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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC
COUNSELORS, INC., a Nevada Non-Profit
Corporation; et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NARCONON INTERNATIONAL, a California
Non-Profit Corporation; et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 6:14-cv-00187-RAW
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MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT

DAVID MISCAVIGE
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Jeffrey K. Riffer, Cal. Bar No. 87016
Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben
Gartside LLP
2049 Century Park East, 27th Fl.
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 746-4406
[Admitted Pro Hac Vice]
David L. Bryant, OBA No. 1262
David E. Keglovits, OBA No. 14259
Amelia A. Fogleman, OBA No. 16221
GABLEGOTWALS
1100 ONEOK Plaza
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4217
(918) 595-4800
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
DAVID MISCAVIGE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

II.

THE PARTIES .................................................................................................... 3

III.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................... 6

A.

B.

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THERE IS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER MR.

MISCAVIGE ............................................................................................. 6
1.

Basic Principles of Personal Jurisdiction ..................................... 6

2.

There is No General Jurisdiction .................................................. 8

3.

There is No Specific Jurisdiction .................................................. 8

4.

Plaintiffs Conspiracy Allegation Should Be Disregarded ........ 9

5.

The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Mr. Miscavige Would

Be Unreasonable, Unfair, and in Violation of Due Process ...... 10
a.

Burden On The Defendant Of Litigating In The

Forum ................................................................................ 11

b.

Forum States Interest In Adjudicating The Dispute...... 11

c.

Plaintiffs Interest In Convenient And Effective

Relief.................................................................................. 12

d.

Interstate Judicial Systems Interest In Obtaining

Efficient Resolution .......................................................... 12

e.

State Interest In Furthering Substantive Social

Policies............................................................................... 13

ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM .......... 14

1.

Plaintiffs Claims and Basic Trademark Principles ................... 14

2.

There is No Secondary Liability under Trademark Law ........... 19

a.

There is No Vicarious Liability ........................................ 19

b.

There is No Contributory Liability .................................. 19

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C.
IV.

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c.

There is No Conspiracy Liability under

Trademark Law ................................................................ 19

d.

In Any Event, Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately

Alleged Civil Conspiracy................................................... 21
i.

Civil Conspiracy Requires Damages, and

Plaintiffs Have None .............................................. 21

ii.

Plaintiffs Failed to Plead Any Facts

Regarding Mr. Miscaviges Involvement In
Any Conspiracy to Misuse Plaintiffs
Trademarks ............................................................ 21

THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAVE TO AMEND................................... 24

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 25

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc.,
722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) .................................................................. 14, 17, 19
Am. Educ. Corp. v. Chase,
2006 WL 2044932 47788 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2006) ............................................. 7
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) .............................................................................................. 3
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) ................................ 21, 22
Banks v. Am. Baptist Churches,
CIV-14-100-RAW, 2014 WL 3037603 (E.D. Okla. July 3, 2014) .................... 23, 24
Barsh v. Mullins,
338 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1959) ...................................................................................... 21
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) ........................................ 9
Brock v. Thompson,
948 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1997) ...................................................................................... 19
Change of Name v. Francis John Deisler
No. 02C01-9909-MI-000109 Allen Cir. Court (1999) .............................................. 4
Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S.Ct. 746 (2014) ......................................................................................... 6, 7, 8
Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co.,
392 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 15, 16
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Inc.,
514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 7, 8
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
U.S. , 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ................................................... 8
Hitch Enterprises, Inc. v. Cimarex Energy Co.,
859 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (W.D. Okla. 2012) ............................................................... 13
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Kerber v. Qwest Group Life Ins. Plan,

647 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................ 21
Khalik v. United Air Lines,
671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................ 9
Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014) ............................................................................................. 18
Mandelbaum v. Fiserv, Inc.,
787 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2011)..................................................................... 22
NAFC v. Assn for Treatment of Sexual Abusers,
1:09-cv-00093-TLS, N.D. Indiana, Dkt. 16-3 ..................................................... 5, 14
National Assn of Forensic Counselors v. Fleming,
143 Ohio App.3d 811, 759 N.E.2d 389 (2001).................................................... 5, 14
National Assn of Forensic Counselors v. State Bd.,
814 A.2d 815 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) ................................................................ 5, 14
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co.,
149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998) ............................................................ 11, 12, 13, 14
Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assn Plan,
205 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................ 7
Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co.,
19 F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ....................................................................... 20
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen,
222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 19
Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co.,
839 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1988) ................................................................................ 8
Robbins v. Oklahoma,
519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) .............................................................................. 22
Shrader v. Biddinger,
633 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 10
Sleepy Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Grp., Inc.,
809 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (N.D. Okla. 2011) ................................................................ 11
TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti,
993 F.2d 722 (10th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................ 21
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Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,

505 U.S. 763, 112 S.Ct. 2753 (1992) ...................................................................... 16
Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research,
527 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 15, 17
Walberg v. State,
73 Wis. 2d 448, 243 N.W.2d 190 (1976) ................................................................... 4
Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc.,
726 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2013) .............................................................................. 16
Statutes and Other Authorities
4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 25:23 (4th ed.
2014).................................................................................................................. 19, 20
12 O.S. 1449 .............................................................................................................. 13
12 O.S. 2004(F)............................................................................................................ 7
15 U.S.C. 1057 ........................................................................................................... 15
15 U.S.C. 1127 ........................................................................................................... 14
Cal. Code of Regs., Title 9, 13000 ......................................................................... 5, 13
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)................................................................................................ 7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) ................................................................................................... 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................................... 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 ......................................................................................................... 13

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Defendant David Miscavige moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Alternatively, specially appearing, he moves to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are two Nevada entities with a principal place of business in

Indiana. They sued 82 defendants in Oklahoma federal court even though only 13
defendants are alleged to live in Oklahoma; the rest reside in at least 14 other
states, Canada and the United Kingdom.
Mr. Miscavige is one of the defendants who does not live in Oklahoma. He is
the Chairman of the Board of Religious Technology Center (RTC) and the
ecclesiastical leader of the Scientology religion, a widely-recognized, global religion
ministering to millions through thousands of churches, missions, and groups in
more than 150 countries. RTC is a California non-profit religious corporation
established to own and maintain Scientology trademarks (and which has nothing to
do with plaintiffs trademarks). RTC filed its own motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
This Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Mr. Miscavige and
Plaintiffs have stated no claim against him.
Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiffs Complaint is 44 pages long and contains 304
paragraphs Mr. Miscavige is mentioned 5 times.
None of the allegations show any connection between Mr. Miscavige and the
State of Oklahoma. None of the allegations show that Mr. Miscavige is liable to the
Plaintiffs on the merits. It is harassing to name Mr. Miscavige as a defendant when
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(a) he has no meaningful contacts with Oklahoma; (b) the only fact alleged against
him is that he gave a 2002 speech to a religious convocation, which speech was not
wrongful; and (c) RTC is already named as a defendant.
There is No Personal Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs admit that Mr. Miscavige
currently is a resident and citizen of Los Angeles, State of California. See
Complaint 63.
Mr. Miscavige has no meaningful contacts with Oklahoma. He has no assets
here; pays no taxes here; and is not registered to vote here. He has been in
Oklahoma only once, and that was for only a few hours in 2003 and had nothing to
do with the allegations in the Complaint. (Plaintiffs allege that the wrongful
scheme began in 2006, see Complaint 212.) There is no personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs Complaint Fails to State a Claim. Mr. Miscavige is the leader of
Scientology, a world-wide religion. He never misused any of Plaintiffs alleged
trademarks (and had no reason to do so).
Plaintiffs 44-page Complaint alleges no facts to the contrary only
conclusory allegations that Mr. Miscavige was part of some scheme to misuse their
alleged marks. Such conclusory allegations fail to state a claim under United
States Supreme Court holdings.
In addition, Plaintiffs scheme is also not plausible for another reason.
Plaintiffs allege, without any facts, a scheme:
(a) taking place over 8 years, see Complaint 212;

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(b) in three countries (on two continents) and in 14 states in the U.S., see
Complaint 20 (Canada), 22 (United Kingdom), 5 (Georgia), 8 (California),
11 (Indiana), 13 (Nevada), 14 (Colorado), 16 (Texas), 17 (Virginia), 21
(Michigan), 33 (Massachusetts), 43 (Hawaii), 52 (Pennsylvania), 53
(Florida), 59 (Arkansas), 68 (Louisiana);
(c) involving 82 defendants, see Complaint 3-84;
(d) who supposedly misused Plaintiffs trademarks in different ways, see
Complaint 125 (logos), 126 (National Board endorsement), 127 (CCDC
certification), 148 (MAC certification).
Such an implausible scheme fails to state a claim.
II.

THE PARTIES
Mr. Miscavige. Mr. Miscavige has been the ecclesiastical leader of the

Scientology religion for over 25 years. He is Chairman of RTC, a California nonprofit religious corporation established to own and maintain Scientology
trademarks. See Warren McShanes Declaration 3-4, attached to RTCs motion
to dismiss, Dkt. No. 247-1.
Mr. Miscavige has dedicated his life to his faith and to the service of its
parishioners. He travels around the world, on a regular basis, presiding (and
speaking) at international Church events.
Plaintiffs admit that Mr. Miscavige currently is a resident and citizen of Los
Angeles, State of California, see Complaint 63, which is a binding admission. See
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 at n. 6

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(2013) (Factual assertions in pleadings and pretrial orders, unless amended, are
considered judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party who made them.).
Mr. Miscavige has no meaningful contacts with Oklahoma. He owns no
property here; rents no property here; has no assets here; has no home here; has no
office here; has no telephone listing here; pays no taxes here; has no bank account
here; and is not registered to vote here. He has been in Oklahoma only once, and
that was only for a few hours (and such trip had nothing to do with the allegations
in the Complaint). See Mr. Miscaviges Decl. 3, 4.
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are the National Association of Forensic Counselors
(NAFC) and its subsidiary, American Academy of Certified Forensic Counselors,
Inc., dba American College of Certified Forensic Counselors (ACCFC).
Plaintiffs are organized under the laws of the State of Nevada. See
Complaint 1-2. Their principal place of business [is] in Indiana. See id.
They are not registered to do business in Oklahoma. See Request for Judicial
Notice (RJN), Ex. 1.
NAFC was founded by Francis Deisler, a convicted felon (armed robbery and
rape) who was sentenced to 15 years in state prison after pleading guilty. Walberg
v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 448, 450, 243 N.W.2d 190, 191 (1976).
He later changed his name to Frank John Palani. Change of Name v. Francis
John Deisler No. 02C01-9909-MI-000109 Allen Cir. Court (1999), RJN, Ex. 2.
Deisler a/k/a Palani along with his wife, Karla Taylor, organized, dissolved,
and then organized again various entities named National Association of Forensic

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Counselors or National Association of Forensic Counselors, Inc. 1 Deislers business

model was to sell a piece of paper called a certification to counselors. His
attempts to obtain recognition for his certification program have routinely been
rejected. See National Assn of Forensic Counselors v. State Bd., 814 A.2d 815, 825
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (NAFC excluded from list of national credentialing agencies
who are exempt from taking Pennsylvanias licensing examination); National Assn
of Forensic Counselors v. Fleming, 143 Ohio App.3d 811, 759 N.E.2d 389 (2001)
(affirming refusal to recognize NAFC certification).
The New Hampshire legislature rejected a proposal to make NAFC the
official licensing body for treatment of offenders, and an official of that states
Department of Corrections stated she was not impressed by its training. NAFC
v. Assn for Treatment of Sexual Abusers, 1:09-cv-00093-TLS, N.D. Indiana, Dkt. 163, RJN, Ex. 3.
Some states, such as California, regulate such certifications, and prescribe
which organizations are authorized to certify drug dependency counselors. See Cal.
Code of Regs., Title 9, 13000, RJN, Ex. 4. NAFC is not on the approved list of
California providers (see Cal. Code of Regs., Title 9, 13035, RJN, Ex. 5) but, it
continues to issue its certificates there.

NAFCs corporate smokescreens continue in the Complaint here, where NAFC is

attempting to recover for alleged violations relating to the National Board of Addiction
Examiners (NBAE) and certain of NBAE certifications. See e.g., Complaint 121, 126. Yet
what is NBAE and on what grounds does NAFC pursue such claims? The following is the
unintelligible answer: NBAE was a short-lived sub-board under NAFC that was created in
1996 and dissolved in 1999, yet continued as a specialty subdivision under NAFC until 2006
when it was completely eliminated. Complaint 239-41.
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NAFC advertises that it offers national credentials and recognition, but

that is false. There is no recognized national credential for such certifications. The
body that sets the standards [and] requirements for NAFC certifications, is
NAFCs co-plaintiff, the American Academy of Certified Forensic Counselors
(AACFC), another Deisler/Taylor entity. See Complaint 95.
Other certification boards use the same generic or descriptive trademarks.
The National Association for Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors (NAADAC)
offers a certification with a Master Addiction Counselor (MAC) designation. See
RJN, Ex. 6, available at http://www.naadac.org/mac.
MAC is a certification mark to certify persons who are performing
substance abuse counseling and has been registered to the MAC Consortium
not Plaintiffs since April 1998. See RJN, Ex. 7.
Plaintiffs have no case on the merits. They know it. Thats why they sued 82
defendants hoping that enough defendants would pay something to be done with
them, thereby obtaining a tidy return on the filing fee they had to pay to start this
lawsuit. This Court should put an end to Plaintiffs misuse of the federal courts.
III.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A.

THERE IS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER MR. MISCAVIGE

1.

Basic Principles of Personal Jurisdiction

A court cannot grant relief against a defendant unless it has personal

jurisdiction over such defendant. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754
(2014).

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Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each

defendant. See Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063,
1069 (10th Cir. 2008).
Before a federal court can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
federal question case, the court must determine (1) whether the applicable statute
potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on the defendant
and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Peay v.
Bellsouth Med. Assn Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000).
The Lanham Act, under which Plaintiffs assert a claim, does not provide for
nationwide service of process. See, e.g., Am. Educ. Corp. v. Chase, 2006 WL
2044932 47788, at *2 n.4 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2006). Therefore, under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(1)(A), the law of the forum state (Oklahoma) is applied. See Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014).
Oklahoma permits personal jurisdiction to be exercised on any basis
consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United
States. 12 O.S. 2004(F). Accordingly, this Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction only if the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution are met.
[T]o exercise jurisdiction in harmony with due process, defendants must
have minimum contacts with the forum state, such that having to defend a lawsuit
there would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070.

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In assessing a defendants contacts with the forum state, the Court may
consider two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general. See Rambo v.
American S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir. 1988).
Jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendants contacts with the forum state is specific jurisdiction. In contrast,
where the suit does not arise from or relate to the defendants contacts with the
forum and jurisdiction is based on the defendants presence or accumulated contacts
with the forum, the court exercises general jurisdiction. Id.
2.

There is No General Jurisdiction

A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreigncountry) [defendants] to hear any and all claims against them when their
affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 754.
For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction
is the individual's domicile. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
U.S. , 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011).
Mr. Miscavige has no continuous or systematic contacts with Oklahoma.
His domicile is in California. See Mr. Miscaviges Decl. 3-4.
3.

There is No Specific Jurisdiction

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction if the defendant has purposefully

directed its activities at residents of the forum state and the plaintiffs injuries
arise out of defendants forum-related activities. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071.

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Mr. Miscavige has not directed any activities at Oklahoma residents.

Plaintiffs are Nevada entities whose principal place of business is in Indiana. They
are not registered to do business in Oklahoma. They suffered no injuries, certainly
not in Oklahoma. But, even if they had, such injuries would not have arisen out of
Mr. Miscaviges forum-related activities because there were no such activities.
Plaintiffs made a binding judicial admission that Mr. Miscavige is a
California resident. See Section II. Their 44 page Complaint does not allege facts
regarding any forum-related activities by Mr. Miscavige and Mr. Miscavige has
no such activities. See Mr. Miscaviges Decl. 3-4. Thus, there is no specific
jurisdiction.
4.

Plaintiffs Conspiracy Allegation Should Be Disregarded

Plaintiffs Complaint alleges with no supporting facts that personal

jurisdiction exists over all Defendants due to Defendants participation in a civil
conspiracy with its [sic] co-Defendants located in this forum. See Complaint 86.
In general, conclusory allegations are disregarded. See Khalik v. United Air
Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012) (While [s]pecific facts are not
necessary, some facts are.) (disregarding conclusory allegations).
Specifically, conclusory allegations of a conspiracy should be disregarded. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L. Ed. 2d
929 (2007) (a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does
not supply facts adequate to show illegality).
A conclusory conspiracy allegation does not meet plaintiffs burden to show
personal jurisdiction. A plaintiff must offer more than bare allegations that a
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conspiracy existed, and must allege facts that would support a prima facie showing
of a conspiracy. Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiffs offer no more than bare allegations of conspiracy.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Miscavige made misstatements about
NBAE (National Board of Addiction Examiners) certifications during an event held
in Florida. (Complaint 248.) There was no infringement, but the allegation is
irrelevant under any circumstances.
First, this event was in 2002 but Plaintiffs allege the conspiracy began in
2006. See Complaint at 212. The speech could not be in furtherance of an alleged
conspiracy that did not exist.
Second, this event was in Florida, not Oklahoma. See Complaint 248.
Plaintiffs allege that the speech was transmitted via satellite, but it was never
transmitted into Oklahoma; it was only relayed locally from the main venue to an
overflow hall a few miles away. See Mr. McShane Declaration 18, attached to
RTCs motion to dismiss, Dkt No. 247-1. 2
5.

The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Mr. Miscavige Would Be

Unreasonable, Unfair, and in Violation of Due Process

In determining whether exercise of jurisdiction is so unreasonable as to

violate fair play and substantial justice, we consider: (1) the burden
on the defendant, (2) the forum states interest in resolving the
dispute, (3) the plaintiffs interest in receiving convenient and effective
relief, (4) the interstate judicial systems interest in obtaining the most
2

In Opposition to RTCs motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs

argued that Mr. Miscavige promoted the Narconon program. But, the argument proves nothing.
The issue is whether Mr. Miscavige infringed Plaintiffs trademarks. He did not. Indeed,
Plaintiffs never allege that he did. See also Section III.B.1 (Mr. Miscaviges 2002 speech was
not trademark infringement as a matter of law).
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efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the

several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 1086, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 1998).
These factors demonstrate the unreasonableness of exercising personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Miscavige, as shown below.
a.

Burden On The Defendant Of Litigating In The Forum

[T]he burden on the defendant of litigating the case in a foreign forum is of

primary concern in determining the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction. OMI
Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1096.
The burden on Mr. Miscavige in this case is significant. He is a California
resident, the leader of a world-wide religion and has no contacts with Oklahoma.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Mr. Miscavige.
b.

Forum States Interest In Adjudicating The Dispute

Plaintiffs are not Oklahoma residents. They are Nevada corporations with
their principal places of business in Fort Wayne, Indiana. They are not registered
to do business in Oklahoma. They brought claims against 82 Defendants 13 living
in Oklahoma and the others residing in at least 14 states, Canada and the United
Kingdom. Those claims are based on conduct that was not centered in Oklahoma,
but rather allegedly occurred in the various places where the Defendants reside.
Thus, Oklahoma has no greater interest in adjudicating the dispute than any
of these other jurisdictions. Cf. Sleepy Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Grp., Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 2d 1300, 1310 (N.D. Okla. 2011) (forum state has an interest in exercising

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personal jurisdiction over a defendant where one or more of the plaintiffs is a

resident of the forum).
c.

Plaintiffs Interest In Convenient And Effective Relief

This element hinges on whether Plaintiffs may obtain convenient and

effective relief elsewhere. This factor may weigh heavily in cases where a
plaintiffs chances of recovery will be greatly diminished by forcing him to litigate in
another forum because of that forums laws or because the burden may be so
overwhelming as to practically foreclose pursuit of the lawsuit. OMI Holdings,
Inc., 149 F.3d at 1097.
No such danger exists here. Plaintiffs are Nevada corporations based in
Indiana and not registered to do business in Oklahoma. There is no a peculiarity of
Oklahoma law that greatly enhances their chances of recovery here. Thus, this
factor does not support this Courts assertion of jurisdiction.
d.

Interstate Judicial Systems Interest In Obtaining

Efficient Resolution

This factor examines whether the forum state is the most efficient place to
litigate the dispute. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1097. Key parts of this inquiry are
where the underlying wrong occurred and what states substantive law governs. Id.
Plaintiffs are Nevada entities with a principal place of business in Indiana
and not registered to do business in Oklahoma. Only 13 of the 82 Defendants live
in Oklahoma. The alleged wrongs mostly did not occur here. Plaintiffs claims are

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based on federal statutes or common law, not Oklahoma law. 3 Thus, Oklahoma is
not the most efficient forum.
e.

State Interest In Furthering Substantive Social Policies

The final factor is the interests of the several states, in addition to the forum
state, in advancing fundamental substantive social policies. OMI Holdings, 149
F.3d at 1097.
This factor focuses on whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum state
affects substantive social policies of other states. Oklahomas exercise of
jurisdiction over Mr. Miscavige would affect the substantive social policies of
California. As stated in Section II above, California regulates certifications like
those claimed by Plaintiffs, and prescribes which organizations are authorized to
certify drug dependency counselors. See Cal. Code of Regs., Title 9, 13000, RJN,
Ex. 4. NAFC is not on the approved list of California providers (see Cal. Code of
Regs., Title 9, 13035, RJN, Ex. 5) but, it continues to issue its certificates there.
California has an interest in preventing unauthorized certification providers like
Plaintiffs who dont meet Californias standards from harassing its residents,
3

(a) Plaintiffs concede that their one Oklahoma claim, for violation of the right-ofpublicity statute, 12 O.S. 1449, has no merit. See Dkt. No. 326, Plaintiffs Response to
Defendants Pita, et al., motion to dismiss, at Section IV, p.15; (b) Plaintiffs civil conspiracy
cause of action fails because civil conspiracy requires a meeting of minds on [an] object or
course of action to commit an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means, see
Hitch Enterprises, Inc. v. Cimarex Energy Co., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1268 (W.D. Okla. 2012),
and Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing there was any meeting of minds between Mr.
Miscavige and any of the defendants who allegedly committed the wrongful acts; (c) Plaintiffs
preliminary injunction cause of action fails because a preliminary injunction is a remedy, see
FRCP Rule 65 of Title VIII titled Provisional and Final Remedies(emphasis added), not a
claim, and Plaintiffs have not made the required showing for such a remedy.

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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 20 of 37

such as Mr. Miscavige. Indeed, at least three other states have disavowed Plaintiffs
certifications Ohio (see NAFC, 143 Ohio App.3d 811), Pennsylvania (see NAFC,
814 A.2d at 825) and New Hampshire (RJN, Ex. 3). See also Section II above.
***
[P]ersonal jurisdiction analysis requires that [the court] draw a line in the
sand. At some point, the facts supporting jurisdiction in a given forum are so
lacking that the notions of fundamental fairness inherent in the Due Process Clause
preclude a district court from exercising jurisdiction over a defendant. OMI
Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1098 (10th Cir. 1998).
Mr. Miscaviges contact with Oklahoma is so slight that forcing him to
litigate here is unreasonable and inconsistent with the notions of fair play and
substantial justice which form the bedrock of the due process inquiry. Id.
B.

ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM

1.

Plaintiffs Claims and Basic Trademark Principles

Plaintiffs first claim is for trademark 4 infringement under the Lanham Act;
their second claim is for common law trademark infringement; and their third claim
is for unfair competition under the Lanham Act. 5

Plaintiffs Complaint refers to trademarks, but the alleged marks are actually service
marks or certification marks. 15 U.S.C. 1127.
The treatment of different types of marks is the same. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2013).
5

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14

6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 21 of 37

Plaintiffs allege that the following marks were infringed: a registered service
mark, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC COUNSELORS, (the NAFC
Mark); an unregistered service mark, the NAFC Logo (see Complaint at 108); and
unregistered certification marks (viz,. Master Addiction Counselor (MAC),
Certified Chemical Dependency Counselor (C.C.D.C.), Certified Forensic
Addictions Specialist (CFAS), formerly known as Certified Forensic Addictions
Examiner (CFAE), Certified Criminal Justice Addictions Specialist (CCJAS),
Certified Co-Occuring Disorder Specialist (CCODS), Baccalaureate Addictions
Counselor (BAC)).
Plaintiffs three claims are essentially identical. See Utah Lighthouse
Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir.
2008) (trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act have
virtually identical elements); Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1219
(10th Cir. 2004) (The elements of common law trademark or service mark
infringement are similar to those required to prove unfair competition under 43(a)
of the Lanham Act.).
The elements of such claims are that (1) the plaintiff has a protectable
interest in the mark; (2) the defendant has used an identical or similar mark in
commerce; and (3) the defendants use is likely to confuse consumers. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1050
(10th Cir. 2008). 6
6

For registered marks, the elements are slightly different as there is a presumption that
the registered mark is a valid mark. See 15 U.S.C. 1057.
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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 22 of 37

First, Plaintiffs have no protectable interest in the purported unregistered

service and certification marks. No party can have a monopoly on words of the
English language. Accordingly, trademark law does not protect generic trademarks
and rarely protects descriptive trademarks. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2757 (1992) (generic marksthose that refe[r]
to the genus of which the particular product is a species, are not registrable as
trademarks.) (internal citations omitted); Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726
F.3d 1136, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013) (Generic marks are not protected as trademarks,
and a descriptive mark can receive trademark protection only when it has acquired
a secondary meaning by becoming distinctive of the [owners] goods in commerce.)
(internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs unregistered Service and Certification Marks are generic or
descriptive (with no allegation they have acquired distinctiveness or secondary
meaning 7) and thus not protectable.
Other entities use identical marks to describe their certifications. The
National Association for Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors (NAADAC) offers
a Master Addiction Counselor (MAC) certification. See RJN, Ex. 6, available at

Marks which are merely descriptive of a product are not inherently distinctive .
They do not inherently identify a particular source, and hence cannot be protected, unless they
acquire the distinctiveness which will allow them to be protected. This acquired
distinctiveness is generally called secondary meaning. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). Secondary meaning exists only if most consumers have come to
think of the word as not descriptive at all but as the name of the product [or service]. Donchez
v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (bracket in Donchez, internal
quotations omitted). Plaintiffs alleged marks have not acquired secondary meaning.

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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 23 of 37

http://www.naadac.org/mac. MAC is a certification mark to certify persons who

are performing substance abuse counseling and has been registered to the MAC
Consortium not Plaintiffs since April 1998. See RJN, Ex. 7.
Certified Chemical Dependency Counselor is generically used to describe
someone who helps people recover from addictions to alcohol, drugs and tobacco.
(See RJN, Ex. 8, available at
http://degreedirectory.org/articles/Certified_Chemical_Dependency_Counselor_
Career_and_Salary_FAQs.html).
Second, Plaintiffs never allege that Mr. Miscavige used any of Plaintiffs
marks, registered or unregistered, in commerce. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v.
Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 2008) (To
invoke the protections of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show that the alleged
infringer used the plaintiff's mark in connection with any goods or services. This is
commonly described as the commercial use requirement.) (internal citations
omitted).
Mr. Miscavige is absent from the list of Defendants with allegedly infringing
websites and publications. See Complaint 116 242, and 250.
Moreover, the services promoted by the alleged use of NAFC certifications
and logo were not Mr. Miscaviges services because he does not provide drug
treatment and rehabilitation services.
Third, Plaintiffs never allege facts showing that any consumers were
confused as a result of Mr. Miscaviges acts. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, 722 F.3d at

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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 24 of 37

1238 (The central question in a typical infringement action under either 32 or

43(a) is whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark is likely to cause
consumer confusion.) (emphasis added).
Finally, the Supreme Court recently held that to invoke the Lanham Acts
cause of action for false advertising, a plaintiff must plead (and ultimately prove) an
injury to a commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused
by the defendants misrepresentations. Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1395 (2014). Plaintiffs never alleged any facts
showing that they lost any sales or their business reputation was damaged as a
result of Mr. Miscaviges acts.
Plaintiffs sole factual allegation against Mr. Miscavige was that he gave a
2002 speech, in Florida, to other Scientologists at a religious convocation, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Board of RTC and ecclesiastical leader of the
Scientology religion. Such a speech is not infringement and there is no allegation
that anything in that speech was false advertising. The speech was given before
Plaintiffs allege the conspiracy started (2006); the speech did not use any of
Plaintiffs trademarks or certification marks; there was no consumer confusion; and
the speech was not the cause of any commercial injury to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs know that Mr. Miscavige did not infringe their marks and so they
attempt to impose liability on him for the acts of others. There is no secondary
liability either, as shown below.

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2.

There is No Secondary Liability under Trademark Law

a.

There is No Vicarious Liability

A party is vicariously liable for an infringing partys trademark infringement

only where there is an agency or employment relationship between the infringing
party and the party to be held liable. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222
F.3d 1262, 1277 (10th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs never alleged that Mr. Miscavige employed any of the Defendants
who supposedly directly infringed Plaintiffs marks or that those Defendants acted
on his personal behalf with his consent. Thus, there is no vicarious liability.
b.

There is No Contributory Liability

[C]ontributory infringement generally consists of either intentionally

causing or knowingly facilitating the infringement of the plaintiffs mark by a third
party. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiffs never alleged that Mr. Miscavige intentionally caused, or
knowingly facilitated, the infringement of other Defendants. As such, there is no
contributory liability.
c.

There is No Conspiracy Liability under Trademark Law

By and large, use of the word conspiracy in civil tort law is a misnomer, for
in most jurisdictions, there is no separate tort liability of conspiracy. 4 McCarthy
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 25:23 (4th ed. 2014).
Oklahoma is one of those jurisdictions with no such separate tort liability.
Brock v. Thompson, 948 P.2d 279, 294 (Okla. 1997), as corrected (Apr. 3, 1998)
([C]ivil conspiracy itself does not create liability. To be liable the conspirators must
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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 26 of 37

pursue an independently unlawful purpose or use an independently unlawful

means. There can be no civil conspiracy where the act complained of and the means
employed are lawful.).
The use of the word conspiracy is merely another way of describing a
concert of action and intent which will extend tort liability beyond the active
wrongdoer to those who merely planned, assisted or encouraged his [or her] acts.
Such conspirators are, in civil law, called joint tortfeasors. In a civil conspiracy to
infringe a trademark, the co-conspirators are joint tortfeasors, jointly and severally
liable for all compensatory damages. 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition 25:23 (4th ed. 2014).
But [m]ere knowledge of the primary actors wrongful conduct is insufficient
to establish that a defendant is a joint tortfeasor. [T]here must be a finding that the
defendant and the direct infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have
authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint
ownership or control over the infringing product. Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein
Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 157, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (internal citations
omitted).
Plaintiffs never alleged that Mr. Miscavige had an apparent or actual
partnership [with infringing defendants], ha[d] authority to bind one another in
transactions with third parties or exercise[d] joint ownership or control over the
infringing product. Id.

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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 27 of 37

d.

In Any Event, Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Alleged

Civil Conspiracy
i.

Civil Conspiracy Requires Damages, and Plaintiffs

Have None

An essential element of a claim of civil conspiracy is a showing that the

plaintiff suffered actual damages as a result of the conspiracy. See TK-7 Corp. v.
Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 725 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); Barsh v.
Mullins, 338 P.2d 845, 847 (Okla. 1959).
Plaintiffs have not alleged any actual damages so Plaintiffs Complaint fails
to allege a conspiracy. (Plaintiffs conclusory allegations of damages are not entitled
to any legal significance. See, e.g., Complaint at 259 (financial and reputational
damages), 264 (damage to status in the industry), 266 (substantial
damages), 282 (damages), and 296 (irreparable harm and loss)).
ii.

Plaintiffs Failed to Plead Any Facts Regarding Mr.

Miscaviges Involvement In Any Conspiracy to
Misuse Plaintiffs Trademarks

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173
L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); See Kerber v. Qwest Group Life Ins. Plan, 647 F.3d 950, 959
(10th Cir. 2011) (to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege
419029v1

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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 28 of 37

sufficient facts to make the claim plausible on its face) (citation omitted));
Mandelbaum v. Fiserv, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234 (D. Colo. 2011) (In
evaluating the plausibility of a given claim, the Court need not accept conclusory
allegations without supporting factual averments.).
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
[W]here the well-pleaded facts[ 8] do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has allegedbut it has not
show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief and the complaint should be
dismissed. Id.
The Tenth Circuit explained the reasons for proper pleadings. Where
plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to relief at the pleading stage, the
cost of discovery [is imposed] on the defendants for no plausible basis. [I]t is only
by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no
reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence
. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).

Well-pleaded facts are to be distinguished from conclusory allegations. Wellpleaded facts are accepted as true in ruling on a motion to dismiss; conclusory allegations are
disregarded in ruling on such motions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1954, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 29 of 37

This Court recently dismissed claims against Defendant American Baptist

Churches because plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading requirements. Banks v. Am.
Baptist Churches, CIV-14-100-RAW, 2014 WL 3037603 (E.D. Okla. July 3, 2014).
To survive the motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Plaintiffs must nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted).
The plausibility standard requires more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendants liability, it stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief. In other words, the well-pleaded facts must
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at *2.
The Tenth Circuit has noted that plausibility in this context must refer to
the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they
encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs have not
nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. The allegations
must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just
speculatively) has a claim for relief. The plausibility requirement serves not only to
weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a
reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual
grounds of the claim against them. Id. at *2.

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In a case against multiple defendants, it is particularly important ... that the

complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide
each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.
Otherwise, the Complaint would fail to provide fair notice and to present a plausible
right to relief. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted).
Thus, Plaintiffs allegations do not state a claim against Mr. Miscavige.
Plaintiffs scheme is also not plausible for another reason. Plaintiffs allege,
without any facts, a scheme: (a) taking place over 8 years, see Complaint 212; (b)
in three countries (on two continents) and in 14 states in the U.S., see Complaint
20 (Canada), 22 (United Kingdom), 5 (Georgia), 8 (California), 11 (Indiana),
13 (Nevada), 14 (Colorado), 16 (Texas), 17 (Virginia), 21 (Michigan), 33
(Massachusetts), 43 (Hawaii), 52 (Pennsylvania), 53 (Florida), 59
(Arkansas), 68 (Louisiana); (c) involving 82 defendants, see Complaint 3-84; (d)
who supposedly misused Plaintiffs' trademarks in different ways, see Complaint
125 (logos), 126 (National Board endorsement), 127 (CCDC certification),
148 (MAC certification). Such an implausible scheme fails to state a claim.
C.

THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAVE TO AMEND

This Court recently denied leave to amend where amendment would be futile.
American Baptist was added simply because Bacone [College] is allegedly
associated with the Baptist religion. Plaintiffs have failed not only to specify what
American Baptist did in violation of any of their rights, but to make any allegations
against American Baptist at all. Amendment would be futile. Banks, 2014 WL
3037603 at *3.
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Here, Plaintiffs 44 page Complaint made no substantive allegations against

Mr. Miscavige. The lawsuit against him should end.
IV.

CONCLUSION
There is no personal jurisdiction over Mr. Miscavige. Alternatively, the

Complaint does not state a claim against him.

DATED: October 30, 2014
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jeffrey K. Riffer
Jeffrey K. Riffer, Cal. Bar No. 87016
Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben
Gartside LLP
2049 Century Park East, 27th Fl.
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 746-4406
[Admitted Pro Hac Vice]
David L. Bryant, OBA No. 1262
David E. Keglovits, OBA No. 14259
Amelia A. Fogleman, OBA No. 16221
GABLEGOTWALS
1100 ONEOK Plaza
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4217
(918) 595-4800
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
DAVID MISCAVIGE

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 30th day of October, 2014, I electronically transmitted
the attached document to the Clerk of Court using the ECF System for filing and
transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following ECF registrants:
1.

419029v1

Donald M. Bingham
don_bingham@riggsabney.com
Wm. Gregory James
gjames@riggsabney.com
M. David Riggs
driggs@riggsabney.com
Riggs Abney Neal Turpen
Orbison & Lewis (Tulsa)

representing

26

Narconon of Oklahoma, Inc.

(Counter Claimant)
Narconon of Oklahoma, Inc.
(Defendant)
Dena G. Goad
(Defendant)
Derry Hallmark
(Defendant)
Janet Watkins
(Defendant)
Kathy Gosselin
(Defendant)
Kent McGregor
(Counter Claimant)
Kent McGregor
(Defendant)
Michael George
(Defendant)
Michael J. Gosselin
(Defendant)
Michael Otto
(Defendant)
Michael St. Amand
(Defendant)
Tom Widman
(Defendant)
Vicki Smith
(Defendant)
Gary W. Smith
(Defendant)
Pita Group, Inc.
(Defendant)

6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 33 of 37

2.

David L. Bryant
dbryant@gablelaw.com
Amelia A. Fogleman
afogleman@gablelaw.com
David E. Keglovits
dkeglovits@gablelaw.com
GableGotwals - Tulsa

representing

Religious Technology Center

(Defendant)
David Miscavige
(Defendant)

3.

John J. Carwile
jcarwile@mmmsk.com
McDonald McCann & Metcalf &
Carwile, LLP

representing

Church of Scientology
International
(Defendant)

4.

Bert H. Deixler
bdeixler@kbkfirm.com
Kendall Brill & Klieger, LLP

representing

Church of Scientology
International
(Defendant)

5.

Nathaniel T. Haskins
nhaskins@hallestill.com
Robert D. Nelon
bnelon@hallestill.com Nelon
bnelon@hallestill.com
Hall Estill Hardwick Gable
Golden & Nelson (OKC)

representing

Narconon Freedom Center,

Inc.
(Defendant)
Nicholas Thiel
(Defendant)
Narconon Fresh Start, Inc.
(Defendant)

6.

Richard P. Hix
richard.hix@mcafeetaft.com
Alison A. Verret
alison.verret@mcafeetaft.com
McAfee & Taft (Tulsa)

representing

David S. Lee, III

(Defendant)
Philip R. Kelly, II
(Defendant)
Intervention Services and
Technologies, Inc.
(Defendant)
Kevin Lee
(Defendant)
Sharon Kubacki
(Defendant)

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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 34 of 37

7.

419029v1

Stacie L. Hixon
slh@steidley-neal.com
Charles D. Neal, Jr.
cdn@steidley-neal.com
Rachel D. Parrilli
rdp@steidley-neal.com
Steidley & Neal (Tulsa)

representing

28

A Life Worth Living, Inc.

(Defendant)
Thomas Garcia
(Defendant)
Best Drug Rehabilitation, Inc.
(Defendant)
Friends of Narconon Intl.
(Defendant)
Anthony Bylsma
(Defendant)
Glen Petcavage
(Defendant)
Joseph Guernaccini
(Defendant)
Golden Millennium
Productions, Inc.
(Defendant)
David S. Lee, III
(Defendant)
Richard Hawk
(Defendant)
GreatCircle Studios, LLC
(Defendant)
Narconon Eastern United
States, Inc.
(Defendant)
Narconon South Texas, Inc.
(Defendant)
James Woodworth
(Defendant)
Narconon Freedom Center,
Inc.
(Defendant)
Narconon Spring Hill, Inc.
(Defendant)
Jonathan Beazley
(Defendant)
International Academy of
Detoxification Specialists
(Defendant)

6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 35 of 37

Premazon, Inc.
(Defendant)
Royalmark Management, Inc.
(Defendant)
Jonathan Moretti
(Defendant)
Luria K. Dion
(Defendant)
Carl Smith
(Defendant)
Daphna Hernandez
(Defendant)
Mary Rieser
(Defendant)
Michael DiPalma
(Defendant)
Nicholas Thiel
(Defendant)
Robert J. Hernandez
(Defendant)
Narconon of Georgia, Inc.
(Defendant)
Rebecca Pool
(Defendant)
The Virtual Workforce Co.,
Ltd.
(Defendant)
Desiree Cardoso
(Defendant)
James McLaughlin
(Defendant)
Shana Austin
(Defendant)
Narconon London
(Defendant)

419029v1

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6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 36 of 37

8.

David R. Keesling
David@KLGattorneys.com
Sloane Ryan Lile
sloane@klgattorneys.com
Heidi L. Shadid
Heidi@KLGattorneys.com
Keesling Law Group, PLLC

representing

American Academy of
Certified Forensic Counselors,
Inc.
(Counter Defendant)
American Academy of
Certified Forensic Counselors,
Inc.
(Plaintiff)
National Association of
Forensic Counselors, Inc.
(Counter Defendant)
National Association of
Forensic Counselors, Inc.
(Plaintiff)

9.

Kerry R. Lewis
klewis@rhodesokla.com
Denelda L. Richardson
drichardsoncourts@rhodesokla.com
Colin H. Tucker
chtucker@rhodesokla.com
John H. Tucker
jtuckercourts@rhodesokla.com
Rhodes Hieronymus Jones
Tucker & Gable

representing

Association for Better Living

and Education International
(Defendant)
Narconon International
(Defendant)
Clark Carr
(Defendant)
Robert Wiggins
(Defendant)

10.

Robert E. Mangels
rem@jmbm.com
Jeffer Mangels Butler &
Mitchell, LLP

representing

Religious Technology Center

(Defendant)

11.

Todd A. Nelson
tnelson@fellerssnider.com
Ryan A. Pittman
rpittman@fellerssnider.com
Fellers Snider Blankenship
Bailey & Tippens (Tul)

representing

Jonathan Beazley
(Defendant)
Joseph Guernaccini
(Defendant)
Michael DiPalma
(Defendant)
Narconon of Northern
California
(Defendant)
Nicholas Bailey
(Defendant)

419029v1

30

6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 454 Filed in ED/OK on 10/30/14 Page 37 of 37

12.

Thomas M. O'Leary
thomas.oleary@leclairryan.com
LeClairRyan, LLP

representing

Association for Better

Living and Education
International
(Defendant)
Narconon International
(Defendant)
Clark Carr
(Defendant)
Robert Wiggins
(Defendant)

I certify that on the 30th day of October, 2014, I served the attached
document on the following party by first class mail:
D. Eric Mitchell, pro se
2133 Indian Trails
Jonesboro, AR 72401
/s/ Jeffrey K. Riffer

419029v1

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