Terrorist Battlespace

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6.1.1 The Physical Battlespace

As Table 1 shows, there are no limits on the physical battlespace, at least when

one addresses Islamist terrorism. However, explicitly, Osama bin Laden in his Fatwa

specifically declares war against America (Bin Laden; 1996). Here, he explicitly quotes

the Koran: “…so when the sacred months have passed away, then slay the idolaters

where ever you find them, and take them captives and besiege them and lie in wait for

them in every ambush…” as justification for killing “idolaters,” specifically Americans.

There is a difference, historically, between ideological terrorism and politically

motivated terrorism when one discusses the physical battlespace. 5 While, as we have

seen, ideological motivations know no particular geography, politically motivated

terrorist acts generally are directed at the source of the perceived political oppression.

Thus, in addressing political terrorism, the physical battlespace is more directed and

certain characteristics in Table 1 narrow and are limited geographically.

6.1.2 The Virtual Battlespace

The virtual battlespace is, essentially, unlimited. Referring to Section 3.1, the

reader can see the scope of the information continuum. This information continuum

(Figure 1) comprises the potential virtual battlespace. Referring to Table 1, one sees that

the terrorist battlespace comprises both the electromagnetic spectrum and the information

environment. An analysis of this characterization shows that it is conceivable that

terrorist organizations could employ portions of the entire information continuum. This

5
Although Islamist terrorists, pursuing the “far jihad” will take the terrorism battle anywhere,
political terrorists often restrict their activities to the local are where they can have the desired effect. For a
sense of what this means in terms of defining the battlespace, compare the global activities of al Qaeda to
the regional or local activities of the IRA.
 57

turns out to be the case (Hoffman, 197ff; 2006, Zhou, Qin, and Lai; 2005, Kohlmann;

2004).

6.2 Information Warfare in the Context of Terrorism

Returning to the definition of information operations in section 3.5.2

(“…exploiting an adversary’s information systems while protecting our own.”) and

applying the concepts in Table 1, one can see some of the elements of information

warfare as they apply to terrorism. In that section, Yoshihara refers to six pillars of

information warfare (Yoshihara; 2001):

1. Physical Attack/Destruction

2. Electro-Magnetic Warfare

3. Computer Network Attack (CNA)

4. Military Deception

5. Psychological Operations

6. Operations Security

Referring to Table 1 and the six pillars, one can get a good picture of how

information warfare might apply in the context of terrorism. Table 2 represents those

connections.
 58

Table 2 - Connections between Information Warfare and the Terrorist Battlespace

Table 2 is especially interesting because it suggests that there is, potentially at

least, a strong connection between information warfare and the terrorist battlespace in

two important classes: military deception and psychological operations. These two

important connections operate on several levels. The following sections examine some of

these.

6.2.1 Deliberate and Planned Application of Violence

Deliberate and planned application of violence clearly addresses physical attacks.

Violence against an enemy’s network information center or destruction of a television

station comes under this class. However, the use of misinformation and disinformation

can confuse adversaries and threats of violence can have a psychological impact. These

both are consistent with the author’s taxonomy of terrorism. Violence anticipated against

information assets demands an operational security response.

Most important, from an information warfare perspective, however, are the

psychological and disinformation aspects of violence.

6.2.2 Terrorist Acts and Insurgent Acts

These have much the same impact, and in much the same way, as deliberate and
 59

planned acts of violence.

6.2.3 Ideological and Operational Imperatives

Information warfare is a potent tool in this aspect of the terrorist battlespace. Key

initiatives for terrorist groups address recruitment, fund raising, and operational

communications requirements. Spreading the message of the terrorists goes beyond

internal communications. Terrorists need to ensure that their terrorist acts get the widest

“air-play” to achieve maximum impact. This is the message of the terrorist: we will kill

you, brutally, violently and unexpectedly if you do not acquiesce to our demands.” In

order to disseminate that message beyond the immediate neighborhood, terrorists need to

engage in information warfare. In order to communicate with other terrorists,

information assets also are required. Those assets can be anything from cell phones to

the Internet. The Internet, video and other communications media are becoming the

stock-in-trade for terrorist groups including those with moderate sophistication

(Kohlmann; 2004). A consequence of this use of information assets is that it is possible

to misdirect the adversary in terms of the terrorists’ actual intentions.

6.2.4 Surprise, Violence, Intimidation Hostage-Taking, etc.

This has its greatest impact as a psychological operation, but it cannot be

overlooked as a deceptive action (when misinformation is offered the adversary) and it

may require operations security to avoid compromise of information assets.

6.2.5 Availability of Targets Carefully Planned

Hoffman (Hoffman, 229; 2006) is clear that terrorists are neither capricious nor
 60

are they insane. Their acts are carefully planned and executed. This clearly opens the

door for misinformation and such tactics are commonplace. Terrorist groups imply in

web casts that they are sending secret communications to terrorist cells around the globe.

Intelligence analysts call this “chatter” and separating useful chatter from disinformation

is difficult. This activity addresses both deception and psychological operations.

Protecting the information infrastructure also required operations security.

6.2.6 Communication Between Terrorists and Dissemination of Propaganda

This aspect of information warfare is critical to the survival of a terrorist

movement. Its details are described above in other connections illustrating the

interlocking relationships between information warfare and the terrorist battlespace

elements. One important aspect here is the sophisticated use of the Internet and the World

Wide Web. Terrorist groups use these tools extensively for training, fund-raising,

propaganda dissemination, misinformation and a host of other communications-related

tasks. (Kohlmann; 2004)

6.2.7 Legitimize the Use of Violence, Recruitment

These two aspects are important to terrorist organizations and, in many respects,

they are interconnected. Terrorists must put a legitimate face on violent acts. These acts

often are portrayed as necessary to free an oppressed people or other seemingly

legitimate cause. Additionally, the legitimization of such violence aids in recruitment

and fund-raising.
 61

6.3 Conclusions

This chapter has pinpointed the connections between elements of information

conflict, especially information warfare, and terrorism. The connections between

elements of information warfare and the terrorist battlespace suggest that there may be

opportunities for counter-terrorism activities in this arena. Indeed, as terrorist

organizations become increasingly dependent upon various aspects of information

technology it may become increasingly practical to include information operations in the

panoply of counter-terrorism weapons.

The application of information dominance as a counter-terrorism weapon may be

as feasible as it is in state-on-state conflict. The next chapter explores this possibility and

proposes a meta-framework for application of information dominance in a counter-

terrorism context.
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7. COUNTERING TERRORISM WITH INFORMATION

DOMINANCE

The rest of this thesis has been setting the stage for this chapter, which articulates

a theory of the application of information dominance as a weapon in the counter-

terrorism arsenal. There are several components of this theory, each of which plays a

role in the overall approach. To introduce information dominance as a counter-terrorism

weapon, the author does three things in this chapter.

First, the author reviews briefly each of the tools that this chapter brings together

and focuses them on the problem of countering terrorism and the terrorist use of the

infosphere to his or her advantage. For the tools that this thesis has addressed in more

detail earlier, such as Shannon information theory, the author simply applies them to the

problem. Second, the author introduces some new tools such as game theory and the

Kopp theory of information conflict. These new tools apply, as has the existing tool set.

Finally, the entire tool set converges into a meta-framework for addressing

terrorism through the infosphere. The notion of a meta-framework is entirely appropriate

here since an important aspect of terrorism is its ability to adjust to changing conditions.

The author recognizes that any effective counter-terrorism weapon itself must be

able to adjust as rapidly and easily without restarting from the beginning. Thus, a meta-

framework that lays down some important precepts and approaches offers a flexible,

affirmative framework for a response to the problems of terrorism even as terrorists alter

course and adapt is completely appropriate. This is an extremely important concept

because a key characteristic of terrorist tactics is the ability to respond and alter tactical
 63

direction rapidly in response to counter-terrorist threats. Hoffman describes al Qaeda, for

example, as “…nimble, flexible and adaptive…” (Hoffman, 282; 2006).

7.1 Shannon Information Theory as a Basis for Information Conflict

The core premise of information conflict centers on Shannon information theory.

As explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Shannon articulates this core premise: “The

fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly

or approximately a message selected at another point” (Shannon; 1948). In information

conflict, the parties are concerned with meeting this objective for their own information

while inserting other components of Shannon theory—such as noise sources or

correction—to alter the information of their opponents.

This correlates well with the generally accepted description of information

operations, exploiting an adversary’s information systems while protecting one’s own.

Thus, as a basis for any meta-framework of information dominance, Shannon theory must

be the central premise upon which the framework rests.

7.2 Kopp’s Theory of Information Conflict

Kopp is notable in his discussions of information conflict for his nearly unique

application of Shannon theory to information warfare/information operations (IW/IO)

(Dr. Andrew Borden of the US Air Force also published similar research leading to the

connection between Shannon and IW/IO leading to the common reference as the

“Borden-Kopp model.” This is considered the only mathematically supportable theory of

information warfare.) Kopp, in a seminal paper on the topic, describes a very simple

classification scheme of the core strategies of IW/IO:

 64

A) denial of information (DoI), ie concealment and camouflage, or

stealth.
B) deception and mimicry (D&M), ie the insertion of intentionally
misleading information.
C) disruption & destruction (D&D), ie the insertion of information
which produces a dysfunction inside the opponent's system; alternately the
outright destruction of the system.
D) subversion (SUB), ie insertion of information which triggers a self
destructive process in the opponent's target system.

He follows this by imposing Shannon theory on the classifications:

A) DoI amounts to making the signal sufficiently noise-like, that a

receiver cannot discern its presence from that of the noise in the channel.
B) D&M amounts to mimicking a known signal so well, that a receiver
cannot distinguish the phony signal from the real signal.
C) D&D amounts to injecting so much noise into the channel, that the
receiver cannot demodulate the signal.

This is as basic a representation of these three models as is possible.

Showing the fundamental nature of the fourth model, subversion (SUB), is
a little trickier since it relates to system internal behaviour. The
manipulation of a channel carrying information is a means to an end.

D) SUB at the simplest level amounts to the diversion of the thread of

execution within a Turing machine, which maps on to the functional
behaviour of the victim system. It amounts to surreptitiously flipping one
or more specific bits on the tape, to alter the behaviour of the machine.”
(Kopp; 2005)

Thus, the connection between Kopp’s theory, information conflict and Shannon

theory is made and is mathematically defensible. However, where Kopp falls short is

generalizing the theory beyond technical applications. The author has extended the

Borden-Kopp model:

• DoI – embeds information within other information such that the original

information cannot be discerned.

• D&M – masquerading information such that the nature and existence of

the masquerade is imperceptible.

 65

• D&D – destroying or contaminating information such that the original

information cannot be extracted.

• SUB – insertion of information that has the property of destroying the

receiving system such that neither the information inserted nor any other

information residing on the system can be extracted.

Note that in this extension the author refers explicitly to “information.” That

information may be electronic in nature but does not need to be. Also, note that

subversion outside of an electronic system can be very tricky. However, an example of

subversion outside of an electronic venue might be discrediting a newspaper or newsletter

through fooling it with deceptive information so that the vehicle loses its credibility with

its audience completely. Another example is the discrediting of an authority figure such

as a mullah or other Islamic cleric such that the individual’s constituency no longer takes

the individual’s pronouncements seriously.

7.3 Applying Scale-Free Social Networks

The second element of the application of information dominance in counter-

terrorism is a core concept in scale-free networks: cascades. A cascade is a process that

begins when selected nodes of a scale-free network are destroyed and progresses until the

network itself crumbles. While the author does not suggest that information dominance

alone can trigger a cascade sufficient to destroy a terrorist network, he does suggest that

in the context of operations against a terrorist organization, the application of this

technique could be efficacious in supporting kinetic techniques as a force multiplier.

As pointed out in Section 3.3.1 of this thesis, research by the author and others
 66

suggests that terrorist networks are scale-free in nature. Figure 10 shows the example of

the al Qaeda network demonstrating some scale-free characteristics.

Figure 10 - A Map Showing Links Between al Qaeda and Associated Terrorist Groups

While this map is difficult to read, al Qaeda sits at the center or hub of the map

and the characteristic “peacock” display of rays or spokes fanning out from the center

terminating in another fan of links and nodes. If one performs a clustering operation on

the map in Figure 10, one sees a map of the organizations most tightly connected to al

Qaeda. That clustering result is shown in Figure 11 (see section 4.3 for a discussion of

clustering).
 67

Figure 11 - Result of Performing a Clustering Operation on the Map in Figure 10

What Figure 11 suggests is that the organizations clustered around al Qaeda

represent optimal targets if one expects to start a cascade that would destroy al Qaeda.

However simple this sounds, there are some other issues that increase the difficulty of

such an operation significantly.

First, the relationships between al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are by no

means stable or consistent. Second, destruction of the nodes in this diagram is difficult

and none of the attacks against the nodes can take place outside of the minimum period

that it takes a node that has lost its partner node to build a new thread. Thus, the entire

cluster must be destroyed before it has a chance to rebuild itself.

The application of information dominance in support of starting a cascade within

a terrorist network, is based upon the use of elements of information conflict across the

entire continuum discussed in section 3.1, and within the terrorism battlespace as a force

multiplier for kinetic attacks, diplomacy related to state sponsors of terrorist groups and
 68

other methods of confronting the terrorist threat. This is an example of disagregation

(Kilcullen; 2005).

Thus, the author views the application of information dominance within the

context of counter-terrorism as simply one of a set of counter-terrorism tools, techniques,

technologies, strategies and tactics. This approach is similar to the role that information

superiority plays in traditional international politics. This is consistent with the author’s

assertion that, “[i]t is possible and practical to apply information dominance as an

affirmative countermeasure against terrorism by non-state actors in much the same

manner that states use information superiority in the conduct of international politics and

economics.” (from section 1.3)

Essentially, information dominance in the counter-terrorism context applies the

meta-framework presented in the next section to a scale-free terrorist social network

within the terrorism battlespace as part of an overall counter-terrorism operation, multiple

coordinated operations or a complete campaign.

7.4 A Meta-Framework for Information Dominance in Counter-Terrorism

In this section, the author proposes a meta-framework that one can use to craft an

information dominance operation in support of the global war on terror.

7.4.1 What is meant by a “Meta-Framework”

Meta-frameworks are frameworks that combine multiple individual frameworks

together to form a new model. One of the major uses of meta-frameworks is in computer

application programming, especially for the Java application language environment. One

can get a very good idea of what comprises a good meta-framework by consulting experts
 69

in this environment. Mills describes five important characteristics of meta-frameworks in

the context of Java development of which the author applies four that are appropriate to

the context of this thesis (Mills; 2005):

1. Broad scope

2. Co-existence

3. Abstraction

4. Longevity

Broad scope is the applicability of the meta-framework in a wide variety of

situations. It may not be restrictive in the intended context but must, at the same time,

not be as broad as to lose definition.

Co-existence describes the meta-framework’s ability to work with other not

directly related frameworks (in this case diplomacy or kinetic attacks, for example)

without either losing its own definition or unnecessarily restricting the other

framework(s).

Abstraction refers to the ability to abstract away from limiting details without

losing the efficacy of the meta-framework’s intent, model or context.

Longevity means that the meta-framework has a long “shelf life” in that it does

not require substantive change just because the conditions in which it is being used

change. This is a critical characteristic because of the ability of terrorist groups to shift

focus, strategy and tactics rapidly in response to counter-terrorism measures.

In the context of this thesis, the meta-framework is derived from both formal

(e.g., the Shannon and Borden-Kopp models) and informal (e.g., information dominance

and the information conflict continuum) frameworks.

 70

7.4.2 Constructing a Meta-Framework

On occasion one hears a framework referred to, incorrectly, as a model. Models

are, by definition, typically considered to have some mathematical basis. They usually

can be expressed either mathematically or using logic notation and they usually can be

proven formally. When one simply develops an approach that is codified structurally—

such as using a matrix of some sort—one has created a framework, not a model. An

example of a well-known framework is the Zachman Architecture Framework (Zachman;

1987) shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12 - The Zachman Framework for Information Systems Architecture Development

 71

The Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance Framework (CTIDF) introduced

in this thesis is a similar depiction. The difference between the CTIDF and the Zachman

Architecture Framework is that the CTIDF is based upon the frameworks described

throughout this thesis.

7.4.3 Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance Framework (CTIDF)

The CTIDF builds upon the matrix in Table 2. Figure 13 depicts the CTIDF.

Figure 13 - The Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance Framework

There are three dimensions to the CTIDF: The key characteristics of the terrorist

battlespace from Table 2 (left-hand column), the six pillars of information warfare from
 72

Yoshihara (Yoshihara; 2001) (top row), and the elements of Shannon information theory

from the Borden-Kopp model (see the “key”). The Framework applies the Borden-Kopp

elements either from the perspective of the terrorist or the counter-terrorist (-T or -C)

from the pillars to the battlespace.

Thus, in the upper right cell where “Operations Security” and “Deliberate and

planned application of violence” converge, one sees the entries, D&M-T, DoI-T and

D&M-C. That is interpreted as:

• D&M-T – Terrorists will use deception and mimicry as an operational

security countermeasure to prevent opponents from discerning their plans

for applications of violence.

• DoI-T – Terrorists will use techniques to deny access to information about

plans for applications of violence.

• D&M-C – Counter-terrorists can use deception and mimicry to mislead

terrorists as to plans for terrorist application of violence. This is a form of

misinformation.

7.4.4 How the Framework was Constructed

The CTIDF was derived from the six pillars, the terrorist battlespace and the

Borden-Kopp model (properly a model because it is based upon Shannon theory, which is

mathematically sound). The author associated each of the Borden-Kopp elements, both

from the perspective of terrorism and counter-terrorism, with each element of the six

pillars and the battlespace. Multiple Borden-Kopp elements could, therefore, be

associated with an individual element of the six pillars or the terrorist battlespace.
 73

After completing the associations, the author performed a standard link analysis

and extracted all of the relationships from the link analysis map. These relationships

connected individual instances of the Borden-Kopp model to pairings of the six pillars

and the battlespace resulting in the matrix in Figure 13.

7.4.5 Meeting the Requirements for a Meta-Framework

The CTIDF meets Mills’ requirements for a meta-framework as follows:

1. Broad scope – The CTIDF covers the full scope of the terrorist

battlespace and is applicable to range of counter-terrorism activities

including information operations against scale-free social networks.

2. Co-existence – The CTIDF co-exists with other applicable frameworks in

that it does not pose any conflict and, in fact, uses several in its

construction.

3. Abstraction – The CTIDF allows abstraction to the level of an individual

cell within the matrix.

4. Longevity – The CTIDF is not dependent on any particular technology,

technique of operational philosophy that could become obsolete. The

Framework is extensible in the sense that additional elements can be

added as necessary to address increasing detail, granularity and levels of

complexity.

Finally, the CTIDF can be used either evaluate terrorist or counter-terrorism

strategies and tactics, or it may be used to develop counter-terrorism strategies,

campaigns and tactics. Thus, it is both an analytical tool and an operational planning
 74

tool. It also may be used across the entire information dominance continuum.

7.5 Conclusions

The CTIDF shows clearly that there is a generalized meta-framework that may be

used to analyze terrorism and to construct information dominance strategies, tactics and

campaigns. The meta-framework is based upon accepted constructs, both in counter-

terrorism, and information science. The meta-framework meets generally accepted

criteria for a meta-framework and is extensible to accommodate increased levels of

granularity and detail.

 75

8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This thesis has examined the elements of information conflict, terrorism and the

law as relates to the use of information warfare in counter-terrorism. Using accepted

building blocks, the author has constructed a meta-framework for information dominance

that is appropriate for use in a counter-terrorism context. The elements of that meta-

framework are:

1. Information dominance and the information dominance continuum

2. Shannon information theory

3. The Borden-Kopp model

4. Prevailing constructs of information operations and information warfare

5. Analysis of terrorism from a variety of perspectives

6. The legal basis for the use of information operations against terrorist

groups

7. An analysis of the terrorist battlespace that is consistent with current

military thinking regarding physical battlespace

The author concludes that the use of such a meta-framework is both desirable and

practical. However, some areas for future research are outside the scope of this thesis.

These opportunities include, but may not be limited to:

1. Practical verification of the Framework through operational counter-

terrorism practice

2. Additional refinement of the theoretical Framework based upon applied

research
 76

3. Development of a set of processes for applying the Framework in practice

 77

Appendix A – A Taxonomy of Terrorism

TERRORISM
Justifiability
Motive
Is Not Justified
Is Political
Is Religious
Is Symbolic
Actors
Are Non-State
Is a Group
Is a Movement
Is an Organization
Is Not Justified
Hostages
Hostage Taking
Threatens International Peace and Security
Targets the General Population
Induces Fear
Threat of Violence
Means
Use of Force
Advances a Criminal Agenda
Affects Constitutional Structure
Affects Economic Structure
Affects Political Structure
Is Criminal
Detonate Explosives in Public Places
Device or Substance Likely to Destroy Aircraft
Device or Substance Likely to Destroy Ships
Affects are Psychological
Endangers Human Life
Imperils Freedoms or Rights
Imperils Honor
Imperils Lives
Imperils Security
Includes Threat of Force
Induces Fear
Is a Campaign
Is Covert
Is Not Justified
Is Political
Is Religious
Is Systematic
Is Unpredictable
 78

Is Violent
Jeopardizes Property
Seize Control of Aircraft in Flight
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Conspiracy
Advances a Criminal Agenda
Affects Constitutional Structure
Affects Economic Structure
Affects Political Structure
Aiding and Abetting Terrorist Acts
Is Criminal
Affects Are Psychological
Endangers Human Life
Imperils Freedoms or Rights
Imperils Honor
Imperils Lives
Imperils Security
Includes Threat of Force
Induces Fear
Is a Campaign
Is Covert
Is Not Justified
Is Political
Is Religious
Is Systematic
Is Unpredictable
Is Violent
Jeopardizes Property
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Financing
Advances a Criminal Agenda
Affects Constitutional Structure
Affects Economic Structure
Affects Political Structure
Is Criminal
Affects Are Psychological
Endangers Human Life
Imperils Freedoms or Rights
Imperils Honor
Imperils Lives
Imperils Security
Includes Threat of Force
 79

Induces Fear
Is a Campaign
Is Covert
Is Not Justified
Is Political
Is Religious
Is Systematic
Is Unpredictable
Is Violent
Jeopardizes Property
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Aircraft and Ships
Safety of Aircraft
Destroy Aircraft in Flight
Affects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Is an Accomplice of Person Who Seizes Aircraft in
Flight
Jeopardizes Property
Jeopardizes Safety of Passengers
Performs an Act of Violence against Passengers
Renders an Aircraft and Capable Flight
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Targets Air Navigation Facilities
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Communicating False Information
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Targets Airport Facilities
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Safety of Ships
 80

Effects Are Psychological

Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Targets Marine Navigation Facilities
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
State of Terror
Intimidation
Advances a Criminal Agenda
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Is Systematic
Provokes the General State of Terror
Results from Major Economic Loss
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
International Peace and Security
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
General Public
Causes Death or Injury
Compel Government or International Organization
to Act or Not to Act
Destabilization
Rights of People
Disruption of Resources
Penalties
Aircraft and Ships
Safety of Aircraft
Targets Air Navigation Facilities
Communicating False Information
Targets Airport Facilities
Safety of Ships
Targets Marine Navigation Facilities
Hostages
Hostage Taking
Damage to Property or Environment
 81

Public or Private Property

Environment
Electronic Systems
Means
Use of Force
Conspiracy
Financing
Damage to Property or Environment
Targets Public or Private Property
Damage Is Serious
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Targets Environment
Damage Is Substantial
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Targets Electronic Systems
Delivers Essential Government Services
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Is a Financial System
Is a Telecommunication System
Is an Information System
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Targets General Public
Causes Death or Injury
Are Civilians
Are Noncombatants
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Compel Government or International Organization to Act
or Not to Act
Are Civilians
Are Noncombatants
Doing Any Act
 82

Effects Are Psychological

Induces Fear
Not Doing Any Act
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Destabilization
Affects Constitutional Structure
Affects Economic Structure
Affects Political Structure
Are Civilians
Are Noncombatants
Causes General Insurrection
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Is Systematic
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Threatens Sovereignty
Threatens Territorial Integrity
Threatens Political Unity
Attacks Rights of People
Are Civilians
Are Noncombatants
Effects Are Psychological
Imperils Freedoms or Rights
Imperils Honor
Imperils Security
Imperils Lives
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Disruption of Resources
Affects Electrical Power
Affects Natural Resources
Affects Water Supply
Are Civilians
Are Noncombatants
Effects Are Psychological
Endangers Human Life
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
 83

Criminal Penalties
Are Civilians
Are Criminal
Are Noncombatants
Effects Are Psychological
Induces Fear
Targets General Population
Threat of Violence
Threatens International Peace and Security
Internationally Protected Persons
Murder
Kidnapping
Attack Official Premises
Is Violent
Targets Residence
 84

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