FACTS

LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
LIMITATIONS
1. ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
2. BENGZON V. SENATE
3. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE V. MAJADUCON (407 SCRA 356)
FULLTEXT: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/136760.htm
On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.157 directing the
Committee on National Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and
retired military officers were organizing a coup d 'etat to prevent the administration of
then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.160, "directing
the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio of the Armed Forces
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it
appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General SantosCity, designated as Lot X,
MR-1160, for P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the
purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty.
Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear at
the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Branch 23, which was docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.On October 21, 1998, the
trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the Committee "to CEASE
and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in General Santos
City and/or anywhere in Region XI or Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling
and sale of Lot X,MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and "from issuing subpoenas to witnesses
from Region XI, particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the
petition for prohibition and injunction.

JURISPRUDENCE

Issue: Whether the trial court (Judge Jose Majaducon) can

issue a Temporary Restraining Order directing the
Committee "to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with
the inquiry. NO.
SC: Courts have no jurisdiction to restrain Congress from
performing its constitutionally vested function to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation, following the principle
of separation of powers.
The senate conducts legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation, and persons were subpoenaed and invited
thereto, the latter cannot go to the court of justice
because it has no authority to prohibit (issue a writ
of injunction) the committee from requiring that person
from appearing and testifying before it; otherwise it will
be inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers
as the same is an encroachment to ones prerogatives.

4. STANDARD VS SENATE COMMITTEE (541 SCRA 456)

FULLTEXT:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/december2007/167173.htm

Issue: Whether the pendency of the cases would bar the

congress or senate from continuing with the
investigation. NO.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech
entitled Arrogance of Wealth before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R.
Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in
violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the
speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had
introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166, DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES,TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION,
INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE
INVESTING PUBLIC.

SC:
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or a quasi- judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert the intended inquiry.

Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara,
set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the
subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.
Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their
written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter
dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were
cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative
inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with
the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile
inquired who among those invited as resource persons were present and who were
absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoena be issued to those who did not
attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include
them in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the
motion was approved.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the
hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the

attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the
bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing
documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there
were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCBPhilippines of unregistered foreign securities.
In re: Sabio 504 SCRA 77
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_174340_2006.html
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on
the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors."
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate
and referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
and Committee on Public Services. However, on March 28, 2006, upon motion of
Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J.
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners,
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted
by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee
on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res.
No. 455.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.
At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
8

On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by

Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners
Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public
hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006.
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August

Issue: Whether Chairman Sabio and Board of Directors

can invoke right to privacy and right against selfincrimination for refusing to appear before the Senate.
No.
SC: The alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and
POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial
participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling
reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary
legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial
measures and policy determination regarding PCGG's
efficacy.
There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the
part of those directors and officers over the subject
covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right
to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate
Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be
emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation
only when the incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing in advance the
nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them."
That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no
ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their
power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power
is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.
At this juncture, what is important is that respondent
Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide them

18, 2006, he reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.

Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator
10
Gordon, sent another notice to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on
the same subject matter set on September 6, 2006. The notice was issued "under the
same authority of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16
August 2006."
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter dated
September 4, 2006 to Senator Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in
the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring
Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show the caause
why they should not be cited in contempt of the Senate. On September 11, 2006, they
submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation.
ROMERO V. SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA (2009)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/174105.htm
FACTS
Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc.,
were invited on an investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The said
investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act
8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act.
SUBJUDISM- is an ethical rule or professional rule that when use, party litigants and
the lawyer in particular should not talk about it in public.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings
to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

when the right against self-incrimination is invoked.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent
Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them
in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent
legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every
citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity
of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully
with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation.

ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committees inquiry is sub judice
owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition.
SC:
It will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice
effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed
congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice
issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1,
2008 in G.R. No. 164527.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court
proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle,
through the application of a law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable
the legislative body to gather information and, thus,

legislate wisely and effectively;1[17] and to determine

whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact
new or remedial legislation,2[18] albeit the inquiry need
not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid
of legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
NERI V. SENATE (2008)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/sep2008/gr_180643_2008.html
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of NEDA, was invited by the respondent
Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in the
NBN Project. This project was contracted by the Philippine Government with the
Chinese firm ZTE, which involved the amount of US$ 329,481,290. When he testified
before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then Commission on Elections
Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange for
his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the
NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not
she directed him to approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner,
requiring him to appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15 November to the Committees

ISSUE:
Whether the three questions that petitioner Neri refused
to answer were covered by executive privilege, making
the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate
Committees void.
SC: The court was convinced that the three questions are
covered by presidential communications privilege, and
that this privilege has been validly claimed by the
executive department, enough to shield petitioner Neri
from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him
for not answering such questions.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neri_vs._Senate

requesting them to dispense with Neri's testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of
China, and given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to
the President, Neri cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the
scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause
Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested
that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance, he
be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance
was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with
delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of
the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. Respondents found the
explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and
consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-AtArms until he appears and gives his testimony.
GARCILLANO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE (2008)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_170338_2008.html
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes,
allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of
public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

Issue:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the
Senates website, satisfies the due process requirement
of law. NO.
SC:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website
of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the
Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling
which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation," precluding any other form of

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument
that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to
th
the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication
by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public
at the Senates internet web page.

publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is

mandatory to comply with the due process requirement
because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at
risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could
be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make
the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use
its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of
these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid
of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it
shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it
can do so only "in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure."

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void
for
being
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public
officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
SC:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad
and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police
(PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.

NERI V. SENATE (2008)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/sep2008/gr_180643_2008.
html
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of NEDA, was invited by
the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation
on the alleged anomalies in the NBN Project. This project was
contracted by the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm ZTE,
which involved the amount of US$ 329,481,290. When he testified
before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then Commission on
Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him
P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions

executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain

information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

ISSUE:
Whether the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were
covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the
respondent Senate Committees void.
SC: The court was convinced that the three questions are covered by
presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been
validly claimed by the executive department, enough to shield petitioner
Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for not
answering such questions.
executive privilege may be validly claimed by the executive department
only in cases where the power subject of the legislative inquiry is expressly
granted by the Constitution to the President. Such powers include the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. In light
of the doctrine of separation of powers, the said powers of the President
enjoy a greater degree of confidentiality than other presidential powers. In

on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not
she directed him to approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on 20
November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a
letter dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to
dispense with Neri's testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, and given
the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to
the President, Neri cannot provide the Committee any further details
of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege
is designed to protect. Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear
before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri
requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt
for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29
November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that
he did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if
there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first
appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He
added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President,
and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible
loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.
Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued
an Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he
appears and gives his testimony.
GUDANI V. SENGA (2006)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august20
06/G.R.%20No.%20170165.htm
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to

the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on

the argument that the communications elicited by the three questions fall
under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process,
and that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of
China. It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or
foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner
Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the President's
Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and
that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public
need by the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present
case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need
for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under
Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of
the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate
vs. Ermita, the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.

ISSUE: Whether the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry.
SC: Yes. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey the President they may dislike or
distrust. The ability of the President to prevent military officials from testifying before

clarify allegations of massive cheating in the 2004

elections and the surfacing of the Hello Garci
controversy. President Arroyo issued E.O 164 enjoining
officials of the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her approval. However, the two
concluded their testimonies before the Senate in spite
the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a
result, both of them were relieved of their assignments
for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honored principle of the Chain of Command.

Congress DOES NOT TURN ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE BUT ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES
POWER AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF to control the actions and speech of the armed
forces. Under the Commander in Chief Clause (Art. XVl, section 5), the President has
absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces.
Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict travel, movement and
speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian
law.
The rule is not absolute. In as much as it is ill advised for Congress to interfere with the
Presidents power as Commander-in-Chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to
unduly interfere with Congress right to conduct legislative inquiries. xxx Courts are
empowered, under the principle of JUDICIAL REVIEW, to arbitrate disputes between the
executive and legislative branches of the government on the proper parameters of
power. By this, if the court so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as
commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before
Congress. Even if the President has earlier disregarded with notion of officers appearing
before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the court.

QUESTION HOUR
SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)
ISSUE: Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464
SC:
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as
limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances
to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of

the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power
to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers.
ENACTMENT OF A LAW
ORIGIN OF BILLS
GUINGONA V. CARAGUE (1991)
ISSUE:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/apr1991/gr_94571
_1991.html
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it
being
higher
than
the
budget
for
education.
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 HELD:
Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress
the
appropriations
for
the
DECS
amount
to is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not
P27,017,813,000.00.
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the
power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is of
other
state
policies
or
objectives.
authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not
PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More
to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to
the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent assailed as unconstitutional.
and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than
the budget for education; therefore it is against Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the
highest budgetary priority to education.

TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY (1994)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/aug1994/gr_11545
5_1994.html
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716
on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively
from the House of Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did
not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus
violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage
of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

ABAKADA v. Exec. Secretary (2005)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_16805
6_2005.html

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase
the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO

Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can

9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on
July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government
from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for
certiorari
and
prohibition
questioning
the
constitutionality of the new law.

never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time
when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its
use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common

proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of

the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the
President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti.
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of
goods and services which cant be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President
has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by
law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the
recommendation.
Alvarez v. Guingona (1996)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/1183
03.htm

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of

ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be
exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

Issue:
whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB

8817, RA 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives

Facts:
HB 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known
as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of
Representatives, subsequently passed by the House of
Representatives, and transmitted to the Senate. A
counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the Senate, and
was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and
signed by the Chief Executive as RA 7720. When a plebiscite
on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion
of Santiago into a city.

Held:
Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import
was passed in the Senate, it cannot be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives.
Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr
1993). The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and
was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of
local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House of Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives
the House bill.

ONE SUBJECT ONE TITLE RULE

Guzman v. COMELEC (2000)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/1291
18.html
The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations
pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act. The
Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four years.
Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection
clause because not all election officials were covered by the
prohibition.

HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure
the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity
with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election
officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

Farinas v. Executive (2003)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/dec2003/gr_14738
7_2003.html
Facts:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates
holding elective office. Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. The
Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban
on the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC
imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing
of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the
OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9006.
PJA v. Prado (1993)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/nov1993/gr_10537
1_1993.html
Facts:

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of
the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should
be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and
scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have
not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this
case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the
House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to
casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the
provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.

The EPC (equal protection clause) is embraced in the concept of due process, as

Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the

constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its
being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the
President, the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec,
former Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics
Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination
as the franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the
Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language,
the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission,
the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and
Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special
Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on
the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In
lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has
been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it
does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not
recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand
why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege
was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify
a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a
smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. If the
problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.
Garcia v. Mata (1975)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_l_3371
3_1975.html
Facts :
Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed
to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel
the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and
readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600
fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation
law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental
governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of
reserve officers in the AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation

of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at
least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said
provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the
budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA
1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the

general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision
attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must
be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are
clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.