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NASA SP-45

MERCURY PROJECT SUMMARY


INCLUDING RESULTS OF THE
FOURTH MANNED ORBITAL FLIGHT
MAY 15 AND 16, 1963

E_

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
PROJECT MERCURY
October 1963

Office of Scientific and Teclmical Information

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Washington, D.C.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Omee Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price $2.75

fi
FOREWORD

This document presents a summary of the the two manned suborbital flights. Although
planning, preparation, experiences, and results this document, to a limit_l degree, summarizes
of Project Mercury and includes the results of the results of the previous manned flights, the
the fourth United States manned orbital flight formal postflight reports published for these
conducted on May 15 and 16, 1963, are also earlier missions should be consulted for greater
included. The papers are grouped into four detail.
main technical areas: The space-vehicle devel-
The material presented in this document has
opment, mission support development, flight op-
been prepared in a short period of time. It re-
erations, and mission results. The performance
flects the close cooperation and intense efforts
discussions contained in the various papers for
the concluding Mercury mission form a con- of the authors, the staff editors, and the printers,
tinuation of the information previously pub- all of whom are to be commended for their
lished for the three manned orbital flights and dedicated efforts.

KENNETH S. KLEINKNECHT, _V. M. BLAND, Jr.,


Manager, Mercury Project. Deputy Manager, Mercury Project.

*oo
111
ERRATA--NASA REPORT SP-45

Page 129--For the first five lines in left-ha_d column, substitute the following:

The United Kingdom also assisted in the selec- tuto Nacional de T6cnica Aeron_utica (INTA)
tion of communication sites in Africa and in the as the Spanish agency to participate in the im-
South Pacific and continued to provide support plementation and operation of this facility.
in the operation and maintenance of certain The Government of Mexico provided land
communication facilities. and participated in the implementation of the
The Republic of Nigeria provided land near station near Guaymas, Mexico. In a joint of-
the city of Kano, assisted in the construction of fort, the Mexico-United.States Commission for
the station and ground communication facili- Space Tracking Observation was formed to
ties, and provided continued support during the provide coordination for the construction and
operational phase. operation of this station.
In establishing stations as a joint effort with
The Republic of Zanzibar provided land and
the various participating countries, every effort
assisted in the establishment of the station and
was made to make maximum possible use of
ground communication facilities. local resources and people, to permit free access
The Government of Spain provided land on to the sites, and to establish a basis for con-
Grand Canary Island and established the Insti- tinued cooperation throughout the program.

Pages 369-381--The following names were inadvertently omitted from Appendix E.

Aikenhead, Bruce A. Glennan, Dr. T. Keith Petersen, Cdr. Forrest N.


Armstrong, Nell Goett, Dr. Harry J. Porter, Thomas J.
Baker, Charles Hand, Ben R. Powers, Col. John A.
Baker, Thomas F. Haney, Paul Rabb, L.
Bathurst, Raymond Hare, Linda J. Reed, Carol C.
Bavely, James C. Harlan, Charles S. Rice, Charles N.
Bayer, Philip J. Hartley, Robert M. Ricker, Harry H., Jr.
Berry, Lt. Col. S. L. Hayes, Capt. Richard Roadman, Brig. Gen. Charles
Brackett, Ernest W. Heaton, Lt. Col. Donald J. Salmassy, Omar K.
Breneman, G. Jean Hemperly, John 0. Sanders, Newell D.
Brockett, H. R. Henry, Maj. Richard C. Schmidt, Richard A.
Buckley, Edmond C. Holmes, D. B. Seamans, Dr. Robert C.
Chiabotta, R. L. Holmes, Jay Silverstein, Abe
Clark, Lt. Col. Raymond L. Horner, Richard E. Soul_, Hartley A.
Conger, Dean Hunter, Willson H. Stack, John
Conner, Lt. Col. Joseph Hyatt, Abraham Stelter, Laverne R.
Cox, Hiden T. Jenkins, Thomas E. Stockwell, Ephriam
Decherd, Mary C. Johnson, ClinVon T. Thompson, Carolyn B.
Dembling, Paul G. Johnson, Harold G. Thompson, Floyd L.
Dick, Louise Johnson, Jennie M. Truszynski, G. M.
Donlan, Charles J. Keany, J. Turner, Lt. Col. W. R.
Draim, Lt. Cmdr. John E. Kehlet, Alan B. yon Braun, Wernher
Dunkleman, Dr. Lawrence Kier, Cmdr. Kenneth Walker, Joseph
Evans, Peggy R. Krieger, Robert L. Wallace, Robert F.
Ferrando, James A. Kuettner, Dr. Joachim P. White, Dr. Stanley C.
Ferrando, Rita P. Land, Vinton T. Williams, J. J.
Frutkin, Arn_)ld_W. Leech, Ted B. Wilson, Charles
Gaever, A. Les Love, James T. Wolhart, Walter O.
Gamble, Dr. Allen O. McCaskill, Patsy L. Wood, Clotaire
Gesell, Ralph T. McGee, Bernard J. Wyatt, D. D.
Giannini, William F. McTigue, John Young, Col. Robert P.
Gibbs, Col. Asa B. Neal, James L. Zimmerman, C. H.
Gill, Dr. Jocelyn R. Ostrander, Maj. Gen. Donald R.
Glahn, Earl W. Overton, John D.

U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:I963 0_708-463


CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD .............................................................. iii
1. PROJECT REVIEW .................................................... 1
By Walter C. Williams, Deputy Director for Mission Requirements and Flight
Operations, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, Manager, Mercury Project, NASA Manned Space-
craft Center;
William M. Bland, Jr., Deputy Manager, Mercury Project, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center; and
James E. Bost, Chief, Engineering Operations Office, Mercury Project Office,
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
2. PROJECT SUPPORT FROM THE NASA ................................ 33
By Charles W. McGuire, Office of Manned Space Plight, NASA Headquarters;
and
James J. Shannon, Asst. Chief, Engineering Operations Office, Mercury
Project Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

I--SPACE-VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

3. SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE ...... 39


By John H. Boynton, Mercury Project Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center;
E. M. Fields, Chief, Project Engineering Office, Mercury Project Office,
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and
Donald F. Hughes, Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
4. MERCURY-REDSTONE LAUNCH-VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT AND
PERFORMANCE .................................................. 69
By Joachim P. Kuettncr, Ph.D., Chief, Saturn-Apollo Systems Integration ._
Office, NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center; and t/_
Emil Bertram, Chief, Special Projects Office, NASA Launch Operations
Center
5. MERCURY-ATLAS LAUNCH-VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE ........................................................ 81
By Lt. Colonel C. L. Candy, Jr., Space Systems Division, U.S. Air Force; and
Major I. B. Hanson, Space Systems Division, U.S. Air Force '_/
6. RELIABILITY AND FLIGHT SAFETY ................................ 105
By JOhn C. French, Asst. Chief, Reliability and Flight Safety Office, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center; and
Frederick J. Bailey, Jr., Chief, Reliability and Flight Safety Office, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center

II--MISSION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT

7. TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS ............................................. 119


By John P. Mayer, Asst. Chief for Mission Planning, Flight Operations
Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and
Carl R. Huss, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

V
Page

8. WORLDWIDE NETWORK SUPPORT .................................. 127


ByNiles R. Heller, Chief, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center;
H. William Wood, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center;
Virgil F. Gardner, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center;
Edward A. Ross, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center; and
Laverne R. Stelter, Chief, Communications Division, NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center
9. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE__ 155
By Maj. General Leighton I. Davis, U. S. Air Force, Department of Defense
Representative for Mercury Support Operations
i0. ASTRONAUT TRAINING .............................................. 171
By Robert B. Voas, Ph.D., Asst. for Human Factors, Officeof the Director,
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
Harold I.Johnson, Flight Crew Operations Division,NASA Manned Space-
craftCenter; and
Raymond Zedekar, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Space-
craft Center
11. AEROMEDICAL PREPARATIONS ..................................... 199
By Charles A. Berry, M.D., Chief, Center Medical Operations Office, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center

III--FLIGHT OPERATIONS

12. SPECIAL INFLIGHT EXPERIMENTS .................................. 215


By Lewis R. Fisher, Technical Asst. to the Manager, Mercury Project Office,
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
William O. Armstrong, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center;
Carlos S. Warren, Space Environment Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center
13. FLIGHT DATA REPORTING .......................................... 231
ByRobert E. McKann, Chief, Engineering Data and Measurements Office,
Mercury Project Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
William A. Kelley, Asst. Chief, Engineering Data and Measurements
Office, Mercury Project Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and
William R. Kelly, .Mercury Project Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center
14. SPACECRAFT PREFLIGHT PREPARATION .......................... 243
By J. C. Moser, Asst. Chief for Data Systems, Preflight Operations Division,
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
G. Merritt Preston, Manager, Atlantic Missile Range Operations, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center;
J. J. Williams, Asst. Chief for Test Operations, Preflight Operations
Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and
A. E. Morse, Jr., Chief, Project Engineering Field Office, Mercury Project
Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
15. FLIGHT CONTROL OPERATIONS ..................................... 253
By John D. Hodge, Asst. Chief for Flight Control, Flight Operations Division,
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and
Daniel T. Loekard, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center

vi
16. RECOVERY OPERATIONS ............................................
By Robert F. Thompson, Asst. Chief for Recovery Operations, Flight Opera-
tions Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
Donald E. Stullken, Ph.D, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Space-
craft Center;
B. Leon Hodge, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
and
John Stonesifer, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center_
17. ASTRONAUT PERFORMANCE ........................................ 281
By Warren J. North, Chief, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center;
Helmut A. Kuehnel, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center;
John J. Van Bockel, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center; and
Jeremy B. Jones, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Space-
craft Center
IV--MISSION RESULTS

18. AREOMEDICAL OBSERVATIONS ..................................... 299


By A. D. Catterson, M. D., Center Medical Operations Office, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center;
E. P. McCutcheon, M. D., Center Medical Operations Office, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center;
H. A. Minners, M. D., Center Medical Operations Office, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center; and
R. A. Pollard, M. D., Center Medical Operations Office, NASA Manned Space-
craft Center
19. OBSERVATIONS OF SPACE PHENOMENA ............................ 327
By John A. O'Keefe, Ph.D., Asst. Chief, Theoretical Division, NASA Goddard ,
Space Flight Center; /'
Lawrence Dunkelman, Ph.D., Space Sciences Division, NASA Goddard /
Space Flight Center;
Stanley D. Soules, Ph.D., U.S. Weather Bureau, National Weather Satellite
Center; and
Paul D. Lowman, Jr., Ph.D., Theoretical Division, NASA Goddard Space .,
Flight Center
20. ASTRONAUT'S SUMMARY FLIGHT REPORT ......................... 349
By L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., Astronaut, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

V--APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A--TYPICAL DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR MERCURY .... 361


APPENDIX B--NASA CENTERS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES_ 363
APPENDIX C--PRIME CONTRACTORS .................................. 365
APPENDIX D--SUBCONTRACTORS AND VENDORS ..................... 367
APPENDIX E---NASA PERSONNEL WHO PARTIOIPATED IN PROJECT
MERCURY ............................................................. 369
APPENDIX F--MA-9 AIR-GROUND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS ......... 383

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................. 445

vii
1. PROJECT REVIEW

By WALTER C. WILLIAMS, Deputy Director for Mission Requirements and Flight Operations, NASA Manned
Spacecra# Center; KENNETH S. KLEZNKNECHT, Manager, Mercury Prefect, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center; WZLLIAM M. BLAND, JR., Deputy Manager, Mercury Prefect, NASa4 Manned Spacecraft Center;
and JAMES E. BOST, Chief, Engineering Operations O_ce, Mercury Prefect O_ce, NAS_ Manned
Spacecraft Center

Introduction
Summary _/_S )

The United States' first manned space flight The actual beginning of the effort that re-
project was successfully accomplished in a 42_ suited in manned space flight cannot be pin-
year period of dynamic activity which saw more pointed although it is known that the thought
than 2,000,000 people from many major govern- has been in the mind of man throughout r_-
ment agencies and much of the aerospace in- corded history. It was only in the last decade,
dustry combine their skills, initiative, and ex- however, that technology had developed to the
perience into a national effort. In this period, point where man could actually transform his
six manned space flights were accomplished as ideas into hardware to achieve space flight.
part of a 25-flight program. These manned Specific studies and tests conducted by govern-
space flights were accomplished with complete ment and industry culminating in 1958 indi,
pilot, safety and without change to the basic cated the feasibility of manned space flight.
Mercury concepts. It was shown that man can Implementation was initiated to establish a na-
function ably as a pilot-engineer-experimenter tional manned space-flight project, later named
without undesirable reactions or deteriorations Project Mercury, on October 7, 1958.
of normal body functions for periods up to 34 The life of Project Mercury was about _%
hours of weightless flight. years, from the time of its official go-ahead to
Directing this large and fast moving project the completion of the 34-hour orbital mission
required the development of a management of Astronaut Cooper. During this period, much
structure and operating mode that satisfied the has been learned about man's capabilities in the
requirement to mold the many different entities space environment and his capabilities in earth-
into a workable structure. The management bound activities which enabled the successful
methods and techniques so developed are dis- accomplishment of the objectives of the Mer-
cussed. Other facets of the Mercury experience cury Project in this relatively short period. It
such as techniques and philosophies developed is the purpose of this paper to review the more
to insure well-trained flight and ground crews significant facets of the project beginning with
and correctly prepared space vehicles are dis- the objectives of the project and the guidelines
cussed. Also, those technical areas of general which were established to govern the activity.
application to aerospace activities that pre- As in any form of human endeavor, there are
sented obstacles to the accomplishment of the certain signs which serve as the outward in-
project are briefly discussed. Emphasis is dication of activity and progress. For the Mer-
placed on 'the n_d for improved detail design cury Project, these signs were the major
guidelines and philosophy, complete and ap- full-scale flight tests. These tests will be re-
propriate hardware qualification programs, viewed with particular emphasis on schedule,
more rigorous standards, accurate and detailed the individual mission objectives, and the re-
suits from each mission. Then, the organiza-
test procexlures, and more responsive configura-
tion control techniques. tion with which management directed the

1
activities of Project Mercury will be explained, sary impulse to bring the spacecraft out of orbit.
particularly with respect to those internal in- (4) A zero-lift body utilizing drag braking
terfaces between major segments of NASA and would be used for reentry.
those external interfaces with contractors and (5) The spacecraft design must satisfy the
other governmental departments. The re- requirements for a water landing.
sources expended during the project will be It is obvious by a casual look at the spacecraft
explained with discussions On manpower and (fig. 1-1) that requirements (1), (3), and (4)
cost. In addition, the major results of the were followed as evidenced by the escape tower,
project will be discussed as will those areas the retrorocket system that can be seen on the
which presented severe obstacles to technical blunt end of the spacecraft, and the simple
progress. blunt-body shape without wings. Items (2)
This paper is primarily a review; greater and (5) have been made apparent by the man-
detail in many of the areas discussed can be ner in which the astronaut has manually con-
obtained by reference to other papers in this trolled the attitude of the spacecra_ during
document and to the documents listed in the orbital maneuvers, retrofire, and reentry, and
bibliography. by the recovery of the spacecraft and astronauts
after each flight by recovery forces which in-
Objectives and Guidelines
cluded aircraft carriers and destroyers.
The objectives of the Mercury Project, as Basically, the equipment used in the space-
stated at the time of project go-ahead, were as craft was derived from off-the-shelf equipment
follows: or through the direct application of existing
(1) Place a manned spacecraft in orbital technology, although some notable exceptions
flight around the earth. were made in order to improve reliability and
(2) Investigate man's performance capa- flight safety. These exceptions include:
bilities and his ability to function in the en- (1) An automatic blood-pressure measuring
vironment of space. system for use in flight.
(3) Recover the man and the spacecraft (2) Instruments for sensing the partial pres-
safely. sures of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the oxy-
After the objectives were established for gen atmosphere of the cabin and suit, respec-
the project, a number of guidelines were tively.
established to insure that the most expedient Some may argue with the detailed way in
and safest approach for attainment of the ob- which the second basic guideline of simplic-
jectives was followed. The basic guide- ity was carried out; however, this guideline
lines that were established are as follows: was carried out to the extent possible within the
(1) Existing technology and off-the-shelf volume, weight, and redundancy requirements
equipment should be used wherever practical. imposed upon the overall system. The effect of
(2) The simplest and most reliable approach the weight and volume constraints, of course,
to system design would be followed. resulted in smaller and lighter equipment that
(3) An existing launch vehicle would be em- could not always be packaged in an optimum
ployed to place the spacecraft into orbit. way for simplicity.
(4) A progressive and logical test program Redundancy probably increased the complex-
would be conducted. ity of the systems more than any other require-
More detailed requirements for the space- ment. Because the spacecraft had to be quali-
craft were established as follows: fied by space flight first, without a man onboard
(1) The spacecraft must be fitted with a reli- and then because the reactions of man and his
able launch-escape system to separate the space- capabilities in the space environment were un-
craft and its crew from the launch vehicle in case known, provisions for a completely automatic
of impending failure. operation of the critical spacecraft functions
(2) The pilot must be given the capability were provided. To insure reliable operation,
of manually controlling spacecraft attitude. these automatic systems were backed up by re-
(3) The spacecraft must carry a retrorocket dundant automatic systems.
system capable of reliably providing the neces- The third guideline was satisfied by an adap-

2
tation of an existing missile, the Atlas. The are three primary types of tests included in
modifications to this launch vehicle for the use these, one type being the research-and-develop-
in the Mercury Project included the addition ment tests, another being primarily flight-
of a means to sense automatically impending qualification of the production spacecraft, and
catastrophic failure of the launch vehicle and the third being the manned orbital flight tests.
provisions to accommodate a new structure that I n addition, the tests with the Mercury-Red-
would form the transition between the upper stone launch vehicle provided some early bal-
section of the launch vehicle and the spacecraft. listic flights for pilot training. Involved in the
Also, the pilot-safety pro-pam was initiated to planned flight-test program were four basic
insure the selection of quality components. types of launch vehicles, the Little Joe, the Mer-
Application of the fourth guideline is illus- cury-Redstone, the Mercury-Jupiter, and the
trated by the major flight schedule which is Mercury-Atlas.
discussed in the next section. Four Little Joe flights and two of the Atlas
Major Flight Schedules powered flights, termed Big Joe, were planned
to be in the research and development category
Planned Flight Test Schedule to check the validity of the basic Mercury
The Mercury flight schedule that was planned concepts.
early in 1959 is shown in figure 1-2. These are The qualification program was planned to use
the major flight tests and include all those each of the four different launch vehicles. The
scheduled flight tests that involved rocket-pro- operational concept of the qualification program
pelled full-scale spacecraft, including boiler- provided for n progressive build-up of flight-
plate and production types. The planned flight test system complexity and flight-test condi-
test program shows 27 major launchings. There tions. It was planned that the operation of all

31 55'

\ Heat shield

l - l . 4 e n e r a l view of rspacecraft.
FIQUBE
3
hardware items would be proven in those envi- mainder of the flights were expected to be used
ronments to which they would be subject in both for manned orbital flight if the flight qualifica-
normal and emergency conditions associated tion achieved at the time so warranted.
with attainment of the planned mission condi- This flight-test, plan was de,veloped and pro-
tions. One qualification flight test was planned posed in early 1959 as a test plan that repre-
with the use of the Little ,Joe launch vehicle. sented a completely trouble-free preparation
This test was planned to qualify the operation of and flight-test program. According to this
the production spacecraft in a spacecraft-abort schedule, the first manned orbital flight could
situation at the combination of dynamic pres- have occurred as early as April of 1960. This
sure, Mach number, altitude, and flight-path flight-test schedule represents planning that was
angle that represented the most severe condition done before experience was gained in the pro-
anticipated for the use of this system during an duction of spacecraft flight hardware and,
orbital launch. There were eight flight tests particularly important, before any experience
planned with the use of the Redstone launch ve- had been gained in the preparation of space
hicle. The first two were intended to be un- flight equipment for manned flight.
manned tests used to qualify the production The planned flight test schedule (fig. 1-2)
spacecraft and to qualify the production-space- presents some missions that are shaded. This
craft launch-vehicle combination. The remain- shading indicates that these particular missions
ing six Mercury-Redstone flights were to be used were eliminated during the course of the pro-
to train and qualify Mercury astronauts for later gram because the requirement either was not
orbital flights. Two flight tests Kere planned in necessary or was satisfied by some other means.
which the .Jupiter launch vehicle was to be used. I n addition, it should be noted that the objec-
The first one of these was to be made to qualify tives of some of the other missions were altered
the production spacecraft for those flight condi- to fit the situation as the project advanced.
tions which produced the greatest load factor
Actual Flight Test Seheddes
during reentry. The second Jupiter powered
flight was scheduled as a backup to the first. The 25 major flight tests accomplished during
The qualification program for the production the Mercury Project are shown in figure 1-3, in
spacecraft also included plans for three flight the order of their occurrence. Those flight-test
tests using the Atlas launch vehicle and the re- missions which are marked with solid circles in-
-

1-2.-Planned
FIQUBE flight schedule as of January 1959.

4
dicate the missions that were added to this charging equipment. The launch vehicle,
schedule as a result of lessons learned during though fully loaded with six solid-propellant
some of the preceding flight tests or because of rocket motors, was left undamaged on the
extensions to the basic mission objectives as in launcher.
the case of the last two missions, MA-8 and Big Joe /.--Spacecraft checkout for the
MA-9. launch of Big Joe 1 was accomplished at the
Little Joe /.--The flight test program was Cape Canaveral launch site starting in June
initiated with the Little Joe 1 research-and-de- of 1959. The primary purpose of the flight was
velopment mission that was scheduled for July to investigate the performance of the ablation
of 1959. The actual launch attempt came in heat shield during reentry, as well as to investi-
the following month, on August 21, at the gate spacecraft reentry dynamics with an in-
NASA launch site, Wallops Station, Va. A strumented boilerplate spacecraft. Other items
nearly catastrophic failure occurred at a time that were planned for investigation on this
late in the launch countdown as the vehicle flight were afterbody heating for both the exit
battery-power supply was being charged. At and reentry phases of flight, drogue and main
this time, the escape-rocket sequence was unin- parachute deployment, dynamics of the space-
tentionally initiated and the spacecraft was sep- craft system with an automatic control system
arated from the launch vehicle and propelled in operation, flight loads, and water-landing
into the air as in a pad-abort sequence. The loads. Recovery aids, such as SOFAR bombs,
escape sequence was accomplished correctly, radio beacons, flashing light, and dye markers,
though initiated by a fault. The tower was had been incorporated. This spacecraft was
jettisoned properly, the drogue parachute was
not equipped with an escape system. The mis-
deployed as it should have been, but the main
sion was accomplished on September 9, 1959.
parachute deployment circuitry was not acti-
Because of the failure of the Atlas booster en-
vated because of a lack of sufficient electrical
gines to separate, the planned trajectory was
power. The spacecraft was destroyed on impact
with the water. The cause of the failure was not followed exactly, but the conditions which

determined by detailed analyses to be a "back- were achieved provided u satisfactory fulfill-


door" circuit which permitted the launch-escape ment of the test objectives. The landing point
system to be activated when a given potential of the spacecraft was about 1,300 nautical miles
had been supplied to the battery by ground from the lift-off point, which was about 500

Missions CY 1959 CY 1960 CY 1961 CYI962

Pro_ect ..... I_4 _._ e m_n,_i_o'_,_r_,_


IIIIII IIIIIIII III ...... .o_,,_,'._. ....
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Fmu_ 1-3.--Actual flight schedule.

5
nautical miles short of the intended landing addition to the first-order objectives, the space-
point. Even so, the recovery team retrieved the craft reentry dynamics behavior without a con-
spacecraft about 7 hours after landing. trol system was found to be satisfactory. The
Data from instrumentation and results of in- spacecraft dynamic stability on descent through
spection of the spacecraft showed that the heat- the atmosphere was found to be as expected.
protection method planned for the production Additional information was obtained on the
spacecraft was satisfactory for a normal re- operation of the Mercury parachute, the Mer-
entry from the planned orbit. On the basis cury spacecraft flotation characteristics, and the
of these results, the backup Big Joe mission operational requirements of spacecraft recov-
was cancelled. ery by surface vessels. A monkey was a pas-
Little Joe 6.--The Little Joe 6 mission was senger on this mission ; both the monkey and the
successfully accomplished on October 4, 1959, spacecraft were recovered in satisfactory con-
from the Wallops Station launch site and dem- dition at the end of the mission.
onstrated a qualification of the launch vehicle Little Joe lB.--The Little Joe 1B mission was
by successfully flying with staged propulsion successfully accomplished on January 21, 1960,
on a trajectory which gave structural and aero- from the Wallops Station launch site. This
dynamic loads in excess of those expected to mission had been added to the flight schedule
be encountered on the other planned Little Joe because of the failures of Little Joe 1 and Little
missions. In addition, a method devised for Joe 1A to meet the test objectives. On this mis-
correcting the launcher settings for wind ef- sion, all test objectives were successfully met,
fects, the performance of the booster command with the accomplishment of an abort at the con-
thrust termination system, and the launch oper- ditions described for Little Joe 1A. This space-
ation were checked out satisfactorily. Two craft also had a monkey as a passenger. Both
minor modifications were made to the Little the monkey and the spacecraft were recovered
Joe vehicle as a result of this flight to protect satisfactorily at the end of the mission.
the second-stage rocket motor and the launch Beach Abort /.--Mission Beach Abort 1
vehicle base from heat radiated from the thrust- (BA-1) was accomplished on May 9, 1960, from
ing motors. the Wallops Station launch site and marked the
Little Joe 1A.--Little Joe ]A w_ launched first time that a production spacecraft under-
on November 4, 1959, from the Wallops Station went a major qualification flight test. Produc-
launch site, as a repeat of the Little Joe 1 mis- tion spacecraft 1 was a reasonably complete
sion. The inflight abort was made, but the spacecraft and contained many systems that
first-order test objective was not accomplished later spacecraft would be equipped with. It
because of the slow ignition of the escape rocket was launched on an abort sequence from a
motor. This slow ignition delayed spacecraft- launcher on the ground. The escape-rocket
launch-vehicle separation until the vehicle had motor provided the impulse as it would on an
passed through the desired test region. All escape from a launch vehicle while still on the
second-order test objectives were met during pad. The test was successful and the feasibil-
the flight and the spacecraft was successfully ity of an abort from a pad was adequately dem-
recovered and returned to the launch site. All onstrated. Though the mission was successful,
other Mercury hardware used in this test, prin- certain modifications to spacecraft equipment
cipally the major parts of the escape and land- were found to be desirable after the perform-
ing systems, performed satisfactorily. ance of these systems was analyzed. Although
Little Joe 2.--The Little Joe 9 mission, which separation of the escape tower was accom-
was intended to validate the proper operation plished, it was not considered satisfactory be-
of the spacecraft for a high altitude abort, was cause of the small separation distance provided.
accomplished on December 4, 1959, from the This resulted in the redesign of the escape-sys-
Wallops Station launch site. The abort se- tem jettison rocket-motor nozzles. The single
quence was initiated at an altitude of almost nozzle was replaced by a tri-nozzle assembly to
100,000 feet and approximated a possible set of prevent rocket-motor performance loss by im-
abort conditions that could be encountered dur- pingement of the exhaust plumes on the escape-
ing a Mercury-Atlas exit flight to orbit. In tower structure. This modification proved to

6
be satisfactoryand wasretainedfor the re- cause of the failure could not be determined be-
mainderof the Mercury program. Another cause of the condition of the spacecraft com-
anomaly was the poor performance of the space- ponents when recovered from the ocean floor and
craft telemetry transmitters. Investigation because of the lack of detailed flight measure-
showed that the cause of this poor performance ments. The results of the analyses attributed
was a reversal of the cabling of the transmitter the failure to components of the sequential sys-
systems ; thus, for the first time in the program, tem, but the cause could not be isolated. The
inadvertent cross connection of connectors had sequential systems of spacecraft 2 and 6 were
been deleted. modified to preclude the possibility of a single
Mervury-Atlas /.--The Mercury-Atlas 1 erroneous signal igniting the escape-rocket
(MA-1) vehicle was launched from the Cape motor.
Canaveral test site on July 29, 1960. The pri- Mercury-Redstone I and 1A.--The Mercury-
mary purpose of the MA-1 flight was to test Redstone 1 (M'R-1), which was to provide
the structural integrity of a production Mer- qualification of a nearly complete production
cury spacecraft and its heat-protection elements spacecraft number 2, in flight with a Mercury-
during reentry from an exit abort condition Redstone launch vehicle, was attempted on
that would provide the maximum heating rate November 21, 1960, at the Cape Canaveral
on the afterbody of the spacecraft. The space- launch site. The mission was not successful.
craft involved was production item 4 and was At lift-off, the launch-vehicle engine was shut
equipped with only those systems which were down and the launch vehicle settled back on the
necessary for the mission. An escape system launcher after vertical motion of only a few
was not provided for this spacecraft. The mis- inches. The spacecraft also received the shut-
sion failed about 60 seconds after lift-off. The down signal and its systems reacted accordingly.
spacecraft and launch vehicle impacted in the The escape-rocket system was jettisoned and the
water east of the launch complex. Because of entire spacecraft landing system operated as it
this failure, an intensive investigation into the had been designed. Analyses of the cause of
probable causes was undertaken. As a result malfunction showed the problem to have been
of this investigation modifications were made caused by failure of two ground umbilicals to
to the interface area between the launch vehicle separate from the launch vehicle in the proper
and the spacecraft to increase the structural sequence. In the wrong sequence, one umbilical
stiffness. This inflight failure and subsequent provided an electrical path from launch-vehicle
intensive investigation resulted in a consider- power through blockhouse ground and the
able delay in the launch schedule and the next launch-vehicle engine cut-off relay coil to
Mercury-Atlas launch was not accomplished launch-vehicle ground that initiated the cut-off
until almost 7 months later. signal. Except for loss of expendable items on
Little Joe 5.--The Little Joe 5 vehicle was the spacecraft, such as the escape system and the
launched on November 8, 1960, from the Wal- parachutes and the peroxide, the spacecraft was
lops Station launch site. The test was intended in flight condition. The launch vehicle was
to qualify a production spacecraft. It was a slightly damaged in the aft section by recontact
complete specification spacecraft at that time with the launcher The spacecraft and launch
with the following exceptions: the landing-bag vehicle were demated. The launch vehicle was
system was not incorporated; the attitude sta- replaced by another Mercury-Redstone launch
bilization and control system was not fully op- vehicle, and the spacecraft was again prepared
erational, but was installed and used water to for its mission. Modifications included a long
simulate the control system fuel; and certain ground strap that was placed between the launch
components of the communications system not vehicle and the launcher to maintain electrical
essential to the mission were omitted. The mis- ground until umbilicals had been separated.
sion failed during flight when the escape-rocket The refurbished spacecraft and new Mercury-
motor was ignited before the spacecraft was Redstone launch vehicle were launched success-
released from the launch vehicle. The space- fully as mission MR-1A on December 19, 1960.
craft remained attached to the launch vehicle At this time, all test objectives were met. All
until impact and was destroyed. The exact major spacecraft systems performed well

7
throughouttheflight. Thelaunch-vehicle per- malfunctioning items. These modifications in-
formance wasnormalexceptfor a higherthan cluded the following:
nominalcut-offvelocity. The only effectsof (1) An additional fiber glass bulkhead was
this anomalywere,to increasetlle range,maxi- installed between the heat shield and the large
mumaltitude,andmaximumacceleration dur- pressure bulkhead to protect the bulkhead dur-
ing reentry. Thespacecraftwaspickedup by ing landing, and items in the large pressure
a helicopter15minutesafter landingandwas bulkhead area that could be driven "dagger-
deliveredbacktothelaunchsiteonthemorning like" through the larger pressure bulkhead dur-
afterthelaunch. ing the landing were removed or reoriented.
Mercury-Redstone 2.--The MR-2 mission ('2) The heat-shield retention system was im-
was accomplished on January 31, 1961, from the proved with the addition of a number of cables
Cape Canaveral test site with a chimpanzee ms and cable-retention devices. The modified heat-
a passenger. Production spacecraft 5 was shield retention system was proved to be capable
used. The mission was successful and the ma- of retaining the heat shield to the spacecraft in
jority of the test objectives were met. Analyses rough seas for periods of up to 10 hours.
of launch-vehicle data obtained during the (3) Tolerances of the inflow valve detent sys-
flight revealed that launch-vehicle propellant tem were changed to assure positive retention
depletion occurred before the velocity cut-off during periods of vibration.
system was armed and before the thrust cham- Mercury-Atlas 2._The Mercury-Atlas 2 ve-
ber abort switch was disarmed. This combina- hicle was launched from the Cape Canaveral
tion of events resulted in an abort signal being test site on February '21, 1961, to accomplish the
transmitted to the spacecraft from the launch objectives of the MA-1 mission. The space ve-
vehicle. The spacecraft reacted correctly to hicle for this flight consisted of the sixth pro-
the abort signal and an abort sequence was duction spacecraft and Atlas launch vehicle No.
properly made. The greater than normal 67-D. Several structural changes made in the
launch-vehicle velocity combined with the ve- spaceci,_ft launch-vehicle interface area as a
locity increment obtained unexpectedly from result of the failure of the preceding Mercury-
the escape-rocket motor produced a flight path Atlas missions were as follows :
that resulted in a landing point about 110 nau- (!) The adapter was stiffened.
tical miles farther downrange than the planned (2) The clearance between the spacecraft
landing point. This extra range, of course, was retropackage and the launch-vehicle lox tank
the prime factor in the 2 hours and 56 minutes dome was increased.
that it took to locate and recover the spacecraft. (3) An 8-inch-wide stainless-steel band was
The chimpanzee was recovered in good condi- fitted circumferentially around the upper end of
tion, even though the flight had been more se- the launch-vehicle lox tank.
vere than planned. By the time the spacecraft (4) The lox-valve support structure was
was recovered, it had nearly filled with water. changed so that the valve was not attached to
Some small holes had been punctured in the the adapter.
lower pressure bulkhead at landing. Also, the (5) Special instrumentation was installed in
heat-shield retaining system was fatigned by the spacecraft launch-vehicle interface area to
the action of the water and resulted in loss of measure loads, vibrations, and pressures.
the heat shield. Another anomaly that oc- The major test objective of the MA-2 mission
curred during the flight was the opening of the was to demonstrate the integrity of the space-
spacecraft cabin inflow valve during ascent, craft structure, ablation shield, and afterbody
which prevented the environmental control sys- shingles for the most severe reentry from the
tem from maintaining pressure at the design standpoint of load factor and afterbody tem-
level. Because the pressure dropped below the perature. The fligh_ closely matched the de-
desig'n level, the emergency environmental sys- sired trajectory, and the desired temperature
tem was exercised, and it performed satisfac- and loading measurements were obtained. The
torily. From the experiences of this flight, a spacecraft landed in the planned landing area
number of modifications were made to the and was recovered and placed aboard a recovery
spacecraft systems to avoid recurrence of the ship approximately 55 minutes after it was

8
launched.A preliminaryevaluationof meas- and-development spacecraft. This flight was
ureddataand a detailed inspection of the re- made as the result of the analyses of the per-
covered spacecraft indicated that, all test objec- formance of the launch vehicles on the Mercury-
tives were satisfied and that the spacecraft Redstone 1A and Mercury-Redstone 2 flights,
structure and heat-protection elements were in which showed that there were some launch-
excellent condition. vehicle problems that required correction and
Little Joe 5A.--The Little Joe 5A mission requalification. Most of these problems had to
was accomplished on March 18, 1961, from the do with the overspeed performance that was at-
Wallops Station launch site. This was an tained during those missions. The flight was
added mission, as a result of the failure of the successful and analyses of the launch-vehicle
Little Joe 5. For the Little Joe 5A mission, data indicated that the launch-vehicle correc-
production spacecraft 14 and the sixth Little tions were entirely satisfactory. No recovery
Joe launch vehicle to be flown were used. The of the spacecraft was attempted since it was
spacecraft was a basic Mercury configuration used only as a payload of the proper size, shape,
with only those systems installed that were re- and weight, and no provisions were made to
quired for the mission. As during the Little separate it from the launch vehicle during the
Joe 5 mission early ignition of the escape-rocket mission.
motor occurred. The mission was unsuccessful. Mercury-Atlas 3.--The Mercury-Atlas 3
However, unlike the Little Joe 5 mission, a (MA-3) mission was accomplished on April
backup spacecraft separation system was initi- 25, 1961, from the Cape Canaveral test site.
ated by ground command and sucz_essfully The planned flight, which was intended to orbit
separated the spacecraft from the launch vehicle an unmanned production spacecraft once
and released the tower. Because of the severe around the earth, was terminated about 40 sec-
flight conditions existing at the time of para- onds after lift-off by range-safety action when
chute arming, both main and reserve parachutes the launch vehicle failed to roll and pitch over
were deployed simultaneously. They filled and into the flight azimuth. The spacecraft was
enabled the spacecraft to make a safe land- aborted successfully as the result of the com-
ing. All other active systems operated prop- mand signal and was quickly recovered. The
erly except that the cabin pressure-relief valve spacecraft came through the abort maneuver
failed to maintain the spacecraft cabin pressure with only minor damages. The performance
because of a piece of safety wire found lodged in of all spacecraft systems was generally satis-
the seat. The spacecraft was recovered and re- factory throughout the short flight. The space-
turned to the launch area in good condition. craft used on this mission was the eighth pro-
Analysis of data from the spacecraft proved duction unit. The launch vehicle, Atlas 100-1),
that the early ignition of the escape rocket motor had increased skin thickness in the forward end
was caused by structural deformation in the of the lox tank and had the abort sensing and
spacecraft-adapter interface area. This early implementation system installed for closed-loop
ignition permitted separation sensing switches operation. Analysis of records indicated that
to falsely sense movement and give the signal there was an electrical fault in the launch
for the remainder of the sequence. The cor- vehicle autopilot. Subsequent action resulted in
rections applied were to reduce air loading in closer examination of electrical components and
the area by b_ter fairing of the clamp-ring connections.
cover, by increasing the stiffness of the switch L_ttle Joe 5B.---The Little Joe 5B vehicle
mounting and reference structures, and rerout- was launched on April 28, 1961, from the Wal-
ing the electrical signals from these switches lops Station launch site. The vehicle was com-
through a permissive network. posed of Mercury production spacecraft 14A
Mercury-Redstone-Booster Development.-- and the seventh Little Joe launch vehicle to be
The Mercury-Redstone-Booster Development flown. The spacecraft, which had previously
(MR-BD) mission was made on March 24, 1961, been used for the Little Joe 5A mission, had
from the Cape Canaveral launch site, with a been refurbished with only those systems in-
Mercury-Redstone launch vehicle and the re- stalled that were required for the mission.
furbished and ballasted Little Joe 1A research- There was no landing bag and certain other
nonessential systemsweremissing. It wasthe Astronaut Shepard satisfactorily performed his
first spacecrafttobeflight-testedwith modified assigned tasks during all phases of the flight.
spacecraft-adapterclamp-ring limit-switch Likewise, launch vehicle and spacecraft sys-
mountingsand fairings. Also,the sequential tems performed as planned. The spacecraft
systemwas modifiedto prevent the limit achieved an altitude of about 101 nautical miles
switches onthespacecraft-launch-vehicle clamp and was in weightless flight for slightly over 5
ring or thespacecraft-escape-tower clampring minutes. Postflight examination of Astronaut
from closingany circuitswhich wouldignite Shepard and inspection of the spacecraft
the escaperocket until the band separation showed both to be in excellent condition. A
boltswerefired. Thesechanges in andaround helicopter pickup was made of the spacecraft
the spacecraft-launch-vehicle interfaceandin after the pilot had made his egress from the
the sequential systemweremadeasthe result side hatch of the spacecraft and had been
of the problemsencountered in missionsLit- hoisted aboard the helicopter. The pilot and
tle Joe 5 and Little Joe 5A. Becauseof a the spacecraft were landed aboard an aircraft
severechangein flight path as the result of carrier 11 minutes after spacecraft landing, and
the delayedignition of oneof the two main the spacecraft was brought back to the launch-
launch-vehicle rocketmotors,thetestwasmade ing site the morning after the flight.
at substantiallymoresevereflight conditions Mercury-Redstone 4.--The Mercury-Red-
than planned. The abort wasplannedto be stone 4 (MR--4) flight was successfully made on
initiated at a dynamicpressureof 990lb/sq July 21, 1961, from the Cape Canaveral launch
ft; insteadthe dynamicpressurehad attained site. Astronaut Virgil I. Grissom was the pilot.
a valueof about1,920lb/sq ft whenthe abort The space vehicle was made up of the llth
wasinitiated. Itowever,thespacecraftescape production spacecraft and a Mercury-Redstone
systemworkedas plannedand this test suc- launch vehicle essentially identical to the one
cessfullydemonstrated the structuralintegrity used for MR-3 mission. The spacecraft on this
of the Mercury spacecraft. The spacecraft mission was somewhat different from spacecraft
landedin the oceanafter about5 minutesof 7, in that, for the first time, a manned spacecraft
flight andwasrecoveredandreturnedto the had a large top window, a side hatch to be
launchsitein lessthan30minutesafterlaunch. opened by an explosive charge, and a modified
Analysesof the flight dataand inspectionof instrument panel. The spacecraft achieved a
the spacecraftafter the missionshowedthe maximum altitude of about 103 nautical miles,
spacecraft tobein goodcondition.An anomaly with a period of weightlessness of about 5
that showedup wasthe failure of two of the minutes. The flight was successful. After
smallspacecraft umbilicalsto eject. Evidence landing, premature and unexplained actuation
indicatedthat theseumbilicalsfailed to eject of the spacecraft explosive side hatch resulted
because of interferencewith the clamp-ring in an emergency situation in which the space-
fairing after its release.This conditionwas craft was lost but the pilot was rescued from
corrected by changingthemannerin whichthe the surface of the water. Analyses of the data
fairing wassupportedonsubsequent spacecraft. from the flight and debriefing by the astronaut
All testobjectives wereconsidered to havebeen indicated that, in general, the spacecraft sys-
met. tems performed as planned, except for the action
Mercury-Redstone 3.--The Mercury-Red- of the spacecraft hatch. An intensive investiga-
stone 3 (MR-3) mission, the first manned space tion of the hatch actuation resulted in a change
flight by the United States, was successfully ac- in operational procedures. No fault was found
complished on May 5, 1961, from the Cape in the explosive device.
Canaveral launch site. Astronaut Alan B. Mercury-Atlas 4.--The Mercury-Atlas 4
Shepard was the pilot. The space vehicle was (MA-4) vehicle was launched on September 13,
composed of production spacecraft 7 and a 1961, from the Cape Canaveral launch site; it
Mercury-Redstone launch vehicle, which was was a repeat of the MA-3 test and became the
essentially identical to the one used for the MR- first Mercury spacecraft to be successfully in-
BD launch-vehicle qualification mission. Anal- serted into orbit, returned, and recovered. Fur-
yses of the results of the mission showed that ther objectives of this flight were to evaluate the

10
Mercury network and recovery operations con- (4) Some thrusters in the spacecraft automa-
cerned with orbital flight. The space vehicle for tic attitude control system had either reduced
this flight was made up of Mercury-Atlas output or no output during the latter part of
launch vehicle 88-D, with the same modifica- the orbit. Postflight analyses indicated that
tions as the launch vehicle used on the M_A-3 possibly the trouble was contamination of the
mission, and the spacecraft which was used on metering orifices in some thruster assemblies.
the MA-3 mission. The spacecraft had been re- Mercury-Atlas 5.--The Mercury-Atlas 5
furbished and designated 8A for this mission. (MA-5) mission was successfully made on No-
This was a very complete spacecraft which in- vember 29, 1961, from the Cape Canaveral
cluded a man-simulator onboard to provide a launch site. A chimpanzee was the passenger
load on the environment control system during on this flight. The mission was planned for
orbital flight. Other differences between this three orbital passes and was to be the last quali-
spacecraft and spacecraft flown on subsequent fication flight of the Mercury spacecraft and
missions were: launch vehicle prior to a manned mission. The
(1) The landing bag was not installed orbit was about as planned with perigee at 86.5
(2) The spacecraft had small viewing win- nautical miles and apogee at 128.0 nautical
dows rather than the large overhead window miles. Further objectives of this flight were to
used on later spacecraft evaluate the Mercury network and recovery op-
(3) The spacecraft entrance hatch did not erations. In general, the spacecraft, launch-
have the explosive-opening feature vehicle, and network systems functioned well
(4) The instrument panel had a slightly dif- during the mission until midway through the
ferent arrangement. second pass when abnormal performance of the
The launch vehicle provided the desired spacecraft attitude control system was detected
orbital path with a perigee of 85.9 nautical and verified. This malfunction precluded the
miles and an apogee of 123.3 nautical miles. probably successful completion of the third pass
The planned retromaneuver over the coast of because of the high rate of control fuel con-
California resulted in a landing in the Atlantic sumption. Accordingly, a retrofire command
Ocean approximately 160 nautical miles east of was transmitted to the spacecraft which re-
Bermuda in the primary landing area. The sulted in it landing in the selected area at the
spacecraft was recovered in excellent condition end of the second pass. Recovery was completed
1 hour and 22 minutes after landing. The mis- 1 hour and 15 minutes after landing. The chim-
sion achieved the :desired objectives, even panzee performed his assigned tasks without
though certain anomalies showed up in sys- experiencing any deleterious effects during the
tems behavior during _he mission. None of the mission and was recovered in excellent condi-
anomalies had serious consequence. The anom- tion.
alies and action taken are as follows : The primary anomaly during the mission was
(1) A spacecraft inverter failed during the the control-system trouble which gave rise to
powered phases of flight. The cause was de- increased fuel consumption by the attitude con-
termined to be a vibration-sensitive component trol system and which precipitated the abort of
and found to be preventable by more precise and the mission at the end of the second orbital pass.
exacting acceptance tests. The trouble was found to be a stopped-up meter-
(2) Some anomalies in the spacecraft scanner ing orifice in one of the low-roll thrusters. Cor-
signals were detected during the mission. Steps rective action applied to subsequent missions in-
were taken to modify the system to make it less cluded closer examinations for contamination
sensitive to the effects of cold cloud layers. in this system.
(3) A leak developed in the spacecraft The spacecraft used for this mission was pro-
oxygen-supply system during the exit phase of duction spacecraft 9; and since it was the last
the flight. The leak was small, and sufficient qualification vehicle prior to the first manned
oxygen was available for the mission. Post- orbital flight, it was intentionally made as near-
flight analyses determined that the leak was ly like the spacecraft for the manned mission
caused by failure _n a pressure reducer. The as possible. This spacecraft included the large
fault was corrected for subsequent missions. viewing window over the astronaut's head posi-

11
tion, the landing bag, a positive lock on the control during the mission. The spacecraft for
emergency-oxygen rate handle, an explosive- this mission was production unit number 13
release type hatch, new provisions for cooling which was essentially the same as spacecraft
the inverters, and ratc gyros modified to insure 9 used in the MA-5 mission except for those
satisfactory operation in the vacuum condition. differences required to accommodate the pilot,
The launch vehicle, Atlas 93-D, was much like such as the couch, a personal equipment con-
those launch vehicles used on the previous two tainer, filters for the window, and some minor
Mercury-Atlas missions; however, some addi- instrumentation and equipment modifications.
tional modifications were included on this The launch vehicle was Atlas 109-D. It dif-
vehicle. These modifications included a new fered from the MA-5 launch vehicle in only
lightweight telemetry system and a redundant one major respect. For this launch vehicle, the
path for the sustaine-' engine cut-off signal. insulation and its retaining bulkhead between
MercuryLA tlas 6.--Mercury-Atlas 6 (MA-6), the lox and fuel tank dome was removed when
the first manned orbital space flight made from it was discovered that fuel had leaked into this
the United States, was successfully made on insulation prior to launch. The spacecraft
February 20, 1962, from the Cape Canaveral landed in the planned recovery area, close to
test site. Astronaut John H. Glenn, Jr., was one of the recovery ships. The spacecraft, with
the pilot. The flight was planned for three the astronaut inside, was recovered approxi-
orbital passes to evaluate the performance of mately 17 minutes after landing. The .astro-
the manned spacecraft systems and to evaluate naut was in excellent shape.
the effects of space flight on the astronaut and Action to prevent recurrence of the anoma-
to obtain the astronaut's evaluation of the oper- lies encountered during the MA-6 mission in-
ational suitability of his spacecraft and sup- cluded relocation of metering orifices and a
porting systems. All mission objectives for change in screen material in the attitude control
this flight were accomplished. The astronaut's system thruster assemblies. Improved specifi-
performance during all phases of the mission cations, tighter quality control, and more con-
was excellent, and no deleterious effects of servative switch rigging and wiring procedures
weightlessness were noted. In general, the were applied to the sensors that indicated heat-
spacecraft, launch vehicle, and network system shield release.
functioned well during the mission. The main Mercury-Atlas 7.--The Mercury-Atlas 7
anomaly in spacecraft operation was the loss (MA-7) vehicle was launched on May 24, 1962,
of thrust of two of the 1-pound thrusters which from the Cape Canaveral launch site. Astro-
required the astronaut to control the spacecraft naut M, Scott Carpenter was the pilot for this
for a large part of the mission manually. The mission. The mission was planned for three
orbit was approximately as planned, with peri- orbital passes and was a continuation of the
gee at 86.9 nautical miles and apogee at 140.9 program to acquire additional operational ex-
nautical miles. During the second and third perience and information for manned orbital
passes, a false indication from a sensor indi- space flight. All objectives of the mission were
cated that the spacecraft heat shield might be achieved. The spacecraft used for this flight
unlocked. This indication caused considerable was production unit number 18 which was very
concern and real-time analyses resulted in the similar to the spacecraft 13 used on the MA-6
recommendation that the expended retropack- flight. Some of the more significant features
age be retained on the spacecraft during reentry and modifications applied to this spacecraft in-
at the end of the third pass to hold the heat clude: the SOFAR bomb and radar chaff were
shield in place in the event it was unlatched. deleted, the earth-path and oxygen partial pres-
The presence of the retropackage during re- sure indicators were deleted, the instrument ob-
entry had no detrimental effect on the motions server camera was removed, provisions for a
of the spacecraft. Network operation, includ- number of experiments and evaluation were
ing telemetry reception, radar tracking, com- added, a more complete temperature survey
munications, command control, and computing, system was added, the astronaut's suit circuit
were excellent and permitted effective flight constant-bleed orifice was deleted, the landing-

12
bag limit (heat-shieldrelease)switcheswere as spacecraft 18 utilized on the previous mis-
rewiredto preventerroneous telemetrysignals sion; however, a number of changes were made
shouldoneswitchmalfunction. in the configuration to increase reliability, to
The launchvehicle,the Atlas 107-D,was save weight, to provide for experiments, and to
similarto the previousAtlas launchvehicleex- conduct systems evaluations. The launch ve_hi-
ceptfor a few minorchanges, thema_oroneof cle also had some changes as compared with the
whichwasthat for this mission,the fuel tank previous Mercury-Atlas launch vehicle. These
insulation bulkheadwas retained. Launch- changes include the following : the fuel tank in-
vehicleperformance wassatisfactory.A peri- sulation bulkhead was removed at the factory
geeof 86.8nauticalmilesandanapogee of 145 to be similar to the launch vehicle for the MA.-6
nautical miles were the orbital parameters. mission, the two booster engine thrust cham-
Duringmostof theflight,thespacecraft-system bers had baffled ejectors installed for improved
operationwas satisfactoryuntil, late in the combustion characteristics, and no holddown
third pass,the pilot notedthat the spacecraft delay was programed between engine start and
true attitude and indicatedattitude in pitch beginning of release sequence.
were in disagreement.Becausethis control The pilot performed numerous experiments,
systemproblemwasdetectedjust beforeret- observations, and systems evaluations during his
rofire,nocorrectiveactionwaspossible andthe mission. For the first time, extended periods
astronautwasforcedto providemanualattitude of drifting flight were accomplished. Pilot ad-
control,usingthe windowandhorizonasthe herence to the flight plan was excellent. Basic
attitudereference, for the retrofiremaneuver. spacecraft systems, launch-vehicle systems, and
Retrofireoccurredabout3 seconds late,andthe ground-network systems performed well with
optimumspacecraftattitudeswerenot main- only a few minor anomalies. The landing was
tainedduringretrofire. As a result,thespace- made in the Pacific Ocean within sight of the
craft landedseveralhundredmilesdownrange primary recovery ship, and the spacecraft and
of theplannedlandingpoint. Because of this, pilot were recovered in about 40 minutes.
recoveryof the astronautwasnot accomplished Mercury-Atla._ 9.--The Mercury-Atlas 9
until about3 hoursafter landing. The space- (MA-9) mission utilizing production space-
craft wasretrievedlater by a destroyerafter craft 20 and Atlas launch vehicle 130-D, was
about6 hoursin thewater. Exactcause of the successfully accomplished on May 15 and 16,
controlsystemmalfunctionwasnot determined 1963, with Astronaut L. Gordon Cooper as the
because the scannercircuitrysuspected of caus- pilot. It was launched from the Cape Canaw-
ing the anomalywas lost when the antenna eral test site for a planned 22 orbital-pass mis-
sectionwasjettisonedduringthelandingphase. sion. Launch-vehicle performance was excel-
Changes in checkout procedures usedin launch lent and a near perfect orbit was attained. The
preparationswereincorporatedto preventre- orbital parameters were as follows: perigee,
currenceof this typeof problem. 87.2 nautical miles; apogee, 144.2 nautical miles.
Mercury-Atlas 8.--The Mercury-Atlas 8 For the first 18 orbital passes, the spacecraft
(MA-8) vehicle was launched from the Cape systems performed as expected, and the pilot
Canaveral launch site on October 3,1962; Astro- was able to adhere to the flight plan and perform
naut Walter M. Schirra, Jr., was the pilot.. The his activities as planned. Up to that time,
MA-8 mission was planned for six orbital anomalies were limited to small nuisance-type
passes in order to acquire additional operational problems. Beginning with the 19th orbital
experience and human and systems performance pass, the spacecraft systems problems began
information for extended manned orbital space with actuation of the 0.05g warning light. In-
flight. The objectives of the mission were suc- vestigation of the occurrence of this warning
cessfully accomplished. The orbital parameters light indicated that the automatic control sys-
were as follows: perigee, 86.9 nautical miles; tem had become latched into _he mode required
and apogee, 152.8 nautical miles. The space for the reentry phase. Later, the alternating-
vehicle for this mission consisted of produc- current power supply for the control system
tion spacecraft 16 and Atlas launch vehicle failed to operate. These failures were analyzed
l13-D. The spacecraft was basically the same by the pilot and the ground crew in real time

13
and i t was determined that the pilot would space environment. I n addition, increasing
have to make a manual retrofire and reentry. numbers of special experiments, observations,
He performed these meneuvers with close pm- and evaluations performed during these mis-
cision and landed a short distance from the sions by the pilots as their capabilities were
prime recovery ship in the Pacific. The pilot utilized have provided our scientific and tech-
and the spacecraft were recovered and hoisted nical communities with much new information.
aboard the carrier only 40 minutes after land- It is emphasized that goals beyond those orig-
ing. More detailed results of this mission are inally established were achieved in a period of
contained in other papers in this document. 4% years after the beginning of the project
Lift-off photographs of the three types of with complete pilot safety and without change
Mercury space vehicles are shown in figure 1-4. to the basic concepts that were used to establish
the feasibility of the Mercury Project.
PERFORMANCE I n early 1959, immediately after project go-
A n examination of the history of the major ahead, the first manned orbital flight was sched-
flight tests, presented in figure 1-3, will show uled to occur as early as April 1960, or 22
that the basic objectives of the Mercury Project months before the event actually took place
were achieved 3v3 years after official project (see fig. 1-5). This difference was caused by
approval, with the completion of Astronaut an accumulation of events which included de-
John Glenn’s successful orbital flight on Febru- lays in production spacecraft deliveries, diffi-
ary 20, 1962. Subsequently, Astronaut Car- culties experienced in the preparations for
penter completed a similar mission. Then., As- flight, and by the effects of the problem areas
tronauts Schirra and Cooper completed orbital that were detected during the development and
missions of increased duration to provide addi- early qualification flight tests. The primary
tional information about man’s performance problem areas included those which were asso-
capabilities and functional characteristics in the ciated with the spacecraft-launch-vehicle struc-

Little Joe Redstonc Atlas

14-Lift-off
FIQURE photograph of the three types of Mercury space vehicles.
14
CY 1959 CY CY 1961 CY 1962

FIGURE 1-5.---Co_npari_on of p ,l_n, ned and actual flight schedules.

tural interface on the MA-1 mission, spacecraft ment phase and those missions accomplished
sequential-system sensors on Little Joe missions through most of the qualification phase were
5 and 5A, launch-vehicle umbilical-release se- accomplished at about the planned rates. The
quence on the MR-1 mission, launch-vehicle major deviations occurred in 1960 when pro-
propulsion system on MR-2, and launch-vehicle duction spacecraft deliveries were later and
control system on MA-3. when launch preparation took longer than
The applicability of these statements can be planned. The planned schedu]e allowed for
illustrated by reference line representations of about a 4-week prelaunch preparation period
the planned and actual schedules that are com- at the launch site. Actual preparation time
pared in figure 1-5. This comparison shows averaged about six times the estimated amount.
that the flight-test program was intiated about Some of the additional required preparation
1 month late. Missions through the develop- time was compensated for by concurrent prepa-

15
ration of several spacecraft. Also, some sig- Keith Glennan, the first Administ_'ator of the
nificant problems were encountered during the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
early qualification missions which caused de- tion (NASA) on October 7, 1958. The plans
lays in the schedule by l'eqairing a(hlil ional mis- approved by Dr. Glennan on that date had been
sions to accomi)lish the objectives. These delays formulated by a joint National Advisory Com-
were accumulative and were not reduced during mit.tee for Aeronautics-Advanced Researet_
the life of the project. The delays that occurred Project Agency (NACA-ARPA) Committee,
later in the project resnlted from deliberate chaired by Dr. Robert. R. Gilruth, at that time
efforts to insure that the prep:lration for the Assistant Director of Langley Research Center.
manned flights was complete and accurate and, The committee had been established during the
still later, from changes made to increase the summer of 1'958 to outline a manned satellite
spacecraft capabilities. program. With the approval of these plans by
Figure 1-,3 shows that 25 flight tests were the Administrator of NASA, formerly the
made in the 45-month period between the first NACA, Dr. Gilrnth was authorized to proceed
mission and the end of the project, for an aver- with the accomplishment of the Manned Space
age of about one flight test in each 2-month Flight Project.
period. This is a very rapid pace when the de- The Space Task Group (STG), later to be-
velopment and qualification nature of the pro- come the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)
gram is considered. Even so, the average rate was informally organized after this assignment
was low when compared with the rate that was to initiate action for the project accomplish-
maintained during the last part of 1960 and the ment. The initial staff was comprised of 35
early part of 1961 when five spacecraft were in personnel from the Langley Research Center
preparation at once and the launchings occurred and 3 from the Lewis Research Center.
more frequently than once a month. It should On November 5, 1958, the STG located at the
also be noted that, during the period of high Langley Research Center was formally estab-
launch rate, preparations were accomplished at lished and reported directly to NASA Head-
two widely separated sites, Cape Canaveral, quarters in Washington, D.C. At the same
Fla., and Wallops Station, Va. time, Dr. Gilruth was appointed head of the
While the flight missions were the significant STG and project manager of the manned satel-
outward signs of the project activity that re- lite program. By the end of November 1958
sulted from the total effort, it was the behind- the manned satellite program was officially
the-scenes activities that made the missions pos- named Project Mercury.
sible. The contents of figure 1-6 show the con- The overall management of the program was
current, aeti_;ity that existed in a number of the the responsibility of NASA Headquarters, with
more si_lificant areas of Project Mercury in project management the responsibility of the
order to reduce the time required to accomplish STG. It was recognized from the beginning
the objectives. The specific requirements in that this had to be a joint effort of all concerned,
many areas were dependent upon the develop- and as such, the best knowledge and experience
ment being accomplished in the other areas. as related to all phases of the program and the
Thns, there was a continual iteration process cooperation of all personnel was required if suc-
carried on which resulted in a gradual refine- cess was to be achieved. It was also recognized
ment of requirements and completion of the that it was an extremely complex program that
work.
would probably involve more elements of gov-
Management
ernment and industry than any development
Modes of Operation program before undertaken. Because of this

Development of the management structure complexity and involvement of so many ele-

and operating mode to direct this complex and ments, management was faced with an ex-
rapidly moving project began concurrently with tremely challenging task of establishing an
the approval of the plans for a program of re- overall operating plan that would best fit the
search and development leading to manned program and permit accomplishment of all ob-
space flight which were presented to Dr. T. jectives at the earliest possible date. To achieve

16
1958 1960 196i 1962 1965
i .... I .... 1.95.9

p!FHAr_ o!JrMA_!J!J!A!_
Proqram planninq and manaqement , _ , ,
)roqrom approved by NASA and ARPA i i i i 1-FFFFHll nlnn_
_osk G_ formed : : : : : IIIIlllll ::::: ::,.:
_cro_cfficofion mailed to bidders , , , _ q !JJJjjJ_ :::::
Bidders briefing_ : : : : : i i i-+-4_ : ,. ,. :
Bids received and evaluated
:::::
Contractor selected I FIJIIII :::::
Contract siqned 'nii_ !!!!lllll ::::: :111
D_X J_Li°r iJ_ ..... Ilil91111
:;;:;- I : : :

Gen Yotes assigned as DOD representative : _ , : , IIIIIII m


::::: r:::-
ProcJrom completed i ........

Research and development i i i:,:


Air-drop
Little Joe
parach__ram
launch vehicle
II I I I _.iii
Desl£n started i i i i i
::::: iiii i ,.
ilJiJJiJJ
First air frame delivered : : : : : i1111t111 ::::: I I I I , ,,,, !
iiiii :::::
First f li_hi atilt II11111 :::::
iiiiiiiii ;;:::
_Design and _on_tr. tu#._oJ3_storfed : : : : : I1:::
Delivered to Cape Canaveral ii!ii _ i!
Wind-tunnel proqram : : " : " !!!ii I
Esc_e-system test_ :::: :
iiiii
Pressure sgit developmenl : _ : : :
i_nn
Contractor selected ' P _ : : iiiiii _!
Prototype SUitS delivered _ :_
;:::::nip r _
First delivery of flight suits |
-4--+-+4--_
;;;;; iiii
Flight crew program
Crew selection --
4-tilt ;;!!
R_lmlllll
-4 ++4--
,Service oeromed personnel joined Space Task Group_
Record screening for astronauts begu n _Jt!!J l!
Aslr0naut exams ai Lovelace Ciih_ I M IlJlll
_lnn
Astronaut tests at WADC
+44 nnnn
Crew selection completed

Astronauts reported for duty +÷+4 +


Trainers delivered

" Astronaut traininq (stud,/1 fhqhi,centrifuqe_etc]l]-H[ IIII .....

1965
I 1958 1959 I 1960 I 19611 1962
_TLockino and around instrumentation IIIlIl:'" . , , m .......................... i '1 I I I I n i i i
ii!!
_startef:l I I II III Nit I iiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii ii iii
Re_nsibilff_t _ned_e_ I/llllllIIIIIlllllllll]lll}llll IIIII
............. I I Ill III
_ontract_ _MIT_etc) _ -l_! L ............. III ........ IIIllfl II IIIII
Bidders bfie_ __ I_11 Illllllllllllll
_on_ractors selected ........ [ t I_J LL[ Jlll_llllll[]lllllll Illlllllll Illl I
Ilrl
IIIlll{llllllllllll II IIIII
- Tracking operot_l - I I II l I t I I I ....................... ',iiill iiiiiii iiiiiiii
Recove_stud#
--_
_n_._.
contract w_rummon liiii
!iiiiI:
.. N_ and Marine tests
DaD support planning office established - IIIlillllllllll]llllHllllllllllllllllllll'"'""
Ne ogohahons Started - Tlqq_i i i Jiiiii ii i ii i i r_
Atlas
Redstone
orders
Orders
LLLLLL[LLIJZLLZUI III IIII IIII IIJ133_LI l II II
............................. I I II I II II I II II IIIIIIi
I I I I I II I I IIII I//I I II I II I I I I I I I I lll[][_[l_lT1- [I]rJrl
Launch
Atlas vehicle
deliveries IIIIIIIIII IIII I1@1IIII I I I It II le _1 Ill I I Ill I I IIIIII
Redstone deliveries I I I IIII II IIIIII Ill Iltllllll I III Ill III II II IIIJl
So_oA£ecra f t-£roduc liD n Illll
_n

Tooling
started

started
'_ _IIIIIIIILIIIIIIIIIII, , ,I ,Ill/
Fi[st drawln_
_oecificetJon
__
control dwgs_to
_
sub-coatracforsl I II I I I I I I
IlJllllJI IIIl/lllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
/llll
Mock_
F'irst
started
spac-e_s tar ted
J_ILIJ |It l
,,,,, II II l'llllllllllll,llllllllil,,
_oek-u_com_on and-inse_ectio_
First eom_ceeraft delivery no, I _l_j J J
Deh-ver_/ for missions I J_
IIIIpiII, ,,,,,,,,,,,_l,,,,,,, ,,, ,_111
Fh_ht tests IIIII1_11 IlJlll_
Little Joe (Deve[oprnent_ ----_T_[- _
- Big JJoe (E)evelopment) ....
_ R_dstone (Oevcloprnem_ -- -- - _T_T_ []II
Redston_ (Quah ficafion_ TI_H_ I'_
Redstone (Manned) TFI_TiT IIIIIIIIIl]_l±]il]llZ_illllil|]_TT_ Ifll
-Atlas
J_#las
(Ouai fica_
_VPQn n ed_
NqTiTqTlq-
+;,ttiHIITH_', III' I_,',III M_,I'._llilN_ IIIl

lot2
0 Denotes none
o. of day
dehveries
mission J I I I
Fiev_z 1-6.--Areas of primary activityduring Project Mercury.

]7
this task a general working arrangement was ments with responsibility for the assigned task
established as shown in figure 1-7. This figure and most knowledgeable in the area for which
illustrates in a very simplified format, the gen- the group was responsible. These third level
eral plan used. teams were established as required to investi-
The arrangement was basically comprised of gate and define detailed technical requirements
three working levels. The first level established and insofar as possible to make the arrange-
the overall goals and objectives as well as the ments to implement their accomplishment. The
basic ground rules and the means for their ac- team continued to function until all details of
complishment. The next level was responsible a particular technical requirement were worked
for establishing technical requirements and out to the satisfaction of those concerned. As
exercising detailed management. The detailed the tasks assigned to a particular team were
management was performed at this level and completed, that team was phased out. New
provided the approval and authorizing inter- teams were established to meet new require-
face with all elements supporting the project. ments which evolved and requirements of var-
The bond of mutual purpose established here ious phases as the project progressed.
provided the direction and force necessary to An example of this working arrangement
carry the project forward. This same bond was with a general explanation'of how it worked is
evident in the groups or teams, in the third level shown in figure 1-8. This example shows the
of effort, set up to carry out the detailed imple- arrangement used to procure and develop the
mentation and, where necessary, further define Atlas launch vehicle for manned flight. To ac-
the requirements. This level consisted of teams complish this, procurement agreements and
comprised of personnel from all necessary ele- overall policy were established between the U.S.

Functional relationship

I
Organization A I Organization B
I

Level I
Overall

management
I' 1 Policy Overall

management
Level I

Approval
and
direction

Supporting Supporting
elements, Technical Technical elements
Level 2 Level 2
other organizations management management other organization=
and contractors and contractors

/
fr
/
/
/

/
/
Working /
Level 3 Level 3
teams
t /

FIGURE1-7.--Typical management arrangement.

18
Air Force Ballistic Missile Division of the De- The same general arrangement was employed
partment of Defense and the NASA Head- between NASA elements in accomplishing
quarters. Working within the framework of major tasks, such as establishing the World-
these agreements the Atlas Weapons Systems wide Tracking Network, as illustrated in figure
Command of the U.S. Air Force and the 1-9. In addition to the many overall arrange-
NASA STG formulated the basic technical re- ments that had to be made in establishing the
quirements necessary to adapt the Atlas for use Worldwide Tracking Network, such as agree-
in the program. Working teams consisting of ments with foreign governments, working
specialists from the STG and the Atlas Weap- through the State Department, regarding the
ons Systems Conunand were established to de- location and operation of ground stations in
fine the detail requirements and initiate the their territory, the task of providing the hard-
necessary action for their implementation. This ware and facilities that made up the ground
implementation could be direct for cases in stations represented a major task that was pri-
which the team had the authority or the rec- marily the responsibility of the STG and the
ommendation for implementation could be for- Langley Research Center. This example covers
warded to the necessary level of authority. In the means by which the basic technical require-
any case, the next higher level could alter the ments and hardware needs of the ground sta-
decisions of the lower level if developments tions were accomplished through the combined
required. This arrangement also provided a efforts of the STG and Langley. The Langley
"closed-loop" management structure, thus as- Research Center was responsible for the pro-
suring positive means of communication and curement and establishment of the network,
proper technical directions. Frequently, spe- with the basic flight monitoring and control re-
cialists from the contractors and other support- quirements being the responsibility of the STG.
ing elements were included in the teams to The overall agreements regarding the imple-
assemble the best available talent to solve the mentation of this effort were established at the
problem. Quite often, tasks involving consid- Director-Project Manager level with the basic
erable effort were assigned directly to individ- technical requirements being defined at the level
ual team members by the chairman of the group of the cognizant divisions. After the basic re-
for implementation. quirements were presented to the Langley Re-

Ballistic Procure ment NASA


Missile and policies Headquarters
Oivison

Supporting Supporting
elements: elements:
other Air Force other NASA
division centers and
and contractors cent re ctors

FmuRm 1-8.--Management arrangement used to procure, develop, and prepare the Atlas launch vehicle for

manned flight.
19
searchCenter,teamswereestablished todiscuss rangement the identifications on figure 1-7
andresolve the detailtechnicalrequirements of could be changed to represent those of the STG
the network. For example,a team was as- and the spacecraft contractor, McDonnell Air-
signedthe task of establishing the communica- craft Corporation (MAC). In this instance it
tions and tracking requirements and resolving was recognized by both parties that normal con-
the type of equipment to be used on the space- tractual procedures alone were insufficient to
craft and the detail design characteristics of achieve the desired results within the scheduled
this equipment. They then had to determine if time frame. Direct communication regarding
suitable receiving equipment for tile ground technical requirements between the specialists
stations was available or if it had to be de- of STG and MAC had to be the rule rather
veloped. This involved coordinating overall than the exception. Management agreements
requirements given to both the Langley Re- on the upper levels provided the framework
search Center's ground station contractors and whereby this could be accomplished and pro-
the STG's spacecraft contractor to determine if vided the management decisions for project di-
the desired requirement could be achieved and rection. Frequently, the teams determined a
if not, to determine an acceptable means of course of action and proceeded without further
achieving the desired results. This points out delay, with verification documentation fol-
only one detail area that this kind of group had lowing through regular channels. The "closed-
to resolve; other areas such as location of the loop" built into the working arrangement
ground stations, frequencies of transmission, provided the assurance that contractual and
bandwidths, spacecraft antemm radiation pat- program requirements were met in all cases.
terns, and so on presented the same type of prob- Regular management reviews of hardware
lems that had to be resolved. These efforts status and task achievement kept management
evolved into the Mercury Worldwide Tracking al)reast of the problem areas and afforded the
Network, the operation of which was the re- opportunity for timely direction of effort to
sponsibility of the Goddard Space Flight Cen- many specific problem areas. This mode of op-
ter (GSFC). Similar arrangements existed eration enhanced the rapidity with which a de-
between the many elements necessary to de- sign change could be implemented or a course of
velop the network and implement its operation. action altered. This contributed to the timely
To illustrate further this type working ar- conclusion of a project.

Research
Group
I Langley ] Policy j Space Task
Center NASA NASA

I I,
Supporting

elements: Research Division=


Approval and and Flight [_ Supporting
Department of Tracking and
elements,
Defense Ground Direction _ Systems J
Contractors
and Instrumentation Divisions
J Instrumentation
¢ofltractors Unit

NASA NASA

s,is ,,t

Working .'""

teams

Fmtms 1-9.--Management arrangement used to establish the ground tracking organization.


2O
The foregoing discussion is primarily con- lished for the specific purpose of conducting a
cerned with the management techniques that space-flight mission. The organization cover-
existed with the external organizations, but the ing the flight operations phase of the project
same type of procedure was commonly used was a line organization with elements from the
within the organizational structure of the STG. government and contractor organizations in-
As firm definition of the program emerged and volved in the operation reporting directly to the
final spacecraft design details were formalized. Operations Director. Figure 1-10 illustrates
it became necessary to centralize the coordinat- the manner in which these elements merged to
ing effort within the STG. To accomplish this, form this functional line organization.
centralized review meetings were condticted on
a regular basis to correlate all elements of the
Director
effort and ascertain that unified approaches and NASA Manned
Operations I
directions were maintained. These meetings Spacecraft Center

were attended by cognizant personnel from


within the STG and by personnel from other I
Flight J
activities when required. The primary func- Director Coordinator
Director J
NASA Manned
tion of these meetings was to obtain the best in- Air Force Space "i-
Launch I NASA Manned J
Spacecraft Center
Systems Division Spacecraft Center J
puts available for the technical management of
the project and to control the engineering and I ,
design
spacecraft.
meetings
and thereby
Information
was dispersed
the configuration
channeled
directly
of the
into these
to the responsi-
i Test Conductor
General Dynamics
/Astr6nautics
Lt Launch
Technical
Vehicle
Advisors

Aerospace
J

ble individuals within the STG, with assign- l J Flight

ments being made directly to the cognizant Controllers J


NASA Manned
organization when action was required. Tech- Launch Vehicle Spacecraft
Spacecraft Center
Systems Test Conductor
nical direction required as a result of action ini- NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
tiated at the coordination meetings, after thor- Atlas
ough review as to need, .cost, and effect on Associate
Contrac tar
schedule, was issued to' the applicable contrac-
tors. Meetings of this type provided fast re-
sponse and accurate direction throughout the I I
Spacecraft Aeromedical and Spac d
duration of the project. As the staff and pro- Systems croft Instrumentation J
ject responsibilities increased, the support ad- Mc Donnell NASA Manned J
Aircraft Carp Spacecraft Center l
ministrative functions performed by the Lang-
ley Research Center, such as Personnel, Pro- FX0URE 1-10.--Integrated functional organization for
curement and Supply, and Budget and Finance launch operations.

Offices, were incorpo_ ated into the STG manage-


ment organization. An organizational chart of this nature fails to
The formation of the Mercury Field Opera- show the unified effort, the cooperation, and the
tions Organization at Cape Canaveral marked team work that was evident in every Mercury
the entry of Project Mercury into the opera- flight. All elements of governnaent and in-
tional phase of the program. In conjunction dustry supporting the project pulled together
with this an Operations Director wasappointed toward a common goal, with each individual
with complete responsibility and authority for striving to do his best. Without this spirit of
flight preparation and mission operations. The cooperation and team work, the degree of suc-
Operations Director also served as the single cess experienced in Project Mercury would not
point of contact for Department of Defense have been possible.
(DOD) activities supporting Project Mercury. The success of Project Mercury demonstrated
Although the general management modes of not only the reliability of the equipment but
operation previously discussed were applied also the effectiveness of the management organi-
throughout the duration of the project, a dif- zation and the working arrangements with the
ferent type functional organization was estab- various supporting elements throughout govern-

21
mentandindustry. Effortsto assure thatProj- were issued in formal report formats that con-
ectMercurywouldmeetits objectivesevolved rained detailed descriptions of the mission and
in the high level agreements that resultedin equipment, performance analyses, result of in-
clearlinesof authorityand responsibilityfor vestigations of anolnalies, and much of the data.
technicaldirection. The reporting effort became greater as the
With theincreasingnationaleffortinthefield complexity and duration of the missions in-
of spaceexploration,additionalmannedspace creased, and larger reports and longer prepara-
projectswereassigned tothe STG. Because of tion times resulted. However, in most cases, the
theincreased emphasis andscope of themanned reports were printed for distribution within 30
spaceflighteffort,the MSC wasestablished in days after the mission. The report of the
November 1961from the nucleusprovidedby MA-9 mission, for example, contained more
theSTG. SoonaftertheMSCwasestablished, than 1,000 pages of information.
theMercuryProjectOfficewascreatedandas- Innumerable documents were generated cov-
signedtheresponsibilityandauthorityfor de- ering all aspects of the program during the life
tailed management and technicaldirectionof of Project Mercury so that management as well
the project,workingwith thesupportof other as the individual elements could have overall
MSC unitsin areasin whichthey had cogni- knowledge of project details and progress.
zanceor had specificspecialtiesneededto These documents were prepared by all elements
achieve projectobjectives.TheMSCorganiza- participating in the program and included such
tionexistingattheendoftheprojectisshownin general types as drawings, familiarization man-
figure1-11. The MercuryProjectOfficepro- uals, specifications, operational procedures, test
videdtheprojectmanagement totheconclusion procedures, qualification status, test results, mis-
of the project and usedthe samegeneral sion results, reports on knowledge gained and
management methodestablishedearly in the status reports of all kinds. It is estimated that
program. at least 30 formal documents, excluding draw-
Tools ings, engineering change orders, and so forth,
A_ reporting system was required by manage- were issued during the course of the project.
ment to control the fast-moving project so that A partial listing of the types of documentation
effective and timely decisions could be made. used during the program is included in appen-
dix A.
Various methods used by management to ac-
complish this included reports, schedules, cost Overall schedule control was accomplished by
control, and later, pr%oTam evaluation and re- the use of a Master Working Schedule which
view technique (PERT) in addition to the tech- indicated major milestones, such as spacecraft
nical reviews previously mentioned. deliveries and checkout periods, launch-vehicle
Many types of technical reports were pre- deliveries and checkout times, launch-complex
pared for management in order to keep it cleanup and conversion, and tracking network
abreast of progress and problems. These re- status. Detailed bar-chart schedules were main-
ports were concise and factual status reports tained in areas of direct concern, such as indi-
issued daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly vidual spacecraft at the manufacturer's plant,
to highlight progress or lack of progress with- launch preparation of the spacecraft and
out conjecture. Obviously, close to the launch launch vehicle at the launch site, astronaut
date, the daily reports became the most impor- train!ng, and the major test programs.
tant. Another valuable report was the one pre- To control cost, management constantly moni-
pared .after the completion of each mission. tored commitments, obligations, and expendi-
These were prepared expeditiously to present tures through the normal accounting techniques.
analyses of the performance of all the systems During the later phases of the program, the
involved in the mission, from the lowest ele- project office maintained cost control charts on
ments through operational recovery techniques. which approved programed funds were shown,
The results of these analyses: were used imme- as well as obligations for a given time period.
diately after a mission to form the basis for From these charts, management could tell at a
corrective action that often influenced the hard- glance the amount of remaining unobligated
ware on the very next mission. These results funds for any given area.

22
Dlrectcr I
I I
_g NASA
Ional Audit' Legal
_: , for Deveownmt _mm*nts end, RS_t'_ity
J J
I endPr°gr°ms
Deputy OIrectorJ JF"ghtC_"m_°nl
for Mission Re- I AA_c
0 an_f_:ht
Office Office

I l
I Gemini __J A __ollo S¢_lcmft I

PPoject office
I Mercury .__ Center I_bdicel I
Project Office _1 _ PImJect Office J Operations Office I
/
I ! I I
Assistant J

_tems J
I
l,I_=,,o_-I
Spacea'aft

_1_'- _--j

Isy.,enws_ml
I
Operotions
Division
Flight
Operations
FllghtW..
ONlsion I

-i
Systems
I[_k_tion
and
Development
Division
and C_moc
Division
Is

] I o,=r__ o,__,
Operatmns
spoce J Pr""" I
Er_ronment
Division S4cwlty Personnel

___ Oivislon

I
,I I I I I I
J
Division
Logistics
T.¢.._,
Services
Otvis;_m
11 i[-11- Ii IT.¢..ico, eho,
Ir_rmatlon
Division
o_
(]IviM_ Division
Adm,_.._.
Sm'vices
Division

J These units provided nmjor support


for Project Mercury

FIGURE 1-11.--Organization existing at end of Project Mercury.

23
In the last year and a half, the Manned Space- magnitude that could affect mission success or
craft Center applied the PERT system to cover mission safety.
all areas of the project. The PERT network Resources
information was analyzed and updated biweek-
ly and provided useful information on a timely Many milestones occurred during the 57
basis to make it possible to employ the use of months of the project as shown in figure 1-3.
redundant action paths or to apply additional Mercury history reflects 25 major fligl_t tests
effort when it appeared as though problems in in a 45-month period. It should be noted that
a single, critical path would result in long de- launch preparations and flights were accom-
lays. plished from two widely separated sites: Cape
Engineering, technical, configuration, and Canaveral, Fla., and Wallops Station, Wallops
mission reviews were held as often as once a Island, Va. Twenty-three launch vehicles were
week to present up-to-date information on pro- utilized--seven Little Joe, six Mercury-Red-
posed technical changes, potential problem stone, and ten Mercury-Atlas. Two flight tests,
areas, and test results. At these meetings, the the off-the-pad abort and the first Little Joe
necessary decisions were made to keep the pro- flight test, did not utilize launch vehicles. Fif-
gram moving along the chosen path at the de- teen. production spacecraft were utilized for the
sired rate. At other times, development engi- flights, some of which were used for more than
neering inspections were held at the contractors' one flight mission or test unit. One s])acecraft
plants as significant systems approached de- was used entirely for a ground test unit.
livery status. These inspections were attended The broad range of effort which occurred,
by top management and the best, most experi- often concurrently, during the life of the proj-
enced supervisors, pilots, engineers, specialists, ect required the services of large numbers of
inspectors, and technicians. As a result of people, as illustrated in table 1-I. At the height
these inspections and thorough validating dis- of this effort there were 11 major contractors,
cussions, requests for mandatory corrective ac- 75 major subcontractors, and 7,9_00 vendors
tion were issued. working to produce the equipment needed for
Flight safety reviews attended by top man- Project Mercury. Also included in this en-
agement probably constituted the most si_fifi- deavor were the task forces from the DOD sup-
cant management tools used in Project Mercury plying ships, planes, medical assistance, man-
to insure that the proper attention had been power, and so on in support of flight and re-
given to necessary details. These reviews were covery operations. During the development
held in the days immediately before hmnch. and qualification phase of the project, effort
In the process of ascertaining that the material was expended from Langley Research Center,
required for presentation at the meetings would Lewis Research Center, George C. Marshall
be acceptable, the technical work in progress Space Flight Center, Goddard Space Flight
was reviewed in great detail with particular Center, Ames Research Center, Wallops Sta-
emphasis being placed on results of tests, modi- tion, and DOD involving hundreds of people.
fications, and changes that had been incorpo- Colleges and universities also investigated many
rated and the action that was taken to correct different and significant facets of Project Mer-
discrepancies. At the reviews, then, the ques- cury. At the height of the program, there were
tions relating to the flight readiness of the some 650 people working directly on Project
spacecraft, the launch vehicle, the crew, the net- Mercury in the MSC and over 700 more in other
work, the range, and the recovery effort could l)e parts of the NASA. In all, it is estimated that
answered in the affirmative, except in those there were more than 2,000,000 persons located
cases where actual anomalies were discovered in throughout the United States who directly or
the test results, data, or records during the pres- indirectly provided support for the Mercury
entation. Of course, these anomalies were then Program. The general locations of the major
completely corrected or resolved, because no contractors, universities, NASA centers and
Mercury launchings were ever made in the face other government agencies are illustrated in
of known troubles or unresolved doubts of any figure 1-12.

24
T_ble l-/.--Peak Manpower Support

Source Approximate peak numbers

NASA: 1,360
Direct .......................................................... 650
Research and development ........................................ 710
Industry : 2,000, 000
Contractors (11) ................................................. 33, 000
Major subcontractors (75) ............... _ ........................ 150, 000
Vendors (7,200) .................................................. 1,817, 000
Department of Defense ............................................... 18, 000
Educational groups .................................................. 168
Others .............................................................. 1,000

Total ......................................................... 2, 020, 528

FIGURE 1-12.--Distribution of organizations in the United States that supported the project.

Lists of government agencies, prime contrac- filled with the successful completion of the MA-
tors, and major subcontractors and vendors are 6 flight and additional space experience was
presented in appendixes B, C, and D, respec- obtained from the MA-7, MA-8, and MA-9 mis-
tively. A list of NASA personnel who con- sions. The latest accounting shows a total
tributed to the Mercury Project effort is pre- project cost of $384,131,000; however, final
sented in appendix E. auditing has not been completed. These cost
The total cost of the Mercury Program as figures include the cost of the Mercury track-
published i'n the Congressional Committee ing network which will be used for manned
Record in January 1960 was estimated to be space programs for years to come, and the cost
$344,500,000. The basic objectives were ful- of the operational and recovery support sup-

707-0560--63--3 25
Table 1-II.--Cost Breakdown

Breakdown Percent of total Cost in millions of


dollars

37. 6 144. 6
Spacecraft :
8.6 33. 2
Design .............................................
Production ......................................... 5.6 21. 7
4.2 15.9
Test and flight preparation ...........................
Subcontract ........................................ 16.2 62. 2
3.0 11.6
Qualification ........................................

37. 6 144. 6
32. 4 124. 6
Network ............................................... ,
23. 7 90. 9
Launch vehicles .........................................
4.3 16.4
Operations ..............................................
2.0 7.6
Supporting development ..................................

Total ............................................ 100. 0 384.1

plied for each mission. A cost breakdown is for operational expenses and for supporting re-

presented in table 1-II, indicating how the search and development. A breakdown of the

funds were used. It is shown that the largest spacecraft costs shows that approximately equal

part of the funds went into the development of percentages were spent on design and on pro-

the spacecraft and the Worldwide Tracking duction. Almost one-half of the total space-

Network. This is not surprising since these craft cost was spent on subcontracts by the

items required complete development. About spacecraft contractor.

24 percent was expended for various launch The peak rate of expendittu_s in the pro-

vehicles. The remainder of the funds was spent gram, ;_s illustrated in figure 1-13, occurred dur-

F Y-1959 FY-1960 FY-1961 FY-i962 FY-1963

JIFIM!AIMIJ JIAIsloINIDIJLFIMIAIMIJ
I I I
JtAISlOiNI0101FIMIAIMIJ
1
J AIsloINiDIJIFIMIAIMIJ
I I I
JIAIslolNIo JIFIM!AIMIJ'

tO0
t25 -

._ 75

!oo _5

jo I[O ) Yeorly rote

300 Totol
420 -
Spacecraft I
Lounch vehicle _---- l /

O_,ro,,o_ .... I / ....

l I / I delilery ....... _-

0 (b) Totol progrom ¢ost.-curnulotive

FxovRz 1-13.--Rate of expenditures and ace ,umulated cc_t.

26
ing tile fiscal year of 1.961 and can be attributed the astronauts. The health of all of the astro-
to several factors. /)urine' this period, more nauts has been good and remains so.
than half of tile total production sl)acecraft Not only has it been found that man can func-
were delivered and more major flight missions tion normally in space, at least up to a maxi-
were accomplished than ill any other compara- mum of 34 hours, but it has been found that he
1)le time period. Launch activities were sup- can be, depended upon to operate the spacecraft
ported both at VVallops Station, Va., and at and its systems whenever it is desired that he do
Cape Canaveral, Fla. Funds were being spent so. On the MA-6 and MA-7 missions, the
on the Worldwide Tracking Network for the astronauts overcame severe automatic control
coming orbital missions. The Redstone phase system difficulties by manually controlling their
of flight program was nearing completion and spacecraft for retrofire and reentry. Also, on
the Atlas phase was approaching a peak. Also, the MA-9 mission, the performance of the astro-
much astronaut training was accomplished and naut demonstrated that man is a valuable space-
the first manned ballistic flight was completed craft system 'because of his judgment, his ability
during this period. to interpret facts, and his ability to take correc-
tive action in the event of malfunctions which
Technical Experience would have otherwise resulted in a failure of
the mission.
The maior results obtained and the significant
The astronauts also proved that they were
philosophies and techniques developed during
qualified experimenters. As a result, the
the course of the project, are gTouped for dis-
weight allocated in each succeeding manned
cussion in the following areas: physiological
orbital space flight increased from 11 pounds on
and psychological responses of man in the space
MA-6 to 6"2pounds on MA-9 for equipment not
environment, flight and ground crew prepara-
related to mission requirements. In each of
tional procedures, and techniques and philoso-
these missions, lhe astronauts have demon-
phy for launch preparation.
strated their ability to perform special experi-
Responses of Man ments and to be a scientific observer'of items of
opportunity.
The manned Mercury flights produced con- It can be concluded that the astronauts have
siderable information on human response and proved to be qualified, necessary space systems,
general physiological condition. Some of the with flexible, wide-band-observation abilities,
most significant result s may be summarized as and have demonstrated that they could analyze
follows : situations, make decisions, and take action to
(1) Results of repeated preflight and post- back up spacecraft systems when provisions
flight physical examinations have detected no were made to give them the capability.
permanent changes related to the space-flight
Crew Preparation
experience, although Astronauts Schirra and
Cooper temporarily showed indications of or- Studies, simulators, and training equipment
thostatic hypotension after their missions. for preparing flight crews and simultaneous
(2) There have been no alarming deviations participation of flight and ground crews in
from the normal, and the astronauts have simulated missions were important to the suc-
cess of the mission. This training is discussed
proved to be exceedingly capable of making
in detail in later papers of this document. Be-
vital decisions affecting flight safety, taking
fore the final round of training and simulation
prompt accurate action to correct systems de-
began, it was found necessary to formulate and
ficiencies, accomplishing spacecraft control, and
freeze a well-defined, detailed flight plan. This
completing all expected pilot functions.
must be done far enough in advance of the mis-
(3) The weightless state for the time periods sion to give the pilot sufficient time to trdin to
of up to 34 hours has shown no cause for con- the particular plan with the ground network
cern. Food and water have 'been consumed and teams who will support him during the mission.
the astronaut has slept. No abnormal body It has also been found to be important to avoid
sensations and functions have been reported by filling every available moment of the flight with

27
a planned crew or ground-station activity. personnel have developed and adhered to a phi-
Time must be available to the flight crew to losophy that is believed to be a basic reason for
manage the spacecraft systems and to investi- Mercury's operational success. This philosophy

gate anomalies or nrllfunctions in the system is that Mercury launcbings will not take plac_ in
and to observe an¢i measure the unexpected. the face of known troubles or in the face of un-

Time must be provided to allow the pilot to resolved doubts of any magnitude that could
consider thoughtfully his reactions to the space possibly affect mission success or flight safety.
environmen_ and its effects upon him. He must It is believed that adherence to this philosophy
have time to eat and drink and to obtain suffi- is of utmost importance to success of any
cient rest. Training in simulator devices has manned space flight program.
proved to be a valuable tool for preparing a man
Areas for Improvement
for space flight. Well in advance of his fight,
the pilot must have detailed training in the basic A list of those general technical areas that
systems and procedures for the mission. In appeared to be either the source of, or a major
addition to preparing the pilot for normal and contributing factor to the problems that repeat-
emergency flight duties, the training must also edly cost the project time and money would
prepare him to conduct successfully the special include design requirements, qualification prac-
experiments assigned to his mission. For cer- tices, definition of standards, tests and valida-
tain of these tasks, the pilot becomes a labora- tion procedures, and configuration management.
tory experimenter and must be suitably trained. The conditions and effects described in these
So far, many different training modes have been • areas are not unique to this project, but repre-
used to good advantage. These modes include sent those that generally exist in the aerospace
lectures by specialists, discussions with the as- field. Therefore, improvements in these areas
sociated scientists, familiarization sessions with would be beneficial in reducing the number of
the specialized flight equipment before the discrepancies that may potentially cause sched-
flight, and parallel study in the field of the ex- ule delays and rising costs. Discussion of these
periment. During the project, the special areas will reveal that in most trouble areas care-
training given the astronauts produced trained ful and continuing attention to detail and qual-
experimenters for each mission. ity assurance program were not as effective in
the aerospace industry as necesary. It is be-
Launch Preparation lieved that the need for improvements has be-
In the process of hardware checkout during come clear and that the changes for the space
flight era are beginning to be made.
launch preparations, it has been found essential
to have detailed written test and validation pro-
Design Requirements
cedures, procedures that are validated and fol-
lowed to the most minute detail during the Requirements and philosophies applied dur-
preliminary systems checkout and, again, during ing the detail design phase have a profound and
later and final systems and integrated systems lasting effect on the overall performance of a
checkouts. It is necessary for the procedures project ; therefore, some of the more significant
to be so written that even small anomalies be- shortcomings observed in the design phase are
come readily apparent to those persons involved emphasized. Adequate design margins must be
in the checkout. These persons must be so established and they must be adequate. An ex-
trained and indoctrinated that they are always ample where inadequate margins were detri-
watchful for anomalies which would be direct mental is the weight-sensitive landing system.
or indirect indications that the hardware may Experience with aircraft and spacecraft designs
be approaching failure. Checkouts are not com- shows that weight continues to increase with
pleted at the end of the detailed procedures, for time. In Mercury, this increase was significant ;
it has been found that the data accumulated and although the rate tended to decrease with
during a checkout procedure may reveal, upon time, it, was present throughout the duration of
detailed analyses, further symptoms that all is the project. The orbital weight of the space-
not well within a system. Finally, the Mercury craft increased at an average rate about 5

28
pounds (0.2 percent) per week during 1959 and proper functions that can cause test failure dur-
1960; thereafter the increase averaged less than ing the life of the project.
2 pounds per week, even after a strong weight- In the design of equipment for specific appli-
control program had been initiated. The over- cations, consideration must be made for the
all weight increase caused an extensive requali- shelf-life periods, including a margin for delays
fication of the landing system because the and extensions to the schedule. Occasionally
original design did not have sufficient growth in Mercury, these periods were not adequate and
margin. During the initial design phase care- some equipment had to be replaced because the
ful consideration should be given to the use lifetime limit had been exceeded while still in
of redundancy. There are different forms of storage.
redundancy and the correct form must be chosen Still another and often overlooked considera-
for the particular application to prevent de- tion is compatibility of materials. This may be
grading the overall reliability of the system. related to the materials themselves, to the en-
Because of the hazards of space flight and the vironment, or, in the case of manned vehicles,
lack of provisions for repairing or replacing to the sensitivity of the man. In any event, care
equipment in flight, it was imperative in Mer- must be taken to see that only those materials
cury spacecraft that all critical functions have properly approved for use in the vehicle are
redundant modes. The redundancy was made actually used. Time and money were expended
less automatic, as man demonstrated the capa- in Mercury to rectify cases where improper ma-
bility of applying the redundant function or terials were found in the systems because some-
providing the redundancy himself. one had failed to follow the approved materials
In the design of a spacecraft, consideration list.
must be given to accessibility of components Qualification Practices

and assemblies. More than 3,000 equipment re- Complete and appropriate qualification of
movals were made during the launch prepara- components, assemblies, subsystems, and sys-
tions on an early spacecraft; at least 1200 re- tems is essential for reliable performance of
movals were performed during preparations of space equipment. In the design of the Mercury
the other production spacecraft. The majority spacecraft, allowances were made for the un-
of these removals occurred to permit, access to known environment of the planned manned
a failed part. It is important that the design space-flight missions, by conservatism in design,
be such that a minimum number of other com-
by redundancy of equipment in systems, and,
ponents have to be disturbed when it is neces- most important, by component qualification
sary to replace or revalidate a component. testing through ranges of environmental condi-
Since man first began making things, partic- tions that were believed to exceed the real con-
ularly with machines that could produce identi- ditions. The exact conditions that the compon-
cal copies, he has found himself in the position ents and equipment would be subjected to dur-
where interchangeability is a combination of a ing Mercury space flights, of course, was un-
blessing and a trap. Time and time again air- known prior to the time of the flights. There-
planes, automobiles, and other types of systems fore, care was taken in selecting the qualifica-
have had troubles and faults, because things tion conditions because underqualification could
that could be connected wrong have been con- result in inflight failures, and drastic overquali-
nected wrong, regardless of printed instructions, fication could cause unnecessary delays and high
colors, or common sense. Therefore, it is imper- costs in the program. The selected qualification
ative that electrical connectors, mechanical com- conditions proved to represent the actual en-
ponents, and pneumatic and liquid connectors be vironment conditions very well. Some modifi-
so designed that they cannot physically be as- cations to the specifications were made as the
sembled in the wrong orientation or in the project progressed to make allowances for spe-
improper order. Experience shows clearly that cific environments, such as local heating in
this requirement cannot be overemphasized. equipment areas and system-induced electrical
Mismated or misconnected parts continued "glitches." Complete coverage of conditions is
throughout the project to ruin components, give important, but not sufficient if the qualification
false indications of trouble, and result in im- is not also appropriate. During the MA-9 mis-

29
sion,equipment
faultsoccurredlatein the mis- preparing electrical wiring nmst be reevaluated
sionwhichresultedin the failure of the auto- to assure that each step is accomplished in a
maticcontrolsystemand requiredAstronaut manner that meets high-quality standards. In-
Cooper to make his retromaneuver and reentry sulat, ion stripping, soldering, crimping or weld-
manually. These faults, which occurred in the ing, and cleaning processes must be accom-
electrical circuitry interfaces of the automatic plished without degrading the materials and in
control system, were caused by the accumulation such a way that the quality of the work can be
of moisture. The components that suffered verified. Requirements must be made more
these faults had passed the Mercury humidity rigorous and must be thoroughly understood by
and moisture qualification tests; however, de- the people performing the operations, by their
tail investigation revealed that one inappro- supervisors, and by the inspectors to insure con-
priate step had occurred. The qualifcation pro- tinuing high quality work.
cedures were set up so that the equipment was Some space equipment is designed to close
functionally validated before the test ; however, tolerances which make it very sensitive to con-
during exposure to humid air and moisture, it tamination in any form ;.therefore, it is impera-
was not functionally operated because it was tive that steps be takeri to assure that proper
not convenient to do so ill the test facility. _Vhile and consistent cleanliness standards are set up
it was being prepared for the posttest validation, throughout the manufacturing, assembly, vali-
it was given an opportunity to do some drying. dation, and checkout phases. A number of these
The obvious fault was that the equipment was cleanliness standards exist at the present time.
not required to operate during the entire course However, what is considered clean by one stand-
of the test. Of course, the weightless condition ard may be dirty when compared with "clean"
could not be simulated in these or any other by a similar appearing standard. Steps are
ground tests and it is quite likely that this omis- now being taken in the industt T to formulate
sion also played a role in this flight failure. logical and consistent standards and it is neces-
To be complete, qualification test requirements sary to implement and to enforce these stand-
must be selected to cover all possible normal and ards as soon as possible to prevent recurrence of
contingent conditions and to allow for the inte- the continual difficulty caused in this project by
grated efforts that show up when a complete sys- contamination that ruined metering orifices,
tem is operated. check valves, pressure regulators, relief valves,
One way the qualification of a complete sys- reducers, compressors, and other mechanical
tem has been accomplished in the project is equipment, as well as electrical and electronic
through the use of full-scale, simulated environ- equipment.
ment tests. A spacecraft was completely out-
Test and Validation Procedures
fitted with flight equipment and instrumented
and tested under environmental conditions to re- Checkout, test, and verification procedures
produce as closely as possible the normal and must be compatible with one aamther and with
abnormal, but possible, flight conditions. From procedures serving the same function on sim-
these tests, it was possible to determine the ef- ilar equipment at different test sites. Numer-
fects of modifications and to demonstrate the ous cases of anomalies, or suspected malfunc-
performance of the integrated system. Almost tions, and failed equipment have been traced to
1,000 hours of this type of testing was accom- improper or incompatible test procedures and
plished, compared with less than 60 hours of test mediums or equipment. Also, it was found
actual space flight during the entire project. that careful attention to test techniques is essen-
tial: otherwise equipment can be damaged be-
Definition of Standards
cause commctions are made improperly or dirt
It has become very apparent that certain can be introduced into the equipment by the
standards that have been used for years in the test equipment. It has been found that test
aircraft industry must be revised and tightened techniques must be tightened, verified, analyzed,
to make them satisfactory for application to and written in detail to lessen the chance for
aerospace equipment. Among these are shop inadvertent steps to ruin the operation or give
practices; for example, those practices used in false assurance.

3O
Configuration Control
component traceability, also was often a tedious,
During the course of the project, consider- time-c0nsuming, and inaccurate process. To
provide for adequate configuration control, it
able effort was expended by NASA and its con-
tractors in maintaining an accurate definition is important that vital information of systems,
subsystems, and components be gathered at a
of system configuration so that configuration
central point. Then, provisions must be made
management could be properly maintained.
Much of this was manual effort that could not to view this information from appropriate lev-
respond as rapidly to changes and interroga- els and directions so that accurate and respon-
tions as desired. At least 12 major documents, sive configuration management can be accomp-
some of which were updated continually, some lished. Eventual incorporation of such a
periodically, and some for each mission, were system on a national scale would provide a re-
used to present the necessary information which trievable file to insure maximum use of techni-
was summarized for the desired definition. cal experience and to lessen the chance of
Component identification, which is essential to repeated errors.

Bibliography

1. Staffs of NASA, Nat. Inst. Health, and Nat. Acad. Sci. : Proceedings of a Conference on Resldts of the First
U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, June 6, 1961.
2. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Second U.S. Man,ned Suborbital Space Flight,
July 21, 1961. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
3. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results oF the First United ][an_ed Orbital Space Flight,
February 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.)
4. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Second United States Mam_ed Orbital _pace Flight,
May 24, 1962. NASA SP-6. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
5. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Project Mercury: Resnlts of the Third UMted States maaned
Orbital Space Flight, October 3, 1962. NASA SP-12, Supt. Doe., U.S. Govermnent Printing Office (Washing-
ton, D.C.) Dec. 1962.
6. BLAND, WILLIAM M., JR. and BERRY, CHARLES A. : Project Mercury Experiences. Astronautics and Aerospace
Engineering, Feb. 1963, pp. 29-34.
7. Project Mercury: Man-In-Space Program ol tbe National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Report of
the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate. Eighty-Sixth Congress, First
Session. Rep. No. 1014, December 1, 1959.
8. Project Mercury, First Interim Report. Staff Report of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S.
House of Representatives. Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session. 1960.
9. Project Mercury, Second Interim Report. Report of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House
of Representatives. Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session. Union Calendar No. 241, House Rep. No.
671, June 29, 1961.
10. Aeronautical and Astronautical Events of 1961. Report of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives. Eighty-Seventh Con-
gress, Second Session, June 17, 1962.
11. Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962. Report of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives. Eighty-Eighth Congress,
First Session. June 12, 1963.
12. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Project Mercury: A Chronology NASA SP-4001, Supt. Doe. U.S.
Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).

31
2. PROJECT SUPPORT FROM THE NASA /
,/
By CHARLES W. McGumE, Offce o] Manned Space Flight, N.4SA Headquarters, and JAMES J. SHANNON,
Asst. Chic], Engineering Operations Office, Mercury Project Offce, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center

Summary _)- l _5_3 Group (STG) and quickly began growing in


size and capability. While the Space Task
This paper outlines the contributions that
Group, and later the Manned Spacecraft Cen-
were made to tile Mercury Project by NASA
ter (MSC), provided the direction and man-
organizations other than the Manned Space-
agement of the Mercury Project, many thou-
craft Center. These contri!butions began several
sands of scientists, engineers, technicians, and
years before the Mercury Project had official
administrators throughout the NASA organiza-
status through the basic research of the Na-
tion provided vital support for the Mercury
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Project. Without this support, Mercury could
which showed such a project to be feasible. The
not have accomplished its goals within the time
assistance provided by these organizations con-
and costs that were realized.
tributed directly to the timely development of
It is appropriate to recognize that Langley
tile Mercury spacecraft and its systems, two of
Research Center is mentioned most frequently
the three launch vehicles used in the Mercury
throughout this paper. The close association
program, and the Mercury Tracking Network.
between Mercury and Langley is attributed to
Introduction the fact that many of the original Space Task
Group were personnel from the Langley Re-
The efforts that were recently ended with the search Center and to the equally important fact
successful completion of the Mercury program that the STG and the MSC were physically lo-
did not begin with the initiation of the Mercury cated within the Langley Research Center for
Project in late 1958 but, in reality, began sev- over 31/_ years.
eral years before that date. The research con- In addition to the formal technical support
ducted in the wind tunnels and other facilities discussed in the following sections, administra-
of the National Advisory Committee for Aero- tive support was provided in the fields such as
nautics (NACA) in a decade preceding the procurement, personnel, and security, by Lang-
Mercury Project established the concepts that ley in the initial phase of STG. The Launch
eventually led to the Mercury Project. None Operations Center provided similar administra-
of these original concepts needed to be changed tive support to the Mercury Field Office at, Cape
during the Mercury program. Canaveral.
It is well known that the NACA provided
its personnel and its facilities as a nucleus for Spacecraft Development
the new agency when the NASA was established
iu October 1958. Almost immediately, a small After a contract was awarded for the Mercury
group of scientists and engineers was organized spacecraft, some 16 months passed before the
at the Langley Research Center in Virginia to contractor delivered the first production space-
formulate plans for the Mercury Project. craft. In order that full-scale tests could be
Many of this group were personnel of the Lang- conducted in the meanwhile, a large n.umber of
ley and Lewis Research Centers who had con- research and development spacecraft were con-
tri_buted to the original concepts of a structed by NASA. These test articles were
man-in-space project in the preceding years. largely made of steel plate and, hence, have been
This o/_anization became the Space Task called "boilerplates."

33
The boilerplates, which were made cheaply Mercury escape and reentry configurations were
and quickly, resembled the Mercury spacecraft tested alone and in combination with all of the
only in external configuration, in weight, and launch vehicles in the Mercury program. Ad-
in center-Cot-gravity location. They were used ditional tests were made at Langley on alternate
primarily to obtain data on the performance of escape configurations, on the structural char-
Mercury rocket motors and parachutes, and to acteristic of the Mercury shingles, and on Mer-
obtain aerodynamic and thermal data needed cury heat-shield materials. Langley also as-
for the design of the Mercury spacecraft. sisted in the data reduction and analysis of tests
In September, 1959, one of these boilerplates run outside of NASA, such as the buffet study
was flown through a ballistic flight by using the made in a wind-tunnel at the Air Force Arnold
first Mercury-Atlas launch vehicle. This test, Engineering Development Center.
called Big Joe, was flown to gather thermody- Tests were conducted at Wallops Station, Va.,
namic data during reentry. This boilerplate early in the program to evaluate the escape
was constructed in phases by both the Langley system planned for the Mercury spacecraft.
and the Lewis Research Centers. The Langley These tests used both boilerplate a_d production
Research Center also provided the parachute spacecraft with the production escape and land-
landing system for the boilerplate and the Lewis ing systems. The first such tests were "off-the-
Research Center designed and furnished the pad" aborts. These tests were followed by in-
instrumentation and telemetry system. This flight aborts from the Little Joe launch vehicle.
successful flight test, in which the Langley and Wallops supported these tests with radar track-
Lewis Centers played so large a part, provided ing, optical tracking, photography, telemetry
valuable design data for the Mercury space- reception, data playback, and radio command
craft. functions. This support was in addition to
The Langley Research Center also designed providing normal launch and range-clearance
and constructed a series of boi]erplates which support and shop and office facilities.
were used in the Little Joe series of flights flown During the development of the propulsion
at Wallops Station, Va., in 1959 and 1960. The systems for the Mercury spacecraft, special tests
Little Joe tests were flown to prove the con- were conducted in a high-altitude wind tunnel
cepts of the launch escape system for inflight at the Lewis Research Center to evaluate the
aborts at critical conditions and to evaluate the performance of the escape rocket and retro-
performance of this system. rocket motors. The popgnn effect of firing the
Similar boilerplates were used in the Mercury posigrade rocket motors into the Mercury-Atlas
program in drop tests for parachute-system adapter cavity between the spacecraft and the
qualification and as astronaut egress trainers launch vehicle was measured. In addition, the
until a Mercury spacecraft became available effect of the escape rocket exhaust on the Mer-
for this purpose. Much of the environmental cury spacecraft window was evaluated.
qualification of equipment carried on all these Lewis also conducted developmental tests on
boilerplates was conducted at Langley. the hydrogen peroxide reaction control system
The many wind tunnels of the Langley, i_ewis, and on the manual proportional control system
and Ames Research Centers were used to per- in the altitude chamber.
form tests early in the Mercury program to de- The Langley Research Center conducted a
fine the configuration of the Mercury spacecraft. series of tests on the solenoid valves for the
Some 28 different wind-tunnel facilities con- reaction control system thrusters. These tests
ducted 103 separate investigations and accu- were conducted in altitude chambers to de-
mulated over 5,300 hours of tunnel time by the termine the effect of vacuum on the valve. The
end of 1960. These tests measured static and results of the tests established that a vacuum did
dynamic stability, pressure distributions, and not affect the operation of a valve even when it
heat-transfer data through subsonic, transonic, was not operated for 24 hours. A method of
and supersonic speed regimes. Certain tests evaluating the movement of the solenoid valve's
were made for vibration and flutter character- seat by measuring the electric current flow
istics, and others to determine the correct size (signature) was developed for these tests. This
of the drogue parachute for stabilization. The method of measuring the valve's signature was

34
later usedfor selectingvalvesthat wereac- spacecraft. On the MA-8 flight, a number of
ceptablefor flight. ablation materials were bonded to the recovery-
The development of the spacecraftlanding section shingles to evaluate them for heat-pro-
systemrequiredan extensiveseriesof tests tection on future spacecraft. Langley not only
which beganat LangleyResearchCenterin furnished two of these materials, but conducted
1958. In the early development of the main many tests on samples of the coated shingles to
parachute,dropsweremadeat WestPoint and assure a good bond and no degradation of the
WallopsIsland, Va., and at PopeAir Force safety aspects of the MA-8 mission.
Base,N.C. Langleysupportedthesetestswith
personnel,aircraft, test vehicles,instrumenta- Launch-Vehicle Development
tion, andtrackingequipment.Latertestswere
madeat the NASA Flight Research Center at The NASA centers were involved in the pro-
Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., to develop the curement and operation of two of the three
Mercury drogam parachute. For these tests, the launch vehicles used in the Mercury program--
Flight Research Center provided personnel, test the Little Joe and the Redstone. The Little
vehicles, and all other facilities needed to ac- Joe was conceived early in 1958 by the same
complish the program. The development of the group at Langley that fornmlated the man-in-
landing-impact skirt required the assistance of sI)ace program. This launch vehicle performed
NASA facilities at Langley Research Center nmch of the qualification of the Mercury space-
and Wallops Station. craft at al)proxilnately one-sixth the cost of an
In the development of the Mercury heat pro- Atlas. Shortly after the official start of Project
teetion system, the Langley Research Center Mercury, the Space Task Group requested
made numerous structural tests at elevated Langley to accept the responsibility for the pro-
temperatures on samples of the ablation heat curelnent of six flight vehicles and one test arti-
shield, the Reng 41 conical shingles, and the cle. Accepting this responsibility, Langley
beryllium recovery-section shingles. performed the basic design of the vehicle, wrote
When a formal program was established by the specification, evaluated contractors' propo-
Manned Spacecraft Center to conduct special sals, and awarded and monitored the contract
inflight experiments on Mercury flights which for detail design, construction, and testing.
were not directly related to the mission objec- After delivery of the Little Joe vehicles, Lang-
tives, other NASA organizations proposed and ley provided personnel for the assembly, check-
furnished many of the experiments that were out, and launch of these vehicles at Wallops Sta-
performed. On all the manned orbital flights, tion, Va. A command destruct system was also
the Goddard Space Flight Center and the designed and provided by Langley for the first
NASA Headquarters Office of Space Sciences four Little Joe vehicles. In addition, Langley
sponsored experiments related to astronomy and designed and constructed the spacecraft-
earth and space science in genend. These orga- launch-vehicle adapters for all Little Joe
nizations also provided assistance in the evalua- flights.
tion of all proposed experiments. Goddard The Marshall Space Flight Center was in-
provided special filters and other optional strumental in implementing the Mercury-Red-
equipment used in making some of these space- stone program. Marshall's task was the provi-
science observations. sion of a launch vehicle for manned flight that
The flashing-beacon experiment flown on the had previously been used only for unmanned
MA-9 flight was designed, constructed, and payloads of considerably lighter weight. Tech-
qualified by the Langley Research ('enter. Meal groups were formed to conduct studies and
Langley also provided the balloon-(lrao" experi- l)erform reliability and structural tests. As a
ments flown on MA-7 and MA-9. The Lewis result of these studies, a number of modifica-
Research Center proposed and furnished the tions were made in the Redstone launch vehicle
zero-gravity experiment carried on the MA-7 to make it acceptable for manned flight. Major

35
modifications, made largely at Marshall, were Mercury Network Development
made in some subsystems, and an Abort Sensing
Of eonsider,_ble import'mce in the successful
and Imp'lementation System (ASIS) was 'de-
accomplishment of the Mercury missions was,
signed for and iniegraled lilt, dm launch ve-
hicle. Other work done at Marshall included of course, the worldwide Mercury Tracking and
Communications Network. The responsibility
compatibility testing of the spacecraft-hume'h-
for the development of this network was given
vehicle combination and static firing of each
to the Langley Research Center. A group
launch vehicle prior to delivery to Cape Ca-
naveral. The resulting launch-vehicle reliabil- formed at Langley in early 1959 wrote the speci-
fications for the network and awarded a contract
ity was a milestone in the Mercury program that
contributed to the reduced requirement for only for its design and construction in July 1959.
five Redstone flights instead of the eight origi- After the contract award, this Langley group
continuously monitored and contributed to the
nally programed.
Prelaunch checkout and launch operations for design and development of the network facil-
the Mereury-Redstone missions were conducted ities. The nerve center of the Mercury network
is the automatic, high-speed computing equip-
by the NASA Launch Operations Center at
ment located at and operated by the Goddard
Cape Canaveral which was formerly the Launch
Operations Division of the Marshall Space Spare Flight Center. Langley's responsibility
Flight Center. The Launch Operations Center for the network ended with the acceptance of
now provides much support to the Manned the facilities by the government. Thereafter,
Spacecraft Center at Cape Canaveral in many the maintenance and operation of the Mercury
technical and administrative areas and in the network ;became the total res.ponsibility of the
provision of facilities. Goddard Space Flight Center.

36
I
SPACE-VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
3. SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE

By JOHN H. BOYNTON, Mercury Project O_ice, NASA Mannned Spacecra# Center; E. M. FIELDS, Chie],
Project Engineering O_ce, Mercury Project O_ice, NASA Mannned Spacecraft Center; and DONALD F.
HUCHES, Crew System Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center )_/¢ f_/

Summary _/ _S_ / mental in three of the four manned orbital


flights in completing the mission successfully
Project Mercury began in 1958 with some
when a malfunction was present in the auto-
basic systems research and a number of feasibil-
matic system. One of these control-system mal-
ity studies to determine if a spacecraft could functions, an electrical anomaly during Astro-
be built which would sustain man in orbital
naut Cooper's mission and the only one of major
space and return him safely to earth. Although
significance in the spacecraft throughout the
it was recognized that some system development
entire 34-hour flight, was successfully circum-
would be required, many of the spacecraft sys-
vented by the pilot's manual control during the
tems could be synthesized from existing hard-
critical retrofire and reentry maneuvers.
ware. A top priority was placed on the space-
craft production from the contract award in Introduction
1959, and 3 years later Astronaut John H.
Glenn, Jr., completed three orbital passes about The initial goal of Project Mercury was to
the earth. In this time span, design, develop- place a man into orbit successfully and return
ment, and qualification of the spacecraft and him safely to earth, and this objective was ful-
its systems were accomplished nearly concur- filled in February 1962 by the flight of Astro-
rently. The ground and flight-test programs, naut John H. Glenn, Jr. This objective was
which included hundreds of wind-tunnel tests confirmed 3 months later by the flight of Astro-
and parachute drops from aircraft, provided naut M. Scott Carpenter. The final two mis-
an opportunity to develop flight systems and sions in Mercury constituted a continuation of
acquire operational experience as the program a program to acquire new knowledge and opera-
progressed. Though a continuing attention to tional experience in manned orbital space flight.
engineering detail by technical specialists and The ninth Mercury-Atlas mission (MA-9) was
management personnel throughout the project, planned for up to 22 orbital passes and was the
the spacecraft and its systems were qualified for concluding flight in the United States' first
suborbital flight in approximately 2 years from manned space program. The primary objec-
tives of the MA-9 mission were to evaluate the
the spacecraft contract award date. Many les-
sons have been learned which were not only effects on the astronaut of approximately 1 day
applied to Mercury systems development, but in orbital flight, to verify that man can function
which have been applied in-*more advanced as a primary operating system of the space-
space projects. Interesting conclusions regard- craft; and to evaluate the combined perform-
ing system performance can be derived by re- ance of the astronaut and the spacecraft, which
viewing all of the flight results. The space- was specifically modified for the 1-day mission.
craft control system was a source of consider- The MA-9 spacecraft, Faith 7, used by Astro-
able trouble during the project. However, naut Cooper in successfully performing the
when in flight failures of this type occurred, it fourth United States manned orbital mission
was the backup capability of the pilot which was basically similar to those used for previous
made possible the successful completion of the orbital flights. The major exceptions were sys-
mission. In fact, the pilot's ability to control tem modifications prompted by the extended

accurately the spacecraft attitude was instru- nature of the mission, and these changes will be

39
discussFd in later paragraphs. It is important sl)ace enviromnental conditions, particularly
to note, however, that since the original (lesio'n weightlessness: therefore, all of the spacecr:fft
of the Mercury spacecraft all major system con- systems which ,'elate to crew recovery from
cepts have remained esse,_tially unaltered. Al- (n'l)it had to be designed for automatic opera-
though some desi_ and early development were tion and many had to incln(le redundancy. It
conducted prior to the official award of the has since 1)een learned that man is not only a
prime contract, the Mercury spacecraft was de- contribulory element bat a necessary part of
veloped, qualified, and met its original objec- the sl)acecraft. It is important to note that
tive of manned orbital flight 3 years after the because of the l)ilot's demonstrated al)ility to
spacecraft contract award in 1959. In this flmction as a primary operating system of the
brief span of time, many lessons have been sl)acecraft , some of the redundant elements
learned and much experience has been gained in were not required and were deleted.
the design, development, and operation of The sl)acecraft systenls (fig. 3-1) include the
manned orbital flight systems. In this paper, heat protection, mechanical and pyrotechnic
the intent is to describe briefly the original de- sl>acecraft control, comnmnications, instru-
sign philosophy, discuss the system develop- mentation, life support, and electrical and
ment and qualification experiences, and 1)resent sequential systems. The mechanical and pyro-
a summary of the experiences relating to sys- technic system group <'Oral)rises the sel)aration
tems performance. devices, the rocket motors, the landing system.,
and the internal spacecraft structure. These
Design Philosophy systems have been descril)ed in previous litera-
tul'e (refs. 1 to 10) : therefore, detailed <lescril)-
In the initial design of the Mercury space- tions are not included in this paper.
craft, two guidelines were firmly established: The design requirements stated earlier in-
(1) to use existing technology and off-the-shelf
v<)lved certain implications for these systems.
equipment wherever practical and (2) to fol-
The launch-escape system was found to be most
low the silnl)lest and most relial)le .tPl)roach to
practical if it incorporated a solid rocket motor
system design. These guidelines were admin-
to propel the spacecraft rapidly away from the
istered to provide for the most exl)edient reali- launch vehicle during an abort in the atmo-
zation of program objectives. The original sphere. This type of system needed to provide
Mercury concept also included a number of
a high level of thrust for a brief time period
mandatory design requirements which were im- should be easily handled in the field and should
posed on the spacecraft contractor : require a minimum of servicing. The tower
(1) The spacecraft must be fitted with a re-
arrangement could be readily assembled to the
liable launch-escape system which would rapidly
spacecraft and jettisoned during powered flight
separate the spacecraft with its crew from the
once it no longer was required for abort.
launch vehicle in ease of an imminent disaster.
An important design feature of the Mercury
(9.) The mode of reentry into the earth's spacecraft was the favorable manner in which
atmosphere would be by drag braking only. the astronaut was exposed to flight accelerations.
(3) The spacecraft nmst carry a retrorocket
For all major g-loads, which occur during
system capable of l)roviding the necessary im-
powered flight, lammh-escape motor thrusting,
pulse to bring the vehicle out of orbit. posigrade motor thrusting, retrograde motor
(4) The spacecraft design should place
thrustino', reentry, parachute deployment and
prime emphasis on the water-landing apl)roach. touchdown, the pilot experienced acceleration
(5) The pilot nmst be given the capability in the most favorable manner, one that forces
of manually controlling spaeeci'aft attitude.
him into the couch (fig. 3-'2).
In many design areas, there existed no pre-
The mode of reentry was specified to be drag
vious experience in reliable system operation
braking only because of simplicity. This con-
which could be applied to the Mercury concept, cept implied that the configuration should be a
and new development programs had to lie ini- blunt body with high drag properties having a
tiated. In addition, there was no information slender afterbody, primary because of heating
pertaining to man's capability to operate under considerations. Thus the bell shaped Mercury

4O
configurationwasevolved,andtheheat-protec- For the periodduring andafter touchdown,
tion systemwasdevisedto accommodate this the spacecraft had to meettwo basicrequire-
shape. Originally,a berylliumthermalshield ments. These requirementswere: (a) the
employingtheheat-sinkprinciplewasspecified. structurehad not only to retain its integrity
Thespecification waslaterchangedto provide suchthat it wouldbehabitableafter landing
a moreefficientablation-typeheatshield,which and (b) thetouchdowndecelerations hadto be
wasusedonall Mercur_,-Atlas orbitalmissions. reducedto anacceptable level. Touchdown de-
Because the heatflux wasexpectedto becon- celerationwasprimarily limitedby thehuman
siderablylesson the afterbodythanattheheat toleranceto acceleration;and,because of the
shield,a combinationof insulationandthin blunt shapeof the spacecraft,touchdownde-
shinglesconstructedof an alloy to withstand celerations of ashigh as50gcouldhaveresulted
hightemperaturewascalculatedto besufficient evenfor a waterlanding. Therefore,a land-
in maintainingthetemperatureof thepressure ing-shockattenuationsystemwas designed
vesselata safelevel. Theexteriorfinishof the whichconsisted of a fiberglassfabric bagwith
spacecraftbodywasintentionallymadea dull holesin it andwasattachedbetweenthespace-
blackbecause of its high emissivityand,there- craft structureandthe ablationshield. Prior
fore,favorablethermalradiationproperties. to landing,the ablationshieldwould be de-
Again,because of their reliability andease ployedandtheshieldweightwouldextendthe
of handling and servicing,solid propellants bag,which would fill with air and providea
werechosenfor the retrorocketsystem. For cushionagainstthe landingshock. The land-
evengreaterreliability, however,a systemof ingbagarrangement adequately attenuatedthe
three solid rocketmotors,any two of which landing decelerationloads to approximately
wouldeffecta safereentry,waschosen.These 15g.
threerocketmotors,togetherwith threeaddi- In additionto theautomaticandratecontrol
tional rockets to effect spacecraft-launch- modes of theattitudecontrolsystem,two man-
vehicleseparation, wereassembled in ajettison- ual controlmodes,oneelectricalandthe other
able package to permit a clean reentry mechanical, wereprovidedtheastronaut. This
configuration. control-mode arrangement hadthefeaturethat,

Electrical and sequential


Escape rocket
equipment
motor

Communications
systems

Legend
Parachutes

Control system

Instrument panel
ECS

Communications system
Control system
Electrical system

Environmental control Instrument panel

system
Heat shield

Heat shield Mechanical and pyrotechnics


Retrorocket motor

FIGURE 3-1.--Spacecraft interior arrangement.

707-056 0--63---4
41
in the event of a spacecraft power failure, the flexible bladder under pressure provided a pos-
direct-linkage mechanical mode would still be itive means of fuel expulsion.
available for control. The two manual control Many challenging design problems were en-
modes were each supplied control-system fuel countered in the remaining spacecraft systems
from separate tanks for additional reliability. because of the new operating environment. As
Although the thrust units were designed to pro- a result of the need to provide flight-control
vide an impulse sufficient for the majority of support on the ground, the requirement for mul-
spacecraft maneuvers, these redundant manual tiple redundancy and high reliability in the
control modes could be used simultaneously, if communications system was evident. Although
desired, in critical situations, such as retrofire part of the instrumentation system was not re-
and reentry, where rapid response to undesir- quired for flight safety and mission success,
able attitude rates might become necessary. certain parameters, such as tho_ which indicate
A monopropellant reaction control system the psysiological well-being of the crew and the
using hydrogen peroxide as the fuel was chosen proper operation of critical spacecraft systems,
for the spacecraft control system to provide were necessary for effective flight control and
the simplest system design and installation. monitoring. The remainder of the instrumen-
Furthermore, similar systems had already been tation data was acquired to complement the
developed for use on other space vehicles. A flight-control parameters for use in postflight

(3)

Posigrade motor ignition

(2)
(4)

Launch escape motor ignition


Refrogrode motor ignition

Reentry
//

(6)

Parachute deployme 1
Powered flight

(7)
i (1) Touchdown

i!ili!i!!i
Direction of acceleration

FIOURE 3-2.--A.cceleration loading for various flight phases.

42
_nalyses of system performance. New desi_l award, the system-design phase of the project
areas were opened up in the fields of gas partial I)roceeded at a rapid pace. Wind-tunnel re-
pressure measurement and of bioinstrllmenta- search, studies by prospective subcontractors
tion, such as long term attachment of human _tnd vendors, the joint participation of key
sensor leads. The life-support-system design NASX and other government installations, and
considerations involved a development task, early design studies by the eventual prime con-
since it was concerned with the snstenance of tractor all hell)ed to facilitate the design effort
the astronaut and his protection from the and make possible the early availability of test
hard vacuum of space, as well as from the widely hardware.
varying temperature conditions associated Based on the total Mercury experience, one
with an orbital-flight profile. This system also of the underlying principles during the initial
was required to provide for the management of design period should be an emphasis placed on
the cooling and drinking water in the space- "designing for operation." For example, one
craft, the food to be consumed by the pilot, and of the lessons learned was that the instrumen-
his normal liquid wastes, again in the weightless tation system should be designed with mission
environment. Although pressure suits and flexibility as a guide, such that, in the later
cooling equipment had been used in high-per- phases of tl_e program, new instrumentation re-
formance aircraft, only part of this experience quirements can be handled with a minimum of
could be directly applied to the design of the complication. In still another area, it was
Mercury environmental control system because learned that component accessibility can be ex-
of weightless flight and more demanding per- tremely important where schedule demands be-
formance requirements. In the electrical and come critical. Certain time-critical systems and
sequential design area, the application of pre- short-life components must be easily accessible
vious design work ,_nd use of off-the-shelf com- in order to minimize the degree of disturbance
ponents was made. But the very nature of the to other systems and the time required to re-
mission and the requirement for reliability, place these types of units. Because of the weight
automation, and system redundancy imposed a and volume constraints, this concept could not
degree of complexity somewhat greater than faithfully be applied in the design evolution of
any previous manned fight system. This in- the Mercury spacecraft, and significant penal-
creased electronic complexity, in turn, made it ties have been experienced whenever items need-
more difficult to insure interface compatability, ed to be removed under a tight schedule. It was
eliminate stray voltages (back-door circuits), learned in Mercury that all systems requiring
and minimize system sensitivity to current manual operation by the astronaut must be de-
transients. signed with the limitations of the cabin volume
As an example of the consequences of stray (see fig. 3-3), suit mobility, and weightlessness
voltages, the Little Joe-1 mission, the first in mind.
launch attempt using a full-scale Mercury space-
craft, is cited. This test, conducted at Wallops Development and Qualification
Island, Va., was in the final moments of count- As in any development program, one of the
down when, during a spacecraft battery charg- original ground rules at the outset of Project
ing operation, a stray voltage initiated the Mercury was to conduct a lo_cal and progres-
launch escape sequence. The spacecraft was sive test program. This concept was closely
separated by the escape motor from the launch maintained from the beginning of the project
vehicle, and the drogue parachute was properly through the flight of Astronaut Cooper last
deployed. Because the battery had been only May. Success in certain phases of this test
partially charged, sufficient current was not progression has made possible the elimination
available to deploy the main parachute, and the of certain backup or follow-on flights. Since
spacecraft was destroyed upon landing. This the time that Mercury was initially conceived,
back-door circuit was subsequently located and literally thousands of individual tests have been
eliminated. conducted in which test articles were used in all
Because of work conducted immediately prior forms from components to full-scale spacecraft
to and in the early period following contract and under all combinations of real and simu-

43
lated operating conditions. For example, dur- i n :I later section of this paper. It is interesting
ing the 1-year period from November 1059, to note that because of the rapid pace dictated
about 10 months after the prime contract was by the liipli priority of the program, many of
awarded, t o November 1960, some 270 hours the indiridunl test 1)rogriii11~ were cvnciuctecl
were spent in testing the environmental control c*oncurrently. This technique involved some
system in the altitude chamber, with a man risk, since, hac1 n nxijor problem developed, the
wearing a pressure suit in the chamber to load expense in both time and nioiiey could have beeii
the circuit more realistically. Early in 1061, consider:ible. The following paragraphs relate
further tests were conducted, often using astro- the more salient lessons learned during the
nauts, in the centrifuge to qualify the environ- formal Mercury development and qualification
niental system under acceleration loads. test program.
For convenience, the spacecraft-system test -
ing can be grouped into ground tests and flight Ground Testing
tests of special test articles. The ground tests,
. The research tests included those which at-
in turn, can be categorized into areas of re-
tempted to verify design theories or sought new
search, design, development, qualification, ac-
ceptance, aiid checkout. The discussion of de- methods for :iccomplishing a given design task,
velopment flight tests, which will be restricted whether it WRS a structural assembly, a heat-
to those using other than production spacecraft, protection system, or improved methods of in-
consists of research studies, development tests. strumenting the spacecraft and its crew.
and qualification programs. The performance Hundreds of tests of this type, particularly
of the production spacecraft will be discussed those conducted in the wind tunnel, were car-

K-

Ilr

I
I
34-Photograph
FIQURE of spacecraft interior.

44
ried out in the early phasesof the Mercury tions on a test article in various combinations for
effort at manyof the NASA centersand at the specific purpose of verifying its reliable
the contractor'splant. Thesetestswill always operation for inclusion as a final flight article.
be requiredwhena newflight spectrumin a That is, there can and should be more than one
relativelyunknownoperationalenvironment is type of qualification program for a given com-
penetrated,asit wasin Mercury. It wastests ponent, subsystem, or system, but these pro-
of this kind whichestablished the basicMer- grams should become progressively more de-
cury configuration, a shapewhichhasalready manding on the capability of the hardware. In
beenprojectedinto more advancedmanned this testing area, adherence to prescribed test
spaceprograms. criteria must be rigorously enforced. The
Thedesigntesting,exemplifiedbythebread- various combinations of qualification tests can
boardlayoutsin the caseof electricalandse- be grouped into environmental tests, load tests,
quentialcircuitry,wasconducted jointly by the and performance tests with each of these groups
NASA andthe contractor. This effort made having a specific purpose. Sometimes, the test
possibletheprooftestingconcurrentwith initial conditions are not realistic enough or are not
designstudies.Manythousands of testswere sufficiently demanding to reveal system weak-
conducted,suchasthosein the designof the nesses. During Mercury, for some of the sub-
spacecraft-control-system thrustchambers, once systems, it was not until the actual unmanned
theinitial concepthadbeenestablished. flights that a system could be fully qualified for
Whenthe basicdesignconcepthadevolved manned operation. For example, the launch-
to a workinghardwareitem,development test- escape tower was subjected to all expected en-
ing servedto expose this conceptin thelabora- vironmental conditions, an exhaustive series of
tory to the manycombinations of operational load tests, and the operational situations asso-
andenvironmental conditions expected in space. ciated with the launch-escape-system perform-
Developmenttestingwasnaturally hampered ance tests. Yet in the actual qualification
by the fact that weightlessness, a primeexam- flight program the heating loads on the truss
ple, couldnot beadequatelysimulatedon the structure of the tower were found to be more
ground;andthis very deficiency resultedin an critical than had been calculated. Ground
ineffectivedesignfor the waterseparationde- qualification is relatively inexpensive compared
viceof theenvironmental controlsystem.The with full-scale flight qualification, and any sys-
development of Mercury systemswas a con- tem discrepancies which can be revealed in this
tinuing program throug!l the _inal mission and phase will yield rewards in terms of time and ex-
was aimed at mission flexibility, even after the penditures later on. For example, during an
spacecraft had been basically qualified for early qualification test, it was found that the
manned orbital operation. It was during the original igniters in the retrorocket motors
development testing that facets of the design would sometimes fail and blow out through the
which pertain to all aspects Of its use were most rocket nozzle before the main propellant grain
evident, including the design-for-operation had been ignited. New i_iters, actually minia-
standards. It is in this testing area that en- ture solid rockets, were substituted for the
gineering mock-ups have proved to be extremely original igniters. Had this system characteris-
valuable. In the case of the landing system, tic been overlooked through the manned orbital
drop tests of boilerplate spacecraft were made flights, the consequences could have been cata-
to develop the landing-system deployment strophic. For flight-acceptance tests on units
sequence and operation. Tests were made in scheduled to be installed in flight vehicles,
the altitude chamber to verify that systems however, it was found that care should be taken
could operate for their required life cycle un- not to over-test the article to the point at which
der realistic conditions. In essence, the de- its useful lifetime is approached or exceeded.
velopment-test phase provided a means of During qualification testing, one must be as-
validating the design concept and proving its sured that. the unit being tested is not a "hand-
intended reliability features. made" article and that, later on, a similar pro-
Qualification testing conducted on the ground duction version will not. fail because it, does
can further impose realistic operational condi- not have the same ability to withstand the test-

45
ing environment. Of course, a critical require- has been disturbed for any reason, such as the
ment for the qualification program is that the removal of another system where a definite in-
test conditions imposed on the hardware ex- terface exists. The acceptance and checkout
ceed those expected to be present in the design aspect of ground testing is more thoroughly
environment in order to provide a safe margin discussed in the paper entitled "Spacecraft Pre-
for manufacturing deviations and unantic- flight Preparation."
ipated design weaknesses. It was found in
Flight Testing
Mercury that no single qualification criterion
necessarily applies to all systems, and local This brief discussion of the development
operating conditions must be evaluated specifi- flight phase of Mercury will be limited to those
cally for each system to insure that they are ade- flights where specially configured test vehicle
quately accounted for in the qualification test (boilerplate spacecraft) were employed. Be-
environment. cause the experiences gained by flights of pro-"
It was learned in Mercury that, whenever a duetion spacecraft are of more operational
significant design change is to be incorporated significance, they will be presented in the next
into the spacecraft, a new hardware qualifica- section, Systems Performance. The flight-test
tion program should be initiated to requalify program began with a number of tests in which
major systems. Approximately 1,000 hours of spacecraft models were flown by using small
test time were accumulated on a full-scale space- multistage rockets. These tests provided pre-
craft in a program called "Project Orbit" which liminary data on the aerodynamic properties
was conducted in a vacuum-thermal facility to of the chosen external configuration. Almost
insure that, during the orbit'd flight program, concurrently with these flights, tests of the para-
systems would maintain their previously denton- chute systems were staged in which boilerplate
strated performance. As an example, when the spacecraft were dropped from cargo aircraft.
spacecraft thruster assemblies were modified as These "drop tests" were initiated as an impor-
discussed in this paper, the modified assemblies tant step in the early desi_l and development
were tested in a vacuum chamber as part of the of the landing system. Specifically, the drogue
Project Orbit testing. These tests, using hydro- parachute was developed by utilizing a
gen peroxide, were made to determine if ex- weighted pod, which was dropped from an air-
posure to combined temperatures and low pres- craft at high altitude. Other early flight tests
sures for the expected duration of the mission included off-the-pad, or beach, aborts to develop
would have adverse effects on the operation of the launch-escape system. In 1959, a reentry
the thruster assemblies. It was found to be flight was conducted in which a specially de-
most effective if actual operating conditions and signed and instrumented spacecraft and an
procedures, including preflight checkout tests, Atlas launch vehicle were used to provide aero-
could be realistically simulated in order to ex- dynamic-heating data in the real flight spec-
pose hardware to a complete operating cycle. trum. This flight, termed "Big Joe," was the
Since system qualification and operating relia- first test in Mercury in which the Atlas was
bility are so closely related, the reader is re- used. It was as a result of the data derived
ferred to the paper entitled "Reliability and during this flight that the shingles initially on
Flight Safety" for additional details. the spacecraft cylindrical section were replaced
Finally, the acceptance and checkout tests with somewhat thicker shingles made of beryl-
which are conducted by using actual flight lium to provide for more effective heat protec-
hardware involve the same recommendations tion. The final series of early flight tests used
previously mentioned, those of avoiding over- the solid-propellant Little Joe vehicle (shown
testing, realistic operational test conditions, and in fig. 3-4) to test the launch-escape system con-
thoroughness. It was learned in Mercury that, cept at critical inflight abort condition. Al-
if tests of this type are conducted at multiple though most of the early flight tests were of a
stations across the country by separate groups, developmental nature, their missions served to
the test procedures must be consistent if the qualify critical flight systems for later, more
test results are to be comparable. It is essen- demanding flight tests. The intermediate series
tial to repeat a system checkout if the system of aircraft drop tests, for instance, was eom-

46
pleted to qualify the parachute and landing- ing the capability of the launch vehicle with
shock ,attenuation systems. During this test its attendant delays.
phase in Mercury, valuable system improve-
Attention to Detail
ments were incorporated at a minimum of cost
and time. One of the most significant lessons learned
from the Mercury program was the need for a
careful and continuing attention to quality and
engineering detail in all phases of the program.
The spacecraft is made u p of many individual
systems and components to form a complex en-
tity, and only through a close monitoring of the
design and development of each piece of hard-
ware and its relationship to all other associated
components is it possible to recognize and cor-
rect problems rapidly before a costly failure
occurs. Many performance discrepancies could
not be anticipated because of the lack of ex-
perience or the inability to simulate adequately
realistic conditions in the early test program.
Later tests, however, were established to reveal
these anomalies with a minimum of cost and
delay. Although somewhat limited by the lack
of experience, attention to detail during the de-
sign phase resulted in the incorporation of sys-
3-4.-Mercury
FIQURE Little-Joe launch-vehicle con-
figuration. ,loor

Weight Growth

A critical problem which was present

-i
throughout the Mercury program was that of
weight growth. This problem, which seems to
be characteristic of any development program
where high performance and reliability are re- 2800
quired, almost defies the steps taken to control
f l I I
:t
weight. Figure 3-5 depicts the weight chron-
ology of the spacecraft's orbital configuration.
The maximum growth in weight was approxi-
mately 10 pounds per week in the very early
-g2700
rl
phases of the program, but this figure was re-
duced to less than 2 pounds per week, or ap-
proximately 1/2 percent, a t the final stage of the
program. The launch weight of Astronaut
Cooper's spacecraft, Faith 7, was some 700
pounds greater than the original design weight,
despite repeated design reviews and other con-
tinuing weight controls. The lesson here is that
proper planning must account for the inevitable
weight growth in the design and development 2300' 1958 ' 1959 1960 ' 1961
Calendar year
I 1962 1963 '
of high-perf ormance spacecraft, since the con-
sequences of not planning for it are either a 3-,5.--Weight
FIQURE chronology for Mercury specifi-
degradation of the performance goals or exceed- cation spacecraft.

47
tem redundancy, where a direct relationship to tire systems fail, some means would exist either
mission success existed. to complete the mission safely or to conduct a
As a prime example of the attention given to successful mission abort so that crew safety
the incorporation of redundancy in the detailed would be maintained. A summary of tim flight-
design of critical spacecraft components, the program o/)jectives and results for tim full-
actuation system of the launch-escape-tower scale sl)acecraft is given in table :_-1. ()f pri-
clamp ring was backed up in nearly every com- mary significance in the table is the fact that
ponent because of the serious consequences that during the manned flight plmse, all major sys-
would have resulted from a failure of the escape tems operated satisfactorily, although on three
tower to jettison. In this system, the clamp of these missions, the astronaut was required,
ring is assembled at three points on its periph- because of improi)er operation of the automatic
ery, with each point being held by a dual ex- control system, to conduct the retrofire maneu-
plosive unit. Five of these six pyrotechnic ver manually. There were system m.tlfmwtions
units were ignited by an electrical squib, and performance discrepancies in each of these
whereas the sixth was actuated by a percussion flights, but they were of such a nature thai
cap. Each of the electrical units incorporated either a backup system or astronaut coul(l cir-
a dual bridgewire. The automatic sequence was culnvent the anomaly or that the failure of a
designed to send electrical signals from one component, such as an instrumentation sensor,
power source to six of the bridgewires, with was not critical to mission success. Tim system
another _but independent electrical supply for experience during the flight proo-ram was char-
the remaining four bridgewires. Should the acterized by a number of isolated component
automatic relay fail, the astronaut was provided anomalies, rather than a critical failure of such
with a manual pull-ring which would energize magnitude that a catastrophe resulted. This
the same jettison relay and also operate a gas system development, accounting for system
generagor to initiate the percussion cap, suc'h malfunctions and performance discrepancies,
that, in the event of failure in both the circuit to the action taken to correct them, and the steps
the sequencing relay and the two separate elec- required to increase system capability for the
trical power buses, the percussion cap would extended flight of Astronaut Cooper, is dis-
ignite. Actuation of any one of the six pyro- cussed in the following paragraphs. Since
technic explosive bolts was sufficient to effect system anomalies are discussed specifically as
proper separation of the escape tower from the they pertain to the continuing development of
spacecraft. The pyrotechnic circuit for the the major spacecraft systems, references 5, 6, 8,
spacecraft-launch-vehiqle adapter clamp ring and 10 should be consulted for a more detailed
was operated in a nearly identical manner. performance discussion. Although random
During the development phase, an adherence failures and system deficiencies are mentioned
to test specifications was maintained through a briefly herein, the greater emphasis is placed
continued scrutiny of detailed performance re- on system l)erfornmnce as it relates to design
sults as they became available. Throughout the experience and the lessons which can be derived
manned flights, attention to detail was necessary from actual operation of the systems in the
for an early recognition of possible problem space environmellt. Throughout the flight pro-
areas, provided a means of responding to sug- gram, with the exception of the MA-9 mission,
gested action items, and precluded the occur- no changes were required specifically to accom-
rence of some system failures which ordinarily modate a longer flight duration. The modifica-
would have caused launch postponements and tions made to the Fa;fh 7 (MA-9) spacecraft
possibly a catastrophe. including those incorporated to make possible
the extended flight period are summarized in
Systems Performance table 3-II. Each major spacecraft system will

During the design of the Mercury spacecraft, be discussed separately, as in previous reports
one of the most important considerations was on the individual manned flights (refs. 5, 8, and
that, should individual components or even en- 10).

48
Heat Protection System tween the launch-escape tower and the space-
craft cylindrical section, between the spacecraft
The heat protection system performed satis-
and the launch vehicle, at the heat shield, and
factorily throughout the entire program and
at the spacecraft hatch. In three of the earlier
essentially as designed.
unmanned qualification flights, some difficulty
Some cracking and slight delamination of the
was experienced in separating the spacecraft-
ablation heat shield following reentry have been
adapter umbilicals, but postflight examinations
experienced on certain flights, but this occur-
showed that the pyrotechnic charges ignited
rence has been of no real consequence. It was
satisfactorily. Further investigation revealed,
established that this minor delamination did not
however, that aerodynamic loads during clamp-
occur during the reentry heating period and
ring separation had caused the clamp-ring seg-
probably resulted from the shock sustained at
ments to damage the umbilicals. A minor re-
landing. Since the flotation attitude depends
design of the clamp-ring cover which protects
somewhat on the heat-shield weight, a slight
these separation devices eliminated the problem.
modification was made to the Faith 7 space-
In the Mercury-Redstone 4 (MR--4) mission,
craft to provide for retention of any small por-
the explosively actuated side hatch, incorpo-
tions which might possibly have broken away
rated for the first time for this flight, was pre-
after touchdown. It has always been desirable
maturely released. The astronaut egressed
to achieve the most upright position in the
rapidly through the open hatch, and the space-
water to facilitate astronaut egress.
craft subsequently took on sea water and sank
Temperature measurements were made at
before recovery could be effected. A postflight
various depths in the ablation shields for the
investigation involving a thorough analysis and
orbital fights, and the maximum values ex-
exhaustive testing was conducted, but the cause
perienced during reentry are summarized in of the malfunction has never been established.
figure 3-6 for each flight. The measurements
However, the landing and recovery procedures
showed good agreement with predicted values
were altered for succeeding missions to mini-
and were satisfactory.
mize the possibility of this malfunction recur-
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems
ring. The only other performmnce anomaly
with regard to separation devices occurred in
The mechanical and pyrotechnic systems con- the recent flight of Astronaut Cooper. Here,
sist of the separation devices, the landing sys-
tem, the rocket motors, and the internal space-
craft structure. Each of the systems in this
Launch escape tower ...............
group is discussed separately.
....... -Tower-spacecraft
There have been only minor problems with separation plane
the separation devices. The primary separa-
tion planes (shown in fig. 3-7) are those be-
--- Predicted
Spacecraft window ............. Spacecraft hatch
...............
(_ MA-4
[] MA-5
2,000 MA-6
\

\
/_ MA-7 Spacecraft-adapter
MA-S separation plane.......... separation plane
u- 1,500
o {} MA-9
.....
Spacecraft-launch-
Retropackage .............
vehicle adapter
Bond line-
Inside __ J
_ 1,000

. C_ ::--_
F- 5O0
' Out1_ide Atlas launch vehicle
/"surroce .-C) surface

I i
I
GO 810 J
IO0
0 2O 40

Depth from outside surface, percent

FIGURE 3-6.--Ablation shield maximum temperatures. FmuaE 3-7.--Major spacecraft separation planes.

49
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m m N
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N N N N N N
Table 3-II.--Sucnm ary of Modifications to MA-9 Spaeecra/t

System Modification Justification

Spacecraft control 1. Removed rate control system (RSCS) 1. Not necessary ; reduced weight by 12 lb
system. 2. Added 15-pound-capacity fuel tank 2. Additional control capability *
3. Installed modified 1- and 6-pound 3. hnproved reliability and operating
thrust chambers characteristics
4. Installed interconnect valve 4. Improved control-fuel management

Communicat ions 1. Removed backup UHF voice trans- 1. l_rimary unit reliable, reduced weight
systems. mitter by 3 lb
2. Installed slow-scan television unit 2. Inflight evaluation of TV for ground
monitoring of astronaut and instru-
ments

Instrumentation 1. Deleted backup telemetry transmitter 1. Primary unit reliable, reduced weight
system. by 2 lb
2. Changed recorder speed from 1}_ ips 2. Greater flight coverage necessary with-
to 1_6 ips and programed out changing recorder or reel size
3. Deleted periscope 3. Reduce weight by 761b; unnecessary
for attitude reference
4. Deleted low-level commutator 4. Served its purpose on previous flights

Life support systems__ 1. Added 4 lb of breathing oxygen 1. Necessary for extended mission
2. Installed parallel suit-coolant control 2. Added reliabPity in case of partial valve
valve blockage as experienced in MA-8
3. Added inline condensate trap 3. Existing condensate system believed
ineffective
4. Added urine and condensate transfer 4. Increase urine and condensate storage
systems with manual operation capability because of extended mis-
sion
5. Added 9 lb of cooling water 5. Increase cooling capability because of
mission
6. Added 4.5 lb of drinking water 6. Necessary for increased mission dura-
tion
7. Added 0.8 lb of CO s adsorber 7. Necessary for increased mission dura-
tion

Electrical and 1. Replaced two 1,500 watt-hour batteries 1. Necessary for extended flight duration
sequential systems. with two 3,000 watt-hour units
2. Replaced two of three inverters 2. Improved thermal and operating prop-
erties

aTank intentionally serviced to only 1D lb. of fuel.

four of the five umbilicals, two between the pyrotechnically were released through actuation
spacecraft and the adapter and three between of a backup mechanical device. This experience
the spacecraft and the retropackage (fig. 3-8) points up the necessity for close control of flight
failed to separate in a normal maimer. Later articles and a means for establishing that the
analysis revealed that each of the malfunc- hardware intended for flight satisfies prescribed
tioned disconnects (see fig. 3-9), which normally specifications.
contained _t dual charge came from a special The landing system, which includes the main,
test lot which did not contain the main charge reserve, and drogue-stabilization parachutes
of explosive powder. Somehow, this lot had and the landing-shock attenuation system
been improperly marked as intended for flight (landing bag), has never failed in flight during
hardware. The umbilical which separated the production-spacecraft flight program. In
normally contained the intended amount of ex- the second Mercury-Redstone mission, the heat
plosive and came from a properly identified lot. shield was lost after landing because the metal
The four umbilicals which failed to separate retaining straps and landing-bag material to

52
which the shield was attached failed as a result gram that the launch-escape tower did not
of wave action and strengthening of existing separate rapidly enough from the spacecraft
straps for later spacecraft eliminated this prob- after an off-the-pad abort test because of thrust
lem. The only other anomalies in the operation impingement on the tower ; therefore, the
of the landing system were concerned with the toirer-j et tison rocket-nozzle configur at ion
' was
altitude of parachute deployment, and these subsequently changed from a one- to a three-
anomalies are discussed in the Electrical and nozzle arrangement. Because of reliable
Sequential Systems section. The successful launch-vehicle operation, the launch-escape
performance of the landing system, particularly system was never needed for an atmospheric
the parachutes, can be attributed to a thorough abort during the manned flight program., and
test program involving some 80 air drops of the large escape motor successfully ignited each
full-scale spacecraft. time when the system was normally jettisoned.
An abort, however, occurred during the un-
manned MA-3 mission. and the system operated
satisfactorily.

3
Briidgewiir e.
---cIgnition
harge
c

FIGURE
3-9.-Schematic diagram of explosive umbilical
disconnects.

Table 3-ZZZ.-iVominaZ Rocket Motor


Characteristics
I I I I 1
Approxi-
Num- Nominal mate
Rocket motor ber of thrust burning
motors each, lb time each,
sec

Escape _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 52,000 1
Tower jettison-.. 1 800 1. 5
Posigrade- - - - - - 3 400 1
Retrograde- - - - - 3 1,000 10
I I I I
3-8.-Spacecraft photograph displaying retro-
FIGURE
rocket umbilicals. The internal spacecraft structure has been
compromised only once during a mission critical
The rocket motors include the launch-escape situation, a record which is essentially proved
motor, the retrorockets, the posigrade rockets, by the fact that water, following an ocean land-
and the launch-escape-tower jettison motor. All ing, had never entered the spacecraft in appre-
of the rocket motors used solid propellants, and ciable amounts, except in one instance, because
their nominal thrust values are indicated in of a structural failure. I n the MR-2 mission
table 3-111. Each of these rocket systems has following landing recontact of the heat shield
operated satisfactorily throughout the Mercury with the large pressure bulkhead caused punc-
flight program. I t was found early in the pro- turing that resulted in a sizable leakage rate.

53
The spacecraft was recovered, however, within small 1-pound tln'ust-clmmber assemblies
a safe period. During postflight inspections of (thrusters). In addition, durino" a manned
all manned spacecraft, some evidence of re- suborbital flight (MR-:_) a (;-l)ound lhruster
contact by the heat shield upon landing has been also failed to produce thrust when required.
present, but this dam./ge to the large pressure I)nring" the MA-5 flight, the mission duration
bulkhead has been slight. The inteo'rity of the was terminated early because of a failure in the
spacecraft's load-carrying structure was espe- thrust chamber assembly. I)m'ing tim flight
cially proven during the Little Joe flight pro- of Astronaut Glenn, interlnittent failures of
grain. In one of these flights, the late ignition the 1-pound pitch and yaw thrusters would lmve
of one of the Little Joe rocket motors caused caused a similar early termination of the mis-
the trajectory to be considerably flattened, and sion had the pilot not been present to exercise
as a result the spacecraft was exposed to loading his manual control option. Immediately fol-
conditions approximately twice those expected lowino" the first inflight thruster failures, a com-
for a normal flight. plete analysis was beo'nn to determine the exact
cause of the system discrepancy. In the post-
Spacecraft Control System
flight inspections for the MR-3, MA-5, and
The spacecraft control system provides for MA-(; spacecraft, small particles were dis-
attitude control and rate stabilization of the covered at, critical points in tim thrust chamber
spacecraft during the orbital and reentry asseml)ly, and for the MA-5 mission a large
phases. In addition to the system electronics, metal deposit which partially blocked the
the spacecraft control system is eolnposed of thruster orifice was found. Although thruster
two independent reaction control systems malfunctions were exl)erienced during the
(RCS), one of which supplied fuel for the auto- MA-4 flight, tim postflight insI)ection did not
marie stabilization and control system (ASCS)
reveal any thruster valve contamination. The
and fly-by-wire (FBW) modes and the other
exact mechanism for transporting these parti-
which, until MA-9, supplied the manual pro-
cles, solne of which were found to be broken
portional iMP) and the rate stabilization and
pieces from the stainless-steel dutch-weave
control system (RSCS) modes. The RSCS
screens which distributed the flow, to npstream
unit was installed in the MR-4 and subsequent
flights as a backup to one of the secondary points is still unknown. Three steps were
taken for the MA-7 mission to correct this
modes of the ASCS, that of auxiliary damping.
This unit was removed as unnecessary for the anomaly, one being the replacement of the
MA-9 flight, with major deciding factors being dutch-weave screens with a combination of a
its high fuel-consumption characteristics and stainless-steel fuel distribution plate and plati-
weight. The FBW and MP modes were avail- num screens, another being the reduction of t.he
able for direct manual control by the astronaut, bore and size of the heat barrier, and the third
initially as backups to the ASCS and in the being the relocation of the fuel-metering orifice
final two orbital flights as modes of equal pri- to the upstream side of the solenoid valve (ref.
ority. Although the control system has oper- 8). While these changes constituted the MA-7
ated adequately in all of the manned flights, modification, a more refined design change was
largely because of the ability of the pilot to ex-
being developed and qualified in the Project
ercise precise attitude control manually, this
Orbit altitude chamber tests. This configura-
system has exhibited failures of one type or
tion, compared in figure 3-10 with previous
another in nearly every flight. The one ex-
1-pound thruster configurations, involved both
ception was the six-pass mission of Astronaut
Sehirra, in which the system operated cor- the 1- and 6-pound tl_rusters and was installed

rectly. in the MA-9 spacecraft. No thruster failures


The single most prevalent malfunction in the of this type occurred on either the MA-7,
control system during the early manned flight MA-8, or MA-9 flights after the modifications
program was the intermittent failure of the had been successively incorporated.

54
Modified landing, it was impossible to conduct a post-
c e s ee ri ic mer _ no v •
flight inspection of the hardware and deter-
mine the cause of the failure. This malfunc-
tion, which occurred in the pitch scanner, is
MA-6 confqgur orion believed to have been random in nature within
the scanner circuitry.

Modified The only remaining control system problem


Heat barrier solenoid valve
of any consequence during the full-scale flight
program was the existence of an open circuit in
Stainless stee_ plate
the pitch-rate gyro input to the amplifier-cal-
MA-7 confJouro_n r, ,ce
ibrator (Amp-Cal), or autopilot, during the
MA-4 mission. The Amp-Cal is the electronic
Modified
solenoid unit which generates automatic control system
_tolnless-steel ¢40fe and valve

4platinum screens 0 I
logic for the various ASCS operating modes.
Heat barrier r, pce

The partial loss of gyro information to the auto-


Screen
pilot caused the spacecraft attitude to be in
error at retrofire, which in turn resulted in the
FIGURE 3-10.--Comparison of 1-pound thrust-chamber MA-4 spacecraft's landing some 75 nautical
configurations. miles up range of the intended point. This
malfunction was either not detected during
The horizon scanners, which were used to pro-
preflight tests or it occurred during the flight.
vide an external reference for the attitude
Although the control system performed satis-
gyros, were _t source of difliculty in the earlier
factorily during Astronaut Cooper's mission, an
orbital flights. In the MR-4 flight after tower
electrical short circuit, which occurred at two
jettisoning, the scanner was observed to be gen-
of the power-carrying plugs into the autopilot
erating unexpected ignore signals, the cause of and resulted iaa the loss of the automatic control
which was later traced to the impingement and
mode duringthe final few oa-bital passes. How-
heating effects caused by the ignition of the
ever, because this malfunctioal occurred at this
launch-escape rocket. A modification to the
specific interface and is primarily of an electri-
horizon-scanner cover eliminated this problem.
cal nature, it is discussed in a later paragraph
In the MA-4 flight, both scanners exhibited
undea. Electrical and Sequential Systems. Be-
output vari.ttions which could not. be correlated cause of the loss of tlle automatic control anode
with attitude changes, a_ld this anomaly was
(luring the retrofire and reentry flight maneu-
subsequently found to have been partially vers, the astronaut conducted these maneuvers
caused by "c01d-cloud effects"; in addition, a by using both manual modes available to him.
shorted capacitor in the scanner circuit contrib-
The only other major modifications to the
uted to the attitude discrepancy. Since the
control system for the 1-day mission of Astro-
scanner unit had been desig-ned without accu-
naut Cooper were the addition of a 15-pound-
rately taking into account the effect of high-
capacity fuel tank, which is shown in figure
altitude cloud formations in the view field, a
3-11, and the incorporation of the interconnect
temporary modification of altering the bias
valve between the two RCS systems for better
levels was made for the MA-5 flight, but this
fuel utilization, in an emergency, and for more
change did not completely eliminate the prob-
effective fuel jettisoning.
lem. Further system refinement involving sig-
nal clipping for the earth portion of the view Communications Systems
resulted in a successful modification for the
first manned orbital flight. Since that time, The original desig_ configuration of the com-
only isolated occurrences of "cold-cloud effects" munications systems proved to have been the
have been observed. During the M__-7 flight, most conservative of all of the major systems.
a horizon-scanner circuit failure (see ref. 8) of These system._--the voice transceivers, the radar
another type occurred, but because the an- beacons, the location aids, and the command re-
tenna canister was normally jettisoned prior to ceivers-operated satisfactorily throughout the

55
flight, program. Because of the excellent per- tion was directed to the ineffectiveness of the
formance of these systems, some of their backup HF recovery beacon. Careful analysis revealed
iunits were deleted, including one of the two that when the HF “whip” antenna was pyro-
command receivers and decoders and the high- technically deployed upon landing, the space-
frequency (HF) recovery transceiver for the craft was usually not coiiipletely erect in the
MA-8 and MA-9 flights and the ultra-high water. The combination of the electrically
frequency ( U H F ) backup voice transceiver for c-onductingproducts of combustion from the ex-
the MA-9 flight. One of the two UHF tele- plosive charge used to extend this antenna and
met,ry transmitters, which were part of the the fact that it was extended under water are
instrumentation system, was also deleted n s nn- believed to be the cause of this communications
necessary for tlie M&9 mission. A slow-scan :inomnly. The antenna was subsequently de-
television system, shown in figure 3-12, was in- ployed by using pressurized nitrogen gas, which
cluded for evaluation aboard the Faith 7 spnce- is nonconductive, and it was programed such
craft. but the quality and usefulness of its that deployment ~ - o u l dnot occur until the
transmissions were not satisfactory. :mtennn WIS clear of the water. Reception
I n the initial two manned orbital flights, it from this beacon was satisfactory during the
was noted that signals were not being received MA-0 mission.
from the HF recovery transmitter, but because For the K4-8 flight, a pair of more sensitive
of the circumstances at the time of recovery microphones was installed in the pilot’s helmet,
:tiid tlie uncertainty of H F reception in the land- :tiid the increased sensitivity apparently caused
ing area, it could not be established that an the background noise from the launch vehicle
anomaly existed. However, when this discrep- to trigger tlie voice-operated relay in the air-
ancy still existed on the M A 4 mission, atten- ground circuit. For the MA-9 mission, these
-- inicrophones were modified to reduce back-
I ground noise sensitivity such that this trigger-
ing action ceased.

3-11.-Auxiliary
FIQURE reaction control system fuel FIGURE %12.-Television system evaluated during
tank. MA-9.

56
Instrumentation System
Reports of reception of HF voice communica-
tions during the first three manned orbital The instrumentation system nmnitored over
flights were somewhat inconsistent with regard 100 performance variables and events through-
to quality, but the periods allowed for a com- out the spacecraft, and the operation of this sys-
plete inflight test of the HF voice equipment tem was satisfactory throughout the entire Mer-
were also very brief. At any rate, because of cury program. The system was designed with
reports that reception of HF voice sigmals dur- enough flexibility to incorporate required in-
ing the first two manned orbital flights was strumentation changes as the program pro-
unsatisfactory, a special HF antenna was gressed. In the manned orbital flight phase, it
installed on the retropackage for the MA-8 was desired to have a more complete tempera-
flight (see ref. 10). There were reports of ex- ture survey at discrete spacecraft points, pri-
cellent reception of signals from this antenna marily on the spacecraft afteffbody; and a low-
during the flight at ranges exceeding 2,000 nau- level commutator circuit was installed. This
tical miles, while other reports stated that even unit was deleted from the MA-9 spacecraft as
when the spacecraft was nearly overhead, the having served its purpose and to save weight.
reception was poor to unreadable. This incon- The confidence in the telemetry transmitters
sistency is not clearly understood, but the effects through the third manned orbital flight led to a
of spacecraft attitude at the time of transmis- decision to eliminate one of the two redundant
sion, the atmospheric propagation character- units from the Faith 7 spacecraft to save weight.
istics at the time of contact, and the status of The onboard recording capacity for the MA-9
operational ground equipment remain as un- flight was extended by changing the tape speed
known variables. A more closely controlled
from 17/s inches per second (ips) to 15/16 ips and
test of this special dipole antenna was conducted reprograming the operation periods such that
during the MA-9 flight, and it was fully sue- only essential information was recorded during
eessful. Although HF voice transmissions the expected 34-hour period.
were heard during MA-8, the results of MA-9
Probably the most widely known system mal-
were more consistent and indicated reliable op-
function in the entire Mercury program is that
eration. It might be mentioned that both the
associated with the failure of a limit switch
pilots and ground-control personnel preferred
which sensed heat-shield release. During the
the UHF voice equipment to the HF system,
MA-6 mission, ground-control personnel re-
particularly since none of the missions were such
ceived a telemetry signal which indicated that
that nearly continuous communications were re-
the heat shield had been prematurely unlatched
quired. The UHF communications, of course,
are limited to essentially line-of-sight ranges, from the spacecraft. Although it was believed

but have signal-to-noise characteristics superior that this signal was improper and involved an
to those of HF in flight. However, the MA-9 instrumentation failure, a decision was made to
astronaut found HF communications quite use- reenter with the retropackage attached to in-
ful during the long periods in which he could sure that the heat shield would not part from
not make UHF contact with a network station. the spacecraft during the critical reentry heat-
Although the command system has never been ing period. A postflight examination of the
exercised for a commanded abort, its perform- instrumentation revealed that a limit switch
ance has been entirely satisfactory during other had a bent and loose shaft (shown in fig. 3-13)
inflight exercises, such as the reception of sig- and that manipulation of the sensor without ap-
nals for instrumentation calibration in all
preciably displacing the sensing shaft would
orbital flights and for an emergency voice com-
generate an erroneous signal. This experience
munications test and a commanded wake-up
prompted a change in the installation technique
tone in the MA-9 mission. For the unmanned
and a directive for tighter quality-control stand-
orbital flights, MA-4 and MA-5, the command
ards to insure that prescribed malmfacturing
system was successfully used to control the
tolerances would be maintained. This type of
operation of the spacecraft and bring it safely
back from orbit. malfunction did not recur in subsequent flights.

57
707-056 0---63--5
FIQUXE
3-13.-MA-6 limit switch used to sense beabshield release.

Early in the flight program, beginning with from a medical standpoint is presented in the
the Little Joe 5 mission, the mechanical space- Aeromedical Preparations paper.
craft clock was found to be sensitive to accelera- During the MA-9 mission, the programer,
tions in excess of 5g. An electronic digital clock which automatically controls the operation and
was substituted for this unit and operated satis- sequence of events of certain spacecraft sys-
factorily. tems, exhibited two anomalies, one inherent
During the MA-7 mission, the blood-pressure and the other resulting from a structural fail-
measuring system (BPMS) yielded data which ure. The inherent anomaly, evident to varying
were of only marginal value. The system was degrees in previous flights, involved a sensitive
thoroughly checked out following the flight, and control circuit containing transistors which
no major system malfunction was found. I t actuated power relays to operate the programer.
was shown, however, that proper techniques, in- This circuit was sensitive to certain input volt-
cluding establishing a proper amplifier gain age transients whicli occasionally caused un-
setting, correlation with clinically measured desired programer operation. Prior to the
values, and the fitting of the pressure cuff to
MA-9 flight, a loading resistor had been added
the individual flight astronaut, were not well
understood. A thorough review of the entire to reduce the inherent sensitivity, and an on-
system, its operating characteristics, and the off switch had been incorporated so that the pilot
preflight calibration procedures was conducted could shut the system down if improper opera-
in the months after the MA-7 flight, and the tion occurred. On t,wo occasioiis, the unit \vas
data quality for the MA-8 and MA-9 missions inadvertently triggered and continued to call
was correspondingly improved and resulted in for instlmuentatioii calibrations, one of its pro-
usable values. A discussion of this anomaly gramed functions. On botil occasions, the

58
astronaut turned the system off, and no serious A postflight investigation of the system dis-
consequences resulted, but the need to improve closed a broken solder joint at the attachment
system design for future programs in this point of the sensor lead.
area, particularly for transistorized circuits, is
exemplified. Life-Support Systems
The other programer anomaly, although in a The life-support systems primarily provide
separate section of the system, involved the for control of the cabin and suit atmospheres,
shearing of a pin used to maintain alinement of inaiingeineiit of metabolic-waste products, and
a gear in the programer drive mechanism. Fig- the supply of food and liquid for the astronaut.
ure 3-14 depicts the misalined gear, which re- The iiiajor changes to the Mh-9 life-support
sulted in an inflight binding of the programer systems, including the environmental control
and the preclusion of a significant portion of system (ECS) (k.3-15), from those of previ-
recorded data during the midpoint of the MA- ous missions were accomplished primarily in
support of the increased mission time, and the
9 flight until the astronaut switched from pro-
most significant modifications were as follows :
gramed to continuous operation.
(1) Addition of about 4 pounds of primary
During the MA-9 flight, the respiration rate breathing oxygen (0,), stored under pressure,
sensor failed to yield reliable data during and for a nominal total of 12 pounds in the system.
after the fifth orbital pass, but other sources (2) Increase in the carbon-dioxide (CO,)
of this information were found to be adequate. adsorber, lithium hydroxide (LiOH) , quantity
from 4.6 to 5.4 pounds. The amount of acti-
vated charcoal, as the odor absorbor, was de-
creased from 1.0 to 0.2 pound, which was
sufficient.
(3) Increase in the stored coolant-system
water from 39 pounds to 48 pounds.
(4) Increase in the capability of the urine
collection and storage system.
(5) Addition of an improved Condensate col-
lection and storage system, including a new
wick-type condensate trap (shown in fig. 3-16)
to extract free water from the suit circuit of
the ECS.
(6) Increase of the stored drinking water by
4.5 pounds for a total of 10 pounds of potable
water.

F'IOURE %15.-Environmental control system sche-


3-14-Nisalined
FIGURE gear in MA-9 programer. matic diagram.

59
60
A parallel coolant control valve (CCV) the system that changes in metabolic and ex-
shown in the upper right corner of figure 3-17 ternal suit-circuit heat loads as a result of
was added in the suit cooling-water circuit for changes in the astronaut's level of activity, open
redundancy with the primary valve (top-left visor operation, solar heat on the spacecraft,
on the control plate) in the event of a serious and int,ernal spacecraft equipment heating will
valve blockage by contamination, which was be experienced and will be reflected in the
experienced in the MA-8 mission. coolant requirements for the suit heat ex-
The operation of the life-support equipment changer. These heat-load changes are not radi-
during the MA-8 mission was normal, except cal under normal conditions and the corre-
that the suit-circuit CCV was partially blocked sponding coolant flow changes would be small
by solidified lubricant and delayed the astro- compared with the capacity of the CCV. It is
naut's stabilization of the cooling system a t a quite possible that the sensitivity of this small-
comfortable level. Preflight procedures were orifice valve, together with the astronaut's nor-
changed for the MA-9 mission so that the CCV's inally varying metabolic heat loads, could have
were cleaned and properly lubricated prior to resulted in the need for frequent coolant-flow
flight, but after the manned systems tests. The adjustment .
cooling mtter was also passed through a 0.15 inline condensate trap, shown in figure
micron filter before being transferred into the 3-16, was designed to remove excess mater from
spacecraft. Blocking of the CCV during the the suit-inlet hose and was installed near the en-
MA-9 flight was not experienced. However, trance point, on the suit. The condensate trap
the astronaut was required to make a large mas activated periodically according to the
number of minor changes to the suit CCV set- flight plan by the astronaut's opening a hose
ting in an attempt to maintain the heat-ex- clamp on the water outlet line from the trap.
changer dome temperature, which was the cool- Condensate water was observed by the astro-
ing system control parameter, within the desired naut, to have been flowing through this line,
range. No system deficiencies or hardware indicating that free water had probably passed
malfunctions were found during the postflight around the sponge.
inspect,ion or testing. It is a characteristic of During the 21st orbital pass, the carbon
dioxide ( COz) level at the LiOH canister out-
let began to show an increase on the CO, meter.
Postflight chemical analysis of the canister
showed definite channeling of the flow through
the canister. Channeling is the localized or
restricted passage of gas through the canister,
rather than a uniform flow for maximum CO,
adsorption. This channeling, which could re-
duce the effective canister lifetime, has never
been experienced during ground testing or dur-
ing any previous Mercury flight. Based on the
:imount of unused LiOH at the end of the flight,
approximately 27 hours of normal usage re-
mained. However, the actual operating capa-
bilit,y of the canister could not be established
because of the channeling effects. The exact
reason for its occurring on MA-9 could not be
established.
The cabin coolant water and fan were turned
off according to the flight plan during much of
FIGURE3-17.-Redundant coolant control valve far the MA-9 mission in order to evaluate the effec-
MA-9. tiveness of the cabin cooling circuit. During

61
this time, the electrical load varied according to these flights, some of which were alleviated by
mission requirements, and the cabin tempera- the astronaut, none of these were repeated on
ture was observed to cycle between 85 ° F and successive flights. The suit cooling system has
95 ° F, as indicated in figure 3-18. Reduction in exhibited a history of undesirable operation,
the electrical load during this no-cooling period characterized by elevated suit inlet tempera-
resulted in corresponding reduction in cabin tures, wet undergarments, and a general lack of
temperature. It is concluded that cabin cooling astrommt comfort. However, metabolic heat
was not required during periods in which the loads were removed sutIieiently to keep body
Mercury spacecraft electrical system was pow- temperatures well below a physiologically mar-
ered down. ginal value. The causes of these cooling system
Problems were encountered during MA-9 problems for the suit circuit were twofold :
with the condensate transfer system. The needle (1) Selection of an improper cooling system
of the hand-operated pump, used to transfer control parameter during the initial design
liquid from the condensate tank to another con- period.
tainer, became clogged with metal shavings (2) Ineffectiveness of the suit-cooling-circuit
from the pump shaft and the condensate could water separator because of the unpredieted be-
not be transferred. Normally, free water re- havior of free liquid in a weightless condition.
moved by the condensate trap and sponge sepa- Ground testing showed that the steam ex-
rator flowed directly to the condensate tank, haust duet temperature used in MA-6 and MA-
from which it was then intended to be pumped 7 missions was not an adequate control param-
to storage bags. The condensate tank contained eter for controlling the operation of the heat
a porous plus to relieve the gas pumped from exchanger. A probe, which sensed the steam
the sponge into the tank by the action of the temperature at the heat-exchanger dome (see
sponge separator. Since it. was known that this fig. 3-19) between the two coolant evaporating
plug could pass water when the tank became passes, provided a more rapidly responding in-
nearly filled, the astrommt elected to discontinue dication of the heat-exchanger operation. This
operation of the condensate trap when the trans- control temperature parameter was used during
fer pump became clogged. This action was the MA-8 and MA-9 flights with satisfactory
taken to stop further flow from the trap to the results. The suit-inlet temperature range of
tank and thereby help to preclude water from 60 ° F to 70 ° F during most of these two flights
being released into the cabin. was more comfortable than the 75 ° F to 80 ° F
No malfunction of the life-support system range experienced during MA-6 and MA-7.
which compromised the mission or presented a See figure 3-9,0 for a summary of suit-inlet tem-
marginal condition to the man occurred during peratures experienced during the four manned
any of the manned Mercury missions. Although orbital flights.
minor malfunctions of equipment occurred on ,---MA-8 and MA-9
Heat-exchanger /' temperature
dome -. momtormg point
,2oF i::i::i::i::ii
::N:::: :i::Ni iii!i::_::
]!iiiiNi ::iiNi iiN::_i_iiiiii
JJo}- _i iiiiiii ii::i::i::ili
_iiiiiii
t i!!_:Zoo,o_?";G,ve::"Z'i'o_e_!iiiiiii
.__- _ Two pass
//®'kSa_.t at _.qc_c_.ftf::!i!iiii::igi::Nii::ii Niii !!Ni::
ioo
6 90 ":: "" .-::_!i
I'"_.\ # pass

_VO I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0 II 12

IC)O ::.:.:.:.:.: ;:;:::::;:;: :::.:.::::: .:,:,:,x;: :::::::::: .:.:,:,:.:.: ::::::::.:


.... .,

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

'°°F_ _ ;iiiiiii!i_
iilc_i::i::i
:i::iiiiiiiii
_j:_:;C°°l,_,:.?..._
vo,veopeoe_
90 X7Power down]
#Voter
80 O?ower, up ]
24 25 26 27 28 29 :50 31 _2 .3:5 _4 55 56 peroture- monitoring

Time, hr:min point before MA- 8

FIeU_E 3-18.--Time history of MA-9 spacecraft cabin FIGURE 3-19.--Temperature monitoring points on heat

temperature. exchangers.

62
90 I MA-9

I_ _ ^ _/ MA-8 .....
..... _ • _._. [ii MA-7 .....
80L ,"" - ./{_ _ i_ ,, MA-6 ....

(',,- "..._. r'V _,x ,..,i

V ,_"
50 i J I
0 I 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0 II 12

g 8O

E
7O

6O

I I I I I / I I I I I
5012 13 4
I 15 ' ' ' 17
16 ' _ ' 18
' ' ' 19
' ' ' 2'
0 ' ' 21' ' ' 2'
2 ' ' 2% ' ' 24'

8O

7O

60

5°_4 , , ,. ..... , , ,. , .....30 , , 32, ,,, , , 54,, , 55, , ,.


25 26 27 28 29 51 55 56

FTeum_ 3-20.--Time history for suit-inlet ten_perature for manned orbital flights.

Other ground tests showed that water in the of tile main parachute during the MR-I mission
suit circuit, when condensed from the gas and of the drogue parachute during MA-6. The
stream in the heat exchanger, was not carried reasons for these premature deployments have
by the gas flow to the sponge separator. This never been fully understood, since no system
water is believed to have been held under weight- malfunction could be found during exhaustive
lessness to the metal surfaces by surface tension postflight testing. During the later manned or-
and flowed from the cooling surfaces to the duct bital missions, a modification to the sensing cir-
walls, thereby probably passing around the cuits for these sequential functions guarded
sponge in the separator. Tile condensate trap, against premature autolnatic deployment. The
which was installed in the MA-9 ECS, verified contractor was instructed to conduct a single-
the need for ,_ trap which will remove free con- point failure analysis, which involved a detailed
densate water traveling along the duct walls. study of the electrical and sequential circuitry
Missions of even longer durations will require to establish all possible failure modes, and this
the extraction of all free condensate to keep the analysis was conducted for all spacecraft sys-
astronaut's body dry and thereby to obtain max- telns before the MA-7 flight. Tlle results of this
imum comfort and hygiene. study were evaluated for failure conditions that
would singularly jeopardize flight safety, and
Electrical and Sequential Systems
t_ppropriate modifications were incorporated
Except for some early development problems into the MA-7 and subsequent spacecraft to im-
in the sequential system, this system group has prove reliability. The greater portion of these
performed satisfactorily throuo'hout the Mer- changes involved the electrical and sequential
cury program. Although there were no serious systems because of their unique relationship to
sequential problems throughout the manned critical mission functions. These changes dic-
flight program, there was an early deployment tated paralleling of redundant sensing ele-

63
ments in some cases in which the actuation of and the open-cycle evaporative cooling system
either element could initiate the proper func- was deleted. The three spacecraft inverters
tion. In other cases where it was important functioned satisfactorily mltil late in the MA-9
that an event sig_lal not be sent early, some flight when an electrical sh(n_t circuit prevented
elements were changed to a series function, as their operating properly.
was done for the paraclmte-deployment In the MA-9 flight, the failure which caused
circuitry. the greatest concern was first recognized at the
The 1)rimary change to the electrical system early illumination of the 0.05g sequence light,
for the MA-9 mission was the replacement of which indicated that the automatic stabilization
two 1,500-watt-hour batteries with two 3,000- and control system (ASCS) had possibly
watt-hour batteries. This change brought the switched to its reenti T mode of operation, which
power supply up to one 1,500-watt-hour and would have included the initiation of rate
five 3,000-watt-hour batteries. damping and a steady spacecraft roll rate.
During the early p'hases of the flight pro- Subsequent checks by the astronaut, revealed, in
gram, (litticulty was experienced in maintaining fact, that this control mode had been enabled.
the temperatures of the electrical inverters be- A requirement for a manual retrofire maneuver
low the maximum recommended operating was therefore imposed on the astronaut, but it
level. A cooling system was subsequently in- was still the 1)lan to use the autopilot during
stalled for the two main inverters, but con- reentry. However, soon after this occurrence,
tamination problems and the limited effective- the main inverter ceased to supply a-c power,
ness of this cooling system did not alleviate the and, in the switchover to the standby unit, this
elevated temperature situation appreciably. redundant element did not start properly. (Re-
However, continued operation of these inverters fer to fig. 3-'21 for details involving the ASCS
from mission to mission, in conjunction with and power supplies.) Without a-c power for
ground test results, without experiencing a tem- the control system, even the reentry control con-
perature-associated failure, provided sufficient figuration was disabled; therefore, the astro-
confidence that these units would operate satis- naut was required to conduct this maneuver
factorily. Finally, for the MA-9 mission, with manual control. This task was further
modified inverters with improved thermal char- complicated by a corresponding loss of gyro
acteristics were installed in place of two of the attitude indications because of the a-c power
old style units (main '250 v-amp and 150 v-amp) failure. A postflight inspection and analysis

O Cage =.
m( in

panel
Attitude light
Sla:;_;:sde I Gyr° _ g_05:- O.05q
indicators O.05g

[
_ignol se_s_r._.l._"
Pin i
4
25Or-amp
_I Main Amplifier
inverter Inverter
a-c power colibrator l15v o-c
"--I_--.1 switchover

250v-amp
.__ Standby
inverter

I
l15v a-c

FIOURE 3-21.--Relationship of electrical power to control system autopilot.

64
of the trouble areas disclosed that a short cir- This t m k is located in the proximity of the auto-
cuit had occurred, both on the power plug pilot power plugs, and normal cycling of the
(shown in fig. 3-22) to the ASCS amplifier- sponge squeezer during the flight could have
calibrator and to another connector (see fig. forced condensate through the vent. Another
3-23), also part of the ASCS power circuit. possible source of water n-hich could have pro-
Both inverters under question were tested thor- duced the short circuit is the local condensation
oughly after the flight and found to operate of cnliiii Iiumidity, which may have been present
within specification, indicating that they did becnnse of n leak in the drinking-water valve or
not contribute to the malfunction. Strong evi- because of water vapor exhaled by the pilot
dence exists that free water in the spacecraft when his helmet faceplate was open. Or the
cabin had been present near the multipin power- water droplets which leaked from the valve may
plug connection and eventually provided a cur- have somehow been deposited, in part, directly
rent path in the insulation between the d-c on the power plug. This experience points up
power and grounding pins shown in right-hand the need to minimize or eliminate the presence
photograph in figure 3-22. Pin R’, labeled in of free liquid or high humidity in a spacecraft
the figure, was found to have been completely cabin where electrical systems are functioning
burned off. Figure 3-23 clearly indicates the and to insulate and seal bare electrical connec-
significant corrosion revealed on the second con- tors more effectively.
nector during the post-flight disassembly and
inspection.
Postflight tests duplicated the above hypothe-
sis; that is, a short to ground could be effected
upon application of condensate water. Re-
sistance measurements taken across certain pins
of the second plug immediately following the
flight indicated electrical paths that could have
caused the 0.05g indication. A likely source of
the liquid which might have caused the electrical
short cimuit was the porous vent of the conden- FIGURE
3-23.-Postflight photograph of M A 4 con-
sate tank in the environmental control system. nector-socket rear face.

(a)-Front view showing burnt pin. (b)-Rear view showing X-rayed current paths in
insulation.

FIG- 3-22.--Pmtflight photograph of MA-9 auto-pilot power plug.


65
Concluding Remarks flights ill completing the mission successfully
when a malfnnction was present in the auto-
The Mercury spacecraft systems design and
matic systeln. Another wduable lesson in both
development phases were conducted concur-
tile control system and coolin_ system designs
rently and although this philosophy involved
was tile avoidance of COml)onents which are
a known risk, it made possible the early realiza-
espe('ially sensitive to contamination. The
tion of the project objectives, l)uring this small valves used to nleter reaction control fuel
time, many valuable lessons were learned and
and enviromnem al control system cooling water
exploited in the development and ol)eration of
s!muhl have been designed to eml)loy larger flow
manned space-flight systems.
areas to reduce susceptibility to lmrticle block-
In tile system desitan , maxinmm use was made
age. ()ther than guarding against stray volt-
of existing technology and off-the-shelf equip-
ages and sensitivity to transients, the major
ment, and systems concepts were kept simple.
lesson derived from the performance of the
However, some important advances in the tech-
electrical and sequential systems was the need
nology also had to 1)e initiated. It was found
to seal and insulate effectively all electrical
that the spacecraft and its systems must be de-
connectors from possible sources of free liquid
signed fro" operational conditions. Examples of
aml humidity in the spacecraft cabin. Ill the
the design-for-operation standard relating to
life SUl)port system, it was also found that the
the preflight activities are system accessibility
cool ing systems must be designed with adequate
and the simplification of system interfaces. It
margins and that food. water, and waste man-
is also important in the early system design to
agement devices require particular attention be-
allow for an inevitable growth in weight.
'cause of phunl)ing coml)lexity and the effects
During development and qualification testing,
of weightlessness.
the test criteria cannot be compromised in most
Throughout the Mer(.u W development and
instances, since an overlooked system ineffi- flight programs, quality control and rigid man-
ciency will inevitably show up later where a ufacturing standards were found to be abso-
redesign is more costly. However, it was also lutely mandatory if incidental flight failures
found in Mercury that no single qualification and discrel)ancies were to be avoided. Through-
criterion necessarily applies to all systems, and out the project, a careful and continuing at-
local operational conditions must be individu- tention was given to engineering detail in order
ally evaluated for each system. Whenever sys- to make possible the early recognition of system
tem components axe significantly modified, as weaknesses and their implications in the opera-
was done for the Faith '7 spacecraft to make lion of flight hardware and to provide meaning-
possible the 34-hour flight capability, a new ful and effective courses of action. This atten-
ground test program for hardware requalifiea- tion to detail was an important reason for the
lion should be administered to insure mainte- success of the Mercury flight program, par-
nance of previous reliability and operational ticularly the manned suborbital and orbital
standards. missions.
In the area of hardware operation and per- Acknowledgement.--The authors wish to
formance evaluation, the Mercury flight pro- gratefully acknowledge the analytical and
gram has been a most valuable experience. documentary efforts of the many NASA engi-
The most important lesson learned from opera- neers and technicians who applied their knowl-
tion of the spacecraft control system is that the edge and foresight unselfishly during the post-
pilot is a reliable backup to automatic system flight evaluations of the various spacecraft sys-
modes. In fact, the pilot's ability to control ac- tems for each Mercury mission and without
curately th e spacecraft attitude was instru- whose contributions this paper would not have
mental in three of the four manned orbital been possible.

66
References

1. FAGET, M. A., and PILAND, R. O. : Mercury Capsule and its Flight Systems. IAS Paper No. 60-34, Presented
at IAS 2Sth Annual Meeting (New York, N.Y.), Jan. 25-27, 1960.
2. ANDERTON, DAVID A. : HOW Mercury Caps_de Design Evolved. Aviation _Veek, Vol. 74, No. 21, May 22, 1961.
3. BOND, ALECK C. : Mercury Spacecraft Systems. Proc. Conf. on Results of the First U.S. Manned Suborbital
Space Flight. NASA, Nat. Inst. Health, Nat. Acad. Sci., June 6, 1961, pp. 11-18.
4. HAMMACK, JEROME B. : Spacecraft and Flight Plan for Merc_lry-Redstone _ Flight. Results of the Second
U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, July 21, 1961. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washing-
ton, D.C.), pp. 3-8.
5. KLEINKNECHT, KENNETH S., BLAND, WILLIAM M., JR., and FIELDS, E4. M. : Spacecraft and Spacecraft Syste_n_.
Results of the First U.S. Manned Orbital Space Flight, February 20, 1962. Supt. Dec., U.S. Government
Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 5-30.
6. JOHNSTONp l_ICHARD S., SAMONSKI, FRANK H., JR., LIPPITT, MAXWELL W., and RADNOFSKY, MATTHEW I.:
Life Support Systems and Biomedical Instr_lmentation. Results of the First U.S. Mannned Orbital Space
Flight, February 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 31-44.
7. VOAS, ROBERT B. : Manual Control of the Merc_lry Spaceeralt. Astronautics, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 1962,
pp. 18-20 and 34-38.
8. BOYNTON, JOHN H., and FIELDS, E. M. : Spacecralt and Lauuch-Vehicle Perlormance. Results of the Second
United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, May 24, 1962. NASA SP-6, Supt. Dec., U.S. Government
Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 1-14.
9. ANON : Mercury Provides Data for Apollo, Gemini. Aviation Week, Vol. 77, No. 1, July 2, 1962, pp. 98-99.
10. BOYNTON, JOHN H., and FISHER, LEWIS R. : Spacecraft and Launch-Vehicle Performance. Results of the
Third United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, October 3, 1962. NASA SP-12, Supt. Doe., U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 1-11.
11. BLAND, WILLIAM M., JR., and BERRY, CHARLES A. : Project Mercury Experiences. Astronautics and Aerospace
Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb. 1963, pp. 29-34.

67
$

4. MERCURY-REDSTONE LAUNCH-VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT AND


PERFORMANCE

By JOACHIM P. KUETTNER, Ph.D., Chie], Saturn-Apollo Systems Integration Office, NASA George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center; and EMIL BERTRAM, Chie], Special Projects O_ce, NASA Launch
Operations Center

5] _ 5_" Summary At this time, two surplus Jupiter C missiles


were available from the Army Ballistic Missile
The Mercury-Redstone launch vehicle was
Agency (ABMA). The Jupiter C was an ad-
used for the first United States ballistic manned
vanced version of the Redstone, a tactical mili-
space flights. As a prelude to the orbital flight
tary missile wiih a record of over 50 successful
program, the Mercury-Redstone missions pro-
flights to verify its reliability. The original
vided an opportunity to evaluate the perform-
Redstoue could not meet the mission require-
ance of the Mercury spacecraft, the reactions of
ments; however, the Jupiter C had elongated
the astronauts to brief periods of space flight,
propellant tanks, 't lighter structure, and the
and the launch and recovery operations. The
required 1)erformance for Mercury. The Jupi-
first steps toward man-rating a tactical missile ter C launch vehicle had been used for conduct-
were made in a series of design changes and
ing reentry studies and placing the first U.'S.
modifications based on ground and flight test-
satellite, Explorer I, into orbit.
ing. This paper describes development of the
Therefore, the Redstone vehicle, in its Jupiter
first U.S. manned launch vehicle, including the
C modification, satisfied the basic Mercury sub-
abort system, the reliability programs necessary
orbital requirelnents of availability and per-
for pilot safety, and the performance of the formance.
Mercury-Redstone space vehicle.
However, the Jupiter C did not incorporate
Introduction all the necessary safety features; and further
adaptation was necessary for use as a manned
The Mercury-Redstone launch vehicle was the
launch vehicle. This development, which is
United States' first manned launch vehicle.
sometimes referred to as "man rating," had as
However, it is only the first of a series of launch its three major g'uidelines safety during launch,
vehicles which will exhibit an increasing capa- satisfactory operation from a hmnan-factors
bility in manned space payloads. standpoint, and adequate performance mar-
By early 1959, several decisions were made in
gins.
regard to the performance required of a launch
The actual adaptation took place in three
vehicle needed for the first phase of the maimed
phases: basic modifications, modifications after
flight program. The vehicle had to have both ground tests, and modifications after flight tests.
the reliability .md performance to place a Although there were specific hardware changes
manned, 2-ton payload safely into a suborbital
during the development, the basic man-rating
trajectory in which at least 5 minutes of weight-
program and design concepts did not require
lessness would be experienced and an apogee of
major alteration.
at least 100 nautical miles would be attained.
In addition, the vehicle had to be available in Basic Vehicle Modification
time to support the desired flight schedule.
These requirements narrowed the choice to As noted, some basic modification was neces-
launch vehicles which had already been devel- sary to adapt the Jupiter C to the Mercury mis-
oped for a military mission. sion requirements. The required modifications

69
and additions made the new Mercury-Redstone less complex, was more reliable and met the
launch vehicle physically distinguishable from guidance requirements of the Mercury-Red-
both the Redstone and Jupiter C missiles. Fig- stone mission.
ure,_--1 illustrates the differences between these ('2) The aft unit, containing the pressurized
cofffigurations. It should be noted that each instrument compartment, and adapter were per-
successive version of the original Redstone was manently attached to the center tank assembly.
progressively longer. In the tactical version, these units separated
with the payload to provide terminal guidance.
(3) A short spacecraft adapter, including
the spacecraft-launch-vehicle separation plane,
$g was supplied by the spacecraft contractor. This
arrangement simplified the interface coordina-
tion.
/ \ To prevent major changes midway in the pro-
i q_ gram, the engine was immediately changed from
the A-6 to the A-7 model. The A-6 engine
was scheduled to be phased out, and a short-
age of hardware was expected to occur during
the Mereury-Redstone program. This early
changeover avoided a foreseeable problem area
• _ _ 85.58'
but required an accelerated test program.

:32.08'
69,4.8'

/ 69 90' For the Mereury-Redstone


cohol
Jupiter
amine
was chosen as the fuel.
C had used unsymmetrical
(UDETA) for greater
launch vehicle, al-
Although
diethyltri-
performance,
the

its
toxicity was higher than that of alcohol and
was considered to be undesirable for manned

3i50' I 3
flights. However, the selection of alcohol led
to a problem with the important jet control
\'anes because of the extended burning time
,. Jn \\ ,, I_
which caused greater erosion of these vanes.
Hence, a program was initiated to select jet
vanes of the highest quality for use in Mercury.
Redstone Jupiter C Mercury- Redstone
The prevalves were deleted from the Mer-
FIGURP.4-1.--Comparison of the three Redstone mis- cury-Redstone launch vehicle in order to in-
siles. crease mission success. These valves had been
used in the tactical missiles between the propel-
To meet performance requirements, use of lant tanks and the main propellant valves to
the elongated Jupiter C tanks was necessary. prevent possible fuel spillage in the event of a
These tanks give the Mercury-Redstone launch main valve failure. Ilowever, failure of the
vehicle a nominal engine burning time of 143.5 l_reval\'es to remain open in flight would have
seconds, 20 seconds more than the original Red- resulted in a mission abort.
s_one vehicle. This greater burning time re- To provide for maximmn crew safety, an au-
quired the addition of a seventh high-pressure tomatic inflight abort-sensing system was added
nitrogen tank to pressurize the larger fuel tank to the launch vehicle and an emergency egress
and an auxiliary hydrogen peroxide (H202) operation was established for the launch com-
tank to power the engine turbopump. plex. These factors were primary consider-
To decrease the complexity for the basic Mer- ations in man-rating the Redstone and are dis-
cury-Redstone, three changes were made: cussed in greater detail later.
(1) The Redstone stabilized platform (ST- The Mereury-Redstone was aerodynamically
80) were replaced by the LEV-3 autopilot for less stable than the standard Redstone. Be-
vehicle guidance. The LEV-3 system, although cause of the [mique payload characteristics and

70
theel6ngatedtanks, the Mercury-Redstone was 32

expected to become unstable in the supersonic 50

region approximately 88 seconds after lift-off. 28 4th natural frequency---,

(See fig. 4-2.) To compensate for this instabil- 26

ity to some degree, 687 pounds of ballast were 24


added forward of the instrument compartment. 22
Cllanges were also necessary because of the
20
decreased lateral bending frequencies. The
18
configuration and payload changes reduced the
16
Mercury-Redstone bending frequencies to one- : 5rd natural fr_

fourth those experienced by the standard Red- u

stone. (See fig. 4-3.) As a result, resonance " 12

problems appeared during both ground and


flight testing. The second bending mode had __ 9
to be filtered out of the control system to pre- 8
2nd natural frequency--_,
vent feedback.
7

10- 5
ISt natural frequency---,
4

Diameter = 70 in, 5

I
CP I I I I I I I
0
D
20 40 60 80 I00 IZO 140
Flight time, see
CG

FIGURE 4-3.--Mercury-Redstone lateral bending modes.

Abort System Description

Even though the vehicle was expected to per-


4
form properly, a launch-escape system was re-
quired for maximum crew safety as long as a
catastrophic launch-vehicle failure remained a
possibility. Therefore, an automatic inflight
system was developed which supplied an abort
signal to the spacecraft in the event of an im-
pending catastrophic failure of the launch
vehicle. This signal caused engine cut-off,
I I I
50 I00 150 escape-rocket ignition, and spacecraft separa-
Flight time, sec tion. This cut-off mode was in addition to those
FIGURE 4-2.--Center-of-gravity and center-of-pressure sent when the mission conditions were achieved
location of Mercury-Redstone during time of flight.
and in the event an emergency command de-
struct signal had to be sent. Because the vehicle
was to be manned, the destruct signal had a
In all, a total of 800 changes were made be-
built in 3-second delay to allow time for ade-
fore the Mercury-Redstone project was com- quate spacecraft separation. The abort system,
pleted. The major modifications just de- shown in figure 4-4, sensed and was activated
scribed, as well as many minor changes beyond by: unacceptable deviations in the programed
the scope of this paper, resulted in a reliable attitude of the launch vehicle, excessive turning
man-rated vehicle. rates, loss of thrust or loss of electrical power.

71
abort capability even if one sensor failed. Since
the predominant failure mode of electrical volt-

Abort bus
A
uirr°r
/ +-5°I-+° I_,o'1
Spacecraft

relay

Mayday
age sensors
switch,
sors
is opposite
the relays controlled
were connected
single sensor monitored
titudes,
redundancy
as well as pitch
was implicit
that for a pressure
by the voltage
in series.
sen-
Although
pitch, yaw, and roll at-
and yaw attitude
for these attitude
rates,
and
a

I sen _or,
._ cut-off rate measurements because of their interde-
pendency.
J,
To supply the necessary timing functions to
the abort system, relay interlocks were used to
ser sot, prevent arming of the abort system prior to
lift-off and to disarm the system at normal shut-
FIUURE 4-4.--Block diagram of Mercury-Redstone auto- down. The P_ switches were armed after engine
matic abort sensing system. start and disabled prior to normal shutdown.
Here, additional relays also provided circuit
redundancy and lock-in of the abort signal.
The criteria for the abort system were based
Time is a critical factor in the abort pro-
on an evaluation of over 60 Redstone and
cedures, and the method of abort initiation is
Jupiter C flights and a failure-mede analysis.
completely dependent on it. Because some
The number of parameters was kept at a mini-
launch vehicle failures could very rapidly re-
mum, since an overly complicated system could
sult in a catastrophe, the abort was designed to
result in little improvement, if any, in overall
be automatically initiated. Since some failures
flight safety. A selection of those parameters
would not cause an immediate catastrophe,
which would reflect the operation of only vital
manual backup was incorporated. The astro-
systems was therefore required. Hence the
naut, blockhouse, mission control center, and
abort, system sensed primarily output or down-
range safety could initiate an abort during spe-
stream parameters, each of which were then
cifically assigned flight periods, some of which
representative of many different types of
overlapped.
failures.
For example, a sudden change in the attitude Nominal Mission Profiles
of the vehicle indicated trouble in the control
system, regardless of the source of this trouble. The Mercury-Redstone launch vehicle, whose
It could be the result of a failure in the control nominal mission profile is shown in figure 4-5,
computer or some mechanical system or the accelerated the Mercury spacecraft into a sub-
limits of controllability having been exceeded. orbital flight at a nominal speed of approxi-
By establishing critical values for I)itch, yaw, mately 6,460 feet per second. At launch-vehi-
and roll angle, a variety of problems, including cle-spacecraft separation the flight-path angle
the unstable "flip-over" with a subsequent ex- was 41.80 °, the altitude, 900,000 feet, and the
plosion, could be predicted in time for a safe Mach number, 6.30. The maximum accelera-
abort. As other examples, loss of thrust, rough tion at cut-off was 6.3g.
combustion, and an impending explosion could In figure 4-5, several important launch ve-
be sensed from variations in the combustion hicle sequencing points are indicated. A circuit
chamber pressure. Finally, a loss in electrical permitting automatic engine cut-off prior to
power or of the electrical interface between the abort was activated 30 seconds after lift-0ff.
spacecraft and launch vehicle could be effec- Prior to this time, this circuit was disabled be-
tively sensed. cause cut-off in the first 30 seconds would have
As shown in figure 4-4, the abort system cir- resulted in an impact of the launch vehicle on
cuitry was designed to include adequate redun- land which was undesirable; therefore, only the
dancy. The combustion chamber pressure (Pc) range safety officer could initiate an engine shut-
switches were wired in parallel to assure an down. To prevent an early jettisoning of the

72
escape tower the normal shutdown circuitry was Reliability, Testing, and Quality Assurance
not armed until 129.5 seconds. At 131 seconds
the velocity cut-off accelerometer was armed. As mentioned earlier, the basic launch vehicle
This arming occurred 12 seconds before nominal had a history of 69 flights prior to the first
expected engine cut-off time to allow for higher- manned flight upon which to base failure-mode
than-expected launch-vehicle performance for a and reliability prediction. Two such predic-
non-optimum mixture ratio, which could re- tions were made. The first prediction used the
sult in premature propellant depletion. The record of all Redstone, Jupiter C, and Mercury-
chamber pressure sensors to the automatic abort Redstone development and qualification flights.
system were deactivated at 135 seconds, thus The second prediction used an artificial Red-
preventino" an abort signal at the time of cut-off. stone configuration composed of individual
Both cut-off activation and pressure switch de- components flown at different times on previous
activation were originally scheduled to occur at flights.
137.5 seconds, but as a result of the early shut- To find the weak spots in the total vehicle,
down of MR-2, the times indicated in the figure large subsystems were submitted to a special
were selected for all subsequent flights. reliability test program. All major missile sec-
At engine shutdown, nominally at 143 tions and the systems contained in each were
seconds, the abort system was deactivated and vibrated under temperature and humidity con-
the escape tower jettisoned. Spacecraft separa- ditions simulating the actual environments of
tion occurred 9.5 seconds after shutdown to transportation, prelaunch, and flight. Bending
allow for thrust tail-off. and compression loads were applied up to 150

Engine cut-off Spocecraf t-launch- vehicle

separation
tower separation
(152.5sec)
automatic in flight,
Abort can be initiated:
abort system

Before lift-off by-

I. The pilot (after umbilical drop)

J,
2, Ground observers

After lift-off by-

I. The pilot

2. Ground observers

3. Launch-vehicle automatic

abort system

4.Range safety officer

(emergency cut-off )
/.J

-'// ........ Abort pressure switches disarmed

"/ ""_-Velocity ( 135 sec )


Abort plus
II cut-off
engine cut-off _" i
i
t" Norma armed,
(131 sea)
cut-off

armed,

/ ( 129.5 sec)

J
I
The destruction command is blocked for J

I
dynamic pressure
3 seconds after spacecraft abort
/ 572 psf at 36,00Oft

Activation of /

automatic inflight

abort system ...... ~ 30 seconds

,,
Start tilting '_
i

(_15 sec)--- Lr> Abort without


,, *_ engine cut-off

-- Lift-off

,/ t
" Z-Umbilical tower drop
Automatic
(pilot introduced into abort system)
countdown

begins

FIOURE 4--5.--Mercury-Red,stone powered flight sequence.

707-056 0--63-----_ 73
percent of maximum flight loads, thereby estab- we1di lip i-epairs, :ii1d prep1ra t io11 of inst ruc -
lishing positire margins of safety. TVlien tions.
trouble spots were found, individual component
testing w a s followed u p with additional sys-
tems tests.
Figure 4-6 shows the vehicle contractor’s com-
bined environmental test facility. This facility
upplied flight vibrations and rigid body motions
iip to 4g at 2,000 cps simultalieously with ten?-
peratiires up to 115” F. This testing proved the
importance of investigating tlie interaction of
all component masses.

47.-Static
FIGURE firing, noise and Tibration test
stand.

Changes Resulting From Ground Tests


During the vibration test program, several
components failed or were damaged. These
coiiiponents included an engine piping elbow, ai1
H,O, bottle bracket, tlie abort-rate switch-
46.-The contractor’s combined vehicle motion
FIGURE niounting bracket, wires in the roll-rate svitch,
and ribration test stand. :md an aiiteiiiia mounting stud. Similar prob-
lems occurred in other components. The suc-
I n addition, structural flight simulation, cess of the modifications proved the value of
spacecraft-launch-vehicle interface compati- total system testing.
bility, clamp-ring operation, and static firing Since the A-7 engine JIXS new, extensive test
tests ivere made. Figure 4-7 shows the mating firings were made. During these firings, an
of the spacecraft and launch vehicle prior to a instability was discovered at 500 cps and elim-
noise and vibration test conducted at the NASA inated through a modification to the fuel
,\farshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) . injector. Investigation as to the source of an-
Quality assurance procedures were relatively other low-frequency oscillation eventually led
more refined than for the tactical vehi&? be- to tlie discovery that the static test tower was
cause of the stress placed on crew safety. A n at fault. Modification of the static test tower
awareness program required that every Mer- subsequently removed it as a trouble source.
cury system assembly carry a special Mercury Checkout and Launch Operations
stamp indicating that it had passed special in-
spections and that all personnel involved in its Prior to shipment to the launch site a t Cape
manufacture and assembly were aware of the Cnnaveral, the Mercury-Redstone abort system
quality expected. Particular attention was was checked by introducing simulated malfunc-
paid the areas involving soldering techniques, tions and evaluating the abort system responses.

74
The first threelaunchvehicleswerealsocare- to be a tolerable time between astronaut inser-
fully testedfor compatibilitywith the space- tion aml lift-off to accommodate possible holds
craft at MSFC. in the countdown.
At Cape Canaveral, the Mercury-Redstone
countdown was conducted in two parts with a Emergency Egress and Pad Abort
rest period in between to reduce fatigue of the
Special astronaut safety precautions were re-
launch crew. Lax loading was scheduled for
quired after insertion since the launch vehi-
completion at 180 minutes prior to lift-off to
minimize the possibility of an additional cle was already fueled; therefore, launch pad
12-hour delay for lax tank purging and drying emergency egress procedures were developed.
during, the recycle time in the event of a launch A study (see fig. 4-8) to determine the best mode
eancellation after lax loading. The astronaut to retrieve an incapacitated astronaut indi-
was to be inserted imo the spacecraft after lax cated the blockhouse-controlled service struc-
loading at approximately 120 minutes prior to ture would provide the most expeditious escape.
lift-off. A period of 4 hours was considered If, however, he were able to exit without help,

J 50 168
Using mobile tower Astronaut
out J spacecraft
Tower from
to ground 208
MII3 Armored personnel carrier
at MII3 to
M '_}3H'_-j BH Block House
spacecraft }28 j VEH __

U Personnel exposure = 218 man-sac


Astronaut
Rescue crew
exposure
exposure
195 245 280

Using service
structure Structure into position around vehicle I Astruotnaut I Elev
dwn 520
95ft from vehicle
MII3BH toJ
(T-55 min to To6min

Personne[ exposure - 135 man-sec


242 292 327

Using service Astronaut Elev


structure Structure into position around vehicle out dwn 367

125ft from vehicle


('1"-6 min to T-O) MII3BH toj
Personnel exposure - 135 man-sec

(a) Astronaut self-sustaining

il8
Tower from
Using mobile tower 273 323 441 481
spacecraft to ground
at
MII3 to ]Astronaut J Tower from MII3 to I
78 VEH Tower from ground to spacecraft I out J spacecraft to ground 8H J
spacecraft

I I Personnel
exposure =
195
178:3 man-sec
Using service
Structure into position around vehicle 245 280 520
structure
95ft from vehicle
(T-55 min to T-6)
120 MII3
VEH to J Elev
up Astronaut
out J Elev
dwn MIlSBH to I I
® _1
Personnel exposure = 685 man-sac

242

Using service
structure Structure position around vehicle 292 527 367

125ft from vehicle Elev Astronaut Elev I


(T-6 mln to T-O)
167 MII3
VEH to [ up out J dwn MII3
BH to I
I Personnel exposure - 685 man-sac

' Note, Exposure time - Total time all personnel are exposed to a potentially hazardous vehicle
I

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480
Time, sac
(b) Astronaut incapacitated

FIGUI_E 4-8.--Time study of astyonaut emergency egress.

75
he could use the pad escape tower, or “Cherry MR-111 launch vehicle to experience a cut-05
Picker,” shown in figure 4-9. The cab of this relocity exceeding the nominal value by about
specialized escape equipment, which was per- 260 feet per second. Use of softer wire and the
manent but extendable? was stationed near the relocation of the electrical leads eliminated the
spacecraft hatch until just prior to lift-off. problem.
Utilization of this escape device was combined
with the use of fire trucks, an armored personnel
carrier (M-113), and rescue teams for exit Fin
from the pad area. I n case of a pad abort,
recovery procedures and vehicles, including
army helicopters and amphibious craft, were
organized and prepared to assist.
Ground strap - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~ -,:;:,-Propulsion connector
control

L.
(60oin)

’--Power connector
(4pin)

Ground strap
I f t trove1 b e f o r e connection broken
50 Ib pull required to break connection
Strap protected from engine flames

FIQURE
4-lO.-Mercury-Redstone ground strap.

(3) As a backup to the integrating acceler-


ometer fix, a time-based cut-off signal was estab-
lished at 143 sec for the MR-2 and MR-BD
(booster development) missions. These later
flights proved that the accelerometer functioned
properly, and use of the cut-off timer was dis-
continued,
(4)The thrust controller on MR-2 failed wide
open causing lox depletion 0.5 second before
deactivation of the abort P, switches and before
FIQURE
4-9.-MR3 with “Cherry Picker” and remote integrating accelerometer arming, which could
controlled service structure. have prevented this trouble. To prevent a simi-
l a r Occurrence on the remaining flights, velocity
System Modifications Resulting From Flight cut-off arming and P, abort switch disarm were
Operations separated in time. Velocity cut-off arming was
advanced to 131 sec to take care of earlier-than-
Problem areas revealed during the qualifica- predicted cut-off velocity, while P, disarming
tion flight-test program (MR-1, MR-2, was set at 1% sec, keeping the combustion
MR-BD) lead to the following modifications : chamber pressure abort capability as long as
(1) The MR-1 launch attempt proved the possible, but removing this capability early
need for ground-negative until all other elec- enough to take care of :I high propellant con-
trical connections were separated. Thus, a sumption rate.
ground strap was added. This strap is shown ( 5 ) Flights MR-lA, MR-2, and MR-BD
in figure 4-10. experienced momentary roll rates approxi-
(2) A scale-factor error resulting from an
excessive pivot torque on the LEV-3 longitu-
dinal integrating accelerometer caused the
mately twice that of the earlier Redstone
vehicle ( - 8”/sec as against 4°/sec-abort
limits were 12”/sec). Since the missile was not
-
76
subject to damage at this rate, the roll-rate •uhlition of a strap for proper electrical
al)ort sensor was deleted after MR-BI) to in- _'roundino'.
crease mission success. The roll attitude angle The sequence of events which led to MR-I's
abort limit of 10 ° was ret'dned. difticulties started during the lift-off when the
(6) An interaction of tile second bendino' power and control connectors did not discon-
mode with the yaw and pitch axis control re- nect sinmltaneously. Because of mechanical ad-
quired the addition of a network filter to reduce justments, the power plug" disconuected '-)9 milli-
control loop o'ain between 6 and 10 cps. The seconds prior to the control plug. This per-
interaction was noted on flights MR-1A and mitted part of a 3-amp current, which would
MR-9 and is illustrated in figure 4-11. have normally returned to ground through the
power plug, to pass through the "normal cut-
7 S de9. off" relay and its gTound diode. The cut-off
Deflection of jel vane no I terminated thrust and jettisoned the escape
tower.
The spacecraft did not separate from the
launch vehicle because the g-load sensing re-
-75
quirements in the spacecraft were not met.
5 deg I secj "Normal cut-off" started a lO-second timer
hngulor velocity, yew whicl h upon its expiration, was supposed to
0 -t'¢.;;t%;:k_;%",,q:,l,JJ..-_.. ..- " _--"_Y signal separation if the spacecraft acceleration
was less than O.%g. (This sequencing was de-
-5 130 I35 sec. signed to minimize the occurrence of a space-
craft launch-vehicle reeontact. However, MR-1
FIGURE 4-11.--Second bending mode oscillations in yaw had settled on the pad before the tinier expired
toward end of MR-1A flight. and the g-switch sensing lg blocked the separa-
tion signal.)
The barostats properly sensed that the alti-
(7) During MR-1A, MR-2, and MR-BD,
tude was less than 10,000 ft and therefore ac-
undesirable vibrations in the adapter and in-
tuated the drogue, main, and reserve parachutes
strument compartment were evident. On MR-
in the proper sequence. The reserve parachute
3 these were dampened with 3-t0 pounds of
was released because no load was sensed on the
lead-impregnated plastic compound added to
the bulkhead and walls of the section. The main parachute load sensors. To prevent this
failure from recurring, engine pressure was
weight of this corn.pound was substituted for an
monitored and, if normal at 129.5 seconds, the
equal amount of ballast weight. Fourteen lon-
normal booster cut-off signal path to the space-
gitudinal stiffeners were also added to the
craft was armed.
internal skin surface. These improvements are
Following the MR-1 attempt, the spacecraft
depicted in figure 4-12. Since Astronaut
was refurbished and mated to a new launch ve-
Shepard still noted considerable vibrations dur-
hicle, scheduled to be launched as MR-1A. The
ing powered flight in MR-3, an additional 109
MR-1A space vehicle successfully accomplished
pounds of the dampening compound, X306,
the MR-1 mission objectives on December 19,
were added to the instrument compartment of
1960. The launch was slightly compromised by
MR-4. The summation of these changes re-
a scale-factor error in the longitudinal integrat-
sulted in the Mercury-Redstone shown in
ing accelerometer which caused cut-off velocity
figure 4-13.
to be ',?,960feet per second higher than normal.
Flight Results
This higher velocity caused the spacecraft to
Three qualification flights were conducted for experience somewhat higher reentry decelera-
the Mercury-Redstone flight series. MR-1 was tion. During the flight, all measured abort
launched on November 21, 1960. After rising a parameters remained below the limits and the
few inches, it settled vertically back on the abort system functioned as expected.
launcher. It proved the need for careful ex- MR-2, launched January 31, 1961, carried a
amination of electrical circuitry and led to the chimpanzee named "Ham." On this flight, the

77
Sta. Sta. Sta. Sta.
-15.00 :57.527 75.951 124.6319

, '1 ...... This area was coated as

_F'_" A J shown in section A- 4 ,

\\ 1
_-x I III Instrument comportment [_ /

,,)Ill -.. II It
",\ Ill I ',, I /I I i

i/ '\",\ _) \\

,,,, A \\ ' ..... Rear bulkhead

F: [:haerod -- - A' "\


"- .... Large access door

,'-""-----',---Indicates installation
of X306 dampening

111 . ..... Access door compound

Access door ...._ ,

Instrument panel .....


',. .... Access door (typical for three large instrument
compartment doors, all coated except for
area around doublers. The door coatings were
Section A-A not limited to area between Sta. 37.:527
and Sto. 73.951)

FIGURE 4-12.--Installation of dampening compound in instrument compartment and adapter section for Mercury-
Redstone 4 (MR-4).

thrust controller ran above nominal resulting in porated to eliminate the overspeed condition ex-
propellant depletion 0.5 second before abort perienced on MR-1A and MR-9. The filter net-
pressure sensor deactivation. The abort system work was intended to dampen the effect of the
was able to sense this early shutdown and abort- second bending mode frequency (6 to 10 cps)
ed the spacecraft. The above normal cut-off on the pitch and yaw loop. The flight went
velocity, combined with the thrust of the escape exactly as expected and proved the effectiveness
motor caused the spacecraft to land well beyond of this change.
the intended recovery area. The simple timing MR-3 was the first manned flight. With
changes explained previously were made to take Astronaut Alan Shepard as the pilot, the space-
care of higher propulsion system tolerances. craft lifted off at 9:34_ a.m.e.s.t, on May 5, 1961.
MR-BD was launched on March 94, 1961, to All objectives assigned to the launch vehicle
evaluate a filter network added in the launch were successfully accomplished and no system
vehicle control circuit and modifications incor- malfunction occurred. During powered flight,

78
the astronaut reported buffeting, ttowever,
Aerodynamic spike........¢:_ I
telemetry data indicated lower vibrations than
Escape rocket ............
I on earlier flights. To reduce these vibrations,
24 fl
additional dampening material was added to the
Escape tower ...........-_
instrument compartment prior to the remaining
V-band clamp (Three explosive flight.
bolts- duat ignition).
...... / _ .......
Spacecraft
Concluding the Mercury-Redstone program
Separation line -'-"_ ! was MR4 carrying Astronaut Virgil I. Gris-
Spacecraft--launch-vehicle-"" ------:--Ballast sore in the second manned suborbital space
adapter
.........
-- .-Vibrationdampening
material: flight. Again, all launch-vehicle sy s t e m s
Aft unit (Contains pr'_ssurized Lead filled plasticmixture
instrument compartment) worked properly and all objectives were
In ballost section and in-
Launch-vehicle airframe ...... side instrument comport- achieved. Improved vibration reports indi-
Standard Redstone with pro- ment
83 ft
cated that the additional dampening material
pellant tanks elongated 96"
for increased burning time Assembly weight added to the instrument compartment proved
Dry: 12,000 Ib
Lift-off: 66,000 Ib
effective.
The Mercury-Redstone flight program was
Propellants:
Alcohol (75 percent ethyl concluded on a positive note with the successful
otcohol_25 percent water)
Liquid oxygen
MR--4 mission on July 21, 1961. The first
_70%
manned flight into space had been accomplished
Fuel pressurization:
by MR-3 in just over 21/_ years from the pro-
Nitrogen
ject's initiation. The initial objectives of pro-
Model A-7 engine
viding space flight familiarization and training
Thrust: 78,000 Ib
Turbopump drive: cata- for astronauts had been accomplished. The
spacecraft was exposed briefly to space flight
_ ._ _lyzed hydrogen peroxide conditions. Of equal importance was the in-
.,._----Airrudders (4)
Jet vanes (4) .............. valuable training of the ground crew in the
preparation, launching, and the recovery of a
FIGURS 4-13.--Mercury-Redstone configuration. manned spacecraft.

79
5. MERCURY-ATLAS LAUNCH-VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT AND
PERFORMANCE

By LT. COLONEL C. L. GANDY, JR., Space Systems Division, U.S. Air Force; and MAJOR I. B. HANSON,
Space Systems Division, U.S. Air Force

_L]_ b//° Summary tories, and more recently the Aerospace Cor-
poration, for more specific systems engineering.
In this paper the overall Atlas launch-vehicle
The basic Atlas "D" system as it existed at
program in support of Project Mercury is dis-
the beginning of the program is described to
cussed. The paper includes the areas of both
provide a basis for the explanation of the
management and operations. Implications to
launch-vehicle modifications that were required
be drawn from the presentation are that sound
to support the mission. A brief description is
planning by experienced Air Force personnel
given of the problems that were associated with
early in the program ; strong top-level manage-
the individual launch-vehicle flights and the
ment support; great attention to engineering,
results of the postflight evaluations. A more
manufacturing, and operational detail; and
detailed postflight evaluation is given of the
strong individual motivation have been respon-
MA-9 flight.
sible for the success of this portion of Project
Mercury. The procedures used in the launch- Program Management
vehicle program were not conceived or prouml-
gated by any one individual overnight. Rather, During the mid-1950's, the U.S. Air Force
conducted a number of studies dealing with
they grew from the experience of many and
manned space flight. Many plans had been
were further shaped by the program itself as it
progressed. formulated and several of the programs had
Introduction reached a detailed development plan state
when, in August 1958, the President directed
This paper presents the management aspects the assignment of the man-in-space effort to the
of the launch-vehicle system in redirecting a National Ael'onautics and Space Administra-
ballistic-missile weapon system into a launch- t.ion. On October 7, 1958, the Space Task
vehicle system for manned space research. Group was organized at Langley Field, Vir-
Early agreements between the U.S. Air Force _nia, to manage the then established and later
and the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- named, Project Mercury.
ministration (NASA) established the program During the period from October 1958 until
responsibilities and identified the management April 1959, a series of meetings took place
interfaces. Specific guidelines were laid down between NASA and the Air Force Ballistic
by the Air Force Chief of Staff to provide ef- Missile Division to define the AFBMD support
fective support to NASA within the military required by the NASA-Space Task Group. The
framework of what was then known as the Air problems considered included: definition of the
Force Ballistic Missile Division. Definitive scope of NASA's effort, definition of laum'h-
policies were established to insure maximum vehicle requirements, definition of procurement
launch-vehicle safety for the pilots. The ini- I)rocedures, launch s('hedules, and launch fa-
tial overall Mercury systems engineering as it cilities. It is interesting to note that at the
affected the launch vehicle was performed by time of the first NASA visit to AFBMD on
U.S. Air Force/NASA technical panels and October 23, 1958, the proposed ])rogram envi-
then gradually shifted to the Air Force and its sioned over '25 flights using the Redstone, Thor
technical contractor, Space Technology Labora- or Jupiter, and Atlas launch vehicles. Space-

81
craft orbital weight was to be approximately panels established by NASA. Participants in
2,100 l_6unds for '_ 1'20 nautical-mile orbit. Ad- the panel work were drawn from various NASA
dition,_l meetings cuhninqted in the issuance to organizations, McDonnell, AFBMD, STL and
AFBMD of NASA Order HS-94 on Novombm- the Atla,_ manufacturer, General Dynamics/
23, 1958, which specifically requested that the Astronautics. One6 the initial problem areas
Air Force supply one "C" series Atlas to sup- had been defined, technical panels were sub-
port Project Mercury. The order specified that divided into working groups with specific tech-
this was the initial request of a proposed pro- nical areas assigned to assure that thorough
gram which would require approximately 13 treatment was given to all engineering prob-
boosters of the Atlas and Thor class. On De- lems. Through the medium of the technical
cember 8, 1958, AFBMD received NASA Order panels, basic trajectory conditions were devel-
HS-36 which requested nine "D" series Atlas oped. The launch-escape system concept was
boosters. Subsequent amendments to IIS-36 born and specific requirements were developed.
deleted tIS-24, changing the total requirements Reliability goals were established, and systems
to 10 Atlas "D" vehicles, later to 14 "D's," elimi- restraints were imposed. In order to imple-
nating the Thors. Further discussions between ment, in detqil, the general systems approach
the two agencies resulted in the agreement that developed through the technical panels, the Air
the Air Force would have full responsibility Force called upon STL to perform these tasks.
for the development, procurement, production It was necessary to institute a special systems
and launch of the Atlas vehicles for Project. eng'ineerino" and technical direction effort for
Mercury (see fig. 5-1). The final meeting of the Mercury/Atlas program, and the STL Mer-
this series was held between General Schriever, cury Project Office was established in the Fall of
then Commander AFBMD, and Dr. Glemmn, 195.9 m_der the direction of Mr. B. A. Hohmann.
Administrator of NASA, on April 7, 1959, in In the summer of 1960, when the Aerospace
Washington. The basic memorandum of under- Corporation was organized, the task was trans-
standing between NASA and the USAF grew ferred to this new organization. The majority
from this conference. of the STL Mercury office personnel transferred
A program office was established within the to Aerospace continued to perform their orig-
AFBMD to manage the l:mnch vehicle effort, inal jobs. The basic responsibilities of the sys-
and the services of the Space Technoloo'y La- tems engineering and technical direction group
boratories (STL) were requested within the were to develop the technical requirements, mon-
framework of the Atlas we'lpons system pro- itor the systems and launch,vehicle development,
gram to support Mercury. Specific guidelines provide trajectory calculations and guidance
were laid down by the Comm./nder of AFBMD equations, analyze both ground and flight-test
in order that maximmn responsiveness to results, assure production acceptability of the
NASA requirements could be assured. launch vehMe, assist in administering the pilot
The early systems engineering was accom- safety program, and provide systems integra-
plished within the framework of technical tion of the Atlas associate contractor's systems.

Support
1 I I I
Hardware Launch Systems Studies and Safety
development technical assistance program

• Modified series iComplex mad • Computer modification • Trajectory panel • ASIS reliability
requirement •Launch operation
"D"Atlos for real time data • ASIS background • Quality assurance
and additional
• Approved: booster-spacec raft • Booster-spacecraft • Factory roll-out
discrete Signals
14 boosters I countdown separation inspection
I• Powered flight • Abort sensing and
• Booster explosive • Flight safety review
implementation
• Orbital insertion effects
system
• Real-time data and

orbital equations

• Booster performance

FiouaE 5-1.--Space Systems Division support.

82
The Space Systems Division and the Aerospace and formally through the SSD program office.
Corporation program offices together were the The Atlas associate-contractor team consisted
focal point for detailed management of the of General Dynamics/Astronautics (GD/A)
launch vehicle program. Program require- who furnished the Atlas airframe and basic ve-
ments reached this level along a formal path hicle, Rocketdyne Division of North American
(see fig. 5-2) established from Headquarters Aviation (R/D) who furnished the propulsion
NASA to Headquarters USAF, to the Air system, General Electric (GE) who pro-
Force Systems Command (AFSC), to Space vided both the airborne and ground portions of
Systems Division (SSD), to the Deputy for the guidance system, and Burroughs Corpora-
Launch Vehicles (SSV) to the program offices. tion who provided the A-1 Computer for in-
A shorter and less forlnal but equally binding flight o'uidance in conjunction with the GE sys-
path existed from Manned Spacecraft Center tem. GD/A performed the launches at the At-
directly to the program offices. Direction re- lantic Missile Range (AMR) under the super-
ceived along' either path was translated by the vision of the 6555th Aerospace Test Wing, and
program office personnel into action items and the other contractors provided al)propriate
routed to the proper agency for accomplish- launch services. Other valuable members of the
ment. Contractual direction and configuration Atlas team were the Air Force's Western and
management were controlled by the SSD Pro- Eastern Contract Management Regions whose
gram Office originally through the Atlas Weap- personnel insured the contractors' compliance
ons System Program Office and later through with contract provisions and performed quality
the SSD Standard Launch Vehicle III (SLV control and teclmical inspection functions.
III) Office. Subsystem offices within SSD Early in the Mercury program, Major Gen-
were responsive to the Mercury launch vehicle eral O. J. Ritland, as Commander of B._ID rec-
program office in the areas of guidance and pro- ognized that a safety program should be insti-
pulsion systems. Technical direction was han- tuted to protect the ._Iel'cury pilot. Accord-
dled informally by direct contact between the ingly, he directed that studies be conducted to
Aerospace program office and the contractors determine what efforts were required to insure

I
U.S. Air Force i_ _ NASA Headquarters

Manned Spacecraft Center


changes
Or°gram I c°T°__

Air Force Systems Command

1Technical direction
Program
mani_emen,
1
Air Force .(support
/ ( spacecraft ) ( research ) of spacecraft test)
I McDonnell NASA Centers
Space System Division 1

Deputy Launch Vehicles

6555th Aerospace
Directorate of Mercury
Test Wing

General
I Technical
launch-vehicle

D ynomics/Astronaut
direction

ics
management
modification and flight

General Electric
÷
Rocketdyne
Launch-vehicle test support
of
Testing support
launch-vehicle flight

Burroughs

FIGURE 5-2.--Management responsibilities.

83
safe powered flight and to assure the program The second objective of assuring adequate
management that the launch vehicle was indeed safety would be met by providing reliability
ready for manned flight. This study resulted augmentation and by special test-site operations.
in tile Pilot Safety Program for Mercury-Atlas The abort sensing and implementation system
launch vehicles (see fig. 5-3), a program which (ASIS) was designed to bridge the gap be-
has dominated the management of the launch- tween the existing reliability of the launch-
vehicle portion of Project Mercury. vehicle and the near perfection required of a
The basic Objectives of tile program have been manned system. Tim ASIS was an automatic
to assure design reliability and adequate pilot system designed to sense an impending cata-
safety. Recognizing that the Atlas had been strophic failure and initiate spacecraft escape
desi_ed as a weapons system and had not been prior to the failure. The ASIS itself had to be
required to meet the reliability expected of a an extremely reliable system. Thi_ reliability
manned system, program personnel established was obtained first through a design based upon
these objectives. The first was to be met redundant sensors and circuitry. Then rigid de-
through quality of production and end-product sign reviews, stringent ground testing, and
excellence. The quality of production would finally flight testing were conducted for the
be assured through education and motivation of system.
all personnel associated with manufacture of the The special test-site operations started with
hardware, through special component selection unique Mercury handling procedures for the
and marking procedures, and through special launch vehicle and a requirement that complete
handling techniques. End-product excellence documentation be maintained on all prelauneh
could be assured by requiring that no shortages operations. The documentation, in tm_, led
would be tolerated at the time of launch-vehicle to assurance that the vehicle was indeed flight
acceptance, and that the vehicle must be com- ready upon completion of the required pre-
plete and up to date with no provisions for field launch testing. The flight readiness was certi-
modifications. This assurance would be gained fied by the Mercury-Atlas Flight Safety Review
by me,ms of '/ detqiled and highly critical fac- Board. This board was established as a high-
tory roll-out inspection. The inspection would level Air Force and Aerospace board chaired
be conducted by experienced and well qualified for all manned flights by the Commander, SSD.
personnel from both the Aerospace and SSD
program offices. NASA observation was Basic Atlas Description
invited.
At the time of the original NASA order for
Quality assurance Mercury-Atlas launch vehicles in the fall of
1958, the V.S. Air Force development flight
• Education of personnel
Assure / • Component selection test program was principally concerned with
s'al n / • Special marking and handling
de • Additional reliability testing the Atlas "C" model. The "D" model (see fig.
5-4) which was scheduled to begin testing in
1959, was considered the operational system and
/
/ End
prod0
e ct ,ence
• Factory rollout inspection
was therefore selected as the most suitable for
Objectives (k • No shortages '
use as the Mercury launch vehicle. The fol-
\ Reliability augmentation
lowing paragraphs give a general description
Assure / system (ASIS) of the basic Atlas "D" vehicle from which the
\ _ Design and development
launch vehicle for the Mercury spacecraft was
phor • Flight testing
. developed.
The Atlas launch vehicle comprises of two
_Test site operations (AMR)
main sections, the body or sustainer section and
• Special test and handling
procedures the aft or booster-engine section. The booster-
• Complete documentation
• Flight readiness determination engine section is connected to the sustainer
• Flight safety review board thrust ring by a mechanical system which per-
decision
mits separation. The Atlas is considered a N/2-
FIGURE5-3.--Pilot-safety program. stage missile in that only the boost engines and

84
associated hardwarearejettisonedat the com- ciatedequipmentand subsystems is gimbal-
pletionof thefirststageof firing. mountedto the sustainerthrust conewhichis
The sustainersectionis madeup of a thin the aft endof the fuel tank. Vernier engine
wall, fully monocoque structurepressurevessel thrust chambersare gimbal-mountedon op-
andderivesits rigidity from internalpressuri- positesidesof thestructureat theextremeaft
zation. The sustainerbodyis a weldedstruc- end of the cylindrical portion of the tank.
ture of corrosion-resistant stainless-steel
sheets Equipmentpodscontainingelectronicandelec-
varying in thicknessfrom 0.048inchto 0.015 trical unit.sare attachedto the tank skin 90°
inch. The tank is approximately50 feet in aroundthe tank from the verniers.
length. The forward endconsistsof a thin Theaft sectionor booster-engine sectioncon-
domeon whichtheliquid oxygenboil-offvalve sistsof two boosterengines, structure,andas-
is mounted.The baseof the domeis joinedto sociated equipment.It isattached to thethrust
the first skin of a conicalsectionwhoseupper ring at the aft endof the tank sectionby a
diameteris approximately70 inches. The mechanism which releasesit for separation.
conicalsectionjoins a cylindrical section10 Themotionof this sectionis controlledduring
feetin diameter. The lowerendof the tank separationby jettison tracks. A radiation
is conical,taperingto a point. A hemispheri- shieldprotectsthe aft sectionfrom the heat
caldiaphrag_m calledtheintermediate bulkhead radiatedfromthe engineexhaust.
dividesthe tank into a forward sectionfor Thepropulsionsystemconsistsof a Rocket-
liquid oxygenand an aft sectionfor RP-1 dyneMA-'2 rocket-engine group madeup of
fuel. A thrustringjoinstheconicalaft section two mainassemblies: the boostersection(see
tothecylindricalportionofthetank. Annular fig.5-5)consistingof two boosterengineshav-
bafflesin thetanksserveto dampenpropellant ing 154,000 poundsof thrusteachandthe sus-
sloshing. The sustainerenginewith its asso- tainer-verniergroup(seefig.5-6)consistingof

Lax tank .... _


I Electrical and

...... plumbing fairing

i Lax tank
---4 .....
pressurization line Rate gyro .....

/--Upper equipment pod ,---Heat mield


/ Y,,
Booster engine --.
Insulation

bulkhead "'-. ._o Intermediate bulkhead--.


(:illS: r c_::bn:r__;_
Fuel tonk--_
Lower
,P/
X ,' o
(stub)---,,
Fuel fill
pod _ o/ _ Ground service
and drain ...... -._ i---
/ engine
"---disconnects t
Sustainer engine___, / '_
/
lhrust chamber "' _ Vernier
--Lax line ,'" /

L_. Booster
thrust
engine
chamber
.... ,/
/ II I I
¥ ii

Shock absorber

View looking forward fitting

Stabilizing _j'

fitting

Booster engine turbine__,


exaust duct
....... Sustainer engine turbine gairin and thrust
exhaust duct
structure

FZGURE 7_-4.--Three-view drawing of basic Atlas configuration.

85
_i_i_1_i_11_1_1_1_]11_1_i_i1_iL_1_i_

I_Bo°ster m
disconnects _ Close

Gas generator Oxidizer Ref_ _ce


pressure -_ --pre 'e
9f
regulator

Mainstage
valve
Pressure

_--regulotor, 750 ps[

Helium supply
\ (from sustainer

_i helium supply)-i;
//

Helium supply, j
57 psi

Helium inlet, 5,000 psi -,,,

Helium outlet---, /
Open
z_l Main oxidizer
"_" valve

Hypergolic
cartndge

Fuel igniter _ Fuel igniter-',


valve ._-- Close _ I_ valve

Main fuel valve ---'


Open

] Breakaway valve _ Pressure switch

® Orifice [_ Bleed and back pre.ssure valve

Check valve _ Pneumatic

CVAC to GFAE ttrrr_ Lube oil


connection
Fill and check valve m'rrrrrm Oxidizer

Relief valve _ Hydraulic Booster

Filter _ Fuel

FIGURE 5--5.--Propulsion system for booster engines.

86
oxidizer
To missiletank _llllllllllglllllllllll ir_
Pressure
To missile
regulator
fuel tank

Helium supply 3pO0


VE ignition
engine tank 3xidizer vent to overboard ....
valves

"-. Propellant .--"


.... valve ....

actuated
_essurizmg valve

Vernier

HS servo---_

--PU serve

Hydraulic ,," Hydraulic press./


Hydraulic accumulator _000 psi
control manifold
GN 2 charge;

Pressurizing valve'" Helium, 57psi-

Lube
" tank

Oxidizer
.--pressure
/ regulator Reference

i F'-pressure
regulator

Helium, _000 psi


/

Igniter valve ..... ,,,

Head suppr
valve

J
• "-'-- PU valve Gas generator

Overboard drain lines

Susta.iner
engine Sustoiner

FIGUR_ 5-6.--Propulsion system for sustainer engines.

87
one sustainer engine having 57,000 pounds of for steering only after the booster engines have
thrust and two vernier engines having 1,000 been shut down. The sustainer is operated
pounds of thrust each. All are single-start, throughout the flight and is at full thrust at
fixed=thrust rocket engines utilizing liquid lift-off.
oxygen and a liquid hydrocarbon fuel (RP-1) The vernier engines are installed on the aft
as propellants. airframe in two separate units. Propellants
The booster engine is composed of two identi- for starting the vernier engines are provided by
cal thrust chambers and a power package. Two pressurized start tanks and are supplied by the
dual turbopmnps in the power package deliver sustainer turbopump for the remainder of the
the propellants under high pressure to the flight. The thrust chamber is double walled
thrust chamber. The turbopmnps are driven and also contains fuel for cooling of the thrust
by high-speed turbines, energized by high- chamber walls. The vernier engines provide
velocity gas supplied by a single gas generator. roll control throughout flight; pitch and yaw
The power package also includes the hydraulic control during staging; and pitch, roll, and yaw
pump used for lubrication of the turbopump during the vernier solo phase during flights in
gears. The booster gas generator consists of which this phase of operation is utilized. Mer-
a spherical comlmstion chamber and an exhaust cury-Atlas vehicles do not have a vernier solo
manifold. After start, liquid oxygen and fuel period. The chamber can be moved through an
are supplied to the combustion chamber under arc of approximately 140 ° in pitch and 50 ° in
pressures developed by the turbopump. The yaw.
combustion gases are routed to the turbopump The automatic start sequence of the rocket
turbine wheels by the exhaust manifold after engines is accomplished by initiating propellant
which the gases pass through the heat ex- flows into the thrust chambers, the firing of
changer to heat and expand helium for vehicle- igniters, and the burning through of i_liter de-
system pressurization and then are vented tector links. These must be accomplished in the
overboard. High-pressure propellants exiting proper sequence and total time, or automatic
from the turbopumps are routed through valves shutdown of the engine will occur.
which control the flow of propellants to the fuel A propellant utilization system shown in fig-
manifold and oxidizer dome. The two thrust ure 5-7 is used to effect emptying of the pro-
chambers are bell shaped and made up of tubes pellant tanks as nearly simultaneously as pos-
running lengthwise from the top of the chamber sible. This subsystem continuously senses the
to the bottom of the skirt. Fuel is routed mass of the propellants remaining in the tanks
through these tubes to cool the chamber walls. and computes the error resulting from a com-
A pyrotechnic igniter initiates combustion of parison of the mass ratio of the remaining pro-
the fuel-oxidizer mixture. Thrust loads are pellants with a nominal mixture ratio. This
transmitted to the missile through gimbal error signal then adjusts the rate of fuel flow by
mounts on each chamber allowing the chambers repositioning the sustainer-engine fuel-control
to be swiveled a maximum of 5 ° in pitch and valve to allow the burning of more or less fuel
yaw about the vehicle centerline. in order that the required mass ratio can be
The sustainer engine is gimbal mounted to maintained. This assembly is made up of two
the thrust cone of the fuel tank. The assembly manometers, each enclosing a mandrel coated
is similar to that of the booster engines. The with a dielectric material, and a computer-
sustainer engine dual turbopump supplies pro- comparator. The unit senses the propellant
pellants to the vernier engine in addition to the masses by functioning as a variable capacitor
sustainer engine. The sustainer engine fuel- by area contact with a column of mercury bal-
lox mixture is continuously controlled during anced against the liquid-propellant head in each
flight by the Propellant Utilization Subsystem tank. The mandrels are shaped in such a way
(PU) in order to maintain optimum mass ratio that the capacitance is analogous to the mass of
of the propellants and thus reduce unusable propellant remaining in each tank.
residuals to a minimum. The sustainer engine The airborne pneumatic system provides the
gimballing is controlled in pitch and yaw within structural rigidity for the main propellant
an arc of -----3°. The sustainer engine is used tanks and also provides the necessary head to

88
Surge
tank

Surge

Fuel
manometer

I_ I assembly
detector I"
I I
I i -- U91V

valve
I
Feedback
controller
ml
assembly Jl Computer
I comparator

I I canister
i J

Hydraulic
P528D PU servo control control
valve package

i Hydraulic
pressure

I Open
HS servo J "_---'_ 'l
control valve
[
_e *-- Close

_jt
PS29D
Lax i
/
nsing J

Jne J -
thTru°st
Fuel thrust
chamber
1, I Lax
chamber
HS Valve
Fuel sensing line

Sustainer thrust chamber

FIGURE5-7.--Propellant utilization system.

707-056 0---63--7 89
Mercury poppet-type H Orifice
lax boiloff valve
• Instrumentation location

r_ Check valve (showing direction of flow)


atmosphere

_ Motor-operated valve

Vent to _ E_ Disconnect
All disconnects except
LN:_, incorporate spnng

Ioaoed poppets (Physically in


_Controls system fuel

Jel tank)

Lax

tan k

F
/
Main start

system and
Relief vernier propellant
valve valve control

| 1 manifold

I LOX
I recju

Fue I
tank
Ube otl tank

Helium to
pressurize
sustainer
J hydraulic
surizing valve

k k, reservoir

[_-
_-_OOOps,gseporationbo.
#_::c,_:_,
e_=_ •

_1
, .'

_
. _:_ _i_ i iii_i_

/
;_, booster
Y ..
/ I-lelium to
r_ _| Separat on
======_=_==_=_=_=_=_=_=_====_===_==_=_=_====._===__ system / pre ssu re booster
_._i_ Explosive fittings J hydraulic tank

_leed valve I '--'7, and lube o,I

vCal_:: Sensing njj_j_J _ tank

_ Fuel I I
ton k
_ _ regulator JJ
I .... J'L_. - ......
_] I I r:.--"..'-.-': "_, LN2 shroud

,' _, ,' ",,_ _,


l | I II I

:%;;:_;_:_%i!__. : : '',
_'_'..............
ii_ B ter _':_
_i_' o.25 " ,Lc-_I _ ,_, _ ll g
e rle bypass
|ii_ co, ,_s _ !1 II orifice q_A- I I-7- "_, /7" "_, II
[_m,o,d
N _ I_ II :'( /:':'( /_1

engine

"eot_r,.r
_V I II II
Booster Lift off line Quick disconnect
-| Booster __ I___ Lift off line --E_-- -- E_ ....

launcher Helium fill line Helium fill line LN fill and drain line
O"

F_GURE 5-8.--Pneumatic system.

9O
prevent the turbopumps from cavitating at low power from external to internal. The position
acceleration levels. This pneumatic system, of this switch is manually selected in the launch
presented schematically in figure 5-8, is used control blockhouse. The main battery is a re-
throughout the missile for control, reservoirs, motely activated unit consisting of 20 silver
lubricant tanks and the pressurization of the zinc cells connected in series and housed in a
vernier engine propellant tanks. The pneu.- sealed canister. The inverter is a rotary-type
matic system also provides the actuation force inverter using a magnetic amplifier voltage and
for the first stage separation latches. The pres- frequency regulator and associated noise filters.
surization medium is helium, and liquid nitro- The inverter is three phase-WYE connected.
gen is used to refrigerate the vehicle borne he- The flight control subsystem consists of a
lium supply during the prelaunch phase of the flight programer, an autopilot, and 10 gimbaled
countdown. Five spherical titanium storage thrust-chamber actuator assemblies. The sub-
vessels are used for the primary supply and are system stabilizes and steers the vehicle along the
jettisioned with the booster section at staging. desired flight path by controlling the direction
The control helium bottle is retained with the of the engine thrust vectors. Steering com-
sustainer section and provides control pressure mands are generated on the onboard flight pro-
for the sustainer section. Tank pressurization gramer during the boost phase. Shortly after
is maintained by helium throughout booster- first-stage separation, the airborne portion of
engine operation only. After first stage separa- the guidance subsystem is enabled to provide
tion, no helium is required since oxidizer vapori- steering commands to the autopilot for the re-
zation will keep the pressure in the oxidizer tank mainder of the sustainer phase. The autopilot
above the allowable minimum limits, and main (see fig. 5-10) consists of a gyro package, a servo
fuel-tank pressure decay will not reduce this amplifier package, a programer, an excitation
pressure beyond the minimum of allowable transformer, and engine-position feed-back
limits throughout the remainder of the flight. transducers. On the standard Atlas "D", the
A liquid-oxygen tank boil-off valve is used to main gyro package is located at station 991 and
maintain proper cryogenic conditions of lax contains thr_,e rate gyros, three displacement
during tanking and holds. gTros, and associated electronic equipment. The
The electrical subsystem (see fig. 5-9) is com- programer is a transistorized electrical timing
posed of a 98 v d-c main missile battery and a device which controls the various flight sequen-
115 v d-c three-phase 400 cps inverter. Battery tial functions such as roll and pitch programs,
power is provided to the inverter, propulsion staging filter changes, guidance enable, and so
subsystem, flight control subsystem, propellant fo_h throughout the entire flight. The pro-
utilization system and abort sensing and imple- gramer has two major sequences, the first of
mentation system (ASIS). A power change- which is initiated at 9-inch motion of the mis-
over switch is used to transfer both a-c and d-c sile and the second at receipt of the staging
command from the ground-based portion of the
guidance subsystem. The servo-amplifier pack-
[
Guidance
(MOD m)
I age provides the integrating circuits and in-
cludes the necessary filters to insure proper
E51V
ESOQ
Azuso I
flight attitudes and rates.
The guidance subsystem (see fig. 5-11) con-
switch assembly
Power changeover
GD/A
PU I
sists of the ground-based General Electric Mad
I
I Mercury
ASIS I III-A X-band radar system, the Burroughs
I
A-1 computer system, and the airborne General
I
I

E28V
:1 '' I Electric Mad III-A guidance group. The Mad
III system consists of a position-tracking radar
_:round I missile
subsystem which determines the position vec-
tor of the missile with respect to the guidance B

------ A Iternat.ing current station, plus a rate subsystem, which by Dop-


-- Direct current
pler techniques measures the missile velocity.
Fzov_J_ 5--9.--Electrical system. In addition, the tracking radar serves as a data

91
Pitch

guidance
package
J Guidance Yaw

l 1
Yaw
:::1- Vernier I yaw
guidance
commands :C3L_ Vernier 2 yaw

"-'x Susfainer yaw

Main gyro Roll ---z Booster I yow/+roll


Pitch
Package Booster 2 yaw/-roll
Roll
--x Vernier 2 pitch/+rol
Servo-amp
package "--,s Vernier I pitch/-roll
Programer
package Pitch Booster I pitch

-'-x Booster 2 pitch

"---I Sustainer pitch

rates]rates/rates
/

Forward gyro
package

Hydraulic controller
with transducer feedback

FIeURE 5-10.--Flight control system.

Rate disable
I Although
not require
weapon-system
telemetery transmission,
Atlas
research
vehicles do

Beaco ':e:'seI [con


;coder _-
and development vehicles have such a require-
meat. Two telemetry subsystems were used on
Mercury flights. The standard subsystem was
t used on flights through MA4 (Atlas 88D).

C-W X
C-W

1
land

/ opilot F
Subsequent
etry subsystem
flights utilized

Two additional
a lightweight
(see fig. 5-19) which will be de-
scribed in the next section.
systems are installed
telem-

for the
use of range safety personnel. The first is the
R range safety command system which receives,
Track Azimuth
Range g
decodes, and activates the arming, engine shut-
Istem _ e
system Elevation
m, Burroughs down, and destruct functions. The other sys-
_, Commands
tem is the Azfisa radio tracking system which
Range rate Computer
monitors launch vehicle space position and
Angular rates velocity. The Azusa system data are sent to
the Atlantic Missile Range IBM 7090 computer
which continuously predicts the instantaneous
FmvnE 5-11.--Guidance system, MOD III.
impact point (IIP) of the launch vehicle.

link to provide operational commands to the Atlas Modifications For Mercury


missile-borne equipment. Position and rate
data from the radar are transmitted to the Bur- The Atlas "D" vehicle had been chosen for
roughs A-1 computer for processing in accord- the task of launching Mercury on the basis of
ance with the guidance equations. The com- its being the most reliable launch vehicle avail-
puter generates corrective commands which are able with the requisite performance dui_ng the
then fed back into the radar to be transmitted time period of the program. It was not possi-
as steering si_o_nals to the launch vehicle. ble ,to start at that point to design a "man-

92
Antenna Antenna r--InsuMtion bulkheat removed

\7 X7
iI
Light weight--_ i --Oelete Atlas
telerneh:y ', _ // ret rorockets

"Square"---. ';\ _ // r--Add forward


outop at ',, j t rate gyro pod
', , ri / ]

Baffled Abort sensing--. ",, \ _ '/ ] p--Skin gauge


• . -'--_. syS em(AS B ",, ', ', / /' " change
in eclor \-. ,, \ /. / i'

. I Co.p,erI-
• , ,""-I'C" type IOX
." :--Ke[ F hner '_--Delete vernier ' boil-off valve
" solo '"
'--':Wet start" '-Add insulation 1o

configuration forward bulkhead

FIGUaE 5-13.--Launch-vehicle modifications for "


Mercury.

pilot rate gyro package in a position considera-


bly ahead of that used on the standard Atlas
"D". This addition was dictated by the longer
Mercury payload and its effect on the flexible
Atlas tank during flight. The modification
provided optinmm attitude rate sensing with
J Batt
data
System
paints resulting minimum engine deflections for more
efficient performance of the launch vehicle.
FIOURE 5--12.--Lightweight telemetry system.
The standard rate gTro installation was re-
rated" vehicle to perform the Mercury flights tained for abort system sensing.
without several years' delay to the program. Additional changes in this category in('lude
Therefore, to capitalize on the reliability in- the deletion of the vernier solo phase of opera-
herent in the basic design of the vehicle which tion and relocation of the retrorockets from the
had been demonstrated in Atlas development launch vehicle to the spacecraft for use as post-
flight tests, a ground rule of the booster pro- grade rocket motors. In the vernier solo mode
gram was to make a minimum number of of operation the vernier engines remain in oper-
changes to the launch vehicle. Only those ation after sustainer engine cut-off, which al-
changes necessary to adapt the vehicle to the lows very delicate adjustments to vehicle
requirements of the Mercury mission or those velocity. Deletion of this mode permitted a
required to improve the safety of the vehicle reduction in weight and mission complexity
for manned flight would be authorized. As with a resultant iml)rovement in performance
with any development pro_oTam, flight-test ex- and relial)ility. Relocation of the retrorockets
perience established the need for incorporation was feasible since the Mercury spacecraft was
of additional modifications with the major pur- lighter and the posigrade rockets would thus
pose being the enhancement of reliability and be more efficient in separating the spacecraft
pilot safety. It should be reco_fized, however, from the launch vehicle. The standard Atlas
that an extremely conservative approach was used these retrorockets to "l)ack off" the launch

taken with regard to such changes. Modifica- vehicle from the payload. This relocation of the
tions required extensive ground testing, and no Atlas retrorockets to the spacecraft retropack
critical modification to be used in a manned required that the thin skin of the lox dome be
flight was incorporated until it had been suc- protected from the rocket exhaust. This was
cessfully flown on at. least one other Atlas. The aceoml>lished by developin_ a fibero'lass shield
following paragraphs describe the major sys- that attached to the mating ring and covered
tem modifications incorporated in Mercury- the entire dome. A wet-start technique was also
Atlas launch vehicles. These changes are incorporated in the engine startino' sequence to
shown schematically in figure 5-13. minimize starting transients. Another change
In the first category of changes required by required for the Mercury mission affected the
the Mercury mission, one of the most important guidance system. Because the trajectory of the
of the changes was the addition of a new auto- Mercury-Atlas flight differed greatly from that

93
of the weapon system vehicles, new gnidance measure of safety in that if the abort sensing
antennas were required to insure maximum sig- system failed in itself, the loss of power to the
nal strength throughout powered flight. Ex- spacecraft would also cause an abort. This sys-
tensive theoretical and model work was re- tem was developed at GD/A under the direction
quired to develop antennas which would have of the Air Force and its systems engineering
suitable radiation patterns. contractor and with the coordination of the
By far the most important change made to NASA Manned Spacecraft Center group. This
the Atlas in support of Project Mercury was subsystem with its sensors was flown "piggy-
the development and installation of an entirely back" on Atlas research and development ve-
new system, the Abort Sensing and Implemen- hicles prior to the first Mercury-Atlas flight at
tation System (ASIS). This system was de- which time it was flown in the open-loop con-
signed to bridge the gap between the admittedly figuration. The first closed-loop flight of this
less than perfect reliability of the basic Atlas system was the MA-3 mission. The flight very
weapon system design, and that near-perfect successfully demonstrated the capability of the
reliability desirable for a manned flight system. ASIS when the launch vehicle was destroyed by
From a very searching and thorough analysis of the range safety officer. The ASIS satisfac-
Atlas flight data, it was seen that certain missile torily sign.aled an abort to the spacecraft in
parameters deviated from a norm sufficiently sufficient time to permit adequate separation of
ahead of catastrophic failure to be used as the spacecraft from the Atlas explosion.
warnings. It, was decided to develop an ex- To provide additional safety measures with
tremely reliable automatic system to monitor the automatic abort, commanded abort, and
these parameters and to signal the spacecraft range safety command destruct, a 3-second de-
escape system when a catastrophe was im- lay was incorporated between the signal that
minent. commanded en_ne shutdown and the signal
The parameters that were considered the most that i_mited the destruct package on the launch
significant for abort indications (see fig. 5-14) vehicle. With this change, the launch vehicle
could not be destroyed by command for a period
t-Sustainer hydraulic /---Lax tank of 3 seconds after the engines were shut down.
/ pressure / pressure
This delay was incorporated to provide ade-
/ Spocecro_
Booster ond'L.l--"'_ 2-"rr- ---_ / / quate separation of the spacecraft from the
sustainer ] _1_-_= z//] "X
,ue,,o,ect,onE
N. e, ) Lo, launch vehicle prior to a command destruct. To
pressures a_ //_/_-
z
/=_
_ Launch-vehicle--
provide protection to the launch area, a lockout
Abort sensing and J // / spacecraft was incorporated from lift-off to 30 seconds that
implementation canister / / / electrical continuity prevented an abort command from signaling
Launch vehicle a-c_ z--Control rate
Bulkhead differential / gyros
engine shutdown. The spacecraft launch-
pressure switch L Backup rate escape motor had sufficient thrust to provide
gyros adequate separation from the Atlas during this
FIGUaE 5-14.--Abort system sensors for Mercury-Atlas
period. Immediately after the failure of the
launch vehicle. MA-1 (Atlas 50D) mission, a special board was
convened to investigate the cause of the failure.
were the liquid oxygen tank pressure, the dif- A number of separate phases of investigation
ferential pressure across the intermediate bulk- were performed under the direction of the
head, the missile attitude rates about all three board. These included extensive analyses by
axes, rocket-engine injector manifold pressures, Aerospace and GD/A of the thermal environ-
sustainer hydraulic pressure, and the launch- ment, discontinuity stresses, and aerodynamic
vehicle a-c power. Dual sensors for each of loads. Wind-tunnel tests were performed to
these parameters were incorporated into the gain more knowledffe of the aerodynamic condi-
Atlas system and operation outside a prede- tions imposed on the total flight vehicle in the
termined tolerance band then caused the ASIS transonic and maximum dynamic-pressure
to drop out the 28 volt power being supplied to reEions. Analyses conducted by NASA Space
the catastrophic failure detection relays. This Task Group personnel indicated the possibility
drop-out of voltage provided an additional of concentrated loads being introduced into the

94
Atlas through the forward structural ring as practicable. This system was first flown on
which mated with the spacecraft adapter. None launch vehicle 100D.
of the investigations or analyses were able to Normal cut-off of the sustainer and vernier
pinpoint the exact cause of the initial failure of engines is initiated by a discrete signal from
the vehicle, but there was no question of the fact the Burroughs computer to the ground guidance
that the failure had occurred in the area of the station. The ground guidance station then re-
forward lox tank and the spacecraft adapter. transmits this signal to the airborne decoder
Because of the failure of MA-1 in July 1960 which in turn signals engine shutdown. A
and the successful flight from a structural partially redundant path for the sustainer-en-
standpoint of Big Joe I (10D) in September gine cut-off (SECO) discrete transmission was
1959, a coordinated decision was made by BMD developed early in the program. This path en-
and NASA to increase the thickness of the four abled the Burroughs computer to forward the
forward skins of the Atlas lox tank on future si_qml to the launch vehicle through the range
Mercury-Atlas launch vehicles to approxi- safety command transmitter, to the airborne re-
mately the same dimensions as those on 10D. ceiver and then to the engine relay control.
At the same time it was agreed that the space- This path was not wholly redundant because
craft adapter Would be stiffened. In order to no duplication existed in the computer func-
fly the MA-2 mission with Atlas 67D, a thin- tion for generating the SECO time; therefore,
skinned vehicle, without undue delay a tempo- a single failure mode still remained. As a re-
rary modification was'made. A stainless steel sult, discussions with the AMR range personnel
reinforcing band was installed about the lower brought out the capability of the Azusa system
flange of the mating structure (Station 502 to proQde a completely redundant SECO dis-
ring) and.the first skin aft. crete sign,-d. The Azusa system in conjunction
Early in the Mercury program, it was decided with the IP 7090 computer continuously com-
to incorporate the electronic "square" autopilot puted the instantaneous launch-vehicle impact
in place of the electromechanical "round" auto- ,l_oint (IIP) for Range Safety purposes.
pilot. The reason for selecting the relatively With certain modifications to the IP 7090 pro-
new electronic system over the proven round gram it was possible to obtain the time at which
autopilot was to obtain improved reliability, im- orbital velocity was attained. This time was
proved maintainability due to modular plug in provided electrically by land line to the NASA
packaging, much increased flexibility to allow Flight Director. The Flight Director used this
for most types of mission changes, and ease of signal as a backup in the event of a failure or
manufacturing by eliminating much of the hid- malfunction of the Mod III guidance system.
den, point-to-point wiring, and the mechanical This backup SECO system was susceptible to
setup of the programer. The improved relia- guidance noise; therefore, it was discontinued
bility was a result of including such design after the MA-8 mission.
features as electronic switching in place of The SECO discrete transmitted to the launch
mechanical switching, electronic integration in vehicle through the range safety command sys-
place of electromechanical integration, and im- tem as described above, was originally tied to
proved circuit board design. the output of the guidance decoder which ob-
Initial flight testing in the Atlas program tained a SECO discrete through the guidance
was accomplished by using an early type of tele- system. Both SECO signals used the same
metry system. The weight and power require- path from the guidance decoder and the range
ments to operate the early system were high, safety command receiver to the engine shut-
and oscillator stability degraded over a short down relays. Additional engineering was re-
operating time span. A transistorized, light- quired to reroute the signal to provide a
weight system was developed by GD/A to sup- completely redundant path.
port the Centaur flight test programs and ap- It is pointed out later in the paper that a
peared to be well suited to the Mercury program problem was discovered with the guidance sys-
(fig. 5-12). NASA requested the Air Force to tem at low antenna elevation angles. After a
incorporate the new lightweight system as soon thorough study of the hardware involved, it

95
was concluded that the excessive noise in re- curred. Again, a thorough ground and flight
ceived signals was cyclic in nature and was test program was I_equired before installation on
caused by all as yet muletermined atmospheric Mercury-Atlas launch vehicles. Another modi-
phenomenon. To reduce the effect of the noise fication provided redundancy in the electrical
ill the over-all guidance loop, first the guidance portion of the propulsion system to insure en-
equations were modified to provide ,idditional gine shutdown at SECO. Action was taken also
smoothing, and second, the rate station base legs to reroute electrical circuitry to insure proper
were increased from 2,000 to 6,000 feet. Al- valve sequencing during start in the high-pres-
though the latter modification did not reduce sure liquid oxygen plumbing.
the actual noise being received, the deleterious Auother major modification was nmde to the
effect of the noise on the received signals was booster engine turbopnmps. Flight and com-
reduced by approximately 3 to 1. The third ponent testing experience show that incidents
and more complex phase of the study was the had occurred where the lox pump impeller had
development of a mathematical model of the rubbed against the inlet adapter of the pump.
noise to permit a more detailed analysis of the This rubbing caused sufficient heat to ignite the
trajectory equation changes that were necessary lox and in some eases cause an explosion in the
to minimize this effect. These changes were turbopump. Extensive analyses and tests could
made to the guidance equations and used on the not pinpoint the exact cause for rubbing; how-
MA-9 mission. ever, the effect of the rubbing could be elimi-
A fuel tanking test that was being accom- nated by lining the inlet adapter with a plastic
plished between the first and second launch at- material. Months of component and system
tempts of the MA-6 mission brought out a prob- testing and engineering review were required to
lem that necessitated a major airframe change. provide positive assurance of the suitability of
The plastic foam material that is used for insu- this modification.
lating the base of the liquid oxygen tank from Limited changes were made to the pneumatic
the fuel tank is contained between two hemi- system specifically for Mercury. Considerable
spherical bulkheads which separate the lox and effort was expended however on analyzing tank
fuel. A more detailed description of this prob- pressure oscillation that occurs during lift-off
lem is contained in a description of the MA-6 under certain payload conditions. The neces-
mission. The limited need for the insulation sary precautions were taken tmtil this problem
material coupled with the undesirable feature was resolved. To resolve the entire problem a
of removing the bulkhead in the field indicated complex computer model was developed to rep-
the need for eliminating the insulation bulkhead resent the dynamic conditions existing in the
from all future Mercury vehicles. A change in pneumatic system and structure of the Mercury-
the production line stopped further installations Atlas vehicle. It was found at the conehsion
of this material. of the study that earlier characteristics of the
A major modification in the propulsion sys- helium regulator which controls pressurization
tem was required to eliminate the possibility of gas to the oxidizer tank tended to drive the sys-
combustion instability. Early in the Atlas pro- tem into a resonant condition. The new regula-
gTam, it was found through flight test experi- tor that was used with Mercury did not have
ence that combustion instability in the booster the unstable characteristics: therefore, flight
engines could cause catastrophic failure of the restrictions were removed.
entire missile. The probability of the occur- The propellant utilization (PU) system was
rence was low ; however, the need for maximum modified to insure an outage of lox rather than
safety in the manned space program dictated fuel in the event abnormal flight characteristics
the need for corrective action. Initially, rough caused the vehicle to expend the total propel-
combustion monitors were incorporated and the lant. Early studies had indicated that a safer
Atlas was held down for an additional period of engine shutdown would be possible in this pro-
time, to allow sensing of the engine vibration pellant depletion shutdown case if the lox sup-
characteristics. A rough combustion cut-off ply was the first to be consumed. The PU
(RCC) system then would automatically shut system normally monitors the propellant levels
down the engine if combustion instabilities oc- to maintain the proper ratio of onboard pro-

96
pellants. For the Mercury-Atlasthe syste_n Flight Test Summary
wasmodifiedto drive the mixtureratio to the Big Joe
lox-rich conditionat 10seconds prior to SECO
to reduce.theratio of lox to fuel. Morerecent- The first Mercury-Atlas launch was that of
Big Joe 1, Atlas number 10D, on September 9.
ly, arevisedmethodofcalibrationandaslightly
1959. Atlas 10D was built originally as an
modifiedmandrelhavebeendeveloped to pro-
R and I) vehicle but had received the initial
vide a moreaccuratemethodof maintaining
Mercury modifications. The payload was a
properpropellantratios.
boilerplate spacecraft. The purposes of the
A normal phenomenon associated with the
flight were to test the spacecraft's ablative heat
Atlasvehicleisaroll oscillationthatoccurswith
the missileas the vehiclebecomes free of the shield, afterbody heating, reentry dynamics,
attitude control and recovery capability.
launchermechanism.Ordinarilythis roll is of
Two flight readiness firings (FRF) were per-
smallmagnitude,andquicklycorrectedasthe
formed on Big Joe 1. The first, on September
autopilot is enabled.A reviewof flight test
1, 1959, ended immediately after T-0 because
history showedthat certainvehiclesweredis-
the ignition stage delay timer commanded shut-
placedat roll rateswhichapproached the abort
threshold established "for the ASIS in roll. down of the rocket engines when neither sus-
tainer nor main engine ignition followed
Two parallel studies were accomplished to re-
normal vernier ignition. There was no booster
view this problem area. One study reeval-
uated the abort thresholds to determine if the or stand damage. The second FtlF was suc-
roll rate limit could be increased. The other cessfully completed on September 3, 1959, with
normal ignition, transition to main stage and
study attempted to determine the cause for the
roll oscillation in order that a proper modifica- shutdown by the engine timer after approxi-
tion could be made. It was determined that mately 19 seconds of running time.
During the launch on September 9, 1959, en-
limited opening of the threshold in roll could
gine ignition, thrust buildup and lift-off were
be accomplished. The study into the cause for
normal, and launch vehicle performance was
the roll included developing a mathematical
model of the launcher mechanism, analysis of completely satisfactory throughout the booster
phase. However, after booster engine cut-off
control forces required to rotate the missile simi-
(BECO) the booster section failed to jettison
lar to that demonstrated in flight, base recircula-
and remained attached to the vehicle for the
tion, engine alinement, and a review of engine
acceptance data at Rocketdyne. It was readily duration of the flight. The sustaiper continued
to power the vehicle until propellant depletion
apparent that the canted turbine exhaust duct
contributed to the clockwise roll moment. This some 14 seconds prior to normal cut-off. The
force could cause only half of the roll moment malfunction resulted in the vehicle failing to
achieve planned maximum velocity and in ex-
experienced by the missile. Acceptance data
ceeding planned maximum altitude.
from the engine supplier showed that a group
Although the injection conditions were con-
of 81 engines had an average roll moment in the
siderably different from the preplanned values,
same direction of approximately the same mag-
the spacecraft reentry satisfied the NASA test
nitude as that experienced in flight. Although
objectives. By extrapolating the acquired
the acceptance test-stand and flight-experience
data, NASA Space Task Group was able to
data on individual engines did not correlate, it derive the information which was required for
was determined that offsetting the alinement of
spacecraft design. The spacecraft was recov-
the booster engines could counteract this roll ered and returned to Cape Canaveral. Since
moment and minimize the roll tendency at lift- the data from Big Joe 1 satisfied NASA re-
off. This change was flight tested and found to quirements, a second Mercury launch, Big Joe
correct the roll moment satisfactorily; there- 2 (Atlas 20D), which had been scheduled for
fore, the change was incorporated for MA-9 in the fall of 1959, was cancelled and the launch
Atlas 130D. vehicle was transferred to another program.

97
MA-1 stalled between the reinforcing band and the
tank skin. This modification was installed as
The first of the Mercury-Atlas series, MA-1,
a precaution against the type of failure which
was launched at 8 : 13 a.m.e.s.t, on July 29, 1960,
haxt occurred on the previous MA-1 flight. At-
from AMR L_unch Complex 14. The vehicle
las 67D had accomplished a successful Flight
consisted of Atlas 50D and Mercury Spacecraft
Readiness Firing on November 19, 1960.
number 4, the first production spacecraft, and
Launch countdown was satisfactory. Al-
adapter. The spacecraft primary test obiec-
though 70 minutes of hold and recycle time were
tires concerned structural integrity, afterbody
required, none of this time was required for
heating and reentry dynamics from a tempera-
the launch vehicle systems. Lift-off occurred
ture critical abort. Launch vehicle objectives
at 9:10 a.m.e.s.t, on February 21, 1961. Igni-
concerned the capability to release the space-
tion and transition to main stage were normal,
craft at the desired insertion conditions and the and lift-off was clean. The launch-vehicle
evaluation of the open-loop operation of the
flight was uneventful. All test objectives were
Abort Sensing and Implementation System
fully met, and the spacecraft was successfully
(ASIS). A single successful FRF was ac- recovered. This launch was the first one which
complished on July 21, 1960.
was preceded by a full Flight Safety Review
Lift-off and flight of the vehicle were nominal
Board in accordance with the Mercury-Atlas
until 57.6 seconds after lift-off when a shock
Booster Pilot Safety Program.
was registered by both the launch vehicle and
spacecraft axial accelerometers. The vehicle MA-3
at that time was at approximately an altitude
Atlas 100D, the launch vehicle for the MA-3
of 30,000 feet and 11,000 feet down range. The
mission, was launched from Complex 14 at
sequence of sensing of the shock indicated that
the disturbances occurred in the area of the AMR at 11:15 a.m.e.s.t, on April 25, 1961. The
mission was terminated by the range safety offi-
adapter and the forward portion of the lox tank.
cer after approximately 43.3 seconds due to
All Atlas telemetry was lost at 59 seconds, which
failure of the launch vehicle to follow its roll
is belie'ved to be the time of final missile destruc-
and pitch programs. Although the launch-ve-
tion. Spacecraft telemetry however, continued
hicle was destroyed as a result of a malfunction,
until 202 seconds, which was the time of land-
considerable benefit was derived from the flight
ing on the sea, approximately 5 miles down-
test. First, the satisfactory closed-loop per-
range. The only launch vehicle primary test
formance of the ASIS was demonstrated when
objective accomplished was successful evalua-
the booster en_nes were shutdown and escape
tion of the open-loop performance of the
rocket ignition was initiated automatically by
ASIS which generated an abort signal at 57.6
the ASIS. The escape was so successful that
seconds due to loss of normal a-C voltage.
The failure investigation and results are dis- the spacecraft was recovered some 20 minutes
after launch and reused on the next flight.
cussed in the section At_s Modifications for
Mercury in this paper. Second, because of the nature of the failure
an intensive reexamination of the complete elec-
MA-2
trical circuitry and its design, manufacture and
The MA-2 mission was flown by using the installation for both the launch complex and
Atlas 67D and a production Mercury space- the Atlas was conducted. The malfunction
craft. Test objectives for this flight were con- which caused flight termination was isolated to
cerned with the ability of the spacecraft to the flight programer or associated circuitry.
withstand reentry under the temperature-criti- The programer either failed to start or started
cal abort conditions and with the capability of and then subsequently stopped without initiat-
the Atlas to meet the proper injection condi- ing the roll and pitch program. The programer
tions. This Atlas "D" modified for the Mercury. was subsequently recovered, examined, and
mission, was unique in the program in that it tested. The most probable cause of the flight
incorporated a stainless steel reinforcing band failure was traced to contamination of one of
installed around the vehicle between stations the programer pins which under vibration could
502 and 510. A thin sheet of asbestos was in- have caused the failure. The extensive review

98
that was conducted to analyze the flight failure istics existed with these changes; therefore, ad-
also revealed other deficiencies in the flight con- ditional filtering was deemed to be necessary
trol systems. Changes were made to the system for future Mercury flights. Propellant slosh
to eliminate these possible failure modes and to amplitudes during the booster phase were low
improve the over-all system reliability. and considerably less than that observed on
launch vehicle 67D. The spacecraft injection
MA--4
conditions on the flight of 88D were of the poor-
On August 24, 1961, the Flight Safety Review est quality of all Mercury-Atlas flights. Toler-
Board for the MA4 mission (Atlas 88D) per- ance limits were not exceeded; however, a
formed a thorough review of all pertinent prob- thorough study was required to determine the
lem areas and all recent Atlas flight test prob- cause. An analysis of the flight data brought
lems. At the completion of the meeting, the to light tracking phenomena associated with low
Flight Safety Review Board approved the use incident angles. Under certain conditions the
of Launch Vehicle 88D for the MA4 mission. guidance system could be affected by varying
The launch was delayed for a 1-week period, and atmospheric refraction towards the end of flight
during this period of time a transistor malfunc- when the vehicle was approaching the horizon.
tion in one of the flight control canisters aroused Limited experience had been obtained at these
considerable concern. An investigation into the low elevation angles with the Mod III guidance
factors associated with this failure necessitated system. A continuing study was conducted by
an Air Force Program Office decision to delay SSD, GE, Aerospace Corporation, and Space
the flight in order that flight control equipment Technology Laboratories in conjunction with
could be reworked to eliminate this failure mode.
the AF Electronic System Division and its tech-
The contractor responded to this decision with nical staff to determine the source and limita-
a concentrated effort to rework and test the tions of this phenomenon. Knowledge gained
equipment in time to support a mid-September from this study was later used to rewrite the
launch. On September 12, 1961, the Flight trajectory equations to reduce the effects of re-
Safety Review Board reconvened. The flight fraction anomalies. The postflight evaluation
control canister rework was reviewed in detail of the launch vehicle 88D mission indicated that
and the Board concluded that '88D was suit-
all flight objectives were successfully achieved.
able for launch. The 88D was scheduled for a
250-minute countdown starting at 9:50 a.m. MA-5

e.s.t, on September 13, 1961. There were four


On November 28, 1961, the Flight Safety Re-
holds and a recycle which resulted in a total
view Board met to consider all aspects of the
count of 374 minutes. Propulsion system per- MA-5 (93-D) mission. Included in the Board
formance was normal throughout the start se- review were the autopilot changes that resulted
quence, additional hold-down period and flight.
from the previous flight and a thorough discus-
Thrust chamber vibration levels were normal
sion of the activities and studies conducted in
during the hold-down period and chamber pres-
the evaluation of the guidance phenomena.
sures were nominal. Lift-0ff occurred at 9:04
Additional problems associated with other Atlas
a.m.e.s.t. The flight control systems satisfac- space and weapons flight test were reviewed.
torily generated the missile roll and pitchover The Board committed the vehicle to launch.
programs and responded correctly to guidance
A number of holds were required during the
discrete and steering commands. An oscilla-
countdown on November 29, 1963. The data
tion in the pitch plane was evident from T + 15
link between the GE ground guidance station
seconds to T + 21 seconds. Missile bending was
and the Mercury Control Center dropped out
evidenced by an accelerometer located on the
temporarily, requiring a 4-minute hold, and a
lox-dome, launch-vehicle flight control rate gy-
3-minute hold was called at T-7 minutes to re-
ros, and by spacecraft, rate gyros. A change to
a launch-vehicle automatic hydraulic actuator solve a pulse beacon anomaly. Ignition and
had been incorporated on the MA-4 launch .ve- transition into mainstage were accomplished
hicle, and the flight control gains had been mod- s_tisfactorily and within expected limits.
ified. A postflight modal analysis of the MA-4 There was no indication of the pitch oscilla-
data showed that marginal stability character- tion observed on the launch of 88D. Following

99
is located beneath the intermediate bulkhead
lift-off a slight oscillation was noted in the pitch
channel during the roll program which is com- that structurally separates the two tanks and is
mon to all launches. The usual flight oscilla- composed of a plastic foam material vented to
tion due to _losh was observed from T+86 _ec- the fuel tank and supported by a thin steel mem-
onds to T+100 seconds. Staging transients brane. Test of the plastic material indicated
were normal. Approximately 30 Seconds before that sufficient fuel could be retained in the in-
sustainer engine cut-off, a slight oscillation ap- sulation material to overload the membrane sup-
peared in the pitch channel. This condition porting the insulation bulkhead under flight ac-
persisted for 15 seconds, but the magnitude of celerations. Inasmuch as it was not possible to
the oscillation was of 11o significance. All flight assess the amount of saturation accurately, a de-
test objectives were met and the performance of cision was made to remove the insulation mate-
the launch vehicle was within expected toler- rial and the supporting structure. The extent
ance limits. of the repair on Atlas 109D at AMR constituted
MA--6 a major but necessary rework of the vehicle in
the field. Because of the extent of the repair
The historic flight of Astronaut John Glenn
was conducted oll board Atlas launch vehicle a highly qualified group of personnel from
109D and Mercury Spacecraft number 13. Aerospace, 6555 ATW and GD/A were selected
This was the flight for which the Atlas Pilot as a special committee to review all procedures
associated with the task. This group also was
Safety Program had been conceived and for
which the launch vehicle team had been prepar- responsible for validating of the complete task.
The primary reason the task was authorized as
ing so long. Major General O. J. Ritland, then
a field modification was because it had been suc-
Commander, SSD, convened the Fight Safety
cessfully performed in the field only weeks be-
Review Board on January 26, 1962, to determine
fore on Atlas 121D, the Ranger 3 launch ve-
the suitability of Atlas 109D for support of the
MA-6 mission. In addition to reviewing the hicle which flew successfully.
readiness of 109D, the Board reassessed the The combined Atlas-Mercury countdown
critical problem areas in the development of the was begun at 11:30 p.m.e.s.t, on February 19,
1962. A built-in hold of 90 minutes was
Atlas in support of the Mercury program.
This reassessment included all major develop- scheduled to begin at T- 120 minutes. At T-
280 minutes, a telemetry check indicated the
meats, flight-test incidents and corrective action,
the results of additional reliability tests and Azus_L impact predictor was "no-go." The
ground station was checked and found to be
analyses conducted specifically for Mercury, the
operating satisfactorily. The tower decks
performance and test status of the abort system,
around the transponder were raised, but still
performance margins experienced on past fights
and the prediction for MA-6, the configuration the Azusa system could not achieve a satisfac-
differences between the previous Mercury ve- tory lock. A decision was made to change the
hicle and 109D, and the production and test his- transponder which was accomplished by T-
'273 minutes. The test was resumed and Azusa
tory of 109D prior to its arrival at AMR. One
was declared "go" at T-213 minutes. No hold
minor, last-minute problem with a faulty pin
time was involved. At T- 149 minutes, during
connection in the staging umbilical necessitated
a second session of the board on January 26, the flight control system test, there was a sud-
1962. The condition was repaired, and a com- den drop in the rate beacon automatic gain con-
plete series of tests to validate all the pin con- trol (AGC). The first backup beacon was
nections in the connector was satisfactorily ac- substituted for the original unit during the
built-in hold. This hold was extended for 30
complished. After the second session the
Board committed 109D for the launch of MA-6. minutes and then extended another 15 minutes
Adverse weather in the launch area forced the to complete installation and retesting. Ten
additional minutes of hold were required for
cancellation of the first launch attempt on Janu-
ary 27, 1962. After a tanking test was con- the spacecraft. At T-60 minutes a 30-minute
ducted on January 30, fuel was detected in the hold was requested by Mercury Control Center
insulation bulkhead located between the fuel and which was then extended an additional 5 min-
liquid oxygen tanks. The insulation bulkhead utes. At T-45 minutes a 15-minute delay was

100
instituted to catch up with the countdown pro- flight director called a 15-minute hold because
cedures. Lox tanking began at 8:30 a.m.e.s.t. of unfavorable ground visual conditions. An
Lox pump problems caused a 25-minute delay in additional 15-minute hold for the same reason
the count. A 2-minute hold at T-6.5 minutes was i:equested. At 7:17 a.m.e.s.t, an additional
was requested by Mercury Control. The count 10-minute hold was requested to analyze air-
then proceeded normally to T-0. Lift-off of borne refractometer test data to determine its
109D and Astronaut Glenn occurred at 9:47 a.m. effect on the ground guidance system. At 6:28
e.s.t. Propulsion system operation during a.m.e.s.t, an additional 5-minute hold was called
ignition was satisfactory. The longitudinal to complete the analysis of the refractometer
oscillation normally expected at lift-off were data. Countdown was resumed at 7:34 a.m.
nominal and damped ,out by approximately 25 e.s.t, and proceeded" normally to T-0.
seconds after lift-off. Performance of the guid- The Atlas vernier-sustainer and booster
ance system was satisfactory. The missile was ignition and transition to mainstage were
acquired by radar at the normal time, and normal. Lift-off transients were very small and
tracking was mairitained continuously through- the normal pitch oscillation seen during the roll
out SECO. Steering began at 155 seconds with program was of minimum mag_nitude. Guid-
60-percent pitchup and 23-percent yaw right ance lock-on was normal. :No yaw command
commands of 10 and 5 seconds duration, re- was necessary at the time of guidance enable.
spectively. These initial commands were ac- A slight pitchup was commanded, after which
ceptable for the planned trajectory. Thereafter no steering commands were required until just
pitch steering did not exceed 10 percent and before SECO. Staging transients were very
yaw steering 5 percent until the end of the flight. small. An anomaly occurred in the sustainer
Flight control system performance was satis- hydraulic system when at T+ 192 seconds te-
factory. All monitored programer pitch func- lemetry data showed that the sustainer engine
tions occurred at the proper time. Staging se- control hydraulic pressure had begun to drop.
quence was normal and no evidence of pitch The number two ASIS pressure switch acti-
oscillation buildup occurred during the flight. vated at T + 265.1 seconds when system pressure
Insertion accuracies were good and well within dropped below the abort level. The number one
the tolerance requirements established by ASIS switch, which is on a separate sensing
NASA. Postflight evaluation of the mission line, did not activate and therefore no abort
indicated that all systems functioned satisfac- signal was generated. Other telemetry meas-
torily, and no significant anomalies were urements did not show corresponding hydraulic
apparent. pressure drop. Test simulations conducted after
MA-7
the flight duplicated flight test indications when
the sense line was cold soaked at liquid oxygen
Atlas 107D was shipped to AMR on March 7, temperatures. Action was taken to modify
1962, to support the MA-7 flight of Astronaut future Mercury vehicles by insulating the sense
Carpenter in spacecraft nurrrber 18. The -¢e- lines. Guidance accuracies for the flight were
hicle was erected on March 14, 1962, and no improved as. a result of the extension of the
serious problems were found during the pre- ground based rate system base legs. This was
launch activity. A joint spacecraft and launch- the first Mercury flight to incorporate this
vehicle flight-acceptance composite test modification.
(FACT) was conducted on May 4, 1962. The MA--8
Flight Safety Review Board met on May 23
under the chairmanship of Lt. General Estes, Atlas launch vehicle 113D scheduled to sup-
then Commander of SSD, for the purpose of de- port the MA-8 mission on October 3, 1962, in-
termining the readiness of 107D to support the corporated the baffled injector modification in
second Mercury manned orbital launch. The the two booster engines. Sufficient ground and
combined Atlas-Mercury countdown began at flight test experience had been conducted to pro-
T-390 minutes at 11:00 p.m.e.s.t. May 23, 1962. vide adequate assurance of the additional flight
The count proceeded very smoothly and without safety possible with this modification. How-
delay until T--11 minutes when the NASA ever, recent ground and flight test failures of

101
the sustainer turbopump created a new atmos- quired after responding to the initial inputs.
phere of concern in the engine area. Investi- Insertion conditions were very close to nominal.
gation of these failures did not reveal any
MA-9
specific cause. Therefore, additional testing
was required to determine the susceptibility of Atlas 130D was the sixth consecutive launch
113D to a similar malfunction. An extensive vehicle to place a Mercury spacecraft into earth
analysis of these past failures did point, out that orbit. It was the tenth and final launch vehi-
two conditions were common to the failures. cle used in the Mercury-Atlas program. 130D
The first condition was that the failure occurred was accepted at the General Dynamics/Astro-
during the period of time the fuel control valve nautics plant at San Diego, California, on
was moving into the control position during March 15, 1962. Acceptance of this vehicle
start. Secondly, the malfunction had always marked the attainment of a long standing goal
occurred during the initial test of the system in of the SSD-Aerospace launch vehicle program
that configuration. For these reasons it was offices: acceptance of a Mercury-Atlas launch
determined that conducting an FRF on l13D in vehicle without discrepancies or contractual de-
its launch configuration should expose the turbo- viations.
pump to this failure mechanism. Accordingly, The Flight Safety Review Board convened
an FRF was conducted on September 8. Post on May 13, 1963, with Major General Ben I.
FRF evaluation indicated tha_ the propulsion Funk, Commander, SSD, as chairman, to re-
system was flight ready. view the status of Atlas 130D to support the
Major General Ben I. Funk, Commander, MA-9 mission. The MA-8 launch-vehicle per-
SSD, conducted the Flight Safety Review for formance and the MA-9 launch-vehicle pre-
the MA-8 mission at 9:30 a.m.e.s.t, on October dicted performance were reviewed. All dif-
2, 1962, to determine the flight readiness of ferences between the MA-8 and MA-9 vehicles
Atlas l13D. NASA concurred with the board's were discussed, as well as the flight qualifica-
recommendation that the vehicle was in suitable tion of these changes. The history of manu-
condition to support the MA-8 mission. facturing and testing of 130D at the manufac-
MA-8 (Atlas l13D) was launched at AMR turer's plant and the prelaunch history at AMR
Complex 14, 7:15 a.m.e.s.t, on October 3, 1962. were reviewed. Atlas flight-test experiences
The performance of the propulsion system was were updated to insure that no related prob-
satisfactory. Telemetered values of all meas- lems existed and the board agreed that 130D
urements were indicative of normal system op- was ready for flight. An initial launch attempt
eration. Because of the incorporation of the was made on May 14, 1963 ; however, the diesel
production baffled thrust chamber injectors on en_ne used for retracting and stowing the
the booster engines the missile hold-down time gantry caused a delay in the count when it mal-
was not extended, and the rough combustion functioned. Subsequently, the launch was
cut-off system was installed open loop on the postponed until the following day because of a
booster and the sustainer engine for instrumen- malfunction in the radar at Bermuda.
tation purposes only. Flight control data in- The Atlas prelaunch operation, which began
dicated the usual clockwise roll transient at on time at midnight of May 14, 1963, was
lift-off; however, in this case the transient con- scheduled for a 390-minute countdown plus one
dition approached 80 percent of the abort planned hold of 90 minutes duration at T--140.
threshold. Longitudinal oscillations and pitch There was one unscheduled hold of 4 minutes
oscillations during the initial portion of the duration at T--11 minutes 30 seconds, to inves-
flight were nominal and slosh amplitudes were tigate a signal fluctuation in the Mod III
within expected values. All monitored pro- ground guidance system. The anomaly was
gramer switch functions occurred at the proper attributed to an outside source of radiation,
times and staging sequence was normal. A low and the countdown was resumed. The whole
amplitude roll limit cycle was apparent from launch vehicle countdown had been exception-
approximately 252 seconds to SECO. Per- ally smooth, and no further delays were en-
formance of the guidance system was satisfac- countered. Ignition, transition to mainstage
tory with negligible steering commands re- and lift-off were normal with no additional

102
hold-downbeyondthe normal approximately A detailed analysis of flight test data has
2 secondsbetweenflight lock-in and release. shown that the launch vehicle performance was
Lift-off occurredat 8:04:13a.m.e.s.t.,on May very close to nominal. An over-all vehicle post-
15, 1963. As the vehicle came off the lalmcher flight trajectory simulation did indicate that the
arms it rolled counterclockwise approximately effective specific impulse of the total launch
0.3 ° before this minor transient was corrected
vehicle system was within, but on the high side,
by autopilot control initiation at 40" motion. of the tolerance band.
The expected slight longitudinal oscillation as- The pneumatic system operated satisfactorily,
sociated with lift-off occurred during the first and no anomalies were noted. The tank pres-
few seconds of missile motion and damped sure oscillation which normally occurs at lift-
normally. At two seconds after lift-off the off was of very low magnitude and of no signifi-
roll program was enabled and 130D rolled to- cance to the flight. Adequate pressures were
ward its elimbout heading of 72 °. The roll pro- maintained in both lox and fuel tanks and well
gram was completed at 15 seconds, and the above the abort limits at all times.
booster pitch program was enabled. Slight The propellant utilization system exhibited
lofting took place during the early portion of very smooth characteristics throughout the
the booster powered flight; however, the vehi- flight and was holding at the nominal position
cle intercepted the planned trajectory at 125 during the period prior to sustainer engine cut-
seconds. Propell_nt sloshing became notice- off, indicating that the propellant mass ratio
able at 55 seconds, reaching a maximum ampli- was correct. The PU system on this flight
tude at 98 seconds and decaying to a negli_ble utilized a slightly reshaped mandrel and im-
value by 120 seconds. Propellant slosh during proved calibration techniques compared to pre-
this period of time is normal, but the ampli- vious Mercury flights.
tudes on this flight were higher than on most The sustainer and booster engine hydraulic
previous Mercury launches. Postflight review systems behaved in a normal manner with only
of the 130D flight control gains indicated they slight booster position response to auto-pilot
were within tolerance but below nominal.
system demands occurring during the propel-
Higher than normal propellant slosh ampli- lant sloshing period.
tudes could be expected under these conditions. The a-e power supply frequency and the main
Booster engine cut-off (BECO) was accom- battery voltage were within specified limits
plished at 132.5 seconds with booster section through powered flight. The a-c voltage ran
staging at 135.4 seconds. Space position at 0.4 to 0.7 volt above the nominal but within the
BECO was very close to planned. At BECO tolerance band. Slight vehicle lofting oc-
the sustainer en_ne was nulled in pitch and curred as a result of this minor shift in a-e
yaw to assure proper clearance of the booster voltage.
section during the jettison phase. After booster The flight control system functioned satis-
jettison the sustainer was reactivated in pitch factorily and properly stabilized the launch
and yaw. The sustainer-stage pitch program vehicle. All guidance discrete and steering
was initiated at sta_ng plus 5 seconds and was command functions of the flight control system
completed at 159 seconds after lift-off. En- were properly carried out. GE and Azusa data
trance into the guidance steering mode was
indicated that the total magnitudes of the boost-
relatively smooth with the initial steering re-
er phase roll and pitch programs were extended
sponse being slightly up and to the right. After
slightly beyond nominal but were still well with-
the initial correction, only extremely small
in allowable limits. The major contributor to
steering commands were transmitted. SECO
these excesses was the higher than normal in-
occurred at 303.03 seconds, approximately 1
verter voltage output during the launch to
second earlier than planned. Burnout condi-
tions of the launch vehicle were very close to BEC0 phase of powered flight. It should be
those planned and were within a few feet per noted that the effect of higher than nominal
second high in velocity, 500 feet low in altitude, engine performance during boost phase tended
and 0.005 ° low in flight path angle. to counteract the effect of higher than nominal

103
inverter voltage on the pitch program. As pre- The range safety command system was not
viously pointed out, the propellant slosh was required until the auxiliary sustainer cut-off
greater than that on most previous flights but signal (ASCO) was transmitted 0.04 second
its effect on attitude rates was negligible. A after the BECO guidance discrete signal in
low-amplitude roll limit cycle was evident from accordance with the computer program logic.
BEC0 to SECO. This motion had been noted Performance of the ASIS was satisfactory.
on previous Mercury-Atlas flights and was not Review of launch-vehicle data did not reveal the
considered detrimental to the mission. existence of any undetected abort condition.
All instrumentation measurements functioned Switching functions to change abort logic and
properly throughout the flight, and the teleme- parameter levels were accomplished in the plan-
try quality was such that a very thorough an- ned manner from launch throughout powered
alysis of all flight parameters was possible. flight to SECO.

104
6. RELIABILITY AND FLIGHT SAFETY

By JOHNC. FRENCH, ASSt. Chie/, Reliability and Flight Sa/ety O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and
FREDERICK J. BAILEY, JR., Chief, Reliability and Flight Sa/ety O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

._._/_ _/'_ Summary all-out effort to apply knowledge and experi-


ence accumulated in years of aircraft and mis-
This paper summarizes the reliability and
sile flight to get the best chance of mission
flight safety features of the Mercury Project.
success and flight safety from parts and compo-
The difference between reliability and flight
nents that already existed, or would be brought
safety is briefly discussed. The basic concept
to the flight stage in, roughly, 2 years. The
that no single failure would cause an abort,
success of manned space flight required an ex-
and that no single failure during an abort would
tensive effort involving dedication of many
result in loss of the pilot, dictated the need for
individuals and their unstinting use of time,
redundancy and manual over-ride capabilities
there being no sophisticated shortcuts to the
in spacecraft critical systems.
disclosure of the many problems and the solv-
An existing missile was modified to provide
ing of these problems to assure success of each
the launch vehicle, and its reliability was aug-
flight. Consideration of cost, manpower, or
mented by a program of special testing and by
schedule were never allowed to influence any
careful selection of components. In addition,
decisions involving mission success or flight
an abort sensing system was developed for the
safety.
launch vehicle to provide for sensing of im-
Throughout the program, there proved to be
pending catastrophic failure and activation of
a need for stringent attention to details of de-
the spacecraft escape system.
sign, fabrication, quality control, testing and
A conservative design approach was used for
training; emphasis was placed on streamlining
the spacecraft, incorporating redundancy in all
the failure analysis and corrective action pro-
critical systems where possible, in order to pro-
cedures, incorporating on-the-spot failure
vide reliability. Off-the-shelf proven compo-
analysis at the launch site.
nents were used where possible to avoid develop-
Reliability and flight safety, although closely
ment problems, and standard design practices
related, are not exactly the same thing. The
were used for designing components where
former refers to the probability that a given
proven components were not available.
mission will proceed to completion without
The success of the flight-test program proved
mishap. This probability combined with the
the effectiveness of the _ound test program in
reliability of the escape system provides the
disclosing essentially all "early development"
overall flight safety or probability of crew sur-
and human induced type failures.
vival. It may be pointed out that flight safety
Flight safety reviews for the launch vehicle
can be achieved by building a high reliability
and the spacecraft, and a mission review for all
vehicle with little or no provisions for escape,
aspects of the mission, were conducted prior to
as in the case of a commercial airliner, or by
each mission and proved to be effective.'
attaching a highly reliable escape system to an
Introduction unreliable vehicle.
Two key design philosophies or guidelines
The Mercury approach to reliability and can be postulated :
flight safety was a practical approach to the (1) No single failure shall cause an
problem of achieving manned orbital operation abort.
with a reasonable degree of reliability and (2) No single failure during an abort
safety at the earliest possible time. It was an will result in the loss of life of the crew.
707-056 0---6'3------8
105
Obviously certain items fall outside the scope existing missile modified for Mercury require-
of thi_se rules. These are such passive subsys- ments and augmented by a special pilot safety
tems as the ablation shield and the spacecraft proo'ram and an abort sensing system. Al-
structure as well as some large active elements though the following discussion centers around
having a background of high reliability such tile Mercury-Atlas program, similar procedures
as the launch escape rocket. were put into effect for the Mercury-Redstone
What might be termed the Mercury approach program.
to mission accomplishment and crew safety is Existing Missile

outlined ill the figures accompanying this re- The Atlas and Redstone missiles were chosen
port. It may be described conveniently under
as latmch vehMes 1)ecause they were already far
three main headings, the launch vehicle, the
alon_" in their development phases and would
spacecraft and the operational procedures and
thus require only minor modification to adapt
philosophy.
them to the Mercury requirements. This choice
The success of the mission and safety of the
had a nmnber of ilnportant implications as to
crew also del)ended on a number of other con-
reliability and crew safety, some favorable and
siderations such as the efficiency of the world-
.__ 1 some unfavorable. On thP arocllf _iclo, fh_ r,_,-_
_'J_te net, work1 of comnmnications and the recov-
titular vehicles chosen were well along on their
ery operations, both of which are discussed in
development cycles, had considerable flight ex-
other papers.
perience behind them, and had already demon-
Launch Vehicle strated their abilities to meet the performance
requirements. Another favorable feature of the
The launch-vehicle reliability and flight Atlas lmmch vehicle was the fact that all en-
safety features are shown in figure 6-1. The gines were started, and satisfactory engine op-
main features indicated here are the use of an eration was verified, before lift-off.

Mercury program I
I 1
I
I
1
I-- .... 1 r
Launch vehicle I Spacecraft I I Operation
t l L

Existing missile
"-_ FI_ Flight experience

-_Engines ok at release

"_Su bsyst eros non-redundont


--Retention of proven components

program
.__ Pilot safety ___ Quality assurance

--Foctory rollout inspection


--Flight safety review

"_I Abort sensing F


system "_-- C re w safety
=Redundoncy

FIOUgE 6-1.--Launch vehicle reliability and flight safety features.

106
Since the Mercury-Atlas vehicle was used as plished within the life of the Mercury Project,
the launch vehicle for the orbital missions, the and therefore special efforts would be necessary
following discussion will be centered around' to make certain that the maximum reliability
this vehicle. of which the design was capable would actually
A determined effort was made to retain the be achieved in Mercury operations. The pro-
proven components on the launch vehicle since gram that resulted involved three parts, a Qual-
the development of new components would have ity Assurance Program, a Factory Rollout In-
resulted in the loss of nmch of the advantage of
spection Program, and a Flight Safety Review
using a developed launch vehicle. Program at the launch site.
The Quality Assurance Program consisted of
Pilot Safety Program
two major areas: An educational program for
The Pilot Safety Program (see fig. 6-1 and contractor and sub-contractor personnel; and
6-2,) was added ill the Mercury Project to aug-
,_ critical parts selection program.
ment the reliability and safety of the basic
Training conducted by the contractor created
Atlas system. This program was developed by
an awareness of the importance of the Man-in-
the Air Force for the selection and preparation
of the Atlas launch vehicles for manned Mer- Space Program and the high reliability re-
quired of the Mercury-Atlas launch vehicle.
cury flights. It was recognized that major de-
sign changes to increase the reliability poten- High quality through careful workmanship was
tial of the basic design could not be accom- stressed.

Range I
Misson ground rules ]

Recovery ]

I
J
develoPment
engtneermg
Spacecraft
inspections

Simulated
mission tests
t J
I

J
--
I MSC
Review
Flight
Spacecraft
Board
Safety
review

MSC
Review
Flight Safety
Board
Aeromedicol

Weather

Launch
J

Missio review

Factory Launch site

/
Mercury - Redstone |

P
acceptance test Review Board

report s _j MSC
Mercur Flight
yrRedstone
Safety }__
r _v i_w

quality assurance
program
Mercury -Atlas I
Mercury-At I a s

factory rollout review Flight Safety


active review team Mercury-Atlas Review Board
L Mercury
inspection -Atlas ] I Mercury -Atlas J - jstatus team

Working teams

FIOVRE 6-2.--Mission review activities.

107
Theresultof the criticalpartsselectionpro- possible efforts to insure a successful mission
gramwastherejectionof components andsub- had been made and that the vehicle was in a
systems with excessiveoperatingtimes,onnon- state of technical readiness. Complete review
st,qndardperformance, o1"questionable inspec- of all facts yielded a "go" or "no-go" recom-
tion records.Choiceof Mercury-Atlaslaunch- mendation to the Mercury-Atlas Flight Safety
vehicleengineswaslimited to thosestandard Review Board, which was chaired by the Com-
Atlas engineswhoseperformanceparameters mander, SSD, for the manned orbital flights.
mostcloselymetthe exact specification require- This Review Board meeting was attended by
ments. Spare parts were also selected with the NASA observers, including the NASA Opera-
same care given to flight hardware. All selected tions Director and one of the astronauts. The
units were specifically identified as accepted findings of this board were subsequently con-
Mercury hardware and stored in a specially veyed officially to the NASA'Operations Direc-
designated and controlled area. tor in the Mission Review.
The Factory Roll-Out Inspection assured The total scope of the Pilot Safety Program
that the Mercury-Atlas launch vehicle was com- resulted in expenditure of about twice the
plete, functionally acceptable, and ready for standard Atlas fabrication tim_._ and. more than
J 1 " rlr_l
tt_t_very, lne technical roll-out inspection three times the normal checkout time and at-
team consisted of specialists in the technical tention.
areas of each flight system. General launch
vehicle progress was analyzed on a continuing Abort Sensing and Implementation System (ASIS)

basis, with special emphasis on hardware status


The abort sensing and implementation system
and replacements.
(ASIS) was conceived and developed to en-
A pre-roll-out inspection meeting determined
hance crew safety. The functions of this ASIS
vehicle status and potential problem areas. A
were to sense impe_lding catastrophic launch-ve-
tentative roll-out inspection schedule was es-
hicle failure, automatically generate an abort
• tablished at this time, and composite test go-
command, and activate the spacecraft escape
ahead was granted for final contractual Air
system in sufficient time to assure astronaut
Force factory acceptance of the Mercury-Atlas
safety. An abort signal would be generated if
launch vehicle. After satisfactory completion
pre-selected tolerances of certain critical
of the composite test, a pre-acceptance meeting
humch-vehicle performance parameters were
was held by the Air Force with associate con-
exceeded. The ASIS was supplemented by
tractors prior to the formal acceptance meeting
manned ground and spacecraft abort capa-
to determine systems-performance status and
bilities.
acceptability of the launch vehicle to the Air
Force. Atlas flight test data were analyzed to deter-
After the final Rollout and Acceptance In- mine whi:ch specific performance parameters
should be monitored and to determine the abort
spection at the contractor's plant, a post-accept-
threshold levels, to assure that sufficient time for
ance critique was held and a final report pre-
escape would be provided and that false abort
pared to cover assembly and test history and all
commands would not be generated.
discrepancies uncovered and corrected up to
time of delivery to the Atlantic Missile Range. Evaluation of ASIS reliability under ex-
treme environmental conditions was carried out
The contractor was also required to submit a
detailed report covering critical item qualifica- by an extensive ground-test and flight-test pro-
tion status. A functionally complete launch gram.
vehicle was required prior to delivery. ASIS reliability was provided by electronic
The Mercury-Atlas Flight Safety Review de- equipment redundancies designed to preclude
termined the status of the launch vehicle flight the possibility of system failures or inadvertent
readiness. Technical flight readiness was estab- aborts. There were deficiencies in the ASIS
lished by personnel from the Space Systems discovered during the development flights, but
Division (SSD) of the Air Force and their corrections were made prior to use on the Mer-
associate contractors who met prior to planned cury-Atl.as flights. Early unmanned Mercury
launch for complete vehicle history review since flights proved out the entire system; successful
arrival at AMR. The team determined that all abort was initiated on the MA-3 flight, saving

108
the spacecraft which was flown again on MA-4. plying a manual engine cut-off command. A 3-
There were no manned Mercury flights which second airborne time delay was integrated with
required an abort action by the ASIS, nor were the airborne range safety command receiver to
there any false ASIS abort signals. insure a safe separation of the spacecraft in the
.__SIS was supplemented by the following event that a command destruct signal became
manned abort capabilities: necessary.
(1) Off-the-pad aborts could be initiated by Spacecraft
the test conductor, through direct electrical
The size, complexity, and cost of the space-
circuitry, until the vehicle had lifted 2 inches
craft and related operational activities includ-
from the pad.
ing recovery precluded a program of using gen-
(2) From the point of 2-inch vertical ascent
eral flight testing to uncover design and systems
through the end of powered flight, an abort
weaknesses. It was necessary to produce the
could be initiated through the Mercury Control
first and following spaceerafts with sufficient
Center (MCC) radio-frequency link.
(3) The mission could be terminated at any reliability to assure that each flight would com-
time throughout the entire powered flight by plete its mission. The following discussion
the astronaut. covers the reliability and flight safety features
(4) Indirect abort capability was provided of the effort expended in Mercury to accomplish
the Range Safety Officer. The automatic air- this result. The features are shown on figure
borne abort system could be activated by sup- 6-3 and may be described under the four head-

i Mercury program

[- --'1

I I
L J_
I
I
I Launch vehicle I Spacecraft I Operation
L_ ..J i

Design

_ Specific
Redundant mission
subsystems

Failure mode and effect analysis

Reliability

_ Developmentol
Reliability goalsfailures

Test to disclose failures

Fabrication

"_ Aircraft practice

Operational feedback

Testing and
checkout
_ round testing

Flight testing

Technical competence

Quality screening
Failure analysis and corrective action

I_IGUBE 6-3.--Spacecraft reliability and flight safety features.

109
ings of design, reliability, fabrication, and test- However, in no case did these failures, some of
ing and checkout. which were critical, result in mission failure.

Design
The adopted design approach utilizing equip-
ment redundancy and pilot back-up modes
The spacecraft was designed specifically for proved it s effect iveness.
manned orbital flight with virtually no back- Insofar as reliablity and safety were con-
ground of applicable experience to serve as a _'erned, components selected or fabricated for
guide. A very conservative design approach use in the subsystem were representative of the
was adopted to provide redundancy in all crit- state-of-the-art at the time of the design freeze.
i('al s,bsystems where possible. The original Standard design practices were utilized for de-
design was required to provide for normal signing components for specific applications
manned operation, unmanned operation, and where 1)roven components were not available.
operation with an incapacitated man aboard. The philosophy of designing redundancy into
3[uch of the redm_dancy, particularly in the Project Mercury is best described by the fol-
smaller items such as explosive bolts, igniters,
lowing examples :
etc., was functional in both the unmanned and One-time-only operating de_iees.--A number
manned vehicles, but for manned flights the
of subsystems are required to operate only once
major subsystems such as the attitude control during a mission, and thus the frequency of
system and landing system relied on pilot opera- failure of these subsystems is independent of
tion of the backup mode: hence, the presence mission duration.
of the pilot substantially increased the reliabil- In order to be sure that the escape tower could
ity of the spacecraft in the manned missions. be released from the spacecraft, and that the
There was an average of ten spacecraft com- spacecraft could be released from the launch
ponent malfunctions or failures per manned vehicle, the clamp rings were divided into three
spacecraft mission despite the level of effort to segments and held together by three double-
disclose and correct all anomalies prior to flight. ended explosive bolts. Figure 6-4 shows the

Major path

_____ Retlundont path

l Isolated
bus :1 Automatic
firinq circuit i
iett_son
.__ Tower
bolt

jettison
bolt
I
I
I
I jettison ....
._ Tower}
bolt
I
I

bus o,n Monuo,


-I
_ff, r i n_.q_ circuit

I
t
I
ii [

Gas

_" Ring -l-,- -- generator

FZOURE 6--4.--Automatic and manual initiation of tower-jettisoning-bolt, pyrotechnics.

110
escape-tower clampring bolt-firing functional performance indications displayed to the pilot
arrangement.Firing any end of any bolt and transmitted to the ground stations were in
couldeffectthe release.The automaticsystem disagreement. An important consideration was
couldfire oneendof eachbolt fromoneelectric the probability that the sensors and indicators
circuit andthe oppositeendof two bolts-from may malfunction and thus incorrectly dictate
a completelyindependent circuit; anastronaut the need of an abort.
manuallyoperatedbackupcould fire the op- A concentrated effort was made to identify
positeendof the third bolt througha percus- single point failures; first, those which would
siondevice,andin addition,couldsendelectrical in themselves be catastrophic or prevent sub-
signalsthroughthe two automaticelectriccir- sequent operation; and second, those which
cuits. would cause a premature operation.
For retroimpulsetherewerethreesolid fuel An example of a subsystem revision resulting
rocketswith dualignitersfiredby dualcircuits. from this effort was the change in arrangement
They could be initiated automatically,or by of the dual barostats that functioned to close
either astronautor ground command.Only the circuit to the parachute deployment se-
two of the threeretrorocketswererequiredto quence. Originally, the dual barostats were in
effecta satisfactoryreentry. parallel; a failure to the closed position of
Theprimaryparachutesystemwasfully au- either would initiate the deployment sequence.
tomatic. It incorporateddual barostats,dual The revision placed the barostats in series,
powersources, andmanualbackupof eachmain thereby requiring both to fail closed in order
functionin thesequence. Theentireautomatic to initiate premature deployment.
systemwasbackedup by an independent man- Reliability
ually operatedreserveparachutesystem.
Operating-time dependent systema.--A num- An effort was initiated in the Mercury Proj-
ber of critical systems of the spacecraft had to ect to make a quantitative reliability assess-
operate more or less continuously throughout ment and obtain an overall estimate of mission
the flight. The frequency of failure of compo- success and flight safety based on test time and
nents in these systems would be, in general, pro- failures that took place during the ground test
portional to the length of time they were ope- program.' The estimate of the reliability of the
rated and hence to the length of the mission. Mercury spacecraft utilized mathematical
The environmental system incorporated the models of the subsystems together with failure
basic redundancy of a full pressure suit in a rate data derived from actual test experience
controlled cabin environment. Manual con- on the system parts and components.
trols were provided to back up the automatic In general, the results were not satisfaztory
control functions. An emergency 02 supply because the applicability of the failure rate
was available to the suit as a further backup data was always highly debatable. It was a
in the event of simultaneous malfunctions in basic ground rule of the approach to manned
both suit and cabin controls. space flight that a failure during development
The attitude control system, which was par- and preflight tests always resulted in a correc-
ticularly critical for retrofire, consisted of a pri- tive action designed to eliminate all possibility
mary automatic system backed up by dual in- of repetition of that particular type of failure.
dependent manual subsystems, one of which Hence, past failure data never applied directly
was completely independent of the automatic to the then-current articles.

system. However, methods were evolved for setting


Failure mode and effect analysis.--A failure up an analytical model to describe the opera-
mode and effect analysis was performed for tion of a complex system, and the computer
each subsystem to investigate the failure mode programing on the IBM 7090 that eliminated
of components comprising the system and de- lengthy and complex manual quantitative analy-
termine the significance to mission success and sis. Those methods appear to have direct
the corrective action to be taken. This analysis applications for assessing mission success and
also included an evaluation to determine the crew safety during the design stages of future
action that should be taken in case the systems- space programs.

111
Mathematical modelswereusedto somede- the effect of a component failure could readily
greein the design stages of the Mercury Proj- be determined.
ect. Catalogued wllues of failure rates that (3) Beyond this point tlle usefulness of for-
had been established by tile manufacturers o1" real quantitative reliability assessment 1)rote -
various testing agencies as being representa- dm'es is debatable: the most effective apl)roach
tive of the random or statistical type of failure from here on is to concentrate on establishing
that predominates in fully developed parts a testing l)rogram and quality assurance pro-
comprised the inputs to these models. Reliabil- gram that will assure detection and correction
ity values obtained in this way tended to l_flect on all the unproven design and induced sources
the ultimate goal : that is, the minimuln failure of system failure before flight.
rate that may eventually be obtained with the
design. Fabrication
The first Mercury space flights with new sys-
Fabrication of the spacecraft was generally
tems could not be delayed pending statistically
rigorous reliability tests to assure demonstration in accordance with the accepted aircraft pro-
duction practices for small lots on the order of
of reliability goals. The problem was there-
twenty articles. Air-conditioned clean room
fore to decide, by a combination of engineering
procedures were introduced in an effort to elimi-
judgment, common sense, experience, and in-
nate the introduction of contaminants o1' debris
tuition, just when the last serious "early de-
into components.
velopment" types and lmman-induced types of
failure had been eliminated. The early devel- The results of operational experiences were
opment type of failure arose from desio'n errors, fed back into the fabrication process by hold-
interaction effects between parts and compo- ing frequent Development Design Engineer-
nents_ unanticipated environmental effects, ing Inspections (DEI). The purpose of the
or errors in estimating environments. The DEI was to assure that the Mercury spacecraft
as engineered and manufactured was safe for
human-induced type were those associated with
faulty fabrication, quality control, failure diag- manned flight. Emphasis was placed on at-
nosis, handling, installation, and carelessness. taining reliability and flight safety with exist-
As a result of the experience in tile Mercury ing Mercury hardware. To accomplish this
Project the role of numerical reliability as- objective, the DEI team was responsible for
sessment in manned space programs may be conducting suitable inspections for deficiences
summarized as follows: and initiating necessary corrective action. The
DEI board was authorized to make final de-
(1) It is desirable to specify an overall nu-
merical reliability goal to insure that adequate cisions on the acceptability of the spacecraft.
attention is directed to reliability in the design Preparatory to the DEI, the inspection team
stage. This goal should be apportioned or reviewed in detail engineering desi_, fabrica-
budgeted through a mathematical model down tion, and assembly, as well as component, sys-
to the various subsystems and their components. tem, and composite testing.
The subsystem designer should be required to
Testing and Checkout
show that his subsystem is capable of absorbing
the expected number of random or statistical Ground testing.--In addition to the stand-
type failures of parts without serious conse- ard type of qualification and acceptance tests,
quences or without exceeding his reliability the following types of tests were conducted.
budget. Demonstration tests: Demonstration tests
(2) The logic flow diagrams which show were made to determine reliability, wherein
functionally the systems sequence of action were several samples of each major subsystem were
especially useful since they represented primary tested under simulated operational environ-
and critical abort paths, crew inputs, and prin- ments and duty cycles for a total operating
cipal events. They reflected the basic ground time considerably longer than that of a single
rules relative to choice of alternate nmdes of mission. The scope of these tests is shown in
operation and aborts. From these diagrams figure 6-5.

112
Major subsystems Typical test time or firings

I. Environmental control system 1500 hrs

2. Automatic stabilization and control system 2000 hrs

3. Reaction controt system - automatic 290 hrs

4. Reaction control system- manual 112 hrs

5. Horizon scanner 720 hrs

6. Landing and recovery 38 firings

7. Rockets 27-37 firings (eatype)

8. Sequential system 400 cycles

9. Communications (tranceivers, audio center,

transponders, beacons, etc.) I000 hrs (ea.type)

I0. Satellite clock 3000 hrs

II. Bolt, expl. clamp release 108-155 firings (ea. type)

12. Bolt, retrorocket release 106 firings

13. Battery (3000w, 1500w) 20 discharge cycles (ea. type}

14. Ejector, antenna firing 145 firings

15. Explosive egress hatch 67 firings

le. Inverter, static 4000 hrs. (eo.type)

FTF, URE 6-5.--Spacecraft subsystems reliability tests.

The results of these tests were questionable the Mercury Project that malfunctions occur-
since the equipment being tested did not al- ring at Cape Canaveral and in the flight made
ways represent production-quality hardware. it imperative that design and fabrication weak-
In addition, actual flight hardware was subject hess be disclosed as early as possible. A com-
to conditions not contemplated in the reliability prehensive test program was started in which,
testing such as handling and shipping environ- to the greatest degrce possible, the mission was
ments, installations in high density and crowded simulated in real time and included orbital
areas within the spacecraft adjacent to unre- heating and near-vaCUUln effects. Obviously
lated heat generating equipment, and contam- zero g effects, launch time and vibration, ex-
ination external to the subsystem as well as plosive devices, launch escape rocket, tower and
within the subsystem. spacecraft separation, exposure of the ablation
Safety margin tests : Safety margin tests were shield to reentry temperatures, parachute de-
made wherein a number of component units ployJnent, and landing could not be duplicated.
were tested under progressively severe environ- However, cabin environment and operation of
ments to determine the safety margin provided. time dependent subsystems under normal and
It was necessary for such tests as Project emergency cabin environment were closely
Orbit and subsystems tests at contractor's simulated. The continuous aspect of this pro-
plant, followed by the intensive subsystems gram conducted in an altitude chamber with all
checkout at the Cape, to uncover weaknesses. systems operating as they would in a mission
These tests are discussed in the following not only disclosed the weaknesses but validated
paragraphs. equipment revised as a result of the malfunc-
Ground test program: A continuous ground tions. Consequently, the test demonstrated the
test program, using a complete spacecraft and performance of up-to-date configurations.
identified as Project Orbit, was instituted at The tests were very effective in disclosing de-
the contractor's plant about midway through sign weaknesses associated with interface prob-
Project Mercury. It became apparent early in lems, time dependent failures, and thermal bal-

113
ances involving heat sinks and heat removal. extended into the quality control and inspection
A typical example of the usefulness of Project areas at the launch site.
Orbit is discussed. Quality screening.--The Mercury Project
A revision in the gyro design resulted when, has featured extremely tight quality screening
during the operation of the autopilot under for deficiencies during all preflight checkout
an emergency mode (decompressed cabin), a operations. This was accomplished by provid-
failure in the gyros caused by decreased hoat ing a system for effectively reporting unsatis-
dissipation under vacuum conditions was dis- factory conditions to the contractor and to
closed. The lubricant vaporized, and there was NASA management, to obtain conclusive correc-
a breakdown in insulation windings. The prob- tive action, and to eliminate irregularities and
lem was resolved by changing the lubricant to deficiencies which adversely affect the space-
one having a lower vapor pressure, and by us- craft program. These anomalies were recorded
ing an insulation that maintained its dielectric on forms noted as Unsatisfactory Reports
Characteristic when subjected to high tempera- (UR's).
tures. Failure analysis and corrective actlon.--The
Spacecraft subsystems tests: Spacecraft sub- effectiveness of the contractor's failure analysis
systems tests at the contractor's plant were fol- and corrective action program was evolutionary
lowed by extensive tests at Cape Canaveral. and improved considerably as the project went
Altitude sensitive systems were tested in an through its transition period from unmanned
altitude chamber at the Cape since such tests to manned flight. Later in the program, it be-
were not made at the contractor's plant for each came apparent that a streamline procedure was
spacecraft. necessary for failure diagnosis and corrective
Flight te_ti_g.---Contributing much to the action to assure effectivity in subsequent space-
success of Project Mercury was the flight test craft. In many cases joint contractor-MSC
program. Each flight of this test program was teams analyzed a failure on-the-spot, or hand-
designed to qualify equipment and procedures carried the failed part to the supplier where a
for succeeding flights as well as ultimately for laboratory analysis of the failure was made.
the manned orbital flights. Any malfunctions In addition to individual failure reports on
that occurred in a flight were analyzed, and cor- all failures, the contractor maintained an up-to-
rected prior to the next flight. These early date status of all failures, submitting an IBM
flights included (1) Beach Abort for qualify- tabulation summary to MSC monthly. This
ing the launch escape and landing system; (2) tabulation included all unresolved failures, and
the Little Joe flights; (3) the Mercury-Atlas was used to point out critical and recurrent
unmanned ballistic flights for qualifying the problems.
structure and ablation shield under severe re-
Operations
entry conditions, (4) the ballistic Mercury-Red-
stone unmanned, primate, and manned flights, Simulated Flights
and (5) the Mercury-Atlas unmanned and pri-
mate orbital flights. There were several features and practices in
The manned orbital flights progressed in a the Mercury operation that are worth mention-
logical manner from a 3-orbit mission to a 22- ing in connection with reliability and safety. A
orbit mission. great deal of attention was given to rehearsals
Technical competence.--A very important and simulations of complete missions prior to
feature of the Mercury approach to flight safety each flight. These simulations were made ex-
was the assignment of personnel with a high tremely realistic. They not only served to
level of technical competence to the perform- verify the feasibility of planned procedures and
ance and monitoring of all preflight tests and provide crew practice for the expected flight
preparations at the launch site. Senior engi- plan, but also included a wide range of emer-
neering personnel, in many cases key members gencies deliberately introduced to show up areas
of the original design team, moved to the launch where improved planning might be needed to
site and developed the launch preparation pro- eliminate all possibility of confusion or inde-
cedures. This high level of competence also cision.

114
Interface Control covered in figures 6-9 and 6--7. In Mercury,
the philosophy was adopted that a launch would
With different groups responsible for the not take place with any unresolved difficulty.
launch vehicle and the spacecraft, there was To insure this, preflight launch vehicle readiness
need for very special planning and procedures and spacecraft readiness review meetings were
to insure proper handling of interface prob- set up. In these meetings, representatives from
lems. It was found necessary in the field to engineering, operations, flight safety, astro-
establish a joint inspection team charged with nauts, and Cape inspection reviewed in detail
the responsibility for witnessing all mating and with the specialists responsible for the checkout
other interface activities, measuring and veri- of each system, all malfunctions observed in
fying the adequacy of all physical clearances, the system, and all changes and corrections
inspecting all structural joints and electrical made. Two sets of contractor failure records
connections, and assuring that no debris was were maintained : first, a segregation of failures
left in critical areas. Adequate access ports for from all testing into specific subsystems; second,
field inspection were found to be an absolute ,_ file of all failures associated with subsystems
requirement. of a specific spacecraft. From these records, it
Special procedures were established for main- was possible to determine any general weak-
taining and periodically distributing one and nesses and to review the case histories of critical
only one official interface wiring diagram, re- areas in any specific spacecraft. These data, to-
flecting the exact current status of the wiring on gether with the unsatisfactory reports (UR's)
the vehicle at specified dates. and record of anomalies occurring in the sub-
systems checkout recorded by MSC personnel at
Flight Safety Reviews
the Cape provided a major input in these
The final item on figure 6-6, Flight Safety meetings.
Reviews, deals with the problem of determining These detailed meetings on the major pieces
that the launch vehicle and spacecraft were in of equipment were followed by a Final Mission
fact ready for launch. These activities are Review meeting. This meeting provided a final

J Mercury program

r- ....................

........ .L__ _
1 r -I

Launch vehicle I I Spacecraft J Operation


J L_ /

Simulated

flights
Verificofion of planned procedures

Practice emergencies

control
Interface h --Physical clearances

-- Electrical circuits

reviews
Flight safety Spacecraft and launch vehicle

/ Mission

FIOURE 6--6.--Operational reliability and flight safety features.

115
confirmation of launch-vehicle and spacecraft These operating procedures were very effec-
readiness and established the readiness of the tive in concentrating the attention of the best
range, recovery, weather, and aeromedical qualified technical talent available oll the de-
elements. tailed engineering problems of each vehicle.

MS C Flight Safety Engineering I


t
Review Board
Safety I
Operations ]

Astronauts I

review meeting
Spacecraft J

Mission objectives
--t Review of
flight
previous

Rockets
preparations
and Overall
structure I ond igniters
Electrical
end
power
sequential F-4 Mechanical

Landing
Communications J
Automatic
stabilization I nstrumentation
and control
Usage
of life limited
Reoction control
components

con trol Document at ion

Environmental Complex testing


inspection
Contractor l

NASA inspection --

FIGURE 6-7.--Spacecraft review activities.

116
II

MISSION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT


7. TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS
By JOHN P. MAYER, Asst. Chie] ]or Mission Planning, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center; and CARL R. Huss, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

%.1 _ 9"_ Summary and the spacecraft propulsion performance re-


quirements were determined leading to the de-
A description of the mission analysis studies sign of the retrorocket system. After the space-
conducted for Project Mercury is given along craft systems were essentially designed, the mis-
with specific examples for the various mission sion-analysis effort shifted to the operational
analysis phases. phase. In this phase the system design was
Aborted mission studies constituted about 90 reasonably fixed and the detailed mission design
percent of all mission-analysis studies con- was then accomplished by taking into account
ducted. These studies were necessary from a all of the constraints, including spacecraft,
flight-safety standpoint and are considered launch-vehicle, and operational constraints.
equally applicable to future manned spacecraft The objective in this phase is to design a mission
projects. It was found that the basic mission within the capabilities of the actual spacecraft
design must be chosen in a flexible manner so system developed. IlL this phase of the mission
that consideration can be given to the changes some feedback into system design was made,
in mission constraints. Real-time computing although these were small changes since the
has proved extremely valuable in Project early design proved to be sound.
Mercury; however, consideration must be given The next mission analysis phase was in the
to changes in mission operational plans which design of specific missions. In this case the
cannot be effectively included in the Real Time mission analysis was specialized to handle the
Computer Complex. aspects of a particular mission by using the
actual performance characteristics of the
Introduction
launch vehicle and spacecraft being used. This
The mission-analysis effort in Project Mer- phase also included the analysis for the partic-
cury was conducted in several phases leading up ular operational mission objectives and ground
to the flight missions. These phases include the rules developed for these missions.
mission analysis supporting the systems design The next phase was the real-time mission-
of the spacecraft, the basic operational design of analysis phase, which started at the beginning
the Mercury missions based on mission require- of the launch countdown and lasted until the
ments and objectives, detailed operational mis-
sion analysis for each specific flight_ and the
formulation of the mission logic to be included
in the computer used for inflight real-time con-
trol of the missions.
mission J-_ m=sslon M mrs

Mission Phases

In figure 7-1 are shown the important phases t';;;'d/;7;r; I


of mission-analysis studies. In the early mis- r

sion-analysis phase, the. analysis was specifi-


cally for use in spacecraft
example, tile maximum
system design.
loads and heating
For
con-
E _ion [

ditions were determined for structural design, 220URE7-1.--Mission analysis sequence diagram.

119
vehiclewasrecoveredafter the mission. In Mercury the systems limitations of the launch
this,_alculationswereaccomplished in realtime vehicle included heating and load restraints and
by ..,_
computer ; however,thelogicandequations the guidance radar look angle constraint.
ustedin this computerweredevelopedin the The operational constraints to be considered
precedingoperationalmission-analysis phase. in the area of launch operations "tre range safety
Althougheveryeffort wasmadeto anticipate limits, abort considerations, enviromnental con-
all thepossibilitiesthat couldaffectthe flight siderations, landing and recovery considera-
and includethem in the real-timecomputer tions, and human factors. Some of the envi-
program,thesepossibilitieswereneverfully ronmental factors that were considered were the
established.Therefore, mission-analysisex- effect of atmospheric and geophysic constraints
perts were used as flight controllers and also and winds. Consideration had to be given to
performed auxiliary computing using off-line recovery and landing constraints for both
computers other than those used in the real- normal and aborted missions and, in all cases,
time computing complex during the missions. the human tolerances to acceleration loads and
The next mission-analysis phase was a post- motions were considered.
flight analysis phase in which the information Abort considerations resulted in about 90 per-
obtained from actual flights was fed back into cent of the mission-analysis studies. Studies
the plans for future flights and, in some cases were nmde to provide flight controllers with the
resulted in system modifications to the space- information as to when to initiate aborts for
craft, the launch vehicle, and the ground sup- maximum pilot safety. Studies were also made
port system. to determine allowable tolerances in order to
Some specific examples of mission constraints obtain safe miss distances 1)etween the launch
affecting the analysis are shown in figure 7-2. vehicle and the spacecraft and acceptable later-
Some of the spacecraft constraints that must be al loads. Also of importance were the studies
considered are the performance of the space- to determine the abort recovery areas for all
craft propulsion system, the spacecraft control phases of the flight.
system accuracies, and other system limitations. Ill order to illustrate some of the techniques
Some of the ground complex constraints to be used and the results accomplished in the mis-
considered are performance (which includes the sion-analysis area, a few specific examples from
effects of the locations of command stations and each phase will be discussed.
command ranges) and system limitations. Con-
straints involving the launch vehicle which had Design Mission Analysis
to be considered were performance, guidance One example of the work performed in the
accuracies, and systems limitations. In Project advanced mission analysis phase is illustrated
by a study of the immediate post-abort condi-
tions. The selection of the escape-rocket offset
Operational Factors involved a compromise between high lateral
I. launch operations loads and low miss distances between the space
2 Abort considerations
craft and the launch vehicle in the high-dy-
3. Environmental surroundings
namic-pressure abort phase of launch. For low
4 Landing and recovery

5 Human factors offset values the probability of exceeding high


lateral loads was low; however, the probability
of obtaining low miss distances was high. For
I Mission Analysis ]
high values of the offset the opposite is true.
Thus, the selection of the offset was made on
Spacecraft Ground Complex Launch Vehicle
the basis of minimum combined probability of
I. Performonce I. Performance I. Performance

2. Guidonce and
occurrence of either events. In figure 7-3 the
2. System 2 Guidance and
control limitations control combined probability of exceeding either a dan-
3. Sys%em 5. System
limitations
gerous lateral load or an unacceptable miss dis-
limitations

tance is shown plotted against the escape-rocket


FmVaE 7-2.--Operational mission analysis. offset.

120
.8
example, an orbit having an 80-mile perigee and
a 170-mile apogee.

o .6 Perigee altitude nautical miles


._ ta

.=_ .__

105
"i "°'4
_
5 Circular orbits.._.._

o I00
>,o •
,,.4
_ 95
ft.

I I I I I I 1 I I I 2 9O
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 .10 85
Escape-rocket offset, in.
I
FZOURE 7-3.--Selection of escape-rocket thrust offset.

0 b-"_-"_"_ I I I I I I I f
80 90 I00 I10 120 130 140 150 160 170
Operational Mission Analysis Apogee altitude, nautical miles

A typical example of the operational mission FIGURE 7-4.--Minimum lifetimes for elliptical orbits.

analysis was in the selection of the Mercury


orbital elements. The orbital inclination which The next constraint to be considered is that
governed the ground track for Project Mercury of launch-vehicle performance. In figure 7-5
was selected because the network facilities es- the staging time is shown plotted against the
tablished prior to Mercury could be used to good insertion or perigee altitude. The curves shown
advantage, reentries for the first three orbital are given for a constant orbital lifetime; that
passes and the 16th to the 18th passes occurred is, the apogee altitude decreases as the insertion
over the United States, and the orbital ground altitude increases. For a constant insertion al-
track fell within the temperate region of the titude the performance, or excess velocity avail-
world. In addition, the specific Mercury in- able above that required (AV_t_), increases
clination was affected by launch-abort recovery with staging time until it reaches a peak value.
considerations. For greater staging times the performance de-
The orbital altitude and shape of the Mercury creases. The minimum acceptable performance
orbit were selected based on launch-vehicle per- curves are shown in figure 7-5. The increment
formance, accuracy, and abort operational con- of velocity AV that defines the acceptable
siderations. These considerations are illus- performance is the difference between the
trated in figures 7-4 to 7-7. In figure 74 the velocity at fuel depletion and the planned
orbital lifetime is shown plotted against apogee velocity. Therefore, all of the clear area in the
altitude for given perigee altitudes. For Proj- figure would represent acceptable orbital in-
ect Mercury it was desired to have minimum sertion altitudes.
lifetime of 36 hours for a 24-hour mission. The launch-vehicle guidance accuracies are
Since the atmospheric densities at orbital alti- considered in figure 7-6. Since the Atlas launch
tudes were not well-defined at the time Project vehicle used for the Mercury program was
Mercury was initiated, it was believed that a guided by a radio guidance system, the guid-
conservative value for density must be used for ance accuracy was dependent to some extent on
estimating lifetime. The density used in this the radar elevation angle at cut-off. In figure
figure is considered to be a 3_, or very conserva- 7-6 the minimum elevation angle E_tn which
tive, dense atmosphere. From figure 7-4 it can was considered acceptable is shown. Again the
be noted that for an adequate lifetime a circular clear area in the figure is indicative of accept-
orbit at an altitude of 105 nautical miles could able orbital insertion conditions. Next, how-
have been selected, or an elliptical orbit ]laving ever, the operational considerations must be in-
the same lifetime could have been selected, for cluded. These are shown in figure 7-7. In this

707-0560----63--9 12 1
case the operational consideration which affect-
ed the orbital conditions was the requirement
to avoid a landing in Africa for an abort from
the minimum acceptable velocity. In this fig-
ure the position of the line shown is such that
the spacecraft would not land in Africa if an
abort were made at the no-go velocity, with al-
lowance for the dispersions on the abort landing
area. From figure 7-7 it may be noted that the
operational consideration significantly affects
the orbital insertion altitudes which could be
used for Proj act Mercury. 60 80 I00 120 140
Insertion altitude, nautical miles

I_OURZ 7-7.--Effect of operational constraints.

Specific Mission Analysis

A considerable mission-analysis effort is


made in the design of each specific Mercury
g flight. Included in this effort are detailed tra-
jectory calculations for the mission, dispersion
calculations, calculations concerning aborts
during all phases of the mission, and calcula-
tions of retrograde time to be used in the mis-
60 80 I00 120 i40
Insertion altitude, nautical miles sion. When the flight day arrived, special
mission-analysis studies were performed to sup-
FIC, VaE 7-5.--Effect of launch-vehicle performance.
port the flight. These studies included evaluat-
ing the wind effects on the loads on the launch
vehicle and determining the landing areas of the

!ili!iiiiiii!!i!!i!ii!ii
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: __ spacecraft in aborted
wind profiles.
missions based on actual
In figure 7-8 the effects of the
actual winds on the abort landing areas at var-
ious times of the flight are shown for the MA-9

_-j .:.:-:,:<.'.;: .. Z_Vm


in \
Coastline
"_g:.':.'.'.'.'.'.':.':.'.....'.'.'.::::......:..:- "_ k

X Atlantic Ocean
k
•:.:--.:.:::':":'..'.:':'.'.:.:.:..'..'v:'."
60 80 I00 120 140 <_ \ No wind

Insertion altitude,nautical miles __.-.. _ _fabort sac

Launch complex__ _=: ....... '


FIGURE 7-6.--Effect of launch-vehicle guidance. 016_ 16_ Actual wind (MA-9 at 6:05 a.m.e.s.t)

As operational experience was gained in


Project Mercury flights, confidence and knowl-
edge in the systems made it possible to reduce
to some extent, the original guidance and per-
formance constraints. For example, the mini-
mum elevation angle was reduced after obtain-
ing a better understanding of the effects on
guidance accuracy from operational experience FI6URE 7-8.--Effects of actual winds on MA-9 abort
with the guidance system. landing.

122
mission. Thesecalculationsweremadeto en-
ablethe recoveryforcesto bepositionedprior
to the launchsuchthat theycouldmosteasily Probability __

makeanemergency recoveryshouldabortoccur.
Real-Time Mission Analysis _% 0.5-_,
g
General Computing Requirements .0
_ Variables
b

Real-time computing has proved very valu- _-2

able in Project Mercury for use in flight control u_

-,4

and monitoring. The basic computing require-


_ _ Dr°g °c efficient ty
ments in real time are as follows: -6

(1) Powered flight.--Pertinent trajectory -_(_1 I I t I I I I I I


,480 25,500 25,520 25,540 25,560
parameters were computed in order that the Velocify , fps

status of the launch could be monitored for any


FIGURE 7-9.--Determination of minimum acceptable
indication of an impending abort. The cut-off orbit.
velocity was used to determine the acceptability
of the orbital parameters based on preplanned
criteria. In addition, landing points for pos-
sible aborts and radar-acquisition data were
computed.
(2) A borted missions.--For aborted missions Apogee

the computer must be programed to select a tar-


get recovery area and if necessary compute the Per ili/E×cessiv e '_ --
time for retrofire to land within this area.
(3) Orbit.--In this phase the orbital param-
reentry heating
eters were predicted with sufficient accuracy
to establish the minimum lifetime of the orbit, FIGURE 7-10.--Determination of maximum acceptable

to predict the retrofire time to land in normal orbit.

and contingency recovery areas, to determine


spacecraft orbital position, to determine acqui- I. 2 I- Orbit
J lifetime _ _"_.-Sofe reentry not
sition data for all radar sites, and to predict the J less than _ _ possible

time of landing for use by recovery forces.


(4) Reentry.--During reentry the computer
program recalculates and updates the landing
point and time of landing, based on conditions
at retrofire, in addition to predicting acquisi-
tion data for reentry radar st/Ltions.

Example of Go---No-Go Computation

The computation of the go---no-go parameters


was probably the most important of the real- -'8 _-'k
..2 _ I '
_ I
time computations. The selection of the Mer- "25,--600 25,700 25,8£0 25,fi00 26,000 261,100

Velocity, fps
cury go--no-go criteria which were used in the
real-time computing program is shown in fig- FIGURE 7-11.--Operational go---no-go orbital-insertioll

ures 7-9 to 7-11. In figure 7-9 the minimum criteria.

energy for an acceptable Mercury mission is


illustrated. The flight-path angle at insertion critical flight safety nature of the problem, the
is plotted against the insertion velocity. The minimum orbit was selected on the basis of a
minimum acceptable orbit was defined as that very conservative drag coefficient CD and at-
orbit in which the spacecraft could safely com- mospheric density p. The symbol, (CDp).,
plete one orbital pass and land. Because of the shown in figure 7-12 has been normalized and

123
represents theratio of the parametricdragco- criteria that resulted from these constraints are
efficient-density
productto a nominalvalueof shown in figure 7-11 where the flight-path angle
this product. Therefore,values of (Coa)n at cut-off is plotted against the insertion ve-
whicharegreaterthanunity areconsidered to locity. The region for a mininmm acceptable
be conservative.The 99-percentprobability orbit lies within the boundaries shown. For all
curveshownin figure7-9 wasthe oneselected Project Mercury missions the cut-off velocities
for thego---no-gocriteria. Thereforefrom a were well within the safe boundaries. For the
lifetimeconsideration the conditionswouldbe MA-9 mission, for example, the cut-off occurred
"go" at velocitieshigher than this boundary; within the boundary of the symbol shown in
however,other constraintsimposed a limit this figure.
athighervelocities. As was previously stated, some auxiliary
computing was performed during each mission
(CDP)o
i.0 outside of the real-time computers. An ex-
1.25
1.5 ample of this auxiliary computing is shown in
,-Hawaii and Cape Canaveral
145 / 3rd pass
figure 7-12 where the effects of the actual at-
mosphere on the orbital lifetime of the MA-9
_'_-'--... r Hawaii 7th pass
QWC
mission are shown. In figure 7-12 apogee alti-
_'_ ,-Bermuda ,6th pass
"__ 140 tude is plotted against time. Because of the
length of the MA-9 mission and the uncertain-
"5
ty of the density of the actual atmosphere on the
135
day of this flight, it was thought necessary to
attempt to determine the variation of the ac-
tual atmosphere from that used in preflight
_ 130
computations. This calculation was necessary
in order to commit the mission to completing
"\
99 passes at a predetermined time during the
12_ [ I [ I ] _N]
8 16 24 32 40 48 flight. The lines shown in the figure are for
Ground elapsed time, hr
precalculated atmospheric densities which var-
ied from that of the assumed atmosphere. The
FZOURE 7-12.--Effects of actual atmosphere on MA-9

orbital lifetime. symbols in this figure indicate the actual apogee


obtained during the flight and also that the ac-
In figure 7-10 the determination of the maxi- tual atmosphere was very close to that used in
mum energy orbit is illustrated. As the velocity the preflight computations. The actual orbital
is increased above orbital velocity the apogee lifetime for the MA-9 mission would have
increases approximately 1 mile for every 2 feet been about 4.7 days if a reentry were not initi-
per second. When the velocity reaches a certain ated using the retrorockets.
critical value, an area occurs near perigee such
that, if the retrorockets were ignited, excessive Concluding Remarks
heating would occur during reentry. As the
The operational experience obtained in mis-
velocity increases above this value this critical
sion-analysis studies for Project Mercury has
area near perigee extends over most of the orbit
proved valuable for application to other
and another critical area for initiation of reen-
manned space-flight programs. Aborted mis-
try appears near apogee. At this point if re-
sion studies constituted about 90 percent of all
entry were initiated, the reentry loads would
the mission-analysis studies conducted for Mer-
become excessive. As the velocity is further in-
cury. Although the results of these studies were
Creased, a velocity is reached in which these
critical areas cover the entire orbital range and not required operationally, the amount of effort
a safe reentry would not be possible from any spent on abort studies is necessary from a fight-
point in the orbit. The operational go---no-go safety standpoint and will be equally applicable

124
to future manned space projects. It is also in Project Mercury; however, it seems that con-
evident that the basic mission design must be sideration must always be given to changes to
chosen in a flexible and manner so that consid- mission operational plans which cannot be ef-
eration can be given to changes in the spacecraft fectively included in the real-time computing
launch vehicle or operational constraints. Real- complex. Therefore, auxiliary inflight com-
time computing has proved extremely valuable puting probably should always be considered.

125
8. WORLDWIDE NETWORK SUPPORT

By NILES R. HELLER, Chie/, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center;
H. WILLIAM WOOD, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center;
VmGm F. GARDNER, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center;
EDWARD A. Ross, Manned Space Flight Support Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; and
I_VERNE R. STELTER, Chie], Communications Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

Summary _2- / _ _'¢f and communications during the launch phase,


as well as voice communications with the astro-
Because the Mercury orbital flight program naut within maximum prescribed time intervals.
required effective ground control during th_ Throughout the Mercury-Atlas orbital flight
unmanned and manned phases, a worldwide program, the Mercury Worldwide Network
tracking and telemetry network was developed. provided adequate and timely support in each
Early in the project, the requirements for the of its charged responsibilities. Voice communi-
network in terms of systems, installation, site cations, telemetry, and tracking were satisfac-
locations, testing, and training for network per- tory for effective flight control and monitoring,
sonnel were established. Maximum utilization and the computation and data handling facili-
was made of existing facilities, but additional ties provided timely support during the criti-
stations had to be implemented because of a cal retrofire and reentry phases of each of the
strategic need at certain points along the or- manned orbital flights.
bital ground track. In addition to the tele-
metry and tracking facilities, two important Introduction
centers were established, those of the Mercury
Meeting mission objectives required that a
Control Center, which was the focal point for
worldwide tracking and ground instrumenta-
all flight control activities, and the Computing
tion system be developed to provide a continu-
and Communications Center. System reliabil-
ous flow of information to be used for mission
ity and provision for ease of maintenance were
control. The intent in tiffs paper is to describe
primary guidelines during the network imple-
the evolution of the network in support of the
mentation. Because of the unique spacecraft
various Mercury missions. Specifically, the
tracking task, an acquisition aid device was de-
paper discusses the development of network re-
veloped to assist in the location and tracking at
quirements and systems; installation, test, and
first contact with the spacecraft. As the tele-
training; the network configuration and later
metry, tracking, and computation functions of
changes made in response to mission require-
the network were being installed, the network
ments, operations, and performance.
was staffed to support even the early ballistic
flight program. As the scope and complexity Development of Network Requirements
of the missions increased, the network was ex-
Approach
panded and modified to accept the changing and
more demanding flight control and monitoring The task of implementing a tracking a_ld
requirements. In addition to the tracking and ground instrumentation system was given to the
data reception cap'abilities of the network, a NASA Langley Research Center (LRC). LRC
multi-frequency air-to-ground reception and formed the Tracking and Ground Instrumenta-
remoting provision was necessary during the tion Unit to manage and direct this effort.
manned flight program. A requirement had This unit in turn utilized industrial firms to
been established to provide continuous tracking assist in determining the approach to be taken

127
in meeting the requirements in certain critical
b
area_and to augment the NASA team.

F Basic Requirements

Basically, network systems were required to


provide all functions necessary for ground con-
trol and monitoring of a Mercury mission from
launch to landing. The function of the net-
work was to end when the spacecraft had landed
and the best possible information on the loca-
tion of the landing point had been supplied to
the recovery teams.
At the outset, the following functional re- FIGURE 8-1.---Map showing the locations of the selected

quirements were established: Mercury stations.

(1) Provision of adequate tracking and com-


Two Centers were also required :
puting to determine launch and orbital param-
The Mercury Control Center (MCC), to be
eters and spacecraft location for both normal
and aborted missions. located at Cape Canaveral, was to provide
equipment necessary to allow control and coor-
(2) Voice and telemetry communications
dination of all activities associated with the
with the spacecraft with periods of interruption
Project Mercury operation.
not to exceed 10 minutes during the early orbits,
The Computing and Communications Center,
contact at least once per hour thereafter, and
communications to be available for at least 4 to be located at the Goddard Space Flight Cen-
minutes over each station. ter (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland, was to pro-
vide for communications control, switching and
(3) Command capability to allow ground-
distribution; also, it was to provide all computa-
initiated reentry for landing in preferred re-
tions necessary to monitor and control the mis-
covery areas and to initiate abort during critical
sion from launch to landing.
phases of launch and insertion.
Such an arrangement of stations, supported
(4) Ground communications between the
by appropriate instrumentation, would provide
ground stations and the control center.
for tracking, command, and monitoring capa-
Safety of the Mercury spacecraft and its
bilities in the highest probable abort phase of
occupant was made a dominant consideration.
launch through insertion and for the critical
Speed and efficiency of installation were essen-
reentry phase after orbital flight. It also al-
tial to meet the planned operational dates. Al-
lowed the maximum use of facilities at the Na-
though no compromises with safety were made,
tional Ranges and of equipment at the Austra-
economy was an important consideration in the
lian Department of Supply facilities at Woo-
overall plan.
mera, Australia. The participating countries
Selection of Stations and ranges were as follows :
The U.S. Department of Defense provided
Stations were selected on considerations of the use of facilities at the Atlantic Missile Range,
flight plan and on the character of the space- Pacific Missile Range, White Sands Missile
craft electronic systems consistent with the basic Range, and the Eglin Gulf Coast Test Range.
requirements. Because of factors relating to the Australia allowed the use of certain existing
earth's rotation and the lack of suitable geo- facilities and construction, installation, and op-
graphic locations, certain compromises had to be erations of the required new facilities. These
made in selecting the total number and loca- arrangements were made through the Austral-
tions of the stations required for a three-orbit ian Department of Supply and were imple-
mission. These compromises resulted in gaps, mented by the Weapons Research Establish-
primarily on the third pass, greater than the ment.
desired 10 minutes. For stations selected, see United Kingdom permitted the construction
figure 8-1. of stations in Canton Island and Bermuda.

128
Nigeriaagreedto the leaseof land andper- non-Mercury sources by carefully selecting sta-
missionto constructa stationin Tungu and tion locations and equipment placement. Inter-
Chawaka. ference studies and field measurements were to
Spainagreedto providethe landfor theCa- be undertaken as required. Radiated noise
nary Islandstation. measurements were to be made at all sites.
Particular attention had to be given to sys-
Development of Equipment Systems tem integration problems and to simplifications
which might be possible; for example, without
Criteria and Equipment Functions
compromising reliability, the possibility of re-
Basic equipment design and implementation ducing the number of antennas at a given site
criteria for this program were the result of sev- by use of antenna-sharing systems had to be
eral major considerations. One of these was considered.
economics: existing facilities were to be used Finally, all equipment had to be able to with-
wherever they met the Mercury location re- stand the environmental conditions found in
quirements. Thus, at six locations, a major such diverse climates as those of the desert at
part of the equipment, including most of the Woomera and the "salt air" of Bermuda."
network's tracking radars, was already avail- To provide mission support, the equipment of
able. Another major consideration was time. the network had to provide the following major
Maximum use of existing, proven equipment functions:
was dictated by the necessity to avoid the long- ('1) Ground radar tracking of the spacecraft
lead times required for research and develop- and transmission of the radar data to the God-
ment. But the primary consideration, over- dard computers
riding all others, was the safety of the astro- (2) Launch, orbital, and reentry computa-
naut. Some of the design requirements stem- tions during the flight with real-time display
ming from this consideration follow : data being transmitted to Mercury Control
(1) Reliability of components and units was Center (MCC)
required to be designed and engineered into ('3) Real-time telemetry display data at the
every element of the equipment configuration, sites
and adequate testing was required to prove this (4) Command capability at various stations
reliability. for controlling specific spacecraft functions
(2) Despite rigid reliability requirements of from _he ground
units, redundancy was to be used extensively (5) Voice communications between the
throughout each system and always at any criti- spacecraft and t:he ground, and maintenance of
cal point. Likewise, diversity was to be added a network for voice, teletype, and radar data
to redundancy. Thus, a very reliable system communications.
was to be physically duplicated and then to be Development of the individual systems to
partially duplicated again by the use of an alter- meet these requirements is described in the fol-
nate frequency, location, or some other means lowing paragraphs. Some systems have been
of achieving diversity. discussed in earlier publications (refs. 1 and 2) ;
(3) Wherever possible, the network system so they are only briefly described here, whereas
should have the ability to verify its own proper other systems, especially systems requiring ex-
functioning. Suitable monitoring and display tensive design, are covered in more detail.
devices were thus required.
Radar
There were also other requirements resulting
from "overlapping" of two or more systems. Mission requirements dictated the need for
One of these concerned interference. Deter- continuous radar tracking during launch and
mined efforts were made to minimize interfer- insertion to monitor the launch phase and to
ence to non-Mercury users of radio frequencies; establish the initial orbital parameters on _hich
to reduce mutual interference between Mercury the go---no-go decision would be based. During
equipment so that there was no degradation of orbital flight, additional tracking data would be
system performance under normal equipment required for a more precise determination of the
operation; and, to minimize interference from orbital parameters and time of retrofire for the

129
desired landing point. As nearly continuous spacecraft beacon. The addition of a beacon
tracking as possible was necessary during the local oscillator wave meter permitted the deter-
less predictrtble reentry 'portion of the flight to mination of spacecraft-transmitter frequency
provide adequate position data on the space- drift.
craft's landing point. Early in the installation program, it was
To obtain reliability in providing accurate realized that the range of the Bermuda FPS-16
trajectory data, the Mercury spacecraft was should be increased beyond 500 miles. With
equipped with C-band and S-band cooperative the 500-mile-range limitation, i t was possible
beacons. The ground radar systems had to ,be to track the spacecraft for only 30 seconds prior
compatible with the spacecraft radar beacons. to launch-vehicle sustainer engine cut-off
The FPS-16 radar (fig. 8-2) in use a t most (SECO) during the critical insertion phase.
By extending the range capability to 1,000
miles, the spacecraft could be acquired earlier,
and additional data could be provided to the
Bermuda computer and flight dynamics console.
This modification also increased the probability
of having valid data available to make a
go-no-go decision after SECO.
The Verlort radar (see figs. 8-3(a) and
8-3 ( b ) ) fulfilled the S-band requirement with
only a few modifications. Significant ones
FIGURE
8-2.--FpS-16 radar installation at California. were the addition of specific angle-track ca-
pability and additional angular scan modes.
national ranges was selected to meet the C-band A t Eglin Air Force Base the MPQ-31 radar
requirement. Although it originally had a was used for S-band tracking by extending its
range capability of only 250 nautical miles, range capability to meet Mercury requirements.
most of the FPS-16 radar units selected for the The data-handling equipment was essentially
project had been modified for operation u p to the same as for the FPS-16. Coordinate con-
500 miles, a NASA requirement, and modifica- version and transmitting equipment was i ~ -
tion kits mere obtained for the remaining sys- stalled at Eglin to allow both the MPQ-31 and
tems. I n addition to the basic radar system, it the FPS-16 to supply three-coordinate desig-
was also necessary to provide the required data- nate data to the AMR radars via Central
handling equipment to allow data to be trans- Analog Data Distributing and Computing
mitted from all sites to the computers. Details (CADDAC) .
on data flow and computation are discussed sub- After implementation these radar systems
sequently in the computer section. performed as planned, and only minor modifi-
The FPS-16 system originally planned for cations were made.
the network did not have adequate displays and
controls for reliably acquiring the spacecraft Active Acquisition Aid
in the acquisition time available. Conse- Once the types of radars to be used were de-
quently, a contract was negotiated with a manu- termined, it became evident that these narrow-
facturer to provide the instrumentation radar beam, precision-tracking units would have dif-
acquisition (IRACQ) modifications. An es- ficulty in initially acquiring the small, high-
sential feature of this modification is that it speed spacecraft. Without externally supplied
examines all incoming video signals, verifies the dynamic pointing data, the spacecraft would
target, and automatically establishes angle-only pass through the radar beam so quickly that the
track. Once the spacecraft has been acquired, basic radar circuits and/or operators would
in angle range, tracking in the automatic mode have very little time in which to recognize the
can be achieved with relative ease. Other fea- target and switch into automatic tracking.
tures of the IRACQ system included additional Two basic types of solution to the radar-ac-
angle scan modes and radar phasing controls to quisition problem were considered. One was
permit multiple radar interrogation of the the use of an on-site analog computer which
130
would be supplied with predicted spacecraft craft telemetering signals and automatically
time and position data by teletype from the track the spacecraft in angle with sufficient ac-
Goddard computers. The on-site computer curacy to provide suitable pointing data to the
would then generate dynamic-tracking data radar.
along the predicted orrbit and supply it to the The hardware to meet these requirements was
radar during the passage of the spacecraft. developed around refurbished and modified
This approach was rejected because of the cost SCR-584 radar pedestals, antenna, and receiver
and development time necessary to provide suit- components. The major units of the h a 1 con-
able analog computers and because it was felt figuration used for Mercury are shown in figure
that complete dependence on teletype data for 8 4 , and figure 8-5 shows the acquisition aid
acquisition would not provide sufficient overall antenna installation at Guaymas, Mexico.
tracking system reliability.
The second solution to the problem was a new
development called the "active acquisition aid."
This device was designed to receive the space-

Antmna ossembiy Antenna assembly


(square ground screen version) (round ground screen version)

multiDiexer
R F housing

Servo
cabinet
Receiver
cabinet

( a ) .-Verlmt installation at Bermuda.

FIGURE
H.--Major units of the acquisition system.

P e r f o m m e analysk-Tests of the first sys-


t.ems delivered showed two major performance
deficiencies. The first of these stemmed from
the fact that the spacecraft-telemetering trans-
mitter bandwidth was substantially wider than
had been anticipated; the acquisition aid re-
( b ) .-Intefior view of a Verlort radar van. ceiver was consequently unable to achieve phase
8-3.-Photographs
FIQURE of Verlort installations. lock. This deficiency was corrected by adapt-

131
ing another existing detector design to the Mer- fore less multipath susceptibility would, of
cury equipment. couxe, have meant some sacrifice of one of the
most desirable advantages of the system: that
of being able to cover large areas of space in a
short period of time.
Fortunately, early experience with the radars,
particularly the FPS-16 which, equipped with
the IRACQ modification, can :ock on a target
very quickly, indicated that the accuracy re-
quirements of the acquisition aid could be re-
laxed ;analysis of tracking requirements showed
that with proper alinement, the equipment
would provide sufficiently accurate data to the
radars. The specified accuracy for the active
acquisition aid was thus relaxed to require only
tracking within the beamwidth of the partic-
ular radar with which it worked (k0.5" for the
FPS-16 and + L O " for the Verlort) for 2 sec-
onds out of every 5 instead of k0.5" on a con-
tinuous basis.
With these changes, the initial performance
deficiencies of the system were alleviated.
However, in the course of the project, a number
of other modifications to the equipment were
found necessary to improve reliability, ease of
maintenance, and ease of operation. Installa-
tion of hermetically sealed R F components,
waterproof connectors, better antenna limit
switching and mechanical limit stops, and bias
regulators for the R F amplifiers was made to
improve reliability. Test points and grounding
switches in the voltage-controlled oscillator
(VCO) and a connector board with many of the
system test points in one convenient location
8--R.--Acquisition aid antenna installation at
FIQURE
were installed to improve the ease of mainte-
Guaymas, Mexico. nance. Changes to the antenna handwheels, re-
location of controls, and installation of mode
The second major performance problem was switches were made to increase the ease of
that the equipment could not meet tracking ac- operation.
curacy specifications on a continuous basis. I n conclusion, it should be noted that although
Two principal factors contributed to the ac- a number of problems of varying degrees of
curacy problem. The predominant one, espe- seriousness were encountered with the acquisi-
cially at low and medium elevation angles, was tion aid-most of them stemming from the ne-
that of multipath signal reception. The lesser cessity of developing a new system in an ex-
factor was the inherent coarseness of the quad- tremely short time-the equipment successfully
helix antenna array and other R F components. fulfilled its intended function. Rarely during
Redesign of the antenna would have pushed be- the latter Mercury missions did one of them fail
yond the state of the art and probably would to acquire and track the spacecraft shortly after
have delayed the program. Use of another, horizon time and thereby aid the radar in ac-
existing antenna with less beamwidth and there- quiring an automatic track.

132
Computing System System desrn$tion.-Since the computing
system was described in a prior publication
Requbemnts.-Early in the design of the
(ref. 2), only a brief review is presented here.
Mercury system it was considered mandatory to
During a mission, radar data from the net-
receive information on a real-time basis and to
work stations are transmitted by way of data
provide for instantaneous computation and dis-
circuits (ref. 2) to the communications center
play of mission data from lift-off to landing.
(fig. 8-6). Here, real-time equipment places
To meet these requirements, new data transmis-
the radar data from each tracking station auto-
sion equipment and computer peripheral gear
matically in the core storage of the computers.
were required. A new concept in large-scale,
Two IRM 7094 computers operating independ-
real-time data processing was required to tailor
ently, but in parallel, process the data. Should
computations to a computer cycle and to manage
a computer malfunction during the mission, the
the priorities of the computations performed
other computer can be switched on-line to sup-
automatically.
port the mission while the malfunctioning com-
I n all phases of the Mercury mission, it was
puter is taken off-line and repaired.
vital that the many different forms of calcula-
The computers provide trajectory informa-
tions be performed with exact precision and the
tion necessary for the flight control of the mis-
data be made available almost instantaneously.
sion. At MCC, about 18 digital displays, 4
For example, in a matter of seconds after
plotboards, and the wall map (fig. 8-7) are
launch-vehicle cut-off and spacecraft insertion
driven by the computers. This map shows the
into orbit, the computers were required to fur-
present position of the spacecraft and the land-
nish data based on tracking information for
ing point which mould be achieved if the retro-
evaluating whether or not the mission should be
rockets were ignited in 30 seconds.
permitted to continue.
Development of new equipment.-To imple-
Before the Bermuda submarine cable was in-
ment a real-time computing system of the com-
stalled, it was decided to supplement the God-
plexity of the one considered for Project
dard-Cape Canaveral complex with a secondary
computing station at Bermuda. Installed there
mas an IBM 709 computer that received the in-
puts of the Bermuda FPS-16 and Verlort
radars. The role of Bermuda was twofold: it
served as a backup remote control center during
the launch phase and as a tracking site there-
after. Specifically, it performed the following
computing tasks :
(1) Provided all the necessary trajectory in-
formation to drive the display devices in the FIGURE
8-6.-Computing center at Goddard Space
Bermuda control center. Flight Center.
(2) Computed an independent go-no-go at
insertion based on Bermuda data.
(3) Computed retrofire times to be used in
the event of an abort to land the spacecraft in
one of the designated recovery areas.
(4) Computed refined landing points for sev-
eral abort cases.
( 5 ) Computed orbital characteristics.
(6) Sent postinsertion conditions to God-
dard.
After the submarine cable was installed in
April 1962, the Bermuda computer was re-
moved and all the computations listed above FIQURE
8-7.-View of Mercury Control Center showing
were programed in the Goddard computers. wall map, plotting boards, and digital displays.

133
Mercury,it wasnecessary
to designsomespe- Table 8-I shows FPS-16 and Verlort radar
cializedequipment.An exampleis the IBM performance. Both radars approached their
7281 Data Communications Channel (DCC) design limits while tracking an orbital target.
which automatically accepts inputs from a large The values were derived by fitting the data to
number of data sources, places the information the equations of motion. The data were far
quantities directly at the disposal of the com- better than expected. Note that, up until the
puter, automatically accepts calculated output MA-9 mission, the standard deviation in eleva-
data from the computer, and makes the infor- tion for the FPS-16 is twice that in azimuth,
mation immediately available for transmission probably as a result of refraction errors. An
to many destinations. improved correction for refraction was incorpo-
For early missions, a duplexed configuration rated into the Mercury programs for MA-9.
of IBM 7090 computers was connected by a This is not apparent in the Verlort ; apparently
DCC to radar stations, and sources comprising the much higher noise level concealed the re-
the real-time tracking and instrumentation sys- fractive error. In many cases the data from
tem. For the MA-9 mission, a Triplex con- certain FPS-16 and Verlort radars were better
figuration of IBM 7094 computers, which were than the 0.1 mil and 1.0 mil criteria.
updated from the IBM 7090 configuration, was A comparison of the single-station FPS-16
used. orbital determination with the single-station
Test and evaluation teehniques.--Any system Verlort solution shows that the FPS-16 is
as complex as the Mercury network had to be roughly four times as accurate in position and
thoroughly tested under conditions as close to eight times as accurate in velocity determina-
actual operating conditions as possible. I¢ had tion.
to be certain that the units and subsystems were The accuracy of the Mercury integration
functioning properly and that all elements were scheme, atmospheric model, and tracking data
functioning together as a complete system. is demonstrated in table 8-II. The orbit, as de-
Thus, it was necessary to devise computer-con- termined by multiple station solution, was inte-
trolled tests to check out all computer-related
grated forward to compare with newer tracking
elements of the total system. Called CADFISS
data. The vector changes in position and
(Computation and Data Flow Integrated Sub-
velocity were averaged and are presented in
system) testing, this worldwide network test
table 8-II.
concept was employed in Mercury launch count-
The accuracy of the total system is demon-
downs to determine final tracking and data proc-
essing system readiness• strated by the calculation of time-to-fire retro-
Performance analysis.--A brief analysis of rockets. The spacecraft timing system is such
how the computing and data system performed that the rockets are fired at the integer second.
during the manner orbital Mercury missions is With the spacecraft traveling at 5 miles per sec-
presented. ond, the landing point is known only to ±2.5

Table 8-I.--Radar Performance

Standard deviations--mission averages

Mission FPS-16 Verlort

Range, Azimuth, Elevation, Range, Azimuth, Elevation,


yd mils mils yd mils mils

MA-6 ........ 8.5 0. 23 0. 44 29. 0 1.63 1.35


MA-7 ........ 9.8 • 22 • 40 33. 7 1.62 1.72
MA-8 ........ 8.6 • 25 • 36 39. 6 1.22 1.34
MA-9 ........ 11.2 • 27 • 26 20. 2 1.36 1.42

134
miles. The recovery forces are able to estimata Table 8-III.-h?esu.?ts of Landing-Point
their position to about 2 2 miles. Thus, the Predictions Made by Computer8
total uncertainty may be approximately ~5 ~~

miles. Table 8-111 shows the landing points Predicted Reported


predicted for the four manned missions. The Mission landing point pickup point of
spacecraft
center column shows the landing point s t a b -
lished by radar tracking. The tracking infor-
mation in MA-7 and MA-6 provided landing MA-6- ____ 21'31.2' 21'25.6' N.
68'52.9' 68'36.5' W.
points within 15 to 20 miles of that reported by MA-7- -_ -- 19'24' N . 19'30'
the recovery forces. This difference may have 63'52' W. 64'15'.
resulted from lift experienced by the spacecraft - MA-8_-_-- 32'06' N . 32'05.5' N.
in reentry. The predictions for MA-8 and 174'31.8' W. 174'28.5' W.
MA-9 are well within the area of uncertainty MA-9----- 27'22'N. 27O22.6' N.
176'29' W. 176'35.3' W.
and show a nearly perfect retrofire and reentry.
Several years ago, a prediction such as that
shown in table 8-111 would have appeared very
optimistic for the performance of the manned
space-flight network. I n considering perform-
ances as a whole, the network can be said to have
performed considerably better than originally
anticipated. The network tracking and com-
puting system has successfully predicted the
spacecraft landing points, and a t all times has
provided accurate information on the astro-
naut's position. F o r all of the Mercury mis-
sions, the network and computing system per-
formed their basic functions normally and with-
out except ion. FIQUBE H.-Antenna installations for the Telemetry
and Control (T and C) Building Area, Guaymas,
Table 8-ZZ.-Average Change in Position and Mexico.
Velocity

I
Mission I
I
Change in
po.?itit, I
I
Change in
vpgy, I
I

I I
-
b
First three passes
I
Mtsslon average-no data on 16 of 22 passes
I

Telemetry &%9.-Display and control consoles aboard the


FIQURE
Rose Knot.
Because the telemetry system has been de-
scribed in reference 2, this section briefly de- Design approach.-Obviously, the ground-
scribes only the design approach, modifications, station design requirements were established to
and performance. T o help orient the reader, be compatible with the spacecraft's telemetry
a typical antenna installation at a telemetry characteristics. The basic type of telemetry
station is presented in figure 8-8, and display system chosen early in Project Mercury was
arid control consoles aboard a telemetry ship are PAM/FM/FM. This system was chosen be-
presented in figure 8-9. cause itj could provide the needed information

135
and was a reasonably well proven state-of-the- Display of the events data carried on the corn-
art type which could be implemented on the mutated subcarriers was to be in the form of
ground stations with commercially available lights. Appropriate translation equipment was
hardware. Implementation guidelines used are to be provided to display the time measurements
as follows : as in-line decimal digits in hours, minutes, and
(1) Two independent links were to be used seconds.
to gain reliability. The equipment at each sta- (7) Monitor displays were to be provided to
tion was to provide independent receiving sys- permit the operator to assess the outputs of
tems for the two links from the spacec_'aft. both receiving systems at a station and to se-
Separate preamplifiers, receivers, diversity com- lect the system to drive the final data output
biners, filters, subcarrier discriminators, and the displays.
associated monitor and control equipment were (8) A permanent recording system capable
to be provided. Separate monitoring of the of rapid processing and display was to be pro-
data from the subcarrier discriminators of each vided to record all subcarrler discriminator out-
system with commutated data not decoded was puts, all decommutated analog quantities, and
to be provided to permit the operator to select received signal strength.
the telemetry system output to be displayed at (9) The overall system-accuracy requirement
a main control console. was that system error not exceed 9 percent un-
(2) At th'e station_ which were to have com- der field conditions.
mand transmitters, separate decoding and dis- System performance. The telemetry and
pla.y equipment was to be provided for the two display system performance was outstanding
telemetry links. (This arrangement was neces- throughout the project. During controlled
sary to provide reliability in determining that flight, coverage time was generally horizon to
the proper commands were received at the horizon. Missions which had periods of drift-
spacecraft.) At all other sites, only one set of ing flight caused occasional signal dropouts due
decommutation and output data display equip- to nulls in the spacecraft antenna pattern. Dur-
ment was to be provided, with appropriate ing reentry phases, both telemetry links were
switching to the output of either receiving attenuated by the ionized sheath created by in-
system. tense heat and ablatiou of the heat shield and
(3) Provisions were to be made for separate reception was completely lost for periods of 3
magnetic tape recordings of the received out- to 5 minutes.
puts from each telemetry system to permit play- System accuracy (to the displays) of 2 per-
back and reassessment of the data following a cent., as originally implemented, was met s_tis-
pass. These recordings also were to provide a factorily. Summary data from remote sites
permanent record of the data with an overall which included the degradation factors of 2-
accuracy of 1 percent. percent meters, meter parallax, short mission
(4) Data-output display equipment was to meter scales (e.g., utilizing 50 percent of full-
be provided with the appropriate meters, lamp meter sc,'rle deflection), and reading error were
indicators, and direct writing records. generally within _+3 percent of futl-scaJe meter
(5) Continuous data on IRIG channels 5, deflection.
6, and 7 were to be recorded and displayed on
Air-Ground Communications
direct writing strip chart recorders with an
accuracy of 2 percent of full scale. Each of A system was required at each site to permit
these channels was also to be provided with a direct communications with the astronaut.
suitable events-per-unit time display. (This This system, termed the air-ground system,
provision was needed by aeromedic_l per'_annel would comprise all of the ground-based trans-
to monitor the astronaut's heart action and res- mitting, receiving, control, and antenna equip-
piration.) ment required to establish two-way voice com-
(6) Individual data outputs of the analog munications with the Mercury spacecraft.
quantities handled on the commutated subcar- General requirements included communications
tier (PAM) were to be displayed on meters reliability, ease of rapidly restoring system op-
with an accuracy of 2 percent of full scale. eration in case of failure, and the use of proven

136
off-the-shelfequipment
to reducebothdelivery attitude of the spacecraft antenna with rela-
time and costs. The following paragraphs tion to the ground antennas.
describethe specificrequirementsfor this (11) Recording facilities were required for
system,the systemmodifications,anda sum- all transmitted and received audio.
mary of systemperformance. (12) Varied distribution of all received au-
Re_uirements.--To provide a highly reliable dio and transmitter sidetones was required
system of communications which would be able through monitor speakers and the station in-
to overcome difficulties arising from spacecraft tercom system in order to satisfy the site oper-
equipment failure, atmospheric disturbances, ating requirements.
and ground-equipment breakdown, the follow- Pe_'forma_ce.:-UHF was used for primary
ing specific requirements were established:
voice communication throughout the proj-
(1) Complete voice transmission and recep- ect with very satisfactory results.
tion facilities for both HF and UHF operation
Because of wave propagation, HF communi-
were to be provided, with the HF equipment to cation proved too intermittent to be used as
serve as a backup facility for the UHF. more than backup communication and could not
(2) Standby UHF transmitters were re-
be considered as a reliable means of extending
quired for backup purposes at all stations. communication beyond station horizon. The
(3) Standby HF transmitters were required I-IF quality improved somewhat, however, after
for backup use at certain critical stations. a dipole antenna was installed on the MA-8
(4) Remote and local transmitter control was and MA-9 spacecraft.
required for all transmitters.
A photograph of the air-ground antenna and
(5) The means for operating these trans-
transmitter van installed at Guaymas, Mexico,
mitters on tone modulation as well as voice was
is shown in figure 8-10.
required.
(6) At those sites equipped with command Command

transmitters, a voice-modulation capability for


the command transmitters was required as an Require ments.--The criteria for the com-
emergency mode of operation. mand equipment followed the general guide
(7) A means was required for individual op- lines for all Mercury equipment. The basic
eration of the UHF, HF, and emergency-voice requirement was the transmission of commands
modes, as well as simultaneous use of the UHF from certain stations to the spacecraft in order
and HF or the UHF, HF, and emergency- to provide a command backup for the manually
voices modes. controlled or internally programed events in
(8) At sites where transmitting equipment the spacecraft. The range coverage of the
was to be installed in vans, provisions for mov- command system was to be limited only by line-
ing the van from the transmitting antenna to of-sight conditions to the spacecraft. The min-
a receiving antenna were required in case of imum normal range of the systems was orig-
transmitting antenna or pedestal failure. inally set at 700 nautical miles.
(9) To offset space-fading effects and also This equipment was to employ a suitable cod-
to provide built-in equipment backup facilities, ing technique to provide high reliability with
dual space and polarization-diversity equip- particular attention to prevention of incorrect
ment was required for UHF reception, and commands because of noise, interference, or
dual-space diversity equipment was required for transmitting equipment failures. All com-
HF reception. This stipulation, then, required mand sites would have dual FRW-2, 500-watt
that two complete and identical sets of antennas, transmitters. The command antenna was to
transmission lines, and receiver elements for have at least 18-db gain, circular polarization,
both the HF and UHF equipment be furnished and to be steerable.
at each site. Modifications.--Bermuda, having coverage of
(10) Circular polarization of UHF trans- the critical insertion phase, required the abil-
mitting and receiving antennas was required to ity to "brute force" command signals to the
offset signal attenuation caused by any skew spacecraft regardless of the spacecraft an-

707-056 (_-63--10 1 37
tenna position. A 10-kw R F power amplifier During the implementation phase of the pro-
was to be provided for that purpose. Likewise, gram, ancillary equipment consisting of control
monitoring facilities that would provide failure and monitoring facilities was designed and fab-
sensing of this power amplifier were required. ricated. This equipment was necessary to pro-
I f failure occurred, antenna transfer to the vide the desired fail-safe features and degrees
operational 500-watt transmitter would be done of flexibility this program required. Further-
automatically. Three existing sites already more, at sites equipped with command vans,
had this high power and failure switching provisions were made to allow the transmitter
capability. van to be moved to the receiver antenna pedestal
in case the command antenna pedestal failed,
Mission requirements made major command
equipment additions necessary. The need for
additional command coverage became apparent
when the program was expanded beyond three-
orbital-pass missions. Consequently, dual 10-
kw command facilities were installed on the
Rose Knot Victor telemetry ship. The basic
equipment furnished was identical to that fur-
nished previously to the land-based stations.
Temporary dual 500-watt command facilities
were also added to the Coastal Sentry Quebec
Ship. Here again, the basic equipment fur-
nished was identical to existing land equipment.
Another major change in the command con-
figuration was the MCC-Bermuda tone rehot-
ing system which became practical only after
submarine cable circuits were available between
Bermuda and Cape Canaveral.
Performance.-As with the other systems, the
command equipment functioned as planned
throughout the project.

Ground Communications

Introduction.-Operation of this system was


discussed in reference 2; therefore, it is only
briefly reviewed in the present paper. Again
the basic design criteria were used : reliability,
FIGURE
€+lO.-Transmitter van and antenna installa- cost, and speed of implementation.
tion a t Guaymas, Mexico, for command and air- Repuirentents.-A primary requirement for
ground voice. the tracking network was that the stations be
tied together with an adequate and reliable com-
It was necessary to remove the standard coder munications center. This center was to act as
controller of the FRW-2 and substitute coder the heart of a communications system which
control units designed to be compatible with would perform the following functions :
the coding technique employed in the space- (1) Transmit acquisition information from
craft equipment and the input requirements of the computing center to the tracking and telem-
the FRW-2 coder KY-l71/URW coder which etry stations.
was part of the FRW-2. Furthermore, the (2) Transmit commands and instructions
coder controllers were to be capable of remote from the MCC to the stations.
activation and rapid changeover to any one of (3) Transmit digital tracking data from the
several codes which might be desired. tracking stations to the computing center.

138
(4) Transmit telemetrysummarymessages Table 8-IV.--Messages Handled During MA-7
fromthestationsto theMCC. and MA-8
(5) Providehigh-speed datatransmission be-
tweenthe computingcenterandthe MCCfor MA-7 MA-8
displaypurposes.
(6) Providevoicecommunications capability Total number of
betweencertainstationsandthe MCC. messages ......... 1,814 5, 587
(7) Transmitmissionteletypetrafficthrough-
outthenetwork. Information flow Messages Messages
Both teletypeandvoicecircuitswererequir- time, min
ed. The teletypecircuitsusuallyoperatedat 0to5 ............. 1, 597 4, 335
60wordsperminuteandprovidedfor transmis- 5 to 10 ............. 169 878
sionof all of the requiredtypesof information Over 10 ............ 24 334
excepthigh-speed trackingdataand, of course, Undetermined ...... 24 40
voice communications. These two were handled
Message transmission
by voice-quality circuits with a pass band of 280
time, min
to 2,800 cps.
The network that was established to meet 0to 1.............. 526 1, 073
these requirements is illustrated in reference 2. lto2 .............. 625 2, 087
Because these channels traverse extremely 2to3 .............. 410 1, 151
3to4 .............. 128 569
long distances and employ a variety of trans- 4to5 .............. 40 134
mission media, such as land lines of various Over 5 ............. 75 515
types, submarine cables, and HF radio, it was Undetermined ...... 10 58
necessary that the design arrangement and op-
erating technique preserve their transmission Garbled messages___
Lost messages ......
capability. The chief factors involved were
overall attenuation, bandwidth, distortion,
noise, return loss, and echo.
Modifications and Perf ormanve.--Following Timing
are some of the major changes made after the
A timing system was required to provide
initial configuration was established:
timing signals for all recorders in a common
(1) The HF link to Bermuda was dropped
format, binary-coded time signals for radar
after the cable became available, and two high-
data, strobe pulses for radar interrogation, and
speed data circuits from Bermuda to Goddard
were added. outputs for driving wall clocks and displays.
(2) The network was expanded to include the The system was to have the capability of syn-
switching, conferencing, and monitoring chronizing with WWV timing with a resolu-
(SCAMA) voice capability to Canary Island, tion accuracy to within 0.001 second. The
Kano, Zanzibar, Canton Island, the Rose Knot stability of the timing system was to be such
Victor, and the Coastal Sentry Quebec. that the local timing oscillator drift would
(3) Zanzibar became a primary HF link for not exceed 0.001 second in 48 hours.
the Coastal Sentry Quebec.
The timing system which had been developed
(4) HF backup to Guaymas was added.
for the scientific satellite tracking stations was
The Mercury communications network in-
selected since it had proved to be reliable and
cluded 102,000 miles of teletype lines, 60,000
accurate under actual field operating condi-
miles of telephone lines, and 15,000 miles of
tions.
high-speed data lines.
The ground communication system operated The timing system performed satisfactorily
very satisfactorily for all missions. Perform- throughout the Mercury Project, and only
ance figures for the MA-7 and MA-8 missions minor modifications were necessary to correct
are listed in table 8-IV. component failures and increase reliability.

139
Intercom redundancy which was considered essential to
the Mercury Project.
It mas apparent a t the outset that rapid and
flexible voice communications (intercom)
would be needed within each station. Station
personnel who would need such communica-
tions mere (1)the flight controllers, who would
monitor the flight status of the spacecraft and
the overall conduct of the mission and who
would advise and assist the astronaut in making
decisions as required, and (2) the maintenance
and operations personnel, who would provide
technical support to the flight controllers in the
operation of the various tracking, telemetry,
and communications systems. F’IQURE 8-ll.-Mercury Control Center as viewed from
The intercom system had to have the capa- the observation room.
bility of interconnecting several different con-
soles or positions in a conference type circuit
Bermuda Control Center.-In the earlier
(loop) whereby several people would be able
phases of the project, this secondary control
to carry on a discussion, with others being able
center was required because the critical orbital
to “listen in” or be called on for comments or
insertion point of the spacecraft would be at B
information. Also, because of the varied ac-
marginal distance and low-elevation angle from
tivities of different positions, there had to be
several of these conference loops so that simul- MCC, which might give unreliable data and
taneous conversations could be carried on with would allow little time for MCC to determine
each loop usually isolated to one system or go-no-go conditions. I n addition, since Ber-
activity. The system also had to connect to muda’s vital tracking data needed for establish-
outside lines so that the flight director could ing insertion parameters had to be relayed by
have immediate contact with any of the flight HF, a more fail-proof arrangement was needed.
controllers at any station through the world- The Bermuda Control Center had the follow-
wide communications network. ing basic functions :
After implementation by using standard (1) To command an abort in the event of
components, only a few minor modifications to critical spacecraft equipment failure or pilot
the intercom system were necessary to obtain difficulty late in the launch phase.
proper, reliable operation. The system met the (2) To command an abort as directed by
project requirements in a first-rate manner. MCC in the event of certain propulsion or
guidance system malfunctions.
Control Centers (3) T o control the mission independently in
the event of communications failure with MCC.
Mermry Control Center.-The primary Figures 8-13 and 8-14 show a view of the
function of MCC was to provide a means of center and an equipment layout.
centralizing control and coordination of all the After the submarine cable to Bermuda was
activities associated with a Mercury mission. available, it was possible to remote the control
Figure 8-11 is a view of the operation room of data safely to MCC. The Bermuda station
MCC. Mission control and coordination were functioned as a remote station for the MA-9
conducted from MCC beginning at approxi- mission with a minimum of flight-control staff.
mately 10 to 12 days before lift-off and continu-
ing through the launch, orbital, reentry, and
Simulation Equipment
recovery phases. Communication, display, and
control capability for MCC operation was pro- The development of a simulation system was
vided in the various consoles, which are shown established primarily to answer the need for an
in figure 8-12. Many of the positions contained active training device for mission flight con-
duplicate displays and controls to provide trollers. A secondary use for the simulation

140
I. Instructor’s console 13 Spacecraft environment monitor
2. Recovery commander(USN) 14 Spacecraft communicator
3. Operations director 15 Spacecraft system monitor
4. Network commander ( U S A F ) 16. Retrofire controller
5. Recovery slotus monitor 17. Flight dynamics officer
6. Range safety observer 18. T V monitors ( 3 )
7 . Flight director 19 X - Y recorders (4)
8. Network status monitor 20. Trend charts (16)
9. Missile telemetry monitor 21. Operations summory display
IO. Strip chart recorder ( 3 ) and alphanumeric indicators
I t . Support control coordinator 22. Signal distribution panel
12. Flight surgeon 23 Teletype printers
24. Data entry console

FIQUBE
8-12.-Operations Room and Observation Room, Mercury Control Center.

of training flight controllers who would be ulti-


mately assigned to stations other than the con-
trol center.
Equipment Doeurnentation

Within a general requirement to furnish ade-


quate instruction manuals for the network
equipment, detailed specifications for individual
manuals were prepared and the overall organi-
€?-13.-View
FIQTJRE of Bermuda Control Center, zation of this family of documentation mas de-
veloped. The detailed specification called for
system was the .familiarization of the mainte- new manuals to.be prepared in accordance with
nance and operating personnel with the mission the best commercial practices and established
support required of them for a particular flight. minimum content requirements for the accept-
The simulation system was designed in two ance of existing, off-the-shelf manuals. The
parts : the first and major part was the addition most notable feature of the overall organization
of specialized instrumentation and control con- of the manuals was the concept of system man-
soles at MCC that could be used by instructors uals and equipment manuals. Equipment man-
to provide the stimulus necessary to activate the uals covered individual units and subsystems,
MCC operational consoles; the second part mas such RS communications receivers, audio line
a separate remote-site simulator for the purpose amplifiers, and radar sets; and system manuals

141
I. Alphanumeric indicators
2 World map
3. Partition wall
4, Lighting panel
5. Plot board
6. Tool and parts locker
7. Maintenance end operations
super visor's desk
8. Flight supervisor's
console

I_ 12

9 Telecommunications
I0, Signal distribution panel
I I. Power distribution panel
12. Common equipment cabinets
113. Flight surgeon's console
14 Spacecraft environment monitorls console
15, Spacecraft communicator's console
16 Spacecraft systems monitorls console
iF, Flight dynamics officer's console
IS. Strip chart recorder

FIGURE 8-14.--Operations Room, Bermuda.

provided information on how the individual sary isolation (separation) between transmit-
units and subsystems tied together to form the ting and receiving antennas. The equipment
major network system. Altogether, approxi- covered a very wide range of frequencies and
mately 450 separate manuals with copies total- required specific terrain configurations to op-
ing nearly 50,000 were supplied for use on the erate at maximum efficiency. It was determined
network. that five of the stations and the control center
Installation could be located on national ranges where use
could be made of existing facilities. One new
The installation of ground instrumentation station was to be located in Texas and two on
equipment actually began with the efforts of the
shipboard. The remaining eight would have to
teams who selected the sites for the remote sta-
be established on foreign or overseas territory.
tions. The general area for each station had
Selection of the foreign locations was accom-
been determined from the planned orbit charts,
plished by two teams. The first, a management
but selected areas required on-site inspection for
team which had representation from the U.S.
the evaluation of local problems and land avail-
Department of State, was to determine and re-
ability. Each station had to be considered
solve, if possible, all difficulties of a general
from cost, adaptability, and accessability stand-
nature such as political considerations, prefer-
points. Every attempt was made to use exist-
ence of local officials as to station location, and
ing facilities, but where these were not available
below the orbital paths, sites were chosen which currency problems. In addition, contact was
made with local contractors, material suppliers,
presented the fewest problems while satisfying
the necessary criteria. and service companies. Labor sources were
The Project Mercury tracking stations re- also investigated and data on living conditions
quired considerable land area to provide neces- were obtained. The management team selected

142
a preferred and an alternate location for each support for the overseas stations and to handle
station. the customs details involved in such shipments.
Data gathering was the prime function of the The depots served as staging areas for overseas
technical survey teams. Project personnel shipments, whereas equipment destined for sta-
spent several days at each prospective site check- tions in the United States was shipped directly
ing soil conditions, topography, water, sewage from the manufacturer. More than 1,000 tons
disposal, communications, transportation, elec- of cargo were processed through the depots,
tric power, and climate. A comprehensive re- most of it in preassembled units. A rigid re-
port prepared on each site provided the basis ceiving and inspecting system was set up at each
for station selection and was used thereafter as station to check in all equipment before i t was
a guide for equipment design and location. turned over to the installation team.
The tight schedule made it impossible to Spare parts provisioning was another logis-
stagger construction a t the various stations. tics consideration. There had to be a reason-
Although first construction operations were not able on-site repair capability. Each industry
started until April 29, 1960, all stations were team member supplied a 2-year supply of
under construction by midsummer, and con- spares unique to his equipment and a list of
struction was completed a t the last station in recommended common item spares. From
Kano, Nigeria, in March of 1961. these lists a combined list of common item
Most buildings were constructed of prefabri- spares was drawn up to eliminate duplications.
cated galvanized sheet metal supported by rigid Common item spares were procured in accord-
steel frames. I n addition to the buildings hous- ance with the combined list and shipped to each
ing electronic equipment, most stations con- site.
tained power buildings, cooling towers, air Thus, the concept of a network of stations
handlers, water chillers, and hydmpneumatic became a reality with equipment and logistic
tanks. Diesel generators were installed to pro- support. The scope of design, construction,
duce power to back u p commercial power. installation, and activation for the Mercury
Extreme precision was necessary in the po- Network is shown in figure 8-15.
sitioning of every radar antenna. Each unit Figure 8-16 shows construction underway at
had t o be surveyed to determine true latitude Ran;.
and longtitude with exact interrelation, and
angles were established with a maximum allow- Demonstration site
Wdard
able deviation of 6 seconds. Cape Canaveral
As construction of facilities was still under- MCC
Grand Canary Is.
way a t some stations, the equipment and the in- Muchea
stallation teams were arriving. The number of Bermuda
Woomera
installers on a site team varied between 5 and Atlantic Ship
25, depending on the amount of equipment to Kano
be installed. A typical team consisted of the Quaymas
Zanz ibar
site manager, the team crew chief, a lead man Canton Island
for a subsystem or a combination of subsystems, IndianOcean Ship
Kauoi Island
several technicians, and one or two subcontrac- Point Arguello
tor advisors for specialized areas such as the Corpus Christi
White Sands
acquisition system. Each team was also sup- Eglin
ported by a logistics man.
All installation team leaders were authorized
to work with the local labor unions and utilize
the local labor market to perform certain jobs
beyond the capabilities of the installation team
and its facilities.
-
I

c
Procurement
Surveys
L 5 0 H 0 I
1959

WB Station development
Overseas transportation
iymllmm Maintenonce ad operations
I M L Y I 1 A 5 0 H 0 I

training ond site team drills


1960

m z z lnstdlatim
i Y L I Y i l

ond test
l9bl

szsm Technical monitoring


II Contractor maintenance

A
A
and operations
Provisionol acceptance dote
Network operationol dote

Two depots-one on each coast of the United E4-15.-Overall


WGURE Mercury Network schedule.
States-were established to provide logistics

143
or the Ampex FR-100B tape recorder. The
unit tests covered every measurable aspect that
could influence the reliability of minimum per-
formance expected of the unit.
(2) Mercury System Tests (MST) were de-
veloped to provide acceptance of a complete
system. These tests checked the action of each
interfaced relay as well as system performance.
(3) Mercury Integrated Tests (MIT) were
developed to provide acceptance of the station
as an integrated complex. These tests assured
successful interface of systems. They also re-
S-lS.-Construction of the receiver building
FIQUBE vealed R F interference problems.
Kano, Nigeria. (4) Mercury Dynamic Tests (MDT) were
developed to test the equipment under simu-
Testing
lated operating conditions. As ground station
Denwnstration site.-The necessity of test- equipment was installed and evaluated a t the
ing and evaluating the ground instrumentation Demonstration Site, the need for a method of
equipment as a complete system prior to its closely simulating spacecraft tracking soon be-
installation on a worldwide basis was recog- came apparent. Small leased aircraft were used
nized in the early planning stages of the Mer- to check the tracking accuracy of the new acqui-
cury Project. Equipment from more than 10 sition aid, and it was found that certain modifi-
major manufacturers plus numerous subcon- cations were necessary for the equipment to
tractors was involved, and it had to be deter-
meet specifications.
mined that all interrelated problems had been
Instruntented aircraft.-As a result of these
solved and that the equipment would perform
as a system. and other special aircraft tests, it was decided
The selection of NASA Wallops Station, that aircraft would be obtained and completely
Wallops Island, Virginia, as a test site was de- instrumented with actual spacecraft electron-
termined primarily because of its availability ics (see fig. 8-17) to serve three functions :
and its proximity to Langley Research Center (1) T o qualify each ground system prior to
at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and the worldwide equipment delivery so that compati-
Goddard Space Flight Center at Greenbelt, bility between ground and airborne systems
Maryland. A complete tracking station was was assured.
installed, with the Mercury data conversion and
acquisition equipment connected to the existing
FPS-16 at the Wallops Station Launch Com-
plex.
Representatives from the suppliers of equip-
ment conducted tests at Wallops under NASA
supervision. As a result of these tests, many
changes were made t o equipment in the proto-
type stage prior to worldwide deliveries. Also
developed at the Demonstration Site were test
procedures that were used throughout the net-
work for acceptance testing of on-site equip-
ment.
The test procedures were of four types:
(1) Mercury Unit Tests (MUT) were devel-
oped to provide acceptance of self-contained
€!-17.-Interior
FIQTJRE view of aircraft showing a
equipment such as the R-390 HF voice receiver small portion of the test equipment.

1M
(2) To provide a complete checkout of each ing to replacement personnel so that network
station in the network so that operational readi- proficiency would not suffer from personnel
ness was determined. attrition.
(3) To provide continual testing and train- To supplement the training received at the
ing throughout the Mercury Project. center, cross-training packages of lesson guides,
equipment exercises, and examinations were
Training
developed for use at all the Mercury network
Prior to station assignment, selected senior stations. These were used for training of per-
engineers received specialized equipment train- sonnel in secondary areas of responsibility to
ing and later helped to install the equipment at enhance the overall capability of each team at
the Demonstration Site. After assignment, the stations.
these senior engineers were responsible for
making their equipment operational and for in- Network Configuration
doctrinating the other team members. Train-
Arrangement for MA-6
ing was largely accomplished by working with
the equipment during installation and by play- Up to this point, network requirements and
ing an active role in conducting acceptance systems development and implementation have
tests. As time allowed, semiformal classes were
been discussed. The types of systems available
held in theory and maintenance. at each site are listed in table 8-V. To illus-
Formal training.--Installation technicians
trate how a Mercury station was arranged, a
were technically capable of performing main-
line drawing of the Hawaii station layout is
tenance, but operational requirements posed
the need for a refinement of the team concept shown in figure 8-18.

and a regimented reaction to the demands of


Boresight tower t _'
mission accomplishment. Transition from in- S-bond radar /_"
staller and maintenance technician to opera- Ii
/s

tor was accomplished by a rigorous training


program that included: formal indoctrination Transmitter von ,_." It
\ '7 Radar van,J
lectures on space-flight matters and on Project Ground-to-air

.-'_
sl H
is

Mercury; on-the-job training combined with transmitter tower


t-_°_ /I I

Substation/_ _\VS-'band [/
classroom drills covering operation of the \' radar t[
0 J
equipment ; local-station simulated missions; i _I tower I
P-Kokee road

True
and network simulations using countdowns, live N
communications, and telemetry tapes.
The maintenance and operation capability \ AN/FPS-16
tower and
rodar_,.._'_
buddm(_[ ;,,
\!,
',,,
of station personnel had to be continually up- ,;/ ',,,
I %
graded, and replacement personnel had to be II I

provided. Likewise, the station had to be ex- Boresight tower .__g._" ,;"
for AN/FPS-16 radar I_ _."
ercised as an entity to assure that it could work
Transformer
as a cohesive unit during a mission. substation\ ..,,'
r-- -3 /'"
Training center.--To upgrade individual Seven- unit _;.jCT_ _'][/

capabilities and to provide replacement per- generator building [_:]

sonnel, a training center was established at the


Demonstration Site. The primary long-term ii II
II tl

objective of the Engineering and Training /I


I I
It
II
I I II
Center was to sustain or improve the level of II 11

_ _?/Boresight
,,L tower
competence of the personnel manning the Mer-
cury network stations through a comprehensive Antenna tower __',
I_\,___._ ',, o 5o'3oo' 4oo' 600'
training program in each of the equipment sub- Telemetry and _" I ' , ' '
control building "/ "_/ _.hntenna tower
systems making up the station. It was also
designed to give the necessary high-level train- FIGURE 8-18.--Hawaii station layout.

145
Table 8-V.--Station Equipment

Ground com-
munications
e_
Station

, o
I
Cape Canaveral (CNV-MCC)_ x x x x x B/GE x i x x
IP7090
Grand Bahama Island
(GBI) __ .............. x x x x x x
Grand Turk Island
(GTI) a_ .............. x x x x x x

Bermuda (BDA) ............. x x x x IBM-709 x x x


Atlantic Ship (ATS) .......... x x X X X X

Grand Canary Island (CYI)___ x x X X X X

Kano, Nigeria (KNO) .... "____ x x X X X

Zanzibar (ZZB) .............. x x X X X

Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) ..... x x X X X

Muehea, Australia (MUC) .... x x x X X X X

Woomera, Australia (WOM)__ x x X X X X

Canton Island (CTN) ........ x x X X X

Kauai Island, Hawaii (HAW)_ x x x X X X X

Point Arguello, Calif. (CAL)__ x x x X X X X

Guaymas, Mexico (GYM) .... x x x X X X X

White Sands, N.M. (WHS)b__ X X X X

Corpus Christi, Tex. (TEX)___ x x x X X X X

Eglin, Florida (EGL) b........ MPQ- x x i x x


31
I
Goddard Space Flight Center I IBM-7090 Communica-
(GSFC)
I tions Center

No raonitoring facilities; downrange antennas for MCC.


b Radar tracking station only.

Major Changes for Succeeding Missions can Mariner, were made a part of the network
and positioned near Midway to get reentry data.
Changes for MA-7.--The second manned
Changes for MA-9.--Since it was decided to
orbital flight, MA-7, was also planned as a three
extend the length of the MA-9 mission to 22
orbital pass mission. The network configura-
orbital passes, it was necessary to modify the
tion was the same as that for MA-6 except network so that adequate support could be pro-
for minor exceptions; there was no Atlantic vided. The following describes the changes
Ship, and the Indian Ocean Ship was reposi- that Were required :
tioned in the Mozambique Channel, off the east
Equipment:
coast of Africa.
(1) All command sites were provided with
Changes for MA-8.--The MA-8 mission was
additional command capabilities to give the site
planned to be a six orbital pass mission with flight controllers the capability to turn on the
landing to be made in the Pacific Ocean. For spacecraft's telemetry transmitter, radar bea-
this mission, the former Atlantic Ship had a cons, and an astronaut alarm. Other command
command system installed and was redesiguated changes included the addition of a complete
as the Pacific Command Ship (PCS) for posi- system aboard the Coastal Sentry Quebec
tioning south of Japan. Three additional ships, (CSQ) and an increase of the Rose Knot Victor
the Huntsville, the Watertown, and the Ameri- (RKV) command power from 600 watts to

146
10 kilowatts. Figure 8-19 shows the two ships (2) Communications to the CSQ at the new
in the port of Baltimore for modifications. location were handled through a radio link
which could operate through either Honolulu
or Bassendean and thence by the usual path.
(3) Communications to the R K V were
handled by R F links to Honolulu and New
York.
(4) A new circuit was added to relay the
Range Tracker data through Honolulu.
(5) The mission message format was changed
to improve circuit operation and to facilitate
accumulation of more data.
(6) New equipment arrangements were in-
stituted at Goddard to permit CADFISS and
operational programs to be conducted simul-
taneously.
F ~ o m&19.-Rose Knot Victor and Coastal Sentry Relocation of ship.9 ;The Coastal Sentry Que-
Quebec in Port Baltimore for MA-9 modifications. bec was relocated to the approximate position
of 28’30’ N. latitude and 130’00’ E. longitude.
(2) Mercury tracking site clocks showing The primary purpose of this location was to
“spacecraft elapsed time” and “time to retrofire” provide adequate retrosequence command back-
were modified to extend their reading time. u p during the 6th, 7th, 21s4 and 22nd orbital
(3) Additional equipment was installed at paSSeS.
California and Bermuda, allowing biomedical The Rose Knot Victor was relocated to the
data to be sent (over land lines) to MCC display approximate position of 25’00’ S. latitude and
consoles. 120’00’ W. longitude. I n this position, it pro-
(4) A telemetry automatic processing system vided optimum command coverage for passes
that used a small general purpose computer not covered by other network sites. The RKV
(-AN/UYK-l) was installed a t Bermuda. The provided coverage with its 10-kw command
system was designed to accept PAM/FM/FM transmitter during the 8th and 13th orbital
frames of 88 parameters every 800 milliseconds passes.
in real-time and generate special and regular Additional support: To provide the neces-
summary messages. The output data were in a sary coverage to support a mission of this dura-
format which represented selected parameters tion it was necessary to add the following track-
in engineering units. A running tolerance ing facilities :
check of all parameters was included and se- (1) The Range Tracker (C-band radar
lected data were stored for postpass analysis. equipped ship) was stationed at 31’30’ N. lati-
(5) Receivers were installed at MCC, Canary tude and 173’00’ E. longitude to provide re-
Island, and the CSQ for reception of the slow- entry radar coverage for the 4th, 7th, and 22nd
scan T V picture from the spacecraft. The in- orbital passes.
stallation at MCC and on the CSQ included (2) The Twin Falls Victory (C-band radar
record and display capabilities, whereas the in- equipped ship) was stationed in the vicinity of
stallation at CY1 was for record only. 31’3’ N. latitude and 75’00’ W. longitude for
(6) An additional IBM computer was added reentry radar coverage for the 2nd and 17th
to the computer complex at GSFC, and the odbital passes.
two 7090’s already in operation were converted (3) The Ascension Island station provided
to 7094’s. FPS-16 radar tracking during the fourth orbi-
Commlunications : tal pass. Also provided were telemetry record-
(1) The radio links to BDA were discon- ing, air-ground relay, and ECG remoting.
tinued since the submarine cable was now (4) The East Island, Puerto Rico, station
operational. provided FPS-16 radar tracking.

147
(5) The Antigua Island station provided voice. In addition to anticipated problems of
telemetry recording, air-ground relay, and ECG spacecraft equipment malfunctions, the ground
relay. team had to cope with such remote possibilities
(6) Air-ground voice facilities were pro- as simulated heart attacks of the astronaut in
vided at Wake Island, Kwajalein Island, and flight.
San Nicholas Island. The Wake and Kwajalein Simulations would ordinarily cover launch
sites provided an extension for the Hawaii air- and three orbital passes and might or might not
ground facilities. California had additional cover reentry. Each simulation would take
coverage provided by the San Nicholas installa- from 41/_ to 61/_ hours. Prior to MA-8, a full
tion. 18-orbital-pass mission was simulated in antici-
Network Operations pation of MA-9 as a means of pointing out any
major problem areas in personnel scheduling,
Time at the tracking station is generally
sleeping, and eating plans.
divided into mission periods and nonmission
Detailed system tests._The detailed system
periods. The mission period for Mercury com-
tests (DST), mentioned earlier as being per-
prised some 10 days prior to launch and the
formed on F-4 day, were a group of standard
actual flight time. The nonmission period was
procedures used to check and measure thor-
the time between missions used for personnel
oughly the operational performance of each of
training, equipment modification, testing, and
the station subsystems. Since the same test was
checkout. The operations activities during the
used for corresponding systems at all stations,
mission period are explained in the following
and since results of previously run DST's were
paragraphs, with the MA-9 mission used as an
recorded, the current status of any subsystem
example.
could be easily evaluated by the DST performed
Precountdown just prior to the mission.
The DST procedures consisted of two parts:
The MA-9 precountdown period for all net- the instructions and the data sheets. Meter
work stations was scheduled as follows :
readings, voltage and current measurements,
F-7 day--Orbital mission simulation and standing-wave ratios, and various other param-
reentry simulation eters were recorded on the data sheets which
F-6 day--Orbital mission simulation and were returned to Goddard for analysis immedi-
reentry simulation ately after the mission. On the station, the
F-5 day--Two reentry simulations cumulative results of the DST's were used in
F-4 day--Detailed system tests the determination of the station status, which
F-3 day--Equipment maintenance was a factor in the decision to proceed with or
F-2 day--Orbital mission simulation delay the launch.
F-1 day--Patching check and equipment Maintenance day.--F-3 day and F-1 day
maintenance
were left open for last-minute maintenance de-
These various activities are described in the
tails, particularly in correcting any equipment
following paragraphs.
deficiencies detected during the DST's. Final
Simulations.--To the station, the simulations briefings were also held to correct any pro-
were full-dress rehearsals for the missions.
cedural problems pointed up by the previous
With the entire network participating and all simulations.
onstation systems in operation, authentic dry
runs were conducted, complete with builtin Network Countdown

emergency situations which had to be detected,


The network countdown began 5 hours and
analyzed, and acted upon in "real time" by the
50 minutes prior to the scheduled launch. This
flight controllers and station personnel. Au-
thenticity was gained by the use of taped inputs time was devoted to computer and data flow
to the telemetry displays and events recorders checks, teletype checks, voice checks, and dbrief
and by the use of a communicator reading from system tests. The Network Countdown docu-
a prepared script over the intercom loop that ment specifically scheduled each of these ac-
would ordinarily carry the real astronaut's tivities, and designated the stations and equip-

148
mentpositionsto whicha particularoperation antennas were immediately slaved to the system
wasapplicable. The brief systemtest wasa which acquired first.
shortened versionof theDST andwasdesigned As the radar locked on target, it would then
to lend assurancethat equipmentperformance be set to track automatically, and, at operator
hadnotsignificantlydeteriorated
sincetheDST discretion, it could be made the controlling sys-
wasrun 4 dayspreviously. Whereas the DST tem for the other antennas. At dual radar
may havetaken12or morehours,mostDST's sites, data from the C-band radar--the most
couldbeperformedin lessthan2 hours. accurate of the two systems--was fed to the
TheNetworkCountdownalsocontainedthe teletype for transmission to the computers at
"plus-count,"a schedulingof pertinentactivi- Goddard. If this radar lost track, data from
ties to be performedbeforeacquisitionof the the S-band radar were put on the line.
spacecraftandduring the pass. As soon as possible after the last pass over the
station, the postlaunch instrumentation message
Flight Activities
was teletyped to the control center. It con-
tained a tabulation of the times of acquisition
After launch of the spacecraft, a time period
and loss of signal for the various systems, the
of from about 5 minutes (at Bermuda) to 90
modes of operation, and a summary status
minutes (at Eglin) would elapse 'before the
report.
spacecraft passed over the station. The actual
pass, the time from which the spacecraft ap- It was obvious that the length of the MA-9
peare(t above the horizon until it was lost below mission would preclude the manning of all sta-
the horizon, averaged about 7 minutes. Av- tion equipments from launch to termination.
erage time between passes was about 85 minutes. The flight path was such, however, that all sta-
This time was devoted to equipment calibra- tions had periods when the spacecraft would
tions--setting up known levels and annotating not pass over them for three or more orbital
the recorders so that later analysis would have passes.
known standards---and preparation for the next Doeunventation guldes.--Three documents
pass. provided the major guideline for station per-
Prepass calibrations were begun 45 minutes sonnel activities during the pass.' The Network
before the start of the nexCc pass. Twenty-five Operations Directive 61-1, was produced jointly
minutes prior to the pass the first acquisition by MSC, GSFC, and DOD and it set forth the
message would be received. This was a tele- general operating procedures for all systems so
type message sent from the control center advis- that a standard action would be used in a given
ing the station of the _ime and coordinates at circumstance at any station in the network.
which it could expect to acquire the spacecraft. The second document, the Data Acquisition
These figures were derived by the computers at Plan, gave detailed instructions for recorder
Goddard based on the real-time radar ilata from setups, pen assignments, patching arrange-
the last station passed over by the spacecraft. ments, and plotboard assignments, and gave in-
The information permitted the acquisition and formation for disposition of data records after
the mission. A new Data Acquisition Plan was
and radar operators to train their antennas to
the spot where the spacecraft would first be published prior to each launch. It was pre-
pared by MSC with inputs from GSFC.
"sighted." A second acquisition message was
The third document was the Communica-
received 5 minutes prior to the spacecraft pas-
tions Operations Plan, prepared by GSFC.
sage to communicate any inflight .deviations
This was a detailed account of how the commu-
during the intervening 20 minutes.
nications network was to function.
Acquisition would ordinarily take place
within a few seconds of horizon time. Because Performance
of the wide beamwidth of the antenna used by
the active acquisition aid, this system'ordinarily The Mercury network, throughout all orbital
was the first to acquire the target. At radar flights of the Mercury spacecraft, has clearly
sites, the S-band and C-band radars would none- demonstrated its capability to keep track of a
theless search independently. At contact, all manned spacecraft and remain in communica-

149
tion with the astronaut. These capabilities are of the equipment and personnel at all network
the direct result of the many months of plan- sites during the actual missions.
ning, instrumentation installation and checkout, There were six orbital flights of the Mercury
training, and the higMy efficient performance spacecraft, one unmanned (MA-4), one with a

40 ° 20 ° 0 o
I I I

r---Recovery

40 %
160 ° 140 ° 120 ° I00 ° 80 °4 50° 40 ° 20 ° (3° 20 ° 40 ° 60 ° 80 °
1 I I I I I I I I I I

FmURE 8--20.--MA-9 orbital charts.

chimpanzee aboard (MA-5), and four manned Radar Tracking

(MA-6 through MA-9). The network per-


During the countdown on May 14, 1963, the
formance continually improved during these
radar at Bermuda failed to pass the CADFISS
missions as more and more experience was
slew tests. Digital data were intermittently of
gained. This progress was typified by the peak
poor quality in both the azimuth and range
performance demonstrated during the last Mer- channels. Efforts to locate the trouble were in-
cury mission, MA-9. It lasted for nearly 22
effective, and the quality of the data gradually
orbital passes (fig. 8-20) with the spacecraft
decreased. At T-15 minutes, the range data
landing in the planned landing area near Mid-
error exceeded the tolerable limits, and at T-13
way Island in the Pacific Ocean. There were
minutes the mission was postponed for 94 hours.
some minor equipment failures associated with
Subsequent investigation revealed a faulty pre-
the Mercury network, but they did not mate-
amplifier in the azimuth digital-data channel
rially affect mission support or detract from the
and a faulty shift register in the range digital-
excellent performance demonstrated by the net- data channel. The simultaneous failure of
work throughout the flight.
both components complicated the failure
A summary of network performance for the analysis.
MA-9 mission is presented in the following On launch day there were no radar problems,
paragraphs. and the C- and S-band beacon checks prior to

150
launchindicatednobeacon
problems.Thenet- At the request of the Flight Dynamics Offi-
workC-bandradarstrackedapproximately 10 cer, the powered flight phase was supported
percent of the total mission time, which is 80 with the "A" and "C" computers, then switched
percent of the total time that the C-band beacon to the "A" and "B" computers during orbital
was turned on. The network S-band radars flight. The "B" computer gave no indication
tracked 1.7 percent of the total mission time, of dropout during the rest of the mission. Lift-
which is 36 percent of the total time that the off occurred at 08:04:13 a.m.e.s.t.
S-band beacon was turned on. The amount of The Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) I.P.
radar data furnished to the Goddard computers 7094 and the General Electric-Burroughs
was of sufficient quality and quantity to update guidance computers provided excellent data
the trajectories, and it was determined that the throughout the launch. A "go" decision was
orbital parameters did not decay an appreciable indicated by all three data sources.
amount. Initial tracking reports indicated In the orbital phase, during the periods when
that the C-band beacon was not as good as it the spacecraft C- and S-band beacons were on,
had been on previous missions because of the the tracking data received from the network
heavier than usual modulation on the beacon sites were excellent. During the mission, space-
replies. The heavy modulation experienced by craft weight change data resulting from fuel
the MCC and Bermuda radars during launch and coolant-water usage were manually put into
seemed to lessen as the mission progressed. the computers.
In addition to the normal Mercury Network The retrofire time recommended by the God-
radar sites, the following sites were used for dard computers was 33:59:30 ground-elapsed
the MA-9 mission: Ascension Island, East time (g.e.t.), and retrofire was manually initi-
Island, Puerto Rico, and the radar ships Twin ated at this time. After retrofire, the predicted
Falls Victory and Range Tracker. landing point transmitted to the MCC from the
Goddard computer was 27022 ' N. latitude and
Acquisition Aid 176o29 ' W. longitude. An attempt to refine this
prediction with six frames of data acquired by
In general, the performance of the acquisi-
the Range Tracker ship during blackout failed
tion-aid systems at all stations was satisfactory
to yield a converged solution. The computed
and comparable to that of previous missions.
time of the blackout was from 34:08:16 to
Low-angle elevation tracking, below approxi-
34:22:30 g.e.t. The actual time of initial black-
mately 15 °, was accomplished manually because
out was reported by the Range Tracker to be
of multipath conditions at most stations. The
34:08:17 g.e.t. The actual landing point was
only major acquisition-aid problem experienced
reported by the recovery ship to be 27°22.6 ' N.
during the mission was on the Coastal Sentry
latitude and 176035.3 ' W. longitude.
Quebec, where failure of the elevation antenna
Although geveral minor computer problems
drive system occurred prior to the 6th orbital
were encountered and corrected throughout the
pass. However, the antenna was positioned
manually from the 6th through the 8th passes, flight, at no time during the mission did the
and the malfunction in the drive system was computers fail to drive the digital displays and
corrected in time for acquisition in the 9th pass. plotboards at the MCC. In addition, perform-
ance of the high-speed lines between Goddard
Computing and the MCC was excellent.

The MA-9 countdown began at midnight on For the first time, CADFISS tests were con-
May 14, 1963. The Goddard computer, equip- dncted during the mission to determine the op-
ment, interface, CADFISS, and trajectory con- erational status of major equipment subsystems
fidence tests were all satisfactory. During the at network sites. These tests were considered
countdown, while using the "B" colnputer, necessary since mandatory equipment, _ot many
some dropout was observed at the MCC. The sites did not operate for prolonged periods of
high-speed output subchannel ou the "B" com- time when the spacecraft was out of range. All
1)uter communication channel was interchanged of these tests were successfully supported by the
with the plotboard high-speed subchannel. third Goddard computer while the other two

151
Goddardcomputerscontinued the operational mission checkout and the mission results indi-
support of the mission. cated that proper use of the squelch circuit elim-
Two range ships, the Range Tracker and the inated background noise from open UHF re-
Twin Falls Victory, were used to provide track- ceivers during periods of silence. This change
ing data to the computers. The Range Track- also resulted in a reduction of noise level on the
er provided good tracking data during the 7th, Goddard circuit during air-to-ground transmis-
sions.
20th, and 21st orbital passes. During reentry
the Range Tracker was poorly positioned with Relay aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean area re-
respect to tile blackout zone and provided only ported good UHF reception from the spacecraft
six frames of data for this phase of reentry. and good relay transmissions to MCC on the
An analysis of these data indicated a landing 2nd, 3rd, and 17th orbital passes. A relay at-
point which was about 3 ° or 180 nautical miles tempt on the 16th pass was unsuccessful because
away from the correct landing point. Twin of a severe thunderstorm in the vicinity of the
Falls Victory data readout was good on three relay aircraft. Communications from the MCC
passes. to the spacecraft through the relay aircraft
Ground Telemetry System were not attempted on the 2nd pass, and they
were unsuccessful on the 3rd pass because the
The telemetry coverage for the mission was
spacecraft had passed out of range. However,
excellent. There were no major ground system
the relay communications were successful on the
failures, although some coverage was lost be-
7th pass. Ascension and Antigua Islands in
cause of the manual switching procedure used
the Atlantic were also available for relaying
ouboard the spacecraft. In general, any de-
communications between the spacecraft and the
viation from nominal coverage can be attributed
MCC. Relay through Ascension was success-
to spacecraft attitude or to the transmitters be-
fully accomplished for a period of approxi-
ing turned off. The telemetry relay circuits
mately 6 minu_es during the third orbital pass.
from Antigua, California, Bermuda, and As-
The Antigua voice relay was not used during
cension were satisfactory in all respects. Dur-
the mission.
ing all passes over these stations when telemetry
In the Pacific Ocean area, communications
antennas were radiating, data were remoted to
were successfully relayed from Hawaii through
the MCC. During the third orbital pass, the
Kwajalein and Wake Islands on passes 3 and
telemetry was switched to the high-frequency
19, respectively. A voice-operated relay from
link prior to the spacecraft's passing over
Hawaii and remained on until it was over the the MOC through the Range Tracker was at-
tempted on the 20th orbital pass. However,
California site, at which time telemetry was
this attempt was unsuccessful because the
switched back to the low-frequency link. At
transmi_ion was made on the MCC-Hawaii
all other times, the telemetry remained on low
remote air-ground position instead of the God-
frequency. No telemetry system anomalies
dard Conference Loop. This error apparently
were noted during this period.
placed a 1700-cps tone on the circuit to the
Air-to-Ground Voice Communications Range Tracker and resulted in keeping the au-
tomatic voice relay continuously closed; how-
The air-to-ground communications were of
ever, several transmissions from the astronaut
good quality. The UHF system was used as the
were received in the MCC. Another attempt to
primary communications system except for the
use the relay on the 2_Ond pass was ineffective.
scheduled HF checks. During periods of com-
As in the MA-8 mission, satisfactory communi-
munication, UHF coverage varied only slight-
cations were established in the primary landing
ly from predicted acquisition and loss times be-
area between the spacecraft and Hawaii by
cause of the nominal orbital trajectory. As ex-
using relay aircraft.
pected, air-to-ground communications could not
be established during the communications Command System
blackout period. An Instrumentation Support
Instruction was transmitted to the network out- The reader is referred to appendix F for a
lining the use of the UHF squelch circuit as transcript of the MA-9 air-to-ground voice
defined in the network documentation. A pre- communications.

152
The command system for the MA-9 mission Ground Communications
operated in a satisfactory manner, and the com-
mand control plan was followed very closely All regular, part-time, and alternate circuits
throughout the mission. Several malfunctions of the network participated in the MA-9 mis-
were noted at various sites,.but command capa- sion. Critical coverage was continuously es-
bility was never lost by any site during the time tablished on these circuits during preflight
in which the spacecraft was passing over that countdown until the end of the mission for Ade-
site. The command carrier "on" indication laide, Muchea, Honolulu, New York, Mercury
from the Bermuda station to the MCC was de- Control Center, and GSFC. For other sites,
layed approximately 32 seconds on the first critical coverage was dependent upon standby
pass; however, it had no net effect on the mis- status (critical coverage being allowed to lapse
sion since the onboard command receiver signal when the station was on a standby basis.
strengt'h remained a_bove the receiver threshold
Upon review of the SCAMA log for the mis-
setting.
sion, it is apparent that this phase of communi-
A total of 19 functions were transmibted from
the command stations. All of these functions cations was quite reliable. The few instances of
poor readability were mainly a result of the sta-
were received onboard the spacecraft with the
exception of one telemetry "on" function from tion operation techniques and excessive back-
Muchea and the clock change from the Coastal ground noise inside and outside the station.
Sentry Quebec. The telemetry "on" command Communications during the mission were
from Muchea was not received because it was nearly perfect. Every communication patch
transmitted when the spacecraft was out of performed properly when needed. As antici-
range of the 600-watt ground transmitter. The pated, outages occurred on a few occasions when
clock change from the Coastal Sentry Quebec a station did not have the spacecraft "in view"
was not received because the command tone was or during otherwise unimportant communica-
also sent before the spacecraft was within tions periods.
range of the ground transmitter.
Average total message delays during MA-9
The following ground-system malfunctions
approximated 2 minutes, compared with 3 min-
were experienced :
utes and 15 seconds for MA-8. This difference
(1) The Rose Knot Victor had an intermit-
can be accounted for by the heavier traffic con-
tent problem in the beam power supply of the
centration of MA-8.
backup power amplifier. It was detected be-
fore lift-off and the equipment remained in- The MA-9 mission occurred during a period
operative throughout the mission. The prime of high solar activity. Unlike MA-8, however,
transmitter was used to support the mission. there were no geomagnetic disturbances and the
(2) Guaymas had a failure in the filament propagation conditions were favorable.
transformer of the standby transmitter at
Timing
29:40:47 g.e.t, which damaged the power am-
plifier tube. The filament transformer and The timing system performed satisfactorily
the power amplifier tube were both replaced at all stations except California. On passes 3,
and the equipment was operational by 32:05:47 4, 5, 16, 17, and 18, the serial decimal timing
g.e.t. The prime transmitter remained opera- was in error in tens-of-seconds readout. The
tional during this time. problem was corrected after pass 18 by replac-
(3) The Bermuda high-power transmitter ing all tubes in the timing counter units and
came on with a 3.6-kw output but did not come adjusting the phanastron in the time-compari-
up to full power. The station automatically son unit. During pass 20, the timing system
switched to low power, 600 watts, at 00:06:31 was again defective since it indicated 21 hour_
g.e.t. rather than 20 hours.
References

1. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Res_llts of the First United States Orbital Space Flight, Feb-
ruary 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Gover]mmnt Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
2. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Second United States Orbital Space Flight, May _,
1962. NASA SP-6, Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).

154
°.(

9. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

By MAJOR GENERAL LEIGHTON I. DAVIS, U.S. Air Force, Department of De]ense Representative/or Mercury
Support Operations _--/ _/ _ (9

_/_ _ 0 Summary provide assistance to NASA medical specialists.


The global DOD communications complex was
The Mercury-Atlas 9 mission marked the activated for use during Mercury missions to
successful conclusion of the nation's first
lend support in a variety of areas where high-
manned space flight program to which extensive speed information flow was required. This com-
operational support had been provided by the munications complex, in addition to facilities
Department of Defense. This support covers of the Mercury Worldwide Network, was espe-
many assets uniquely available within the broad cially valuable in coordinating the deployment
scope of this nation's military structure and and operation of the recovery forces for an orbi-
includes such areas as early wind-tunnel studies, tal mission. The DOD also supported the
astronaut training facilities, parachute devel- NASA in disseminating and controlling Mer-
opment, launch vehicles and launch operations, cury mission information for public consump-
aeromedical assistance crews, network facilities, tion through its public information organi-
recovery forces, and public information. zation.
Early in the program a need was recognized Providing support to Mercury flights has con-
for a more precise planning and control of the tributed greatly to the Department of Defense's
many areas of DOD support to the National knowledge and experience in areas of launch,
Aeronautics and Space Administration. A De- network, recovery, communications, and medi-
partment of Defense Representative for Mer- cal space operations. Future space-flight opera-
cury Support Operations was designated by the tions can be effectively supported by applying
Secretary of Defense and was the sole point-of-
the experience and procedures derived during
contact within the DOD for coordinating all
Project Mercury.
NASA requirements with DOD resources. A
coordinating organization, the Mercury Sup- Introduction
port Planning Office, was established to admin-
ister the plans, policies, and directives of the Throughout the Mercury Project, the De-
DOD Representative. partment of Defense (DOD) provided valuable
Both the Redstone and Atlas launch vehicles and timely support in critical operational
developed by the DOD for other programs were phases of the project. As the project pro-
modified and together with launch operations gressed and the scope of its activities increased,
provided support for the Mercury flight pro- a need for a centralized coordinating agency
gram. Military facilities and persons associated within the DOD was recognized. The person
with tracking and telemetry stations within the in charge of this agency was desi_lated the
DOD complex were made available to complete DOD Representative who had the sole responsi-
the Mercury Worldwide Network. By far the bility of coordinating the resources of the vari-
largest DOD support effort in terms of people, ous military organizations to satisfy the proj-
was the level of recovery forces deployed for ect requirements of the National Aeronautics
the various Mercury missions. This manpower and Space Administration. In this regard the
level was approximately 14,000 people for the DOD Representative was the primary point-of-
manned orbital missions. For those missions contact for the NASA Operations Director in
where an occupant was included in the space- conjunction with specific requests for Mercury
craft, DOD medical teams were deployed to support.

155
Prior to the designation of a DOD Represent- the Mercury project. The NASA Operations
ative for Mercury support operations, opera- Director was designated as the single point-of-
tional, support for the project was handled on contact with the Department of Defense. The
an ('i_cial but somewhat informal basis. The talents, resources, and facilities of tile Depart-
intent of this paper is to describe the opera- ment of Defense were used to assist NASA in
tional support that was provided after the attaining the overall objectives of the project.
designation in 1959 of a DOD Representative The Secretary of Defense approved DOD sup-
for Mercury support operations. This desig- port of Project Mercury in areas of launch,
nation also provided NASA with a single point- network, recovery and bioastronautics.
of-contact for the submission of their DOD The Commander, Atlantic Missile Range Test
support needs. Center (AFMTC), was designated as the De-
Early in the Mercury Project wind tunnel partment of Defense Representative for Proj-
facilities such as the Arnold Engineering and ect Mercury support operations by the Secre-
Development Center, Tullahoma, and the crew tary of Defense and was made responsible to
training devices such as the Centrifuge at coordinate the efforts of the many DOD ele-
Johnsville, Pa., were also made available; how- ments invoh-ed and to provide a single point-
ever, these support areas will not be discussed. of-contact for NASA for the Mercury Project.
The support areas which are discussed comprise The DOD Representative was authorized such
launch vehicles and operations, worldwide staff as he might need to accomplish his duties
tracking, recovery, communications, aeromedi- and was required to make maximum use of
cal, and public information. These areas are existing DOD organizations and procedures.
discussed separately as they pertain to Mercury- Broad plans of DOD support for Project Mer-
Redstone and Mercury-Atlas mission activities cury were developed by the DOD Representa-
and are followed by a summary of DOD sup- tive and published in an Overall Plan on Janu-
port provided for each specific mission. Al- ary 15, 1960.
though the DOD provided launch, range, and The Mercury Support Planning Office, con-
recovery support for the first Atlas launch, sisting of representatives from the major par-
named Big Joe, and for the Little Joe space- ticipants in DOD support of Project Mercury,
craft development flights, these are not pre- was created to administer the plans and poli-
sented. The Big Joe flight was conducted to cies of the DOD Representative. This office
provide early aerodynamic and thermodynamic coordinated NASA's support requirements for
data by reentering a boilerplate spacecraft. A Mercury with the DOD elements to insure that
greater emphasis is placed on describing the needed support in the form of talent, facilities,
gradual build up of operational support from organization and other resources, was timely
the relatively simple ballistic flights, requiring and sufficient to the extent compatible with
assistance primarily in the area designated the DOD's primary defense mission. The Mercury
Atlantic Missile Range, to the worldwide orbital Support Planning Office was the final coordi-
missions requiring DOD medical, network, and nating staff office for the DOD Representative
recovery forces stationed around the globe.
in all matters relating to DOD support of
This paper is intended only as a summary of
Project Mercury operations.
the concepts and techniques employed in the
Department of Defense support was origi-
various support areas relating to the Depart-
nally divided into two stages: preoperational
ment of Defense. The Aeromedical Activities,
Network Development and Performance, Re- and operational. The operational stage in-
cluded launch through recovery phases and the
covery, Redstone Development and Perform-
ance, and Atlas Development and Performance preoperational stage included all other times
papers should be consulted for greater detail during which DOD supported Project Mercury.
in the operational aspects of these subjects. During each of these stages, control of DOD
support differed, and a separate functional or-
Planning and Organization ganization was required. In the preopera-
The National Aeronautics and Space Admin- tional stage, the DOD Representative had re-
istration had sole responsibility for conducting sponsibility for coordinating the action of DOD

156
forcesin ProjectMercury activities. In the Based on these orders, the supporting com-
operationalstage,full decision-making respon- manders prepared their individual directives
sibility wasexercisedby theNASA Operations for the control of their assigned forces.
Director. In eitherstage,additionalguidance
Documentation
was provided by direct contact between the
DOD Representative and the NASA.
Several methods were used by the DOD Rep-
These planning, coordination and control
resentative to evaluate DOD performance dur-
procedures, set up in the early days of Project
ing the Mercury Project. Monthly status
Mercury, remained basically unchanged until
reports were submitted by the DOD Representa-
the end of the seventh Mercury-Atlas mission
tive to the Secretary of Defense and Annual
(MA-7). After MA-7, it was decided to
Reports summarized calendar year operations.
amend the charter of the DOD Representative
Postmission reviews and preoperational con-
to insure a tighter control of the diverse DOD
ferences were held by the DOD Representative
elements during mission operations, because of
and attended by representatives from NASA,
the expanding scope of the program, the need
the Nation,l Ranges and DOD support forces.
for a change in operational procedures and
Prior to each mission, the DOD Representa-
realinement of recovery communications. As
tive received readiness reports from the sup-
a result, the duties and responsibilities of the
port forces and kept NASA informed as to the
DOD Representative were revised in June 1962.
DOD's ability to support the mission. DOD
Significant changes were incorporated into the
forces were kept apprised of countdown status,
revised terms of reference for the DOD Rep-
lift-off time, flight progress, and landing infor-
resentative which established two phases of op-
mation during an operation.
erational support: the coordinating phase and
To consolidate and standardize the adminis-
the operational control phase which, at times,
trative and operational procedures for the DOD
ran concurrently. The coordinating phase was
National Ranges, Operations Plan 60-1 was
that time during which plans were developed
published in 1960. The procedures proved so
and resources arranged to support future opera-
effective for the early Mercury flights that a
tions. This phase was continuous and included
joint DOD/NASA docmnent, Network Opera-
training and simulation exercises preparatory to
tions Directive 61-1, was published with a de-
flight operations. The operational control
tailed description of the manner in which the
phase included the launch through recovery
DOD, NASA and the Australian Weapons Re-
aspects of the mission and began at 24 hours
before the scheduled launch at which time the search Establishment (WRE) facilities would
operate as an integrated global network in sup-
DOD Representative assumed operational con-
port of Project Mercury. The documentation
trol of the D0D forces, assets, and facilities
flow which transferred information between
used for support of Mercury operations. This
NASA and DOD started with the NASA Pro-
phase terminated at the time the spacecraft and
gram Requirements Document which requested
its occupant were recovered and turned over to
NASA officials. specific items of support from the ranges. The
ranges, in turn, replied with a Program Sup-
To provide for the centralization of overall
port Plan which specified how they would meet
operational control of the global recovery
NASA's requirements.
forces, the D0D Representative established the
DOD Mercury Recovery Control Center at
Launch Support
Cape Canaveral. Another method used by the
DOD Representative for exercising operational Lannch operations for Project Mercury were
control of the support forces was the publica- conducted at the Cape Canaveral Missile Test
tion of operations orders and directives prior Annex of the Atlantic Missile Range. The Red-
to each mission. These orders proved to be an stone vehicles were launched by NASA Mar-
effective means for conducting these missions shall Space Flight Center assisted by members
and contained a more detailed description of of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. Other
the procedures by which operational control DOD participation in the Redstone launches
would be exercised by the DOD Representative. was limited to standard launch complex and

157
instrumentation support normally provided to DOD Communications Center was replaced by
missile programs by the AMR. the NASA Communications and Computing
The DOD role in Atlas launches was extended Center at the Goddard Space Flight Center
to include the Atlas D launch vehicle, guid- (GSFC) and some Mercury stations became
ance system, and launch complex, and was pro- identified by names more descriptive of their
vided by the Space Systems Division (SSD) actual location.
of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). During Mercury missions, the entire network
The 6555th Aerospace Test Wing of SSD lo- was under operational control of the DOD Rep-
cated at Patrick AFB was given the responsi- resentative's network commander, assisted by
bility for final installation, prelauneh check- the network status monitor, who advised the
outs, and actual launch of the Atlas launch ve- NASA Operations Director on the status of
hicle to insert the Mercury spacecraft into a the network to perform its mission. Upon
proper orbit. termination of the mission, operational control
Network Support of the stations reverted to the respective range
commanders or the NASA, as appropriate.
The mission of the Mercury Worldwide Net- After the network had been established, NASA
work was to enable flight control people to provided the technical planning, augmentation,
monitor, by electronic means, the status and
and modification of the network to complement
performance of the spacecraft, its systems, and the DOD operational control.
its occupant and to communicate with the pilot. Instrumentation for the initial Mercury
To accomplish this mission, NASA, with the flights involved only the facilities of the AMR.
assistance of the DOD, implemented a global
The entire network, except for the Coastal
tracking and telemetry network. This network
Sentry, was first called up for support of MA-3.
required the use of certain existing DOD sta-
The first time a Mercury network instru-
tions as well as the construction of additional
mented ship was used in support of a Mercury
facilities. As originally planned, the network
mission was during MR-3. The Coastal Sentry
consisted of 14 land-based stations, two DOD
ship was located in the landing area for telem-
tracking ships, and a communications center.
etry and communications between the space-
A listirrg of the network stations is as fol- craft and the ground.
lows :
For the second manned flight, MR-4, the
Station Operating AMR Rose Knot ship, was deployed in the
number Station name agency
lauding area. It was during MA-4 that most
1 Cape Canaveral .................. AMR
Grand Bahama ................... AMR of the network stations had their first oppor-
Grand Turk ....................... AMR tunity to attempt radar track. In general, r_dar
2 Bermuda ........................ NASA track from the stations was poor and the Ber-
3 Rose Knot ....................... AMR muda, White Sands, and Woomera data were
4 Canary Island .................... AMR
not usable at Goddard. A postflight review
5 Kano ............................ NASA
6 Zanzibar ......................... _NASA was held at AMR and was attended by repre-
7 Coastal Sentry ................... AMR sentatives from all of the radar sites. It was
8 Muchea ......................... WRE learned from this review that the antenna pat-
9 Woomera ........................ WRE terns for both the C- and S-band beacons were
10 (Deleted)
not good because of deep nulls in the antenna
11 Canton Island .................... PMR
12 Hawaii ........................... PMR patterns. A decision was made to install an an-
13 Pt. Arguello ...................... PMR tenna pattern-phase shifting device on the
14 Guaymas ........................ NASA spacecraft for the next mission. This device
15 White Sands ..................... WSMR
introduced a phase delay of 400 cycles per sec-
16 Corpus Christi ................... WSMR
17 Eglin ............................ APGC ond to shift the antenna pattern and effectively
smear over the deep nulls.
The network was later modified on a mission-
The installation of the phase shifter on the
to-mission basis by other DOD facilities, in- C-band antenna system for MA-5 proved suc-
cluding additional stations of the Atlantic Mis- cessful. During the MA-5 postmission review,
sile Range and two radar tracking ships. The indications were that the radar coverage was

158
much improved. This improvement was the single planned landing area, recovery support
result of the use of the phase shifter, the in- multiplied until the DOD was supporting 32
tensive training received by the radar operators planned landing areas and 51 contingency land-
between missions, and by the use of a radar con- ing areas for the final Mercury mission. For
troller on the handover net. MR-1A, the first unmanned ballistic flight, tho
During the MA-7 flight, several stations re- recovery support forces consisted of 8 ships
ported amplitude modulation by the phase and 15 aircraft all located within 1,500 nautical
shifter on the C-band beacon; however, reentry miles of Cape Canaveral. Recovery support
data were smoother than on previous missions. for the final MA-9 mission consisted of 28 ships
The two relay aircraft obtained SARAH bea- and 171 aircraft.
con b_arings on the spacecraft and confirmed
Mercury-Redstone Series
its location prior to sighVing.
Failure of the magnetron driver unit on the The Mercury-Redstone series of four flights
Canary Islands Verlort radar caused a 15-min- which required recovery support took place
ute hold in the MA-8 countdown. Some com- during the period December 1960 to July 1961.
munications problems were encountered during These missions all involved ballistic trajectory
periods of poor propagation conditions and air- flights, with the primary planned landing area
craft relay was unsuccessful because the dis- located directly downrange northeast of Grand
tance between spacecraft and aircraft was too Bahama Island. Naval ships and aircraft
great. formed the recovery task force and were as-
The launch for the Mercury-Atlas 9 (MA-9) signed stations within the designated recovery
mission was the first mission rescheduled be- areas, Aircraft units from the Air Rescue
cause of network difficulties. Bermuda's C- Service (ARS) and the Air Force Missile Test
band radar had unacceptable range data errors Center (AFMTC) assisted the surface recovery
because of a faulty shift register in the range forces. Contingency recovery commanders
digital data channel and a faulty preamplifier were designated and units of their commands
in the azimuth digital data channel. were pre-positioned along the ballistic track to
The network for MA-9 was augmented by insure readiness should a contingency recovery
the addition of the Twin Falls Victory Ship situation have occurred.
(AMR), the USNS Range Tracker (PMR),
Mercury.Atlas Series
Antigua Island, Ascension Island, East Island,
Wake Island, and Kwajalein Island. Mercury-Atlas missions MA-3 to MA-9 were
Relay aircraft were equipped with high gain all planned as orbital flights varying from one
antennas and the spacecraft-to-ground voice re- orbital pass to the extensive 1-day, 92-orbit
lay was successful. Voice relay was also accom- mission which concluded the Mercury program.
plished through Ascension, Wake, and Kwaj- With the advancement from ballistic to or-
alein. Radar aircraft of the Air Defense
bital flight, the support provided by elements
Command, used as part of the network for the of the DOD substantially increased. No longer
first time, obtained a good skin track of the was it sufficient to consider only/a downrange
spacecraft during reentry, including blackout, flight path, but now it was necessary to view
and were xble to obtain some contact during the entire earth-circling orbital paths as poten-
orbit. For the first time, stations were allowed tial contingency recovery operation areas. Al-
to go on standby status during the orbital phase, though the number of planned landing areas
and computer and data flow tests were con- increased from 1 to 32, the greatest expansion
ducted to confirm their return to operational of DOD recovery effort occurred in the area of
status.
contingency recovery operations. The support
of contingency recovery landing areas was pri-
Recovery" Support
marily borne by aircraft, and in many instances
During Project Mercury the DOD contribu- by the same aircraft used in support of planned
tion to planned and contingency recovery opera- landing areas. The number of aircraft directly
tions expanded considerably. Starting with a participating in recovery operations for this
concentration of all recovery efforts about a series increased from 22 located along the AMR

159
ballistic track to 171 located at 30 land-based The Pacific recovery force trained intensively in
sites and onboard two aircraft carriers. preparation for these missions, and the smooth'-
The unmanned flight of MA-3 was the first ness with which the two operations were con-
planned one orbital pass mission, but failure in ducted reflected their efforts and refined pro-
the launch vehicle resulted in its destruction by cedures. In both flights the manned space-
the Range Safety Officer. The spacecraft escape craft landed within 41/_ miles of the primary
system worked perfectly and the spacecraft was recovery ship and was recovered and on board
retrieved by a launch-site recovery-force heli- within 45 minutes in each' case.
copter, 200 yards off shore. This was the only Recovery forces supporting MA-8 were de-
time during the program that the launch-site ployed with 19 surface units in the Atlantic and
recovery forces had to put into practice the 7 in the Pacific. A total of 134 aircraft pro-
many hours of training for just such an vided the planned and contingency recovery
emergency. support for this mission. For MA-9, surface
Because of extensive slippages in the original support forces in the planned landing areas
scheduled dates for the orbital missions, two numbered 15 ships in the Atlantic and 11 in the
separate and distinct recovery-force deploy- Pacific. Air support was provided by aircraft
ments were required. The DOD recovery from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
forces in support of these missions adjusted and Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Commander,
substituted units as necessary to meet normal Middle East Force, provided a contingency sur-
military commitments during the periods be- face recovery force of two ships for the north
tween recovery deployments. Despite these Indian Ocean areas.
reorganizations, all recovery elements and units
Aeromedical Support
were ready and effectively performed their
recovery missions. To fulfill the objectives of Project Mercury,
The MA-7 mission of Astronaut Lieutenant the NASA requested the Department of Defense
Commander Carpenter, USN, terminated after to provide certain medical support. The pur-
a three-orbital flight with a 250 nautical mile pose of this support was to assure thorough on-
overshoot of the primary landing area. Re- scene medical care and a prompt and complete
covery was effected, however, about 3 hours assessment of the astronaut's postflight condi-
after landing. A postmission review of this tion.
flight revealed the need for a change in recovery On December 1, 1959, the Department of De-
communications and operational procedures. fense Representative for Project Mercury Sup-
This review led to the establishment of port Operations designated the Staff Surgeon,
a D0D Mercury Recovery Control Cen- AFMTC, as his Assistant for Bioastronautics.
ter (MRCC) jointly staffed by Commander The principal function of the Assistant was to
Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Four (CTF-140) plan, organize, and deploy worldwide medical
and his deputy, Commander Air Rescue Serv- support for Mercury flight operations in re-
ice, who performed the recovery mission for the sponse to NASA medical requirements.
DOD representative. Furthermore, recovery The Department of Defense provided medical
communications equipment and procedures were support in the categories of administration, peo-
changed for future missions so as to provide a ple, training, facilities, and equipment. The
more tightly controlled recovery organization extent of this support is discussed to show the
capable of quick response to changing situations. magnitude of such support.
The last two missions of the Mercury Proj-
Administrative Support
ect, MA-8 and MA-9, constituted a culmina-
tion of all the lessons learned in previous mis- Administrative support included selection
sions, and reflected the flexibility of the recov- and deployment of medical resources and facil-
ery forces when the primary planned landing ities and the formulation of medical support
area was relocated from the Atlantic to the Pa- plans. The scope of this support included the
cific Ocean. The final flight had the greatest following :
number of recovery forces providing support (1) Development of medical plans and pro-
and required the closest coordination of effort. grams.

160
(2) Acquisition,siting, and making opera- (6) A dietitian and food service supervisor
tionally ready,the requiredmedicalfacilities. were provided in the astronauts' dining facil-
(3) Requisition,preparation,and deploy- ity to prepare and serve prescribed diets to the
mentof all neededmedicalequipment. flight astronaut and his backup.
(4) The preparationof plans to provide
Facilities
bloodfor an injuredastronautand procedures
in case of non-survival of an astronaut.
The following medical facilities were pro-
(5) Medical staffing of a Forward Medical vided :
Station, an Operational Support Unit, and (1) Cape Canaveral: Two blockhouses were
launch site recovery forces. modified to provide a forward Medical Station,
(6) Deployment of people and equipment to a Medical Command Post, a Medical Com-
fleet recovery units. munications Center, an astronauts' diet kitchen
(7) Establishment of specialty teams and
and dining room, and a ready room for the
alerting of specific DOD hospitals. Medical Specialty Team.
In addition, administrative actions were (2) Downrange: Two prefabricated surgical
taken to procure medical specialists from Aus- hospitals and medical debriefing units were
tralia and the Public Health Service to sUp- erected at Grand Bahama Island and Grand
port each mission. Arrangements were made Turk Island.
for immunizations, distribution of publications (3) The Wilford Hall USAF Hospital,
to recovery medical forces, and training pro- Lackland AFB, Texas; the US Navy Hospital,
grams. Portsmouth, Virginia; the Walter Reed Army
Hospital, Washington, D.C. ; the Tripler Gen-
Training
eral Hospital, Honolulu, Hawaii; were desig-
For the later manned missions, 84 medical nated as specialty team hospitals. Seven other
officers were trained by the AFMTC in June DOD hospitals were alerted in high probability
1960 and in April 1963, 23 DOD medical officers landing areas, to support the astronaut if
needed.
were trained specifically for MA-9 by NASA.
Senior medical officers from the three armed
People services established the medical equipment
needs in support of Project Mercury. The medi-
During the program 233 medically trained
cal supplies and equipment were provided to
people were made available by the DOD in sup-
NASA on a loan basis and will be available for
port of Project Mercury flight operations.
These people served in the following areas: support of future manned space flights.
(1) As aeromedical monitors. The monitors The DOD medical participation in Project
were assigned to Mercury network tracking Mercury has been mutually beneficial in that
stations. Their functions were to monitor, the NASA received support otherwise un-
using telemetry displays, the physiological available to them and the Department of De-
condition of the astronaut. fense medical services gained extensive experi-
(2) At Cape Canaveral, to provide emer- ence in medical support operations. These
gency surgical support in the event of a launch ,trained .experienced people represent a core
site incident or disaster.
of technically competent specialists to support
(3) On recovery vessels, to provide immedi- future manned space programs.
ate on-scene medical assistance in the event of
a medical emergency during recovery opera- Communications
tions.
The termination of Project Mercury was also
(4) At advanced medical units in high prob-
the termination of an extensive communications
ability landing areas at Grand Bahama Island
and Grand Turk Island. complex used by the Department of Defense
(5) In the Bioastronautic Holding Facility forces in support of this NASA project. This
in IIangar "S", Cape Canaveral, to assist in pre- complex started with the early Mercury ballistic
flight preparations. missile communications limited to that of radar

161
and telemetry data needed within the confines tracking sites through the use of the AMR sub-
of the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR). marine cable.
As the proiect progressed to the orbital (3) Ultra-high frequency (UHF) and high
flights, communications grew in complexity to frequency (HF) communications between the
a point which involved the resources of the na- spacecraft and ground with equipment pro-
tional ranges, Defense Communications Agency, vided by NASA and operated by the AMR at
and the equipment and facilities available to Cape Canaveral, Grand Bahama, and Grand
the separate commands, commercial agencies, Turk.
and foreign governments. Additional communications support for the
Programs were initiated to provide com- first manned suborbital flight consisted of a
munications that were uniquely required by the basic teletype and voice plan to provide for the
Mercury mission. Some of the equipment re- passing of traffic to a recovery force consisting
sulting from these programs was adopted by of 10 surface vessels and 11 aircraft in the At-
NASA for incorporation into future facilities lantic area. Teletype circuits connected the
support. Mercury Recovery Control Center (MRCC) at
As Mercury missions advanced from un- Cape Canaveral to the three service communica-
manned suborbital to manned orbital flights, it tions centers, Andrews AFB, Ft. Derrick, and
became necessary for the DOD representative's Cheltenham, in the Washington complex; the
staff to have communications specialists im- AMR submarine cable connected the MRCC
mediately available to assist in the overall DOD with the recovery forces in Puerto Rico; and
communications support as well as to participate simple high-frequency single sideband (HF/
actively in the operational phase of the mis- SSB) voice communications connected the
sions. Beginning with the MA-7 mission, the MRCC to the recovery ships and aircraft.
function of the Communications Coordinator As the missions progressed into orbital flights,
was performed for the DOD Representative by the NASA tracking network could not meet the
the Chief, Range Support Communications need for expanded global tracking and com-
Division, AFMTC, assisted by other communi- munications requirements. The DOD aug-
cations specialists in the AFMTC organization. mented the existing NASA network by
The value of this group was fully realized dur- providing coverage at such stations as Antigua,
ing the course of the MA-9 mission. For this Ascension, Pretoria, Kwajalein, Wake Island,
mission the most complex communications sys- and San Nicholas Island. DOD also provided
tem employed in the support of the national range ships and aircraft specially configured
space effort was implemented. From 48 hours for spacecraft voice relay.
before lift-off through test termination, this During MA-8 and MA-9 the DOD provided
group of communicators supervised and main- communications support for the xenon flash-
tained constant surveillance of the worldwide
ing-light experiment being conducted at Dur-
communications systems insuring that the best ban, South Africa, by routing communications
possible support and performance was afforded
through the AMR station at Pretoria, South
this Mercury mission. Africa.
Network Support The DOD Interrange tie line connecting Pt.
Argnello, White Sands Missile Range, Eglin
Communications for the Mercury suborbital Air Force Base, and Cape Canaveral was
flights consisted basically of the following :
widely used during the Mercury mission for
('1) Launch pad intercommunications sys-
radar handover and for intersite coordination.
tems with associated circuitry to other Cape
The value of this circuit was realized by both
Canaveral instrumentation areas, such as com-
NASA and DOD elements for radar control.
mand control, telemetry, radar, and central
control. These systems were interfaced with Beginning with the MA-6 and subsequent mis-
those provided by NASA within the Mercury sions, modifications were made to include the
Control Center for internal communications. sites at Guaymas, Mexico, and Corpus Christi,
(2) Voice, teletype, data, and _timing circuits Texas. The line was extended to the Hawaii
to Grand Bahama and Grand Turk Island tracking site for MA-8 and MA-9.

162
To overcome problems associated with space- to the DOD Representative's communications
craft-to-ground communications especially dur- staff for support of MA-9.
ing the reentry period, the DOD initiated a de- The hub of the DOD recovery communica-
velopmental program on the use of' airborne tions effort was the Mercury Control Center at
platforms as automatic relay stations. Special Cape Canaveral. As missions progressed from
C-130 aircraft were configured with equipment suborbital to full orbital flights, the center was
modified from one of limited communications
capable of the receipt and automatic retrans-
mission of the modes of communications, support to an extensive and complex system
HF/UHF, available from the spacecraft or which supported the 22:orbital flight (MA-9).
ground stations. Included in the program were This Center was designed to provide for the
various patterns by which the aircraft would receipt of status information from worldwide
fly so as to provide the best coverage and relay deployed forces and for the passing of direc-
tions to the task force commanders. Desks were
conditions. During MA-8 and MA-9 this sys-
tem was also incorporated aboard the telemetry replaced by operational-type consoles equipped
aircraft operated by the PMR in the Pacific with communications systems capable of pro-
area. viding direct communications between the de-
Shortly after MA-8, the AMR developed a ployed forces and individuals on the recovery
technique for the relay of telemetry data by staff. Visual display equipment was provided
way of single-sideband radio. This system was for the rapid dissemination of information, as
successfully demonstrated in November 1962 needed, within the MRCC and intercommunica-
tions links were installed for coordination be-
from AMR stations Antigua and Ascension
tween DOD and NASA elements.
Islands to Cape Canaveral involving distances
of 1,200 to 4,400 miles, respectively. General Support
The system was offered to the NASA for use
As originally planned, the Mercury network
during MA-9 as a means of relaying
real-time aeromedical data. The NASA ac- communications system did not provide voice
communications to network stations having an
cepted this proposal and the system performed
HF link connecting them with the Goddard
successfully.
Recovery Support Space Flight Center. In order to maintain
voice communications with AMR range vessels
In addition to the basic teletype and voice operating under their control, the AMR estab-
plan for passing communications traffic to the lished a voice circuit to two range vessels by
recovery force deployed in the Atlantic, pro- using the unused sideband of the NASA SSB
visions were also made for the handling of clas- teletype circuit. This method of operation,
sified traffic by the installation of a secure tele- commonly in use though not applied to the
type circuit between Patrick AFB and Cape Mercury network, proved exceptionally useful
Canaveral. The AMR submarine cable was
to the flight controllers during early missions.
used to interconnect the MRCC at Cape Canav- This method of operation was extended to other
eral with the recovery forces in Puerto Rico. Mercury stations so that during MA-9 voice
High-frequency single-sideband (HF/SSB) communications were available to all sites.
voice communications were used between the re- Prior to MA-9, teletype communications from
covery ships and aircraft in the Atlantic and the Mercury Recovery Control Center were
MRCC. routed to the three military services communi-
For the MA-9 mission communications were cations stations in the Washington area com-
needed to support 28 surface vessels, 171 air- plex. The basic service, although satisfactory,
craft, and various Recovery Control Centers created delays when it became necessary to pro-
and contingency forces deployed around the vide alternate routing or to correct technical
world. To tie this vast complex into an effec- difficulties and was also cumbersome in effecting
tive communications network, the communica- coordination during the course of the mission.
tions resources of the DOD, with its inherent For MA-9, a plan was created which routed all
capability to interconnect with other govern- teletype communications for the recovery forces
mental and commercial systems, were available through one station, Army East Coast Relay

163
Stationat Ft. Detrick, for further dissemina- cations lines (525 pairs of telephone lines and
tionbyautomaticmeans tothefinaldestination. six wideband video lines from the Cape press
This newsystemprovedvery effectiveduring site), shelter, and public-address systems.
MA-9by providingasinglepoin(,of con(actfor AFMTC had a full-time representative at tho
coordinationpurposes, a reductionof circuitry NASA news media center; and for MA-8 and
betweenCapeCanaveralandWashington,D.C., MA-9, a DOD information officer was on duty
andanability to reactquicklyto alternaterou- at the Pacific News Center in Honolulu.
tine requirements. For coverage of recovery operations, news
TheAreaFrequency CoordinatoratAFMTC media representatives were positioned with
wasgiventheresponsibilityfor providingpro- DOD forces in the primary landing areas and
eeduresandcontrolsnecessary toinsurethatthe communications channels were furnished so that
11spacecraft frequencies wereprotectedfrom real-time reporting was possible. Excellent co-
harmfifl interference. Critical times were operation was received from all DOD agencies
establishedasbeingfrom6 hoursbeforelift-off in the preparation of information material and
throughmissiontermination. The frequency in the support of news media people by DOD
protectionplan,as developed, wasapplicable forces.
throughouta belt extendingsome700miles After MA-8 and MA-9, NASA Headquarters
northandsouthof the predictedorbital paths. convened in a meeting of the press pool repre-
To providethecontrolagencies with timely in- sentatives from all news media to critique the
formationon implementation andtermination information aspects of the flights. The reports
of frequency protection,
some87addressees were of the media personnel indicated that the lo-
contacted by useof AddressIndicator Group gistic support, furnished by DOD was sufficient
teletypemessages. In additionto theseactions, and timely.
it wasnecessary during the courseof Project
l_[ercuryto coordinatethe assignment anduse Review of Mercury Missions
of 171HF frequencies.Throughoutthe Mer- The Department of Defense support dis-
cury program a total of 43 eases of electronic
cussed here is limited to that. provided for the
radiation interference was reported and saris-
Mereury-Redstone (MR) missions and nine
factorily resolved or alleviated.
Mercury-Atlas (MA) missions during the Mer-
Public Information cury Project. DOD support in the early
phases of the Mercury Project was primarily
DepaI_ment of Defense support of the NASA in the areas of launch and network. As the
public information effort on Project Mercury project developed and missions became more
began with logistic support of news media cov- complex in scope and objectives, DOD support.
ering the early launches. A press site which of- expanded into the additional areas of recovery,
fered a direct view of the Redstone launch communications and bioastronauties. The
complex was built near the Mercury Control scope of this support, in terms of people, air-
Center for the flights of Astronaut Commander craft, and ships for the manned orbital flights
Shepard, USN, and Astronaut Major Grissom, is shown in tables 9-I and 9-II. A brief sum-
USAF (MR-3 and MR-4, respectively). A mary of each mission with regard to DOD sup-
new, improved press site was constructed near port follows.
the Cape Canaveral landing strip, neat the The first Mercury-Atlas vehicle (MA-1) was
Atlas launch complex, for the orbital flights. launched on July 29, 1960. The spacecraft, was
Logistic support of the news media covering unmanned and was intended to land northeast
the Mercury activities developed into a general of Antigua Island in the West Indies. Stand-
pattern with the greatest amount of support re- ard AMR tracking and data acquisition equip-
quired at Cape Canaveral. The number of ac- ment was available and the recovery support
credited news media representatives covering consisted of units from the Atlantic Fleet
the flights increased with each launch until (CINCLANT), Air Rescue Service (ARS),
more than 700 covered the MA-9 flight. Sup- and AMR forces deployed as a task force. A
port included transportation, escorts, communi- structural failure occurred approxmi_tely 1

164
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Table 9-II.--DOD Aircraft and Ship Support for Project Mercury

Aircraft MA-6 MA-7 MA-8 ] MA-9

Atlantic Area .................. 82 74 65 65


Pacific Area a .................. 12 12 41 58
EUCOM ...................... 16 16 16 27
Inland U.S ..................... 4 2 4 4
CAIRC ....................... 0 2 5
Mauritius ..................... 2 0 0
Photo Recon ................... 3 2 4
Weather Recon ................. 1 1 4
Admin A/C .................... 4 3 4

Total ................... 126 114 134 171

Recovery ships ................. 24 2O 26 28

• Includes 4 aircraft from RAAF.

minute after lift-off. After a 21/_ hour search ing the flight. Recovery aircraft located the
by the launch-site recovery group, without suc- spacecraft, and a helicopter returned it to a
cess, activity reverted to r%o'ular salvage opera- dock landing ship. Medical support people and
tions by AMR forces au_oznented by two Navy materiel were provided on ships, at Cape Ca-
minesweepers. Approximately 98 percent of naveral and at Grand Bahama Island to assist
the spacecraft and some parts of the launch ve- in medical operations.
hicle were ultimately recovered. The second Mercury-Atlas mission (MA-2)
On November 21, 1960, the first Mercury- on February 21, 1961, was successful and the
Redstone mission with an unmanned spacecraft landing was northeast of Antigua Island. A
using the Redstone launch vehicle was unsuc- recovery helicopter retrieved the spacecraft 42
cessful because premature engine cut-off acti- minutes after launch and delivered it to a dock
vated the emergency escape system when the landing ship from which it was delivered to
launch vehicle was a few inches off the pad. Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.
The launch vehicle settled back on the pad and The unmanned Mercury-Atlas 3 (MA-3)
was damaged slightly. The spacecraft was re- mission on April 25, 1961, was planned as a one-
covered for reuse. pass orbital flight with landing east of Ber-
The unmanned Mercury-Redstone 1-A mis- muda. All network stations except the Coastal
sion (MR-1A) on December 19, 1960, was a re- Sentry ship were called up to support the mis-
attempt of MR-l, and was successful. The re- sion. The Recovery task force was deployed to
covery phase started with visual sighting by cover the desi_o'nated landing area. A recovery
ship and aircraft lookouts and search and rescue team from U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe
and homing (SARAH) detection by search air- (USCINCEUR) provided a contingency capa-
craft prior to spacecraft landing. A helicopter bility to 0 ° longitude. A failure in the launch
hoisted the spacecraft clear of the water 15 min-
vehicle resulted in the Range Safety Officer's
utes after landing and deposited it onboard ship
aborting the mission 40 seconds after launching.
17 minutes later.
The spacecraft was retrieved 200 yards off shore
The spacecraft for the Mercury-Redstone
by a recovery helicopter which was deployed for
mission 2 (MR-2) was launched on January 31,
1961, and carried a 37-pound chimpanzee 420 this purpose.
statute miles downrange. The spacecraft was The first manned Mercury flight, Mercury-
tracked by the AMR almost to landing, al- Redstone 3 (MR-3) took place on May 5, 1961.
though it had overshot by about 100 miles. After a successful reentry, the spacecraft, with
Ultra-high frequency (UHF) transmissions Astronaut Commander Alan B. Shepard, Jr.,
were detected by several recovery aircraft dur- USN, aboard, was sighted prior to its landing in

166
the planned landing area by deployed heli- down, launch-vehicle problems were identified
copters. One of the helicopters delivered the which resulted in a 3-week delay of the launch.
Astronaut and spacecraft safely to the recovery All deployed forces were recalled, then rede-
aircraft carrier 26 minutes after landing. All ployed for a September 12 launch. On Septem-
phases of DOD support, including range, recov- ber 13, the mission was successfully conducted
ery, and medical, were excellent. For this mis- with the spacecraft completing a one orbital
sion the AMR Coastal Sentry ship was located pass and landing in the planned landing area.
in the landing area for telemetry and space- A C-5_ search aircraft located the spacecraft
craft-to-ground communications. Medical sup- and retrieval was accomplished by the USS
port consisted of aeromedical monitors aboard Decatur and delivered to Bermuda Island.
the Coastal Sentry Ship, emergency medical Network performance, with the exception of
teams aboard recovery vessels and at the launch generally poor radar tracking, was good. The
site, and a medical debriefing team at Grand tracking problem was traced to the lack of
Bahama Island. Aircraft of the ARS were on operator training and poor spacecraft antenna
station to assist in search operations. patterns.
The second manned flight, Mercury-Redstone Mercury-Atlas 5 (MA-5) was scheduled for
4 (MR-4), was conducted on July 21, 1961. November 14, 1961_ to carry a chimpanzee on a
DOD support was comparable in scope to that three-pass orbital flight. Recovery planning
of MR-3. For this mission the AMR Rose Knot included the primary landing area at the end
ship was used in the landing area. The flight of the third pass, as well as the probable areas
and landing phases were successful. After for landing at the end of the first and second
landing, premature actuation of the spacecraft orbital passes. Recovery forces were deployed
side hatch resulted in an emergency situation in accordingly and contingency recovery com-
which the spacecraft filled rapidly with water manders planned for a full deployment. Ad-
and began to sink. Astronaut Major Virgil I. ditional medical forces included veterinary spe-
Grissom, USAF, egressed from the spacecraft, cialists for postflight care and examination of
and, after a short but difficult period in the the chimpanzee, as well as a complete launch-
water lasting approximately 3 minutes, was site support team. On November 12, space-
hoisted aboard the recovery helicopter and craft problems resulted in a 2-week delay in the
delivered on board the recovery ship for medi- launch. During this period, recovery forces
cal examination 19 minutes after spacecraft reverted to normal operational control, were
landing. A second helicopter attempted to reorganized, and redeployed for a November
recover the sinking spacecraft. The weight of 29 launch date. The launch was successful and
the flooded spacecraft exceeded the lift capa- flight was normal until spacecraft problems
bility of the helicopter at full power and the prompted a decision to land the Spacecraft at
pilot elected to release the spacecraft rather the end of the second orbital pass. Radar
than to jeopardize further the safety of the tracking was greatly improved through inten-
helicopter and crew. The spacecraft sank in sified training prior to the flight and better
2,800 fathoms of water. spacecraft antenna patterns as a result o_ a
A second attempt, to orbit an unmanned beacon modification. Reentry and landing pro-
spacecraft, was scheduled for August 25, 1961. ceeded normally and the spacecraft was sighted
This mission was designated Mercury-Atlas 4 in the planned landing area by recovery air-
(MA-4). All network stations were scheduled craft about 260 miles south of Bermuda. It
to participate. Recovery forces were deployed was retrieved within 80 minutes after sighting.
similarly as had been for MA-3. Contingency The spacecraft and occupant were delivered to
support was increased in scope to include full Bermuda.
deployment by forces from CINCLANT, Mercury-Atlas mission 6 (MA-6) on Febru-
and partial deployment by forces from ary 20, 1962, was the first manned orbital flight
USCINCEUR, CINCPACFLT, and ARS. and involved three orbital passes. The space-
Bioastronautic support included additional craft, with Astronaut Lieutenant Colonel John
forces deployed for training in the launch-site H. Glenn, USMC, aboard, ]nnded about 166
area. Shortly prior to beginning the count- miles due east of Grand Turk Island, approxi-

167
mately 4 miles from the recovery destroyer manual retrofire maneuver was planned and the
which retrieved the spacecraft 21 minutes after countdown was sent from the California site.
landing. Attitude errors at retrofire caused the space-
All network instrumentation remained opera- craft to overshoot the planned landing point by
tive and provided full coverage throughout the approximately 250 miles. A directional find-
three orbital passes. Telemetry and communi- ing (D/F) bearing on the spacecraft was quick-
cations were excellent in spite of some telemetry- ly obtained by search aircraft and a SC-54 ar-
recording and radio-propagation problems. rived within 1 hour after spacecraft landing
Radar coverage was better than expected, ex- with an auxiliary flotation collar and other sur-
ceedingthe performance for MA-5. Although vival equipment. Helicopters were launched
a 4-minute ionization blackout occurred during from the carrier U.S.S. I_trepicl when the car-
reentry, the C-band radars were able to main- rier was within flight range. Although an ARS
tain track of the spacecraft which resulted in SA-16 arrived on scene before the helicopters,
an accurate prediction of the landing point. the Task Force Commander decided to effect
The landing areas after passes 1, 2, and 3, recovery by helicopter. The astronaut was re-
were treated as primary recovery areas for this trieved 3 hours after landing and returned to
mission. The recovery task force comprising the carrier. The spacecraft was retrieved by a
a total of 24 ships and 41 aircraft was stationed recovery destroyer for delivery to Puerto Rico.
in the nine planned landing areas in the Atlantic A postmission review held at Patrick Air
Ocean. An additional 37 aircraft were stand- Force Base, Florida, revealed the need for a
ing by at Jacksonville, Florida ; Bermuda, Lajes more rapid flow of information between the
Air Force Base, Azores; BenGuerir, and Mercury Recovery Control Center (MRCC) at
Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Forces from Cape Canaveral and the on-scene forces. Re-
USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and USAF were covery communications equipment and pro-
deployed along the remaining orbital tracks for cedures were changed for future missions so as
contingency recovery. to provide for a more tightly controlled re-
A full B{oastronautic Task Force, consisting covery organization capable of quick response
of 159 medical people was provided by the DOD to changing situations.
and deployed to support this mission. These On October 3, 1962, the eighth Mercury-Atlas
people staffed or augmented 4 medical treat- mission (MA-8) was launched. This mission,
ment facilities, 21 recovery ships, and 14 medi- planned for six passes, was successfully com-
cal monitoring st,tions. The medical evalua- pleted and the spacecraft, with Astronaut Com-
tion and debriefing of the astronaut was mander Walter M. Schirra, US_, aboard,
completed at the advanced medical treatment landed in the primary landing area approxi-
facility at Grand Turk Island on February 23, mately 41_ miles from the recovery aircraft
1962. carrier. For the first time in the Mercury Proj-
The seventh Mercury-Atlas mission (MA-7) ect, recovery forces were deployed in the Pa-
was launched on May 24, 1962. This mission cific Ocean for a primary landing northeast of
was the second three-pass orbital flight. Astro- Midway Island. The landing area in the At-
naut Lieutenant Commander M. Scott Carpen- lantic Ocean at the end of the third pass was also
ter, USN, was the pilot for this mission. All treated as a primary area in the event that a
network stations were scheduled to participate full six-orbital mission could not be completed.
except the AMR Rose Knot ship which was Contingency recovery forces were expanded to
undergoing modification for a command-con- cover the additional ground tracks in the South
trol system. Only the landing area at the end Atlantic, Caribbean, and western Pacific Ocean.
of the third orbital pass was designated as The AMR Coastal Sentry ship was positioned
primary for this mission, requiring support .of in the Pacific Ocean to monitor the planned
only one aircraft carrier. The spacecraft was retrofire maneuver. Two S-band radar ships
launched and inserted into a nominal orbit with from the Pacific Missile Range and an Army
exceptionally good precision. Just prior to C-band radar ship were positioned uprange
retrofire, at the end of three passes, a failure in from the primary landing area for reentry
the automatic control system was noted. A tracking. The Bioastronautic Task Force con-

168
sisted of 84 medicalspecialists assigned to the entry and after landing, voice communications
launch area, network stations, and recovery were relayed through PMR aircraft to the
units. An additional 22 specialists were avail- Hawaii network site where it was patched
able on a standby basis. through network voice circuits to MCC. Radar
Centralized operational control together with airplanes of the Air Defense Command sta-
the cooperation of the DOD forces participat- tioned in the Atlantic and Pacific obtained skin
ing in MA-8 were instrumental in achieving an track of the spacecraft. The network provided
integrated and responsive organization. excellent tracking coverage throughout the
The ninth Mercury-Atlas mission (MA-9) flight, considering the lengthy operating period
was launched on May 15, 1963. This manned for the equipment and long working hours for
1-day mission was planned for 22 orbital passes site people. Thoroughness in planning and ex-
with the primary landing area in the Pacific cellent performance of assigned missions by
Ocean southeast of Midway Island. The DOD forces were reflected in the success of the
MA-9 spacecraft, with Astronaut Major Gor- MA-9 mission.
don Cooper, USAF, aboard, was placed into a
near-perfect orbit by the Atlas launch vehicle. Coneludlng Remarks
After 33 hours of normal flight during which
Many changes in procedures and techniques
the major objectives were met, a malfunction
used in providing Department of Defense sup-
in the spacecraft control system required man-
port were developed during the course of the
ual control of the spacecraft during retrofire
Mercury Project. Many lessons were learned
and reentry. This was accomplished success-
and put into effect during successive missions;
fully and precisely by the astronaut and the
however, only those significant items which may
spacecraft landed in the primary landing area
have possible application in supporting future
within 41/_ miles of the recovery aircraft carrier.
manned space programs are described.
There were a total of 26 planned landing
The organization for the coordination and
areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for
control of the overall DOD participation in
the MA-9 mission. These areas were selected
Project Mercury was highly satisfactory. The
so that the ships of the Atlantic and Pacific
designation of a DOD Representative for co-
task forces could cover more than one area. A
ordination of DOD support for Project Mer-
worldwide deployment of contingency recovery
cury operations was effective in that NASA was
forces was required to cover the entire ground
provided with a single point-of-contact for the
track of the spacecraft. All theater forces were
submission of their overall DOD support re-
augmented by long-range C-130 MATS air-
quirements.
planes. There were 98 aircraft deployed for
The operation of the global Mercury network
contingency recovery by the Air Rescue Service
comprising DOD ranges, NASA stations, and
(ARS), Caribbean Air Command (CAIRC),
two stations in Australia was a significant
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and CINCUSA- achievement in coordinated team effort and was
REUR. Two AMR network ships were po- only accomplished by the complete cooperation
sitioned in the Pacific Ocean to give command-
of all concerned. Network management and
control coverage. Reentry tracking in the
operational procedures were clearly defined and
Atlantic and the Pacific was available from
compiled in a comprehensive joint DOD-NASA
two C-band radar ships. The Bioastronautic
Mercury Network Operations Directive which
Task Force included 78 medical people de-
proved to be a very useful and effective
ployed, 35 specialty team members on standby,
document.
two specialty team hospitals, and 7 recovery
support hospitals. The demonstrated ability of several ranges
Support efforts of DOD also included the to combine their collective resources effectively
successful accomplishment of voice relays both to support global missions proves the possibility
in the Atlantic and Pacific. Relay to Mercury of combining all such national missile tracking
Control Center (MCC) of the astronaut's voice resources under a single management control for
while in orbit was obtained by the AMR the support of all missile and space programs
C-130's stationed near Bermuda. During re- of all agencies.

169
7o7 05_; 0 (;3-- --12
The integration of radar-tracking equipment mission added significantly to the flexibility of
into a tracking system at the DOD missile network operations.
ranges increased the capability of each range to The use of the vast communications resources
support future missions. Technological ex- within the DOD and their integration into cx-
perience and achievements of each range were isting NASA and commercial systems to sup-
pooled to permit all ranges to take advantage port network and recovery operations contrib-
of such advancements or modifcations. uted significantly to the operational success of
The application of relay techniques for trans- the project.
mitting remote telemetry data from the down- One of the more important considerations
range stations, derived from AMR experience for support of Mercury operational planning
in data transmission, was reported to NASA was to provide for the safe and rapid recovery
for possible adaptation to the wire and radio of the astronaut. Plans made by the DOD ele-
circuits of the Mercury network. Subsequently ments provided for the deployment of forces
NASA secured a telephone line for data trans- ill a large number of strategic locations to cover
mission between Pt. Arguello and the Mercury possible aborts during all phases of the mis-
Control Center. During the ninth Mercury- sion. Much of the effort in training was ex-
pended by forces that were deployed to act in
Atlas mission the Mercury Control Center was
contingency situations which essentially never
supplied with a real-time display of electrocar-
developed. Their efforts, nevertheless, contrib-
diograph functions from the DOD sites at Cali-
uted to the success of the recovery mission.
fornia, Antigua, and at Ascension. In addition
Providing support to Mercury flights has
to increasing the potential at each site by such
contributed greatly to DOD's knowledge and
improvements, a considerable saving in research experience in areas of launch, network, recov-
and development costs was also realized by vir- ery, communications, and medical space opera-
tue of this exchange of technical information. tions. Future space-flight operations can be
The use of radar-tracking aircraft during effectively supported by applying the experi-
Mercury missions and especially the results ob- ence and procedures derived during Project
tained during the reentry phase of the MA-9 Mercury.

170
10. ASTRONAUT TRAINING

BY ROBERT B. VOAS, Ph. D., Asst./or Human Factors, O_ce o] the Director, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center; HAROLD I. JOHNSON, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and
RAYMOND ZEDEKAR, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center .2--/_2 L/

f _' _ { Summary sition from airplanes to spacecraft. The pro-


gram seems to have been well suited to the
Any training program must be based on three
requirements of the Mercury Project and future
factors: the requirements of the job, the char-
programs will make use of the same basic tech-
acteristics of the trainees, and the training fa-
niques. In retrospect, some of the emphasis on
cilities available. Each factor is briefly dis-
environmental familiarization might have been
cussed and its effect upon the nature of the
reduced, and more complete simulation of the
training program is indicated. Selection of the
external view from the spacecraft should have
Mercury astronauts began in January 1959.
been provided. However, the great majority
They reported at the Manned Spacecraft Center
of the trainers and training activities have been
in April of that year and took part in a group
both beneficial and necessary to produce the
training program for the next 2 years. In level of readiness that was demonstrated in the
April 1961, when the Mercury manned flight
flight program. -_
program began, a special preflight preparation
program was conducted with each of the pilots Introduction
and his backup designated for a flight. The
remainder of the group took part in develop- The Mercury training program was the first
ment and operational activities and did limited opportunity to prepare individuals for space
training to maintain tile proficiency developed flight. In general, however, the techniques used
during the group training program. were not basically new or unique to this project.
The group training program consisted of five Rather, standard training techniques and
major areas: (1) basic astronautical science in- training equipment approaches which had
struction, (2) systems training, (3) spacecraft been used for many years in aviation were
control training, (4) environmental familiari- adapted for preparing the astronauts for their
zation, and (5) egress and survival training. flights. From the beginning, the role of the
The specific preflight preparation programs in- astronaut has been conceived as being active and
volved : (1) integrating the pilot with the space- highly similar to that of the test pilot who
craft, (2) specific systems training, (3) devel- carries out the initial flights of new aircraft.
opment and practice of the specific mission While the Project Mercury drew heavily upon
flight plan, (4) training with flight controllers,
flight training methodology, there were certain
and (5) medical and physical preparation. All
specific requirements of this program which
of the Mercury trainers and training facilities
were significant in determining its basic form.
are briefly listed and discussed, and this section
It is perhaps worth keeping these requirements
concludes with an evaluation of the training
in mind in a review of the Mercury training
devices and of the various phases of the train-
ing program. procedures:
Overall, the Mercury training program ap- (1) The Mercury program was not a mass
pears to have been successful in providing ex- training program, only seven individuals were
perienced pilots with the detailed spacecraft involved, and, therefore, it was possible to re-
operation and systems information and skills duce the formality of the program and to use a
which were required for them to make the tran- number of shortcuts which would not have been

171
feasible in the larger aviation training pro- to the mission by allowing for a greater variety
of maneuvers and scientific observations. The
grams.
('_) The participants in the training program decision to provide for complete manual opera-
were experienccd individuals who were already tion was highly significant for the crew train-
well along in preparation for space flight. This ing program because it meant that there would
not only greatly reduced the overall amount of be a requirement for an individual who could
training necessary, it was also possible to em- skillfully manage the vehicle, as well as merely
phasize individual initiative and responsibility tolerate the physical stresses of the flight.
for their training .status. The major tasks (refs. 1 and 2) which can
(3) The training program had to be flexible be identified from an analysis of the Mercury
hecause the spacecraft which the astronaut was vehicle and its mission, involve:
being trained to operate was under development (1) Sequence monitoring--monitoring all of
and therefore was being modified according to the critical phases of the space mission, such as
mission requirements. lift-off, staging of the launch vehicle, the sepa-
(4) The training program had to be desi_led rat ion of the escape tower, the separation of the
to help feed back into the developmental proc- spacecraft from the launch vehicle, firing of the
ess. The astronauts were expected to aid the retrorockets, and deployment of the parachute.
development engineers by participating in the ('2) Systems management--operation of all
desi_ and review of many of the spacecraft of the onboard systems and the management of
systems, and the training activities were fre- the critical consumable supplies to insure that
quently combined with systems tests to evaluate any out-of-tolerance condition is recognized and
both onboard qnd crew equipment. corrected before an emergency situation devel-
(5) Unlike flight training, actual training in ops.
space was not feasible. There was a complete (3) Attitude control_maneuvering the ve-
dependence upon ground simulator training hicle to the proper relationship to the earth or
until the astronaut flew the mission for which orbital path whenever it is required during the
he had been preparing. mission.
(6) The training had to be designed to tie (4) NavigationIbeing able to determine the
in with the training and preparation of other spacecraft's position in orbit at any time and
operational groups such as the flight controllers. determining the critical retrofire time.
(7) The significance of the program to our (5) Communications--operating the radio
national prestige, the very great interest of the links to keep the ground control center in-
formed of his status.
public, and the large cost resulted in an un-
usually strong emphasis upon a very high level (_) Research observations--carrying out the
of reliability, perfection, and precision in the special activities related to research and the
man's performance. evaluation of spacecraft function under flight
conditions. The difficulty of performing these
Training-Program Characteristics tasks was increased by the presence of environ-
mental conditions, such as high acceleration,
Any training program must be based on three
reduced pressure, heat, noise, vibration, and
major factors : the job requirements, the charac- weightlessness.
teristics of the trainees, and the training fa- In addition to these tasks involved in the ac-
cilities which are available. These factors are
tual operation of spacecraft, the Mercury astro-
discussed in the following paragraphs.
nauts were expected to contribute to a number of
areas in the Mercury program. These included
Characteristics of Mercury Astronaut's Job
four main areas :
While the Mercury spacecraft was designed (1) Design of the Mercury spacecraft.
to comi)lete a limited preprogramed mission on (_) Development of operational procedures.
a COml)letely automatic basis, from the very be- (3) Development of inflight tes_ equipment.
ginning manual controls were also provided. It was desired to carry out tests of the space-
It was recognized that the man could provide craft function, of special advanced systems and
increased systems reliability and give flexibility components, and to do scientific research during

172
the space flight that required the astronauts' who met the above requirements. The 69 most
participation in the development of a number of highly qualified of these candidates were in-
specialized kinds of equipment. vited by the services to come to the Pentagon to
(4) Contribution to public relations activi- receive a briefing on Project Mercury and to be
ties. The astronauts served as excellent spokes- interviewed by the NASA Space Task Group.
men for the program and were an important aid On the basis of these interviews, 32 were
in meeting the requirement set by Congress to selected to proceed to the Lovelace Clinic for a
keep the public informed on the space program. w_ek of detailed physiological examinations
and then to the Wright Field Aeromedical
Characteristics of Trainees
Laboratory for a week of stress tests (refs. 3
to 6). Data from these two testing programs
The job requirements discussed in the previ-
were summarized and reviewed at the Space
ous section required individuals with high skill
Task Group during the first week of April 1959.
levels, appropriate personality traits, and a
In all, 18 men were found to be medically quali-
high level of physical fitness. The require-
ments under each of these areas are summarized fied without reservation and, of these, the seven
as follows : most technically qualified were selected to enter
training.
(1) In the area of al_titude and ability fac-
tors, ,the individual needed : Training Facilities

(a) A good engineering knowledge


Table 10-I summarizes all of the major
(b) A good knowledge of operational pro-
training facilities used in the Mercury Astro-
cedures typical of aircraft or missile systems
naut Training Program. Included are train-
(e) General scientific knowledge and re-
search skills. ing devices and other facilities used for sig-
nificant areas of the training program. From
(d) High intelligence.
the table, it can be seen that there were a large
(e) Psychomotor skills similar to those re-
number of facilities used. This resulted from
quired to operate aircraft
at least three factors.
(2) In the area of personality factors, the
candidate had to demonstrate : (1) Since the program was a first effort of
its kind, it seemed appropriate to try all fa-
(a) Good stress tolerance
cilities to get a better feel for the relative im-
(b) A good ability to make decisions
(c) Ability to work with others portance of various types of experiences to the
(d) Emotional maturity training.

(e) A strong motivation for the program (2) It was generally impossible to simulate
more than one or two of the environmental con-
(3) The physical requirements included :
(a) Freedom from disease or disabilities ditions at any given facility. Therefore, it was
(b) A resistance to the physical stresses of necessary to use many different devices to ob-
space flight accelerations, reduced pressure, tain experience with all aspects of the environ-
ment.
weightlessness, high temperatures, and so
forth (3) Most of the training devices had to be
(c) Medium size so that they could be ade- simple and rudimentary because the simulation
quately accommodated by the relatively small techniques for space flight were in their in-
Mercury spacecraft. fancy, and the training program was based on
Initial planning during the fall of 1958 an accelerated schedule.
resulted in the definition of five basic require- Table 10-I also lists the availability, date,
ments for Mercury crew members: age, 39 or approximate training time per astronaut, esti-
below; height, 5 feet 11 inches or below; grad- mates of cost, lead time, and support time for
uate of a test pilot school; qualified to fly jet each of the major training devices. The sched-
airplanes; with 1,500 hours of jet flying time; uling of some types of training activities had
and a bachelor degree in science, engineering, or to be held up pending delivery or completion of
the equivalent. During the first weeks of Janu- this equipment. Also as can be seen from the
ary 1959, a selection board reviewed the records source or location of each device in table 10-I,
of 508 military test pilots and selected the 110 these training facilities were spread out over

173
0

0 0 0 0 0 LO 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 _'_ 0 ,--_ CD 0 0 0 0
0 _P eO 0 0

CP

<'" _E

0 0 0
0 0 0 C_ CP
0 C_ 0 CP C_
Or,; _
O" O" O-

I.
I 0._._ I_O+-_ .

0 0

o'_

_.N

• _ _,_'_ _-_ ._ _ _ _ _
_. _ '_ "_

"_,
r_

._.

._ _ "_ _ _._ b_O ,'4 .. ._ "_

174
t
o_

_ o t-, _1

t".-

q',l

0
0

,...q

_5

! i

,2

175
tlie country. This resulted in a large amount
of travel for the astronauts. AS a result, their
time w s used somewhat less efficiently than
if all tlie training facilities had been available
from the beginning of the program at MSC.
Most of these facilities are pictured in figures
10-1 ( a ) to 10-1 (p).

Training Chronology

Figure 10-2 presents a. chronology of the


Mercury training program. The astronaut sel-
ection program occupied the period from Janu-
ary to April 1959. The group training pro-
gram ran for approximately 2 years, to April
1961. After April 1961, the manned flight ( c ) Centrifuge acceleration facility.
program began. Prior to each flight, a pre-
flight preparation program was conducted for
the pilot and his backup. The length of this

---VI CI

( a ) Langley analog computer simulator.

r
x:.
-4
c \ >

_IbL.cllrrr- -La- .*
( b ) Aircraft used for proflciency flights. ( d ) ALFA trainer.

FIGURE
l(r1.-Photographs of various tralning facilities.

176
k

( g ) Zero-g airplane flights.


( e ) Analog computer trainer no. 2.

( f ) Slowly revolving room. ( h ) Chapel Hill Planetarium.

B-IGURE 10-1.-Continued.

177
(k) Procedures trainer.

( i ) MASTIF trainer.

,-

I
-- - - :e

(j) Egress trainer. ( 1 ) ECS .trainer.

FIQURE
10-1.-Continued.

178
( m ) Attitude instmment display mockup.
- __ ~

(n) Ground-features recognition trainer. ( p ) Virtual image celestial display.

(0) Yaw recognition trainer.

FIQURE
10-1.4ncluded.

179
1959 1960 1961 1962

I
2 I 3 I 4 I 2 3 4 I 2 3 4 I 2 I 3

Menned Mercury flights _R 3 MR 4 MA _ _A 71


1 1
Astronout selection r-- I

i
Group troining

1
MR

Preflio_t preporotion

M_8 I
!

1
Astronout development OCtlvitiesr
1 ,_..... L............ 1__1,
Mercury ___J
1

Future progroms

---L
.....:......
)......... I

'
l
2
22
2
2
222
l
222
l
Operations a ctivitles I I
I I I I I I I 1__
FIGURE 10-2.--Chronology (ff Mercury training program.

program depended upon the time available Group Training Program


between flights and on tim nature of the flight.
The group training program consisted of five
In general, the backup pilot on one flight was
major areas which are described in the follow-
selected as primary pilot for the next mission.
ing paragraphs. Portions of this program
In this way, the actual preflight preparation
have previously been described by Astronaut
of each pilot encompassed close to 6 months--
Slayton in ref. 7 and others (ref. 6 and 8).
the first half as a backup and the second half
as the primary pilot. Basic Science Program
The pilots" contribution to the development
An initial phase of the Mercury astronaut
activities in the Mercury program began soon
training program consisted of brief but com-
after they reported to the NASA and had had
prehensive courses in the astronautical sciences.
sufficient indo('trination on the Mercury space-
The astronauts had had considerable training in
craft systems. The astronauts participated in
the aeronautical sciences, but most had not had
plalming for the programs to follow Mercury
an opportunity to acquire the basic knowledge
which began in 1961 and became greatly accel-
erated in 196:2). in such subjects as rocket propulsion and space
mechanics which were required in the Mercury
Each man was assigned to a Mercury network
flight 1)rogram. Training in the space sciences
station as voice communicator. Service in this
enabled the astronauts to function better as ob-
capacity normally involved a minimum of 3,
or more, weeks. This activity in connection with servers of inflight phenomena and provided a
Mercury operations began with the manned basis for better understanding of the technical

Redstone flights in 1961 and became greatly aspects of the Mercury spacecraft and vehicle
amplified with the manned orbital flights in systems. The series of courses listed in table
1969 and 1963. After the termination of the 10-II was conducted with the cooperation of
group training program, they had to devote the NASA Langley Research Center. Time
time to maintaining their proficiency, in addi- did not permit a more extensive program al-
tion to these operational requirements. though it would have been desirable.

180
Table lO-II.--Zectures on Space Sciences problem, was the Capsule (Spacecraft) Flight
Operations Manual (ref. 10). This document
Subject Hours was printed in a size small enough to be carried
in the pocket of the flight jacket with the inten-
1. Elementary Mechanics and Aero- t.ion that it could be carried along on flights,
dynamics .................... 10 if desired. In actual practice, it was not carried
2. Principles of Guidance and Con- with the flight but was used during some trainer
trol .......................... 4
6 runs. A third publication used extensively in
3. Navigation in Space .............
4. Elements of Communication ...... 2 training was the Flight Controller's Handbook,
12 which was developed within the Manned Space-
5. Space Physics ..................
8
6. Basic Physiology ................ craft Center (see paper 15) and which provided
a number of useful diagrams for analyzing
system malfunctions.
Systems Training Specialty Assignments.--To insure that the
astronauts had available to them the most up-
A large portion of the training program was
to-date information possible, they participated
devoted to familiarizing the astronauts with the
in the engineering reviews and other meetings
Mercury systems. This knowledge was not only
on the spacecraft systems. Since no one man
basic to all of their training activities but was
the essential basis of their contribution to the could cover all of these meetings, each astronaut
was assigned to a specialty area (ref. 7). Each
development program. The primary require-
man attended meetings in his area and reported
ments of this training were: to develop a basic
back to the group.
understanding of the nature and characteristics
Merc_lry Procedures Trainers.--The bulk of
of each system; to build on this understanding
the ol)erational training in the Mercury sys-
a knowledge of the system operation and func-
tems was achieved on the Mercury Procedures
tion; and, finally, to develop, in the Mercury
Trainers (MPT). The name "procedures
procedures trainers and the spacecraft, skill in
trainers" is actually a misnomer since these de-
managing the onboard systems.
vices could better be classified as flight simula-
Systems brlefings.--The systems training be-
tors. Initially, a very simple open-loop device
gan with a series of briefings given by special-
had been considered for training in the basic
ists within the Space Task Group. The first set
launch procedures. This was to be supple-
of lectures covered the Mercury systems and was
mented later by a complete flight trainer. How-
followed by another group of lectures covering
ever, the time available for development and
operational areas. These lectures were followed
delivery of these training devices was so short
by a series of somewhat more detailed systems
that it was decided to combine the two into a
briefings by contractor personnel at the various
single trainer. In this trainer, it was possible
contractor facilities. Periodically, throughout
to simulate the operation of all of the Mercury
the 2 years of the group training program, sys-
systems and induce approximately 275 separate
tems lectures were repeated.
Contractor visits.--The astronauts visited system failures (ref. 11). Provisions were
made to pressurize the pressure suits. How-
contractor plants and other NASA centers in
ever, with the exception of the indicator read-
order to get a firsthand view of the developing
in_, the actual environmental conditions in the
hardware and of the operational facilities.
Manuals.--Documentation of the Mercury cabin were not provided. Two of these units
were procured in order to have one available
systems was a particularly difficult problem be-
at the launch site to be used in prelaunch train-
cause the spacecraft was under development.
ing, while the other was used at the main train-
The first set of systems lectures were used as the
in_ base at Langley Field, Va. These two pro-
basis for the Mercury Familiarization Manual
(ref. 9). This manual became the basic systems cednres trainers differed slightly in their

document used by the astronaut. provisions for animating attitude control sys-
A second manual, which was developed later tem, as is described later, but they were essen-
in tile program and which emphasized the oper- tially identical in their capability to simulate
ational aspects of the systems management the operation of onboard systems.

181
Initial training began by reviewing each sys- mately 2 hours of the expected postlanding
tem separately in the trainer. The normal op- temperature. During these runs, the astronauts
erati0n of each system and all of the failures wore the pressure suits and becaxne familiar
which could be simulated were demonstrated with function of the suits when associated with
during this initial period. Following this, a the environmental control system. However,
series of both Redstone and Atlas simulated since a provision had been made for simulating
flights were made for each student, during the suit function in the procedures trainer, this
which simulated emergencies were kept to a type of training was not considered essential.
minimum in order to allow the astronauts to This was particularly true since the astronauts
become familiar with the timing of the normal received further first-hand familiarization to
missions. Once they were generally familiar the environmental control system by participat-
with the timing of the missions and the normal ing in the preflight checkout of the spacecraft
indications, the numbers and types of malfunc- environmental control system at the launch site.
tions were increased. By the end of the group
training period, all the astronauts had made a Attitude Control Training
large number of Atlas and Redstone runs and
A number of fixed, and moving based simu-
had had an opportunity to experience most of
lators had to be employed because no single
the major emergencies.
trainer was capable of simulating all of the
E_vlronmental Cantrol Systems Trainer.-
tasks on all of the control systems under all en-
Additional training in the operation of the en-
vironmental conditions (ref. lg). The function
vironmental control system was provided bv
of each of the principal control attitude trainers
the environmental control systems trainer is summarized in table 10-III. This table lists
which was a heavy shell mock-up with a proto-
the attitude control trainers and the spacecr'_ft
type spacecraft environmental system. The de-
control systems which could be simulated, the
vice used was delivered to NASA in November
1960 and installed in a man-rated vacuum cham- reference systems which were available to the
pilots, tasks which could be practiced, environ-
ber at the U.S. Naval Air Crew Equipment
mental conditions simulated, and finally
Laboratory in Philadelphia (fig. 10-1(I)).
During December of 1960 and Janu,_ry of 1961, whether or not attitude tasks could be practiced
the astronauts participated in a program of sys- in conjunction with other flight activities. Each
tem familiarization that included being exposed of these trainers is briefly described in the fol-
to a simulated reentry heat pulse and approxi- lowing paragraphs.

182
;4

g_ .d
•£ _-,'
o"= a=_o=
_8 I @

_'_ _._e

_.o

._,_

%
&

c
_ ,,_

!
_a

i e
o
r..)

_ M 14 N M N N 14

I I I i r t I I i

i
I I °

= ;
i i i

= = ._ .=. i I i

_._ _, i I i


, g

183
Analog tralner.--The analog computer flight. Approximately 6 months prior to com-
trainer provided the first sinmlation of the as- pletion of Project Mercury, additional equip-
tronaut's manual flight-control task in Project ment was obtained to provide manual damping
Mercury. The simulator (fig. 10-1(a)) was practice during reentry.
set up by Langley Research Center personnel at Trainer no. 1 had an active periscope display
the inception of Project Mercury and was used consisting of a moving dot on the face of a cath-
heavily during the first half of 1959, both for ode ray tube which was activated by the hand
engineering feasibility tests and for introducing controller and the analog computer. Very late
the Mercury flight control tasks to the in the project a new, versatile, virtual image
astronauts. display was also added to trainer no. 1. This
A_mlog tr,/ner no. 2.--The trainer was acti- display was used briefly for training prior to the
vated in the latter half of 1959. The simulator last Mercury flight.
(fig. 10-1(e)) utilized a special-purpose a-c Virtual-image celestial display.--Because of
analog computer obtained from an obsolete the state-of-the-art of space flight external-
F-100 gunnery trainer. Realism was enhanced view simulation at the outset of the Mercury
by the use of an early type molded styrofoam project 'rod the compressed time schedule, no
couch and a prototype Mercury three-axis con- external view other than that through the peri-
troller supplied by the contractor. Aside from scope was provided on MPT no. 1 at the time of
providing the astronaut with his first oppor- delivery of the procedures trainers. However,
tmfity to practice attitude control in the pres- considerable effort was expended in trying to
surized suit, this trainer was used to perform develop new and versatile displays. One result
a number of engineering feasibility studies. of these efforts was the virtual-image viewing
Merc_.ry Procedures Trainers.--The Mercury system (fig. 10-1(p) ). The first working model
procedures trainer no. 1, housed in the NASA of the system was delivered and installed on the
Full-Scale Tunnel at Langley Air Force Base, MPT no. 1 in time for limited training prior to
Va., and trainer no. 2, housed in the Mercury the MA-9 flight. This display could simul-
Control Center (fig. 10-1(k)) at Cape Canav- taneously accept inputs ranging from three-di-
eral, Fla., were the most valuable flight-crew mensional models to closed-circuit television or
trainers used in the Mercury Project. film strips. However, the only display avail-
The decision to provide two trainers was able at the time of the MA-9 flight was
found to be sound since, in addition to the astro- a star view. The stars were produced by
nauts' requirements, there were requirements to setting ball-bearings of various sizes into
use I)oth Mercury Procedures Trainers in con- the sm'face of a 12-inch diameter, hollow
junction with simulations in the flight controller magnesium sphere which was gimballed and
training program. Trainer No. 1 was used in driven by a computer. The ball bearings, upon
conjunction with the remote site simulator at illumination by a point light source, produce
exceedingly realistic point sources of light of
Langley Air Force Base, Va. ; and trainer no. 2,
the desired brightness to represent the star
with the Control Center Mission Training Com-
fields.
plex at the launch site. (See paper 15.)
Yaw-recognition trainer.--Prior to the MA-
Both trainers were delivered without analog
8 six-orbital-pass mission, there was consider-
computers for animating the rate-and-attitude
able concern regarding whether or not the pilot
flight instruments. Therefore, procedures
would be able to detect his yaw position solely
trainer no. 1 was connected to the same com-
1)y use of the slow translation of terrain or
puter used in the analog trainer no. 2. This clouds viewed out the window of his spacecraft.
computer allowed activation of all of the 22 pos- The pilot's ability to determine accurately yaw
sible combinations of manual and/or automatic
by using out-the-window references is all-ira-
attitude controls that were provided in the Mer- portant if his gyro altitude information was
cury spacecraft. Three months after delivery, lacking during retrofire as in the MA-9 flight.
procedures trainer no. 2 was supplied with a In this case, Astronaut Cooper had to rely on
small-capacity general-purpose analog com- his window scene to determine heading or yaw
puter which permitted activation of only the position accurately for retrofire. (See paper
manual-e0ntrol modes for the orbital phase of 17.)

184
In orderto give the astronauts a preview of eral hours studying the maneuvers planned for
the out-the-window motion cues they would their flights.
have in orbit, a yaw-recognition trainer (fig. Ground-recognltlon trainer.--The ground-
10-1 (o)) was conceived, built, and activated in recognition trainer (fig. 10-1 (n)) consisted of
about 2 weeks. The trainer consisted of a a prototype molded couch, an actual Mercury
33-foot diameter convex-lens-shaped screen, periscope, a back-projection screen, and a
one surface of which represented either the motorized slide projector. The slide projector
earth's surface or a constant-altitude cloud displayed a colored, moving image of the earth
deck. This surface was made of polyethyl- on the screen. No cloud cover was simulated.
ene plastic and was used to display a real, The image was viewed through the periscope,
moving image of simulated clouds produced located at the proper distance from the screen
by a film strip moving at the proper speed to simulate the geometry of a periscope in a
through a slide projector. The speed of the Mercury spacecraft at 110 nautical miles alti-
image movement duplicated the in-flight ap- tude and aimed at the earth's nadir.
parent movement between the spacecraft and The purpose of the trainer was to familiarize
the ground by having the observer view the astronauts with the wide-angle optics of the
the scene from a point at the middle of the periscope which caused a compression of the
lens while standing 2 feet away from the sur- images of coastlines, rivers, mountain ranges,
face. To heighten realism, the flight crews and other topographical features. This trainer
wore a box over their heads which had an open- was not used extensively because, to a certain
ing which simulated the proper size and shape degree, the scenes viewed were very similar to
of the spacecraft window. those that were seen through the periscope
The MA-8 and MA-9 flight crews utilized the simulation of the ALFA trainer.
yaw recognition trainer prior to their flights. Air-lubrlcated free-attitude trainer.--The
The other astronauts used the trainer subse- air-lubricated free-attitude trainer (ALFA)
quent to their flights. All of the pilots who had (fig. 10-1 (d)), was designed and developed by
flown orbital flights reported that it duplicated engineers of the NASA Manned Spacecraft
almost exactly the visual yaw motion cues ob- Center. This trainer moved on an air-bearing
served from the spacecraft. and had 360 ° of freedom in roll and 35 ° of
Attitude i.r_'trument d_splay mock-up.--The freedom in pitch and yaw. The astronaut oper-
attitude instrument display mock-up (fig. 10-1 ated compressed air jets through a Mercury
(m)) consisted of a half-scale transparent hand controller. Retrofire disturbance torques
model of the Mercury spacecraft mounted were also simulated with compressed-air jets.
within a four-gimbal all-attitude support. The Two attitude-control systems were simulated
mock-up contained the actual Mercury rate and on ALFA: manual proportional and fly-by-
attitude indicators without horizon scanner or wire. In the fly-by-wire simulation, only the
ASCS logic hardware. The exterior covers of low-torque jets (used for attitude control in
the attitude gyroscopes were removed so that orbit when attempting to minimize fuel con-
the trainee could observe the manner in which sumption) were simulated. All three reference
the attitude gyros tumbled during simulated
systems are provided. The periscope was simu-
motions of the spacecraft. The device illus-
lated through a wide-angle lens and a system
trated how the attitude indicators can read in-
of mirrors which presented a view of a circular
correctly as a result of various spacecraft
screen on which a map of the earth was pro-
attitudes occurring at times when the floating
jected from a film strip. The actual Mercury
gyroscope axes are not parallel to the spacecraft
gyro package and instrument display were
axes. The major purpose of this training de-
mounted on the trainer. The window display
vice was to teach the astronauts how to regain
use of the attitude gyros and attitude indicating was simulated schematically by an illuminated
system if correct reference were lost as a result strip to represent the horizon and small bulbs
of the tumbling of the gyros or the interference to simulate the stars.

of the "repeater" stops. This conceptual trainer Multi-Axi_ Spin-Test Inertia Facility
was very useful and each flight crew spent sev- Tralner.--The Multi-Axis Spin-Test Inertia

185
707-056 O--63,-------1_
Facility (3fASTIF) trainer, created in Feb- and for demonstrating the adequacy of the
ruary 1960 by personnel of the NASA Lewis spacecraft instrumentation for viewing under
Research Center, was utilized for a simulation acceleration.
training program of recovery from tumbling
Environmental Familiarization
flight in February 1960. The trainer (fig. 10-1
(i)) consisted of a couch mounted inside three Despite the general familiarity of the astro-
gimbals, a three-axis hand controller, and a nauts with the space flight environment and
rate display. The astronauts were spun at rota- their demonstrated capability of performing
tional rates of about 30 rpm about all three effectively under stress, an attempt was made
spacecraft axes simultaneously. At a prear-
during the training program to provide addi-
ranged time, the astronauts assumed control of
tional familiarity with this environment. The
a three-axis compressed nitrogen fly-by-wire at-
following five requirements were thought to be
titude control system and brought the couch
conducive to good performance under space-
to rest by reference to a Mercury rate-indicator
flight conditions :
instrument.
(1) The astronauts required a detailed knowl-
The purpose of the trainer was to provide the edge of and confidence in the equipment which
best technique and improved confidence level
they had to operate in space. This was pri-
for stopping inadvertent tumbling of the Mer-
marily provided through the systems training
cury spacecraft. The training was considered
described previously. However, the environ-
valuable even though the possibility of its ap-
mental familiarization involving pressure cham-
plication was thought to be fairly remote.
ber and centrifuge runs provided an opportu-
Centrifuge Training nity to become more fully acquainted with the
pressure suit, the couch and restraint systems,
Four formal centrifuge programs were con- the bioinstrumentation and other items of per-
ducted at the Aviation Medical Acceleration
sonal equipment and to develop confidence that
Laboratory's centrifuge at the Naval Air De- these items would perform their functions ade-
velopment Center at Johnsville, Pa., as part of quately in the space-flight environment.
the group training program (fig. 10-1(c)). (2) The astronauts also required a familiar-
The first two programs were combined engi- ity with the environment itself. Familiarity
neering-feasibility and preliminary astronaut- with the conditions of space flight minimizes
familiarization programs while the last two the number of novel and possibly distracting
were intensive operational training programs stimuli which will be encountered in flight. Ex-
for the Redstone and the Atlas flights. The perience with these conditions also permits the
configuration of the centrifuge gondola and the development of the specific techniques for mini-
computer control system varied between pro- mizing these environmental effects. For ex-
grams. The gondola was configured to simu- ample, under acceleration it is necessary for the
late spacecraft for either orbital or ballistic astronauts to learn a special breathing tech-
missions. The simulated attitude control sys- nique to minimize the tendency of peripheral
tem was run closed loop and the centrifuge was vision to become blurred because of reduced
run open loop. The astronauts wore full pres- oxygenation of the blood. During early trMn-
sure suits and some runs were made at a simu- ing, this breathing technique required some
lated altitude of 28,000 feet. thought and distracted the astronauts from their
Overall, the astronauts experienced an aver- control tasks. However, as training progressed,
age of 45 hours on the centrifuge. These pro- the breathing became automatic and full atten-
grams appeared to be extremely valuable both tion could be devoted to the task.
for training and in providing an opportunity The accommodation of the pilot to the effects
for checking out items of personal equipment of accelerat:ion can be seen in figure 10-3 which

186
conditions which were simulated during the
0 Static
group training program. The first column lists
the various conditions experienced while the
second gives the intensity of exposure encoun-
tered in suborbital and orbital flights. The
third column summarizes the level experienced
in training while the final column lists some of
the trainers which were used to provide this
experience. With the exception of weightless-
ness_ all the environmental conditions were sim-
,I I J I I . I ulated during training at least to the level ex-
I 2 5 4 5 6
Training trials pected in a normal flight. Weightlessness
condition cannot be simulated within the atmos-
FIGURE 10-3.--Centrifuge retrofire training.
phere for more than 60 seconds; however, the
astronauts did, over several runs, build up an
provides a comparison of the retrofire attitude
average of 40 minutes total weightlessness per
control performance_ under the simulated accel-
man. In general, all of the environmental fa-
eration of the retrorockets and statically. The miliarization experiences were of value. How-
data presented are average values for all astro- ever, with the exception of the linear accelera-
nauts and show an increase in error with ac-
tion experienced on the centrifuge and effects of
celeration; however this initial effect tended to suit pressurization, none of the environmental
disappear with practice. simulations were critical, including weightless-
Table 10-IV summarizes the environmental ness.

187
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.s

n n n
r I n
n n n
n

t n °

°
¢.D

C_

" ,L

t= _a0
Z °_ _

n i I a t
n I k t q I
t i I

q p o_
I I
n t
n n ._ n
n I n _ a u

al
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188
(3) A high level of physical conditioning of the training program a series of balloon
was also required. Since, to meet flying re- flights be undertaken in which the actual Mer-
quirements, the trainees had been maintaining cury spacecraft would be carried to altitudes
themselves in good condition for a number of of from 80,000 to 100,000 feet. The plans for
years, no formal group physical training pro- this program were carried for several months
gram was initiated aside from a short period and the requirements studied in detail. The
of instruction in scuba diving. Reliance was studies indicated that training value did not
placed on each individual to keep himself in justify the risk or the cost involved in the pro-
good physical condition and he was aided in gram. Two other programs of a similar nature
monitoring his conditions by frequent physi- were also eliminated. One program involved
cal examinations and by his own observations placing the actual spacecraft on the Lewis
of his ability to perform adequately on the MASTIF device for training in controlling at-
centrifuge and in other types of environmental titude during retrofire. The MASTIF device
training. was inside a full-scale wind tunnel, which could
(4) A fourth requirement was the detailed have been depressurized. Analysis also showed
planning and practice of emergency procedures that it would be very difficult to reproduce the
until they could be rapidly and correctly ex- conditions of motion typical of space flight be-
ecuted. The majority of this type of training cause of the very high inertia of the MASTIF
occurred on the procedures trainer, particu- gimbals. A final program of the same sort was
larly during the period just prior to the flight. a plan to place a flight Mercury spacecraft on
(5) A final requirement for performing ef- top of the Redstone launch vehicle during static
fectively under stress was to maintain their firing so that the astronaut could experience
habits of altertness and their ability to react the actual noise and vibration typical of launch.
rapidly and think effectively in emergencies, Once again neither the risk nor the cost ap-
which they had developed during their careers peared justified in view of the limited training
in flying. Since none of the training situations value. These three examples illustrate what
involved any significant amount of hazard, it seems to be a basic result of the Mercury train-
was important that the astronauts have an op- ing experience. Using actual flight equipment
portunity to maintain their skills in meeting in simulated environments for training pur-
real emergencies. As a result they were pro- poses alone generally involves too great an ex-
vided with aircraft so they could maintain their pense to be worthwhile. When only training is
flying skills (See fig. 10-1(b) ). involved, mission simulators are most efficient.
Through these five steps, knowledge of the On the other hand, in the Mercury program,
equipment available to their use, familiarity valuable training was achieved during the
with the environment, physical conditioning , launch checkout of the actual flight vehicle in
preplanning for emergencies, and the habit of the pressure chamber at Cape Canaveral. In
constant alertness and readiness for action, the this case, however, the simulation benefited not
astronauts were provided with the basis for a only the training program but the checkout of
high degree of effectiveness in performing well the flight article.
under the unusual environmental conditions
Egress and Survival Training
associated with space flight.
In considering the problems of preparing in- The astronauts were provided with several
dividuals for performing effectively in a realis- training programs designed to prepare them to
tic environment, it is interesting to note that a egress successfully, survive and be recovered
number of programs, in which it was intended under various contingency conditions. The
to use actual hardware in real environments in egress and survival programs are summarized
order to train the astronauts, were consitlered as follows.
but were not put into practice because the train- Egress training, phase 1.--The first egress
ing value appeared to be too small to justify training program was conducted in February
the cost or safety hazards involved in their im- 1960, in which the egress trainer, spacecraft no.
plementation. At the initiation of the Mercury 5, (fig. 10-1(j)) and the NASA Langley Re-
program, it had been recommended that as part search Center Hydrodynamic Basin no. 1 were

189
used. Each of the astronauts .made several (2) 1 day of field demonstrations covering the
egresses through the top hatch with and with- utilization and care of available clothing and
out the pressure suits in calm water and in artifi- spacecraft and survival equipment; and (3) 3
cially generated waves up to 2 feet in height. days of remote-site training during which the
Egress training, phase 2.--The first full-scale astronauts applied the knowledge and tech-
open water egress program was conducted in the niques that they had learned during the brief-
Gulf of Mexico near the Pensacola Naval Air ings and demonstrations.
Station in March and April of 1960. This pro-
gram consisted of 1 day at sea, during which Preflight Preparation
both top and side hatch egresses were accom- Approximately 3 montl_s prior to each fight,
plished, and a second day at the training tank the designated pilot and his backup began spe-
for water-survival technique and drill. cific preparations for the mission. The period
Egress training, phase 3.--Underwater egress of preparation was, however, somewhat vari-
was accomplished at NASA Langley Research able depending upon the particular mission and
Center in August 1960, with the Langley Re- the time between missions permitted by the
search Center Hydrodynamic Basin No. I again fight schedules. Pilots participating in the
being used. Each astronaut made six egresses earlier missions had the advantage that the
while the spacecraft was submerged. Half of training received in the group program was
these were accomplished while wearing the Mer- fresher and that less change had occurred in
cury pressure suit. the vehicle configuration between the time of
Periodically, the astronauts were given re- this program and their fight. Those partici-
fresher courses on proper egress and recovery pating in later flights experienced a lapse of in-
procedures through briefings and participation tensive training from 1 to 2 years and had the
in subsequent egress and recovery exercises. problem that the spacecraft configuration had
In addition, each designated fight crew par- changed considerably in the interim, particu-
ticipated in a full-scale recovery exercise prior larly as the mission length was extended. Thus,
to each fl'ghtl during, which both top and •side• the preflight period of training became more
egress, survival equipment deployment, and and more significant. The final impression de-
helicopter pickup operations were accomplished. veloping out of the Mercury experience was
Survival training, phase 1.--_Vater survival that on a day-for-day basis preflight prepara-
training was accomplished in conjunction with tion was the most valuable period of the train-
most of the water-egress programs and through ing program. Experience indicated that the
briefings. The first water-survival training pilot was required to put in a 10- to 12-hour
program was conducted at Pensacola, Florida, day for at least 6 days a week during this pre-
in March 1960. The training consisted of sev- flight period. Astronaut Cooper's activities
eral briefings, a training film, and actual prac- during this time are shown in table 10-V.
Since there were so many demands upon the
tice with the use of the survival equipment in
pilot's time, a definite danger existed that im-
the training tank and in the open sea during
portant items of training would be pushed aside
egress and recovery operations.
or overlooked unless care was taken to plan
Survival training, phase 2.--In July 1960,
carefully in advance, and frequent training re-
the Mercury astronauts completed a 51/_-day views were held to assure that all critical train-
course in desert survival at the Air Force Sur-
ing items had been accomplished. During this
vival School, Stead Air Force Base, Nevada. period there are five major preparation activi-
The course consisted of three phases: (1) 11/_ ties for the flight crew. These activities have
days of academics oriented to survival opera- been described previously by Astronaut Car-
tions in the North African or Australian desert; penter (ref. 13).

190
Table IO-V--MA-9 Pilot Preflight Activities From January 1, 1963 to Launch Date

Date Day Activities

Jan. 2 .............. Wed ............... Altitude Chamber Systems Test Review, blood-pressure
checkout in altitude chamber, flying (TF-102A)
Jan. 4 to 7 .......... Fri. to Tues ........ Altitude Chamber Systems Test
Jan. 10 ............. Thurs .............. Flight-plan revicw, flying (TF-102A)
Jan. 12 ............. Sat ................ TV systems test, flying (TF-102A)
Jan. 18 and 19 ...... Fri. and Sat ........ Morehead Planetarium (celestial review)
Jan. 21 ............. Mon ............... Weight and balance
Jan. 22 ............. Tues ............... Systems briefings (ASCS and RCS)
Jan. 23 ............. Wed ............... Systems briefings (communications and sequential)
Jan. 24 ............. Thurs .............. Flight-plan and experiments review
Jan. 25 ............. Fri ................ Systems briefings (electrical and ECS)
Jan. 30 ............. Wed ............... Flying (F-102A)
Jan. 31 ............. Thurs .............. Flying (T-33A)
Feb. 1 ............. Fri _ Launch vehicle rollout inspection
Feb. 2 ............. Sat ................ Flying (T-33A)
Feb. 3 ............. Sun__ .............. Flying (T-33A)
Feb. 4 ............. Mon ............... Experiments status review
Feb. 5 ............. Tues ............... Flight-plan review
Feb. 6 ............. Wed ............... Couch fitting
Feb. 7 ............. Thurs .............. Flying (T-33A)
Feb. 8 ............. Fri ................ Observation of flashing beacon on T-33A
Feb. 11 ............ Mon ............... Flight-plan briefi:ng to Deputy Director for Mission Require-
ments
Feb. 12 ............ Wues ............... Flying (F-102A)
Feb. 20 ............ Wed ............... Flying (F-102A), flight-food testing
Feb. 21_ __.......... Thurs .............. Experiments briefings
Feb. 23 ............ Sat ................ Flying (T-33A)
Mar. 1............. Fri................ TV systems test
Mar. 4 ............. Mon ............... Communication systems radiation test
Mar. 6 ............. Wed ............... Weight and balance
Mar. 8 ............. Fri .............. _ _ Flying (F-102A)
Mar. 12............ Tues ............... Couch fitting
Mar. 13............ Wed ............... Flying (T-33A, F-102A)
Mar. 14............ Thurs .............. Communication systems radiation test
Mar. 15............ Fri ................ Communication systems radiation test, Mercury Procedures
Trainer
Mar. 19 ............ Tues ............... Darkness and egress test
Mar. 20 to 24 ....... Wed. to Sun ........ Simulated flight (Hangar)
Mar. 24 ............ Sun ................ Flying (F-102A)
Mar. 26 ............ Tues ............... Flying (T-33A)
Mar. 27 ............ Wed ............... Flying (T-33A), Mercury Procedures Trainer
Mar. 28 ............ Thurs .............. Flying (T-33A), Centrifuge--acceleration refamiliarization
Mar. 29 ............ Fri ................ Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 1 and 2 ........ Mon. and Tues ...... Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 4 ............. Thurs .............. DOD-NASA MA-9 Review, Prepad RCS test
Apr. 5 ............. Fri ................ Mercury Procedures Trainer, flying (TF-102A), Morehead
Planetarium (Celestial review)
Apr. 6 ............. Sat ................ Morehead Planetarium (Celestial review)
Apr. 7 ............. Sun ................ Flying (F-102A)
Apr. 9 ............. Tues ............... Flying (F-102A)
Apr. 10 ............ Wed ............... Egress and recovery training
i
Apr. 11 ............ Thurs .............. i Egress and recovery training, survival pack exercise
Apr. 15 ............ Mon ............... I Flying (F-102A)
Apr. 16 ............ Mercury Procedures Trainer, mission and flight controller
Tues ............... briefing
Apr. 17............ Wed ............... I Mission and flight controller briefing
Apr. 18............ Thurs .............. Alinement, weight, and balance; Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 19............ Fri ................ Mercury Procedures Trainer

191
Table IO-V--MA-9 Pilot Preflight Activities From January 1, 1963 to Launch Date--Continued

Date Day Activities

Apr. 22 ............. ion ............... Mechanical mate


Apr. 23 ............ Tues ............... Simulated flight no. 1
Apr. 24 ............ Wed ............... Electrical mate
Apr. 25 ............ Thurs .............. Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 27 ............ Sat ................ Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 29 ............ Mon ............... Yaw demonstration (AF Hangar)
Apr. 30 ............ Tues ............... Systems briefings (review)
May 1 ............. Wed ............... Systems and operations examination
May 2 ............. Thurs .............. Launch simulation, Mission Rules review
May 3 ............. Fri ................ Examination questionnaire review, marked spacecraft's nor-
mal and emergency instrument limits
May 4 ............. Sat ................ Launch simulation
May 5 ............. Sun ................ Flying (TF-102A)
May 6 ............. Mon ............... Flight configuration sequence and aborts
May 7 ............. Tues ............... Network simulation, Flight Plan Procedures training
May 8 ............. Wed ............... Launch simulation and RF compatibility tests
May 9 ............. Thurs .............. Network simulation
May 10 ............ Fri ................ Simulated flight no. 3, flying (F-102A)
May 11 ............ Sat ................ Mission Status Review, flight-plan and experiments briefings
May 12 ............ Sun ................ Network simulation, physical examination
May 13 ............ Mon ............... Mercury Procedures Trainer, mission review
May 14 ............ Tues ............... Countdown (canceled)
May 15 ............ Wed ............... Launch

Integration of the Pilot and the Spacecraft the spacecraft. The participation of the MA-9
After the spacecraft had been delivered to the pilot with the checkout activities of the space-
launch site, a primary opportunity was provided craft is listed in table 10-Vi(a) and a summary
for the pilot to operate the actual controls of of the time spent in the actual spacecraft of all

Table lO-VI.--Pilot Time in Spacecraft During Hangar and Launch Complex


(a) MA-9 Pilot Time in Spacecraft 20

Date Test description Duration,


hr: min

Oct. 11 to 19, 1962 .......... Integrated systems tests .................................. 06:45


Nov. 11, 1962 ............... RCS-hangar ..... : ...................................... 03:15
Jan. 5, 1963 ................ Altitude chamber ........................................ 06:45
Jan. 12 and Mar. 1, 1963 ..... TV systems test ......................................... 07:00
Mar. 4, 14, 15, 1963 ......... Communications systems radiation test .................... 04:45
Mar. 19, 1963 ............... Darkness and egress ..................................... 01:20
Mar. 20, 21, 22, 1963 ........ Simulated flight, hangar .................................. 12:10
April 4, 1963 ................ Prepad RCS test ........................................ 00:50
April 18, 1963 ............... Alinement, weight, and balance ........................... 04:00
April 23, 1963 ............... Systems test and simulated flight no. 1 ..................... 04:00
April 24, 1963 ............... Electrical mate .......................................... 04:30
May 3, 1963 ................ Mark instrument normal and emergency limits .............. 00:45
May 6, 1963 ................ Flight configuration sequence and abort .................... 03:00
May 8, 1963 ................ Launch simulation and RF compatibility ................... 05:00
May 10, 1963 ............... Systems test and simulated flight no. 3 ..................... 03:45
May 14, 1963 ............... Countdown (canceled) ................................... 06:00

192
Table lO-VI.--Concluded. Systems Training

(b) Approximate Time in Flight SpacecraJt During A second major area of activity of the astro-
Preparation Periods for Each Orbital Flight nauts during this period was in systems training
for his spacecraft. This systems training began
with one or more series of lectures by the engi-
Flight Time, hr
neers involved in the checkout of the vehicle.
Each lecture covered a specific system in great
MA-6 25:55 detail, emphasizing operational techniques and
MA-7 45:00
functional interrelationships. These systems
MA-8 31:27
MA-9 73:50 lectures were then followed by extensive prac-
tice in emergency procedures on the Mercury
Average 44:03 procedures trainer. A problem was encoun-
tered in modifying the Mercury procedures
trainer no. 2 to keep it as close as possible to the
configuration of each spacecraft. It was, of
the orbital pilots is given in table 10-VI(b).
course, impossible to make them completely
This activity is essential, since:
identical. However, in general, it was possible
(1) An opportunity was provided to make
to alter the trainer so that as the spacecraft
final adjustments of personal equipment, such
systems were modified, the changed perform-
as the pressure suit, survival equipment, food
ance would be reflected to the pilot during simu-
items, and check lists to satisfy the special re-
lations. When modifications could not be made,
q.uirements of the flight spacecraft and the
it was extremely important to make the pilot
pilot.
aware of the differences between the trainer's
(2) These tests provided an opportunity to
check out the spacecraft system with the man operation and the flight operation so that he
in the loop; thus, for example, the adequacy of could keep them clearly in mind.
the environmental control system was checked Table 10-VII(a) summarizes the MA-9
with the pressure drop resulting from the pilot pilot's training on Mercury Procedures Trainer
in his suit. no. 2 whereas table 10-VII(b) shows the total
(3) The pilot became familiar with the amount of time spent on the Mercury procedures
specific configuration and performance of his trainer by the pilots of the four orbital missions
spacecraft. The settings for the cooling sys- during their preflight training program. Also
tem or the feel characteristics of the control indicated in table 10-Vii(b) are the numbers
systems vary slightly from spacecraft to space- and categories of malfunctions experienced.
craft, and the pilot had an opportunity to be-
These data give some indication of the amount
come familiar with these features of the vehicle
of time devoted to recognition and correction
he would fly.
of the many malfunctions which could be pro-
(4) The pilot had an opportunity to gain
gramed into the trainer. The relative emphasis
further familiarity with the prelaunch check-
to be placed on emergency procedures in com-
out procedures on the launch pad. During this
time, he learned his role in the countdown and parison with normal mission activities is diffi-
became familiar with the instrument indica- cult to assess. This seems to be a characteristic

tions and the lights and sounds that accompany which may be increasingly true in the future,
the various tests as the vehicle is readied for since a major function of the man may be to
flight. correct malfunctions of the vehicle's systems.

193
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194
Table lO-VII.--Goneluded

(b) Four Orbital Pilots

Number and type of failures


Number of Total Hours
Flight Missions on MPT
I10. 2 ECS RCS Sequential Electrical Commu- Other
nication

MA-6 80 59:45 30 24 57 35 11 25
MA-7 73 70:40 24 11 43 26 7 32

MA-8 37 29:15 10 5 22 15 5 Ii

MA-9 52 33:30 13 8 32 17 5 6

Average 60 48:35 19 12 38 23 7 18

Flight Plan Development and Training actual day of the launch and to simulate some
of the special astronomical phenomena to be
The pilot also participated in the develop-
observed during the flight.
ment and practice of a mission flight plan,
which varied considerably in each mission. Combined Astronaut-Flight Controller Training
(See paper 17.) The astronaut participated in
this process to help insure that he adequately A fourth area of training conducted during
understood the requirements and that the the preflight period was the combined training
specific procedures could be carried out without of the astronaut with the flight control groups.
compromising other mission requirements. The For this training the Mercury procedures
flight plan activities were tried out in the Mer- trainer no. 2 was tied into the Mercury Control
cury procedures trainer to determine the best Center's simulation equipment so that the astro-
procedures and equipment configurations. naut could communicate directly with the flight
Since it was highly desirable to give the pilot controllers and the vehicle parameters from the
ample opportunity to practice the flight plan Y[ercury procedures trainer no. 2 would be dis-
and to get experience with the experimental played to the flight controller in the same form
equipment prior to the flight, it was essential as the vehicle data during the flight. Two
to finalize the flight plan and have the experi- types of training runs were made. The first
mental equipment ready well ahead of the was the launch-emergency training sessions in
launch date. which only the launch portion of the mission
In addition to the practice of the specific mis- was simulated. Various types of emergencies
sion activities in the Mercury procedures were simulated, some affected the astronaut but
trainer, a number of special refresher training most involved information displayed to the con-
activities were conducted. Normally, each of trollers. During this time the astronaut and
the flight crews received a short refresher the ground flight controllers had an opportu-
training program on the centrifuge. In this nity to become familiar with each other's pro-
cedures and to refine the launch communications
program no attempt was made to provide a com-
plete simulation of the Mercury instrument and emergency procedures. Following each
panel or control tasks. The pilots normally run, a debriefing session would be held to cri-
experienced from six to eight launch or reentry tique the run and to modify any procedures
profiles in the centrifuge to help refresh them in which did not appear adequate.
their breathing and straining techniques. Following the launch abort simulations, net-
The flight crews also normally received a work simulations were run with the flight con-
planetarium indoctrination (fig. 10-I(h)) to trollers. On these simulations the pilot,
help them review the celestial sphere as seen through the hardline, could be in direct com-
from orbit. Since these programs were held munication not only with the launch control
close to the flight date, it was normally possible center but with the other flight-control
to simulate the appearance of the sky on the sites in the United States and Australia. In

195
these simulations the pilot would frequently effects were noted with any of the pilots. Astro-
take part, thereby providing some of the sta- naut Glenn experienced the longest delay fol-
tions with an opportunity to become familiar lowing a launch attempt (80 days) with no un-
with his particular voice and communication desirable effects either by his own account (ref.
patterns. This was particularly significant for 14) or as indicated by his trainer performance.
the medical monitors since they made use of His performance on the retrofire control task
voice communications as one of their major for the month before and after the postpone-
monitoring aids. While these sessions were ment of his flight is shown in fi_ure 10-4. As
highly valuable for the flight controller, they [] Error scores in degrees-each point

were less valuable for the astronaut since much represents the 3axis summed maximum

attitude errors Averaged over 5 or more


of his time would be spent with' the spacecraft retrofire scores
48
in the orbital configuration with little or no op-
42
portunity to practice emergency procedures.
36 Canceled
As a result, the astronaut frequently went launch
30
through a launch and perhaps one-orbital pass r-Launch
_24 E3-- -_ _E].-
with the network simulation and then spent
w 18 x _
the rest of his time in the simulator, carrying 12
out emergency procedures and other special 6
activities in which he particularly needed I I I I I I
I 2 3 4 5 6
practice. Number of I0 day periodsof troining prior to launch

Medical and Physical Preparation FIGURE 10-4.--Procedures trainer retrofire attitude

control scores. MA-6 pilot.

A final area of activity during this preflight


period was in the medical and physical prepara- can be seen there is no evidence of decrement in
tion of the astronaut. During this period, the performance following the postponed launch.
final physical examinations, establishing the
fitness of the pilot for the flight, were given and Training Evaluation
the majority of the baseline data with which
The inflight performance of the pilot provides
the inflight results would be correlated was col-
the best indication of the adequacy of the astro-
lected. It was also during this period that the naut training program. Further verification
astronaut was placed on a special diet in order was provided by comparing performance of
to prevent possible solid waste problem during specific maneuvers during flight with those on
the flight. Medical preparations for the flight
the trainers, and by having the pilots' comment
are described in greater detail in paper 11.
on the value of the various training devices.
During this preflight period each of the as-
In those cases where specific flight maneuvers
tronauts intensified their physical fitness pro- were practiced on the procedures trainer, com-
gram, bringing it to a peak shortly before the parisons can be made between the attitudes held
launch date. This physical activity was impor-
in the trainer and those maintained in flight.
tant not only in insuring a high level of fitness
This has been done in all previous flight reports
at the time of launch but it also served the pur-
in the sections on pilot performance (refs. 15 to
pose of giving the pilot an opportunity to relax
19). However, the number of these compari-
from the pressing technical problems which oc-
sons is limited since many periods of manual
cupied the majority of his day. Overall, the maneuvering could not be compared with
problem of maintaining good physical fitness ground data because the specific maneuver car-
and avoiding excessive fatigue during this pe- ried out during flight was not practiced under
riod was a serious one. controlled conditions or because the maneuver
Concern was expressed in some quarters that involved attitudes outside the limits of the auto-
the repeated delays which often occurred in the pilot sensing system, in which case, attitude data
launch date would produce anxiety in the pilot would not be available from the gyro indicators.
or result in a letdown in profficiency due to A great deal of evaluative material was ob-
"over training" or loss of motivation. No such tained from the astronauts during the debrief-

196
ings following eachmission. In general,the (2) The program could have been shortened
astronautsreportedthat while weightlessness and made more efficient had adequate training
wasgenerallypleasant,therewasashortperiod facilities been available at the initiation of
duringtheflight whentheyfelt thattheyneeded training and in one location.
sometime to adapt to both the weightless (3) The most important environmental fac-
experience andto the novelview throughthe tors requiring simulation during the training
spacecraftwindow. (Seepaper90.) Both of were linear acceleration and the reduced mobil-
these features of the space flight were inade- ity produced by the pressurized suit.
quately simulated during the training periods (4) Other environmental simulations were
since the weightless condition could not be sim- desirable but not critical to adequate flight prep-
ulated for more than a minute and, until late in aration. This conclusion includes the weight-
the program, there was no dynamic simulation less experience. However, it should be noted
of the view through the Mercury spacecraft that training in weightlessness was relatively
window. This adaptation period, to the orbital unimportant in the Mercury program because
flight condition, might have been reduced had it the astronaut was unable to move from the seat.
been possible to have a simulation of the exter- (5) Simulations involving actual flight hard-
nal view and more prolonged weightless experi- ware in realistic environments were studied and
ence. In any case, this small adaptation period generally found to involve more cost and risk
was not a serious problem for any of the than could be justified by their training value,
astronauts. unless they were required for vehicle checkouts.
The pilots were unanimous in indicating the (6) Experience in the actual vehicle to be
importance of their participation in the check- flown prior to the flight is a highly essential fea-
out of the spacecraft during the period just ture of the preflight preparation and is an
prior to the flight. Many of them felt that this exception to the foregoing generalization.
was the most valuable single portion of the (7) Flight plans and all experimental and
training program. All of the pilots felt that other movable equipment items which will be
the procedures trainer was the single, most use- used within the spacecraft must be available
ful training device. However, there were vari- and finalized well in advance of the launch date
ations among them in the opinions of the in order to permit adequate time for training
amount of time required on the trainer prior in their use.
to the flight. There was also general agree- (8) A fixed-based simulator with dynamic
ment that the centrifuge was the most critical displays is generally adequate for orbital flight
environmental simulation device and that a training since angular and linear acceleration
short refamiliarization experience on the cen- cues are relatively insignificant in the weight-
trifuge prior to the flight was highly desirable. less condition. However, in certain cases
The Mercury flight program was too limited motioh may simplify the simulation problem.
to evaluate in detail all the many training de- (9) Two simulators are necessary in order to
vices and programs which were used in the support bot.h the general group training pro-
astronaut training program. However, the best gram at the central site and the preflight prepa-
estimate of the authors as to the relative utility ration program at the launch site.
of the various trainers and programs are in- (10) External view simulation on the full-
dicated in Table 10-I in the last column. In mission simulator is essential since much of the
considering these ratings, the reader should note orbital maneuvering will be done with the ex-
that they apply to programs with the special ternal view used as a reference.
features of the Mercury training program listed
(11) Integrated flight crew-flight controller
in the introduction to this section. In addition
training is essential to refine mission rules and
to these ratings, the following general conclu-
sions appear warranted : communication procedures.
(1) The devices and programs used in the (12) Flexibility in the design of all trainer
Mercury astronaut training program were ade- systems is e_ential in order to permit modifica-
quate to provide transition training for skilled tion to fit the particular configuration of each
pilots to the operation of a spacecraft. .flight vehicle.

197
References

1. VOAS, ROBERT B. : A Description of the Astronaut's Task in Project Mercury. Human Factors Journal, vol. 3,
no. 3, June 1961, pp. 149-165.
2. SLAYTON, D. K. : A Pilot's Look at Project Mercury. Paper given to the Society of Experimental Test Pilots.
Oct. 9, 1959.
3. WILSON, C. L.; ed. : Project Mercury Candidate Evaluation Program. Wright Air Development Center,
WADC Tech. Rep. 59-505, Dec. 1959.
4. RUFF, GEORGE E., and LEVY, EDWIN Z. : Psychiatric Evaluation ol Ca_didatcs 1or Space Flight. Am. Jour.
of Psychiatry, vol. 116, Nov. 1959, pp. 3_5-391.
5. CARP, ABRAHAM, ed. : Report of the Working Group on Personnel Selection for Man in Space. Meeting at
National Academy Research Council Building, Washington, D.C., Dec. 2-3, 1959.
6. DOUGLAS, W. K. : Selection and Training of Space Crews. Lectures in Aerospace Medicine, USAF Aerospace
Medical Center, Jan. 11-15, 1.960.
7. SLAYTON, DONALD K.: Pilot Training a_d Preflight Preparation. Proc. Conf. on Results of the First U.S.
Manned Suborbital Space Flight. NASA, Nat. Inst. Health, Nat. Acad. Sci., June 6, 1961, pp. 11-18.
8. VOAS, ROBERT B.: Project Mercury Astro_mut Training Program. In Psychophysiological Aspects of Space
Flight, Columbia U. Press, 1961, pp. ,06-116.
9. ANON. : Project Mercury Familiarization Manual. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., SEDR 104, Dec. 1, 1962.
1O. ANON. : Capsule Flight Operations Manual. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. SEDR.
11. ANON.: Operational Manual for Manned Satellite Capsule Procedures Trai_er. McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
SEDR 115, Book I, Apr. 30, 1960.
12. VOAS, ROBERT B. : Manned Control of Mercury Spacecraft. Astronautics, vol. 7, no. 3, Mar. 1962, p. 18.
13. CARPENTER, M. SCOTT: Astronaut Preparatio_l. Results of the First U.S. Manned Orbital Space Flight, Feb-
ruary 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.) pp. 105--111.
14. GLENN, JOHN H., JR. : Pilot's Flight Report. Results of the First U.S. Manned Orbital Space Flight. Feb-
ruary 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.) pp. 119-136.
15. STAFFS Of NASA, NAT. INST. HEALTH, and NAT. ACAD. SCL : Proceedi_gs o] a Con?erencc on Results of the
First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington,
D.C.), June 6, 1961.
16. STAFF of NASA MANNED SPACECaAFT CENTER: Results of the Second U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight,
July 21, 1t_61. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).

17. STAFF of N_,-_SA MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER: Results of the First U_itcd States Orbital Space Flight,
, February 20: 1962. Supt. DOC., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
18. _TAFF of NASA MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER: Results of the Second United States Orbital Space Flight,
_lay 2]t, 1962. NASA SP-6, Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
19. STAFF of NASA MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER: Results of the Tbird Uuited States Man,ned Orbital Space
Flight, October 3, 1962. NASA SP-12, Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.),
Dec. 1962.

198
11. AEROMEDICAL PREPARATIONS

By CHARLES A. BERRY, M.D., Chief, Cent_ Medical Operations Oj_ce, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

ercise periods is necessary. A method of ob-


'_ b _9_ Summary
taining separate urine samples was successfully
The lessons learned from the operational used. Dietary control of defecation was suc-
medical program conducted in Project Mercury cessful. Inflight food and water ingestion must
are discussed in this paper. be scheduled.
The objectives of the medical portion of the Medical monitoring was performed for flight-
crew selection orn_ram were met, and detailed safety reasons and for aiding the surgeons in
physical examinations on even select test pilot making go-no-go recommendations to the op-
zroups have found rejectable defects. Stress- erations director. The value of range flight
testing has been made part of a selection-in- simulations and of the medical flight controller
depth training program. has been shown. Parameters monitored in-
Medical training given to the astronauts has cluded body temperature, respiration, electro-
been of great value during inflight monitoring cardiogram, blood pressure, and voice. The
and discussion of medical problems. comparison and correlation of readings with
Medical maintenance has included routine environmental data are stressed. Correlation
medical care, and annual and special physical of inflight events and physiolo_gical responses is
examinations. Close association of the flight very meaningful. The space-flight environ-
surgeon and the astronaut in training has pro- ment, while exposing men to numerous stresses,
duced an excellent preventive medicine prac- has produced no unmanageable physiological
tice. The flight crew surgeon is best fitted to overload. Postflight orthostatic hypotension
determine the astronaut's readiness for flight, has been noted for a period of several hours.
but a specialist team conducts the examination Recovery operations have been modified from
for baseline data to compare with postflight takin_ medical care to the astronaut to taking
data. Preflight examinations were conducted the astronaut to medical care. The support has
before each checkout procedure and more for- been trimmed to require fewer highly trained
mally at 10 days and 3 days before flight, and personnel to "wait it out" at the launch site.
on flight morning. Longer missions with Pa- Project Mercury gave the opportunity to de-
cific recovery caused modification of the post- fine more closely the medical problem areas as
flight examinations. The importance of prac- the future is anticipated with great expecta-
tice runs of most of the medical procedures tions and confidence in man's ability to adapt
was shown and a medical countdown was de.. to and conquer this new frontier.
veloped and integrated with the Mercury Con-
Introduction
trol Center (MCC) and blockhouse countdown.
Complete isolation of the crew is impractical The development of an operational medical
and has depended on a reduction of stronger program for Project Mercury posed a challenge
contacts in the immediate preflight period. to the national aerospace medical community
Drugs were provided in injectors, and pills in line with that which the orbiting of man
were available in flight and in the survival kit. posed to the national engineering community.
The only drug used was the dextro-ampheta- The purpose of this paper is to review briefly
mine sulfate on the MA-9 mission. The astro- and necessarily incompletely the medical opera-
naut must always be pre-tested to any drug he tions and findings from all our manned space
may use. Scheduling of rest, activities, and ex- flights and to emphasize the knowledge ac-

199
quired Which may be applied to future pro- a means of evaluating the next step into space,
grams.. Details of the operational procedures and it is believed that the six manned missions
and _dings are documented in the several re- in this program have laid the groundwork for
ports of the Mercury missions (refs. 1 to 12). future programs. Project Mercury gave the
The nature of the challenge called for the opportunity to define more closely the medical
development of some ground rules applicable to problem areas, and the future is anticipated
the medical aspects. It was determined that: with great expectations and confidence in man's
(1) The simplest and most reliable approach ability to adapt to and conquer this new
should be used. frontier.
(2) Off4he-shelf items and existing tech-
Crew Selection and Training
nology should be used wherever possible.
(3) Man was being thrust into a truly un- The medical portion of the selection program
known environment, and his reactions to this had as its objectives the provision of crew mem-
environment were relatively unknown. bers who (1) would be free of intrinsic medical
(4) A direct approach would be taken to the defects at the time of selection, (2) would have
problem areas, and attempts would be made a reasonable assurance of freedom from such de-
to provide the best protection and monitoring fects for the predicted duration of the flight
capable within the operational constraints of program, (3) would be capable of accepting
the mission. the predictable psycho-physiologic stress of the
Many lessons have been learned from this missions, and (4) would be able to perform
first experience of the free world with manned those tasks critical to the safety of the mission
space-flight operations. The responsible medi- and the crew. The selection board found them-
cal community had honestly attempted to eval- selves viewing already trained test pilots some-
uate potential problems based upon knowledge what in the same manner as cadets entering a
at that time. In doing this, several possible training program are viewed. Small numbers
problems were raised which, it appears, this pro- were selected, leaving little excess for attrition.
gram has answered to some degree. Weight- In view of these objectives, the group was culled
lessness is a good example of the many barriers by records review, interview, and testing until
to man's entry into space which were raised a final group was given a rigorous medical
prior to this program. Some of the dire phys- examination at the Lovelace Clinic in Albu-
iological effects predicted as a result from ex- querque, New Mexico. This examination was
posure to this condition and therefore to be followed by a stress-testing program at Wright-
limiting to space flight were anorexia, nausea, Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The results
disorientation, sleepiness, sleeplessness, fatigue, of these examinations were reviewed by the par-
restlessness, euphoria, hallucinations, decreased ticipating physicians, and the candidates were
g-tolerance, gastrointestinal disturbance, uri- given a medical rank order. This rank order
nary retention, diuresis, muscular incoordina- was then presented to a board which selected the
tion, muscle atrophy, and demineralization of original seven astronauts. In retrospect, it can
bones. It will be seen that few of these remain be said that the results of this program were
of concern. Another area in which there were adequate in view of the fact that the assigned
predictions of undesirable effects is in the psy- astronauts have successfully completed their
chological response to the isolation of space. flight missions. This early program has been
The astronauts to date have not been isolated in of assistance in the development of current se-
space and have generally complained of too lection program. The stress-testing in the
much earth contact. There has been no evi- initial selection efforts has been deleted since it
dence of any breakoff phenomenon or aberrent was found to be of little value in a group who
psychological reaction of any sort. Thus, while had already been very thoroughly stress-tested
no serious problems have developed, more infor- by virtue of their test-pilot background.
mation is needed on increased time periods in Stress-testing has become a part of the training
space and the conclusions of the present paper program with a selection in depth carried on
can only be based upon the duration of flights during the training. Thus, each exposure is
thus far flown. Each mission has been used as mission-oriented and further is an additional

200
selection test as well as providing baseline cal, being ready to participate in a given pro-
medical information. In the current programs, cedure, and collecting baseline data. A close
this technique is being used; and the astronauts and frequent contact between flight crews and
understand that they are continually under- flight surgeons, with the flight surgeons moni-
going selection and that there may be attrition. toring participation in all stress exposures and
The premise that detailed physical examina- training exercises, proved to be extremely valu-
tions given to groups as select as test pilots will able preparation for the flight mission. This
show up many physical defects which would close association also provided excellent preven-
interfere with a reasonable prediction of career tive medicine practice among the flight crews.
length in the manned space-flight program has It is thought that the flight crews have cer-
been confirmed in this program. tainly had no more illness than what would be
The training program has included a series expected in a routine pilot population; and the
of lectures on the anatomy and function of the general feeling is that there was probably much
less.
human body, and the series has proven to be of
great value during inflight monitoring and dis- The preflight physical examinations were to
cussion of potential medical problems. Every serve two basic purposes. First, they should
attempt has been made to use engineering allow the flight surgeon to state that the astro-
analogies where possible and to impress the naut was qualified and ready for flight. Second,
flight crews with the fact that the human they should provide a baseline for any possible
organism and its many systems must be moni- changes resulting from exposure to the space-
tored as thoroughly as many of the engineering flight environment. The flight crew surgeon
systems if mission success is to be assured. appears best qualified to determine whether the
There has been no formal physical training pro- _tronaut is medically ready for flight. Early
gram but each astronaut has been charged with in the program, the search for unexpected
maintaining his fitness through programed changes in body systems as a result of exposure
exercise of his choice. A wide variety has been to space flight dictated specialty examinations
used 'by the group. Medical advice was offered of various body systems. A team was assembled
and the importance of regular training periods from the Department of Defense and included
was stressed during the preflight preparation specialists in internal medicine, ophthalmology,
period. A plateau should be reached and, al- neurology, psychiatry, and laboratory medicine.
though no specific level is specified, it is believed The same specialties have continued to be repre-
the astronaut is better prepared to withstand sented, but certain items of the examinations
the flight stresses if he maintains a state of have been modified as knowledge of the lack
physicM fitness. of serious effects of flight on the astronaut was
gained. Prior to the selection of a flight astro-
Medical Maintenance and Preflight naut for a given mission, the medical records
Preparation of those being considered are reviewed in detail
The medical maintenance during this pro- and a medical recommendation given to the
operation director. Following experience on
gram consisted of the routine medical care
similar to that provided specialized groups of the early missions, it was determined that a
thorough evaluation of the flight astronaut
aircraft pilots, annual physicM examinations,
would be made 10 days prior to the scheduled
and special physical examinations performed
mission to assure management and the flight
before procedures such as altitude-chamber
director that the astronaut was indeed ready
runs, pressure-suit indoctrinations, and centri-
for the mission. This examination included a
fuge runs. The flight schedule with its neces-
medical evaluation of both the flight astronaut
sary preflight spacecraft checkout procedures,
and his backup. Three days prior to the mis-
simulated flights, and launches, frequently ex-
sion, the detailed physical examination was
posed each flight crew member to several physi-
cal examinations within a given year. An completed by the various medical specialists
attempt was made to make these physical ex- and the necessary laboratory work was accom-
aminations serve several purposes such as plished. On flight morning, following a brief
medical examination, a final determination was
qualifying the individual for his annual physi-

201

707_-056 0----6_-----14
made as to the readiness of the astronaut for medical countdown was developed with specific
flight. This examination was principally con- timing of the various events and coordination
cerned with noting any recent contraindications with the blockhouse and range countdown. In
to flight which may have developed. While order to have no delay in the scheduled launch,
early in the program other si)ecialists partici- a great deal of practice in this countdown was
pated in this examination, on the last two mis- necessary. It has continued to pay dividends in
sion 5 the participation was reduced to that by the later missions. Backup personnel in the
the flight, crew surgeon. various medical areas are needed just as back-
The postflight medical examinations were ups are needed for the various pieces of equip-
initially made by the Department of Defense ment. Experience has allowed the number of
recovery physicians stationed aboard the re- backup personnel to be _ept to an absolute
covery vessel. On the early mission, the astro- minimum.
naut was then flown to Gran<t Turk Island and Prior to the first launch, consideration was
was joined there by the team of medical special- given to the necessity for isolating the flight
ists who had made the preflight examination crew in order to prevent the development of
and by the flight crew surgeon. As the flights some communicable disease immediately prior
became longer and recovery was accomplished to or during flight. It soon became evident,
in the Pacific Ocean, the plan was changed and however, that such isolation was impractical in
one of the NASA flight surgeons was prede- view of the numerous requirements upon the
ployed aboard the recovery carrier to do the flight crew during the 2 weeks prior to launch.
initial postflight examination and debriefing. Many activities required the presence and par-
On the MA-8 mission, the Director of Medical ticipation of the astronaut, and the isolation
Operations and the medical evaluation team was reduced to attempts to curtail the number
deployed to the Pacific recovery site several of cont.acts with strangers. As the missions get
hours after recovery, and this was not only a longer and longer, the situation may have to
tiring experience, but necessitated that a great be re-evaluated since the mission could last
deal of the examination and debriefing be done longer than the incubation period of some dis-
prior to their arrival. The detailed postflight eases. No difficulty was encountered during the
specialty examination was then conducted at Mercury program with the use of only a very
Cape Canaveral when the astronaut returned modified isolation plan.
from the recovery site. In some instances, this One of the basic concepts developed stated
practice required the teaching of special tech- that there would be no drugs used as routine
niques to the flight surgeon in order that early measures, but that drugs would be made avail-
information could be obtained. Project Mer- able for emergency use. Injectors were made
cury has been most fortunate in having rapid available which could deliver their contents
postflight recovery and examination of the through the pressure suit into the astronaut's
flight astronauts, allowing excellent comparison thigh. During the first four missions, the
of postflight with preflight data. It would drugs available in the injectors included an
seem from our experience that the retention of anodyne, an antimotion sickness drug, a stimu-
any specialty examination team at a mainland lant, and a vasoconstrictor for treatment of
launching or debriefing site would be the pref- shock. In the later missions, this was reduced
erable plan of action. to the antimotion sickness drug and an anodyne,
Early in the preflight preparations, it was available both on the suit and in the survival
determined that there was a need for many kit. An evaluation of the longer mission pro-
practice runs of various procedures. These grained for MA-9 led to the decision to make
runs were accomplished by doing the actual available tablets of dextro-amphetamine sulfate,
flight-type preparation for centrifuge runs, both in the suit and in the survival kit. Anti-
spacecraft checkout runs in the chamber at motion sickness and antihistamine tablets were
Hanger S, simulated flights and launches, and also made available. The astronaut's mental
procedures trainer exercises. The Mercury- and physical integrity were never in doubt dur-
Redstone suborbital flights were also extremely ing the mission. As the time for retrofire
helpful in preparation for orbital flight. A approached, a review of the mission tasks made

202
it evidentthat the astronauthadundergone a Early in the preparation period, a medical
longandrigorousworkschedule fromwhichhe flight plan is developed and integrated with
might be expectedto experienceconsiderable the overall mission flight plan. A good deal
fatigue,evenassuming idealenvironmental con- has been learned about realistic sampling in
ditionsandfull benefitfrom restfulsleep. As light of flight plan and in utilizing normal
hasbeenreported,medicationwasusedfor the operational activities and reports as means of
firsttimeduringflight whenthedextro-amphet- medical evaluation.
aminesulfatewastakenpl:iorto the initiation Dietary control has been utilized for approx-
of retrosequence. Suchdrugsshouldbeavail- imately 1 week prior to each mission. The first
ableandplansmustbemadefor theiravailabil- several days were used to assure a normal bal-
ity bothduringflight andpostflightin thesur- anced diet during the rather hectic preflight
vival kit. The astronautmustalwaysbepre- preparations. In order to prevent defecation
testedfor effectof thedrugswhichwill beused. during the mission, the low-residue diet was
Experiencehasshownthatcaremustbetaken programed for 3 days prior to launch, and the
to preventastronautfatigue during the final time extended if the launch was delayed. This
preflight preparationsas well as postflight. diet performed its task very satisfactorily dur-
Many individualshavemattersof importance ing the entire Mercury program; still, indica-
whichmustbedecidedby theastronautduring tions are that any more prolonged period would
the final weekof preparation;and aslaunch seem unwise. The inflight food has consisted
daygrowscloser,thedemands ontheastronaut's of the bite-size and semi-liquid tube food on the
time increase.Careful scheduling of rest, ac- early missions. On the last mission, the freeze-
tivities, and exercise periods are needed; and dehydrated food was added. Problems with
much more attention must be paid to this crumbling have been encountered with the bite-
scheduling in future missions. Since the effects size food, and difficulty in hydrating the freeze-
of these variables were unknown, it was the dehydrated food was encountered on the last
flight surgeon's decision to administer 5 mg of mission. The assurance of palatable food is
dextro-amphetamine sulfate to the astronaut necessary, and proper containers and practice
in order to increase the probability of peak per- in their use appear indicated. It also appears
formande during reentry. Experience has necessary to schedule food and water intake on
shown that 48 to 72 hours is a minimum time the flight plan and to check to see that it has
for a postflight rest and relaxation following a been properly accomplished.
34-hour mission. Seventy-two hours should be
a minimum for future missions. Medical Monitoring
Early missions required only simple provi- The Mercury program provided the free
sions for the collection of urine and blood world with the first opoprtunity for full-time
samples. The short-mission durations made it monitoring of man in the space-flight environ-
entirely feasible to collect all the voided urine ment. At the start of this program, the con-
in a single container within the suit and to tinuous monitoring of physiological data from
recover it after astronaut recovery. As mission a pilot conducting a mission was a very recent
duration increased, this became an unworkable concept. At the time, there were no off-the-
procedure; and further, there was a desire to shelf items available to allow continuous and
obtain separate urine samples for analysis. The reliable physiological monitoring. It was de-
last mission utilized a system for collecting five cided to attempt to monitor body temperature,
separate and complete urine samples for later chest movement, and heart action (ECG).
evaluation. This system worked properly but Standards required that the sensors and equip-
will require modification for future missions. ment be comfortable, reliable, compatible with
No blood samples have been obtained during other spacecraft systems, and would not in-
flight. Every attempt has been made to com- terfere with the pilot's primary mission.
bine the various blood requirements in order It should be realized that the biomedical sen-
to require as few vena punctures as possible sors are used as a means of flight-safety moni-
both preflight and postflight. toring. The primary purpose is to assist the

203
monitoring flight surgeon in determining gained with the range and with the planned
whetherthe astronautis capableof continuing recovery operation, it was determined that the
themissionfrom a physiologicalpointof view. best philosophy was one which held that the
Tile informationis useda_a basisfor making astronaut was ill a very fast, air-conditioned
go-no-go decisions in thecontrolcenter. Noat- anfl)ulance on lO0-percent oxygen and in most
tempthasbeenmadeunderthe currentopera- instances it would be better to return him in
tional conditionsto performdetailedsystem the spacecraft to a planned recovery area rather
evaluationor analysis. than to abort the flight in a contingency area
A greatdealof experience in medicalflight where it might take hours or days to recover
controlof an orbiting astronaut was obtained him.
through the use of the many range simulations The physiological parameters monitored and
and the several actual flights. The participa- the sensor changes and problems may be sum-
tion in simulations and ill flights prior to those marized in the following manner. Body tem-
which were manned proved to be extremely val- perature was monitored in all missions through
uable training exercises for the actual missions. MA-9 with a rectal thermistor. Rectal tem-
The'medical flight controller has indeed shown perature was found to be the most reliable
himself to be a valuable member of the flight- measurement. The long duration of the last
control team. The development of mission flight and a desire for more comfort resulted in
rules to aid in flight control was necessary in this thermistor being modified for oral use.
the medical area just as in the many engineer- The range of the thermistor was also changed,
ing areas. It is difficult to establish definite so that when it was in the stowed position on the
number-value eut-offs for various medical pa- right ear muff it would record suit-outlet tem-
rameters, but this was done early in the pro- perature. It worked very satisfactorily in this
gram. Gradually, these rules were made less manner.
specific so that the evaluation and judgment of Respiration was at first measured by an in-
the medical flight controller were the prime de- direct method by using a linear potentiometer
terminants in making a decision. The condition and carbon-impregnated rubber. This method
of the astronaut as determined by voice and in- was changed early in the program to a thermis-
terrogation rather than physical parameters tor kept at 200 ° F and placed on the microphone
alone became a key factor in the aeromedical pedestal in the helmet. Neither of these
advice to continue or terminate the mission. methods gave reliable respiration traces during
This is as it should be and follows the lessons flight, and a change was made to the impedance
which were learned in general medicine wherein pneumograph for the last two missions. This
numerical laboratory values are not necessarily device gave very accurate respiration informa-
the final answer. Trend information as shown tion during most of the flight.
by at least three stations was shown more relia- Electrocardiographic electrodes were of a low
ble than single values. In developing the impedance to match the spacecraft amplifier.
flight-control philosophy prior to the first They were required to record during body
manned flight, it was thought that it would be movements and to stay effective during flight
necessary for the flight surgeon to talk directly durations of over 30 hours. These electrodes
to the astronaut very frequently in order to functioned well and gave very good informa-
evaluate his physiological state. As opera- tion on cardiac rate and rhythm. The value of
tional experience was gained, it became obvious having two leads of electrocardiograph, even
that this was not the ease. Information in- though they differed from the standard clinical
quiries were passed easily and smoothly through leads, was repeatedly shown. This allowed
the spacecraft communicator with the flight easier determination of artifacts and was most
surgeon retaining the privilege of talking di- helpful in determining the valid sounds on the
rectly should the need arise. It was also blood-pressure trace by comparison with the re-
thought early in the program that the occur- maining ECG lead. The electrode paste was
rence of most any medical emergency in flight changed from 30-percent calcium chloride in
would require an early or even a contingency water mixed with bentonite to a combination of
landing. Again, as operational experience was earboxy polymethylene in Ringer's solution.

204
ThetentimesisotonicRingersolutionnot only The value of the comparison of multiple
retainedthenecessary conductivityandlow im- physiological parameters and their correlation
pedancerequired,but alsoaffordeddecreased with environmental data has been repeatedly
skinirritation afterprolongedcontact. proven. Abnormal or lost values attributed to
In 1958,the obtainingof bloodpressures in instrumentation difficulty have frequently been
flight wasconsidered and then delayedas no obtained, but it has been found that interpreta-
satisfactorysystemwasavailable. Definitive tion of the astronaut's physiological condition
work beganaboutthe time of the Mercury- could be made by the use of the parameters re-
Redstone 3 (MR-3) flight, andthe automatic maining or the correlation of those remaining
with environmental data.
systemwhich usedthe unidirectionalmicro-
phoneand cuff wasdevelopedfor usein the It has been interesting to note that a satis-
orbital flights. This systemwithoutthe auto- factory amount of information on current as-
maticfeaturewasusedontheMA-6 missionof tronaut status can be obtained with the use of

AstronautGlenn. During the MA-7 mission, such basic vital signs or viability measures. It
all of theinflight bloodpressures obtainedwere is realized that the monitoring methods may be
elevated, andanextensivepostflightevaluation far from ideal. They did not provide the ulti-
programwasundertaken.It wasdetermined mate in the measure of man's physiological
that the causeof theseelevationswas most status. It would have been desirable to have

likely instrumentation errorresultingfrom the a single parameter which would tell the ground
necessity for verycarefulgainsettingsmatched monitor whether the nervous system of the pilot
to the individualastronautalongwith the cuff was capable of the peak mission performance
andmicrophone.A greatdealof preflightcali- necessary. To date, however, there is no such
brationandmatchingof thesesettingswasdone single or even multiple measures; and an attack
prior to the MA-8 flight; and on both MA-8 must be made upon this problem from the pe-
and the last mission,MA-9, very excellent riphery. It is believed that at present the raw
blood-pressure tracingswereobtained. physiological data cannot be replaced by com-
Voicetransmissions havebeena very valu- puter evaluation. The basic idea of computer
reduction has merit, and he'p is certainly needed
able sourceof monitoringinformation. The
normal flight reportsand answersto queries in relieving ground medical monitors of long
havebeenusedfor evaluationof the pilot. In periods of observation. At present, however,
orderto insurethat themonitorswerefamiliar there appears to be no useful system to meet this
demand.
with the astronaut'svoice,tapesof mission
simulationswith the flight astronautasa pilot In the postflight report on the MR-3
mission (ref. 3), it was stated that "the remote
weredispatched to all of the rangestationsfor
monitoring on a noninterference basis of
usein preflight simulations. In addition to
parameters such as temperature, respiration,
normalreports,verificationof actualcomfort
the electrocardiogram, and blood pressure in
levelwasveryvaluablein determiningtheim-
active men fully engaged in prolonged and
portanceof temperaturereadingsobtainedby
exacting tasks, is a new field. Hitherto, flight
way of telemetry. Inflight photographyand,
medicine has accepted the information concern-
on the last mission,televisionviewsof the as-
ing the well-being that could be derived from
tronauthavebeenplannedas additionaldata
the pilot's introspection and conveyed by the
sources.In Mercury experience, both of these invaluable voice link. For the rest it has relied
sources have proven to be of very little value
on performance to tell how close the man was to
in the medical monitoring of the astronaut be- collapse. It is to be hoped that some of the
cause of poor positioning of cameras and vary- developments in automation necessitated by
ing lighting conditions resulting from the Project Mercury will find application in clin-
operational situation. A full face view of the ical medicine."
astronaut in color on a real-time basis would be This hope is rapidly coming to fruition in
a good monitoring tool for it would approxi- the light of the wide activities in medical moni-
mate the clinical face-to-face confrontation of toring now being carried on in everyday medi-
cine.
the patient.

205
PhysiologicalResponses
to Space Flight Table 11-I.--Pulse Rates

One of the basic objectives of the Mercury


Mission SECO Weightlessness Re-
flights was the evaluation of man's physiologi- (Peak) (Range) entry
cal responses to exposure to this space-flight (Peak)
environment. These responses also had impli-
cations as to his performance capability in this MR-3 138 108 to 125 132
environment. The stresses of this environment MR-4 162 150 to 160 171
MA-6 114 88 to 114 134
to which physiological responses are elicited in- MA-7 96 60 to 94 104
clude the wearing of the full-pressure suit al- MA-8 112 56 to 121 104
though not pressurized in flight, confinement MA-9 144 50 to 60 (sleep) 184
and restraint in the Mercury spacecraft with 80 to 100 (awake)
the legs at a 90 ° elevated position, the 100-
percent oxygen 5-psi atmosphere, the changing
rates have ranged from 30 to 40 breaths per
cabin pressure through powered flight and re-
minute at sustainer engine cut-off, from 8 to
entry, variation in cabin and suit temperature,
20 breaths per minute during weightless flight,
the acceleration force (g force) of launch and
and from 20 to 32 breaths per minute at reentry.
reentry, varying periods of weightless flight,
Changes noted in the electrocardiograms have
vibration, dehydration, the performance re-
included alterations in the pacemaker activity
quired by the flight plan, the need for sleep and
with wandering pacemakers and aberrant
for alertness, changes in illumination inside the
rhythm including atrio-ventricular nodal beats
spacecraft, and diminished food intake.
and rhythm, premature atrial and ventricular
Sources of data used in evaluating these re-
contractions, sinus bradycardia, atrial rhythm,
sponses have included the control baseline data
and atrio-ventricular contraction. All of these
previously referred to, data from the biomedi-
"abnormalities" are considered normal physio-
cal sensors received at both the Mercury Control
logical responses when related to the dynamic
Center and the range stations, voice responses
situation in which they were encountered. In-
at these stations and the detailed onboard tape,
flight blood-pressure values and body-tempera-
the film record of the onboard tape, answers to
ture readings have all been within the physio-
debriefing questions, and the detailed postflight
examination. logically normal range.
The six astronauts who have flown have
In considering these physiological responses,
shown themselves capable of normal physiologi-
it was found necessary to have a detailed in-
cal function and performance during the accel-
flight event history since the peak physiological
eration of launch and reentry. The launch ac-
responses are closely related to critical inflight
celerations are those imposed by the Redstone
events. This meaningful relationship is very
and the Atlas launch vehicles. These impose a
well demonstrated in considering the pulse re-
peak transverse acceleration load of llg in the
sponses to the Mercury flights. The peak pulse
case of the Redstone and 7g to 8g in the case
rates during the launch phase has usually oc-
of the Atlas.
curred at sustainer engine cut-off. This peak
The vibration produced by launch or reentry
value has ranged from 96 to 162 beats per min-
has been well tolerated in all cases.
ute. The peak rates obtained on reentry have
There has been no conclusive evidence of dis-
ranged from 104 to 184 beats per minute. This
orientation during flight; and while the astro-
peak usually occurred immediately after obtain-
naut may not have been oriented with respect
ing peak reentry acceleration, or on drogue to the earth, he has always remained so with
parachute deployment. Pulse rates obtained respect to his spacecraft. The lack of earth
during weightless flight have varied from 50 orientation has posed no problem whatsoever.
to 60 beats per minute during the sleep periods There has been no evidence of motion sickness
to 80 to 100 beats per minute during the normal in any of the flight astronauts.
wakeful periods. (See table ll-I.) Elevated The heat loads imposed by the environmental
rates during weightless flight can usually be control system have on occasion caused discom-
related to flight-plan activity. The respiratory fort but have not been limiting factors in the

206
missions to date. The heat loads and decreased On the last two missions, some postflight
water intake have resulted in postflight dehy- orthostatic hypotension, or changes in blood
dration. It has been learned that thermal con- pressure and pulse rate with change in body
trol in the environmental system is of critical position, has been noted. This postflight con-
importance. dition has been investigated by the use of the
The Mercury missions were originally tilt table during the last mission and these re-
planned for altitudes which would not involve sults confi_n what was only a suspicion on the
contact with the Van Allen Belt of radiation. previous mission. Symptoms of faintness oc-
It was therefore believed that radiation posed curred following egress from the spacecraft,
no problem in the conduct of these missions, and the changes in blood pressure and pulse rate
and this was the case until the man-made radia- were present for some 7 to 19 hours after land-
tion belt was noted just prior to the MA-8 ing. In both instances, these changes have been
mission. Personal dosimeters were added with- present up until the astronaut retired for the
in the astronaut's suit and inside the spacecraft night, a time period of approximately 7 hours;
at this time in addition to the film packs which and they have always disappeared by the time
had originally been carried. The results ob- of the first check after the astronaut has awaken.
tained from this dosimetry on the last two Thus, the orthostatic changes have lasted no
flights revealed that the astronauts have re- longer following the more prolonged flight in
ceived no more radiation dose than they would the MA-9 mission than for the shorter flight;
have received had they been here on earth and and in both instances, blood pressure and pulse
certainly less than that received during a chest rate have returned to normal while the astro-
X-ray. naut was at bed rest. These findings do cause
The Mercury program has provided incre- concern about prolonged exposure without some
mental exposures to weightless flight in order interim steps for further evaluation of this
to obtain information on which to base predic- condition.
tions of reactions to more prolonged exposures. Recovery
The crews have uniformly reported that the
The medical support of the overall Project
condition is extremely pleasant and restful. In
Mercury recovery operation had to meet two
fact, most of the crews think that it is the only
basic requirements :
time they have been comfortable in a pressure
(1) The capability of providing prompt,
suit. They have conducted complex visual
optimum medical care for the astronaut, if nec-
motor coordination tasks proficiently in the
essary, upon his retrieval from the spacecraft.
weightless environment. No evidence of body
system disfunction has been noted during the (2) The provision for early medical evalua-
period of weightless flight through any of the tion to be made of the astronaut's postflight
condition.
means of monitoring at our disposal. Food, in
cube, liquid, and reconstituted freeze-dried It was considered essential to establish a
forms, has been eaten normally. Urination has medical capability for any circumstance under
occurred quite normally in timing and amount, which recovery could occur. The general con-
and there is no evidence of difficulty in intestinal cept was to provide the best care in the fastest
absorption in the weightless state. Our one ex- manner possible. Details of the medical recov-
perience with sleep periods has raised the ques- ery requirements may be found in the appro-
tion as to whether brief periods of sleep in the priate NASA documents (refs. 1, 4, 7, 10, and
weightless condition are more restful than the 12). The original plans were necessarily based
same periods in a lg atmosphere. The MA-9 on anticipating the direst situation expected,
astronaut feels that they are. There is also and very correctly so. The extent of medical
some question concerning the effect of such a care which could be effectively administered to
relaxing condition as weightlessness because a the astronaut during the recovery operation is
number of unscheduled naps occurred. This governed to a large degree by the physical cir-
question will require further investigation on cumstances under which recovery occurs. Con-
other flights. In the missions to date, there has sequently, the level of medical support neces-
been no evidence of the mobilization of calcium. sary at the different recovery areas varies

207
according tothe potentialextentto whichcom- out the mission in a deployed state with an un-
petentmedicaltreatmentcan be administered likely probability that they would be utilized.
in that area,and the mostextensivemedical Careful evaluation of the experience and of
supportis properlyconcentrated in thoseareas sound medical principles involving emergency
wheredescent to earth_)ytheastronautis most medical care led to the conclusion that the
probable.Accesstimesfor the variousrecov- specialty team could be maintained on standby
ery areasweredeterminedto bemedicallyac- at a stateside hospital and easily flown either to
ceptabletime periodsto allow reasonable pro- Cape Canaveral or a recovery site if their serv-
tectionof theastronautbaseduponaccumulated ices were needed: There were surgical resusci-
knowledge of humansurvival,needfor medical tatives teams available at these sites. Other
attention,and reactionto physiologicstress. launch-site support was provided by a point
Sincethe recoveryforcesare routine opera- team consisting of a flight surgeon and scuba-
tional units divertedto this operationby the equipped pararescue personnel airborne in a
Departmentof Defense, it alsobecame obvious helicopter. Medical technicians capable of
that the medicalsupport must be obtained rendering first-aid care were also available in
throughthe cooperation of the Departmentof LARC vehicles and in a small water let boat
Defense.Civilian physiciansarenot available stationed on the Banana River. A surgeon and
for deployment for the necessary timeperiods. an anesthesiologist with their supporting per-
It will benotedthat oneof thebasicphilosophy sonnel were stationed in a blockhouse at Cape
changes duringthe programinvolveda change Canaveral to serve as the first echelon of resusci-
in emphasis from taking medical care to the tative medical care in the event of an emer-
astronaut in the early missions to provisions for gency. Physicians were stationed throughout
returning the astronaut to definitive medical the recovery areas aboard destroyers and aboard
care in the later missions. The medical support one aircraft carrier in the Atlantic and one in
was provided for three basic categories : the Pacific. In the early missions each vessel
(1) Rapid crew egress and launch-complex was assig'ned a surgeon, anesthesiologist, and
rescue capability during the late countdown a medical technician team with the supporting
and early phases of powered flight. medical equipment chest necessary for evalua-
(2) Positive short-time recovery capability tion and medical or surgical care. As confi-
throughout all phases of powered flight and dence was gained in the operations, this dis-
landing at the end of each orbital pass. tribution was modified to assig'ning only a
(3) Reduced capability in support of an un- single physician, either surgeon or anesthesi-
planned landing along the orbital track. ologist, to the destroyer. Attempts were made
In the launch-site area, this support included to place a surgeon on one and an anesthesiolo_st
a medical-specialty team consisting of a general on another vessel nearby. This would allow
surgeon, an anesthesiologist, surgical techni- their teaming up if necessary. The general
cians and nurses, a thoracic surgeon, an ortho- concept was, however, that they would provide
pedic surgeon, a neurosurgeon, an internist, a resuscitative care only and then evacuate the
radiologist, a pathologist, a urologist, a plastic astronaut to the carrier in their particular area.
surgeon, and supporting technicians. In the The carrier was provided a full surgeon, anes-
early missions, these individuals were deployed
thesiologist, technician team. Hospitals along
to Cape Canaveral and were available should
the orbital track were alerted for their possible
the need arise for their use either at Cape
use, and some near planned landing areas were
Canaveral or, in the event of a requirement for
briefed by NASA-DOD teams. These briefing
their services in the recovery area, they could
are thought to be extremely valuable aids in
be dispatched by aircraft. On the last two mis-
sions, it became necessary to develop a team at assuring adequate medical support. Early in
Triphr Army Hospital, Hawaii, to cover the the missions, blood was drawn from donors and
Pacific area as well as a team deployed to Cape made available for transfusion at Cape Canav-
Canaveral to cover the Atlantic area. It became eral and in the recovery area. As the operation
obvious that there were large numbers of high- grew wider in scope involving the Pacific, and
ly trained physicians who were merely waiting as more confidence was gained, dependence was

208
placed upon walking blood bank donors who nal Space Task Group. Special gratitude is
were typed, and drawn blood was available only extended for the professional advice and assist-
in the launch site area. ance of the medical monitors who served as the
Acknowledgements.--The author wishes to eyes and ears of the MCC Surgeon at the range
acknowledge the invaluable contributions of stations, the many DOD physicians and their
Stanley C. White, M.D., William K. Douglas, supporting DOD personnel who served on eval-
M.D., Carmault B. Jackson, M.D., James P. uation, specialty, and recovery teams, and the
Henry, M.D, David P. Morris, M.D., and the entire staff of the Center Medical Operations
staff of the Life Systems Division of the origi- Office.

References

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inations. Prec. Conf. on Results of the First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight. NASA, Nat. Inst
Health, and Nat. Acad. Sci., June 6, 1961, pp. 31-36.
2. AUGERSON, WILLIAM S., and LAUGHLIN, C. PATRICK: Physiological Responses of the Astronaut in the MR-3
Flight. Prec. Conf. on Results of the First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight. NASA, Nat. Inst.
Health, and Nat. Acad. Sci., June 6, 1961, pp. 45-50.
3. HENRY, JAMES P., and WHF, ELWEIGHT, CHARLES D. : Bioinstrumentation in MR--3 Flight. Prec. Conf. on
Results of the First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space FligJat. NASA, Nat. Inst. Health, and Nat. Aead. Sci.,

June 6, 1961, pp. 37-43.


4. DOUGLAS, WILLIAX( K., 5ACKSON, CARMAULT B., JR., et al. : Results of the MR-$ Preflight and Postflight Medical
Examination Conducted on Astronaut Virgil I. Grissocn. Results of the Second U.S. Manned Suborbital
Space Flight, July 21, 1961. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 9-14.
5. LAUGHLIN, C. PATRICK, and AUGERSON, WILLIAM S. : Physiological Responses ot the Astronaut in the MR-$
Space Flight. Results of the Second U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, July 21, 1961. Supt. Doe.,
U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C. ), pp. 15-21.
6. DOUGLAS, WILLIAM K. : Flight Surgeon's Report JOT Mercury-Redstone Missions 8 and _. Results of the
Second U.S. M_inned Suborbital Space Flight, July 21, 1961. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office

(Washington, D.C.), pp. 23-31.


7. MINNERS, HOWARD A., DOUGLAS, WILLIAM K., et al. : Aeromedical Preparation and Results of Post flight Medical
Examination. Results of the First United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, February 20, 1962. Supt.

Dec., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C. ) pp. 83-92.


8. LAUGHLIN, C. PATRICK, McCuTCHEON, EltNEST P., et al. : Physiological Responses oI the Astronaut. Results
of the First United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, February 20, 1962. Supt. Dec., U.S. Government
Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 93,-103.
9. JOHNSON, RICHARD S., SAMONSKI, FRANK A., JR., LIPPITr, MAXWELL W., and RADNOFSKY, MATTHEW L : Li_e
Support Systems and Biomedical Instrumentation. Results of the First United States Manned Orbital
Space Flight, February 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Governanent Printing Office (Washington; D.C.), pp. 31-44.
10. MINNEgS, HOWXgO A., WHITE, STAr_LEY C., et al. : Clinical Medical Observations. Results of the Second United
States Manned Orbital Space Flight, May 24, 1962. NASA SP-6, Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing
Office (Washington, D.C. ), pp. 43--53.
11. McCUTCHEON, ERNEST P., BERRY, CHARLES A., et al. : Physiological Responses of the Astronaut. Results of
the Second United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, May 24, 1962. NASA SP-6, Supt. Doe., U.S.
Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C. ), pp. 54-62.
12. BEERY, CHARLES A., MINNERS, HOWARD A., McCUTCHEON, ERNEST P., and POLLARD, RICHARD A. : Aeromedical
Analysis. Results of the Third United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, October 3, 1962. NASA SP-12,
Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 23-36.

209
IH
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
12. SPECIAL INFLIGHT EXPERIMENTS

By LEwis R. FISHER, Technical Asst. to the Manager, Mercury Project O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center; WILLIAM O. ARMSTRONG, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
and CARLOS S. WARREN, Space Environment Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

_l _ b_ Summary ect, this concept was not compromised by the


desire to perform experiments."
The Mercury spacecraft, although not de- However, an inflight experiment program
signed as a vehicle for performing experiments, was evolved in the latter stages of the Mercury
was used to accomplish a program of special in- Project within the constraints imposed by the
flight experiments not directly related to mission spacecraft and operational requirements. The
objectives. The major constraints imposed on experiments, in general, fall into three catego-
the experiment program by the spacecraft were ries-biomedical, physical sciences, and engi-
the weight and volume requirements, and the neering. The biomedical experiment program
consumables required such as attitude-control is described in paper 11 and is not covered
system fuel and electrical power. The program herein.
evolved from an early period when no planned This paper discusses the constraints placed
experimental endeavor existed through the de- on the Mercury experiment program by the
velopment and implementation of an inflight spacecraft and the operational limitations, de-
experiments panel specifically chartered to eval- scribes the procedures which evolved for the
uate the growing number of proposed inflight evaluation and implementation of experiments,
experiments. The inflight experimental pro- and summarizes the Mercury inflight experi-
gram carried out during the Mercury manned ment program. An analysis of those experi-
orbital flights is outlined in this paper and the ments in the area of space sciences is made in
results of these experiments are briefly pre- paper 19.
sented. An analysis of the results of those ex-
Spacecraft Constraints
periments performed in the area of the physical
sciences is presented in paper 19. Weight

The maximum allowable weight of the Mer-


Imtroduetion
cury spacecraft was dictated by the capability
A major objective of the Mercury manned of the Atlas launch vehicle and by the require-
space-flight program was the determination of ment to achieve an extremely high probability
man's ability to function in the space environ- of satisfactory orbital insertion. The entire 5-
ment. The Mercury spacecraft was designed year history of the Mercury Project has been
to sustain a man in space for a given period of marked by a constant struggle to maintain the
time and to protect him against the accelerations weight of the spacecraft within the weight
and temperatures to be encountered during exit constraints. Even without the addition of in-
from and reentry into the earth's atmosphere. flight experiments, the spacecraft weight was
Because of the emphasis on the sustentation and still increasing approximately 1 pound per
protection of man in space in the design stages, week at the close of the program.
practically no consideration was given to the After the first manned orbital mission, when
employment of the spacecraft as a platform it was shown that man can function reliably
for specific inflight experiments. Astronaut in the space environment and is a competent
safety was the prime design consideration ; and, technical observer, an increasing amount of
even in the latter stages of the Mercury Proj- spacecraft weight was devoted to the accom-

213
D
plishment of experiments. The battle to re- operation. The major portion of the third
duce the weight of the Mercury spacecraft had orbital pass was devoted to preparations for
not been wSn by any means; but weight devoted retrofire and reentry. Thus, only part of a con-
to the performance of experiments was con- tinuous 90-minute period was available for the
sidered to be justified by the fact that Mercury performance of experiments. On both the
became a part of a growing national program manned three-pass missions, control-system dif-
of scientific space exploration for peaceful ficulties forced the astronauts to devote their
purposes. attention to flying the spacecraft. Although
The weight associated with experimental the time available was limited, both Astronauts
equipment carried on each of the Mercury Glenn and Carpenter were able to make obser-
manned orbital missions is tabulated as follows : vations of scientific interest. Even on the 34-
hour manned 1-day mission (MA-9), the re-
quirements for engineering and operational
Mission Weight, lb
data, astronaut rest periods, communications,
MA-6 11 and other duties resulted in only a limited time
MA-7 18 available for experiments.
MA-8 22
A major constraint on the selection of experi-
MA-9 62
ments for the Mercury spacecraft was the small
amount of control-system fuel available for ex-
Volume
periments. At least some degree of attitude
control of the spacecraft was required for prac-
An observation of the Mercury spacecraft in-
tically all of the experiments. After reserves
terior, particularly with the astronaut in place
were first established for operational require-
and wearing his pressure suit, impresses one
ments, in particular the retrofire and reentry
with the compactness of the spacecraft and the
maneuvers, the fuel available for experiments
lack of available volume. Several worthy sug-
was allocated according to priorities established
gestions for experiments were rejected simply
for the experiments.
because there was no space available to store the
Other limitations imposed by the spacecraft
equipment required for the experiment. A rel-
consumables were requirements for electrical
atively small hand-held camera, for example,
power and for data-recording channels. While
became a major problem because of no suitable
these limitations were not severe, they were ad-
place to stow it for launch and reentry. Al-
ditionM considerations in the selection of ex-
though the astronauts have had available to
periments.
them a personal-effects container, this storage
Some types of experiments require an ex-
space was rapidly filled with food, flight plans,
tremely accurate control of spacecraft attitude.
star charts, and other paraphernalia required
Such fine control was not designed into the
for the flight. Astronaut Cooper on the MA-9
Mercury spacecraft because of weight limita-
mission managed to squeeze into this bag two
tions and the necessity for conserving control-
cameras together with associated film maga-
system fuel. The automatic-control system, for
zines and lenses, but he experienced a great
example, had a deadband of up to 11 ° . The
deal of difficulty in extracting and storing his
manual-control system and the attitude and rate
camera equipment. One planned experiment
indications to the astronaut were such that the
could not be completed because a piece of equip-
astronaut could control the spacecraft attitude
ment could not be taken from the container.
within a deadband of approximately only 2%
These tolerances made the spacecraft unsuitable
Operational Limitations
for certain types of experiments.
On the two, three-orbital-pass missions, the The optical qualities of the Mercury space-
short duration of these flights allowed little craft window were limited to begin with, and
time for experimental observations. In gen- even these qualities were considerably degraded
era], on such a mission, the astronaut used the by residue from the escape rocket which was
first orbital pass to acclimate himself to the normally ignited when the escape tower was jet-
space environment and verify proper systems tisoned just after launch-vehicle staging. Fu-

214
ture spacecraft will require some type of high- (3) To seek out and foster the generation of
quality optical port if precision photographic suitable experiments from all available spurces.
experiments are to be conducted. In carrying out these responsibilities, the
MSEP formed a close working relationship
Evalution and Selection of Experiments with scientists in the NASA Office of Space
Sciences and the NASA Goddard Space Flight
Prior to the MA-6 manned orbital flight, no Center.
formal procedures existed for the acceptance,
The major considerations in the evaluation of
evaluation, and incorporation of proposed
proposals for experiments by the MSEP were:
experiments in the Mercury missions. Sug-
scientific, technical, and biomedical merit;
gestions were made informally by organiza-
weight of equipment; volume and location of
tions both within and outside of the Manned
equipment; attitude-control-system fuel re-
Spacecraft Center for certain types Of observa-
quired; electrical power, requirement; instru-
tions or photography to be accomplished on the
mentation requirement; effect on safety of
MA-6 mission. These suggestions were made
flight; state of readiness and qualification of
directly to the office responsible for astronaut
equipment and effect on spacecraft schedule;
training activities; and, where possible, certain
and extent of changes required to the spacecraft.
of the suggested experiments were incorporated
into the MA-6 flight plan. The MSEP functioned effectively for the
MA-7 and MA-8 missions. With the approach
With the successful accomplishment of the
of the MA-9 manned one-day mission, however,
MA-6 mission, the original objective of the
it became increasingly evident that the scope of
Mercury Project was fulfilled. It had been
the _SEP should be enlarged to include con-
proven that man could function effectively in
sideration of scientific experiments for MSC's
space and be safely recovered. With the real-
advanced progra, ms and to encompass a broader
ization that the Mercury Project was now in
background of scientific interest.
a position to perform certain types of experi-
ments of scientific value from an orbiting To accomplish this broadening of responsi-
spacecraft, the Mercury Project Office became bilities, the MSEP was supplanted in October
the recipient of a large number of proposals 1962 by the Manned Spacecraft Center In-
for such experiments. These proposals origi- Flight Experiments Panel (IFEP). The
nated from divisions within the Manned IFEP difers from the MSEP in that its mem-
Spacecraft Center, other organizations and cen- bership was enlarged to include representatives
ters within the NASA, industry, and educa- of the other two spacecraft project offices and
tional institutions. It was soon evident that a an ex-officio member from the NASA Office of

special organization was needed to serve as the Space Sciences. Its recommendations for the
implementation of experiments are made to the
focal point of the effort devoted to inflight
Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center for
experiments.
approval. The chairman of the IFEP is the
In April 1962, the Manned Spacecraft Center
MSC Assistant Director for Engineering and
officially established the Mercury Scientific
Development.
Experiment Panel (MSEP). This panel was
It is the policy of the MSC to make maximum
made up of representatives of the Mercury
use, for scientific and research purposes, of the
Project Office and all technical, operational,
flights scheduled under approved spacecraft
aeromedical, and scientifically oriented divi- programs. In keeping with this policy, the
sions of MSC. The MSEP was specifically Center encourages the development of worth-
charged with the following responsibilities: while investigations which can be implemented
(1) To evaluate inflight experiments pro- on manned flights within the limitations of op-
posed for inclusion in Project Mercury missions. erational requirements and flight safety. To
(2) To propose to the manager of the Mer- promote this policy, the IFEP has established
cury Project the order of priority in which formal procedures for the submission, evalua-
acceptable experiments should be incorporated tion, and acceptance of proposals for inflight
into the program. experiments.

215
Implementationof Experiments than the qualification testing that was required
of all Mercury spacecraft systems. The possi-
The_IFEP recommends to the MSC Office of
bility of the compromise of a Mercury mission
the Director the experiments for a given space-
because of the failure of a piece of experimental
craft mission. With the approval of the Direc- apparatus could not be tolerated. Failure
tor, these experiments become the official experi- modes of the experimental apparatus were ex-
ments for the mission. An experiment coordi-
amined very closely to assure that such failures
nator was appointed from within MSC for each
could have no degrading effect on the mission or
of the approved experiments. His responsibil-
on pilot safety.
ity was the timely development and flight quali-
The responsibility for integrating experi-
fication of hardware required for the experi-
ments into the mission flight plan and into the
ment. In general, the equipment required for
astronaut training activities was that of the
an experiment was furnished by the organiza_ MSC Flight Crew Operations Division. This
tion which had proposed the experiment. division worked closely with other elements of
The Mercury Project Office was responsible
MSC to develop a flight plan for each mission
for the integration of experimental equipment
which would accomplish the mission objectives
into the Mercury spacecraft. The experiment and would, at the same time, provide for the
coordinator submitted the following documen-
performance of experiments. It was necessary
tation for an approved experiment:
that the flight plan be completed in final form
(1) A firm schedule showing all significant many weeks prior to a mission so that the train-
milestones for the delivery of equipment ing of the flight astronauts in the procedure
(2) A qualification plan in accordance with trainers would conform with the flight plan.
specified requirements Once the final phases of astronaut training in
(3) A weekly status report preparation for the mission had begun, the
To prevent the spacecraft schedule from being flight plan could not be changed except for
affected by the integration of experiments, it compelling reasons because late changes could
was necessary to set the delivery date of experi- seriously disrupt the astronauts' training status
mental equipment well in advance of the to the point where mission safety could have
scheduled launch date. In a normal prelaunch been affected. This, then, was the second reason
schedule for a Mercury spacecraft, the final why experiments must have been approved for
checkouts of the spacecraft and its systems are a given mission many months in advance.
made 8 weeks prior to the scheduled launch
date. Once these tests were complete, abso- Mercury Inflight Experiment Program
lutely no changes were made to the spacecraft
With this brief background on how the ex-
except those dictated by flight-safety considera-
perimental program in manned space flight has
tions. Therefore, the experimental equipment
evolved, a review of the results of the Mercury
was required to be at the launch site 3 months
experimental program will now be presented.
prior to the scheduled launch in order to allow
These experiments generally can be divided into
sufficient time for the installation and checkout
two major categories. The first category, that
of this equipment before the final spacecraft
of special inflight experiments, is the topic of
tests were begun. It was also imperative that
this paper. The second category, that of analy-
the flight astronaut be thoroughly familiar with
sis of observations and comments on the space
the equipment and trained in its use. It be-
environment and astronomical phenomena, is
comes apparent, then, that the selection and
discussed in paper 19.
evaluation procedure for experiments must be
completed many months before the scheduled
Planned Inflight Experiments
launch of a spacecraft to allow time for the de-
sign, construction, and qualification of equip- The inflight experiments planned for and
ment before the required delivery date. carried out during the Mercury Project can
It was specified that the qualification environ- be grouped generally into several areas of
ments and the levels of these qualification tests study. These areas are: (1) visual acquisition
for experimental equipment be no less stringent and perception experiments, ('2) general photo-

216
graphic experiments, (3) radiation experi- using statistics furnished by the U.S. Weather
ments, (4) tethered balloon experiment, and Bureau to determine a favorable location, the
(5) several miscellaneous studies which include light was positioned a t Bloemfontein, South
investigations of fluid behavior under zero grav- Africa. Sightings were scheduled for the sixth
ity and of the characteristics of various ablative orbital pass and in this case Astronaut Cooper
materials under reentry conditions. was successful in acquiring the light.
The light assembly used f o r this experiment,
Visual Acquisition and Perception Studies shown in figure 12-1, was a pulsed xenon arc
light consisting of three sections of six lamps
I n future space flights it may be necessary each. The lamps were mounted in a shallow
for astronauts to acquire and track lighted open-top box above a polished reflector and
targets either on the ground or in space to pro- were operated by using a 50-cycle, 220-volt,
vide a backup capabi1it.y for rendezvous and three-phase a-c circuit. Each section operated
navigation. Visual acquisition of a target in independently from a single phase and flashed
space may also be used to back up the primary once every cycle. Thus, the three sections pro-
method of rendezvous with other space vehicles. duced a total of 150 flashes per second, well
Experiments were, therefore, undertaken on above the response of the eye, and appeared as
Mercury flights t o evaluate the operational a steady burning light. The measured average
problems associated with visual acquisition intensity of the light was found to be between
from space of both earth-based lights and 30,000 and 35,000 candle power and required
lighted targets ejected from the spacecraft. between 13 and 15 kilowatts of power for op-
Ground-light expe&mnts.-Attempts were eration. The light could first be viewed at a
made on each of the manned orbital Mercury slant range of 320 nautical miles from the space-
flights to sight known earth-based lights at craft and was calculated t o be as bright as a
night. These studies were expected to provide 3.5 magnitude star. Astronaut Cooper esti-
information on man's ability to acquire a fixed mated the light to be third magnitude in bright-
light source against an earth background and ness when first acquired, and he was able t o
determine to what extent targets of this type retain it in sight for 30 t o 40 seconds before it
would prove useful as navigational aids in faded out. Thus, the experiment produced
space. A n attempt was made by Astronaut sighting results approximately as predicted and
Glenn t o sight flares launched by mortars from the light was considered of sufficient brightness
the Indian Ocean Ship on the first and second to be used as a navigational landmark. A flash-
orbital passes of the Mercury-Atlas 6 (MA-6) ing light or some distinctive light pattern, how-
flight. The astronaut was unsuccessful in his ever, was believed essential for identification of
attempts to see these flares, however, because of a target light for any future use. The rapid
heavy cloud coverage in the area. Attempts angular passage of the spacecraft over the
were again made to acquire ground flares of ground will also pose a problem for use of
1,000,000 candle-power intensity over the Woo-
mera missile range in Australia on both the
Mercury-Atlas 7 (MA-7) and Mercury-Atlas
8 (MA-8) missions. These experiments were
also unsuccessful on both flights because heavy
cloud cover and poor visibility prevented the
pilots from sighting these targets. A ground-
based xenon light located at Durban, South Af-
rica, was also used on the MA-8 mission to in-
crease the probability of having favorable
weather a t one site. Unfortunately, rain and
clouds obscured the light in South Africa as
well as the ground flares in Australia. Another
attRmpt, to sight. the xenon light was planned
for the Mercury-A'tlas 9 (MA-9) mission. By FIQWB l%l.-Ground-light installation.

217
707-066 &--16
ground targets of this sort as navigational fixes. 10.84X104
Weather conditions on the ground also proved I
to be an important factor in using ground lights,
and perhaps airborne lights carried above the
weather region of the atmosphere would prove
more dependable. More testing is needed t o
prove the operational feasibility of using air-
borne lights and to determine flash frequencies
most desirable for acquisition and tracking. Time. microseconds
Flashinplight experiment.-The problem of
FIGURE
12-3.-Time history of a typical flash of the
visual acquisition of other space vehicles di- beacon.
rectly relates to the rendezvous of two space-
craft. For visual sighting of another vehicle a t a compressed spring acting against a piston
ranges up to 100 miles, the problems of visual when the canister covers were released. The
acquisition and tracking need to be identified light was powered by mercury-cell batteries,
and studied. Therefore, a study to investigate which were connected in series, and it delivered
some of the problems of visual acquisition of a approximately 8 watt-seconds of power per
target vehicle in the space environment was flash.
carried out on the Mercury-Atlas 9 (MA-9) A typical time history of one of the flashes
flight. is shown in figure 12-3. This figure shows
On this flight a flashing light was ejected that the light reached a peak intensity output
from the spacecraft and viewed by the astro- of about 8.0 X lo4 candles and that the light has
naut at varying distances in orbit. The light, a flash duration of about 100 microseconds at
its container, and the ejection mechanism were or above one-half peak intensity.
built by the NASA Langley Research Center, Extensive measurements were made by the
and the details of this assembly are shown in National Bureau of Standards to determine the
figure 12-2. The flashing-light unit was a 5.75- integrated light intensity and to establish that
inch-cliameter spherical assembly weighing the distribution of the light was reasonably uni-
about 10 pounds and equipped with two xenon- form in all directions and reasonably constant
gas-discharge lamps located at opposite poles. throughout its designed lifetime of 5 hours.
The two lamps flashed simultaneously a t a rate Figure 1 2 4 is an example of this directional
of approximately one signal per second. The survey and shows the variation of integrated
beacon was designed to appear about as con- light output in candle-seconds per flash with
spicuous a s a second magnitude star when light orientation. Distributional measure-
viewed at a distance of 8 nautical miles. As ments of this type for varying viewing angles
shown in the figure, the sphere was ejected from showed that the light output was reasonably
the container at a speed of 10 ft/sec by means of uniform and produced a flash intensity of ap-
proximately 12 candle-seconds per flash. As
shown by figure 1 2 4 , regions near the Oo and
180" orientation showed some degradation in
light intensity, with intensity falling as low
as 8 to 9 candle-seconds in these regions. By
using a value of 0.2 for the Blondel-Rey con-
stant for threshold viewing of flashing lights,
this light can be converted to an equivalent ef-
fective steady-light intensity of from 40 t o 60
candles. This intensity corresponds to a light
of second magnitude in brightness when viewed
at a distance of between 7 and 8 nautical miles
by using the commonly accepted value of 8.3
x 10-7 lumens per square meter for a first mag-
FIGURE
lZ-Z.-Assembly for flashing-light beacon. nitude light. Visual air-to-air and ground-

218
f4

_= 10

a_

_4
_E

I I I I I I
0 60 120 /80 240 300 360
Beacon orientation about the vertical axis (axis through lights), dog

FIGVRE 12-4.--Integrated intensity of the flashing beacon about an axis passing through the lights and inclined
,at 30 ° from the vertical.

sighting tests, with Astronaut Cooper as one were ejected 88 ° below the pitch horizon of the
of the test subjects_ indicated that the light in- spacecraft at a velocity of 10 ft/sec, the desired
tensity was approximately the same as had been trajectory would be obtained. Figure 1'2-5
measured in the lal_oratory. shows the spacecraft attitude and canister lo-
Trajectory studies of ballistic number, ejec- cation used to provide the desired ejection angle.
tion angle, ejection velocity, and orbital posi- The pilot controlled the spacecraft attitude to
tion at ejection were made to determine the

proper
light.
orbital
These
conditions
studies
for deployment of the
showed that if the beacon _ 12h--"]Day,_
Night period

period
Pitchattitude-,9*...
__
A
"--

Spacecraft E _ .__ t-,:_

\ k'k__ ----Eanister _8 j_

Local horizontal _ center line-..._/_f _10 _ °-T:: _hde _

o_
I'00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00
Time from deployment, hr
Ejection path
FIaUR_ 12-6.--Variation in separation distance between

FIGURE 12-5.--Spacecraft orientation at beacon the spacecraft and the flashing beacon after

deployment, deployment.

219
Blue filter Red filter

Blue filter Red filter Red filter Blue f i l t e r


MA-9

12-7.-Typical
FIQU'RE horizon definition photographs.

the desired position by using horizon-sighting light as about one star magnitude dimmer than
markings on the window for aiming. The had been expected. For example, when the
beacon was ejected 15 minutes prior to sunset on beacon was between 7.5 and 9 nautical miles
the third orbital pass and postflight records in- away at 2 hours and 14 minutes after deploy-
dicated the pilot controlled attitude to within ment, the light was described as not very bright
&lo of the desired attitude. Figure 12-6 shows but discernible, about the order of a third mag-
the calculated separation distance between the nitude star. The light was also seen during the
spacecraft and the beacon as a function of time third night at a range of between 9.5 and 11.5
after deployment. The band between the upper nautical miles and was rated as very, very weak
and lower curves represents the variation in and just barely discernible.
range that might have occurred because of an I n general, the flash was found to make the
uncertainty in ejection attitude. light easily distinguishable from stars. The
Astronaut Cooper was unable to locate the beacon's intensity and flash rate appeared to be
beacon on the first night pass after deployment, adequate for acquisition distances of up to 8
probably because the spacecraft was not nautical miles at night which corresponded to
oriented closely enough in yaw to position the a light intensity of about a second magnitude
light in the field of view. During the second light.
night pass after deployment the astronaut suc- General Photography
cessfully sighted the beacon and was able to
change the spacecraft attitude and then return Horozk-definition photography.-Horizon-
t o reacquire the light. During these sightings, definition photography was conducted on two
noted on figure 12-6, the astronaut rated the Mercury space flights to assist the Instrumenta-

220
tion Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute erational difficulties during the period in which
of Technology (MIT) in determining the effec- this photography was planned.
tiveness with which the earth's sunlit limb A preliminary analysis of the MA-9 photo-
could be used for navigational sighting during graphs taken substantiates the initial results of
the terminal phase of advanced space missions. the MA-7 flight. Although the analysis is not
Photographic studies were carried out on both yet complete, it is expected that the limb radi-
the MA-7 and MA-9 flights. A 35-mm Robot ance in both the red and blue portions of the
camera was flown in MA-7 and a 70-mm Has- spectrum can be fairly accurately established.
selblad was used as the photographic device for An accurate determination of the height of the
MA-9. For both flights, a special red and blue limb cannot be made by using data from the
split filter was inserted in the field of view just MA-9 flight, however, because the image of the
ahead of the film plane. This filter was used to moon is too distorted and indistinct. The film
provide information on the resolution and effec- and dust layer which collected on the space-
tiveness of using the limb as a navigation aid craft window might well have contributed to
at the two extremes of the visible spectrum. this indistinct image. Although no significant
Data obtained from these photographic difference in limb height was noted when the
studies are presently being analyzed by Instru- four quadrantal photographs were compared,
mentation Laboratory scientists under the di- much more data covering a wide variation in
rection of Dr. Max Peterson. Limited results the angle of incidence of sunlight striking the
of the MA-7 flight have shown, as expected, atmosphere are needed to determine the effect
that the earth's limb viewed through a blue fil- of variation in scattering angle on limb height.
ter has a somewhat higher elevation than when In order, therefore, to establish the value of the
viewed through a red filter. This distinction earth's limb as a navigational reference, addi-
is clearly evident in figure 12-7 which shows tional studies are needed to determine limb
typical photographs obtained on both the MA- height and the variation in this height at differ-
T and MA-9 flights. The MA-7 flight results. ent scattering angles of incident light.
have shown that contrast and definition are im- Weather photography.--Weather observa-
proved when viewed in the longer wavelen_hs tions and photography were carried out during
of the visible spectrum (see fig. 12-7). The the Mercury flight program to augment other
limb viewed through a blue filter is expected, meteorological information and to provide spe-
however, to provide a better navigational ref- cific information that would be useful in de-
erence because the blue limb appeai_ more signing advanced weather satellite systems. On
stable and is not as subject to interference effects both the MA-6 and MA-7 missions, cameras
from clouds and other atmospheric conditions equipped with special film and filters were car-
as is the red limb. ried on board for photographing interesting
The MA-9 photographic study was con- meteorological phenomena. However, because
ducted to provide additional information on the of difficulties, arising during each of these
limb elevation viewed through the red and blue flights, no photographs were obtained. Mete-
filters. It was also planned to obtain informa- orological data obtained on these missions were
tion for determining the radiance of the limb, derived from the astronauts' observations and
for evaluating the effect of variations in scatter- the general-purpose color photography.
ing angle of incident light on limb height, and Photographic experiments were conducted
to establish the height of the limb above the during both the MA-8 and MA-9 flights for
surface of the earth. To accomplish these ob- the National Weather Satellite Center. These
jectives, it was planned to take a series of photo- experiments were designed to examine some of
graphs in the four quadrantal directions rela- the spectral reflectance characteristics of cloud,
tive to the sun, of the setting moon near the land, an_t water areas of the earth's surface as
earth's limb, and of the limb during the day- viewed from space. Figure 12--8 shows the
light period of most of an orbital pass. It was camera and filters used on these two flights.
not possible to obtain the daylight-period The 70-mm Hasselblad camera shown in the
photographs on the MA-9 flight because of op- figure was used for both missions. For the

221
MA-8 70mm Hasselblad MA-9
Filter and magazine Filter and magazine

FIQURE
12-8.-Photographic equipment used for Weather Bureau experiment.

Blue Green Neutral Ye1 Iow Red Far Red

1%9.-Weather
FIQIJRD photograph of a region of the South Atlantic, southeast of Brazil taken ‘by Astronaut1
Schirra on the M A 4 flight.

222
The MA-9 weather photography was con-
ducted to investigate this hypothesis by using
infra-red film and a special filter shown in fig-
ure 12-10. This filter divided the infra-red
spectrum from 6,600 B to 9,000 A into three
parts. T o accomplish this division of the spec-
trum, the filter was divided into three sections
each having the bandpass width shown in fig-
ure 12-10, which is a typical photograph and
was taken over southern Arizona looking west-
ward. As pointed out by Mr. Soules in his

6,600 to 9,000 A
-- .
7,300109.000%
-
8,000to9,000%
- analysis of these results, water has a very low
reflectance in the near infra-red as shown by
the dark portion on the left of the photograph
covering the Pacific Ocean. Clouds and land
FIGURE12-10.-Weather photograph of the Baja
California area taken by Astronaut Cooper on MA-9. have a very high reflectance ; hence, coastlines
and cloud patterns over water are easily dis-
cernible. However, as illustrated by the figure,
MA-8 mission a wide bandpass Wratten filter clouds are more difficult to detect over land
consisting of six elements varied in range of area because both the clouds and land areas
spectral transmission from blue t o f a r red. covered with green vegetation have a high re-
Neutral density was added to each of the color flectance.
filters to produce a nearly uniform neutral den-
sity over the entire spectrum examined. Film Terrain p?wtograph.-Terrain photographs
sensitivity extended from 3,700 B to 7,200 A have constituted a portion of the general pur-
pose photographs on each of the four manned
thus limiting the wavelength response t o 7,200 A.
Figure 12-9 is a photograph from the series orbital flights. However, they were specifically
scheduled as a part of the flight plan on only
obtained during the MA-8 flight and was
taken over the South Atlantic on the fifth or- the MA-8 mission. On the other three flights,
bital pass. It was exposed a t an altitude of terrestrial photographs were taken when the
140 nautical miles viewing northwest toward opportunity arose rather than as specifically
the southeast coast of Brazil approximately planned activities. These photographs were
1,000 miles away. Analyses of this and other
taken to aid in building up a cataIog of space
photographs of various geological features such
photographs of this series were carried out by
Mr. Stanley Soules of the National Weather as folded mountains, fault zones, and volcanic
Satellite Center t o provide design inputs to fu- fields, and to provide topographical informa-
ture weather satellites. Results from the MA-8 tion over a major portion of the earth’s surface.
They were taken on each flight by using high-
flight indicated that contrast increased with
speed color film in the general-purpose camera
wavelength in the visible spectrum as shown by
figure 12-9. These results indicate that the carried aboard for the flight. The following
optimum wavelength for viewing the earth table lists the camera and exposure settings used
might be the near infra-red spectrum where on each flight.
scattering by atmospheric particles is relatively Generally, the terrain photographs of the
low. first three manned orbital flights were of poorer.

1 Flight 1 Camera Film I Exposure

MA-6 35-mm Ansco Autoset Eastman color negative stock no. 5250 Automatic
MA-7 35-mm Robot Recorder Eastman color negative stock no. 5250 1/125 at f/16
MA-8 70-mm Hasselblad Super Anscochrome color ASA no. 160 1/125 at f / l l
MA-9 70-mm Hasselhlad Ultraspeed Anscochrome color FPC 289 1/250 at f/16
I

223
quality than those obtained on the MA-9 mis- of Physics, University of Minnesota, was car-
sion, although some useful photographs were ried out for the MA-9 mission to obtain pho-
obtained on each of these flights. The reduced tographic data on two dim-light phenomena
quality of the photographs on these first mis- best observed outside the earth’s atmosphere.
sions resulted primarily from the much poorer These phenomena are the so-called zodiacal
weather conditions that existed over the land light and the night airglow. Photographs of
areas of the earth and by the limited land area the zodiacal light were needed to assist in de-
covered during the flights. It was quite for- termining its exact origin, geometric distribu-
tunate that worldwide weather conditions dur- tion, and relationship to solar radiation and
ing the MA-9 mission were much better than on flare activity. Data on the airglow were needed
previous flights; and because of the favorable to define the layer further and to provide in-
weather and the fact that the flight covered formation on the solar energy conversion proc-
many land areas of the world, excellent photo- ess occurring in the upper atmosphere.
graphic coverage, particularly regions of the Figure 12-11 shows a photograph of the 35-
African and Asian deserts and the Himalaya mm Robot camera as it was modified for this
mountains, was possible. experiment. The camera was equipped with
Preliminary analysis of these photographs an automatic film advance and had a fixed lens
has been made by Mr. Paul D. Lowman of the with an equivalent speed of f/0.95. Exposures
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and is were timed manually, and the camera controls
presented in paper 19. As a result of the analy- were simplified to improve operation by the
sis of these photographs, Mr. Lowman con- astronaut in a pressure suit. Three small sup-
cluded that potentially useful geological and ports or “feet” (see fig. 12-11) were provided
topographical information could be obtained to aid the pilot in positioning the camera
from all terrain photographs taken during against the window for aiming.
orbital flight. The quality and resolution of Photographs, varying in exposure time from
these photographs approached or equaled that 1 to 30 seconds, of the zodiacal light were to
of the black and white exposures from the best begin immediately after sunset and were to
rocket flights. cover the ecliptic region from sunset to about
Dim-Zight photogrpphy.-A dim-light pho- 30” of arc past sunset. Photographs of the air-
tographic experiment sponsored by the School glow layer were to be taken periodically over an
entire night orbital pass with exposures varying
in duration from 10 to 120 seconds.
Unfortunately, the zodiacal-light sequence
yielded very little useful data since all of these
photographs were underexposed. A small de-

FIGURE
12-ll.-Modifled Robot camera used for 12-12.--Photograph of the airglow layer taken
FIGURE
MA-9 dim-light photography. by Astronaut Cooper on the MA-9 flight.

224
lay in initiating the sequence or an error in Radiation Experiments

exposure time could have caused these unsatis-


Some form of radiation measurement has
factory results since the gradient in zodiacal
been included on all Mercury space flights to
light intensity varies quite rapidly near the sun.
record the dose received by the astronaut and
The airglow photographs, however, were of
to furnish experimental information on the
quite usable quality. A representative photo-
space radiation environment over the Mercury
graph from this experiment is shown in figure
altitude profile.
12-12. Preliminary analysis of these photo-
Generally, data obtained during these experi-
graphs by Dr. Edward P. Ney and associates
ments were measured by the following method:
at the University of Minnesota has shown them
to be useful in determining surface brightness (1) Studies in which film or lithium-fluoride
thermoluminescent detectors were used to meas-
of the airglow layer. These photographs also
were found to be valuable for assessing the ure the dosage to the astronaut.
height of the layer with varying latitude, in (2) Emulsion packs and ionization chambers
measuring the angular width of the band, and to measure the radiation level inside the space-
craft.
in determining angular displacement above the
earth's horizon. Considerably greater discus- (3) A package containing Geiger-Mueller
sion of this phenomenon is presented in pa- tubes to measure the electron flux external to
per 19. the spacecraft.

tal track

/--/M A- 9
radiation
measurement

FIGURE 12-13.--Variation in predicted flux at 100 km in the anomaly of the earth's magnetic field over the South
Atlantic on the MA-9 flight. Increased flux density shown by increase in amount of shading.

225
Film badges and thermoluminescent detec- 12-14. The other tube viewed essentially a
tors used to monitor the electron dose to the hemispherical area about a direction 40 ° below
astronaut were mounted on the helmet and on the roll axis.
the chest and thigh of the astronaut's under- The uncollimated tube was shielded Io reject
garments on each of the final two manned orbit- all electrons having energy levels less than 2.5
al flights. Evaluation of these detectors has mev to avoid saturation, and because the radia-
shown that the radiation dosage received by tion level in the anomaly was nmch lower than
the astronaut is quite low, less than that nor- anticipated the shielded tube was never ener-
mally received by a man from cosmic radiation gized sufficiently to record usable data. Usable
in 2 weeks on the surface of the earth. data were recorded by the collimated tube.
Emulsion packs carried on the MA-8 and Results obtained from these Gieger-Mueller
MA-9 flight at several locations inside the tubes and emulsion package measurements from
spacecraft as well as an ionization chamber both the MA-8 and MA-9 missions, summariz-
mounted on the spacecraft hatch were used to ing the decay of the artificial electron belt
assess the radiation level {nside the spacecraft. created by the July 1962 atomic explosion, are
Data obtained from these devices generally shown in figure 19-15. The solid curve defines
agreed with results derived from the film badges the decay in percent of initial flux based on un-
and showed a very low radiation level inside published riometer data of Dr. Gordon Little of
the spacecraft. the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). The
Radiation measurements were made on the environmental measurements obtained on both
MA-9 flight to map the electron flux in an the MA-8 and MA-9 flights are also identified
anomMy of the earth's magnetic field occurring 5O
over the south Atlantic Ocean where the radia-
tion levels are expected to reach a peak in the
45
Mercury orbit. (See fig. 12-13.) Variation in 0 Ion chamber data

between radiation intensity is indicated by the I":1 Geiger tube data

variation in shading in this region. Measure- 4O

ments were taken in this region on the seventh


orbital pass as indicated by hatched region on
55
this figure. Operational problems interfered
to some extent with completing all of the sched-
uled measurements. E MA-8

A package with two Geiger-Mueller tubes


were mounted on the spacecraft retropackage
as shown in figure 19-14 to measure these data. 25
One tube was collimated to view along the
spacecraft roll axis over a solid angle of ap-
._ 20 NBS nometer data

proximately 0.8 steradian as illustrated in figure

MA-9: .... 0

[ t I I "rrl I
2 4 6 8 I0 12

Time since July _962 atomic explosion, months

F_GVRE 12-15.--Results showing artificial electron flux


FIGVRE 12-14._Geiger-Mueller tube installation on the decay in the magnetic anomaly over the South
MA-9 spacecraft. Atlantic.

226
in the figure. The electron belt is shown to have control of balloon construction was maintained
decayed as predicted by several orders of mag- throughout the development program and nu-
nitude during the time period between MA-8 merous deployment and inflation tests were con-
and MA-9 flights, possibly because of atmos- ducted by the Langley Research Center to in-
pheric collisions or other processes. sure the quality of the device. These tests were
conducted with the flight equipment under con-
Tethered Balloon Experiment ditions which closely simulated the space envi-
ronment without a single failure. Numerous
A Winch mylar inflatable sphere was pack- squib firings were made, without a single fail-
aged in the antenna canister of both the MA-7 ure, to insure that either one or both of the
(see ref. 1) and MA-9 Mercury spacecraft. squibs used to unlatch the cover of the canister
These balloons were to be ejected, inflated, and would accomplish this task. The assembled
towed at the end of a 100-foot nylon line through unit was carefully checked after installation on
one orbital pass to measure the drag experienced the spacecraft and was found to be satisfactory.
by the balloon throughout the orbit. The I t was, therefore, believed that this experiment
measured drag could then be readily converted was well qualified for flight, but unfortunately
into air density over the Mercury altitude pro- the balloon failed to deploy in flight. Failure
file. I n addition, it was hoped that the astro- mas attributed to some malfunction in the squib-
naut could obtain some sightings yielding vis- firing circuit that released the hatch cover of
ual data on objects i n close proximity to the the balloon canister. The exact cause of this
malfunction could not be determined because
spacecraft.
the circuit was contained in the spacecraft an-
The design, construction, and qualification of
tenna canister which is jettisoned prior to
the equipment used on this experiment were car- landing.
ried out by the NASA Langley Research Cen-
Miscellaneous Studies
ter. The components of the equipment are
shown in figure 12-16. The results of this ex- Study of liquid behavior a t zero gravity.-
periment conducted during the MA-7 flight are A n experiment sponsored jointly by the NASA
contained in reference 1. Briefly summarized, Lewis Research Center and the NASA Manned
the balloon was deployed satisfactorily but was Spacecraft Center was developed to examine the
only partially inflated ; hence, little useful data behavior of fluids of known properties in a
were obtained on this flight. weightless state by using a given container con-
figuration and was flown on the MA-7 mission
By a thorough investigation of the MA-7
(see ref. 1). Basically, this experiment was in-
failure, it was concluded that the balloon failed tended to provide data that would complement
to inflate because one of the seams connecting and extend work already carried out at the
the many gores comprising the balloon skin Lewis Research Center. Data obtained from
pulled apart. this study were expected to provide information
The experiment was believed to have been of relating t o the tankage and fuel transfer re-
sufficient value to be repeated on a later Mercury quirements on future space missions.
flight ; therefore, new equipment was developed The results of this experiment are well de-
and qualified for the MA-9 flight. Careful fined in reference l and other NASA publica-
tions dealing with this subject. It need only be
noted here that the limited results obtained on
this experiment generally tended to verify past
experimental and theoretical data obtained
from laboratory studies.
Study of various ablative materials o n a
Mercury flight.-Several advanced ablative ma-
terials were flown on the cylindrical section of
the MA-8 spacecraft to evaluate the thermal
FIGURE12-16.-Balloon canister assembly. performance of each. These materials were

227
J
j
I / _ _
_,_,..._Ant en na
/ canister

/ \
/ \
@ o o 7-
k_5,,--I

T
o o

Cylindrical

section _

15"

Typical
I
Typical --
material thermocouple I_¢--- Conical

panel instrumentation I" section

shingle

L _j
.J
/
/

FIGURE12-17.--Location of ablation panels on the Mercury spacecraft used for the MA-8 flight.

located as shown in figure 12--17. Each ablative from the blunt end) along the specimen. No
panel was 15 inches long and 5 inches wide. material, regardless of the heat rate to which
Each sample was centered on a beryllium it was exposed, showed any marked superiority
shingle and was attached to the shingle at the in performance over that of the other specimens
cone--cylinder junction of the spacecraft. The although the elastomeric materials did prove
materials were bonded to each of these shingles, superior to hard ablation materials in limiting
and temperature-sensitive paints were applied the growth or delamination of intentional cut-
to the rear face of the shingles to assist in deter- outs. Surface effects and imperfections noted
mining the temperature profiles present along during preflight ground testing were also evi-
the ablation panels during reentry. (See dent during the postflight analysis, but to a les-
ref. 9.) ser extent. However, the scaling effect when
Upon completion of the MA-8 flight, each comparing the relatively large specimens flown
strip of ablative material was removed from the with those tested in a ground facility has not
spacecraft and examined to determine char been established.
depth and temperature distribution and to ex- Micrometeo_ite studies.--Examination was
amine the material for delaminations, pitting,
made of all the spacecraft flown on manned or-
and cracks.
bitM flights during the Mercury Project for
It was not possible to compare the panels col-
evidance of micrometeorite impact encountered
lectively because of significant circumferential
in orbit. Macroscopic surveys were made of the
variation in heating around the cylindrical sec-
tion, probably caused by a spacecraft angle of beryllium shingles and the window of the MA-
attack of 9 ° during high heating. As expected, 6, MA-7, and MA-8 spacecraft before and after
all samples showed an increasing thermal ex- flight in an effort to determine if any microme-
posure and char depth with length aft (away teorite impacts could be detected. Microscopic

228
surveys were made of the areas in which anv
indications of impact were noted. As a resuit
of these examinations, no evidence was found
that could be construed to be a micrometeorite
impact.
Microscopic mapping of the vycor window of
the MA-9 spacecraft was performed before and
after the mission. During the postflight sur-
vey, one small surface pit was detected on the
outer surface of the MA-9 spacecraft window.
A photograph of this pit is shown in figure 12-
18. This surface pit has the circular shape,
depth to width ratio, and general characteristics
of a hypervelocity impact in basalt. Further
analysis is in progre& to ascertain whether or
not the pit resulted from a micrometeorite im-
FIQUR~ 12-18.-Photograph of the surface pit on the
window of the MA-9 spacecraft. x42, top and pact or was caused by spacecraft debris encount-
bottom lighted. ered during reentry.

References
1. BOYNTON, JOHN H., and FIELDS,E. M.: Spacecraft and Lamch-Vehicle Performance. Results of the Second
United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, May 24, 1962. NASA SP-8. Supt. Doc., U.S. Government
Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 1-14.
2. BOYNTON, JOHN H., and FIBHER, LEWIS R.: Spacecraft and Launch-Vehicle Perfomname. Results of the
Third United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, October 3, 1962. NASA SP-12. Supt. Doc., U.S.
Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 1-11.

229
13. FLIGHT DATA REPORTING

By ROBERTE. MCKANN,Chief, Engineering Data and Measurements Oj_ce, Mercury Project O_ce, NASA
Manned Spacecra# Center; WILLIAM A. KELLEY, Asst. Chie], Engineering Data and Measurements
O_ce, Mercury Project O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; and WILLIAM R. KELLY, Mercury
Project Oj_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center

_-[ _ _ ¢ Summary port of the results for each flight, the Post-
launch Memorandum Report, is discussed in de-
During the progress of the Mercury Project
tail in this paper.
an effective method evolved for the postflight
This paper describes the techniques employed
data processing, analysis of systems perform-
to process raw data into usable form, to obtain
ance, and timely reporting of the results of the
the overall analysis of mission results, and to
analyses. This method was a compromise be-
report those results to management.
tween the conflicting requirements of complete-
The processing of certain data, such as the
ness, clarity, and technical accuracy on the one
trajectory information from the radar tracking
hand and an early publication date on the other.
network, and the numerous reports that were
It was learned that there is a need for exten-
made by the spacecraft contractor and other
sively planning the report preparation effort
supporting organizations after each mission,
and establishing procedures for expediting data
are not discussed in this paper.
processing in order to provide engineering data
rapidly and in readily usable forms. It was Scope
also learned that for a report to be effective,
it must be factual, carefully written, and edited. Data Sources

Introduction The flight data with which this paper is pri-


marily concerned were those data available
The success of a complex technical endeavor, from the spacecraft onboard tape recorders
such as Project Mercury, depends to a great ex- since these tapes contained the most complete
tent on the ability to analyze and report rapidly data and were available for quick processing.
the very large amount of information which is The onboard tape included information per-
generated. Rapid availability of information taining to the operation of the spacecraft sys-
was essential to maintain theMercury schedule, tems, the astronaut's physiological conditions,
since the developments from any mission might the pilot's voice communications, and other
need to be implemented for subsequent missions. special measurements. A list of typical meas-
Extensive planning and scheduling was done urements is presented in table 13-I. Most
to facilitate the acquisition and preparation of of this information was also transmitted to the
data. The flight data and information were ground and recorded by range network stations,
examined to determine weaknesses and malfunc- and some of the information was displayed ill
tions in the performance of manufactured sys- real time to monitoring personnel. These
tems and human organizations, and to verify the range-recorded data have often become critical
proper performance of these systems and or- to the analysis conducted after the flight, in
ganizations. When these analyses had been addition to serving as a complement for the
made, they were summarized and a brief, ac- onboard recorded data. Since the spacecraft
curate, and factual report was written so that sank in deep water following the Mercury-
the management of the program would have Redstone 4 (MR--4) flight, the onboard-re-
available all significant information to aid in corded data were not recovered, and the
making necessary decisions. This primary re- range-recorded data became the only source of

231
t

information from this flight. In the Mercury- the Postlaunch Memorandum Report (PLMR)
Atlast9 (MA-9) mission, the tape supply of the was completed. The analysis of problems re-
onboard recorder was insufficient to provide quiring study beyond the publication date of

Table 13-I.--List of Typical Recorded Flight Measurements

Flight accelerations in three axes Reaction control system

Physiological measurements Automatic and manual fuel pressures


Fuel line and thruster temperatures
Body temperature
ECG Stabilization and control system

Blood pressure Control stick positions


Respiration rate and depth Spacecraft attitudes (gyros)
Events (approximately 20) Spacecraft attitudes (horizon scanners)
Automatic system high and low thruster actuation
Environmental control system
Spacecraft attitude rates
Oxygen supply pressures
Onboard time
Suit pressure and temperature
Time since launch
Cabin pressure and temperature
Static pressure Time of retrosequence initiation
Time since retrorocket ignition
Heat exchanger temperatures
Structural heating
Oxygen and carbon dioxide partial pressures
Electrical system Heat shield temperatures
Retrorocket temperatures
Instrumentation reference voltages
Shingle temperatures
Main, standby, and isolated bus voltages and
current Experiments

Fans and ASCS bus a-c voltages Balloon drag


Inverter temperatures Radiation flux density
Communications system

Command receiver signal strength


Command receiver on-off

continuous recording for the entire mission; the PLMR was continued to completion, and
therefore, the range-recorded data were used the method of reporting the final results is dis-
to supplement the onboard-recorded data. cussed in the following section of this paper.
The pilot's comments recorded during the
Reporting
mission and in postflight debriefings were an
important source of information. This infor- The results and analyses for each mission were
mation was used in many cases in defining the (or will be) presented in five formal NASA
performance of the spacecraft or launch ve- reports, which are listed in table 13-II.
hicle systems when the measured data were The first of these reports, issued in the form
lacking or permitted ambiguous interpretations. of a telegram approximately 2 days after the
Even more important, the pilot's debriefings end of the mission, gave a broad overall sum-
and reports were the only source of information mary of mission results as they were known at
regarding many of his observations. that time. For most of the flights this report
Additional sources of information during was issued within a day of the end of the mis-
various flights were provided by a variety of sion in order to disseminate the available in-
cameras which were carried onboard the space- formation as quickly as possible; however, for
craft and used to photograph the instrument the MA-9 flight it was found that more time was
panel, the astronaut, the view through the space- needed to gather and summarize significant in-
craft window, and, for the unmanned Mercury- formation, and as a result this telegram was is-
Redstone and Mercury-Atlas flights, the view sued 3 days after the end of the flight. This
field of the periscope. first report had a very limited distribution, go-
ing only to those organizations directly con-
Analysis
cerned with the mission.
The analysis of the flight data began at the The second of these reports, also issued in
launch site during the flight and continued until the form of a telegram approximately 6 to 10

232
_i_ _o
o "_

cI
O

q:l

T o

D _ _D c._ v

233
707-05_$ 0--_ 3_-------16:
days after the end of the mission for the more The remainder of this paper will be limited
recent manned missions, had a dual purpose. to discussion of the preflight and postflight
The first purpose was to show any significant activities related to the PLMR.
changes to the information contained in the ill-st
telegram, and the second purpose was to de- Report Planning and Organization
scribe the status of the analysis of the mission
Planning
results at that time with emphasis on any prob-
lem areas. Any problems encountered during In the early days of the Mercury Project,
the mission were of particular interest since the planning and organization for postflight
such problems might have a direct effect on the analysis and reporting of mission results did
schedule or the prepartions for the next mis- not need to be very elaborate, and these plans
sion; as a consequence, little time was spent in were made known to the participants on an
this second telegram discussing systems that informal verbal basis. A NASA Project Engi-
had exhibited satisfactory performance. This neer was responsible for all aspects of a par-
telegram had the same limited distribution as ticular flight.
the first telegram. For the first few flights, such as the pad-
The third type of report, the PLMR, was abort flight and early Little Joe flights, the
bound into one or more volumes depending on flight time was measured in minutes, with a
the amount of information contained. This re- relatively small amount of data collected. The
port was completed in a period of 10 to 26 days, analysis and reporting effort, though intensive,
and contained 90 to 95 percent of the significant was correspondingly small in terms of the num-
information that would come from the flight. ber of people involved and the total amount of
The amount of time needed to complete the time spent when compared to the later orbital
report depended primarily on the amount of flights. All of this analysis and report prep-
data collected during the mission. This re- aration was done at the launch site at Wallops
port was the most important of the postflight Island, Virginia.
reports in terms of its usefulness to the program The plans for organizing the analysis and
management in the timely prosecution of the reporting efforts continued on an informal basis
program. This report had a relatively wide dis- through the Little Joe phase of the Mercury
tribution within NASA. Project and extended into the Redstone and
The fourth of these reports was a summary Atlas phases. As the flight time, amount of
of the important highlights of the mission, with data, and number and complexity of the sys-
classified information deleted to permit release tems to be analyzed increased, and the number
to the public (see refs. 1 to 5). of personnel grew, it became difficult and then
The fifth of these reports was issued as a virtually impossible to disseminate by verbal
working paper (WP) for the Mercury-Red- discussions and telephone calls the work as-
stone manned flights. The WP was used for signments, schedules, changes in plans, et
rapid dissemination of information, and the for- cetera, to the participating personnel. To cir-
mat and quality of presentation was not suit- cumvent these difficulties, informal memoran-
able for general distribution outside NASA. dums came into increasing use. As a result,
For the manned Mercury-Atlas flights the fifth prior to the MA-5 flight a data processing,
report will be issued as a Technical Memoran- analysis, and reporting schedule was prepared
dum (TM), suitable for distribution outside for the first time, and was in the form of a five-
NASA. These TM's (one for each mission) page memorandum. This memorandum, which
will be distributed within the scientific com- was distributed to all participating personnel
munity after publication. Both the WP's and to the necessary organizations, outlined the
and TM's contained, or will contain, the sig- schedule for data processing and noted when
nificant information published in the PLMR's and where various types of data would be avail-
plus any additional results that became avail- able, the assignment of individuals to various
able after publication of the PLMR. sections of the PLMR, and the detailed sched-

234
ule for the writing and editing of the various method of managing this analysis and report-
sections of the report. This procedure was ing effort reverted for the next flight to an ar-
found to be effective, and the memorandum rangement with a single organization respon-
grew steadily in scope and detail as the need sible for the effort. This arrangement was kept
for additional information became evident throughout the remainder of the Mercury Proj-
through the subsequent orbital missions. For ect.
the MA-9 mission this memorandum had grown Prior to the first manned Mercury-Redstone
to 31 pages. It contained such things as per- (MR-3) flight, the increasing responsibilities
sonnel assignments, data-availability and re- for data analysis and reporting had resulted in
port-preparation schedules, schedule of the the assignment of key technical personnel to
pilot's postflight activities including debrief- duties on editorial boards or Senior Editorial
ings, locations of various facilities where peo- Committees headed in each case by the appro-
ple would be working on data analysis and priate project engineer. The function of this
report preparation, and a definition of the editorial board was to actively participate in
responsibilities and work scope of the orga- the planning and monitoring of postflight sys-
nizational elements participating. tems testing, data analysis, and editing of sec-
tions of the report.
Organization
The membership of the editorial board
The organization of the effort of the analysis during the early flights changed from flight to
flight, but usually one or more members were
and reporting went through a continuing evolu-
the same for at least two flights in order to
tion as the Mercury flight program proceeded,
provide continuity and some consistency of
up through the PLMR for the MA-5 flight. By
effort. The PLMR editorial board for MA-5
this time, a method of organizing the effort had
and a majority of the systems-performance
evolved which was satisfactory in producing in
a short time a reasonably complete and factual analysts were for the most part the same people
who had served in those capacities for the
report, written with sufficient clarity.
As in the case of the dissemination of the PLMR for MA--4, and these personnel assign-
plans, the organization of the effort for analysis ments remained relatively constant for the re-
and reporting was relatively small and informal mainder of the Mercury Project.
for the first few flights of the Mercury Project. As an example of the organizational arrange-
The effort was headed by the NASA Project ment of the reporting team, figure 13-1 shows
Engineer for that particular flight, who largely
determined the scope of the analysis effort and I Manager's
MercuryPr°ject
Office I
edited the various sections of the PLMR. I
I
During a part of the early phase of the Mer- I
I
cury-Atlas and Mercury-Redstone flights, as the
analysis and reporting became more complex I Senior Editorial
Committee I
I
because of the increasing complexity of the I
flights, additional NASA organizational ele- I
I
ments became more deeply involved in the I

analysis and reporting. Because of this, there


was a movement to create an editorial board
Report Contro, I--'----i
consisting of one member from three or four Figure Preparation ----|------|_1 -- I Data Support

of the major organizational elements involved,


Facilities Support I------]
with each member having equal responsibility i
and authority. One of the early Mercury-Atlas I

reports was prepared under the direction of I I I


a three-man editorial board but this arrange- I I I

ment was quickly found to be unworkable Senior Editor, Pert I Senior Editor, Port
I Mission Analysis Data Misson Transcr pts
mainly from the standpoint of settling policy
and procedural questions that inevitably arose FZOVRE 13-1.--Functional relationships for editorial

during each analysis and reporting effort. The and support personnel.

235
the major elements of the task organization for scripts, managed the preparation and editing
the MA-9 report. The Senior Editorial Com- of the various voice transcripts for both flight
mittee members and the supporting members communications and post flight debriefings, and
were drawn from various elements of the planned and conducted the postflight scientific
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, and for the debriefing.
period of the PLMR preparation the members The functional organization shown in figure
reported functionally to the Chairman of the 13-1 was used in the overall management of the
Senior Editorial Committee. As each member's mission analysis and reporting. A more de-
part of the task was completed, he returned to tailed breakdown of the functional organization
his parent organization. of the Part I effort is shown in figure 13-2 to
The functions of the elements shown in figure illustrate the depth of organizational detail
13-1 are described briefly below : needed. The personnel for each assignment
The Manager's office provided the overall di- were drawn from throughout the Manned
rections for the postflight test program. In Spacecraft Center, with assistance from other
addition, the Manager's office reviewed the NASA centers and contractors as needed.
PLMR for technical accuracy, completeness, The need for a well-planned organization can
and policy, immediately prior to printing. best be illustrated by noting that for the MA-9
The Senior Editorial Committee com- PLMR analysis and reporting effort, contribu-
prised the senior editors of the separate parts tions were made by personnel from fourteen
of the report and the MA-9 backup pilot and NASA organizations, four contractor major
these persons directed and coordinated the de- organizational elements, numerous organiza-
tailed efforts of postflight testing, analysis, and tions of the Department of Defense, the U.S.
reporting. The members of this committee also Weather Bureau, and several colleges and uni-
performed a continuous review and editing of versities. During this analysis and reporting
the individual sections of the report in an effort period, approximately 20,000 man-hours were
to maintain continuity and technical agreement spent by approximately 130 people in produc-
among the sections of the report. The Chair- ing a 1,000-page 3-volume report in 26 days.
man directed the planning of the overall re-
porting effort prior to flight, provided inter- Analysis of Mission Results
mediate and final editorial reviews of major Data Processing
portions of the report, acted as official repre-
sentative of the Manager's office, and coordi- To meet the needs for processed data to be
nated the report preparation effort continually used for analysis and reporting purposes in the
through the Senior Editorial Committee. shortest possible time, several decisions were
The Senior Editor of Part I, Mission Analy- made as experience was acquired. The maxi-
sis, gave overall direction to a team of sub- mum use would be made of electronic data proc-
editors and system specialists who performed essing to provide data in the most readily usable
postflight analyses, and tests required to ex- form. Where necessary, manual effort would be
plain inflight systems malfunctions. These used, in addition, to provide the data in a for-
sub_ditors participated as required with the mat which would require the least additional
system specialists in the analysis of the data manipulation on the part of the analyst. In
from the mission and the preparation of this processing the data the initial format would be
part of the report which summarized the over- made as nearly as possible of a quality that
all results of the mission. would be suitable for final report use. In this
The Senior Editor of Part II, Data, gathered way the data would be prepared for its various
data-processing requirements prior to flight, types of usage by photographic reproduction
planned and provided data processing, presen- rather than by recomputing, rescaling, and re-
tation, and distribution. In addition, he di- plotting. The requirements of the analysts
rected the analysis of data quality and was would be determined as far as possible well in
responsible for the preparation of the flight data advance of the generation of the data in order
section of report. that the parameter arrangements, scale selec-
The Senior Editor of Part III, Mission Tran- tion, and priority might be determined. As

236
I Senior
MissionEditor,Port
Analysis I I

i
.... i,. m IiW I. I
I I i

Editor
Spacecraft ] 1 Launch Operations
Editor I Flight Editor
Operations I Spacecraft
Ed tor Systems

]H
I
Launch Vehicle
_i{ Mission
Summary Description I1_ Trajectories i1_ Control I
I
Launch Vehicle
H Spacecraft Performance -] Communications I
Description _I Flight
Summary
Control I
I I I

Protection
Heat 1 H I
Weather
H

I
Network I H

I
Mechanical
P_/rotechnicsand I
I

History
Spacecraft
I H Photography _i t Recovery I H Sequential and
Electrical I

I
Flight Safety
Reviews I LI Telemetry
Instrumentationand I

L_l Postflight
Inspection I
|

Editor
Astronaut Activities
I iAeromed'co'
Ed
,or
Ac''vi''es
I Ed,,or
I I L"eS'o0°r'
E0,,o,
I
I I

I
Scientific
Experiments I L_ Aer°medicolAnalysis II q PilOtReport'S
Flight I q SupportLife ]

q Astronaut
Performance I
FIGURE 13-2.--Typical functional organization for Part I of report.

successive flights were made, formats were quire more care in the reduction of the data
standardized to enable comparison between the than was the general practice. Utilization of
data from various flights, thus providing an experiences gained from the preceding flights
additional constraint. were required to obtain the product quality and
When the electronic data-processing method processing efficiency attained on MA-9. The
became operational, a decision was made to pro- Mercury experiences have indicated that sig-
cess all applicable data during one effort for nificant improvements in quality and efficiency
each flight. To permit parallel processing, sev- can still be attained.
eral copies of the onboard tape were pre- The initial effort to use automatic processing
pared. If the processing results were to methods was begun with the off-the-pad abort
be accurate, the tape copying had to be and Little Joe tests. In this effort, time-his-
carefully checked. To accomplish this, os- tory plots were _repared from telemetered data
cillographic records were prepared from the by using analag plotting methods. The dif-
master and tape copies. These oscillographic ferences between the oscillographic-type rec-
records were visually compared. If visual ords and the analog plots were that the time
inspection indicated any differences, _he rec- axis was compressed and engineering units could
ords were compared by superimposing records be read from the analog plots. The compres-
over a back-lighted glass plate. If there sion of the time axis accentuated the scatter in
were any si_o_ificant differences between the
the data, however, and the processing methods
records, the tape copy was rejected.
themselves added some additional scatter. As
The automatic data-processing capabilities
a result, the electronically processed data lacked
were not easily obtained. Data reduction proc-
the desired accuracy. In these cases, the an-
esses may introduce errors at many points in
the system. The accuracies of the basic space- alysts continued to use the oscillographic re-
craft data system were sufficiently high to re- cordings as a primary source of data.

237
To improve the quality of the processed data, was practical to sample the data and it was
various techniques of reducing scatter (filter- much easier to apply nonlinear calibrations. By
ing) were applied and some of the plotted data this time the electronically processed data had
were smoothed by line fairing. The require- become acceptable, since comparisons of both
ments for the postflight analysis were still not methods had shown them to be equally accurate.
satisfied by the electronically processed data, Also by this time most of the data require-
since vital information might still be lost as ments had become well established through dis-
a result of data filtering or line fairing. Never- cussion with systems analysts. These reqlfire-
theless, it was recoga_ized that here was a method meats included a definition of the parameters
which provided all of the flight data in a stand- of interest, their grouping for analytical pur-
ard format and in a compact form suitable at poses, the time periods of concern, the plotting
least for indicating major trends. scales, and the priority of processing. Thus by
The use of digital computers for the data the time of the first manned orbital flight the
processing increased as the Mercury Project basic equipment, methods, and standards were
continued. At first the computer-processed established. Further improvements were made
data were used for checking analog plots and but these were improvements in methods rather
later some of the data were plotted from com- than equipment. The most important of these
puter-prepared cards by using a small card-fed improvements were :
digital plotter. The data obtained from the (1) The plotting density was reduced, thus
digital plotter were hand faired to provide a speeding up the plotting and improving the
trace comparable to the analog processed data. appearance of the plot. This required more
The greatest "bottleneck' 'encountered in data thorough checking to insure against the loss of
preparation was in the plotting of data. In- data during transients. To overcome this fault
itially, one analog plotter was used in pre- a variable plotting density was used; that is,
paring the Mercury data. Only one parameter each data point was compared with the pre-
could be plotted at a time and the time to vious data point. If the difference was more
plot was the same as real time. At the time than a predetermined amount, both the pre-
of the MA-5 flight, four analog plotters were vious point and the present point were plotted.
in use and they were operated at a speed of If the difference was less than the predeter-
eight times real time. mined amount, a point was plotted at fixed
Because of the difficulty in making correc- intervals of time.
tions to the analog plots when graph paper was (2) Instead of rewinding a plotter tape to
used, it was decided to plot on a clear plastic plot a second parameter on a page, time was
film. This innovation speeded the plotting pro- saved by plotting the second parameter in re-
cess by making it possible to erase an error verse.
rather than replot several parameters on a new (3) Special photog'raphic techniques were
page, and by providing a means for superim- used to minimize replotting. Analysis plots,
posing analog plotted data onto digitally plot- normally made with expanded horizontal scales
ted data for related parameters. The plastic for detailed work, were photographically re-
duced in the horizontal axis without reduction
film was also less affected by temperature and
humidity changes than was graph paper. in the vertical axis. Thus working plots were
compressed in len_h for use in the reports
It was not until the MA-6 mission that digi-
without it being necessary to replot.
tal computers and digital plotters became the
(4) A developmental program was initiated
primary processing tools. Prior to this mis-
to permit the determination of heart rate by
sion, the computer was used to prepare tabu-
digital means. Such a method became a
lations of data in engineering units, and some
necessity on the longer flights in order to ob-
digital plots were prepared. But now a faster tain a complete time history of heart rate. The
general purpose computer and a magnetic-tape- method developed provided the time between
fed plotter were available. It became the ex- beats so that an average over any selected pe-
ception rather than the rule to use analog riod of time could be obtained. Statistical
plotters. With these faster tools available, it treatment of these data was thus made possible.

238
(5) Much valuableinformation wasvoice- essed for MA-9. However, the total processing
recordedduringflight by the astronautbut its time was held nearly constant at 5 days as the
value wasto a great extent dependentupon productivity of manpower increased and pro-
having an accurateknowledgeof the time a cedures were improved. Figure 13-4 shows a
statementwasmade. Early methodsrequired comparison of the time required for manual
that a typedtranscriptof the voicerecordbe processing as compared with semiautomatic and
timedwith theuseof a stopwatch andthevoice automatic data processing for a given sample of
tape; this methodwasadequate for the short- data.
durationflights. For thethree-orbitalmanned Systems Performance Analysis

flights,timing wasaccomplished by useof the Most of the analysis of the Mercury systems'
typed transcript and an oscillographrecord performance was made either at Wallops Is-
containingthe voicepatternsand time from land, Virginia, or Cape Canaveral, Florida, by
lift-off in 1-second
intervals. By simultaneous- NASA and contractor personnel who were re-
ly relatingthe voicetranscriptto thevoicepat- sponsible for the spacecraft preflight prepara-
ternswhilelisteningto the voicetape,anaccu- tions and checkout and who were familiar with
6000 - 14
Date points processed MA-9-"'")-"'/
Time to completion //

5000 - 12 .... Data points per manhours _../.-'"


PA Pad Abort rMA_ 8 _.-_
LJ Little Joe A : "" _ --
MR Mercury Redsfone / ....... _'"

40oo - °,o MA Mercury Atlas .._'-"

MA 6 ,,,, /..-"

&3ooo
o
-_a

M A -5 -""v////// /
ooo -
MA-2 _, cLJ-SA MA-4-, /'/

MR-2 i ;LJ-5B ,/
IO00 - _ 4 i i ; MR-4--; /
MR-IA_, ; ,_ : i MR 3 : /

._o PA LJ -5 -, ', ::
/ 'L i_ .... -;/

L
10 0 - 2-I

-"- ._. _ "&'- .... - - -_,


8
0 l I _J '', I i i I i i
1960 _ 1961 _ 1962 1963

F--

t_e_RE 13-3.--Number of data points and processing time and rate for Mercury flights.

1,000
rate time for each communication was deter-
mined. For the longer 6-pass and 29-pass or- Manhours

bital flights, a method was developed to auto- r---] Machine hours


800
800
mate this process to some extent. A magnetic
tape recording of the voice, with spacecraft time
recorded on a second track, was played while an
60O
operator followed the typewritten text. At the
first word of each communication in the text, J
Based upon the processing
E
the operator pressed a switch to compute and of 20,0OO data points

400
record the time. This process permitted the
rapid preparation of a complete and accurately
timed transcript of all of the pilot's voice com- 210
munications. 2O0

Figure 13-3 provides some statistics related


to data processing for each flight. As may be
o
noted, the number of data points processed in- ManlJa I Semi- automatic Autom a tic

creased rapidly for the longer duration flights; FIGURE 13--4.--Comparison of data processing

for example, 14 million data points were proc- techniques.

239
these systems. The majority of the analysts of the mission in question. For example, the
had extensive experience in appropriate spe- temperature of the pilot's pressure suit was di-
cialty fields. rectly controlled by the operation of the suit
As discussed in the Data Processing section of heat exchanger; however, there was an indirect
this paper, the major portion of the analysis effect resulting from the temperatures in the
of the early flights in the Mercury Project was spacecraft cabin, which in turn were affected by
made by using oscillograph" records and hand- the operation of the cabin heat exchanger, the
processing only those portions of the records amount of electrical power being used (heat
that seemed to be significant. This hand-proc- generation), and whether or not the spacecraft
essing was time-consuming and several days was in the sunlight or in the earth's shadow.
were required to obtain an appreciable amount Thus an analysis of the suit temperature could
of data in the form of engineering units plotted not be made without considering possible effects
against time. The conversion to electronic data from these secondary sources of thermal
processing was a most important factor during disturbance.
the later missions in permitting a rapid assess- Postflight Tests

ment of the mission results; without this elec-


It was extremely important that immediate ac-
tronic data processing, an incomplete analysis
tion be taken to determine the causes of any
would have resulted if the same flight schedule
system malfunction or failure and the corrective
had been maintained.
action to be taken, since this information was
Toward the end of the Mercury Project a
necessary in order to support subsequent
few data-comparison plots were prepared by missions.
using the electronically processed data. The
A person or group was assigned to determine
purpose of such plots was to display time his-
the reason for the malfunction, and these inves-
tories of the data for a particular system in a
tigations often became quite detailed and time-
manner to allow very rapid comparison of the
consuming. It was found to be necessary to re-
nature of the data on previous missions, showing
quire, whenever practical, that the malfunction
at a glance the normal scatter and variations for
be repeated with the same or an identical piece
both proper and improper system performance.
of equipment in laboratory tests to demonstrate
The very limited amount of data prepared in
that the cause of the malfunction was fully un-
this comparison-plot form was found to be an
derstood. In addition, when the flight equip-
extremely useful tool for the analysts, the edi-
ment had been modified to preclude future
tors, and technical management personnel.
malfunctions of that type, it was again demon-
During the analysis and reporting period of
strated in ground tests with the simulated in-
the earlier flights, various types of work weeks
flight environment that the modification would
were tried. The maximum number of hours
do its intended job.
worked by individuals was limited to 60 except
An example of postflight testing that could
in unusual circumstances. Work days ranging
not be accommodated to the above philosophy
from 8 hours to 12 hours each, in combination
of duplication on the ground of inflight mal-
with 5-day to 7-day work weeks, were utilized
function was occasioned by the MA-1 inflight
at various times. Experience showed that a
structural failure. It was impossible to dupli-
schedule of 10 hours a day, 6 days a week, was
cate this failure in ground testing, since the in-
a good arrangement to accommodate both the
flight loads spectrum resulting from vibration,
schedule and the participants' non-work-con
acceleration, aerodynamic drag, unsteady air-
nected responsibilities.
flow, and noise could not be simultaneously ap-
In the analysis of the data, it was found that
plied in ground tests. The postflight investiga-
mission-oriented technical personnel were tion was therefore centered around tests on the
needed to supervise and direct the analysis and structure of the front end of the launch vehicle,
ensure that the overall effort would be inte-
and on the adapter between the spacecraft and
grated and fully coordinated. Few of the the launch vehicle. These tests, and a concur-
spacecraft systems could be analyzed as to their rent analytical investigation, did not conclu-
performance without considering the perform- sively define the exact cause of the failure but
ance of other systems and the particular phase did show that strengthening the front end of

240
the launch vehicle and stiffening the adapter It was quite difficult, of course, to separate
would be sufficient to prevent a similar failure. key technical personnel completely from day-
These changes were incorporated in the MA-2 to-day duties, since these duties needed their
mission, and the flight demonstrated that the continuous attention. However, it had to be
modifications were satisfactory. done to a large extent, or the postflight analysis
for a mission would have proceeded at a rela-
Report Preparation
tively slow pace and the program schedule could
The preparation of the PLMR actually began have suffered. The steady and intensive work
just prior to the mission when some sections of schedule of 10 hours per day and 6 days per
the report that dealt with preflight activities week, necessary to meet the analysis and report-
were written. The main body of the report con- ing schedule, was maintained for two to three
taining the sections of technical significance weeks on occasion without any apparent ill ef-
was generated during approximately the last 5 fects on the work output.
to 10 days prior to issuance of the report. Dur- As the reporting of the Mercury mission re-
ing this time, the rough drafts were prepared sults progressed from flight to fight it became
and examined for accuracy, completeness, and increasingly clear that a strong editorial policy
absence of conjecture, by appropriate members would have to be followed in order to insure
of the report editorial staff. that the PLMR's would be effective. One rea-
As in the case of data analysis, it was found son why this strong editor policy was necessary
that mission-oriented technical personnel were was that quite often it was necessary to dicuss
indispensable in performing the editing func- different facets of a subject in different sections
tions. The editors were technically experienced of the report, with the sections being prepared
personnel and most had degrees in appropriate by different authors; a strong editorial hand
specialized fields of study. They were tempo- was needed in such cases to make sure that the
rarily relieved of their various technical duties various discussions were consistent with each
in their organizations to serve as editors. There other and with the facts. Another reason was
was never any attempt to use non-technical that the various sections of the report needed
people as editors of technical parts of the to have a reasonable consistency in the format,
PLMR, since the nature of the editing task and amount of summary material and depth
was such that the use of technical personnel in of discussion relating to the systems' perform-
this function was mandatory . ance and their effect on the overall mission re-
The experiences in the PLMR reporting in- sults; a strong editorial hand was again needed
dicate that three main factors contributed to implement and enforce these requirements.
heavily to the rapid completion of the reporting From experience it was thought that a single
phase: person should perform the final editing task;
(a) All reporting participants were relieved however, as the reports became larger and more
as completely as possible of their day-to-day complex with the longer flights, it also became
responsibilities so that they could devote full apparent that one person could not edit all
time to the reporting task. In addition, when sections of the report in the short time avail-
possible they were physically relocated to a able. The compromise used in the reports of
place away from their usual duty locations in the last few flights was that one person (the
order to minimize distraction by non-reporting Chairman of the Senior Editorial Committee)
duties.
edited the technically important sections of the
(b) A steady and intensive work week sched- report, and the supporting sections of the report
ule was utilized, consisting of approximately 10
were edited by an editorial assistant or one of
hours per day, 6 days per week. the members of the Senior Editorial Commit-
(c) The editors exercised close and constant
tee. This arrangement worked quite satis-
supervision of reporting personnel in their tasks
factorily, although the work load on the Chair-
of writing the sections of the report, with em-
phasis on the need for completeness, clarity, man was very great, particularly during the
accuracy, and absence of conjecture or specula- few days just prior to final typing and printing
tion. of the PLMR.

241
During the period just prior to printing the Data Processing

report, the senior editorial committee reviewed (1) Electronic data-processing equipment
and edited all sections of the report. This re- can accurately process quantities of data that
view was accomplished to insure that the various are impossible to accomplish in the same time
sections were compatible in the discussions and with manual methods.
treatment of common subject matter. The re- (2) Analysis requirements must be deter-
port was then reviewed in detail by the staff mined in advance and data processing must be
of the Project Managers Office for accuracy planned to supply these needs.
and technical emphasis. It was found that the
Analysis
various reviews and editings of the sections
of the report and the report as a whole were (1) Mission-oriented technical supervisors
necessary , although publication of the report are needed to supervise the analysis in order to
was delayed somewhat by this process. Experi- insure integration and coordination of the
ence showed that the most useful report resulted effort.
from a compromise between the conflicting re- (2) Extensive time-history data are essential
quirements of completeness, clarity, and techni- to the analysis of spacecraft system perform-
cal accuracy on the one hand and an early pub- ance.
lication date on the other. It was also found Reporting
that a report was ineffective if it was not com-
plete, clear, and factual. (1) A report should have all of its technically
important sections edited carefully by one per-
Conclusions son if the report is to be of maximum usefulness.
As the Mercury Project progressed from the (2) A report, to be useful, must be a com-
relatively simple flights to the more lengthy promise between the conflicting requirements
orbital missions, the postflight data process- of completeness, clarity, and technical accuracy
ing, mission analysis, and reporting, went on the one hand and an early publication date
through a steady evolutionary process. A num- on the other. Such a report is ineffective if
ber of lessons were learned and are summarized it is published quickly but is not complete, clear,
as follows : and factual.

References

1. Staffs of NASA, Nat. Inst. Health, and Nat. Acad. Sci. : Proceedings ol a Conference on Results oi the First
U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight. Supt. Doc., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.),
June 6, 1961.
2. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Second U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight,
July 21, 1961, Supt. Doc., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
3. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results oJ the First United States Orbital Space Flight, Febru-
ary 20,1962. Supt. Doc., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
4. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results oF the Second United States Orbital Space Flight, May 24,
1962. NASA SP--6, Supt. Doc., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C. ).
5. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Third United States Manned Orbital Space Flight,

242
14. SPACECRAFT PREFLIGHT PREPARATION

By J. C. MOSER, Asst. Chic] jar Data Systems, Preflight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecra#
Center; G. MERRITT PRESTON, Manager, Atlantic Missile Range Operations, NASA Manned Spacecra#
Center; J. J. WILLIAMS, Asst. Chic] ]or Test Operations, Preflight Operations Division, NASA Manned
Spacecra# Center; and A. E. MORSE, JR., Chie/, Project Engineering Field O_ice, Mercury Project
O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center _--/ q _

_/9 E,¢ Summary was developed and proved that digital computer
systems were superior to analog methods in pro-
This paper presents the evolution of test phi- viding information and control to test engineers.
losophies and procedures used in preflight
checkout of Mercury spacecraft at Cape Ca- Introduction
naveral, Fla. The impact on preflight opera-
Preflight preparation and checkout experi-
tions of tight schedules, mission changes, dis-
ence began at Cape Canaveral in 1959 with the
crepant performance of ground and spacecraft
Big Joe boilerplate spacecraft. This space-
equipment, and new information gained from
craft was the first to be launched in Project
ground testing and flight are discussed. In-
Mercury. The Big Joe spacecraft was de-
cluded in this discussion are numerous examples
signed and built by the National Aeronautics
to illustrate the kinds of problems that were en-
and Space Administration (NASA) to deter-
countered and their effects on preflight opera-
mine the aerodynamic and heating character-
tions. In addition, this paper presents the les-
istics of the Mercury shape.
sons learned in preflight preparation and check-
In the following year, a variety of test and
out over the 4-year span of the program.
checkout equipment and the first production
Test operations personnel learned that only
spacecraft arrived at Cape Canaveral. During
formalized testing with all inter-dependent sys-
the next '2 years, the techniques and procedures
tems operating simultaneously would provide
for preparation and checkout of spacecraft for
a flight-ready spacecraft. Tests emphasized
manned flight were developed and refined.
astronaut safety and included participation of
By the time of the early manned flights, these
the astronaut as often as possible. Few substi-
preparations and procedures had been proved
tutes for actual flight equipment were permitted
through operational experience. A formal but
during spacecraft assembly, rigging, and test-
flexible operations routine had evolved, incor-
ing. Such matters of quality control as clean-
porating close coordination with design, mis-
liness, component limited-shelf and limited-op-
sion management, manufacturing, and quality
erational life, and equipment failure, influenced
control groups. For example, components were
the test philosophy. Validation and trouble-
inspected and tested before installation; and
shooting of spacecraft systems revealed the need
work to be done on the spacecraft was described
for many more test points to be provided for
in detailed work sheets. This procedure con-
in-place testing. Repair and bench testing of
trolled the disturbance of spacecraft components
failed equipment reemphasized that the equip-
ment needed to be made more accessible for re- and assured that the status of the spacecraft
configuration was known at all times. De-
moval and reinstallation. Rapid feedback of
test results and failure analyses to design and tailed test procedures had been written, and
manufacturing personnel was necessary and led step-by-step test results recorded. Checklists
to the increase of inspection and on-the-spot had been established to guide spacecraft assem-
failure analysis. Di_L-d checkout equipment bly and configuration before each test.

243
spacecraft was connected to the complex and
It' Spacecraft Assembly
testing was begun.
In preparation for spacecraft testing, com-
Various efforts were made to accelerate prep-
ponent mockups and simulators were con-
aration of the spacecraft; for example, when
structed and used as substitutes for components
the spacecraft was idle, as during periods when
that were fragile, dangerous to handle, or in
data were being analyzed, efforts were made to
short supply. However, it was found that these
continue work on the apparently-unaffected sys-
mockups and simulators could not be con-
tems. However, it was found that this work
structed accurately within a reasonable cost and
would adversely affect the test setup and there-
time schedule, and therefore they proved to be
by the spacecraft preparation schedule. Mer-
of marginal value.
cury components were so closely packed that
For example, wooden pyrotechnics mockups there was little room for a man to work inside
did not properly establish cable fits, and substi-
the spacecraft without accidentally damaging
tute escape towers did not establish clearances.
such things as cables, tubing, connectors, or
This resulted in delays and difficult working
cameras. Generally, it was ruled that only test-
conditions when modifications had to be made
associated work would be done on a spacecraft
while at the launch pad. Other simulators did
while it was being tested.
not work because of the high packaging density
Early in the program before systems inter-
and multiple interfaces inside the Mercury
relationships had been completely analyzed,
spacecraft.
some equipment was damaged when tests of one
Ultimately, it was deemed necessary to fit-
system influenced another. For example, reac-
check all flight items simultaneously, and,
tion control system (RCS) valves in a dry state
where substitutes had to be used, exact flight
overheated when activated by the automatic
types were required. Because better facilities
stabilization and control system (ASCS).
for mechanical modifications were available at
As test crews and planners gained experience
the point of manufacture, experience indicated
in attending to these many details, test plans
that complete assembly of the spacecraft should
became more reliable. Offsetting this experi-
be accomplished at the factory; this was true
ence were the number of modifications made to
even for those components which had to be re-
the spacecraft to accommodate mission flexibili-
moved for shipment.
ty and safety and to improve systems perform-
Test Preparation ance. As a result, plans and procedures were
constantly changing.
General
Test Philosophy and Procedure
In the early planning stages of Project Mer-
cury, it was thought possible to deliver flight- Gradually, a set of guidelines evolved which
ready spacecraft to Cape Canaveral, conduct a were used as the basis for all testing. Two
single, total spacecraft test in the hangar, and principles served as foundations for checkout
launch very soon thereafter. However, it was procedures throughout this evolution. The
demonstrated that more preflight preparation safety of the astronaut was considered fore-
was required at the launch site and formal pro- most, and secondly, all philosophy was directed
cedures evolved from experience. toward a test plan which would guarantee a
Before spacecraft testing was begun, very flightworthy spacecraft at lift-off. These were
careful preparations were made. Each step had expanded to six principles which were applied
to be formalized through configuration docu- to all spacecraft tests.
ments, checklists, and test procedures. The Building block approach to testing.--The
ground-support equipment was tested to prove operational status of each system and each com-
its readiness. Test complexes were checked for ponent in the system was functionally verified
compatibility with the particular spacecraft. before that system was operated concurrently
The spacecraft was put into test position and or in conjunction with another system with
its configuration conformance to test plans was which it might have an interface.
established; of particular concern were proper End-to-end testing.--During testing, the ini-
cabling and plumbing of all systems. Then the tiating function and end function took place

244
sequentially as would actually occur in flight. simulations and functioned as he would during
The use of artificial stimuli was minimized. the actual flight. These simulated flights were
Implementation of this guideline was most made both in Hangar S and at the launch pad.
evident in the hangar-simulated flight test. Figure 14-1 shows preparations being made for
Isolation and fwnctional verification of all a simulated flight test of a spacecraft in the
redundancies.-All redundant signal paths altitude chamber.
were isolated and functionally proven by end- The astronaut as a n integral part of the sys-
to-end tests. These included redundancies tem during tests.-The astronaut was con-
between the spacecraft and launch vehicle and sidered part of the total system and functioned
redundancies within the launch complex. during systems test and mission simulations as
Interface testing and verification.-There he would during the actual mission. This re-
were two basic interfaces in Mercury: The sulted in a dual advantage. The system tested
spacecraft to launch vehicle and the space was closer to flight configuration when the astro-
vehicle to ground complex. These interfaces naut was included, and the astronaut became
included RF, hardwire, and mechanical fea- intimately familiar with the spacecraft and
tures. Tests involving these interfaces were spacecraft system. Figure 14-2 is a photo-
consistent with the test philosophy previously
discussed, namely, end-to-end testing and test-
ing of all redundancies.
Mission profile simulation.-Simulated mis-
sion tests, which included the spacecraft, launch
vehicle, and ground complex, were designed to
approach functionally actual mission conditions
as nearly as possible. This procedure included
simulating real-time functions through orbit
insertion. The astronaut was aboard for these

FIGUBE
14-2.-Astronaut Cooper in spacecraft on RF
tower for communications test.

graph of a spacecraft on the R F tower for com-


munication tests. This test, with Astronaut L.
Gordon Cooper, was made to determine voice
clarity under simulated flight conditions.

Component Acceptability
Components of proven design were planned
for use in Project Mercury. I n order to insure
that only properly-operating items of these
proven designs were used for flight, not only
FIGURE l&l.--Spacecraft bcing prepared for simulated
spare parts but also many components installed
mission test in altitude chamber at Cape Canaveral. in the spacecraft were subjected to testing a t

245
Cape Canaveral. Numerous component failures equipment immunity to these effects. These
were experienced during these spacecraft tests; procedures were frequently quite involved.
in addition, during 196'2 and 1963 approxi- High voltage problems were encountered in
mately 50 percent of component sparen were i_- ground power supplies. Electrically-regulated
jected after testing. These failures were dis- power supplies operating over long lines tended
covered by rigorous preinstallation acceptance to react and surge to high voltages and cause
(PIA) tests which in most cases exceeded the loss of remote sensing, and they were abandoned
test conditions that could be achieved after com- in favor of lead-acid batteries.
ponent installation. These tests increased con-
fidence that replacement components in a state Partially Qualified Equipment

of incipient failure would not be installed in Equipment not fully qualified for flight when
Mercury spacecraft. delivered included tape recorders, ECG ampli-
Control of the stock of spares also was tiers, water traps for the environmental control
tightened to assure that qualified replacements system (ECS), and impedance pneumographs.
were available when troubles occurred. Spares Tape recorders were brought to acceptable
which were significantly affected by shelf life status by careful shop asembly and testing. The
were periodically tested and returned to stock. electrocardiogram (ECG) amplifiers were rede-
In special cases, the inspection was extended to
signed and rebuilt. Internal voltage r%o'ulators
the source. Vendor and component manufac- and feedback loops were modified. Rebuilt
turing plants were visited by engineers and in-
units were requalified in detail. Later, new
spectors to convey the nature of problems and models were specified for vendor development
to encourage higher quality of work. based on experience with the originals.
Component acceptability and rejection rate In some cases, flight systems had to be modi-
was governed by such factors as performance fied to accept new components, and special sys-
criteria modification, the delivery of partially tems tests had to be devised to be sure that the
qualified items, and inadequate shelf life of some effects of the modification were not serious. For
components.
example, the environmental control system per-
Modified Performance Criteria formance depended upon closely balanced pres-
sures and flow, and testing of the system was
During systems tests of Mercury spacecraft, conducted to insure that the addition of the
the effects of electrical-current surges demon- water trap did not degrade system performance
strated the need for performance criteria modi- in the MA-9 spacecraft.
fication. These current surges, resulting in
Shelf Life
momentary variation (transients) of the battery
voltage, occurred during testing and were at-
Many components procured for the Mercury
tributed to the normal starting of mechanical-
Project proved to have inadequate shelf life
electrical systems, such as the orbital timing de-
because of the time period required to complete
vice or the spacecraft cameras. As a result of
the program. Such items as rockets had to be
these voltage transients, energized timers would refurbished because of an 18-month shelf limit
occasionally exhibit early time-out, interference
established by the vendors. A system was estab-
would appear in instrumentation amplifier out- lished whereby equipment that utilized rubber
puts causing faulty indications, and noise would O-rings was periodically exercised or returned
appear in the astronaut voice channels. The
to the vendor for replacement of time-critical
solution to these problems required inclusion of
components. For example, the Environmental
a special battery for the maximum altitude
Control System (ECS) negative-pressure relief
sensor, the addition of capacitors to circuits
valves were operated at prescribed time inter-
with time relays as a protective measure to pre-
vent early time-out, and the replacement of vals, and the Reaction Control System (RCS)
components with like items that demonstrated relief valves were reconditioned by the
low susceptibility to voltage transients. manufacturer.
Extensive voltage-transient tests were added Another problem involved deterioration of
to spacecraft checkout procedures to prove the solder connections of nichrome bridge wires

246
to the electricalconnectorsof manypyrotech- evident that the use of proven and qualified
nic initiators. This deteriorationresultedin a components did not result in the reliabilities
gradualincreasein the resistance of squibcir- desired to satisfy man-rated system require-
cuits. This was precludedby establishinga merits. A more-rigid quality control procedure
time limitation of 6 monthsbetweendate of was required in all aspects of component and
solderingandactualuse. system assembly. The need for this requirement
was typified by the number of discrepancies
Test-Equipment and Procedure Changes (performance or configuration deficiencies) to
be corrected for the MA-9 backup spacecraft.
The need to prove the acceptability of space-
A total of 720 system or component discrepan-
craft equipment required many changes in pro-
cies were recorded, of which 526 were directly
cedures and test equipment at the Cape. Com-
attributed to a lack of satisfactory quality of
ponent and systems simulators were used less
workmanship. Of this number, 444 required
and less in spacecraft testing even to the point
specially-scheduled time to correct.
of requiring participation of the astronaut, ful-
Additionally, flight-safety considerations re-
ly suited.
Bench simulators were made more realistic. quired that inspection be made of all parts and
components scheduled for the space-flight pro-
Voltage-transient generators and ECG simula-
gram. These inspection requirements extended
tors were added to the Cape's test equipment.
from the parts vendor to the Cape in order to
Battery source impedance and load impedances
locate and reject every defective or marginal
were more carefully simulated as was line noise
part.
character. There was, also, an increased tend-
As a result of inspection, fourteen 1,500
ency to operate equipment on the bench in exact
watt/hour storage batteries were rejected for
connection with production models of their com-
case leakage during preparation for the MA-8
panion components and systems. Camera sole-
mission. Several incidents of leakage were due
noids and transmitters were properly connected
to tooling holes not being plugged during man-
to and operated with instrument systems during
ufacture. Others were from case cracks or un-
final bench tests before spacecraft installation.
determined sources. Also, an inspection of bat-
Quality Assurance tery vent-pressure relief valves revealed
dimensional deviations in valves after assem-
Some equipment and components such as bly, and improperly applied potting adhesive.
rockets and pyrotechnics could not be fully vali- Three of these valves failed to operate at proper
dated before use. Reliability of these items pressures. These defective batteries were re-
was almost entirely dependent upon good de- jected following inspection at the Cape.
sign, workmanship, and qualification. This Five failures were experienced on gas-pres-
workmanship requires great patience and atten- sure regulator assemblies in the MA-8 reaction
tion to detail even under the tedium of produc- control system (RCS). An investigation of the
tion lines. Considerable progress has been made failed assemblies revealed that internal
in promoting this extreme attention to detail scratches, inadequate cleanliness, and improper
which directly contributes to the success or fail- torquing of end caps were contributing causes
ure of each spaceflight mission and the safe re- of these failures.
turn of the astronaut. Also in the RCS, an examination of failed
In the MA-9 mission, the three retropackage gas-pressure vent valves revealed damaged
umbilicals and one of the two spacecraft-to- O-rings. In one case an O-ring was found to be
adapter umbilicals failed to separate from the scuffed, while in another case the O-ring had a
spacecraft. Each of these contained two squibs. metal fragment driven into the material.
and initiation of either squib should have result- The MA-8 spacecraft was demated from its
ed in explosive disconnection. Postflight analy- launch vehicle and returned to Hangar "S" to
sis revealed that the umbilicals failed to sepa- replace the manual selector valve in the RCS
rate from the spacecraft because the squibs were due to a leakage'encountered during a preflight
not loaded with the appropriate charge. pressure check of the system. Upon removing
As the Mercury Project matured, it became the valve, it was noted that the valve had been

247
installed out of alinement so that an excessive carbon dioxide absorber itself. Ten and one-
side-load was induced into the valve internal half hours were used to gain access to the ab-
parts. sorber and then to restore the spacecraft to its
During an inspection of the escape-tower original condition.
wiring for the MA-6 primary and backup The number of removals of equipment is an
spaeeerafts, it was found that the electrical con- index of the amount of modification, repair, and
nectors had improperly-soldered joints. Addi- servicing required as the program progressed.
tionally, it was discovered that improper inser- Figure 14-3 exemplifies the amount of work re-
tion of the conductor wire into the solder had quired at Cape Canaveral.
been made as a result of the use of an 18-gauge
380(
wire with a £0-gauge solder pot.
In Project Mercury, thousands of man-hours 360(

were expended in testing, calibration, assembly, .3400


and installation of a variety of hardware that
3200
later failed to meet performance specifications
or that malfunctioned during systems tests in a 3000

simulated space environment. When malfunc-


2800
tions occurred or when these components failed
to meet specifications, it was necessary to re- 2600
Mission Spocecreff
move, repair, or replace them, a procedure. MR-I 2
2400
MR-2 5
which could have been avoided in a large per-
MA-2 6
2200
centage of cases if adequate attention to detail MA-3 8

during manufacture or thorough inspection be- 2000 MR-3 7

MR-4 II
fore delivery had been exercised. 1800 MA-4 8A

MA-5 9
Component Accessibility 1600
MA-6 I :3
MA-7 I 8
1400
Mercury spacecraft were literally packed MA-8 I 6

with equipment and components were installed 1200 MA-9 20

three deep in some instances. Limited interior


I00(
working space, which posed a severe handicap
I I I I I ! I 1 I I j
to preflight preparation, resulted in a certain 5 6 8 7 II 8A 9 15 18 16 20
amount of wiring and equipment damage dur- Spacecrc]f I

ing normal work and test operations. Repair FIOURE 14-3.--History of equipment removals for Mer-
was a continuing work item during all phases of cury spacecraft for rework service and replacement.

spacecraft modification and checkout. Any


system affected by these repairs or modifications Cleanliness
had to be reverified by test.
Early in the Mercury program motion pic-
Extensive changes and modification were
tures of the inside of a spacecraft in orbit
caused primarily by component or subsystem
showed washers, wire cuttings, bolts, and alli-
malfunction, as well as extension of mission re-
gator clips floating in the cabin. The cabin
quirements.
fan became plugged on an early unmanned flight
As an example, it became necessary to replace
with similar free-floating debris.
MA-6's life-limited carbon dioxide absorber in
Such evidence led to more care in the habits
the ECS, since more time than had been planned
of technicians working inside the spacecraft.
was required to check out the system. This re-
A periodic tumbling of the spacecraft to dis-
placement required no less than eight major lodge and expose dirt and loose objects became
equipment removals and four revalidations of standard practice at the Cape. Figure 144
unrelated subsystems. It caused an overall de- shows a spacecraft in the tumbling fixture dur-
lay of nearly 12 hours. By way of comparison, ing a cleaning operation, and figure 14--5 shows
it took only an hour and a half to replace the the debris removed.

248
fore being put into their spacecraft containers,
and a variety of equipment which was found
to contain contaminating deposits was carefully
inspected and cleaned before being used. This
equipment included astronaut suits, valves,
hoses, and tubing.
Provisions and Procedures for
Troubleshooting
It can be seen from the preceding discussion
that there was a great need for troubleshooting
spacecraft components both in spacecraft and
on the bench. As a consequence, facilities at
the Cape were expanded to include a malfunc-
tion investigation laboratory, staffed with ex-
FIQUBE144-SpaceCraft being tumbled to remove perienced specialists in such areas as X-ray,
debris left during work periods. spectroscopy, microscopy, and chemistry. Also,
because of the need to qualify many spacecraft
components, a laboratory of test equipment was
developed and fully equipped with environ-
mental chambers, shaker table, accelerator, im-
pact tester, and pressure testing equipment.
Absence of Test Points

I n Project Mercury, it was necessary to add


ground support equipment to that provided
with the spacecraft and to devise means for
testing individual components in the space-
craft. Test points were not available and inter-
connecting cables and tubing had to be broken
lM.--Debris
FIQURE removed from spacecraft during into for tests. This invalidated the very circuit
tumbling.
or pressure system that was being tested.
Technicians generally were not aware of the Preplanned Troubleshooting
strict cleanliness required in handling compo-
nents of the E C S and RCS systems. It be- I n Project Mercury it bemme necessary to
came necessary to specify handling procedures plan exact steps and equipment configuration
for these highly dirt-sensitive components. before troubleshooting was begun. Expected
Many parts were kept in sealed plastic bags values in response to stimuli that had been care-
until installation was to begin, a t which time fully defined were listed in. documents prepared
ultra-clean handling methods were used. Ven- in advance. It was found that preplanned
dors have delivered many items of spacecraft troubleshooting procedures significantly re-
equipment which contained wire ends, solder duced testing time.
balls, and stray hardware. Such items as gums, I n addition to drawings and standard space-
powders, lubricants, chips, and hydroczarbons craft test procedure, the contractor provided
have appeared on components where they could logic diagrams and detailed drawings and spec-
not be tolerated for proper operation. Hydro- ifications of systems and components. Sys-
gen peroxide systems have yielded some de- tems consisting of many separate circuit ele-
composables which could have caused extreme ments were detailed by separate subsystem
reaction. Breathing oxygen and drinking diagrams showing all wire routing throughout
water also have been contaminated. As a result, the spacecraft. As a n example, instrument sys-
all consumables were chemically analyzed be- tems were broken down to show each sensor and

249
its signal conditioning and cable connections. knowledge gained from previous flight experi-
This was in addition to overall system cabling ence; (2) modifications as extensive as re-
diagrams and detailed drawings of repairable working a spacecraft from a suborbital
items including mounting details that were pro- configuration to an orbital configuration to in-
vided. These drawings were invaluable for crease spacecraft systems capabilities for ex-
troubleshooting. tended mission requirements; and (3) changes
and modifications resulting from component or
Scheduling system malfunctions during preflight testing.
Changes of considerable magnitude were
To accomplish spacecraft preflight prepara-
made at the Cape only because it was more
tions and checkout within schedule objectives,
efficient and less time consuming than return-
it was necessary to increase the number of
ing the spacecraft to the factory. In any event
spacecraft undergoing preflight preparations
the final flight configuration of any particular
at Cape Canaveral from one to two, or three, at
spacecraft could not be entirely determined
any given time. This approach provided ad-
until successful completion of the preceding
ditional time for preflight preparations of each
mission. This required that final configuration
spacecraft without a corresponding increase in
changes be accomplished at the Cape if the
the time interval between successive missions. schedule was to be maintained.
On the average, spacecraft modifications ac-
Preflight Preparation
counted for more than half the time that the
Preflight preparations and checkout opera- spacecraft remained at the Cape prior to flight.
tions included: (1) modifications to update the Examination of the average time that the space-
untested spacecraft configuration based upon craft spent at Cape Canaveral shows that 60

Hangar S
Launch, recovery and return
Prelaunch :
3ad operatlan-7 days
Total days at Cape Canaveral: 247
Total rework days in hangar S aero: 142 (non-work days 48) Demate and replace RCS valve-4days
Total test days in hangar S area: 40 Pad operations-I0 days
Total clays on complex, 14:17
Clean up- 8 days
Postlaunch:
Total hours in orbit: 09:15 hours Alinement,weight and balance-2 days
Total days of test (approx): 6 G rework days
Total days at hangar S:54 (until Nov25, 1962) (Pyrotechnic test-hangar) I day

02 servicing
(ASCS dynamic-hangar test) I day

Clean up- :5 days


(Simulated flight-hangar) 4 days

37 rework days

(Communications systems radiation)Iday

2 rework days

(RCS hangar test) 15 days

28 rework days

(Altitude chamber test) 5days

6 rework days

(Environment control hangar test) 4days

t5 rework days

(Communications systemshangartests) 3days (ASCS hangar test) 2 days

(Launch,orbit and egress and recovery hangar test) 2 days


(Instrumentation system hangar test) Iday

(Electrical tests) I day

52 rework days

14
21 18 I 15 29 2 16 3,0 14 II 25

Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov

I_IeURE 14-6.--Test and work schedule for prelaunch preparation of spacecraft in Hangar S.

250
percent of the total time involved modification, Failure Analysis
repair, assembly, service, and inspection. Only Rapid failure detection and corrective action
25 percent of the time was spent in hangnr tests were basic requirements in maintaining pro-
and 15 percent for all work and testing at the gram schedules. Facilities were provided to
pad. permit extensive failure analyses a t Cape
When converted to months, these percentages Canaveral where failure conditions were inti-
show approximately 3 months for hangtlr work, mately known to engineers and technicians.
11/! months for actual hangar testing, and 1 These analyses provided a basis for accurate
month on the launch pad, for a total average feedback through quality control channels.
time a t the Cape of approximately 51/3 months. However, the lack of spares often made it im-
The Mercury-Atlas spacecraft averaged 33 possible to take the necessary action required in
more hangar work days, 6 additional hangar
order to meet preflight preparation and test
test days, and 4 additional days on the pad than
sch edu 1es.
the Mercury-Redstone spacecraft. This small
increase in test and pad time indicated that the Evolution of Digital Checkout Equipment
increased complexity of Mercury-Atlas mis- One of the more time consuming problems
sions was offset by increased experience, and during Project Mercury was that of spacecraft
therefore there was little effect on time required
preparation for testing. This required con-
for hangar testing or total pad time. Figure
necting a large number of cables to the in-
14-6 shows how the time was divided between stalled equipment, largely by breaking cables
testing and other work in the preparation of
spacecraft 16 (MA-8).
Operational Life
--
and tubing. As shown in figure 1 4 3 , many of
1

Equipment having a short operational life I

caused many problems in meeting spacecraft


checkout schedules. Dissipating chemicals,
such as lithium hydroxide which was used to
adsorb carbon dioxide in the astronaut’s breath- I
ing-oxygen circuit, exemplify this problem.
The carbon dioxide and oxygen partial-pressure
sensors are another example. The latter had to
be installed late in the countdown and required
some spacecraft disassembly for installation.
I f holds occurred during the countdown, a new
removal-activation-calibration-installation cy-
cle had to be completed.
Spacecraft cameras also posed short-life
problems in the Mercury Project. Most of the
camera shutter and film advance mechanisms
failed frequently. Complicating matters fur- 14-7.-Spacwraft
FIGURE in Hangar S.
ther was the fact that the camera solenoids
caused momentary deep reductions in battery these cables were draped around the spacecraft
voltage because of periodic pulsing. I n addi- and through the hatch. Not only did this tend
tion, excessive back-voltages in the coils caused to invalidate systems being tested, but i t re-
failures of programer switches. Because cam- quired much detailed planning and preparation
eras placed transients on other systems, these of the spacecraft and test equipment. Each
systems had to be tested often to establish their time the spacecraft was moved, the entire test
ability to accept these transients. This ex- complex had to be torn down, putting another
tended use, in turn, burdened the cameras and strain on equipment in the spacecraft.
their failurcs accclcrated. Spare cameras soon A study of digital equipment proved that
became unavailable. data conversion provisions could be built into

251
the spacecraft and permanently wired to test provide technical direction where required. In
points. Pulse code modulation--a form of digi- addition, engineering specialists from these or-
tal data--allows compression of data so that ganizations met frequently at Development
hundreds of measurements can be sent over one Engineering Inspections (DEI) at the space-
cable. By this means, test configuration prob- craft manufacturing plant to review in detail
lems can be greatly reduced. Spacecraft can the hardware being produced so that results of
be moved from place to place with much less current experience were reflected in this hard-
breakdown and buildup of test configurations. ware. Each of these efforts provided manage-
As the Mercury Project progTessed, many ment a valuable too] for directing effort along
different methods of data presentation and dis- the desired channels. 'A sigMficant manage-
tribution were investigated. Through these ef- ment device employed during the project to
forts, it was demonstrated that data of the pulse assure mission success was the spacecraft
form could be consistently transmitted by radio Flight Safety Review meeting held prior to
frequency or by cable. The receiving and con- each launch. At this meeting, every activity
version equipment which was used for about 4 connected with the spacecraft was discussed in
years proved to be a reliable and accurate means detail between management and engineering
for presenting data to test engineers. specialists to determine the flight readiness of
In an effort to make data more immediately the spacecraft. The criteria established for this
useful to these engineers, printers and digital review was that a Mercury launch would not
displays were added. It was gradually realized take place in the face of unresolved difficulties
that this immediacy was of prime importance that might affect, mission success or flight
to men who had to make constant decisions as safety.
Conclusions
to the state of their systems. These studies of
improvements needed in spacecraft checkout led The foregoing discussion has presented in de-
to the desigu of a digital computer-controlled tail the lessons learned in preflight preparation
system capable of automatic checkout of and testing during the Mercury Project. The
manned spacecraft. It also had the capability conclusions that have been drawn from this ex-
of use as a completely manual system controlled perience follow :
by test enzineers miles from the spacecraft, (1) Test procedures incorporating the tech-
thereby allowing a natural evolution to auto- niques of end-to-end testing, interface verifica-
matic checkout. An experimental model was tion, and astronaut participation should be doc-
assembled and proved during hangar and pad umented and continually updated.
tests of Astronaut Cooper's spacecraft. (_) Spacecraft should be completely as-
sembled at the factory, using a minimum of
Technical, Configuration, and Mission simulated hardware.
Reviews
(3) The number of component malfunctions
Close coordination between preflight opera- during testing proved the need for better qual-
tions personnel and those of other organiza- ity control and inspection procedures.
tions, including contractors, subcontractors, (4) The lack'of test points, spares, and for-
vendors, the Department of Defense, the ground malized troubleshooting procedures often hin-
complex, the network, and other NASA centers dered rapid malfunction analysis and corrective
action.
was maintained continuously to insure that in-
(5) Limited shelf life and operational life
terf.we compatibility of operations planning as
of components create spares problems and pos-
well as equipment ]eft no si_lificant problems
unresolved. sible delays in launch schedules.
(6) Pursuance of exacting cleanliness pro-
Throughout Project Mercury, a continuing
cedures reduces the possibility of component
series of technical, confi_lration, and mission
and system malfunctions.
review meetings were conducted to resolve
(7) An automatic checkout system can pro-
problems, to initiate action where necessary, vide complete real-time test documentation and
to coordinate activities oll a wide variety of better control of test operations by test engi-
matters affecting each Mercury mission and to neers than an analog system.

252
I'

15. FLIGHT CONTROL OPERATIONS

By JOHN D. HODGE, Asst. Chief ]or Flight Control, Flight Operations Division, N_4SA Manned Spacecraft
Center; and DANIEL T. LOCKARD, Flight Operations, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center

_-_/_& (,, Summary malfunction. Also, the ground crew would


have the capability to command reentry of the
An organization was established at the begin-
spacecraft in unmanned vehicles and in manned
ning of Project Mercury to provide support to
vehicles should the necessity arise. In addition,
the astronaut in all phases of the mission. This
organization was to monitor and direct the mis- it was necesary that the flight control organiza-
tion record information for postflight analysis.
sion to insure a greater margin of safety for the
The major objectives of flight control were :
astronaut, provide support necessary for mis-
(1) Assist the astronaut during critical mis-
sion success by extending the analysis capability
of the astronaut, and record data for detailed sion phases where additional close monitoring
postflight analysis. and direction would insure a greater margin of
safety.
To be able to accomplish the assigned tasks,
(2) Provide support as required in conduct-
it was necessary to plan operational require-
ing the flight plan to contribute to mission
ments, generate documentation for real-time
success.
use, and train personnel specifically for the job
of flight control. (3) Extend the system analysis capability of
the crew and make available experts in all ve-
As the program progressed from the plan-
hicle systems should they be needed to support
ning stages through manned orbital flight, flight
the crew.
control progressed in its ability to provide bet-
Flight control is the team work existing be-
ter support.
tween the spacecraft crew and a worldwide
All Mercury flights were successfully sup-
ground crew to accomplish manned space flight.
ported by flight controllers at the Mercury
This task covers the entire premission prepara-
Control Center and sites located throughout
tion phase and terminates with the recovery of
the world. During the program a number of
the spacecraft and crew. Flight control was
difficulties occurred which required changes and
broken into five separate tasks :
improvements to methods used in the early
flights. Most of these difficulties were corrected (1) Preparation of the ground and flight
crews prior to launch, which includes the de-
and flight control provided the necessary sup-
tailed development of Flight Plans, count-
port to contribute significantly to the success
downs, Mission Rules, and training of personnel
of the program. Because of the experience
in vehicle systems and ground network opera-
gained in the Mercury program the flight con-
tions.
trol organization is now more qualified to
(2) Execution of mission control, which in-
progress to the more complex programs planned
for the future. cludes the direct supervision and coordination
of all aspects of mission real-time gTound sup-
Purpose of Flight Control port and the control of the launch vehicle and

At the beginning of the Mercury program, it spacecraft crew during flight.


was recognized that a ground-based crew would (3) Supplement the vehicle systems analysis
be needed to aid the astronaut in monitoring the capability of the spacecraft crew, primarily by
spececraft systems, to evaluate systems per- the compilation, reduction, and evaluation of
formance, and to advise the astronaut on the telemetered and voice data from the spacecraft
proper action necessary in case of a spacecraft and its crew.

253
(4) _ssistanee to the spacecraft crew in at- spacecraft systems and making medical analyses
taining the mission objectives. This task re- of the astronaut's physical status.
quires participation in the development of an (2) The voice conversations between the
optil_mm flight program, provision and co- astronaut and the spacecraft communicators
ordination for real-time ground support neces- around the world proved to be invaluable. The
sary for execution of this optimum Flight Plan, ability of the astronaut to make observations
modification of the Flight Plan in real time as and relay them to the control center, to verify
required, and assistance in preparation for sub- telemetry data, to update the retrofire timer, to
sequent mission phases. exchange information with the ground, and to
(5) Participation in postmission analysis, carry on discussion of problem areas proved to
recommendations, and the preparation for sub- be the best tool for flight-control analysis.
sequent flight programs. Voice communications also proved to be a pri-
mary method of making a medical analysis of
History of Communication Between Ground the astronaut's physical status.
and Pilot

Development of Flight-Control Operations


The development of a complex vehicle re-
quires the parallel development of a test and Network Requirements
control organization to provide the support nec-
essary to accomplish the test objectives. hi the planning stages for manned flights,
The advent of air-ground data links has al- the design criteria for the tracking network
lowed a ground-based crew to monitor the test were established. These requirements were:
in progress, to modify the flight if necessary, (1) A central control facility able to coordi-
and to recommend the most expeditious course nate a worldwide network of tracking stations.
of action to be taken ill the event of a con- (2) Contilmous monitoring of the powered-
tingency situation. The missile age brought flight phase of the mission.
about the development of a ground-to-air data (3) A worldwide network capable of moni-
link by which information and commands could toring a spacecraft while in orbit.
be sent from a monitoring gTound crew to the (4) Voice, telemetry, radar tracking, and
vehicle to modify its flight plan. command capability at the time of retrofire for
In the early planning stage of Project a planned reentry.
Mercury, it became evident that an extensive (5) A recovery force capable of astronaut
tracking and data-acquisition network would be rescue in case of an emergency as well as re-
required. The presence of man in an orbiting covery after a normal reentry.
satellite demanded that considerably different
Development of Detailed Flight Control Operational
requirements be placed on the tracking network
Planning
than had previously been necessary for un-
manned vehicles. The most significant of these
As preparation began for manned space
requirements was that it was now imperative
flight, it became apparent that a need existed for
that the network respond rapidly to contingency
a well-trained control organization in order to
situations to insure adequate safety of the astro-
perform the flight-control tasks previously men-
naut. In order to meet the new requirements
tioned. As in the case with any engineering or
and to analyze the progress of the flight, the
scientific undertaking, the ability to control a
tracking network combined previously used
mission successfully is primarily a result of pre-
methods of monitoring. These methods are
mission planning.
telemetry and radar and voice communications Documentation.--At the beginning of the
which are discussed as follows :
project, the different organizations connected
(1) Telemetry and radar, which were used with the Mercury program published a number
to monitor and track satellite and missile sys- of documents in which the method that should
tems, provided a nleans in 1)reject Mercury not be used to accomplish the flight-control task was
only of analyzing launch vehicle performance described in detail. Some of the documents
and trajectory progress lint a]so of monitoring were revised and used in Astronaut Cooper's

254
flight. However, the majority of the documents the rules. A page from the Mission Rules for
proved to be too cumbersome for real-time use orbital reentry is shown in table 15-I.
and too difficult to keep updated for use by Flight Plan: The Flight Plan for the man-
the flight-control organization. Consequently, ned Mercury missions consisted of a time-refer-
some of these documents were revised, others enced step-by-step list of the astronaut's activi-
were discontinued, and new ones which would ties during an individual mission and the neces-
be more adaptable to use in real time were writ- sary supporting information. It was basically
ten. As a result of the experience gained by written as a guide for the astronaut in conduct-
the use of these documents, several specifically ing the mission, but it also served as a focal
designed for flight control were published. point for the coordination of all the inputs into
The most difficult task of flight control is that the mission and the coordination of the ground-
of being prepared to make a real-time decision. controller activities with those of the astro-
A real-time decision by flight control could re- naut. In addition, it served as a basis for pre-
sult in an action to change the entire mission. mission training, simulations, system tests, and
The action based on this decision may range detailed management in meeting the mission
from a slight variation of the flight plan to objectives.
immediate termination of the mission. The The formulation of the Flight Plan required
documentation to be used by flight control per- the coordination of inputs from many organi-
sonnel not only must have all necessary infor- zations into a sequence that not only met the
mation available to research a problem, but also mission objectives and ground rules, but also
must contain information that can be quickly could readily be perform_l by the astronaut.
located_ if time is limited. The most significant The inputs into the Flight Plan were concerned
documents that evolved through experience and with the astronauts, the spacecraft systems,
use were Mission Rules, Flight Plan, Flight flight controllers, medical requirements, and
Controller .Handbook-l_ and the Trajectory experimental considerations. As these inputs
Working Paper. were received, they were arranged to meet the
Mission Rules : A fundamental approach to requirements of astronaut usage, reliability,
the analysis of systems failures in any flight- priority, Mission Rules, and ground control.
test program is to formulate a set of probable In order to obtain the maximum amount of use-
component failures and their respective coun- ful information from the flight, the Flight Plan
termeasures which may either rectify the prob- was continuously coordinated with and re-
lem, provide for the safety of the occupant_ or viewed by the various input organizations and
protect the equipment. This compilation of finally approved by the Operations Director.
preplanned actions for each flight is called Mis- The Flight Plan, as an operational document,
sion Rules. In no other document are the ac- served several purposes. Primarily, it pro-
tions of the crew and the flight control teams vided the astronaut with a coordinated schedule
so well defined. Each rule is carefully scruti- of his activities during the mission. It also out-
uized by the flight controllers and astronauts lined part of the astronaut's preflight training.
for possible ramifications which need more The Flight Plan further served to inform the
clarification. This document shows the inte- flight controllers of the astronaut's planned
grated actions of the spacecraft crew and activities and was used as a tool to help coordi-
nate the activities. In addition to the activity
ground-support personnel which are required
schedule, the Flight Plan provided the normal
to establish an efficient team that may be called
and emergency procedures and checklists for
on to take life-saving actions should an emer-
the control of the spacecraft and procedures-_or
gency situation arise.
conducting experimental and medical activities.
These Mission Rules are put to the final test
During the mission it provided a basis from
during the extensive series of simulations prior
which changes could be made because of,_ystem
to the mission. Some of the rules may be modi- malfunctions or alterations in the requirements.
fied as a result of the realistic situations created Also, it provided nonoperational organizations
by the simulation. A Mission Rule Review is with information concerning the activities
held the day before launch to assure a consistent scheduled for an individual mission. See table
interpretation and a complete understanding of 15-II for sample page from flight plan.

255
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257
Flight Controllers Handbook : The first docu- quate. Since these people were responsible to
ment designed specifically for flight controllers their own organizations except during a mis-
was published in December 1960. This book sion, they were not available for premission
was designed to contain operational informa- planning and postmission analysis. In addi-
tion needed by a flight, control team to analyze tion, the flight-control tasks interfered with
spacecraft systems problems. Schematics, logic their responsibilities to their own organizations.
diagrams, and other publications were used to .ks a result, it was determined that full-time
prepare schematics oriented for operational flight controllers were needed. The first full-
utilization. This document, entitled Flight time team of systems monitors came to NASA
Controllers Handbook No. 1 (FCH-1), was in January 1961, and new techniques of instruc-
used from the MA-3 mission until the end of tion were incorporated through the experience
the 3Iercury Project. During this time, the gained in the preceding class. These systems
FCH-1 was modified and revised to include monitors learned the spacecraft and ground
more system details. The final document con- systems and conducted the succeeding flight-
tained highly detailed functional schematics of controller training classes. The follmi-ing
spacecraft systems, yet the arrangement of these facilities and aids were used in the flight-con-
schematics along with notes explaining details troller training program: classroom lectures,
provided information very adaptable to real- Mercury procedures trainer, and training docu-
time use. The schematic diagram, shown in fig- mentation.
ure 15-1, was taken from the Flight Con- An updated formal training course was held
troller's Handbook. in April 1962 and consisted of 156 hours of
Trajectory Wor/sing Papers: Real-time de- classroom lectures on spacecraft and ground
cisions concerning flight dynamics are of para- systems. The original NASA flight controllers
mount importance to the astronaut's safety and were the instructors and were responsible for
to mission success. Should the flight trajectory the training lesson plans. The FCH-1 manual
vary from the precalculated nominal during was the primary source of information for the
launch, there is no time for analysis, and cor- lectures on spacecraft systems. Within one
rective action must be immediate. In order to year, a total of six classes were conducted with-
aid the flight controllers in making these fast out any significant changes in the format.
decisions, a flight dynamics document was pre- The Mercury procedures trainer was utilized
pared to provide a ready reference of charts, in training flight controllers in network opera-
curves, tables, and other data illustrating the tional procedures, spacecraft communications,
expected normal trajectories, calculated allow- and systems analysis. The first Mercury pro-
able limits, and timed sequence of events. This cedures trainer was installed at Langley Air
document contained not only information per- Force Base, Va., in 1960 and became operational
taining to all the conditions necessary for in- the latter part of the year. The remote site
sertion of the spacecraft into orbit, but it also console simulator was also installed at Langley.
contained curves for calculating retrofire times For a description of the procedures trainer and
and making reentry landing predictions. Table the simulator, see paper 10. This remote-site
15-III and figure 15-2 are examples of infor- simulator was designed to operate from outputs
mation contained in the Trajectory Working of the spacecraft procedures trainer for simul-
Paper. taneous site-vehicle training. Initially, the pro-
Tralning.--In November 1960, training cedures trainer was used primarily by the astro-
courses were organized for NASA personnel nauts for systems training, and there was
who were to become flight controllers. The limited availability for use by the flight con-
classes covered basic spacecraft systems. Be- trollers. In 1961 a Mercury procedures trainer
cause of the limited number of personnel avail- was installed at Cape Canaveral, and more time
able to man a worldwide tracking network, it was then available for the Flight Controllers to
was necessary to borrow personnel from other train on the one at Langley. The trainer con-
organizations to be used as flight controllers on figuration was continuously updated to make it
a part-time basis. However, it was soon dis- identical with the spacecraft used for the real-
covered that this arrangement was not ade- time operation.

258
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I I i I i i i I i i i ; I I I r I
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260
A full network simulation was first used for
°°ll the MA-3 mission and was the basic final mis-
'' ' L ' III IN_"' '
I[./I
_00 I
t sion preparation tool utilized in all subsequent
'': t: t !
': L I] I iv'
YI .,_Ii.._ ._ flights. The flight controllers were sent to
their stations approximately 9 weeks before the
ooll :: ' .¢11 "" scheduled launch date. Before the launch, three
.... / L _ i1/ II
or four simulations were conducted to give the
:: i.. iJ." It flight controllers experience in the use of cor-
':
:: _/i _/_1 I I1
LI rect procedures, coordination of the efforts of
all support groups, and to exercise systems
I00 L ., I "" II
"/"_f" I II analysis capabilities. For the MA-9 mission, a
0 1'6 20 24 28 .32 36 40 44 48 52
real-time simulation of 18 orbital passes was
8
l
I
2
Time from sust(]iner engine cut-off,sec
performed to determine if any network opera-
FIGURE15-2.--Separation distance as a function of in- tional difficulties existed which could affect the
cremental time from SECO for different thrust sens- success of a long-duration mission. Thus, the
ing levels during noininal thrust conditions. problem areas were uncovered and solved before
deployment for the MA-9 flight. After each
A flight plan was written which deviated
simulation, there was a briefing in which the
from the normal Flight Plan in order to give
flight controllers explained their actions and
the flight controllers experience in a contin-
any problems were reviewed. As a result, many
gency situation. A typical simulation picked
changes to operational procedures and docu-
up the last five passes of the spacecraft and dur- mentation were made.
ing that time three flight controllers practiced
The flight controller% detailed systems-
simultaneously : one as the astronaut, one as the
analysis capability coupled with his under-
spacecraft communicator, and the third as the
standing of the network equipment were the
systems monitor.
basic requirements necessary to perform his job.
In order to apply some of the defined pro-
A brief examination of an orbital station pas-
cedures and to gain experience in the operation
sage will permit a better understanding of the
of the spacecraft systems, the Mercury pro-
real-time aspects of flight control.
cedures trainer at the Mercury Control Center
Prior to radar and voice acquisition of the
(MCC) was used for launch and network simu-
spacecraft at a particular site, the flight-control
lations involving the MCC and the remote sites.
team at that site received systems status reports
The primary objective of the launch simula-
and monitored the air-to-ground transmissions
tions was to train the MCC flight controllers
between the spacecraft and other network sites.
and the astronauts as a team by means of simu-
Trend plots were prepared and acquisition mes-
lated launch experiences in order to develop
sages were received from the Goddard com-
their ability to perform correctly in any situa-
puters. The flight controllers at the site were
tion during the launch phase. In order to pro-
generally briefed by the Mercury Flight Direc-
vide a realistic simulation, the launch trajec-
tor prior to contact. At the expected acquisi-
tory was determined and prerecorded on tape
tion and the approximate horizon time, the
with the additional capability of introducing
spacecraft communicator attempted UHF con-
an abort at any time by the operations staff, the
tact with the astronaut. Almost simultaneously
astronaut, or a simulated automatic launch-
the telemetry supervisor announced contact, and
vehicle abort. A complete voice network was
shortly thereafter, solid telemetry lock was ob-
exercised within the MCC and to the astronaut
tained. The spacecraft communicator took the
for complete familiarization of communication
astronaut's systems status report; the aeromedi-
procedures. The telemetry backups of the MCC
cal and spacecraft monitors evaluated systems
trainer allowed the flight controllers at MCC
status. After completion of the preliminary
to view actions taken by the astronaut without
a fixed simulation program. This practice re- systems assessment, the flight-control team
sulted in a more realistic flight simulation than concentrated on any potential problem areas.
that afforded by the taped simulations used at If a problem existed, the data were rapidly
the remote sites. evaluated and notification was sent to the MCC

261
and networkby either voiceor teletype. If tempt. For the first time, flight controllers
timedid not permit or if lossof communica- were deployed to remote sites. As a result,
tionswith the MCCdid not allowinstructions many dittieulties were experienced with logis-
to begiven by the Flight Director,the flight tics and communications. Originally, the
controllerhadto bepreparedto advisethe as- MA-3 mission was to have been a suborbital
tronaut. In orderto providetheproperadvice flight, but 3 weeks prior to the actual launch, the
to theastronaut,the flight controllermustrely lnission 1)rofile wits changed to an orbital flight.
on hisknowledge of MissionRulesandspace- .ks a result, problems were encountered with
craft systems. transportation, currency, passports, and travel
orders.
Flight Control Chronology The remote-site flight controllers on the MA-
4 mission were able to acquire, evaluate, and
The ability of the ground crew and tile astro-
transmit real-time data; however, problems de-
nauts to work together as a team has contrib-
veloped because of the delay in preparation of
uted greatly to the success of Project Mercm'y.
The astronauts' confidence in the flight-control summary and postpass messages. The major
concern during this mission was the inability of
organization and its ability to 'tdvise and direct
the sites to acquire C- and S-band radar track-
their actions when problems occurred greatly
ing. The inability of the sites to acquire C-band
simp]iiied the flight control task.
radar tracking was attributed to poor space-
MR-3 AND MR--4 craft antenna radiation pattern which was cor-
rected for later flights. Failure to track S-band
America's first manned space flight, Astro- at several sites was determined to be the result
naut Shepard's flight (MR-3), was i)erformed of personnel error. This difficulty was cor-
satisf'tetorily despite the tension involved with rected by further training of the maintenance
the first manned htunch.
and operational personnel at the remote sites.
The flight-control ol)erations of Astronaut For the MA-5 mission, the telemetered data
Grissom's flight (MR-4) were smoother than from the spacecraft were of good quality and
those of the MR-3 flight, indicating the bene- all sites received total coverage. Data trans-
fits obtained from flight-test exI)erience. In- mission from all sites was good, and the God-
formation i)rovided by all sources allowed a dard conference loop was utilized for the first
good analysis of the flight to be made in real time to provide real-time voice data to MCC
time. From launch through binding, the flight
from sites that had access to a telephone cable
was comi)letely normal from the standpoint of
for voice capability. The MA-5 mission was
flight control. However, early rele'tse of the
originally scheduled for a three orbital-pass
spacecraft hatch caused the spacecraft to flood
mission, but a series of problems caused termi-
with water after landing and it wlts not
nation of the flight at the end of the second pass.
recovered.
The al)paratus used to measure the chimpanzee's
MA-3, MA4, AND MA-5 psychomotor responses nmlfunetioned. In ad-
dition, there was a suit and cabin temperature
Although the MA-3, MA-_, and MA-5 increase; however, a control-system malfunc-
flights were unnmnned, they provided valuable tion causing high fuel usage was the reason for
experience to the flight-control team. In MA-3
termination of the flight. If the flight had been
and MA--4 a mechanical man was used to ex-
allowed to continue an insufficient quantity of
ercise the Environmental Control System. In
fuel would have been available for retrofire and
MA-5, a chimpanzee was on board.
reentry. The decision to terminate was made
The MA-3 flight of April 25, 1961, was the
and executed in 12 seconds in order to be able
first attempt to orbit a Mercury spacecraft;
to bring the spacecraft into a planned landing
however, because of a launch-vehicle guidance
area. The decision was made, and the Cali-
malfunction, the mission was aborted shortly
after lift-off. From the viewpoint of the flight fornia spacecraft communicator commanded
control organization, a tremendous amount of retrofire. The MA-5 flight proved to be a fine
experience was gained from this orbital at- example of the importance of being prepared

262
to makea real-timedecisionand to act on it MA-9

immediately. Permission.--The flight controllers began de-


MA-6
ploying for the MA-9 mission on April 30,
Because MA-6 was the United States' first 1963, and by May 5 all teams were at their sites.
manned orbital flight, the events which occurred Onsite prelaunch preparation began with
are quite familiar. At the beginning of the launch simulations at Cape Canaveral and Ber-
second orbital pass over Cape Canaveral, the muda. A total of ten launch simulations were
telemetry data indicated that the heat shield conducted, five on May 2 and five on May 4.
had become unlatched. This indication caused The network simulations began on May 7
a great deal of concern to the ground crew be- with two simulations being conducted on that
cause of the possibility that the heat shield was day. In the first simulated mission, the sys-
loose. While he was in contact with the Hawaii tems-analysis capabilities of the flight con-
station during the third pass, Astronaut Glenn trollers were exercised by a failure of the FBW
was asked to put the landing-bag switch in the high thruster control followed by a loss of cabin
automatic position to determine if the landing- and suit pressure integrity. The second simu-
bag deploy light would come on. The astro- lated mission contained a 1-second-late sus-
naut did not get an indication which meant tainer engine cut-off resulting in an overspeed
that the problem was probably an instrumenta- insertion which caused a higher than normal
tion failure. However, after further analysis apogee. These conditions tested the ability of
it was decided that the safest approach was not the flight dynamics officer and retrofire moni-
to jettison the retropackage so that the retro- tors to calculate new reentry areas and retro-
package straps could hold the heat shield in its fire times. Also, all the flight controllers were
proper position during reentry until sufficient tested in their ability to adjust to an abnormal
aerodynamic force was exerted on the shield to sequence of acquisition-of-signal and loss-of-
hold it in place. Another problem was a partial signal times.
failure of the automatic stabilization and con- On May 8 the first simulation contained noisy
trol system (ASCS), but this problem was and intermittent telemetry data, and the flight
handled very adequately by the astronaut's controllers were required to obtain data from
using manual backup and fly-by-wire (FBW) backup recorders. The second mission con-
control. tained a leaking regulator in the manual fuel
MA-7 pressurization system. During the second
orbital pass a Military alert was simulated,
For the MA-7 mission, the air-gTound con-
which caused a reevaluation of the Mission
tact procedures were reviewed and negative re-
Rules concerning loss of two-way communica-
porting procedures were initiated to eliminate
tion with the spacecraft.
unnecessary conversation with the pilot and net-
The first mission of the third day of simula-
work teletype traffic. The only major systems
tions, May 9, was primarily an aeromedical
problem was the improper functioning of the
monitor exercise with the astronaut experienc-
ASCS. Astronaut Carpenter was forced to per-
ing a simulated heart attack. The second mis-
form a manual retrofire since attitudes could
sion of the same day contained another systems
not be controlled by the ASCS.
problem with a failure of the main fans in-
MA-8 verter and the standby inverter. Reentry was
initiated by the California station when the
As far as the flight was concerlled, the MA-8 Guaymas station experienced a failure of the
mission was a "textbook flight," in which no
air-ground transmitting capability. Landing
problems of any importance developed. As a
was approximately 1,100 miles downrange from
result of the excellent performance of Astro- nominal because of a failure of the third retro-
naut Schirra and the spacecraft, the flight- rocket to fire.
control task became one of monitoring, gather- The last simulation was on May 12 and an at-
ing data, and assisting the astronaut with the tempt was made to exercise both the range
Flight Plan. maintenance and operations personnel and the

263
flight controllers. During the mission the 10.5- tinual status reports were obtained from Ber-
kc voltage-controlled oscillator drifted in fre- muda, and the performance of the radar was
quency, and this action required the telemetry marginal for the T-45 minute liquid-oxygen
ground-station operators at the remote sites to status check. A final slew test was performed
adjust the discriminator center frequency con- with Bermuda at T-20 minutes, and the error
trol constantly, and the flight controllers to rate on these data was unacceptable. It was de-
analyze the pulse-amplitude-modulation wave termined at this time that the radar would not
train on the backup recorders. be able to support the mission and the launch at-
Throughout the simulations, the intent was to tempt was canceled at 10:00 a.m.e.s.t.
provide the flight controllers and support per- The Bermuda station began immediate trou-
sonnel with the atmosphere of an actual mission. bleshooting of the FPS-16 system, and the God-
For that reason, each mission began with lift- dard computer was placed on a standby status
off, and reentry was determined by the condition to run data slew tests with the radar when it was
of the spacecraft and the astronaut without re- repaired. The problems were isolated to the
gard to any set pattern of orbital or reentry preamplifier in the azimuth digital data chan-
simulations. nel and the shift register in the range digital
The performance of the site simulation teams, data channel.
and particularly the astronaut simulators, was The count was recycled for 24 hours and the
outstanding throughout the MA-9 simulations. network count was resumed at 2:00 a.m.e.s.t.
Probably the most often heard criticism of the on May 15. All primary network systems were
MA-9 simulations was the fact that 3 con- operational when the countdown was initiated.
secutive days of network simulations were The confidence summaries transmitted by the
scheduled. This rigorous schedule imposed network to verify the site patching and cali-
extremely long hours on the maintenance and brations were very good. No major discrep-
operations personnel as well as the flight con- ancies were noted in the network voice communi-
trollers. cations; however, Zanzibar, Canton Island,
Mission.--The network countdown for MA-9 Rose Knot Victor, and Coastal Sentry Quebec
was initiated on May 14 at 2:00 a.m.e.s.t. stations were influenced by propagation and
The spacecraft-launch-vehicle countdown pro- several repeats were required from the stations.
ceeded normally. The network radar-computer The May 15 countdown was continuous except
data test was completed on schedule, and the for a short hold for the launch vehicle ground
mandatory equipment at all stations was op- support equipment. The countdown was re-
erating satisfactorily with the exception of the sumed within approximately 4 minutes and lift-
Bermuda FPS-16 radar, which had failed the off occurred at 8:04:13 a.m.e.s.t.
slew tests in both azimuth and range. The slew The powered-flight phase was normal, and all
tests were scheduled to be rerun for Bermuda, launch events occurred at the expected time.
and the "C" computer at Goddard was standing The performance of the guidance and data sys-
by to check the Bermuda data. Bermuda esti- tems was excellent. A clear go condition was
mated that it would take an hour to isolate the evident at insertion, and orbit lifetime was not
problem. Reruns of the radar-computer data considered to be a problem. All vehicle sys-
tests indicated the azimuth and elevation data tems performed satisfactorily through launch
were good; however, some dropouts were experi- and the air-gTound communications were better
enced in range. than those of the previous mission.
At T-60 minutes, a series of short-duration After spacecraft separation from the launch
holds, eventually totaling 2 hours, were called vehicle, the astronaut manually performed a
because of problems with the diesel generator FBW-low turnaround maneuver. Shortly
used for moving the gantry. The fuel system after the completion of this maneuver, the Ber-
on the diesel was changed and the count was re- muda station advised the MCC that they had
sumed at 9:09 a.m.e.s.t. observed approximately a 6 ° F rise in cabin and
The Bermuda radar had passed the test per- suit dome heat-exchanger temperatures. The
formed during the hold ; however, there was still astronaut was informed of this situation and
a 14-percent error rate in the range data. Con- increased the coolant flow. When the astronaut

264
acquired voice communications with the Canary Fuel usage was also less than expected, and
Islands station, he said that the dome tempera- all reports indicated that the astronaut was
ture warning light had come on, which indicated managing his fuel supplies exceptionally well.
that the suit dome temperature was below 51 ° The astronaut made several attempts to deploy
F. The astronaut was required to monitor this the tethered balloon, in support of air-density
temperature throughout the flight and to make studies and visual tests; however, all attempts
frequent adjustments to the coolant control were unsuccessful. After ground analysis of
valve. The cabin temperature rose from 94 ° this system, it was decided that no further at-
F at launch to approximately 118 ° F when the tempt would be made to deploy the balloon.
spacecraft passed over Muchea as a result of the The most serious trouble of the flight was
exit heat pulse; subsequently, this temperature reported over Hawaii during the 19th orbital
began to decrease slowly to a value of between pass. The Hawaii spacecraft communicator
90 ° F and 100 ° F. All spacecraft systems were contacted the astronaut and received a report
functioning normally, and MCC advised the that the 0.05g green telelite had come on and
Guaymas station to transmit to the astronaut that the astronaut had placed the ASCS 0.05g
the go decision for seven orbital passes. fuse switch and the emergency 0.05g fuse
Throughout the flight, cabin air temperature ap- switch to off. The main concern at MCC was
peared to vary, slightly as a function of the to establish the state of the amplifier-calibrator
spacecraft a-c power configuration. During (auto pilot) unit and to determine what func-
the periods when the ASCS llSv a-c inverter tions of the ASCS were lost as a consequence.
was powered for an appreciable time, the tem- There was no need for planning early mission
perature rose to a maximum value of 105 ° F; termination at this time as no Mission Rules
and when this inverter was powered down, the had been violated and there was an effective con-
temperature decreased slowly over a period of trol mode remaining on both the automatic and
several orbital passes to a value between 85 ° F manual control systems.
and 95 ° F. After analysis and discussion of the problem,
The first discrepancy occurred over Cape it was decided that the first step was to have the
Canaveral at the beginning of the second orbital astronaut power up the ASCS bus as the space-
pass. When the telemetry was commanded by craft passed over Guaymas. Subsequently,
the ground, a series of repetitive telemetry cali- over Cape Canaveral, the gyros were slaved to
bration signals occurred. It was decided that the horizon scanners; and after about a minute
the programed telemetry calibration function of operation, no gyro or scanner deviation from
would be turned off during the sleep period so the gyro caged condition was noted. This situ-
that it would not interfere with normal ation indicated that the gyro and scanner power
telemetry. actually was off and that the 0.05g circuit was
At the beginning of the fifth orbital pass, latched up. It was realized at this time that a
the astronaut turned the cabin fan and cabin manual retrofire would be required and that a
heat exchanger off as indicated by the Flight checklist must be prepared for the astronaut.
Plan. It was noted subsequently that turning The remote-site flight control personnel on
off the cabin cooling did not materially affect standby status were called to their stations and
the cabin temperature. The astronaut opened advised to be prepared to attempt to relay com-
the outlet port of the condensate trap, and munications to the astronaut if directed by the
whenever this trap was activated, it is believed MCC.
that the system performed satisfactorily. It While he was in contact with the Coastal
was noted early in the flight that the actual Sentry Quebec, the astronaut was requested to
power consumption was less than predicted. turn on the telemetry and C-band beacon to
This surplus electrical power was utilized to allow the Range Tracker to check its radar
obtain more beacon tracking during the later data. These data were very important since
phases of the flight. The C-band beacon was the retrofire maneuver would be performed
powered up three times prior to passes over the manually. While the spacecraft was passing
Hawaii station to enable tracking by the Range over the Hawaii station, the astronaut was re-
Tracker ship. quested to place the ASCS 0.05g and emergency

265
707-05_ 0---_18
0.05g fuse switches to the on position and to indicated that the landing point would be close
select the ASCS automatic mode to verify the to nominal.
0.05g event. If the spacecraft began to roll as The network flight-control teams performed
it would normally do when the 0.05g indicators well during this flight. Communications be-
were valid, the ASCS would be latched in the tween the ground and the astronaut were precise
reentry mode. The astronaut verified this roll and conveyed the necessary information. The
rate and the 0.05g event which were again con- flight control teams utilized the proper contact
firmed by telemetry over the Guaymas station. and reporting procedures that were developed
At this point the flight controllers knew the for this flight test. The operations messages
exact configuration of the ASCS logic and the provided much useful real-time data, and no
required configuration for reentry. After com- difficulty existed in determining the precise
pletion of these tests, it was determined that the status of the spacecraft, the astronaut, or the
ASCS would provide proper attitude control mission. The entire mission period from de-
and roll rate for reentry after the normal 0.05g ployment through recovery was an extremely
event time. The manual retrofire checklist was smooth and well coordinated effort. The co-
completed and thoroughly reviewed by the MCC operation between the flight astronauts and the
flight control team. This checklist was relayed flight control personnel had a significant in-
to the spacecraft via the spacecraft communi- fluence on the success of the MA-9 mission.
cator on the Coastal Sentry Quebec and written
Concluding Remarks
down by the astronaut. The astronaut was ad-
vised to "take Green for go" which was a coded Tile flight control organization has played a
means of telling him to take a dexadrine pill. significant role in the first space flights and has
The purpose for taking the pill was an added made a major contribution to the success of the
precaution to be sure that he was alert for the Mercury program. A wealth of experience and
manual retrofire maneuver. The flight surgeon information has been gained from the project.
was not concerned over the astronaut's condi- Some of the more important are as follows:
tion but he was not certain the astronaut was (1) Documentation used by flight control
thoroughly rested from his sleep. On acqui- had to be easy to update, contain detailed in-
sition by the Zanzibar station on the 22nd orbital formation, yet be put together in such a manner
pass, the astronaut reported that the ASCS that the information could be found quickly in
inverter had failed and the standby inverter real time.
would not start. These failures meant that the (2) People could not be borrowed from other
pilot could no longer have automatic control organizations on a part-time basis to be flight
after 0.05g but would have to introduce the controllers. It not only disrupted their own
reentry roll rate manually. The failure of the organizations but prevented them from being
inverters to start required that a revision be able to devote the required amount of time to the
made to the checklist previously transmitted to flight control task. As a result, it was learned
the astronaut. The revision consisted of chang- that full-time flight controllers were a necessity.
ing only one switch position on the earlier (3) It was also discovered that a flight con-
checklist. troller had to have the following special quali-
fication: The flight controller must be a tech-
Prior to retrofire, the Coastal Sentry Quebec
nically trained individual. It became apparent
acquired the spacecraft and the reentry pro-
he should be an engineer or oriented toward
cedures were reviewed. The astronaut was
engineering with a wealth of experience in
given time hacks at retrofire minus 60 seconds,
system analysis.
minus 30 seconds, and a 10-second terminal (4) It was also found that a continuing pro-
countdown. The telemetry immediately con- gram of training was necessary to keep flight
firmed the retrofire and the astronaut indicated
controllers proficient in knowledge of space-
that his attitudes were good and confirmed that craft systems and operation procedures.
all three retrorockets had ignited. Reentry (5) The network and launch simulations held
blackout was confirmed by the Range Tracker prior to the actual mission were found to be a
ship within 2 seconds of predicted time which necessity. In simulations, mistakes are made

266
and corrected. Simulations are run until the cury it has become obvious that the more com-
entire network is functioning as a team and plex missions of Gemini and Apollo will require
complete confidence is gained in the ability of more automation. In order to be able to process
the flight controllers to respond correctly to any the information in real time and arrive at a

emergency. proper decision, it is necessary that more data


(6) Because of the experience gained in Mer- processing aids be utilized.

267
1.

16. RECOVERY OPERATIONS

By ROBERT F. THOMPSON, Asst. Chie] ]or Recovery Operations, Flight Operations Division, N_4SA Manned
Spacecra# Center; DONALD E. STULLKEN, PH.D., Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecra#
Center; B. LEON HODGE, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and JOHN
STONESIFER, Flight Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center

[ _ _ 7 Summary were divided into five general categories, as fol-


lows :
The basic philosophy for the recovery phase (1) The first category included landings
of Project Mercury was to provide a positive which might occur during that period of the
course of action for any conceivable landing mission from arming of the launch escape sys-
situation that could develop, and to provide re- tem prior to launch until that point after launch
covery support according to expected needs and where an abort would result in a landing within
the probability of such situations occurring. 19 miles of the launch site at Cape Canaveral.
Throughout the program this philosophy was This area is referred to as the "Launch Site
continuously reviewed as experience was Abort Landing Area."
gained and mission complexity increased. Al- (2) Aborts subsequent to this time and prior
though certain improvements and changes were to insertion of the spacecraft into orbit would
made in recovery equipment and techniques, result in a landing in one of several planned
there was no significant change in the basic "Pre--orbital Abort Landing Areas."
philosophy originally adopted and all recovery (3) After the spacecraft was committed to
operations were highly successful. orbit, Planned Landing Areas were selected
so that a landing could be made in the vicinity
Introduction
of predeployed recovery forces at approximate-
This paper presents a general review of the ly 100-minute intervals through the flight.
recovery planning and operations conducted for (4) The "Primary Planned Landing Area"
Project Mercury. A discussion of the overall was that area where the flight would be ulti-
recovery philosophy and a brief description of mately terminated, if possible.
the location and retrieval techniques that were (5) Finally, a landing might occur at any
planned and used for spacecraft recovery are place along the ground track as a result of an
included. emergency situation. This emergency might
not permit the spacecraft to reach one of the
Recovery Philosophy planned landing areas and, therefore, would
result in a contlngency recovery situation. A
In reviewing Project Mercury recovery oper- location capability was provided along the en-
ations, it is appropriate to go in some detail tire ground track of the flight. To reduce the
into the basic philosophy upon which recovery search area, when some choice of spacecraft
planning was based. The foundation of this
landing point remained available, so-called pre-
philosophy was the premise that a positive
ferred contingency landing areas were desig-
course of action to provide safe recovery of the
nated. These areas were intermediate locations
astronaut would be planned for all conceivable
along the ground track between planned land-
landing situations, including provisions for the
ing areas that either were adjacent to land areas
most expeditious return of the spacecraft. The
or location forces.
type of action to be taken was determined by the
probability of occurrence and location of the The degree of support in terms of the number
landing. For this purpose, possible landings of ships, aircraft, and personnel planned for

269
4
e@ of these landing areas was determined by or personal survival beacon enroute. Upon re-
t;e degree of probability that a landing might ceiving ;t signal, they would then home in on it
occur. Hence, since the greatest probability of until close enough to conduct a visual search,
a landing was in the primary landing area, the aided in daylight by dye expelled from the
greatest level of support was provided here. spacecraft or by a flashing light at night.
The amount of support provided for contingen- I n the absence of a reliable network landing-
cy landings was considerably less, consistent point prediction, alternate sources could be
with the much lower probability of a contin- called upon for such information. Some geo-
gency landing. graphical areas were blanketed with either HF/
I t can readily be seen that extensive recovery D F or SOFAR networks which could determine
forces were necessary to support this pliiloso- the general location of spacecraft landing with-
phy. I n keeping with the National Space Act, in their limits of coverage. F o r landings out-
maximum utilization was made of Department side those areas, where no other specific location
of Defense (DOD) capabilities, with a mini- information was available, location would be
mum of interference with their normal opera- accomplished by searching the ground tracks
tional functions. (See paper 0.) Although along which the landing could have occurred.
standard DOD ships and aircraft could be uti- I n the early part of the project it was desir-
lized, the requirement existed for specialized able that the retrieval of the spacecraft could be
equipment to support the Project Mercury re- accomplished by either ships or helicopters.
covery operation. The special equipment neces- All ships utilized in the program had the capa-
sary was provided by the NASA. Indoctrina- bility of lifting the spacecraft from the water.
tion and training programs were conducted to Those ships not having a lifting crane could,
establish and qualify recovery procedures and with a minimum of modifications, utilize their
familiarize the forces involved with the use of existing boat davits to lift the spacecraft (fig.
specialized equipment and techniques. 16-1). Helicopters with the capability of lift-
This basic philosophy for recovery planning ing the spacecraft were equipped with special
was continuously revien-ed throughout the pro- hooks and lifting slings (fig. 16-2) to provide
gram, particularly in light of experience them with a man-rated retrieval system. Early
gained from each successive mission and with in the project, when uncertainties about the
regard for the increasing complexity of forth- condition of the spacecraft and occupants were
coming missions. Nothing developed to justify the greatest, helicopters were considered the
any significant change in the basic philosophy most desirable means of retrieval because of
originally adopted, although certain improve- their ease of access to the scene of the landing
ments and changes mere made in the equipment and the rapid method of spacecraft retrieval.
and techniques used in support of the recovery
plans.
There are three major phases in the recovery
operation : location, retrieval, and postrecovery
activities. The location phase began with the
notification of the recovery forces that a land-
ing was imminent and the general area in which
the landing could be expected. As the landing
progressed from retrofire through reentry to
actual touchdown, information from the Mer-
cury Worldwide Network provided a predicted
landing point.
Search aircraft, both airborne and on station
in the planned landing areas or staging from a
contingency deployment site, then proceeded to-
ward this point conducting an ultra-high fre-
quency/direction finding ( U H F / D F ) elec- l&l.--Jlodified davit and hold-off rig on
FIGURE
tronic search for the spacecraft recovery beacon destroyer.

270
FIQW 16-3.-Auxiliary flotation collar.

provided increased flotation capability t o the


spacecraft, under all water-landing conditions.
The collar also provided a suitableworking plat-
form for rendering assistance to the astronaut,
and it also served as a platform from which the
astronaut could be retrieved by helicopter. The
spacecraft, even with an open hatch, was sea-
16-2.-Spacecraft being lifted from water by
FIOUBE
helicopter.
worthy when fitted with the auxiliary flotation
collar.
Procedures were established whereby the astro- After the suborbital flights had been com-
naut would be retrieved by the same helicopter pleted, the following technique was instituted
that picked u p the Spacecraft. I t was not pos- as the primary retrieval method. After space-
sible to have helicopters in all the landing areas, craft location, either swimmers or pararescue-
however; so in those areas of lower landing men, deployed by helicopter or aircraft, would
probabilities only ships, with retrieval capabil- attach the flotation collar to the spacecraft.
ity, were provided. The astronaut could then exit the spacecraft
This philosophy existed throughout the early or remain within as he chose. Medical assist-
development flights at Wallops Island and ance could be given and spacecraft systems
through the Redstone program. The helicop- could bo secured as well. Retrieval of the space-
ter retrieval method by its very nature required
craft was to be made by surface ships and use
maximum demands on both personnel and re-
of the helicopters was primarily intended for
covery equipment. The experience of M R 4 ,
retrieval of the astronaut only.
when the helicopter was able to hook the space-
craft but was unable to retrieve it successfully, Following retrieval, the post-recovery ac-
pointed out the limitations of this method. I t tivities of the astronaut include : personal medi-
was apparent then that this method exposed it- cal attention as required ; physical examina-
self to many hazards that were not desirable. tions: a medical debriefing and technical de-
During the early development flights, a con- briefings with trained specialists in these fields;
current program for development of an auxil- and scheduled rest periods. Following retrieval
iary flotation collar T T ~ Sunderway. The attach- of the spacecraft, trained personnel secured the
ment of this collar (fig. 16-3) to the spacecraft spacecraft systems, conducted initial postflight

271
inspections, and removed the onboard data for were fitted with radio beacons compatible with
rapid delivery to Cape Canaveral. The space- the UttF/DF equipment in the search aircraft.
craft was then transported by special airlift to Many other preparations were made to insure
Cape Canaveral for detailed inspection and a safe and rapid recovery. For example, a
analysis. worldwide recovery communications network
The recovery plan for contingency area land- was established utilizing both DOD and com-
ings included the deployment of pararescue men mercial facilities. This extensive communica-
by parachute as soon as possible after the space- tion network was required to provide for rapid
craft had been located by search aircraft. For reporting and coordination among the recovery
water landings the auxiliary flotation collar, forces, Area Command Centers, and the Re-
also dropped by parachute from the search covery Control Center at Cape Canaveral. A
plane, was then attached to the spacecraft so
worldwide weather reporting and analysis sys-
that the astronaut could emerge to await rescue.
tem was also established to provide pertinent
Rescue of the pilot and retrieval of the space-
meteorological data in the recovery areas, so
craft were then to be accomplished by the most
that action could be taken to delay the launch
expeditious means available under the circum-
or move the recovery area in the event of ad-
stances. Had the spacecraft been located by an
verse weather conditions.
aircraft not carrying pararescuemen, or had
local conditions precluded their jumping to the Table 16-I provides pertinent recovery facts
spacecraft before the aircraft had to leave the for all Project Mercury missions and shows
landing area, drop buoys were provided to as- how the various preparations described above
sure relocation of the spacecraft. These buoys were useful in each case.

272
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276
MA-9 Recovery Operations proximately every 100 minutas or about once
per orbital pass.
A brief description of the recovery plan and
Recovery forces were deployed within these
operations for the MA-9 mission will serve as landing areas so that location and assistance
a typical example of the Project Mercury re-
could be provided within a period of from 3 to
covery, based on the philosophy and techniques
9 hours after spacecraft landing. This period,
previously described.
denoted as the recovery "access time," was a
Prior to the MA-9 launch, all recovery forces
function of the planned deployment of recovery
were repoi'ted to be on station and ready. After
forces in a given area and varied according to
insertion of the astronaut into the space-
the probability of a spacecraft landing within
craft, a pad-emergency egress team was stand- that area. Selection of landing areas at space-
ing by to assist the astronaut in the event he
craft ground track intersections permitted cer-
had to leave the spacecraft for some emergency tain recovery units to move from one area to
that did not require activation of the launch
another during the flight and thereby provide
escape system. This team included medical support in several landing areas.
personnel, spacecraft specialists, and fire fight-
Throughout the mission, flight progress was
ers in special vehicles.
continuously monitored, and periodically dur-
Special recovery teams were located in the ing the mission, decisions based on spacecraft
launch site abort landing arw to provide rapid and astronaut conditions were made to continue
access to the spacecraft for landings resulting
the flight. Obviously, a higher probability of
from possible aborts utilizing the launch escape
landing is associated with the landing areas
system during the late countdown and early
immediately following these decision points.
phase of powered flight. Because of the varia- Landing Areas 2-1 and 17-1 in the Atlantic and
tions in the type of terrain and proximity to the Area 7-1 in the Pacific were such areas and
ocean in the launch site area, these teams util-
were referred to as "go---no-go" areas. Area
ized helicopters and amphibious vehicles.
22-1, the Primary Planned Landing Area for
Small craft operated in the Banana River, and
a nominal flight, was located in the Pacific
standing by offshore were several salvage ships.
about 70 nautical miles southeast of Midway
Winds at the launch site were measured and
Island and adjacent to Area 7-1. Since the
abort landing positions were computed and
probabilities of landing in these two areas, 2-1/
plotted. These plots were used to evaluate pos- 17-1 in the Atlantic and 7-1/22-1 in the Pacific,
sible landing hazards prior to committing
were considered to be higher than for other
the spacecraft to a launch and to optimize the planned areas, recovery-support helicopters
positioning of these recovery forces. operating from aircraft carriers were provided
Areas A through F, the pre-orbital abort for a more rapid access to the spacecraft and
landing areas stretching across the Atlantic astronaut after landing.
Ocean and shown in figure 16-4, supported all A total of 23 ships and 44 aircraft were em-
probable landings in the event an abort was ployed in supporting the planned water landing
initiated at any time during powered flight. areas designated for the MA-9 mission, of
Landings in Areas A and B would result from
which 12 ships and 26 aircraft were in the At-
an abort at velocities up to about 24,000 feet
lantic planned landing areas, and 11 ships and
per second, and Areas C, D, E, and F would 18 aircraft were in the Pacific planned landing
support aborts at higher velocities where pro- areas. Additional search aircraft were avail-
gramed use of the retrorockets would provide able as backups to these aircraft on station.
for selection of the landing area.
A total of 66 contingency recovery aircraft
Also shown in figure 16-4 are the numbered and associated personnel were on alert status
landing areas. These locations are planned at staging bases around the world to provide
landing areas or areas in which the spacecraft support in the event a landing should occur at
could have landed if the flight had been termi- any place along the ground track. These air-
nated prior to the planned end of the mission. craft were equipped to locate the spacecraft
The planned landing areas were spaced so that and to provide emergency on-scene assistance
the spacecraft would pass over one of them ap- if required. A typical support unit at a stag-

277
Bermuda .... Area B .... ,,Area C

.-Area D

3O

7O

15

75 60 45 30 15
Westlongitude, deg

(a) Atlantic Ocean

45
i:

.....
_'J':_'!iii!_!:_,,,
....... _,_::_i_ii!i_i_ii
¸¸¸¸¸
...5....0.
5o

/ Q. Hawaii

_ - "__ __a_e,sland _ns,oo _


_'lIPhilippine __ I_ Island

z 15

" _// V=_:¢ -_ I _ .Pass 2


"_._--<J._.ea ,,-, /_C" Pass,SX°_ ° I / ><L....

155E 150E 165E 180 165W

Longitude, deg

(b) Pacific Ocean

Fmum_ 16-4.--MA-9 planned landing areas.

278
“Tachikawa Midway

FIGURE16-5.-MA-9 staging locations for contingency recovery.

ing base consisted of 2 or 3 long-range aircraft the spacecraft (fig. 16-6). The spacecraft was
with pararescue personnel. The location of lifted clear of the water and placed on the car-
contingency recovery units for the MA-9 mis- rier deck. The explosive-actuated hatch was
sion is shown in figure 16-5. All recovery then released, and medical personnel began
forces, including those in the planned landing their initial examination of the astronaut.
area and those supporting contingency land- Following a debriefing and rest period aboard
ings, were linked by communications with the the carrier, the astronaut and his spacecraft
Recovery Control Center located within the were airlifted to Cape Canaveral from Hono-
Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral. lulu, Hawaii.
The location and retrieval of Astronaut
Cooper and his spacecraft were straight for-
ward. The spacecraft of the MA-9 mission
landed approximately 4% miles from the re-
covery aircraft carrier, the USS h?eaT8aTge,
positioned in the center of Area 22-1. The
USS Kearsarge had radar contact with the de-
cending spacecraft, and carrier personnel visu-
ally sighted the spacecraft as it descended on
its main parachute.
Helicopters launched from the carrier prior
to spacecraft landing were in excellent position
to deploy swimmers who immediately installed
the auxiliary flotation collar around the space-
craft. As the carrier approached the spacecraft FIGURE
lM.-Motor whale boat carrying retrieving
a motor whaleboat carried .a retrieving line to line to MA-9 spacecraft.

279
17. ASTRONAUT PERFORMANCE

By WARREN J. NORTH, Chie/, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; HELMUT A.
KUEHNEL, Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; JOHN J. VAN BOCKEL,
Flight Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; and JEREMY B. JONES, Flight
Crew Operations Division, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center

Introduction
Summary __/ ? _

As flight experience was gained, confidence This paper is the summary report on the pi-
in the Mercury mission and particularly in the lot's ability to operate the Mercury space vehicle
pilot's capabilities increased, which resulted in and to accomplish experiments as well as make
the pilot playing an increased role in establish- scientific observations. The main topics to be
ing the configuration and in the operation of discussed are attitude control of the vehicle and
the spacecraft. As a result (1) improvements overall management of spacecraft systems be-
were made in preparing the crews for flight, cause of their importance during Mercury and
(2) ground-flight coordination was improved, future space missions, and because it generally
(3) mission rules became more definite, (4) more in these areas that the most objective and valid
functions were delegated to the pilot, (5) many data were obtained. The results obtained from
systems modifications were made to increase the each Mercury flight are summarized with par-
pilot's systems management capabilities, (6) op- ticular elaboration upon the MA-9 results since
erating procedures were simplified, (7) flight the results of prior flights have been reported
activities became more flexible, (8) inflight ac- in references 1 to 5. Topics are discussed chron-
tivity priorities were more clearly defined, and ologically with examples from each flight when
(9) pilot workload became better distributed. applicable. This approach should illustrate the
The benefits of this experience were manifested trend in operational philosophy throughout the
during the MA-9 mission where the success of program concerning the increased role of the
the flight was directly attributa'ble to the per- pilot.
formance of the pilot. Attitude Determination
Mercury flight experience has shown that
Throughout the program a great deal of effort
man's performance in a spacecraft environment
was applied toward investigating the relative
is very similar to his performance in an aircraft
environment. This fact will enable manned value of the Mercury spacecraft's controls and

spacecraft designers to utilize several decades displays for various maneuvers and for vehicle
orientation. The results of these investigations,
of aircraft design and operational experience in
the formulation of man-machine relationships as well as brief description of the different con-
for Gemini and Apollo. trols and displays, are summarized. Figure 17-
1 illustrates the display and control systems that
Overall results of the Mercury program ver-
were available in the spacecraft.
ify that the pilot, given adequate controls and
displays, and sufficient monitoring instrumenta- The attitude displays available in the Mer-
tion, is a reliable and flexible system of the en- cury spacecraft were a centerline window, a
tire spacecraft and launch vehicle and enhances periscope, and an attitude and attitude-rate in-
the success of the mission. In addition, with dicating instrument (fig. 17-1). The center-
the proper equipment, he can greatly benefit the line window, located directly in front and al-
experimental effort. most level with the pilot's head, was trapezoidal

707--056 0--4_19

281
Rate and attitude indicators

Acceleration

--__---

Automatic reaction
control system
Manual reaction
control system

F~QUIW
17-L-Mercury spacecraft display and control systems.

in shape. The viewing limits, with the head The attitude indicators were referenced to the
restrained, were 33" vertically, 2 2 O laterally at gyros which, in turn, were slaved to the horizon
the bottom, and 5 4 O laterally at the top. The scanners during normal operation.
periscope, located at the bottom of the center The relative value of each display system was
instrument console, was oriented to the earth's dependent upon the task to be accomplished.
nadir when the spacecraft was a t a pitch atti- Generally, the window and periscope were both
tude of -14". The field of view through the adequate for spacecraft orientation during day-
periscope was 172". The attitude and attitude- light conditions, whereas only the window was
rate indicating instrument, located at the top an adequate external display system under re-
of the center instrument console, consisted of duced lighting conditions. For example, the
six needles, one for each attitude, and one dial periscope was the best display for acquisition of
which displayed attitude rates. (See fig. 17-2.) the earth horizon and for realinement of the
gyros to the true earth-referenced spacecraft
attitudes because of its wide field of view.
However, in obtaining this wide field of view
it was necessary to reduce the image, which re-
sulted in a high attenuation of available light
and caused the periscope to be ineffective dur-
ing the night period. The periscope was re-
moved for the MA-9 flight.
The attitude indicators were used primarily
during those periods when the pilot's attention
was required in the cockpit, when external ref-
erences were lacking, and when establishing
17-2.--Blercury
FIGURE rate and attitude indicators. proper rates and attitudes prior to engaging the

282
automatic system. The indicators were also the spacecraft at the retrofire attitude to within
preferred for controlling the spacecraft attitude approximately -4-8 ° . The purpose of the first
during the firing of the retrorockets because the three control modes is self-explanatory, and
pilots had been trained much more thoroughly their relative value compared with the manual
in this method than in using an external visual- control system is discussed in a subsequent sec-
display system. Although the attitude indi- tion of this paper. The orbit mode of opera-
cator system provided good references for such tion, however, requires a brief discussion at this
operations as those described above, they also point. This mode was designed to control the
had several shortcomings. Attitude maneuvers spacecraft within rather broad limits for long
beyond a very narrow operating corridor had a periods of time and with economical fuel usage.
great effect upon the accuracy of the system. While in orbit mode, the pilot could devote his
This problem was reduced as a result of modifi- attention to other systems, perform experiments,
cations to the later Mercury spacecraft attitude- make observations, or relax. During the MA-
control systems; however, because of the basic 9 flight this mode was used extensively for con-
characteristics of the gyros and of the attitude ducting various experiments. In addition, the
repeater stop limits, it remained a nonversatile MA-9 pilot utilized a modified orbit mode of
system. operation by manually positioning the Y-Z
In summary, the window was the most versa- plane of the spacecraft parallel to the ecliptic
tile and reliable of the three display systems. plane and then manually realining the attitude
The periscope disadvantages outweighed its ad- gyros to this new reference plane. This action
vantages, and the attitude and attitude-rate in- resulted in automatic control of the spacecraft
dicators were a good display system within in the desired plane and allowed the pilot to
rather narrow operating limits. complete the dim-light phoU)graphic experi-
ment, the results of which are reported in
Controls paper 12.
Of the three manual control systems, FBW
The Mercury spacecraft had four basic atti-
proved to be the most versatile. In the initial
tude-control modes which could be used singly
or in various combinations. These control design, the 1-pound thrusters were actuated at
modes were : automatic stabilization and control approximately 25 percent of full control-stick
travel, whereas the 24-pound thrustel's were
system (ASCS), manual proportional (MP),
actuated at approximately 75 percent of full
fly-by-wire (FBW), and rate stabilization con-
control-stick travel. In order to prevent in-
trol system (RSCS). Each of these modes was
advertent actuation of the high thrusters, a
used and evaluated extensively throughout the
modification was made on the later spacecraft
early Mercury flights, and as a result, their rela-
by w!lieh the pilot could, by throwing a switch,
tive value and efficiency for various attitude-
control maneuvers became evident. lock out the high thrusters. Generally, the
pilots preferred this control mode during orbit
The ASCS was capable of controlling space-
because precise attitude maneuvers and control,
craft attitude and rates, or both, in all three
or both, could be accomplished with minimum
axes by using information from the attitude and
fuel usage.
rate gyros. Four automatic modes of opera-
The MP system was not used extensively dur-
tion were available : g reentry mode, an orienta-
tion mode, a retrograde attitude hold mode, and ing the Mercury flights except in the MA-9
mission. Earlier mission results indicated that
an orbit mode. The reentry mode positioned
neither fine attitude control nor fuel economy
the spacecraft to the proper reentry attitude,
could be obtained with this system during orbit
inserted the roll rate, and damped the reentry
oscillations. The orientation mode was de- because of the minimum thrust levels that could
be obtained and the rather long thrust-response
signed to position the spacecraft to any spe-
cifically commanded attitude to within ±1 °. lag characteristics that existed in this system.
During the MA-9 mission the pilot demon-
The retrograde attitude hold mode utilized the
strated that by making very rapid hand-con-
high torque thrusters to maintain the spacecraft
to within ±1 ° and +__l/2°/sec of retrofire atti- troller motions, the MP system would produce
tude. The orbit mode was designed to control thrust impulses of a much lower level than

283
expected. Results of this mission indicated that of the orbit. (See ref. 5.) The results of these
the pilot was able to exercise precise attitude maneuvers are shown in figures 17-3 (a) and 17-
control with fuel consumption rates similar to 3(b) and include the attitude variation in all
tho_ of the FBW 1-pound thrusters. three axes, fuel, time required, and the sole
The RSCS was used primarily for the reentry
Time
phase of the flight. It was normally not used maneuver Gyro
for orbital maneuvers because fine attitude con- initiated Conlrol Auto switch

Maneuver Reference hr min,qet mode fuel Ib


trol was difficult to maintain and required an -- I Window OV41 FBW-low 0 59 Normal
excessive amount of control fuel. The RSCS .... 2 Periscope 01:50 FBW-low 0.52 Free
2C
was removed from the spacecraft for the MA-9
flight. 2 c _v

All the various manual control systems were


-2C
controlled by the pilot by using the three-axis
hand controller. This proved to be an adequate Pilot "mark"end
Pilo! "mark" of maneuver----4
controller for manipulation of the manual con- end of
trol systems. -14 maneuver ....

Yaw Determination _ -34


o

Throughout the Mercury program, investi- ,_ -54


gations were made to determine the pilots'
abilities to orient the spacecraft in yaw by use 2O

of external reference information. Although


pitch and roll reference was not considered dif- o
>-

ficult as long as a view of the earth's horizon -20


00:00 01:00 02:00 05:00
was available, as expected, yaw determination
was more difficult. Inflight information was Time,min: sac

considered necessary to evaluate how accurate-


(a) Day.
ly and how long it would require the pilot to
FIGURE 17-3.--Yaw maneuvers during MA-8 mission.
orient the vehicle, particularly when good ex-
ternal references were lacking.
Time
The results from the MA-6 and MA-7 flights maneuver Gyro
initiated Control Auto switch
indicated that yaw determination during day or
Maneuver _ hr : minrg.et mode fuel.lb position
moonlit night conditions was not difficult but --5 Window 02:26 FBW-low 0.25 Free
took more time than did determinations for ---4 Window 02,28 FBW-low 0.30 Free
2O
pitch and roll. Yaw orientation at night with I It
no moon required even more time, and accuracy o 0
rr
was somewhat reduced. Both the MA-6 and
-20
MA-7 pilots reported that yaw determination I

by using the window was improved as the t


-14

vehicle
However,
was pitched toward
since the horizon
the nadir point.
is not in view to the
o
_ -34
I

o.
= _u 'IIpil ot "mar k"
pilot beyond a pitch-down attitude of approxi-
_ _-s4r I end°f I
mately 45 °, this method makes it difficult to
distinguish between yaw and roll errors.
The results of the first two orbital flights sug- 20
,,C!
gested that a thorough analysis of yaw deter-
mination areas was desirable. A series of yaw
I
maneuvers were planned and accomplished dur- -20 - I
3;00
00:00 1,00 2,00
ing the MA-8 mission which provided quanti-
Time, min:sec
tative information on the use of the window and
periscope as independent references for deter- (b) Night.

mining yaw during both day and night phases F_ouaE17-3.--Concluded.

284
reference used. At the termination of each and cloud features. Occasionally, lighted cities
maneuver the pilot "marked"' it on the onboard provided good yaw reference even without
tape recorder. moonlight. When these references were not
As can be seen by these figures, the pilot was available, he was required to use identifiable
successful in determining yaw under both day stars and constellations. This was more com-
and moonlit night conditions by using the view plicated and usually took more time because the
through the window as a sole reference. Fur- restricted field of view through the spacecraft
thermore, these maneuvers were accomplished window made identification of the constella-
at a pitch attitude of -34 °, which made the ho- tions more difficult.
rizon available for good pitch and roll refer- A convenient method of yaw determination
ence. The day yaw maneuver in which the view was noted by the MA-9 pilot after observing
through the periscope was used was completed the relative motion of the so-called fireflies seen
within the same accuracy and time period as by all of the pilots of previous orbital missions.
were the yaw maneuvers in which the view These luminous particles, which appeared to
through the window was used. The pilot did emanate from the thrusters, were observed to
not attempt a night yaw maneuver using the move outward from the spacecraft and then to
periscope because he found that it was ineffec- recede back along the spacecraft's trajectory in
tive even under moonlit night conditions. The the manner of a contrail, remaining visible for
pilot stated that he could have alined the space- several seconds. The pilot believed that by po-
craft much more quickly than these maneuvers sitioning the spacecraft relative to the motion
indicated if urgency had been a more important of these particles, an accurate determination of
consideration than the conservation of fuel. the 0 ° yaw position could be achieved.
Since the information obtained from the first
Gyro Realinement
three orbital missions was quite conclusive, the
periscope was removed from the MA-9 space- The realinement of the attitude gyros to the
craft, and no specific investigation concerning spacecraft's attitude was an important function
yaw determination was planned for the MA-9 because it directly affected the usability of the
flight. However, it should be noted that in pre- entire ASCS and Mercury attitude indicating
paring for retrofire, the MA-9 pilot performed systems. The two important objectives in ac-
a very critical and precise yaw alinement at complishing this maneuver were maximum ac-
night by using stars and ground references curacy of alinement and minimum fuel
only. expenditure. There were several variables
The MA-9 pilot reported that yaw deter- which directly affected these objectives, such as
mination in daylight was quite easy even when the control and display systems used, the ex-
only a small portion of the earth horizon was in ternal conditions (day-night), the external ref-
view (-20 ° to -25% pitch attitude). He felt erences available, and the time available. Time
he could accurately aline the spacecraft directly was particularly important because the space-
toward or away from the direction of motion craft could be alined accurately and with low
over the ground within 1% At the 90 ° yaw po- fuel usage even during worst conditions, pro-
sition he believed his accuracy might be de- viding ample time was available to complete the
graded to +_10% The pilot used several cues maneuver.
to determine yaw attitudes and rates during One important systems modification which
daylight, such as the "streaming by" of terrain significantly affected the capability and ease of
features, and cloud patterns, or both, the con- realining the gyros to the spacecraft attitude
vergence point of these flow lines, and the track- was changing the gyro caging position to -34 °
ing of terrestrial objects or cloud prominences in pitch. All but the MA-9 spacecraft's gyros
across the window. caged to the zero position in all three axes.
The pilot reported that yaw-attitude deter- With the spacecraft in this position, the earth
mination at night was not difficult but it usually horizon was not available through the window.
required more time. If he was well dark- Although the total re,alinement maneuver was
adapted and the moon was illuminating the quite complex in the earlier missions, the MA-9
earth, he used the motion of terrestrial features realinement maneuver was relatively simple and

285
consisted of orienting the spacecraft to the A t the very beginning of Mercury Project, it
retroat,titude position by using the horizon and was not known how well the pilot would be
caging and uncaging the gyros (fig. 1 7 4 ) . able t,o function in a space environment. This
As an example, the amount of fuel used by the contributed to the Mercury spacecraft being
MA-9 pilot in accomplishing this maneuver was designed so that most of the inflight functions
only approximately 25 percent of the average would be automatic with tlie man being used
amount required for the maneuver during the :is a. backup system. As flight experience was
previous Mercury missions. gained, confidence was increased in the space-
craft, mission operations, and particularly in
the man's capabilities. As a result the pilot was
permitted more latitude and given more re-
sponsibilities as f a r as inflight activities, such
as the turnaround maneuver, were concerned.
A second important factor was that fuel con-
servation became more important during the
longer duration missions. Early flight results
indicated that an automatic turnaround ma-
neuver would require between 4 and 6 pounds of
control fuel. Results on the Mercury proce-
dures trainers, n-hich simulated quite accurately
fuel usages for the various control modes, indi-
cated that the pilot could, after practice, per-
form the maneuver within the same time period
required by the ASCS and with a significant
savings in fuel.
FIGURE174.-Horizon view at retroattitude. On this basis, it was decided that the MA-7
pilot would perform the turnaround maneuver,
Attitude Control by using FHV, and complete it within approx-
Turnaround Maneuvers
imately the same time normally required by the
ASCS. As can be seen by table, 17-1, tho MA-
During the suborbital flights and the first 7 turnaroiind required only 1.6 pounds of fuel
oribital flight the spacecraft was turned around as compared with the 5.8 pounds of fuel re-
to the retroattitude position by the ASCS, quired for the M&6 automatic turnaround.
whereas the turnaround maneuvers after orbital This fuel conservation verified that subsequent
insertion for the subsequent orbital missions flight turnarounds shonld be conducted manu-
were accomplished manually as shown in table ally.
17-1. The remons behind this change warrant During tlie MA-8 flight it was planned that
a brief discussion. if the flight were proceeding smoothly, tlie
Table I7-Z.-8ummury of Turnnround turnaroiind mnneuver would be executed at a
Maneuvers leisurely pace at a yaw rate of 3"/sec to 4O/sec
with the pilot relying solely on the rate and
Flight Control system Fuel, lb Time, attitude indicators nnd using only the FPJV
min : sec 1-pound thrusters to conserve fuel. A second-
ary objective was to confirm that the pilot
MR-3 4.0 0:30 could perforni tlie mmeuver as precisely in a
MR-4 4. 0 0:35
MA-6 5. 8 0:38
space-flight environment as he could in train-
MA-7 1. 6 0:30 ers on the ground.
The pilot performed tlie maneuver identically
MA-8 0. 3 1:lO as it litd been practiced 011 the procedures
MA-9 0. 2 1:40
trainer. Figure 17-5 shows tlie flight gyro at-
titudes with n background envelope of five
ASCS-Automatic stabilization and control systcin.
FB W-Fly-by-wire. turnaround maneuvers accomplished on tlie

286
20
it was not imperative for the spacecraft to be
0 pitched down to retroattitude. The MA-9
cr
turnaround maneuver required only 0.2 pound
,,, "_ .... Trainer bac groun
-20 of control fuel.
L-Flight attitude
Retrofire

Control of the spacecraft attitude during the


firing of the retrorockets was perhaps the most
critical and exacting function of either the pilot
or the ASCS. Therefore, a great deal of the
astronaut's attitude control training on the vari-
ous fixed and dynamic trainers was devoted to
the determination of the relative value of the
different control-display configurations and in
150
perfecting the pilot's capability to use these
various configurations effectively in accomplish-
o 120
>,
L_
ing this maneuver.
The summary of the planned and actual con-
90 trol-display systems used for controlling the
spacecraft during the retrofire maneuver of the
>- manned Mercury flights and resultant fuel
60
usages is shown in table 17-II. Of particular
note is the fact that only one (MA-8) of the
four orbital flight retrofire events was accom-
plished as planned. The amount of fuel used
agrees quite well with the trainer results; that
(Time 00:00-05:30 g e.t.)
is, in terms of fuel savings there are no signifi-
cant advantages in selecting any particular
-3O I I
00:00 00:30 O1:00 O1:30 control mode.
Time, min: sec
During the orbital flights it was planned to
FTGURE 17-5.--Turnaround maneuver, MA-8 mission. use the ASCS to control the spacecraft during
the retrofire event because it was designed to
procedures trainers. The pilot executed the maintain attitude within very tight limits of
maneuver smoothly and with precision, using ±1 ° and because a manual retrofire did not
0.3 pound of control fuel, which is less than 10 represent a sig-nificant saving in fuel. How-
percent of the control fuel normally required ever, because of systems failures or anomalies
by ASCS. As a result of this flight it was affecting the ASCS only the retrofire maneuver
clearly established that a leisurely executed of the third orbital flight (MA-8) was accom-
manual turnaround, providing the flight was plished solely by the ASCS.
proceeding smoothly, was the most efficient The MA-6 pilot decided to backup the ASCS
maneuver. by using the MP control system. With this
The MA-9 pilot accomplished the turn- particular set of control modes 11.6 pounds of
around maneuver in a manner similar to that control fuel were used during the maneuver.
of the MA-8 pilot except that it was not in- Because of a problem with the ASCS, the
tended to be completed in as precise a fashion MA-7 pilot controlled the spacecraft during
as the MA-8 maneuver. He used FBW-lo_, to retrofire by using both FBW and MP, again
conserve fuel, but he elected to observe and resulting in a rather high fuel usage. Be-
photograph the launch vehicle rather than posi- cause of an error in the pitch indicator the pilot
tion the vehicle directly to the proper retro- was required to cross-check between the view
attitude position. The pilot had been informed out the window and his instruments.
that he had a good insertion, that all systems The MA-8 spacecraft was controlled by the
were functioning properly, and therefore that ASCS during the retrofire event within ± 1 ° in

287
Table 17-II.--Summary of Retrofire Maneuvers

Control system Landing


Flight Display Fuel. lb error,
nautical
Planned Actual miles

MR-3 MP .......... MP .............. Instruments ................ 4°

MR-4 MP .......... MP .............. Instruments ................ 3.6


MA-6 ASCS ........ 1 ASCS, MP ..... Instruments ................ 11.6 --40
MA-7 ASCS ........ i FBW, MP ...... Instruments and window ..... 7.0 + 250
MA-8 ASCS ........ ASCS ......................................... 3.8 --4
MA-9 ASCS ........ MP .............. Instruments and window ..... 3.2 --1

t Double authority
MP--Manual proportional
ASCS--Automatic stabilization and control system
FBW--Fly-by-wire

all axes. The pilot had selected MP as a backup references, as evidenced by the nominal reentry
but it was not required. trajectory and accuracy in landing position.
As a result of the loss of ASCS power, the Figure 17-6 shows the spacecraft's attitude
MA-9 pilot was required to initiate the retrofire rates and attitudes, which were calculated from
event manually and to control the spacecraft an integration of the spacecraft rates during
during retrofire by using the rate gyro indica- the retrofire period. The calculated attitudes
tors (the attitude indicators were non-opera- and the initial attitude of the spacecraft at the
tional) and the view of the earth through the
-- Flight ratesand attitudes
window as rate and attitude references, respec- .... Desired rates and attitudes

tively. The pilot, realizing that he would be 5.2 lb manuat fuel usage

conducting the retrofire maneuver shortly after Retrofire I a


2 Retrofire 2 I Retrofire 5
sunrise of the final daylight phase, oriented and
= 0
maintained the spacecraft very close to the m° -2
proper retroattitude throughout the last night ._ -4

period by using stars and clouds as references. 4

The pilot was well prepared for retrofire, hav- _ 2


8_. o
ing completed well in advance the storage and o -2

preretrosequence checklists. 6_

During the retrofire maneuver, the pilot used


MP and cross-checked between his rate indica-

tors and the view through the window. Be-


cause of a high contrast between the relative
brightness of his interior and exterior refer-
ences, the pilot experienced difficulty in adapt-
ing his vision while shifting from one reference
to the other. Consequently, he had to shade

his eyes with his left hand when attempting to -32 - -- ........ f
view his rate indicators. In spite of this prob-
c

E -40 - J
lem and the fact that he did not have the oppor- -4Zl
g
tunity to practice retrofire maneuvers with this o

combination of attitude references, except much


earlier in his training program on the air-lubri-
cated free-attitude (ALFA) trainer, the pilot -80 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22

Time from start of event, sec


was able to maintain excellent control of his

spacecraft with this combination of attitude FIGURE 17-6.--MA-9 retrofire nmneuver.

288
beginning of the retrofire were further verified with frequency increasing until maximum dy-
by reentry trajectory computations. The pilot namic pressure, and damping decreasing after
controlled rates extremely well particularly the maximum dynamic-pressure period, the
in pitch which is the most critical axis. Rate control task requires a considerable amount of
control was maintained within -+-2°/sec in pitch pilot skill and technique.
and roll and within ___5°/sec in yaw through- The preferred control systems for this task
out the first 19 seconds of the 22-second retro- were either the auxiliary damping (ASCS) or
fire period. A maximum misalinement torque the rate command mode. Rate command, al-
of approximately 40 to 50 foot-pounds appears though highly effective in controlling the oscil-
to have occurred in left yaw when the number lations, usually consumed a large amount of
two retrorocket fired. This value represents fuel, as can be seen in the case of the MA-8
approximately 40 percent of the MP control reentry shown in table 17-III. The MP con-
capability. trol mode had a significant response lag and tail-
The pilot maintained good control of space- off in thrust, which made it very difficult to damp
craft attitudes, with a maximum deviation of effectively. The FBW was not completely ade-
- 12 ° in roll at the completion of the maneuver. quate for effective control because it was limited
Deviations in pitch and yaw attitude were neg- to the selection of two discrete thrust levels.
ligible as far as the reentry trajectory and land- All of the manned Mercury flight reentries
ing accuracy are concerned. The maximum except MR-3 were planned to be controlled by
pitch deviation was 9 ° , which occurred very late the auxiliary damping or rate command control
in the retrofire period; and the maximum yaw modes. Furthermore, these two control modes
attitude deviation was 5 ° . The pilot purposely were used entirely or in part for each Mercury
maintained the pitch attitude at the nominal flight reentry with the exception of the MA-9
-32 ° position or slightly lower, a direction of reentry. The rate command system had been
deviation which least affects the reentry trajec- removed from the MA-9 spacecraft and the
tory. auxiliary damping system was inoperative be-
Reentry cause of the loss of ASCS power.
The MA-9 pilot decided to con_trol the re-
During the reentry the ASCS or the pilot, entry by using FBW, but when he checked the
by means of one of the manual control modes, system just prior to 0.05g, he was not satisfied
was required to initiate and maintain a roll rate with the way it was operating and elected to
of approximately 10°/sec and to damp the os- use both MP and FBW. During the early por-
cillations in the pitch and yaw axes. Since the tion of the reentry he was able to damp the
frequency and damping of the oscillations small and rather slow oscillations by using the
varies considerably during the reentry phase, FBW 1-pound thrusters and the MP control

Table 17-III.--Reentry Control

Control mode
Mission Fuel, lb

Planned Actual

MR-3 MP MP, switched to Aux. damp. 6.5


MR-4 RSCS RSCS 6.0
MA-6 Aux. damp. (MP and FBW) _ switched to Aux. damp. 8.6
MA-7 Aux. damp. Aux. damp. 4.6 to fuel
depletion
MA-8 RSCS RSCS 10.0
MA-9 Aux. damp. (FBW and MP) I 5.2

1 Dual authority
MP--Manual proportional
RSCS--Rate stabilization and command system
Aux. damp.--Auxiliary damping part of automatic (ASCS) system
FBW--Fly-by-wiro

289
',\
\
\
mode.At approximately1 minuteand30sec- second advantage of onboard monitoring in-
ondsprior to peakreentry deceleration,the strumentation was that it was often more
pilot inadvertently
actuatedtheFBW-highyaw reliable than telemetered data, and, if discrep-
thruster. This actuationre_nultedin almost49 ancies did occur between ground and flight
poundsofcontrolthrustandaddedtotheampli- information, the actual status could be better
tude of the oscillations.However,the pilot determined with the onboard instrumentation.
maintainedpositivecontrolof the oscillations Finally, as mission duration increased the man-
throughdrogueparachutedeployment. The agement of consumables, such as fuel and elec-
pilot hadnootherdifficultiesin controllingthe trical power, became more critical.
reentl:¢oscillationsexceptduring maximum Figure 17-7, which compares .the MR-3 and
deceleration
for a brief periodin whichhewas MA-9 spacecraft instrument panels, illustrates
unableto manipulatethe controlhandleprop- the numerous changes in the Mercury panel
erly becausethe g-forceepulledhis arm away configuration. These changes primarily re-
from the controlhandleandinto a troughon sulted from the increased knowledge about the
thearmrest. spacecraft systems and their operations as well
The maximumfrequencyof oscillationsoc- as the mission requirements. One of the major
curredatpeakdeceleration with aperiodonthe modifications was to the attitude control sys-
orderof 0.9second.Maximumrateswereap- tem and its controls in order to maximize the
proximately- 15°/sec with a maximum ampli- capabilities of the system and also to simplify
tude of approximately ± 10 ° in pitch and yaw the control system management requirement.
which occurred after peak deceleration. The
pilot reported that he believed he needed dual- Control-Mode Switching

authority control to be effective after the peak


A major pilot function during all of the Mer-
deceleration point.
cury missions, but particularly during the MA-
9 flight, was control-mode usage and switching
Systems Management
which had a direct effect upon control-fuel ex-
As flight experience was gained and as the penditure and the success, of the entire mission.
successive flights increased in length and com- Table 17-IV shows control-mode usage and
plexity, it was necessary to make many modi- switching during the MA-9 flight. In general,
fications and improvements in the controls, dis- the control system was used almost exactly as
plays, and monitoring instrumentation so that planned until the 0.05g relay prematurely
the pilot could more effectively manage and latched in and the ASCS power was subsequent-
assess the status of the spacecraft systems. ly lost. After this point, the pilot used FBW
Increased onboard monitoring capability was and MP, or both, since these were the only
particularly important during the MA-9 flight available systems.
because of the long time periods during which The pilot was very successful in switching
the spacecraft was not within communication from the manual control modes to the ASCS.
contact with the various groined stations. A The orientation high-thruster mode was never

Table 17-IV.--MA-9 Control Mode Usage

Percentage time Maximum time


Control mode configuration used in rank used at any one Frequency used
order time, hr : rain

Drift .......................................... 43 13:01


Drift and MP .................................. 26 8:44
ASCS orbit ..................................... 13 1:20
Drift and FBW-low ............................. 13 3:11
FBW-low (gyros unoaged) ....................... 2 0:11
ASCS reentry .................................. 2 0:37
MP (gyros uncaged) ............................. 1 0:04

290
0
0
o@

(a) MR-8 configuration.

(b) MA-9 configuration,.

Fzoua_ ll-7._Spacecraf_ instrument panels.

291
inadvertently actuated throughout the entire the window. As a result the pilot had to place
flight. The maximum excursions, during the the attitude permission switch to the "bypass"
eight times the spacecraft was manually alined position and initiate and control the retrofire
to retroattitude and control switched ovcr to the event manually. Without the pilot the retro-
ASCS, were 5 ° in attitude and _+__2°/sec in rate. fire could not have been initiated from the
The pilot did not at any time inadvertently use proper attitude.
double authority during the mission. Double During the MA-9 flight, the amplifier cali-
authority was used purposely for the reentry. brator locked into the 0.05g configuration, which
The MA-9 pilot's success in control mode resulted in putting the ASCS into the reentry
utilization can be attributed primarily to two mode of operation. Shortly thereafter, all
areas: simplification of tile control mode switch- ASCS power was lost, and the pilot was re-
ing operations, which reduced the chances of quired to perform manually all subsequent func-
inadvertent use of orientation mode or inadvert- tions, such as retrofire initiation, retrofire at-
ent dual authority, and a very thorough under- titude control, and damping of reentry rate
standing of the operational characteristics of oscillations.
the entire attitude-control system. In summary, without the man, only the MA-8
flight would have progressed normally; the
Pilot Reliability
MA-6 mission would have had to be terminated
Throughout the Mercury flights there were early ; and the MA-9 spacecraft would not have
several minor and a few major systems failures. reentered successfully.
In order to illustrate the value of the pilot as a
Management of Consumables
backup and/or primary system indispensable
to the Mercury space flights, a brief review of An important function of the pilot was to
the failures which occurred in the spacecraft's monitor and conserve to the extent possible the
attitude-control system during the four orbital various consumables, including attitude-control
flights and the effect that these failures would fuel, electrical power, oxygen, water, and the
have had on mission success had the spacecraft onboard recorder tape. The first two items
been unmanned is warranted. were extremely critical to the success of the
At approximately 1 hour 30 minutes after mission since mismanagement or a malfunction
lift-off of the MA-6 flight, the 1-pound left affecting either of these quantities could cause
yaw thruster malfunctioned. After repeated an early mission termination or a loss of the
switching between the ASCS and FBW control spacecraft.
modes, the thruster began to function properly. Attitude-control fuel was the prime con-
However, almost immediately thereafter the sumable quantity over which the pilot had both
right yaw 1-pound thruster malfunctioned and monitoring and control capability. The normal
continued to be inoperable for the rest of the premission procedure was to establish both pre-
flight. Although mission safety was not jeop- dicted and minimum fuel-consumption levels
ardized, this malfunction would have required that were expected and required for a success-
an early termination of the flight because, had ful mission. After lift-off, the management of
the pilot not been on board, the spacecraft the control fuel to meet the mission require-
would have repeatedly dropped into the ASCS ments was the sole responsibility of the pilot.
orientation high-thruster mode, and a prema- It was found that for both the Redstone mis-
ture fuel depletion would have resulted. sions and the first two manned orbital missions
The pitch horizon scanner malfunctioned the fuel quantities required were within the sys-
throughout the MA-7 flight. At retrofire, the tem capabilities; however, during the later two
pitch horizon scanner read approximately missions the longer duration required that par-
-16 °, whereas trajectory computations based tieular attention be paid to this parameter. In
on radar tracking data yielded a pitch attitude most eases, particularly during MA-9, the pilot
of -36.5 ° . This discrepancy was verified by demonstrated an ability to perform the required
the pilot who reported that the ASCS orienta- maneuvers by using less than the expected
tion mode caused the vehicle to pitch down be- amount of fuel and to stay well below the pre-
low the - 34 ° position to such an extent that the dicted and minimum fuel consumption levels as
earth's horizon was no longer visible through illustrated in figures 17-8(a) and 17-8(b).

292
I00 _/'Turnoround
_ ..Flashing beacon

90
LL._

L .... _L.
80

7O
k
u • ..... _.--Dim light and horison
_- 6o "" .................. _ . d_experimenf
_°__ _ Retrofire

.c ........ . reen,,
_ 5o

I.L .Actual

.... Expected
3O

20

I0
Ca)

0 I 1 1 l [ I I l t I I I I I I I I I

0 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 IB 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
Elapsed time, hr

(a) Automatie system.

.Turnaround
100
\ ..... _hlng beacon

9O
l \
8O I I _ photographs

I ..... _ "k_Amp-cal checks


70-
t_ _-_ _-._x./'R%rofiretry

cL 60- L ..... __

c
--Actual
50--
..... Expected

2 40-

50--

20--

I0-
(b)

i I I 1 I i I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 o 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
Elapsed lime, hr

(b) Manual system.

Fi6uaE 17-8.--H,_,0,_, fuel usage.

293
Electrical power capacity was ample for the overall operational requirements, and during
shorter duration missions, such as the MA-6 and the weightless period emphasis was placed upon
MA-7 flights. However, monitoring of this an evaluation of the various spacecraft attitude-
quantity was still of importance since a mal- control systems. Starting with the MA-6 mis-
function, if major, could jeopardize flight sion, all conditions during orbital flight had to
safety. It was only during the final two mis- be considered. The launch, retrofire, and re-
sions that electrical power conservation became entry procedures were similar to those of the
a concern with respect to full completion of the Mercury-Redstone missions; however, the
mission. During the last two missions the elec- orbital period required detailed scheduling.
trical power source was not sufficient to allow Spacecraft systems checkouts were scheduled
the use of all electrical equipment throughout following insertion and at the end of each
the mission and still have an adequate reserve. orbital pass. Activities related to mission con-
Consequently, the flight plan included periods trol and mission-orientated information, such
of drifting flight in order to conserve power. as medical, control-display analyses, and ex-
Thus, during both these missions, it was very perimental activities, were scheduled so that
important that the pilot monitor and control they would not interfere with basic operational
closely this consumable quantity. tasks. Results of each mission were analyzed
and the knowledge gained was applied to the
Inflight Activities subsequent missions. The following are the
Flight Plan general areas where improvements were made
based on the previous mission experience.
The activities of the pilot on each Mercury First, pilots were allowed more time for each
mission included requests and requirements specific activity. The first orbital 15ass was re-
from medical, engineering, and scientific areas. served for systems checkout, and time was al-
In order to obtain the maximum amount of in- lowed for the pilot to become orientated to his
formation from each mission, it was necessary new environment.. More time was allotted for
to schedule all the activities of the pilot and to monitoring systems, and the air-to-ground com-
assign a priority system in the event of overlap munications were improved and simplified so
between activities. that. they would require a minimum of the
The type of activities with which the pilot pilot's time. Second, the spacecraft systems
was involved varied from mission to mission, were analyzed in more detail and the pilots were
but generally they included normal systems thoroughly briefed on their characteristics.
monitoring and control, spacecraft attitude The spacecraft configuration and activity
control, systems checkout, air-gq'ound coordina- schedule were also finalized at an earlier date
tion, medical, and experimental. Activities re- than had been true on previous missions and
lated to mission reliability such as spacecraft this allowed the pilot valuable additional time
control were given top priority. Second prior- to train and become more familiar with the
ity activities were those investigations which flight activity schedule.
were intended to improve the spacecraft and The sum total of all these improvements was
its mission capabilities in general. Third reflected in the MA-9 mission plan. At only
priority was given to the experimental and one period did the pilot feel rushed; however,
other operational activities that were not di- even in this case he was able to complete the
rectly related to the mission safety. Once all scheduled activity. Two additional factors
of the flight activities had been determined, which contributed greatly to the improved
they were formulated into a flight plan that flight activity schedule of the MA-9 mission
was designed to meet all of the objectives of were that activities were scheduled at any of
the mission. several different points in the mission so that
The period of weightlessness of the manned the pilot could conduct the activity at the most
Mercury-Redstone flights was too short to convenient time and that the increased mission
allow many activities. The flight plan for these duration allowed a reduction in the frequency
two missions concentrated primarily upon the of activities.

294
Communications oxygen quantities once per orbital pass. The
sleep period, during which communication si-
Air-to-ground communications procedures
lence was maintained, also greatly decreased the
were continually being improved throughout total air-to-ground communications. One com-
the Mercury program in an attempt to deter-
munications problem that did occur during the
mine the best set of procedures which would be
MA-9 flight was an interruption due to ground
simple for the pilot and yet insure proper in-
station communications while the pilot was con-
formation flow.
ducting the dim-light experiment.
The MA-6 pilot was requested to report a
large quantity of information to the various Conclusions
ground stations. "Over each ground station, he
reported the fuel and oxygen quantities, the Conclusions concerning the performance of
control mode, and the general status. In addi- the pilot during the Mercury program and the
tion, approximately twice during each orbital implications for future manned space programs
pass, he was required to report to a ground sta- are :
tion all the switch positions and gage readin_ (1) The pilot, during Mercury flights was a
on the instrument panel. In addition many reliable and flexible part of the system, and
communication attempts were required to estab- therefore enhanced mission success.
lish contact with each station, primarily be- (2) The three-axis hand controller proved to
cause the stations would attempt communica- be adequate for spacecraft control.
tions contact prior to the expected acquisition (3) Although the Mercury training equip-
time. These premature attempts resulted in ment was generally adequate, good external dis-
many additional transmissions in an attempt to plays would have provided valuable additional
make two-way communications contact. training.
Several changes were made in communica- (4) Spacecraft systems modifications should
tions procedures prior to the MA-7 flight. The be finalized as early as possible to permit earlier
requirement for reporting all the switch and flight-plan finalization and to allow more time
gage readings was deleted and the initial trans- for the pilot to practice the various inflight
mission from the ground was not begun until tasks.

the expected time of acquisition. The MA-8 (5) There was no significant effect upon
pilot reported only control mode and status. In pilot's operating capabilities resulting from his
addition, many intermediate transmissions were being subjected to the space environment for up
eliminated because the pilot transmitted spe- to 34 hours.
cific information at given stations, which re- (6) Throughout the Mercury Project there
duced the number of requests initiated from was a trend toward design and operational con-
ground stations. The net effect of all these cepts similar to those for flight-test aircraft.
changes was to decrease the amount of the pilot's This indicates that the decades of aircraft ex-
time required for this activity and thus permit perience will be very useful in designing sys-
more time for other activities. tems, selecting and training astronauts, and mis-
The MA-9 communications procedures rep- sion planning.
resented the application of all the previous (7) It is advantageous from a reliability and
experience and included several major improve- systems simplicity standpoin t to make maxi-
ments. Ground stations did not attempt com- mum use of the pilot's capabilities in spacecraft
munications with the spacecraft until after they operations. Early design should take manual
had received the spacecraft telemetry signals operation into consideration in order to achieve
and had evaluated the data. This procedure in- a most effective and efficient overall system.
sured that the spacecraft and ground station Those functions that are determined to be be-
were in good communications range. In addi- yond man's capability or are of a monotonous
tion the MA-9 pilot reported only go-no-go or repetitious nature should be designed for
status to each station and read out fuel and automatic operations.

295
References

1. Staffs of NASA, Nat. Inst. Health, and Nat. Acad. Sci. : Proccedi_gs of a Co_zference on Results of the First
U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.),
June 6, 1961.
2. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center : Results of the Second U.S. Manned Suborbital ,gpace Flight, July 21,
1961. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
3. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the First United States Manned Orbital Space Flight,
February 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
4. Staff of the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Second United States Manned Orbital Space
Flight, May 2_, 1962. NASA SP-6, Supt. Dec., U.S. Govern_ment Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
5. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Third United States Manned Orbital Space Flight,
October 3, 1962. NASA SP-12, Supt. Dec., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1962.

296
IV

MISSION RESULTS

707_0_ 0-_6_
18. AEROMEDICAL OBSERVATIONS
By A. D. CATTERSON, M.D., Center Medical Operations O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; E. P. Mc-
CUTCHEON, 1 M.D., Center Medical Operations Office, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; H. A. MINNERS,
M.D., Center Medical Operations Office, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; and R. A. POLLARD, M.D.,
Center Medical Operations Office, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
_/_ Summary Introduction

The results of physiologic measurements and This paper presents the specific results of
medical studies of Astronaut Cooper made medical studies of Astronaut Cooper's responses
prior to, during, and following his flight as during and after his MA-9 mission in the dual
pilot of the spacecraft of the MA-9 mission are context of a detailed report of the final Mercury
presented in this paper. The pilot was in ex- mission and an effective summary in its own
cellent health and in a complete state of mental right of the medical findings from Project
and physical fitness for his mission on launch Mercury. The results of the MA-9 mission
morning. The data revealed that all physio- are an effective summary of the entire program
logic parameters measured in flight remained because every observation which was made on
within the envelope of normal variability de- pilots during the earlier missions was repeated
veloped for this pilot through extensive moni- and qualitatively reconfirmed in the final flight.
toring of these same parameters under dynamic At the same time, the medical-data collection
circumstances during his participation in train- program for the last flight was developed on the
ing activities as a Mercury astronaut. foundation of knowledge gained from each of
Astronaut Cooper withstood the stresses of the preceding manned space missions. The
the flight situation with no evidence of degrada- suitability and the limitations of the Mercury
tion of his functional integrity as a pilot. He spacecraft environment to meet the require-
slept as part of the planned mission activities merits of hulnan physiology were better under-
during his flight and reported that sleep was stood with each succeeding flight. Thus, the
subjectively normal. Postflight examination of final flight was approached with a better under-
Astronaut Cooper revealed that he had de- standin_ of the likelihood of a given physiologic
veloped dehydration. He exhibited an ortho- response occurring after exposure to the known
static hypotension accompanied by an acceler- stresses of a mission profile than had been pre-
ated pulse response in the postflight examina- viously possible. The opportunity for making
tions. The pulse and blood pressure responses valid medical observations during the MA-9
returned to normal while the pilot was sleeping mission was further enhanced by the duration
between 9 hours and 19 hours after landing. of the mission, as well as by the length of par-
A reversal of the ratio between neutrophiles and ticipation of Astronaut Cooper in tile Mercury
lymphocytes was noted in the peripheral blood program, which provided all invaluable fund of
at an examination accomplished 4 days after
baseline data prior to his actual flight.
the mission. This lymphocytosis persisted for
weeks and subsided spontaneously by June 14, Preflight Observation
1963. With respect to all other studies, the
medical status of the pilot was found essentially Data were evaluated from very thorough
unchanged between the preflight and postflight medical studies of the pilot, Astronaut L.
examinations. Gordon Cooper, Jr., conducted immediately
prior to his selection for astronaut training in
1 Currently a research fellow in the Department of Physi-
1959 and from annual examinations since that
ology at the University of Waahington, Seattle, Washington.

299
date. Medical examinations were also con- prehensive Medical Evaluation," was conducted
ducted b_th before and after six preflight space- by specialists in internal medicine, ophthal-
craft checkout tests and a session in the Cape mology, neuropsychiatry, radiology, and avi-
Canateral procedure_ trainer, all of which re- ation medicine. The NASA flight surgeon who
quired the pilot to wear the full-pressure space had examined the pilot for most of the preflight
suit. Special examinations to assess the pilot's activities conducted the final preflight medical
fitness for flight were conducted 11 and 3 days examination on launch morning. The preflight
before launch. The latter examination con- aeromedical procedures and examination are
ducted on May 12, 1963, designated the "Com- listed in table 18-I.

Table 18-I.--Pilot Preflight Activities

[Selected activities for which medical study or support was performed]

Date Activity Medical study or support

January 5 .......... Altitude-chamber spacecraft Physical examination before and after


checkout. Background data (biosensors)
March 22-23 ........ Hangar flight simulation ...... Physical examination before and after
Background data (biosensors)
Low residue diet (3 days) and flight food (2 days)
April 23 ............ Flight simulation no. 1....... Physical examination
Background data (biosensors)
Timed urine collection
May 4 ............. T-10 day physical examina- Physical examination, 45 minutes
tion.
May 7 ............. Mission simulation (proced- Physical examination before and after
ures trainer). Background data (biosensors)
Timed urine collection
May 8 ............. Launch simulation ........... Physical examination before and after
Background data (biosensors)
Timed urine collection
Begin controlled diet
Blood specimen, 50 cc
May i0 ............ Flight simulation no. 3....... Physical examination before and after
Timed urine collection
Background data (biosensors)
May 11 ......................................... Begin low residue diet
May 12 ............ T-2 day physical examination_ Comprehensive medical examination, 2½ hours
Blood (30 cc) and urine specimen
May 14 ............ Countdown (flight canceled)___ Physical examination before and after
Timed urine collection
Blood specimen, 30 cc
May 15 ............ Flight countdown ........... Physical examination
Aeromedical countdown
Awaken 2:51 a.m.e.s.t.
Launch 8:40 a.m.e.s.t.

In addition to examinations by physicians, Close supervision of the pilot's food intake


baseline clinical evaluations included an audio-
began 7 days before the planned flight with spe-
gram, an electrocardiogram, a chest X-ray, and cial preparation of a normal balanced diet. In
laboratory studies of blood and urine. The order to reduce the need for defecation during
results of these evaluations are found in tables
the mission, a low-residue diet was followed for
18-II to 18-V. For the 3 months prior to the
4 days before the launch (ref. 1). This diet was
flight, the pilot continued in excellent health
well tolerated, although the pilot did mention
with no significant abnormalities. In the month
prior to flight, he maintained his physical fit- that appetite satisfaction was short-lived fol-

ness by daily distance running and calisthenics. lowing the low-residue meals.

300
Table 18-II.--Pertinent Excerpts From Clinical Examination

Postflight (U.S.S. Kearsarge)


Preflight, May 15, 1963; May 16, 1963, 7:15 to 7:45
3:55 to 4:11 am. e.s.t. p.m.e.s.t.

Temperature (oral), °F ................... 97. 4 99. 4


Heart rate, beats/min .................... 76 86
Respiration rate, breaths/min ............. 16 16
Blood pressure, left arm, mm Hg .......... 108/76 supine 90/80 supine
122/82 standing
Nude weight (bladder empty), lb .......... 147 139_
Comments .............................. Alert, cooperative, 2+ ery- Fatigued and sweating. See
thema at BPMS micro- text.
phone tape site.

Table 18-III.--Complete Blood Count


[All times are in e.s.t.]

Sept 4, Mar 4, May 12, May 16, May 17, May 20, May 31, June 14,
1959 1963; 1963; 1963; 1963; 1963; 1963; 1963
1:40p.m. 5:00 p.m. 8:55 p.m. 9:00 p.m. 11:00 a.m. 3:00 p.m.

Hematocrit, percent___ 46 44 43 49 43 43 43 43
Hemoglobin, grams/
100 ml ............ 14. 8 14. 3 15. 0 16. 5 14. O 14.7 14. 3 14. 2
Red blood cells,
millions/mm 8....... 5. 09 4. 79 4. 80 4. 83 4. 50
Platelets/mm 8......... 284, 000 314, 000 230, 000
White blood cells/
mm 3............... 5, 850 6, 800 6, 500 9, 200 5, 650 6, 000 7, 700 5, 100
Differential blood
count:
Neutrophiles,
percent .......... 69 5O 6O T5 49 35 38 49
Lymphoeytes,
percent .......... 29 46 36 :_0 42 58 61 47
Monocytes, percent_ 1 2 3 5 5 5 1 2
Eosinophiles,
percent .......... 0 2 1 O 3 2 0 1
Basophiles, percent__ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

Table 18-IV.--Comparison oJ Typical Preflight and Postfligkt Urine Values

Prefight Postflight

Date, 1963 ..................... May 12 ........................ May 20


Source ......................... Random sample ................. Random sample
Specific gravity ................. 1.018 .......................... 1.019
pH ............................ 6.0 ............................ 6.0
Albumen, sugar, acetone, and bile_ Negative ....................... Negative
Microscopic ..................... Few WBC, no RBC, small amounts One to 2 WBC/HPF, no RBC, no
of amorphous phosphates and casts, moderate amount of
mucus, and one hyaline cast. amorphous phosphates.

301
O

I.
J

Ill_Lll Illll

.... I I I

302
fll ......

iii

303
The results of the final prelaunch examination creased duration of the MA-9 flight, a change
revealed a healthy pilot who was ready for the was iriacle from con t inuons rectal to intermit-
mission. Two minor discrepancies were local tent oral body temperature measurement. The
skin erythema at the biosensor sites and nioder- basic thermistor was retained. The thermistor
ate erythema, edema, and tenderness of the skin and its lead wires remained within the suit.
over the right sacral prominence. He fre- The sensor was attached to the right ear muff
quently demonstrates a skin reaction around the inside the helmet where it was readily accessible.
sensors for 24 to 36 hours after application, The sensor and its location are illustrated in
despite the use of microporous surgical tape for figures 18-1 and 18-2. It thereby provided an
fastening these sensors. It should be noted that
these sensors were in place for 7 hours during
the canceled launch on the preceding day. The
skin findings over the sacrum are frequently
present following prolonged periods of 4 or
more hours on his back in the couch.
On the night before the postponed launch of
May 14, 1063, the pilot slept well for about 2 lS-l.--Oral
FIGURE temperature probe.
hours :tnd then tlozerl restlessly for mother 3 1 ,
hours. However, on the night before the suc-
cessful launch, he slept well for 6 hours.
Although he did become sleepy during periods
of relative inactivity, such as the period spent
in the transfer van, he felt adequately rested
on launch morning. -2t no time \\-as a drug
administered to induce sleep.
The sources of detailed preflight physiologic
data are. outlined in tables 18-VI to 18-IX.
These sources include dynamic tests for evalua-
tion of general physical condition, Mercury-
,2tlns three-orbital pass simulations, and Mer-
cury-Atlas acceleration profiles conducted a t the
T'.S. Kaval Aviation Medical Acceleration Lab-
oratory (AMAL) in Johnsville, Pa., and vari-
ous spacecraft checkout procedures required
during the final stages of preparation for flight. lf%2.-1nstallation
FIGCRE of oral temperature probe
The procedures which mere monitored result- in helmet. ,
ed in the largest number of total hours of ob-
indication of suit-outlet temperature whenever
servation yet arailable for any one astronaut.
an oral temperature was not being taken. When
This extensive monitoring was possible as a
oral temperature was desired, the pilot placed
result of his activity as the MA-8 backup pilot
the small thermistor under his tongue for about
and of his participation in three altitude-cham-
5 minutes. Preflight body temperatures were
ber spacecraft-checkout procedures, including
all within the normal range. The remainder of
the longest such test conducted at Cape Canav-
eral. the biosensor system was the same as that used
The pilot-safety monitoring and data-pther- for the MA-8 mission (ref. 1).
ing biosensor system for this mission consisted Preflight biosensor preparation included
of two sets of electrocardioprapliic (ECG) careful calibration of the system so that accu-
leads, the impeclnnce pneumopritph, an oral tem- rate, repeatable determinations were assured.
perature thermistor, and the blood-pressure ,icljiistments were required to compensate for
measuring system (RPJIS). The details of individual variations. This requirement was
oper:ttion of tlie biosensor system ]lave been cle- especially true for the blood-pressure measur-
scribed in references 1 to :;. Recause of tile in- ing system. The clinical blood-pressure mean

304
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308
val.ues, shown in table 18-IX, are of particular atrio-ventricular (A-V) node with escape and
interest and indicate that the correlation be- fusion beats. This occurrence was identified by
tween these readings and those taken with the both biphasie and negative P waves of decreased
BPMS is valid. The stability of the_ calibra- amplitude, and on occasion by changes in the
tions was rechecked oll several occasions before ventricular complexes. Numerous such beats
flight. All systems operated properly during were noted during the countdown of the post-
the final preflight-preparation period. poned launch, and one brief episode of nodal
The preflight biosensor data are presented in rhythm occurred during this period. This find-
tables 18-VI to 18-IX. The analysis methods ing was considered acceptable as a normal vari-
used were both manual and automatic. ant in this pilot only by virtue of the extensive
All respiration minute rates were obtained by preflight monitoring which had shown nodal
manual reduction; 30-second counts made from rhythm to be an incidental occurrence. These
the continuous direct-recorded analog signal, data are illustrated in figure 18-3. There was
with sampling intervals either every 3 or every sinus bradycardia, which, at times, was followed
4 minutes. Heart rates from many of the rec- by a sinus-generated beat and, at other times_
ords were determined in the same manner. was followed by an A-V nodal-generated escape
Those sets can be readily identified by the rela- beat. Other infrequent rhythm alterations
tively low number of values used. The auto- were premature atrial and ventricular beats.
matie analysi s utilizes a general-purpose The preflight data were collected in order to
computer to determine the intervals between all establish the baseline physiological responses of
the R waves of the ECG complex in the record, the MA-9 astronaut specifically using the flight
and the reported values were computed from biomedical instrumentation.
these determinations. The automatically re-
duced rates are readily identified by the large FLIGHT OBSERVATIONS
mlmber of values. The validity of both of these
Inflight biomedical monitoring spanned a
methods has been substantiated by repeated time interval of 34 hours, 16 minutes, and 43
cross-correlation of results during the two years seconds on this flight. Continuous onboard re-
of development of the analysis pr%oTam. Al- cording included the first 1 hour and 35 minutes
though the data analysis format was arbitrarily and the last 10 hours and 45 minutes of flight
selected, the results are fully reproducible and time until bioplug disconnect. Flight data were
appear to be adequate for the present medical programed to be intermittently recorded for 1
requirements. All blood-pressure measure- minute of every 10 minutes between 1 hour and
ments on record were incorporated in the tables. 39 minutes elapsed time and 23 hours and 32
A highly significant aspect of the preflight minutes elapsed time. Recording of physiolog-
data is the rather wide range of values recorded, ical data through the mid-portion of the flight
particularly heart rates, which have modified was erratic and did not follow original plans
the understanding of expected or so ealled"nor- because of a malfunction of the tape-recorder
real" responses. This wide variation is a com- programer which occurred at approximately
mon phenomenon among healthy individuals in 12:00:00 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.) and con-
dynamic situations, and clearly indicates the tinued throughout the flight. However, suffi-
need for the use of extreme caution in attribut-
cient data points were obtained for confident
ing changes observed in flight to weightlessness
extrapolation of trends of physiologic values
or other factors peculiar to the flight environ-
during this portion of the flight by the astro-
ment.
naut's voice contacts with the ground, his use of
The ECG from the preflight observation pe-
the vox-record actuation of the tape recorder, or
riod was scanned repeatedly by numerous ob-
his turning the tape recorder temporarily to
servers. The collective opinions were that
continuous to document certain inflight experi-
marked normal sinus arrhythmia was present
ments. Data during the final portion of the
with frequent occurrences of a wandering car-
diae pacemaker. At times, sinus node suppres- flight, from 24:00:00 g.e.t, until landing, were
sion was suflicient to allow activation by the obtained because the failed programer was over-

309
ECG (chest)

ECG (side)

ECG (chest)

ECG (side)

FI(iVRE 18-3.--MA-9. May 14, 1963, 07:42:00 e.s.t. SamI)le record illustrating nodal beats occurring during
ean(.ele<l launch countdown. Recorder speed 25 ram/see.

ridden by the astronaut's selection of continu- and from 30-second averages taken at all other
ous recorder operation. During the period short intervals when data were available from
when the astronaut was resting quietly or was the onboard tape recorder. Blood pressures
asleep, essentially no medical data were ob- were obtained according to the flight plan with
tained on the onboard recorder; consequently only very minor variations. These values were
mean heart-rate values for the entire duration with few exceptions not recorded on the on-
of the flight are probably biased on the high board recorder since the astronaut was gener-
side of a true mean. Data from the onboard ally quiet while sending the blood pressure, and
recorder _,ave been supplemented by data ob- therefore the tape recorder was not operating.
tained during network station passes through- However, the values were received at ground
out the mission, and an exceptionally valuable stations in every instance and read in real time
short period of recording was obtained onboard by medical monitors. The readings were subse-
the carrier during egress of the astronaut. The quently verified by postflight analysis of the
inflight responses are summarized in tables 18- tracking-site data. Body temperature was sam-
VII and 18-IX. Heart-rate response, includ- pled intermittently during the flight with an
ing mean rates, was obtained through a com- oral thermistor, which the pilot placed under
puter reduction of the inflight data from the his tongue on four of the five planned occasions.
onboard tape recorder. One additional oral temperature was requested
Respiration rates were obtained by the man- and obtained during the flight. Body tempera-
ual reduction of 30-second periods every 3 min- tures obtained in flight and listed in table 18-X
utes during the period of continous recording were all within an acceptable range.

310
Table 18-X.--Oral Temperatures Obtained in appraisal of the effect on these rates of exertion
Flight under equally cramped circumstances at lg.
There does not appear to be a significant differ-
Ground elapsed time,
ence in terms of heart-rate and respiratory-rate
hr : rain : sec Oral temperature, °F
response in the two situations. This impression
was further borne out in the two planned exer-
1:10:00 98.5
cise periods in which there was similarity be-
6:00:00 100.0
10:25:00 100.0 tween the response to exercise in orbital flight
12:25:00 99. 0 and the response to exercise in preflight practice
23:50:00 98.0 sessions, as shown in table 18-XI.
When the flashing light was deployed at about
3:'26:00 g.e.t, his heart rate rose to a sharp
The overall mean heart rate recorded during peak of 134 beats per minute and then promptly
the period when the inflight recorder was oper- declined to 95 beats per minute while the pilot
ative was 89 beats per minute, and the overall was maneuvering the spacecraft in an attempt
respiratory rate recorded from available data to sight the flashing light.
was 19 breaths per minute. The significant The respiratory rate sensor malfunctioned
events of powered flight showed corresponding during the flight. The failure was subsequently
increases in heart rate and respiratory rate, as traced to a separation of the lead wire from the
has been the case in all manned Mercury flights. electrode, which was attached to the left lower
The pilot's heart rate at booster-en_ne cut-off chest. Tile first sign of respiration-sensor fail-
(BECO) was 147 beats per minute; at launch- ure ocurred at 7:08:00 g.e.t.; and throughout
escape-rocket ignition, 154 beats per minute; the remainder of the flight, the respiratory-
and at sustainer-engine cut-off (SECO), 144 rate recording was intermittent. Sometimes,
beats per minute. Within 2 minutes after the trace appeared to be a faithful replica of
SECO, the heart rate subsided to about 110 the pilot's breathing, but at other times it was
beats per minute and then gradually declined entirely unreliable or without apparent relation-
over the next 13 minutes to rates of 80 to 100 ship to respiration. The respiratory rates dur-
beats per minute for the remainder of the first ing the last portion of the flight are tentative
orbital pass. Respiratory rate was 28 breaths rates based on the appearance of the pneumo-
per minute at BECO, between 25 and 30 breaths graph waveform during periods when evidence
per minute through SECO, and then declined available indicated it was following changes in
to rates of 18 to 2290breaths per minute within thoracic volume. Typical signals of properly
the first 15 minutes of weightless flight. ol)erating biosensors are illustrated in figure
Heart rate remained stable around 80 beats 18-4.
per minute throughout the first 8 hours in space During the sleeping period, heart rates re-
except during periods when the astronaut an- corded on passes over tracking stations were
nounced on tlle tape that he was undergoing generally as low as 50 and averaged between
some specific exertion such as emptying the 55 and 60 beats per minute. However, when
condensate tank or removing equipment from the pilot awoke and announced anything which
the equipment kit. During these intervals, rates was recorded on the onboard recorder, his heart
would increase to values from 100 beats per rate immediately rose to about 80 which is the
minute to as high as 130 beats per minute for same value as during his working period earlier
very short times. in the flight. After about 23:32:00 g.e.t, and
At 8 : 25 : 00 g.e.t., the pilot specifically men- for the remainder of the normal orbital flight,
tioned stru.ggling with his writing desk. At the astronaut's mean heart rate rose to a value
this time. his heart rate rose to 96 beats per of about 100 beats per minute. His first indica-
mimlte and then promptly settled back to its tion of a spacecraft system malfunction oc-
resting rate of about 80. The longer period of curred at about 23:59:00 g.e.t, when he noticed
_)bserwttion and tile opportunity which this that the 0.05g relay light had come on. Heart
flight afforded to correlate pilot activities with rate at this time rose sharply to 148 beats per
heart and respiratory rates permit a tentative lninute and then rapidly declined to the low of

311
b,-
C_

I 0

--I

0"1

CO
r_

e_ 0

o _

_ F

_ m

o_ ,_

1",,-

o o

m _

el

312
ECG (chest)

t-

FIC,VRE 1S-4.--MA-9. 12:29:52. Sample of typical biosensor data received at a range station. Blood pressure
117/3 mm Hg. (Recorder speed 25 mn_/sec.)

60 beats per minute and stabilized at a rate of to the normal resting rate were seen in response
around 100 beats per minute. After a prelim- to physical exertion. The peak heart rate noted
inary analysis of the nature of the malfunction (luring the flight generally corresponded to
indicated by this 0.05g light, the pilot's heart levels which have been seen following an equiva-
rate varied, with a peak of 14'.29beats per minute lent amount of exertion under lg. A sharper
while he was engaged in checking his ASCS rise of heart rate to high levels in excess of 140
system at approximately 30:08:00 g.e.t. Again, beats per minute was seen as a response when
the heart rate declined rapidly to its resting the astronaut was evidently emotionally alerted
level of approximately 100 beats per minute. to a highly significant change in his environ-
At al)out 32:41:00 g.e.t., the pilot was advised mental situation.
to take 5 mg of dextro amphetamine orally The ECG intervals were well within normal
which he did very shortly after receiving the physiologic limits during the major portion of
advice. His heart rate rose gTadually beginning this flight. The A-V nodal beats noted during
at 33 hours elapsed time, with rather marked the prelaunch period were rarely seen during
swings in rate between levels as high as 140 the 34½ hours of flight monitoring. A careful
t)eats per minute and lows of about 80 beats review of all flight records revealed that data
per minute throughout the remainder of the from both leads of ECG showed periodic
flight. A significant change in heart rate oc- changes in the character of the P wave and the
curred at retrofire when the heart rate rose to P-R interwll, which are consistent with a wan-
166 beats per minute for no longer than 20 dering pacemaker. There were frequent pro-
seconds. longed sinus pauses during the flight which
The heart rate during reentry varied between generally are associated with deep inspiration
120 and 140 beats per minute until drogue para- by the pilot, and in the great majority of
chute deployment when it spiked to 184 beats instances a sinus beat, rather than a ventricular
per minute. It then gradually declined to 164 escape, followed the pause. One period in which
beats per minute when bioplug disconnect was this rule did not hold was during the sleeping
accomplished subsequent to main parachute time as the astronaut was passing over the Rose
deployment. Knot Victor tracking ship. At 17:10:00 and
The changes in heart rate throughout this 18:45:00 g.e.t., the medical monitor reported a
flight seem to fall readily into two categories. nodal rhythm which was verified during the
Moderate increases in rate with gradual return postflight examination of the records. Figure
_ 1, _ .411 I:L:I

P" i t;<.lqiq' :i :

ii:_ i_ i:;t
t':iI/:L:ii',:g
I2,t :

16:11:30. a range station illustrating one of the frequent


occurrences of sinus arrhythmia with wandering of the cardiac pacemaker. In this sample, the negative P
wave suggests inverse depolarization from the atrioventricular node. Similar changes were observed before

flight. (Recorder speed _5 mm/sec.)

18-5 illustrates this variation. Late in the of each of his predecessors that the g-forces are
flight, the sternal ECG lead became rather noisy readily tolerated and that the sensation of
with a marked fluctuation of the baseline. This weightlessness is 'm entirely pleasant experi-
fluctuation appeared at times to be synchronous ence to which he adapted readily. Astronaut
with respiration and at other times to bear little Cooper noticed tlmt his perspective within the
or no relationship to respiratory movements. spacecraft cabin was altered during the first
few minutes of weightless flight. Specifically,
At this period in the flight, sinus arrhythmi'_
was somewhat more pronounced that it had he observed that after SECO and during the
first _)0 minutes or so of weightlessness he felt
been early in the flight. A recurrent finding on
the record consisted of a simultaneous disrup- that the equipment kit located near his right
tion of the sternal ECG recording with a sharp arm was rotated 90 °. A similar phenomenon

negative impulse on the relatively insensitive of orientation was reported by the MA-7 pilot.
See reference 9. This was not a troublesome
respiratory channel and a sinus pause showing
on the side-to-side ECG lead. It is believed illusion to the pilot and gradually vanished as he
that this characteristic pattem_ resulted from became accustomed to the altered sensory cues

either a habitual deep sighing breath taken by of orbital flight.


The astronaut stated that he did not feel par-
the pilot or perhaps a repeated stretching mo-
tion made in an attempt to relieve his cramped ticularly hungry during most of the flight and

position. ate primarily because it had been scheduled.


Blood pressures did not vary remarkably dur- However, later in the flight he did feel hungry
ing the flight from preflight values, as shown in on one occasion and after eating felt better.
table 18-IX. Because of problems with the food containers
Postflight analysis of the film badges wom_ and water nozzle during flight, he was unable
to reconstitute property the freeze-dehydrated
1)y the astronaut revealed a total radiation
(lose well below a level of medical concemL food and could only eat one-third of a package
(See paper 1_ for a report on the radiation of beef pot roast. Therefore, he subsisted on
measurement.) bite-sized cubed food and bite-sized peanut but-
With regard to symptoms related to the flight ter "sandwiches." He avoided the bite-sized

experience, the pilot repeated the observations beef sandwiches, since they had crumbled in

31.4
their package. His caloric intake during the H e urinated without difficulty several times
flight was only 696 calories of the 2,360 calories during flight and stated that bladder sensations
1 available to him at lannch. H e rapidly tired of were normal. The urine collection and transfer
the cubed “snack-type“ foods and this contrib- system worked well, a n d separate urine samples
uted to his low cdoric intake. Typical samples were obtained at four different times during the
of the food types carried aboard from the MA-9 flight. It required, however, a considerable
flight are shown in figure 18-6. :mount of time and effort to transfer the urine
to the storage bags manually.
The astronaut had n very good sleep tlie night
prior to launch and was as rested as possible.
H e found, even early in the flight, that when he
had no tasks to perform and the spacecraft \\-as
oriented such that .the earth was not in view
from tlie window, he easily dozed off for brief
naps. This dozing did not occur during times
when there were tasks to perform or items to
see through the window. During the period
designated for sleep, he slept only in R series
of naps lasting no more than 1 hour each. His
totad sleep time was about 41/2 hours. H e awoke
from these 30- to 60-minute naps feeling alert
and rested, but 30 to 45 minutes later he would
again doze off. H e stated that if there had been
another person along to monitor the systems,
pnrticularly tlie environmental control system,
lie could hare slept for much longer periods, but
still “no more than 4 to G hours in a day.”
Table 18-SI1 lists estimated inflight sleep
periods.
H e had a brief period of confusion the first
I ~ L - R lX-B.-‘I’yl)es
E of food used during MA-0 flight.
time or tv-o that lie awoke in that he did not
The astronaut’s water intake was also limited. realize exactly where he was. However, it took
When the condensate transfer system would no him only a very few seconds to become com-
longer permit fluid storage in the 3.86-pound- pletely awake and oriented. H e reported that
capacity main condeimite bag during the flight this brief period of confnsion did not occur later
lie was forced to put condensate water into one in the flight. The pilot stated that lie slept
of the drinking-water tanks before he had con- (6 perhaps a little more sonndly” than on earth.

sumed all of its contents. Kormal operational He did dream, but he did not remember the
procedures required the exclusion of condensate contents of the dreams. Tliis is consistent with
water as a drinking-water source. H e began his past experience.
drinking small amounts from his survival-kit H e felt that being strapped into the seat made
water supply, as planned, but he wished to con- little difference in his sleep, but he definitely I i i ~ c l
serve this supply :is much as possible. H e was the feeling he WRS sleeping sitting up. He noted
not really thirsty until during the last orbital when he awoke that his arms were floating out
p : ~ but
. he was SO busy at that point that he in front of him, a i d because of his concern that
(lid not take time to drink. Recause condensate he might inadvertently trip a critical switch
water was placed into the drinking-Iyater tank during sleep, he folded his hands and hooked
in which an unknown nmount of drinking water his thumbs under the helmet restraint cables.
remained, it is impossible to make a precise H e was never startled or alarmed to awaken
statement as to his wntcr intake during flight, and see his hands floating in front of llis face-
but he did consume more than 1,500 cc. plate.

315
Table 18-XII.--Inflight Sleep Periods

]Other "unrecorded naps occurred]

Estimated
Time, g.e.t. duration, Source
min

02:10:15 to 02:14:00 ................. 4 Onboard tape.


05:40:00 to 05:45:00 ................. 5 Astronaut record.
13:50:00 to 14:46:00 ................. 56 Onboard tape.
14:20:00 to 14:47:00 ................. 27 Astronaut record.
15:11:00 ............................ (') Onboard tape.
15:20:00 to 16:05:00 ................. 45 Astronaut record.
16:28:11 ........................... (') Onboard tape.
16:50:00 to 17:50:00 ................ 6O Astronaut record.
08:20:00 to 18:25:00 ................ 5 Astronaut record.
18:40:00 to 19:27:00 ................ 47 Astronaut record.
19:38:39 ........................... (q Onboard tape.
21:22:44 ........................... (-) Onboard tape.
27:26:08 ........................... (.) Onboard tape.

Total sleep recorded: 4 hours and 9 minutes.

Short naps, duration not determined.

The oral temperature probe was easily han- tell, had the same effects as test doses taken prior
dled by the pilot. It was necessary to use a small to flight.
hand mirror to check its position on the right During the last two orbital passes, the car-
ear muff to be sure it was not extending beyond bon-dioxide partial-pressure (PCOz) gage was
the helmet, but at no time did it interfere w.ith noted to indicate a rise in the amount of carbon
closing the faceplate. dioxide in the suit. The astronaut actuated
The only real discomfort experienced during the emergency oxygen flow rate for 30 seconds.
tlle flight was associated with the pressure suit It did not seem to change the pilot's onboard
being pulled tightly across the pilot's knees. reading noticeably, although telemetry signals
By the sixth or seventh orbital pass, his knees indicated a slight drop. At this time the pilot
were becoming quite uncomfortable. He alle- closed his faeeplate and felt that his respira-
viated this discomfort somewhat by periodically tions were deeper and more rapid. This change
sliding his feet up past the normal foot posi- in respiration could not be confirmed by post-
tion into the tower area of the spacecraft. This flight examination of respiration and heart rate
action permitted the straightening of his legs recordings. Although he felt more comfortable
to relieve most of the pressure and also allowed with the faeeplate open, he kept it closed during

him to pull on the legs of the suit to gain a little the final orbital pass and the reentry as planned.
slack around his knees. The PCO2 gage indicated about 5 mm Hg at
reentry. This concentration is not enough to
The astronaut took 5 mg of dextro-ampheta-
cause symptoms of hypereapnia on the ground,
mine sulfate approximately 1 hour 20 minutes
and there was no apparent interference with the
prior to retrofire on advice of the MCC surgeon.
pilot's normal responses.
He stated that within 20 minutes he felt much
more alert and confident and seemed to be "more Postflight Observations

on top of things." He had less tendency to drop The spacecraft landed in the water about 4.5
off to sleep for the remainder of the flight. miles from the recovery ship, the USS Kear-
There was no apparent degradation in the sarge, and was placed on deck approximately 40
pilot_'s performance following this medication. minutes later. In order to gain medical data as
The pilot stated that the drug, as far as he could early as possible, the NASA flight surgeon

316
wboardthe recoveryshipwasequippedwith an The astronaut was then taken to the ship's
8-foot extension cord for the biomedical cable. sick bay where a comprehensive medical exami-
Immediately after the hatch was opened, this nation and preliminary debriefing were per-
cord was attached to the astronaut's biosensor formed. The remainder of the debriefing was
plug and blood pressure fitting and connected conducted by the NASA fight surgeon in the
to the spacecraft onboard recorder to record admiral's inport cabin. The astronaut spent 48
blood pressures and ECG before, during, and hours on board the ship. Details of his activi-
after egress. This system was extremely effec- ties during this 48-hour period are shown in
tive in deriving egress data. table 18-XIII.

Table 18-XIlI.--Pilot Postflight Activities

Date, 1963 Time, local Midway _ Activity

May 16 ............ 12:25 p.m .................. Landing.


12:55 p.m .................. Spacecraft on deck.
1:09 p.m ................... Blood pressure, recumbent in spacecraft.
1:12 p.m ................... Egress and blood pressure standing.
1:15 p.m ................... Physical examination begun in recovery ship sick
bay.
1:45 p.m ................... First tilt table procedure.
3:00 p.m ................... Examination completed.
3:30 p.m ................... First postflight urination.
3:42 p.m ................... Second tilt table procedure.
4:10 p.m ................... First postflight meal.
5:45 p.m ................... First postflight bowel movement.
7:11 p.m ................... Third tilt table procedure.
9:30 p.m ................... To bed.
May 17 ............ 7:00 a.m ................... Awakened.
7:40 a.m ................... Fourth tilt table procedure and brief medical ex-
amination.
8:00 a.m ................... Breakfast.
9:00 to 11:00 a.m ............ Self-debriefing.
2 :O0 to 5:00 p.m ............. Technical debriefing.
7:00 to 9:00 p.m_= ........... Medical debriefing.
May 18 ............ 1:00 p.m ................... Left recovery ship.
May 20 ............ 9:00 a.m.e.s.t ............... Comprehensive postflight medical examination at
Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.

To convert times to e.s.t., add 6 hours.

The postflight examination began prior to ventricular dissociation. At that point, another
egress from the spacecraft. Approximately 40 blood pressure recording was attempted and,
minutes after landing, two measurements of the although the apparatus appeared to cycle nor-
astronaut's blood pressure were recorded while mally, no pressure pulses were seen on the re-
he was still lying in the spacecraft on the deck cording. His heart then returned to a normal
of the recovery ship. He was then able to %oTess sinus rhythm with a rate of 92 beats per minute
from the spacecraft without assistance and at sensor disconnect.
stand erect on the deck while his blood pressure
After standing on the deck for approximately
was again recorded on the onboard tape. Later
a minute, the pilot began to look pale and, al-
examination of this 31/.2 minute record shows
though his face was already wet, new beads of
that, while he was still in the spacecraft, his
perspiration appeared on his forehead.
blood pressures were 101/65 and 105/87, with
a corresponding heart rate of 132 beats per min- He swayed slightly and reported symptoms
ute. During egress and immediately thereafter of impending loss of consciousness including
while standing upright on the deck, his heart lightheadedness, dimming of vision, and ting-
rate rose to 188 beats per minute with atrio- li_tg of his feet and legs.

317
The cable was immediately disconnected and, and a slight reddening around the left tympanic
with support at each arm, he began to walk away membrane. The astronaut complained that he
from tile spacecraft. After a few steps, 5 to 10 had a little trouble clearing his left ear during
seconds later, he was able to walk without as- dosoont. Both oars "crackled" for 6 to 8 hours
sistance and to salute the ship's commanding of- after recovery as the oxygen in the middle ear
fleer. There were no other objective changes was gradually absorbed and replaced with air.
of this kind throughout the postflight examina- This condition is commonly seen in aviators
tion nnd debriefin_ period. when they have been breathing 100-percent
The remainder of the physical examination oxyzen.
was conducted in the ship's sick bay and was Tilt tahle studies were performed at 1, 3, 61_,
completed within 2 hours after landing. Dur- and 19 hours after landing. At no time did the
ink desuiting it was noted that the astronaut astronaut have any subjective complaints, nor
was soaking wet, presumably with perspiration. were objective changes noted except in heart rate
His hands had the white, wrinkled appearance and blood pressure. Specifically, there were no
characteristic of prolonged submersion in wa- unusual color ehang'es in the feet, as had been
ter. His feet and socks were dry. He com- noted following the MA-8 flight. The results
plained of being thirsty and his voice was dry of the tilt table studies are tabulated and dis-
and hoarse. He participated actively in the cussed under Special Studies.
desuiting and examination but appeared tired The medical findings during the initial exam-
and less talkative than usual. ination after desuiting are shown in table 18-II
The urine collection device contained 107 ee of and included a blood pressure of 90/80 mm tIg
urine. When the soaking wet underwear was while supine, a heart rate of 86 beats per minute,
removed, the lead wire to the lower left. a respiration rate of 16 breaths per minute, a
of the pneumograph sensor on the chest was body weight of 1391/_ pounds, and a body tem-
seen to be disconnected. It is not known perature of 99.4 ° F taken orally. Three hours
whether it separated prior to this time, although after landing, his urine showed a specific gravity
it appears probable that it was loose and was of 1.031, and the hematocrit was 49. These
making partial contact, held by the plastic in- findings, combined with the elinicM evaluation,
sulation sleeve until the suit was removed. indicate a moderate dehydration. As has been
There were some evidences of pressure on the indicated elsewhere, this dehydration resulted
skin at all lateral sensor locations, but no signs from a reduced intake of food and water during
of irritation by sensors, or paste. All sensors the flight. Detailed results of the blood and
were securely in place and the electrode paste urine analyses are contained in tables 18-III to
seemed to have maintained its normal consist- 18-V. The reversal of the ratio of lymphocytes
ency. At the sensor locations on the left lateral to polynmrphonuclear Ieukocytes during the
chest, there were narrow semicircular marks week following the flight, without a significant
that looked like very shallow cuts with a sharp chanze in the total count, has not been ex-
blade. These cuts may have I)een caused by the plained. This ratio has since returned to nor-
thin edge of the tape where the rul)ber sensor real. A clinical electrocardiogram and a chest
disc slightly overlapped it. X-ray completed the initial postflight examina-
There were painful and slightly swollen red tion. The chest X-ray showed no changes when
areas over each patella caused by the pressure
compared with that taken before the flight on
suit having been pulled tightly across the ante-
May 12, 1963. The ECG showed a moderate
rior knee when the knee was flexed. Other red-
rightward shift in the QRS and T axes when
dened areas were found over each posterior in-
compared to that of May 1_, 1963.
ferior iliac spine and the posterior spinous
process of the fifth lumbar vertebra. There The astronaut slept very soundly for 91/_

was a diffuse redness over the right lateral iliae hours and awoke cheerful and eager to complete
area, but none over the left. the debriefing activites.
Additional findings of note were a bilateral A brief examination the following day showed
conjunctivitis, which probably resulted from that the conjunctival irritation, the hoarseness
drying of the eyes by the constant oxygen flow of his voice, most of the skin pressure marks,

318
and mostof the evidenceof dehydrationhad swollenthan on the previousday. The sharp
disappeared.The areasof pressureoverthe semicicular markswerestill muchin evidence
kneeswerestill painful and somewhatmore andremained visiblefor severaldays.

Table 18-XIV.--Period of Pilot's Weight Changes

During the 3-week period prior to flight, the pilot's maximum weight was 149}_ lb and his minimum weightwas
146 lb. IIis weight on launch morning was 147 lb and his weight on the recovery ship was 139}_ lb.]

Date Activity Duration, Weight


hr loss, lb

Preflight

Jan. 5, 1963 ......... Altitude-chamber spacecraft checkout 9 3. 5


procedure.
Apr. 23, 1963 ........ Flight simulation .................... 7 2.0
May 8, 1963 ......... Launch simulation ................... 8_t 3.0
May 1O, 1963 ........ Flight simulation .................... 6 2.0
May 14, 1963 ........ Canceled launch ..................... 8 1.3

Flight

May 15/16, 1963 ..... Orbital flight ........................ 34}_ 7. 75

Table 18-XIV shows the pilot's weight loss Special Studies


during several preflight activities and the in- Tilt Test Evaluation
flight experience. Intake and output records
for the first '24 hours after recovery indicate a The medical examination performed immedi-
fluid intake of 3,900 cc and a urine output of ately after the MA-8 recovery suggested an
545 cc. alteration in the pilot's cardiovascular responses

The pilot returned to the launch site on the to position changes (ref. 1). In order to obtain
/

more quantitative measurements of these re-


f(mrth day following launch and was examined
sponses, an operational tilt procedure was de-
the following morning. The same medical spe-
veloped for shipboard use. This procedure
('ialists who examined him prior to flight found
utilized a Stokes' Litter with cross-bars added
him to be in excellent health. The only changes
for lifting and stabilization. The modifications
noted were the persistent slight erythema and
1)ermitted a tilt of 70 ° from the horizontal in
tenderness of both patellae resulting from the 3 to 4 seconds. The individual being tested was
pressure areas in the suit, a continued rightward comfortably secured in the litter, without cir-
shift in the QRS and T axes of the ECG, and culatory interference, by straps across the knees
persistence of the previously noted alteration and the upper chest.
in blood count. The ECG shift had become less tIeart-rate and blood-pressure measurements
apparent, however. The laboratory studies of were taken at least every minute in all tests and
blood and urine are contained in tables 18-111 were chosen as the primary indicators of altered
to 18-V. functions, in conjunction with observation of
The pilot remained in good health and main- visible reactions and subjective comments. Op-
tained his high morale following this examina- erational use called for minute heal_ rates
_ion. IIe participated in debriefing sessions and ca.lculated from 15-second counts of the right
other postflight activities without further medi- radial pulse with clinical blood i)ressures taken
cal change. from the left arm. Greater capability in the

319
Space Medicine Laboratory in Hangar S per- a modified Flock Test was used in some of the
mitted simultaneous determination of both olin- tilts. This test utilizes a tube with a small ori-
it.a! and BPMS blood pressures and continuous fice through which the individual exhales after
re,'nr(ling" t)f respiration rate and ECG from a maxinmm inspiration, producing a constant
the I)iosensor sytem. Minute heart rates were pulmonary overpressure of 40 mm Hg. The
determined from the directly recorded biosen- Flack Test lasted 15 seconds and was conducted
sor (!ata by using 12-second counts made every from 31/2 to 41/_ minutes after the individual
30 set'ands.
was tilted to the 70 ° position.
Minute respiration rates were determined Preflight results were obtained from 11 tilt
from 30-second counts made each minute. There
tests on the flight astronaut• from January 5 to
were no apparent differences between the clini-
May 10, 1963. Flack Tests were performed
cal and biosensor values.
with four of the tilts. All of these tilts were
The procedure was carried out in the follow-
performed in conjunction with a spacecraft
ing manner. After four sets of similar control
checkout procedure which required at least 2
values, the individual was tilted for 5 minutes
hours in the spacecraft couch in the semisupine
and values were sampled at least every minute.
Then the subject was returned to the horizontal position. The time between the prerun tilts
position for a recording of at least four more and the procedure varied from 1 to 5 hours be-
sets of similar values. Thus, the minimum time cause of uncontrollable operational factors. In
for the complete test was 13 minutes. In order each ease, the postrun tilts were conducted from
to superimpose a further cardiovascular stress, 5 to 15 minutes after the procedure, and on Jan-

The mean and range of preflight prefllt and posttilt values are plotted
separately The mean and range of last value before tilt and first value

after fllt ore identified Four fllt procedures were accomplished


postfiight, they are:

t Last value before tilt

I at 13:55 to 15:56(Iocaltime), May 16,1965 '_' First value after tilt


Pretilt and posttilt
2at 15:42to 15 53(tocaltime), May 16, 1963
] Flocks means and range
3at 19:11 to 19:25(Iocaltime), May 16,1963 Z_ Mean values
4at 07:42 toOT:55(Iocaltime), May 17, 1963 E Range
The postflight tilt procedures are plotted indwiduolty

Preflight
Post flight
Preprocedure ( 5 tilts) _ Postprocedure (6 tilts) (4 tilts)

t End tilt Tilt


i80
__ ii t E_d tilt j I

160
i I
!dti"ll"
t
_- Tilt period Tilt period L
i i : Tilt period

140 i i i
_ I
.E i i
E

i20
q i _---¢-.-_
, ,v'-I!
x_
i q
,,I / -_-
o_ I00 i i

-_ _ I ,_. .... 2--l_ _-


I

80

I/
) i l
6O
? ,"
I , T "-X!
i
I
4O
00:00 ' 02'00 ' 04:00 0000 02:00 04:00 OO:00 02:00 0400
Time, min.sec

FIOURE 18-7.--Tilt studies---heart rate responses---MA-9.

320
uary 5, 1963, a second postrun tilt was per- produced a rise in heart rate varying from 5 to
formed 1 hour after the first. about 20 beats per minute within 30 seconds.
The heart-rate and blood-pressure values are This reading gradually increased during the
summarized in table 18-XV and illustrated in first '2 minutes to rates of 80 and 90 beats per
figures 18-7 and 18-8. The preflight results fall minute, at which point it stabilized. Posttilt
within the ranges reported in the literature. In values between 100 and 110 fbeats per minute
the prerun period, most heart rates were be- occurred after a 6'1./2hour run, which was more
tween 55 and 80 beats per minute. The tilt than twice as long as any of the other runs.

_The mean and range of preflight pretilt and posttilt values are plotted

separately. The mean and range of last value before tilt and first value
after tilt are identified. Four tilt procedures were accomplished
post flight, they ore:

_' Last value before tilt

_' First value after tilt


I at 13:35 to I 3:56 (local time), May 16, 1963 Pretilt and posttilt
2at 15:42 to15:S3(Iocal time), May 16, 1963 t Flocks D
means and range
A Mean values
3at 19:1 I to 19: 23(Iocal time), May 16, 1963

4atO7:42toO7:55(Iocal time), May 17, 1963 m Range

Preflight Post flight

Preprocedure Postprocedure

Tilt End tilt Tilt End tilt Tilt End tilt

'1
140 I

i
130

120 q
E
E
IlO

) (
_100

9O

'i
8C
ii I
t.__ period --
- Tilt period --
I
i

i
t
ioc- I!
_' 90 I i
i i
80 i
i
d
"_ 70 !
i | I
_6o I I
5°I- /:
00;00
0

02;'00
,

04;'00
,,Tn;i_.

' ' 00:00 02:00 04:00 00:00 02:00 04':00


:}.
I _
[_1
Time, min:sec

FIeURE 18-8.--Tilt studies---blood pressure respon_es.-MA-9.

At the beginning of the Flack Test, a brady- change and are not reported. The increases in
cardia for 3 or 4 beats usually occurred, fol- diastolic blood pressure were the most remark-
lowed by an increase in rate to 80 to 90 beats per able produced by the tilt. The mean increase
minute. On several occasions, the maximum was 15 mm ttg, but many of the diastolic pres-
observed rates of 110 beats per minute followed sures rose 20 to 30 mm Hg. An initial systolic
a Flack Test. The sudden release of the in- drop was followed by a compensatory rise.
creased intrathoracic pressure again produced Postrun tilts produced somewhat more striking
a transient bradyeardia foUowed by an "over- blood-pressure changes, with narrowing of some
shoot" of 10 to 15 beats per minute. Conclu- pulse pressures to as little at 6 mm Hg. The
sion of the tilt period'consistemly produced an maximum systolic levels followed Flack Tests,
immediate drop in rate to the pretilt range. without an associated diastolic change of
Respiration rates were without significant significance.
321
I

°_
s,

t-- _ r.-

i_

322
The ECG demonstrated expected alteration Test. Unfortunately, simultaneous ECG could
of the QRS axis secondary to position change. not be recorded with any of these tilts.
Decrease in size of the QRS was especially The blood-pressure responses to the post-
prominent in the chest lead as a consequence of flight tilts were nearly uniform ; therefore, only
R-wave depression. There were sinus pauses the mean values are shown in figure 18-8. In-
with an occasional aberrant complex of ventric- stead of the preflight systolic drop with prompt
ular origin. The usual pretilt sinus arrhythmia compensation and a 15 mm Hg diastolic rise
disappeared with the rate increases. The Flack following the tilt, most of the postflight tilts
Test produced dropped beats and occasional were followed by a systolic drop, a very delayed
premature ventricular contractions during the systolic rise, and little or no change in diastolic
period after sudden release. levels. Narrowing of pulse pressure to as little
On no occasion could symptoms of near-syn- as 6 mm Hg was evident in the early postflight
cope be detected. Subjectively, all of these tests tilts. Table 18-XVI presents the postflight
were exceedingly well-tolerated. Observation blood pressure values during the tilt studies.
of the physical apearance while tilted showed The blood pressure responses to the final tilt
a tendency to bluish mottling of the hands and were nearly normal but still showed a delayed
feet and a tendency to increased filling of the compensation for the systolic drop. No visible
veins of the legs. objective changes occurred and there were no
Postflight results are shown adjacent to the subjective symptoms.
preflight findings in table 18-XV and figures In summary, the prefight tilt test produced
18-7 and 18-8. It is readily evident that in expected cardiovascular compensatory reactions
the postflight tilt test no. 1 (conducted approxi- in that they could be demonstrated by heart
mately 1 hour after landing) the mean pretilt rate, blood pressure, a_nd ECG data, _nd M'I of
heart rates were found to be 11 beats per minute these tests were well tolerated. The postflight
higher than during the preflight controls, and tilt tests demonstrated the presence of moderate
the tilt produced a greater heart rate response orthostatic hypotension, with far greater heart
than any of the prefight tilts. Most of the rates required to maintain effective cardiovas-
values from tilt test no. 1 were 120 beats per eular function. Compensation was achieved,
minute (maximum 132 beats per minute) and however, and the pilot did not develop even
near-syncope. Tilt studies of responses after
exceeded any of the maximum values obtained
stresses similar to those experienced during
during the 11 preflight tilts. A Flack Test
was not believed to be indicated in view of the flight are not available. Contributing stress
factors including heat stress, the effect of pro-
tilt response. Tilt test no. 2, conducted 3 hours
after landing and 2 hours after no. 1, began longed confinement, dehydration, fatigue, and
from a higher point and showed an even greater a possible effect of weightlessness per se are
rate response; three of the six values were be- thought to be the principal elements responsible
for this change. The picture is further clouded
tween 140 and 144 beats per minute. Within
41/2 minutes after tilt, the heart rate had by residual effects of the dextro amphetamine.

declined to 132 beats per minute when the Flack Calibrated Work
Test produced a jump to 145 beats per minute.
The tilt was ended and subsequent rates were A device for calibrated work consisting of a
similar to the pretilt rates. Tilt test no. 3, con- short plastic handle and expandable bungee
ducted 63/_ hours after landing and 31/_ hours cords (see fig. 18-9) w'ts fixed within the space-
after no. 2, showed responses very close to the craft near the astronaut's feet. A limiting
preflight maximums, which are still excessive, cable ensured repeatability of handle travel, re-
but much less so than the previous two tilts. quiring 65 pounds of force for each full exten-
The rates decrease slightly after the Flack Test. sion. At 9_: 25 : 00 and again at 7 : 41 : 00 g.e.t,
Tilt test no. 4, initiated 19 hours after landing the astronaut recorded his blood pressure, pulled
and 12_2 hours after no. 3, produced responses the device 30 times in as near 30 seconds as pos-
very near those obtained before flight with a sible, and again recorded his blood pressure.
continued slowing of heart rate after the Flack The results of these two work periods were com-

323
Tnble I8-XVZ.--RZood Pressure 17nZues During T i l t Xtudies, Postflight

Pret'ilt Tilt Posttilt


Tilt, ~~

Time Value Time Value Time Value


-____

May 16, 1963; No. 1 13:35:00 90180 13 :46:30 90170 13:52:00 90170
13:36:00 90180 13 :46:45 86/70 13 :53:00 94/72
13:37 :00 90182 13:47:30 86/78 13:54:00 96/74
13 :46 :00 88/76 13:48:30 86/70 13:55:00 98/78
13:49 :00 84/70 13:56:00 l00/80
13:50:00 84/70

May 16, 1963; No. 2 15:42 :00 86/60 15:44:00 100170 15:51:00 104172
15:43 :00 88/62 15:44:30 94/74 15:51:30 104172
15:43 :15 88/64 15:45:00 84/78 15:52 :00 106174
15:43:30 88/66 15:46 :00 82/72 15:52:30 102170
15:47:00 92/84 15 :53:00 104172
15:48:00 a102/80
15:50:00 86/60

May 16, 1963, No. 3 1 9 : l l :oo 88/52 19 :15:00 110168 19 :19 :45 92/58
19:11:30 88/54 19:15 :30 84/70 19 :20 :15 96/60
19 :12 :00 90152 19 :16:00 80168 19:21:00 92/60
19 :13 :00 90154 19 :17 :00 86/68 19 :22:00 94/58
19 :14:00 88/54 19 :18:00 80174 19 :23:00 92/58
19:18:30 a120/90
19:19:00 80170

May 17, 1963; No. 4 07:42:00 96/60 07:45:30 92/78 07:51:00 96/56
07:43:00 98/60 07:46:00 l00/68 07:52:00 100154
07:44:00 100162 07 :46 :30 88/68 07 :53 :00 100156
07 :45 :00 98/60 07 :47 :00 92/70 07:54:00 108158
07:48:00 92/66 07:55:00 104154
07 :49 :00 86/64
07:50:00 8110164

a Values recorded dbring Flack Tests.


slightly easier. During flight he felt his post-
work breathing was not as labored as it was
following control runs, and he thought his heart
rate returned to prework values more rapidly.
The data, however, do not support this state-
ment.
Analysis of the data does not show any strik-
ing differences between the one gravity and
zero gravity work periods. Inflight mean heart
rates during the calibrated work period are 16
I :;ERE lS-!).--Exercising device used for calibrated beats per minute higher than preflight, but his
work.
inflight mean heart rate before work is 15 beats
paredmith five such periods performed at nor- per minute higher. (Return to prework values
mal gravity in the spacecraft and in the pro- was slower following the inflight exercise.)
cedures trainer. The results are given in table 18-XI and pre-
Subjectively, tlie astroiiaut could tell little sented graphically in figure 18-10. One pre-
difference between tlie work performed under flight heart rate during work was 160 beats per
normnl gravity and under zero gravity, the ef- minute. This value occurred at the only time in
fort under zero gravity being, if anything, one of the seven periods in which he worked

324
over 0.7 minute and probably reflects the pro- flight mean heart rate dropped to 11 beats per
longation of the work period rather than indi- minute over the preflight value, while during
cating a higher work load. During the 18- the flight it fell to 17 beats per minute over the
second recovery period after the test, the pre- prework mean.

_ Range IIIIIIIIl'llllllllll Diastolic range A Mean heart rate values


iMean blood pressure _, Last value before work IPrework and postwork heart
nllnlllllSystolic range _, First value after work lrote means and ranges

Preflight Inflight

, i I
. _ Wo_rk- __ __ 1_ __ --W( rk-- "1
i I I
I I
i I
I I
160 I I
II I
150 I I

150 I :':.a:,_._'.;._

I--
"_ 120 I . _._ I
-_ II0 _' _ ...... __i
i /V I I

,oo ' I
'
I
I
,
i
I
I
:I= 80 ---
-ib
70 I 1
I I
I I I
0 12 24 56 48 0 12 24 36 48
Time,see Time,sec

FI6URE 18-10.--Calibrated work--MA-9.

Table 18-XVII.--Blood Chemistries

May 16, May 17,


Determination Mar. 12, May 8, May 12, May 14, 1963; 1963; May 20,
1963 1963 1963 1963 landing landing 1963
-{--2}/_ hours + 24 hours

Calcium, mEq// ........ 4. 17 4. 28 4. 60 4. 22 4. 67 4. 56 4. 22


Chloride, mEq// ......... 105 106 100 104 104 102 104
Protein (total), g/100 ml_ 6.0 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.3 6.2 6.2
Phosphorus, mg/100 ml__ 4.2 3.5 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.0 3.4
Sodium, mEq// .......... 153 151 16i 144 153 147 146
Potassium, mEq// ........ 4.6 4.6 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.0 4.9

Special Clinical Studies tions appear in table 18-XVII. It should be


noted that mineral content of the diet was not
Retinal photography, urine and plasma elec-
provided in equal daily portions during the pe-
trolyte determinations, and plasma enzyme
riod of time represented by this table. There
studies comprise special clinical studies. The
was no indication of increased urinary calcium
retinal photographs, taken after the flight for
excretion. Sodium and chloride retention
comparison with preflight pictures, show no
changes. The results of the urine-electrolyte shown on May 17 and 18 are consistent with the

determinations are presented in table 18-V. period of restoration of fluid balance following
The results of the plasma electrolyte determina- the dehydration which occurred in flight. All

325
other values are within the normal range for persisted for between 7 and 19 hours after land-
Astronaut Cooper. Enzyme studies have been ing. The changes were of greater magnitude
made in each of the Mercury flights as part of ,'t following the 34-hour flight than those follow-
developlnent program. The clinical signifi- ing the 9-hour flight; however, all changes dis-
cance of the data is still undergoing validation ; appeared in a similar time interval in both
therefore, interpretation has not been at- cases. The implications of this hemodynamic
tempted. Consequently, results are not re- response will have to be given very serious con-
ported in this paper. sideration as longer missions are undertaken.
No other clearly significant changes have been
Conclusions
found in comprehensive preflight and postflight
On the basis of the total experience obtained physical examinations.
during Project Mercury, the following medi- Acknowledgments.--The following individ-
cally significant facts have been derived from uals helped in preparation of and data process-
the medical operations. ing for this paper and their assistance is
(1) There has been no evidence of significant gratefully acknowledged: the Space Medi-
degradation of pilot function attributalble to cine Branch, Crew Systems Division, NASA
space flight. A mission of 34 hours in the zero- Manned Spacecraft Center, particularly Miss
gravity condition has been well tolerated and Rita Rapp ,and also the bioinstrumentation
all measured physiologic functions remained section; Edward C. Knoblock, Ph. D., Wal-
within anticipated ranges throughout this ter Reed Army Institute of Research, Wash-
flight. ington, D.C.; Ashton Graybiel, M.D., U.S.N.
('2) Sleep in flight is possible and subjec-
School of Aviation Medicine, Pensacola,
tively normal.
Fla.; Donald Flinn, M.D., and W. Bruce
(3) The radiation dose received by the _tstro-
Clark, M.D., U.S.A.F. School of Aerospace
nauts to date is considered medically insignifi-
cant. Medicine, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas; David

(4) There is no evidence of abnormal sen- H. Newbern, M.D., Orlando Air Force Base,
sory, psychiatric, or psychological response to Fla.; Charles W. Upp, M.D., Selfridge Air
an orbital space flight of up to 11/2 days. Force Base, Michigan; Robert D. Bolinder,
(5) Following missions of 9 and 34 hours M.I)., Fort Dix, New Jersey; Walter Frajola,
duration, an orthostatic rise in heart rate and Ph.D., Ohio State University; and the many
fall in blood pressure has been noted and has medical flight controllers.

References

1. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Third United States Manned Orbital Space Flight,
October 3, 1962. SP-12, Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
2. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Scco_d United States Manned Orbital Space Flight,
May 2_, 1962. Sp-6, Supt. Doe., U.S. Govenlment Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).
3. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the First United States Manned Orbital Space Flight,
February 20, 1962. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).

326
19. OBSERVATIONS OF SPACE PHENOMENA

By JOHN A. O'KEEFE, PrI. D., Asst. Chie], Theoretical Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center;
LAWRENCE DUNKELMAN, PH. D. Space Sciences Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; STANLEY
" " 0
D. SOULES, PH. D., U.S. Weather Bureau, Natwnal Weather Satelhte Center; WILLIAM F. HucrL U. ]
_tinnesota; and PAUL D. LOWMAN, JR., PH.D., Theoretical Division, NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center

2/ _ 9 _ Summary straints discussed in paper 12. The position,


transmission polarization structure, and field-
In the following report are presented the of-view of the spacecraft window are described
principal scientific observations made by the in figure 19-1. As can be seen, this window
Mercury astronauts, arranged according to the contains two panes of plate glass and two panes
sequence: daylight, twilight, and night. The of Vycor, the latter set at oblique angles, which
first section is principally concerned with the increases the problem of light scattering and
examination of the earth as seen from these window reflections from internal lighting dur-
heights, although a section is also presented on ing night time observations. The window
the sky. In the second section, the appearance transmission cuts off sharply at the lower end
of the sun at sunset is discussed, then the twi- of the visual spectrum, precluding photography
light atmosphere, and the astronomical phe- in the ultraviolet region. Transmission in the
nomena peculiar to the early twilight. In the infrared range permitted photography in this
third section are discussed the new data about area for the Weather Bureau. Transmission
the earth as seen at night and the difficulty asso- in the visual range is reduced approximately
ciated with viewing the moon at the horizon. to the same extent that light is attenuated by the
atmosphere. The polarization produced by the
Introduction
window was probably of no sig-nificance to any
of the observations described in this section.
From the beginning of time, man has looked
The field-of-view was a limiting factor since
out upon this world with an active curiosity,
control fuel conservation restricted the freedom
cataloging what he saw and eventually devel-
of the pilot to orient his vehicle for making
oping explanations for why the earth and sky
observations. In addition to the viewing limi-
appear as they do. The results of this type of
"tations indicated in figure 19-1, during the
naturalistic activity as they relate to the earth's
normal launch, the window frequently becomes
atmosphere have been summarized by Minnaert
covered with a film from the exhaust of the
(ref. 1), whose work summarizes at least the
escape tower when it is jettisoned, which re-
main lines of all of the knowledge which man
duces slightly the light transmission and in-
had been able to gain from an earthbound posi-
creases the problem of scattering.
tion, by use of the unaided eye. With the ad-
Throughout this portion, an attempt is made
vent of manned space flight, it is possible for
the first time to observe the earth from outside to present an integrated picture of the appear-
auce of the earth and sky as viewed from space,
the atmosphere, and so to extend the naked-eye
observations which are summarized in Min- together with a physical explanation of the phe-
nomenon observed where sufficient information
naert's work.
is available to make hypothesis. In general,
This section compiles and summarizes the
most of what has been reported by the astro-
observations of the Mercury astronauts and the
nauts confirms data from other sources, such
findings from the principal photographic stud-
ies conducted duriug the Mercury flights. as recent aircraft, balloon, and sounding rocket
These observational and photographic da_a studies. If much of the information is not

were limited by a number of operational corn novel, it has helped to fill in the basic outlines

327
Composite plot of spectral transmission for several
window angles Project Mercury, MA-IO- Window

e" I00 -
Angle between window
normal and photometer axis

Spacecraft window arrangement 80-

3
E_ 60 -
8

E
40 --

20--

0
0.5 07 I0 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.5
Wavelength, microns
Window polarization for electric vector
relative to plane parallel to the long
window dimension and contain window
normal / photometer axis Project Mercury:
MA - I0 window

20 °
2100_
_8o 40°
_-60

_40 Angle between window normal


and photometer axis
a: 2o

o ,_ _o _o 1o 5o'6o
i
7'0 8o
i
9o
J

Polarization angle, deg


" _ Me:/ciudY°:Pa cecr a f t cecraft

' 60° "l

,o3°0,,

/ /
_:: Field of view J_20°_ Field of view__ ;-:_-
left eye right eye
glass-Coming code 1723
Reid of view through .the Mercury window

FIGURE 19-1.--Mercury spacecraft window.

of our knowledge about many features of the science program are listed at tim end of this
upper atmosphere• section.
The program of astronaut observations and
Appearance of the Earth in Daylight From
their interpretation has been greatly aided by
Space
consultation with investigators in _ number of
fields. The individuals who consulted with During the daylight phase of the orbit_ the
._[anned Spacecraft Center personnel on the general impression of the earth as seen from a

328
distance of 100 to 150 miles has been character- t ions are relatively easily discernible. These
ized by the astronauts as similar t o the view may be quite spectacular as when the spiral
from a high-flying jet aircraft. The earth's shape of n hurricane a thousand miles in diam-
surface, particularly when viewed obliquely, eter is clearly seen from above (fig. 1 9 4 ) .
:Lppears to have a somewhat bluish cast, as would The day horizon has been described as a light-
be expected from tlie longer visual path through blue b:iiid, shading off into the blackness of the
the atmosphere. Greens are less readily visible, space above the earth. Photographs taken by
except when directly below the spacecraft. the astronauts provide some indication of band-
However, major color variations can be dis- ing in this horizon layer. Such banding has
tinguished. The coastlines and rivers are easily been reported by Astronauts Shepard, Grissom,
risible (fig. 19-2) :is are mountain ranges (fig. and Glenn in references 2 to 4, respectively.
19-3). The banding appears to be related to the layers
In the daytime, the clouds are extremely i n the atmosphere. The width of the daytime
bright and easily visible. The astronauts have horizon nppenrs to correspond to the width of
reported that, generally, they can determine the troposphere and to be approximately y2"
relative cloud levels, perhaps by noting shadows :is rieu-ecl from the spacecraft. This is demon-
or the apparent motion of cloud tops re1at 'ive strated in figure 19-5, which shows the moon
to the surface. Different types of cloud forma- just above tlie daylit horizon. The diameter of

FIGURE 1%2.-Ganges River Basin. MA-9 photogralJh.

707-0516 0--22
329
FIGURE1M.-Anti-Atlas Mountains in North Africa. M A 4 photograph.

the moon, which is 1/2", is approximately equal that has been consistently clear throughout all
to the thickness of the daytime horizon as pic- the orbital flights is the western African desert
tured in the photograph. shown in figure 19-3 and the southwestern
United States. Efforts to observe ground signal
Visibility of Ground Features
lights from the spacecraft mere frustrated on
The visibility of small features on the surface three of the four flights by overcast conditions
of the earth from space is a complex but impor- (See p p e r 12). Astronaut Cooper enjoyed the
tant problem since ground landmarks offer a best visibility conditions of any of the astro-
potentially very useful navigational reference. nauts and yet he estimated the cloud coverage
To obtain some information on the operational to average 50 percent during his flight.
problems of viewing objects on the surface of
Even where no cloud coverage is present, visi-
the earth in addition to that provided by the
bility may be markedly deteriorated by haze
ground light study reported in the section on
experiments, the pilots were asked to report produced by smoke, dust particles, or other
cmefnlly what could be seen from orbit. These aerosols. Thus, for example, Astronaut Cooper
observations have been described in the pilot's noted that, while he could see roads and fields
report made after each manned flight. and an airport in the El Centro area, he could
One of the major features of interest to Glenn not see either Los Angeles or San Diego, though
during the MA-6 flight (ref. 4) was the extent he flew right over them. Figure 19-2, which
of the cloud cover over the earth. The only area shov-s a view of the Ganges River Basin photo-

330
graphed on the MA-9 flight, demonstrates this of North Africa. The position of the cloud
problem since the city of Calcutta with 24/2 produces a n apparent change in the coastline,
million population is almost completely invisi- which could be confusing if such geographical
ble and was not seen by Cooper during the features were to be used for navigation.
flight. Landmarks can be most clearly seen Thus, the extent of cloud cover and atmos-
when viewed directly below the spacecraft. The pheric haze in the latitudes in which the Mercury
blue haziness, which is seen in photographs of flights have been made reduces the usefulnem

FIGURE194.-Hurricane Debbie. M A 4 photograph.

the daylight horizon (fig. 19-5), illustrates the of landmarks or ground lights for naviga-
reduction in visibility produced by the longer tion. On the other hand, in areas where the
path through the atmosphere. The visibility weather is good, relatively small objects may be
of features farther from the spacecraft is also sighted. However, this is not a result of magni-
reduced by the reduction in size because of view- fication produced by the difference in refractive
ing distance and foreshortening because of the index between the atmosphere and the vacuum
angle-of -view and the earth’s curvature. of space as had been proposed in reference 5.
Moreover, cloud cover may not simply obscure The effect proposed is the same as the magnifi-
targets. It may also produce cues which lead cation of a penny a t the bottom of a cup of
to misinterpretation of terrain features. An water-the penny appears to be a little higher
example of this is shown in the photograph in than it really is (fig. 19-6). Because of the
figure 19-3, taken on the M A 4 flight, Khich relatively small difference between the refrac-
shows a low lying cloud over the Atlantic coast tive index of the atmosphere and the vacuum,

331
1%5.--RIoon
FIGURE near horizon. MA-5 photograph.

(ref. 6 ) . This work is too extensive to be


reviewed here. However, it is well kno1T-n that
where the dust, smoke, and aerosol content
of the atmosphere is low, small objects may be
seen for considerable distances if the illumina-
Apparent posltion
,'-of penny
tion and the contrast between the object and its
background are high. The relationships among
illumination, contrast between the object and its
background, and the size of the object or
Water Actual posttion angle subtended at the eye is indicated in
r-
of penny
figure 19-7. These data, taken from ths well-
known work of Blackwell (ref. 7 ) , illustrate
1q7~(;i.i:b n i apparent magnification pro-
~ ~ ~ ; . - I ) i a g r ; i of that the smallest object that can just be detectecl
dured by water. 50 percent of the time is dependent on size con-
trast and illumination. One minute of arc is
the effect is much smaller than in water. I f often taken as a "rule of thumb" for the practi-
the index of refraction is computed and summed cal limit of human visual acuity. However, a s
for each kilometer of atmosphere up to the alti- can be seen from this figure, this is an oversim-
tude of 45 kilometers (where it becomes unity) plification. Under many combinations of illu-
based on the U.S. Standard Atmosphere, 1969, mination and contrast, the smallest object that
the maximum magnification possible is on the can just be seen is 10 times th:it large, while at
order of only 1.00002, or a rise of 8.5 feet. other combinations of these factors, objects ap-
The problem of risibility from aircraft has proximately M' of arc can be seen. Where con-
received considerable attention in recent years trast or illuniinatioll are very high, even smaller

332
4I and railroads have been reported by all four of
the pilots who flew orbital flights. These ob-
5 servations have all been made at close to perigee
0.595 altitude (86 to 90 nautical miles) between 8:00
2 and lO_:00 a,.m., loom time, under excellent visi-
bility conditions. Astronaut Cooper, who en-
I joyed mmsu,llly good weather conditions, also
reported identifying the cities of Dallas and
0 IIouston, in Texas, and from the pattern of lakes
and wooded areas, the region around Clear Lake
-I where the new Manned Spacecraft Center is
being built. In addition, the astronaut made
-2 a number of observations in the mountainous
and plateau regions of India and Tibet. There
-5_5 he reported what appeared to be individual
Log, of brightness buildings in Tibetan villages. Some of these ob-
servations were apparently aided by trails of
FIOURE 19-7.--Threshold of brightness contrast for 50
smoke from the chinmeys of the buildings. In
percent dete(.tion for two stimuli diameters (minutes
addition, he reported he was able to see roads
of arc), after Blackwell (ref. 7. Stimuli brighter
than background. Unlimited time of exposure. on one of which he saw a trail of dust. At the
intersection of the dust trail and the road, he
objects may be seen. Thus, Zoethout (ref. 8) saw a spot which he felt might be a vehicle (See
gives a value of 10" of arc for the minimum paper '20). These observations over Tibet were
visible white square on a black background. made from an altitude of 88 n'mtical miles at
This corresponds to 30 feet at 100 nautical miles. al)proximately 7:30 a.m., local time. The
These general relationships are complicated weather conditions were clear with good visi-
by several factors. Thus, for point light bility. Atmospheric attenuation was further
sources, such as stars, visibility is independent reduced by the altitude of the Tibetan plateau
of size and dependent only on the intensity of which at this point is approximately 16,000 feet.
the stimulus. Fox" lille or ribbon objects, the It should be reco_dzed that all these observa-
extended length reduces the necessary diameter tions were greatly facilitated by the context in
for detection, thus the width of a line, which which the observation was made. To be report-
can just be detected, may be one-sixth or less ed, objects must be perceived. Previous train-
than the minimum diameter of a circular object ing and experience have a marked effect on
which can just be seen. This is illustrated in what an individual will report in any situation.
figure 19-8 which shows an infrared photograph Experience generally increases the likelihood
taken by a Viking rocket over the southwestern that a small object near visual threshold will
United States (ref. 9). This photograph was be detected, although it may work in the op-
taken at a height of 150 miles. From the type posite direction as when an unusual angle of
of fihn, the characteristics of the camera lens, lighting or shadow changes the appearance of
the exposure length, and the extent of enlarge- an object to the point that it goes unrecognized.
ment, the resolution can be calculated to be 500 Such exI)erience and training can also lead to
feet (ref. 10). Yet roads running across the the accurate identification of objects that would
desert, whose width must be on the order of 5(1 otherwise not be recognized. This procedure
feet or less, can be clearly seen. is much like that of interpretation of a photo-
There have been several reports by the astro- graph where a set of vehicle treadm'/rks, run-
nauts of sightings of small objects on the day- ning into a forest area, indicate the possible
light side of the orbit. These observations have presence of a vehicle among the trees.
primarily been confined to the area of the south- Astronaut Glenn described a situation in
western desert of the United States between El which he saw a road crossing a river. Each of
Centro, California, and El Paso, Texas. In this these could be recognized because they were
region, cities, cultivated fields, roads, airports, extended, ribbon-type objects. At the point

333
l!kX.--Tiking
FIGURE photograph of El Paso, Texas, area.

where they crossed, he said that he felt he could to be no need for postulation of either improved
almost see the bridge, though he recognized visibility resulting from weightless conditions
that it was too small to be seen. or unexpected atmospheric magnification ef -
Since the actual objects which were being fects to account for the observations made to
viewed a t these points cannot be verified, it is date. Despite the impressive nature of these
not possible to determine the accuracy of these observations, the important feature to be kept
observations. However, from knowledge of the in mind is that they are scattered and involve
factors which affect risibility under these condi- viewing under essentially optimal conditions.
tions, there appears to be no reason to suspect As pointed out earlier, the large amounts of
that these identifications were not generally ac- haze and cloud cover make ground observations
difficult and somewhat unreliable.
curate. All the astronauts have normal, or bet-
ter, distance visual acuity. Astronaut Cooper Terrain Photography
in particular has an acuity, as measured during As with the problem of direct viewing, it is
a recent annual physical, of 20/12, which is sig- not possible to put a lower limit on the physio-
nificantly better than 20/20 which is the normal graphic and geologic detail which can be delin-
standard of good acuity. A11 the observations eated on space photographs without an exten-
were made under high levels of illumination, sive study. However, a rough idea of the useful
excellent visibility conditions, and with the aid resolution can be gained by examination of
of many contextual cues. Thus, there appears some of the Mercury pictures listed in table

334
Table 19-I.--Summary of Potential Usefulness o] Mercury Earth Photographs

Approximate number Potential uses and


Flight Area covered Film type useful pictures remarks

MR-1 AMR 70 mm, black 168 total Meteorology


and white

MR-2 AMR, Florida, 70, mm, color 30 useful Meteorology and topog-
Bahamas raphy; good quality

MR-3 AMR 70 mm, color 50 feet exposed Meteorology; relatively


poor quality

MA-4 Atlantic Ocean, 70mm, color About 350 usable photo- Meteorology, topog-
North Africa graphs raphy, and geology;
excellent quality

MA-5 Florida, West Coast, 70 mm, color 80 feet probably about Meteorology, topog-
Mexico, Ocean 5 to 10 usable terrain raphy; fair quality
areas photographs

MA-6 Florida, North 35 mm, color 38 usable pictures, about Meteorology, topog-
Africa 5 or 6 terrain photo- raphy, geology;
graphs good quality

MA-7 West Africa 35 mm, color 200 pictures, 4 or 5 ter- Meteorology, topog-
rain photographs raphy

MA-8 Mexico, South 70 mill_ 14 color photographs Fair to poor quality;


America meteorology; quality
of terrain pictures poor

MA-9 Tibet, South east 70 mm 30 photographs Meteorology, topog-


and South Central raphy, geology; ex-
Asia, Africa, Mid- cellent
dle East

19-I. This table summarizes the general pur- ularly useful because of the favorable camera

pose photographs taken on manned and un- angle. A geologic sketch prepared from this

manned Mercury flights. photograph is shown in fig. 19-10. A number

The MA-4 photographs of North Africa are of structures of possible economic interest are

of considerable interest because they are among indicated in the sketch. For example, the domes

the best color pictures showing unobscured ter- and anticlines represent potential oil-bearing

rain. The Anti-Atlas Mountains are especially areas, and intersections of some of the linea-

striking (fig. 19-3) in the amount of geologic ments might be the loci of mineral deposits.
detail which can be seen. The folded structure It is interesting to note that manmade fea-

of the mountains is obvious, and many individ- tures (excepting large areas of cultivation) are

ual plunging folds can be traced. A linear fea- generally very difficult to identify on the color

ture suggestive of the Zemmour fault (ref. 11) photographs. As already noted, figure 19-2

can be seen intersecting the coast south of Aga- shows the area of Calcutta but the city itself

dir but not identified with any certainty. cannot be recognized.

Many of the MA-9 photographs show abun- The scientific value of the Mercury terrain

dant topographic and geologic detail. Figure photographs depends on several characteristics

19-9, taken over the Tibetan plateau, is partic- in which they differ from conventional aerial

335
FIGURE194-Photograph of Tibetan Plateau. MA-9 photograph.

photography. The most obrious of these is the photographs, such as the very long lineaments
tremendous aerial coverage provided by each illustrated in figure 19-10. I t should also be
picture baken from orbital altitude. This is mentioned that the synoptic nature of space
illustrated by comparison of the 1: 800,000 scale photography is valuable in meteorological and
of figure 19-9, taken on the MA-9 flight, with oceanographic applications.
the 1: 20,000 or 1: 40,000 scales of conventional Another characteristic of space photographs
air photos. The area covered increases with is tlie fact that they show the earth, subject to
approximately tlie inverse square of the scale, limitations of visibility and resolution, as it is.
and is so much greater in pictures taken from Stereoscopic vision is possible with even roiiplily
space as to be virtually a qualitative difference. oriented photographs if there is overlap. In
This great coverage permits continuity of ob- addition, subtle tonal differences covering large
servation wliich may lead to discovery of large areas can be detected. Both of these properties
geologic features unnoticed on conrentional are essential for geological interpretation and
336
/ _ f----_/ _ Folds

/ ::i_ " Dome

Montcalm s___" _ _ i'G - F{glds (t"/" _ .

. "

Snow-covered highland ""------_ Plunging anticline

_-G Valley-Glacier
__L_ Strike and dip of strata

(_ Lake

Center of photograph near 91 ° E, 34<>30'N,


Sedimentary lock contacts in north-central Tibet.

Approximate scale, east west direction at


._---I Lineament (fault ?)
center of map: 1800,000

FZGURE 19-1O.--Geologic sketch based on figure 9. 337


cannot, in general, be provided by mosaics of clouds were more difficult to see over land in
conventional aerial photographs. This strongly the near infrared because of the high reflectiv-
suggests the unique scientific value of terrain ity of both clouds and areas covered with green
photographs from orbital altitudes, not only vegetation containing chlorophyll.
for unexplored areas such as Tibet, lint also These two studies show, then, that the spec-
for areas previously covered by conventional tral sensitivity of television camera systems for
photography. weather satellites should probably be restricted
In sumary, photographs of the earth from to the region from about 5000 to 7500 dr a.s a
orbiting spacecraft are potentially valuable for compromise between the adverse effects of seat-
(1) geologic reconnaissance, (2) topographic tering by molecules and aerosols at shorter vis-
mapping, (3) forest mapping, (4) icepack and ible wavelengths and the low contrast effects of
iceberg monitoring, (5) supplemental weather clouds over land areas at near infrared
observations, and (6) mapping of near-surface wavelengths.
ocean currents. In addition, experience in inter- Many of the black and white pictures taken
preting such photographs will prove useful in by Astronaut Sehirra show a bright band on
interpreting similar photographs of the planets the earth's horizon. The bright band is ap-
when they become available. proximately 16 kilometers thick, which agrees
with the expected thickness of the tropical
Meteorological Information From Mercury Flights
troposphere. Large light scatterers in the tro-
Each astronaut has devoted part of his space- posphere, such as dust and water droplets,
flight program to visual and photographic produce this bright band at the earth's limb.
observations of value to meteorology (ref. 12). The thermal stability of the stratosphere se-
Since high photographic contrast is needed in verely limits the convective transport of aero-
pictures from weather satellites to aid in dis-
sols to higher levels, so that there is very little
tinguishing 'coastlines and patterns of thin
scattered light coming from the stratosphere.
clouds, two photographic studies were initiated
The apparent brightness of the tropospherie
to study cloud, land, and water contrast as a
layer varies from pieture to picture, suggesting
function of wavelength. These studies have
that there are changes in the size or concentra-
heen described in paper 12. tion of scatterers over different geographic
Astronaut Schirra took a series of 13 black
areas. Changes in brightness in the same pie-
and white photographs of the earth through ture from one filter to another demonstrate the
six color filters in the visible spectral region wave length dependence of the scattering of sun-
from 3700 .'_ to 7200 dr to record some of the
light; more light is scal:tered at the shorter
spectral reflectance characteristic of clouds, wave lengths. However, within an individual
land, and water areas when viewed from out-
picture, both geographical and wave len_h
side the atmosphere. In general, the results
effects may appear.
from this study showed that, as would be
The pictures obtained with photographic film
expected, photographic contrast increases with
contains more meteorological information than
increasing wavelen_h in the visible spectrum.
do the low resolution pictures from present
It might be concluded that the optimum
weather satellite television pictures. Because
wavelengths for viewing the earth would be in
of the greater resolution and lower altitude the
the near infrared spectrum where scattering
from atmospheric particles is relatively low. cloud types and patterns can be seen in greater
That this is not quite true was demonstrated detail in the Mercury photographs. If a mete-
in a second study conducted by Astronaut orologist can see the smaller cloud forms and
Cooper. In this stu(ly, three areas of the infra- their orientation, then he may have important
red spectrum were isolated by use of filters and clues to the direction of the wind, the wind
infrared film. shear, and possibly a rough estimate of the
Water has a very low reflectance in the near wind speed in the lower levels of the atmos-
infrared, while clouds and land have a high phere. Photographs from Mercury flights have
reflectance. Therefore, in this second study, been useful in cloud studies to help interpret
coastlines and cloud patterns over water were the meteorological information in Tiros
easily discernible, lTnfortunately, however, pictures.

338
SeveralMercuryastronautshaveseenlight- dark than the night sky, and the _hreshold of
star visibility correspondingly raised by as
ning in thunderstormsat night, appearing,as
much as two magnitudes. Two hypotheses sug-
AstronautGlenndescribed it, "like ballsof cot-
ton illuminated from within." Astronaut gest themselves to account for this observation.
Cooperobservedthat eachlightning flashwas aThehighmorealtitude probable one is that this results from

by static on his high frequency atomic emission at 6300 -_. possibly that of the
dayglow
accompanied
andultrahigh frequencyradioreceivers.This
A second less likely hypothesis is that the sky
observationconfirmsthe findingsof a recent
appears less dark during the daytime as a result
researchstudyconductedfor the WeatherBu-
of scattering due to small solid particles. The
reau, which concludedthat high frequency
argument against this proposal is as follows.
energyradiatedfrom a lightning strokecan If the glow were due to small solid particles,
propagateand be detectedand locatedon a they would have to be at a level low enough so
worldwidebasisby meansof a lightning (or that the sun could not reach them during the
sferics)detectorcarriedona satellite. Efforts
are underwaynow to developsuchan instru- night; otherwise, this glow would be apparent
ment andour confidence that it, will work is from the ground all night long. Since astro-
much higher becauseof Astronaut Cooper's nomical twilight is defined by saying that
at the end of astronomical twilight the zenith
alertobservation.
werevisibleat nightwith par- has reached full night-time darkness, it is
Cloudsystems clear that at this time, the dust particles,
tial moonlightor none,indicatingthatlow-light if any, must be out of the sunlight. It is
level televisioncamerason weathersatellites
known that astronomical twilight occurs when
may photographcloudcoverat night success- the sun is 18 ° below the horizon; and it
fully. Photographsof cloudsover snoware is a matter of simple trigonometry to show that
beingstudiedto seekwaysof discriminating at this time an object more than about 350 kilo-
one from the other in televisionpictures. meters high would still be in the sunlight.
Cooperreportedhe coulddetectthe difference Hence, if there is a layer of dust particles, they
betweensnowand clouds. He alsoreported must be below 350 kilometers.
that smoketrails gavean indicationof surface Now, Astronaut Cooper reports that the day-
wind direction.
glow as he saw it drowned the light of stars
Daylight Sky
fMnter than about the fourth ma_mlitude. This
To date, none of the astronauts has reported is about the same thing that happens on a night
seeing stars on the daylight side when the sun of full moon ; the fifth and sixth magnitude stars
or the illuminated earth's surface was within become very difficult or impossible to see.
the field of view. Nor was the flashing light Hence, the brightness of the sky as Astro-
released from the MA-9 spacecraft seen by naut Cooper saw it was more or less like the
Astronaut Cooper during the daytime, though brightness of the sky on a night of full moon.
the possibility that he was looking in the wrong We know that from the ground the sky causes
direction cannot be ruled out (See paper 12). a loss of about 30 percent in the light reaching
However, some of the astronauts have reported the earth; and, thus, we may think of it as if
observations of a few bright stars or planets there were small particles covering about one-
at twilight, but their level of dark adaptation third of the sky. Above the spacecraft, the sky
and the degree of cabin lighting are uncertain is so much reduced in scattering power that it
factors to be considered. There is, of course, no scatters only as much light from the sun as the
difficulty in seeing the moon (fig. 19-5) since whole atmosphere scatters from the moon.
it is even visible from the surface of the earth Since the full moon is about 400,000 times faint-
in daylight. er than the sun, it follows that the amount of
When the sun and the illuminated earth's sur- scattering material must be such as to cover
face is not within the field of view, it is possible about 0.3 of 1/400,000 of the sky, or roughly,
to look into space and maintain dark adapta- one millionth. By the usual laws of optics, this
tion. Under these conditions, Astronaut Coop- means that in a column one square centimeter
er reported that the dayside sky appeared less in cross-sectional area and 350 kilometers in

339
length, there must be enough matter to cover ange, white, and blue layers, however, show up
one millionth of a square centimeter. very clearly in the photographs of the setting
It will be shown that this is too much matter. sun and of the orbital twilight which follows.
Tile most efficient size of particle for producing As the sun approaches the horizon, the ter-
scattered light is about 1 micron in diameter; minator passes below the spacecraft and moves
smaller particles perform the electrical equiva- off toward the horizon so that, at sunset, the
lent of bobbing up and down on the light earth directly below the spacecraft is dark. All
waves without disturbing them, and larger ones that can be seen is the band of light in the west,
simply block the light. A 1-micron par- stretching perhaps as much as 180 ° around the
tic]e blocks about 10 -s square centimeters; horizon.
hence about 100 such particles are needed in the The sun, of course, sets much more rapidly
above-mentioned column. Since the volume of for the astronaut than for the observer on the
tile column is 35 cubic meters, the density is ground. Since the sun moves for the ground
about 3 particles per cubic meter. observers at approximately 15 ° an hour, neglect-
A spacecraft moving at 8,000 meters per sec- ing tile effects of atmospheric refraction, it takes
ond will then encounter 24,000 such particles the sun, which is 1/2° in width, 2 minutes to set
per second per square meter. Actually, how- from the time it first touches the horizon to the
ever, micrometeorite counters, which are ade- time when it completely disappears. In con-
quately sensitive for these very small particles, trast, for the orbital vehicle, the sun moves
show between 1/100 and 1 particle per second 'it 4 ° per minute so that, once again neglecting
per square meter outside of showers. Rates of the effects of refraction, it sets in 71/_ seconds.
thousands of particles per square meter per sec- Once the sun has set, the glow along the western
ond are never observed (ref. 15). Hence the horizon gradually fades but remains visible for
layer cannot consist of micron-size particles. apparently about the astronomical twilight pe-
Neither can it consist of particles of other sizes, riod or until the sun is 18 ° below the horizon,
because the counts are even lower for these. which is approximately 41/2 minutes at orbital
There is approximately the same amount of velocity.
mass in each logarithmic increase in size; and Solar Flattening Effect

the other sizes are less efficient. The hypothesis


,lust prior to sunset, calculations show that
of a dust layer thus fails by a factor which can
the effects of terrestrial refraction should be to
be conservatively estimated as 10,000.
give the sun a football-shaped appearance. The
phenomenon lasts such a brief time and is so
Appearance of the Earth at Sunset and
Twilight extremely difficult to observe because of the
problem of glare that only the visual report
The spacecraft window attentuates the aver- from Astronaut Carpenter (ref. 16) conclu-
age light intensity in the visible range to about sively confirms it. It is, however, plainly visible
the same extent as the atmosphere. It does on photo_oTaphs, obtained by both Carpenter
not, however, produce the same color change. and Glenn (fig. 19-11), and matches the theo-
To the astronauts , the sun appears white; they retical shape (ref. 17). The significant point
describe it as having the color of an arc light, here is not that the path of the ray through
rather than tile yellowish color seen from the
the atmosphere is different from the path as
earth. As the sun approaches the horizon, a
seen from ¢he ground. Actually, the distance
band of orange light spreads from below the
between the observer and the refractive layer
sun around tile horizon. Above this orange
causes the entire atmospheric effect to be com-
1)and can 1)e seen the hazy blue layer similar to
that of the daytime sky. As the sun comes pressed in such a way that it results in a com-

('loser to the horizon, a white layer appears pletely different phenomenon.


above the orange band. The orange, white, and
Twilight Bands
1)lue layers are quite distinct, particularly the
border between the white and blue layers. Some I)nring twilight, three atmospheric layers at
astronauts have been able to report on layers least are distinguishable (fig. 19-11). As illus-
which do not appear in photographs. The or- trated in figure 19-12 at the top of the atmos-

340
l%ll.-Sunset
FIQURE photograph. MA-7 photograph.

no storms between the observer and the sun,


the twilight colors change slowly and continu-
ously. Discontinuous changes occur when the
contribution t o the sky which should be made
by some distant region is blocked by a storm.
In the same way, if there \\-ere no storms along
the line of sight as seen from the spacecraft, it
would be reasonable to anticipate that the colors
19-12.-Proposed explanation for horizon bands,
FIGURE
of the twilight horizon hand would melt uni-
seen at twilight from space.
formly into each other. I n general, however,
phere, the light of the sun is scattered in the just as the storms interrupt the orderly time
ordinary way (Rayleigli scattering) by atoms sequence of colors as seen from the p o u n d , so
: ~ n dmolecules of the upper atmosphere. This also they may interrupt the orderly spatial dis-
layer is blue for the well-known reason that play of colors as seen from space in the twilight
Rayleigh scattering varies as the minus fourth horizon band. I n addition, the variation
power of the \ravelength and, therefore, effects between troposphere and stratosphere may play
the shorter blue wavelengths much more than a part in producing these lines.
the longer wavelengths. Lower in the atmos- I n addition to these bands, which can be seen
phere the scattering approaches saturation in on photographs taken at twilight by Astronauts
all wavelengths, and so we have a white layer Glenn and Carpenter, Astronaut Schirra noted
I)ec:iuse there is eiiougli atmosphere to scatter further detail in the area in and below the
even the red light. Close to the horizon the Rayleigh scattering level. H e observed the
brightness of more distant atmospheric layers planet Mercury setting through this region and
exceeds that of the layers at which me are look- reported a dark-blue band, a light-blue band,
ing. a consequence, we see, not the light and then n dark-blue band near the earth’s
wliich has heen scattered by the atmosphere but snrfnce. These observations are still being
that which has come through it either from the analyzed ; however, there is some indication
sun itself or from bright layers. As a result, that the Chappiis absorption bands of ozone
this layer appears red, since the beam which may play a role in producing the central blue
reaches 11s has lost blue light. band (ref. 19). Copper confirmed these obser-
Volz and Goody have studied the colors of vations of Schirra by describing the appearance
twilight as seen from the ground (ref. 18). of the blue banding and by examining a sketch
They find that in the rare c:ws when there are prepared from Schirra’s report.

341
Luminous Particles ing the nozzle producing minute droplets or
On numerous occasions, when the sun was crystals which can be viewed under very favora-
above the horizon, small luminous particles ble conditions. It is possible that these par-
drifting generally backboard along the space- ticlea are tiny fragments of the catalyst eroded
craft line of motion at relative velocities of a by the hydrogen peroxide blast. In any case,
few meters per second were observed by the as- particles coming from the jets were not_seen by
tronauts. Carpenter demonstrated by rapping Glenn, Carpenter, or Schirra, probably because
on the hatch that such particles could be pro- the latter were observing them under less fa-
dueed from the spacecraft itself. Given the vorable circumstances. Cooper had the enor-
very close coincidence in orbit velocity, which mous advantage that his cabin ligh'ts could be
is implied by the small relative velocity, it is completely extinguished and his window cov-
considered highly probable that all such par- ered for extended periods of time to assist him
tieles originate from the spacecraft. From the in becoming fully dark-adapted.
remark of Glenn that the particles seemed to be
Dim-Light Phenomena
about as luminous as fireflies, it is possible to
estimate that the sizes of those seen by him are At the time of the beginning of the orbital
of the order of one millimeter (refs. 20 and 21). flight program, it was realized that the most
Some of them may have been bits of debris. The promising field for nighttime observations was
majority, however, appear to be ice crystals the study of extended dim objects, especially
probably formed from the steam which is re- immediately after sundown or before sunrise.
leased by the life-support system. At all times, the astronaut is above a major
Astronaut Cooper (paper 20) reported seeing portion of the airglow layer; and this
particles emerging from the attitude jet nozzles. means a major reduction in the background
He was observing them under especially favora- illumination. Near the time of twilight,
ble circumstances, namely at a time when the the astronaut has the further advantage over
sun was up but the window faced away both the ground observer that his sky is without
from the sun and from the earth, so that he had twilight except for the band along the horizon.
a black sky against which to see them. Further- Since the majority of comets are found by
more, he was dark-adapted. Under these cir- ground observem in twilight, the astronauts
cumstances he could see objects as faint as the were urged to keep an eye out for them at this
fourth magnitude, as compared with an esti- time. It should be noted that a new comet was
mated -9 magnitude for the objects seen by discovered at the eclipse of July 20, 1963
Glenn (refs. 20 and 21). They must thus have (ref. 2o_). It was hoped that the astro-
been as much as 100,000 times fainter, corre- naut would observe the no-man's land between
sponding to the difference of 13 magnitudes. the zodiacal light, which can be observed from
Thus, their diameters may have been as small as the ground only at distances of 30 ° or more
25 microns. For such small particles, it is ex- from the sun, and the outer corona, which is in-
tremely difficult to be sure of the origin. Given visible at distances from the sun more than
the high temperature of the jet exhaust (ap- about 3 ° (ref. 23). This gap has been partially
proximately 1,300 ° F.), ice crystals would not bridged by airplane flights, but more data are
be expected. Furthermore, most of the material still needed.
leaving the nozzles should be moving at super- Astronaut Cooper reported that at about 20
sonic velocities if the jets are to be effective in seconds after sunset, he saw a whitish arch ex-
moving mass of the spacecraft. However, tending some 15 ° or so out from the sun.
Glenn reported seeing a small "V" of steam each Approximately 1 minute after sunset, Cooper
time he activated the pitch down thruster (ref. successfully observed the zodiacal light as a
4). Such steam, under more favorable viewing faint band concentrated along the ecliptic. The
conditions might appear as individual particles. failure of previous astronauts to see it was pre-
It appears possible that some of the material in sumably because of lights in the cabin which
the periphery of the jet exhaust may be moving could not be extinguished. As part of an ex-
relatively slowly and cooling rapidly upon leav- periment developed by Ney and his associates

342
describes it as "tan to buff"; similar descriptions
a seriesof photographsweretakenof the zo-
diacallight, but thesewereunsuccessful
because were given by the others. The nature of the
of theproblems describedin paper12. band was made clear by Astronaut Carpenter
who employed a filter which passed only the
Appearance of Earth and Sky at Night 5577 fk line of the neutral oxygen atom (refs.
21 and 24). Through the filter, the band con-
Once the orbital twilight has faded, the visi-
tinued to be visible although all other details
1)ility of the earth depends upon the phase of
of the horizon had vanished. It was thus clear
the moon. Even'with no moon, the earth's hori-
that the band resulted from the phenomenon
zon is visible to the dark-adapted eye.
of nightglow; that is, the emission of light by
According to Cooper, the earth's surface is
gases of the high atmosphere. In this emission,
somewhat darker than the space above it, which
the line 5577 plays an important part; it con-
is filled not only with the visible stars, but also
stitutes about 1_ of the total, according to
has a diffuse light produced by the countless
Tousey and his associates. Carpenter reported
stars, which cannot be individually resolved by
that the light seen through the fil_er seemed to
the eye and by dim light phenomena, such as
be about the same as that without; this remark
airglow and zodiacal light. With the aid of
should, however, be understood as an indication
starlight, zodiacal light, and airglow, clouds and
of order of magnitude rather than as a precise
coastlines are just visible to the dark-adapted
measurement, for which neither time nor instru-
eye. With moonlight reflected on the earth, ments were available.
the horizon is still clearly defined, but in this
Carpenter also provided a rough estimate of
ease, the earth is brighter than the background
the brightness, indicating that it was compar-
of space. With moonlight, the clouds can be able with that of a bank of clouds near the hori-
seen rather clearly and their motion is distinct
zon illuminated by the quarter moon, or about
enough to provide a cue to the direction of
30 kilorayleighs, according to later computa-
motion of the spacecraft. Lights from cities
tions. This figure happens to agree closely with
can be distingafished, even through thin clouds.
rocket measurements (ref. 25).
Thus the lights of Shanghai shining through the
The height of the nightglow layer was also
clouds were used by Cooper to help aline his
measured on the MA-7 flight. Carpenter
vehicle in yaw on the last night pass prior to
observed the passage of the second mag_nitude
retrofire.
star Gamma ITrsae Majoris through the night-
The night sky appears quite black with the
glow layer. He timed its entrance into the layer,
stars as well defined points of light which do not its passage through the level of maximum
twinkle. Lights upon the earth do twinkle when brightness, and its emergence. From this infor-
viewed from above, according to Cooper. mation, it has been possible to calculate the
Comparison of visual estimates of angles near height of the nightglow layer, by using the
the horizon with the corresponding measure- standard formulas for the dip of the horizon.
ments shows that the so-called "moon illusion" A value of 91 kilometers was found; the close
continues to exist in space; that is, objects near agreement with rocket measurements is prob-
the horizon seem to be larger than their true ably to be expected, since the method is capable
angular dimensions (ref. 21). The fact is inter- of considerable precision.
On the MA-9 flight, a camera with a f/0.8
esting, since it shows that this illusion is not
lens of 3.8 cm focal length using Anseo H 529
related to any sensation of gravity, but is a
color film was carried to photograph the night-
consequence in some way of the visual percep-
glow (see paper 12). A total of 15 usable
tion of the location of the horizon.
exposures were made. Some of these were
The Nightglow degraded by roll of the spacecraft during the
exposure, but a number of them show the night-
Around the horizon, all the astronauts report glow layer as a thin line a few degrees above the
that they saw a band of light, which appeared to horizon as can be seen in figure 19-13(a). The
them to be centered at a height of some 6 ° to 10 ° results of this study are summarized in table
above the visible horizon. Astronaut Glenn 19-II.

343
supported by the densitometry of the photo-
graphs taken by Astronaut Cooper.
Table 19-11 shows the altitudes of the space-
craft as n function of time and the measured
:ingles that the airglow layer has with respect
to the observable earth's limb. It also shows
the inferred heights of the airglow layer, and
these heights vary from somewhat in excess of
100 kilometers down to something just under 80
kilometers. The average height as determined
from all the pictures is 88 kilometers, and the
thickness of the layer is 24 kilometers. There
is an indication (figs. 19-13 (a), ( b ) , and
(c) ) that the earlier photographs of the airglow
( a ) Kightglow photograph number 20 (MA-9) (Un-
retouched). layer show it higher above the horizon as de-
FIGUKE 1%13.-Sightglow photography. termined by lightning flashes on the horizon

Tnb7e 19-ZZ.--illA-9-Nightglow Photogrnphs Used f o r Geo?netricnl Mensurements


[From Gillett, Huch, and Ney, U. of Ninn.]

Angle be- Angular


ween earth' Height of Height of Latitude width at Normal
Picture Time, G.m.t limb and spacecraft center of at which half in- exposure
No. nightglow above earth, nightglow nightglow tensity of time, sec
line, deg km band, km is observed nightglow
band, deg
-~ -

22....._. 1342:50 3. 62 241 111 27' s. 0. 66 30


23 .._..__ 1343:lO 3. 26 240 105 26.5' S. . 69 10
25 ....___ 1346:20 3. 00 232 97 23's. .88 30
2 7 - . . _ _ _ _ 1349:30 2. 26 220 75 18' s. . 71 120
28. . . _ _ _ 1350:20
_ 2. 40 218 78 17' s. . 89 30
29 ...___ 1350:40 2. 41 217 77 16.5' S. . 87 10
31 ~. -. - -. 1355:OO 2. 66 202 81 8' s. .78 30
32 1355:lO 2. 65 202 81 8' s. .78 10
35.._.___ 1401:40 3. 20 181 87 8' N. .92 10
--
Average- - - - - ..- - 2. 86 - - - - - .- . 88 -------- 0. 80

The color of the nightglow band, as deter- than the later pictures, in which the earth's
mined from the photograplis, is greenish with limb is illuminated by the quarter moon. This
respect to tlie bluish-u-hite illumination of the could be true latitude effect, and, if it were,
earth. I t is not, however, the same green as would indicate that the airglow layer has a
higher altitude a t high latitudes-the highest
a pure 5577 line since, as noted above, the
\A
latitude in this cnse being about 27" S. where the
light of the 5577 A line is diluted with other layer is about 108 kilometers as measured from
racliations. the lightning horizon references. The lowest
0 1 1 some of the photographs, the atmospheric
altitude of the :iirglov- layer is near 17" and is
clouds and haze near the horizon can be seen, about 78 kilometers.
The width of the nightglow band a t the half-
illuminated by the moon, then at last quarter
intensity points was measured from the films
(fig. 19-13 (b) ) . As remarked by Carpenter :is between 0.66" and 0.92'. By comparisoll,
(ref. 24), the brightness of the nightglow layer tlie distance from the center of the nightglow
is comparable with that of the clouds illumi- layer to tlie bottom was measiired by C q l e n t e r
nated by the quarter moon; this conclusion is and his coworkers (ref. 24) as 0.34'; he did

344
not measure the entry of the star into the layer.
Carpenter’s half width is in good agreement
with the photographed total width ; both indi-
cate that the nightglow layer is considerably
narrower than the space between itself and the
horizon. Table 19-111 summarizes and com-
pares the data from the MA-7 and MA-9
flights.

( c ) Artist sketch based on nightglow photograph


number 22 (MA-9).
19-13.--Concluded.
FIGURE

tropical 6300 A atomic oxygen emission, first


reported by Barbier and his associates (ref.
14). It is believed that the arc observed
by Schirra is similar to that observed a t
Tamanrasse‘t, Algeria, and Maui, Hawaii. On
one occasion, Cooper noticed and immediately
( b ) Artist sketch based on niglhtglow photograph
reported a patch, similar to that described
number 29 (MA-9).
FIGURE1+13.-Continued. by Scliirra, above the “ordinary” nightglow
Inyer while over South America. It had been
.lstronaut Schirra observed on one occasion predicted that there miglit be risiial concomi-
on the night side, while over the eastern por- tants of the South ,itlantic magnitnde anomaly ;
tion of the Indian Ocean and probably while lio\\-erer neither of tliwe observations were in
looking in :I northerly or northeasterly direc- the correct geograp1iic:il location to he related
t ion, :I large luminous patch which he described to this phenomenon.
:IS :I brownish smog-appearing patch. H e saw A4r h i o rr-?edgm~nts.-Iii nddit ion to the indi-
stars above and below this patch which he felt viduals specifically referred to in the text of
\\-:IS higher and thicker (wider) than the “nor- this sertioii, tlie follo\\-ing scientists assisted in
mal” nightglow. On the average, this higher the dewlopnieiit of the Mercury inflight re-
patcli or layer did not seem t o be as bright as search 1)rogr:im :IS consultants, or members of
the “normnl“ nightglow layer. Some stars the “,id Hoc Comniittee on Scientific Esperi-
c.ould be seen near the feathered edges of the merits,'. or tlie “Panel on Inflight Scientific Ex-
layer, but lie T T ~ Snot certain he could see any perinients” of the SAISA\Office of Space
stars in the central denser portion (nor is it Sciences : ,Jocelyn R . Gill, Pli. I).,PITIMAHead-
likely that, at the short period of observation, quarters; Gordon C. ,ingason, KA\SL\ ,imes
tliere vas a rich and bright star field in the Research Center ; Jlnnrice Dubin, KAiSr\God-
I)ac.lcpr.ouiitl). It is tempting to conclude that clarci Space Fliplit Center ; Frederick R.
this phenomenon may have been a view of a Gracely, NA2SA\He:dqnnrters ; ,John E. Kaugle,

707-058 0-@3+--213 345


Table 19-III.--Comparison of MA-7 and MA-9 Nightglow Observations

Type of measurement Carpenter et al. Cooper photographs

Color ..................... At least partly 5577 ......... Whitish green.


Brightness ................. Like a cloudbank under a Same.
quarter moon; 30 kiloray-
leighs.
Height .................... 91 km ..................... 88 km.
Width .................... 0.68 ° ....................... 0.66 ° to 0.89 °

Ph. D., NASA Headquarters; Freeman H. lin Roach, National Bureau of Standards; Ed-

Quimby, Ph. D., NASA Headquarters; George ward P. Ney, Ph. D., U. of Minnesota; Leslie
P. Tennyson, NASA Headquarters; Ernest J. Meredith, Ph.D., NASA Goddard Space Flight
Ott, NASA Headquarters : Albert Boggess, III, Center; and Dale W. Jenkins, Ph. D., NASA
Ph.D., NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; Headquarters.

George Swenson, Ph. D., U. of Illinois; Frank-

References

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2. S_EPARD, ALAN n., JR. : Pilot's Flight Report, Including In-Flight Film*. Pro*2. Conf. on Results of the First
U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight. NASA, Nat. Inst. Health, Nat. Aead. Sci., June 6, 1961, pp. 69-75.
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5. STI_MBROS, W. : Letter to the Editor, Aviation Week, August 12, 1963, p. 118.
6. MIDDLETON, W. E. K. : Vision Through the Atmosphere. University of Toronto Press, 1952, pp. 122 ft.
7. BLACXWELL, H. R. : Contrast Thresholds of the Human Eye. J. Optical Soc. of America, col. 36, 1946, pp.
624-643.

8. ZOET_OUT, W. D. : Physiologival Optics. The Professional Press, Inc., 1947, pp. 247-353.
9. BAUMANN, R. C., and WINKLEP_ L. : Photography From the Viking II Rocket at Altitudes Ranging up to 158
Miles. Naval Research Lab. Rep. 4489. 1955.
10. LOWMAN, PAUL D., fiR.: Photography of the Earth From Sounding Rockets and Satellites. Photogrammetric
Engineering Journal. (In press.)
11. ROD, E. : Faul Pattern, Northwest Corner of Sahara Shield. Bull Am. Assoc. Petroleum Geologists, col. 46,
No. 4, 1962, pp. 529-552.
12. Sou/ms, S. D,. and NAOLER, K. M. : Weather Observations From Manned Space Stations. Paper presented at
the XIV International As_cronautical Congress of the International Astronautical Federation in Paris,
France, September 25 to October 1, 1963.
13. SCHn_RA, WALTER M., JR. : Pilot's Flight Report. Results of the Third United States Manned Orbital Space
Plight, October 3, 1962. NASA SP-12. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.),
pp. 49-55.
14. BARDIER, DANIEL, and GLAUME, JEANINE: Les Radiation de L'oxyg_ne 6300 et 55777l de la Luminescence du
Uiel Nocturne dans Une Station de Basse Latitude. Annales de Geophysiqu_, col. 16, Issue No. 3, 1960,
pp. 319_34.
15. ALEXANDER, E. N., MeCRACKEN, C. W., et al. : Review of Direct Measurements of Interplanetary Dust From
Satellites and Probes. Space Research III. Prec. of 3d International Space Sciences Symposium, Wash-
ington, May 1962, North Holland Publishing Co. (Amsterdam).
16. CARPENTER, M. SCOTT: Pilot's Flight Report. Results of the Second United States Manned Orbital.Space
Plight, May 24, 1962. NASA SP-6. Supt. Doe., U.S. GoverI_ment Printing Office (Washington, D.C.), pp.
69-75.

17. CAMERON, W. SAWTELLE, GLENN, J. H., CARPENTER, M. S., and O'KEEFE, J. A. : The Effect of Refraction on
the Setting Sun as Seen From Space in Theory and Observation. Astronautical Journal, col. 68, no. 5
1963, pp. 348-351.
18. VOLZ, S. E., and GOODY, R. M. : The Intensity of the Twilight and Upper Atmospheric Dust. J. Atmospheric
Sciences, col. 19, no. 5, 1962, pp. 38.5-406.

346
19. DUNKELMAN, L. : Visual Observations o[ the Atmosphere From U.S. Manned Spacecraft in 196_. Paper pre _
sented to the IV International Space Sciences Symposium of COSPAR, Warsaw, Poland, June 6, 1963.
20. GLENN, JOHN H. : The Mercury-Atlas 6 Space Fright. Science, vol. 136, June 1,962, pp. 1093-1095.
21. O'KEEFE, JOHN A., and CAMEaoN, WINIFRED SAWTELL: Space Science Report. Results of the Second United
States Manned Orbital Space Flight, May 24. 1962. NASA SP-6. Supt. Doe., U.S. Government Printing
Office (Washington, D.C.), pp. 35-42.
22. Doss_N, F. D. : Goddard News, vol. 5, no. 7, September 9, 1963, p. 1.
23. ROACH, F. E., and VAN BIESBaOECK, G. : The Zodiacal Light and Solar Corona. Sky and Telescope, vol. 13,
no. 5, March 1954.
24. CARPENTER, M. S., O'KEEFE, J. A., and DUNKELMAN, L. : Visual Observations oJ Nightglow From Manned
Spacecra#. Science, vol. 138, 1962, pp. 978-980.
25. KOOMEN, M. J'., GULLEDGE, I. S., PACKER, D. M., and TOUSEY, R. : Night Airglow From Orbiting Spaeecra[t
Compared With Measurements From Rocket Observations. Science, vol. 140, 1963, p. 1087.

347
20. ASTRONAUT'S SUMMARY FLIGHT REPORT

By L. GORDON COOPER, JR., Astronaut, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center

_- [ ¢_ '_/ Summary Introduction

Tile MA-9 flight marked the conclusion to When the seven of us came together as a group
the United States' first manned space-flight for the first time at Langley Field, Virginia,
program. From their initiation into the pro- in April of 1959, neither we, any of the newly
gram in 1959, the seven Mercury astronauts created NASA Space Task Group, nor anyone
participated as a specialist team, and their com- in the country knew what our exact roles as
bined experiences, both in space and on the Project Mercury Astronauts would entail. We
ground, constitute a valuable contribution to were unsure how we should train for space
the nation's manned space-flight capability. flights, how we would become familiar with the
The launch checkout activities constitute one spacecraft and its many systems, or even how
the pilot would be integrated into these systems.
of the most valuable portions of this experience,
We were all starting from scratch, from the
and the MA-9 flight demonstrated once again
ground floor in manned space flight.
how critical this period is both to the prepara-
Looking back now on more than 4 years of
tion of the spacecraft and the pilot. The sen-
concentrated training, detailed study of space-
sations and experiences of tile flight were craft systems, attending countless hundreds of
generally similar to those reported by the pilots coordination and planning meetings, participat-
of previous flights with the exception that bet- i_g in hundreds of hours of hardware develop-
ter dark adaptation was obtained and therefore meut and checkout, we can all recognize that in
more dim light phenomena could be seen. Dur- some cases there would have been more efficient
ing the MA-9 flight, the zodiacal light and what ways of doing things. However, considering
may have been the daytime airg'low were ob- tile limited knowledge in this space bnsiness in
served for the first time. While some new the spring of 1959, I consider it remarkable that
observations were made on phenomena such as Project Mercury ran so close to its originally
tile airglow and space particles, the appearance planned time schedule. Few programs in the
history of airplane development ever ran as
of the earth features and weather patterns gen-
close, and no airplane program ever had so
erally seemed to be similar to the description of
many unknowns staring the test operations
the previous pilots. As on previous flights, team in tile face.
several photographic studies were conducted
By correlating all that we have learned in
and the results of these exercises ]lave proved
the last 4 years and properly applying it to fu-
to be valuable. A series of new experiments ture manned space programs, we should be able
and evaluations of Mercury systems were con- to increase the efficiency of our next program.
ducted, with generally good results. The mis- This application of experience will be important
sion appeared to be relatively routine until a because taking the step from the successful mis-
malfunction in the control system late in the sions of Project Mercury to manned interplane-
flight made it necessary to control attitude tary flights involves many stumbling blocks and
manually during retrofire and reentry. The unknowns. These uncertainties must be uncov-
flight of Faith 7 concluded after some 3t hours ered and soh, ed in a logical manner.
in space with a landing within 41_ miles of the Back in 1959, the pilot was one of the real
primary recovery ship, the U,_,_ Kear,_'arye, in mfl_nowns in space flight. No one could really
the Pacific Ocean. say for certain how a pilot would react or how

349
t
well he could perform in a space environment. ence, but I shall attempt to summarize the in-
Partially for this reason and because unmanned flight sensations and observations of the other
flights were scheduled as part of the develop- astronauts and relate their experiences to my
ment program, the Mercury slxicecraft was de- own. Beginning with the prelaunch activities
signed to perform the mission automatically. mliich are so necessary to preparing for the mis-
Manual controls for spacecraft control and sys- sion and concluding with my landing in the
tems management were included primarily as Pacific after 34 hours of weightlessness, I shall
backups to the automatic program. From the try to discuss the many experiments and systems
start of the program we encouraged the concept operation in which each of us took part.
of the pilot being a primary part of the overall
system. Throughout the manned flight phase, Preflight And Launch
this concept has become more and more of a Spacecraft Readiness and Checkout
reality.
While we adopted the team concept during The period from the time the spacecraft ar-
most of our space-flight training, we were re- rived at Cape Canaveral until the time it was
quired to be at so many places and cover so many mated with the launch vehicle was the period
areas that each man was assigned a specialty where the pilot and his backup became com-
area to monitor closely and brief the others on pletely familiar with the spacecraft and a11 its
periodically. various systems (fig. 20-1). We learned all the
“Faith 7” \\-as the name I selected for the individual idiosyncrasies of each system. We
spacecraft which performed so well for me also became familiar with many of the mem-
until the electrical problem late in flight. I bers of the launch crew and learned whom to
chose this name as being symbolic of my firm call on for expert advice on each system. I t
belief in the entire Mercury team, in the space- was also during this period that we had an
craft which had performed so well before, and opportunity to discuss the coming flight with
in God. The “7,” of course, a s in the names used team members who had flown before (fig. 20-2)
by the others before me is representative of the and take advantage of their experiences.
original astronaut team. This flight report will The preflight phase was used to incorporate
present a discussion of my entire flight experi- certain modifications into the spacecraft and

FIGURE20-2.-Astronauts Glenn and Cooper discuss


FIGURE
20-1.-A4stronauts Cooper and Shepard discuss items of the pilot’s personal equipment during the
MA-9 camera during prelaunch activities. MA-9 prelaunch period.

350
to add some pieces of equipment necessary to with all systems operating. This series of tests
meet operational requirements. Because of the was felt by all of us to be a necessity not only to
limited usable cockpit space and the even more check out all the systems, but to train the
limited center-of-gravity travel and gross launch crew, the pilots, and the personnel of the
weight of the Mercury spacecraft, these con- worldwide network.
figuration changes were ahvays a soul-search-
Countdown
ing problem. Regardless of how they were
accomplished, additions often resulted in some I believe that we can very readily shorten the
type of compromise to the pilot's com- time that the pilot is in the spacecraft prior
fort, freedom of movement, and/or operational to launch. I was busy enough with the count-
smoothness. down activities that time did not drag, but I
The natural tendency was for everyone to did have time to take a short nap during this pe-
want to improve on existing equipment and to riod. It seems to me that to conserve the pilot's
add worthwhile experiments that could be fitted energy it would be desirable to accomplish
in. Space flight is so expensive that no one more of these checks with the backup pilot prior
wants to waste a single second of orbital time. to insertion. Of course, you do need a few
However, we all discovered that the entire minutes to shift around and get settled, see that
flight is compromised when all equipment, all the equipment is located properly, before you
experiments, and all the flight plan detail are are prepared for the flight.
not frozen early enough to check out each piece Most of the countdowns in Mercury went
of equipment and allow everyone, particularly fairly smoothly as a result of the practice that
the pilot, to become thoroughly familiar with the launch crews had acquired on simulated
all procedures. flight tests. The first attempt to launch MA-9
On all our flights the cockpits have been clut- on May 14 was delayed for a diesel engine that
tered to the point where the space remaining would not operate to drive the gantry back.
for the astronaut and the equipment with which Then it had to be postponed because a critical
he must work is very limited and inefficiently radar set became inoperative. I was in the
arranged. In most cases getting some of the cockpit for some 6 hours before we scrubbed on
equipment located and moved about provided that first day. I was quite tired but felt ready
more exercise than did the special onboard exer- to recycle for another count the following day.
cise device. Stowage of equipment is a very The countdown on May 15, 1968, went almost
real problem that too often is not given enough perfectly. Everything was really in a "go"
consideration. status and I think everyone felt that we were
As the flights lengthened, a detailed flight going to have a good launch. And it was !
plan and abbreviated checklists for experiments I had thought that I would become a bit more
and operational procedures became a real neces- tense as the count neared minus 1 or 2 minutes,
sity. It is impossible for a pilot to remember but found that I have been more tense for the
all the details of times, amounts, and so forth, kick-off when playing football than I was for
of the many experiments and tests to be con- the launch on May 15. I felt that I was very
ducted. Proper formats and storage for these well trained and was ready to fly a good flight.
items had to be developed during the preflight
preparation periods. Powered Flight

It is a wonderful feeling when the engines


Integrated (_eckout
light and you have lifted off. The long period
Faith 7 passed all the spacecraft tests in of preparation is over, and at last you are ready
fine shape and was taken to the launch com- to settle down to your work.
plex to be mated with the Atlas 130D launch The acceleration is not disconcerting or de-
vehicle. At this time, a buildup of integrated grading at the levels encountered in the Mer-
launch vehicle and spacecraft tests, system by cury flights. In fact,., it gives one somewhat the
system, was initiated and proceeded until the same feeling as that of adding full throttle on a
program was culminated in a fully integrated fast car, or a racing boat, or a fighter airplane.
simulated flight from countdown to recovery The pilot can easily monitor several of the more

351
critical parameters, including his attitudes, about 200 yards away from me. It was cer-
throughout the entire launch phase. The task tainly beautiful. I could read the lettering on
that he is given to do should be uncluttered with the sides and could see various details of the
minor details if possible, but he is fully c,'q)able sustainer. It was a very bright silver in color,
of functioning as an intricate part of the system with a frosty white band around the center por-
throughout the entire launch. I was surprised tion of it. It was still wisping vapor from the'
at how many things I could keep track of and attend. It was yawed approximately 15 ° to
feel that I had plenty of time to do the exact 20 ° to its left. I had it in sight for a total of
item planned. approximately 8 minutes. The front end was
On previous flights, it had been noted that slowly turning in counterclockwise rotation.
vibration encountered in the region of maxi- Despite these distractions, the many hours of
mum dynamic pressure was feeding through the training took over and we all proceeded to do
couch to the helmet and causing slight blurring our tasks as scheduled. After a few minutes
of vision. We found that this could be elimi- I readily adapted to the new environment and
nated by adequate padding between the helmet felt completely at ease. Weightlessness is ex-
and the couch. I had approximately _4 inch of tremely comfortable. After a pilot has once
foam rubber between my helmet and the couch experienced weightlessness in space flight, he
and experienced no blurring of vision. should almost immediately adapt to this con-
Booster engine cutoff (BECO) is very dis- dition when exposed to it again. We all even
tinctive, by the decrease in both the acceleration tended to forget we were weightless.
and the noise. It was just as I had expected it I agree with Scott Carpenter that the cock-
to be from talking to the others. pit did seem to be somewhat differently located
John Glenn and Scott Carpenter had dis- in respect to myself upon insertion into orbit.
cussed with Wally Schirra and me how they had You move up forward in the seat, regardless
encountered some springboard effect from the of how tight your straps are cinched. The
guidance while in the latter phases of the sus- equipment storage kit on the right seems to be
tainer flight. Wally Schirra experienced very at a different angle to you than it is when you
little or none of this effect. I had an almost are on the launch pad. I did feel very distinctly
perfect sustainer trajectory with almost no that I was sitting upright. Most of the time
guidance corrections at all, so it was an excep- I felt as if I were lightly floating. A couple
tionally smooth and almost perfect insertion. of times I felt ahnost as if I were hanging
Sustainer engine cutoff (SECO) is also quite upside down because of the feeling of floating
distinctive, in the same manlier as BECO. This into the shoulder straps. Because the space-
is followed by the noise of clamp rings and posi- craft was weightless, equipment stayed where
grade rockets. The spacecraft is in orbit. it was whenever I let go of it. Nevertheless,
every time I "dropped" something, I had the
Orbital Flight tendency to grab below it, expecting it to fall.
You really need to have a low workload on
Insertion
the first pass in order to collect your senses, to
We had all run many full launch profiles on acclimatize yourself to this new situation, and
the centrifuge, so I felt very well prepared for to organize the flight activities. I felt that I
all the powered flight, but there is some differ- was not on top of the situation as completely
ence between the transition from positive accel- as I would like to be right after insertion. Al-
eration on a centrifuge back to 1-g and the though I was thinking about all the items to be
transition from positive acceleration on the done and of how to do them, I did not feel
flight to zero-g. I felt somewhat strange for the completely at home. I felt that I was in a
first few minutes. The view out of the window strange environment and was not at my best,
is a tremendous distraction as the spacecraft until perhaps halfway through the pass. By
yaws around and the earth and the booster come the end of the first pass, I was feeling really
into full view for the first time. We all noted a adjusted to my new surroundings.
strong desire to concentrate on the tremendous One indication of my adjustment to the sur-
view out of the window. Atlas 130D was only roundings was that I encountered no difficulty

352
in beingabletosleep.Whenyouarecompletely motion cues are available, you have a very slow,
powereddown and drifting, it is a relaxed, floating feeling.
calm,floatingfeeling. In fact, you have diffi- When I was drifting, the changing view out
culty not sleeping. I found that I was cat- the window was not at all disconcerting, and
napping and dozing off frequently. Sleep seems the random orientation caused me no concern.
to be very sound. I woke up one time from In fact, it is a very relaxed way to travel. I
about an hour's nap with no idea where I was might mention an item here on the natural
and it took me several seconds to orient myself dynamics of the spacecraft. When rates were
to where I was and what I was doing. I noticed near zero, and the spacecraft was powered
this again after one other fairly long period of down, I never ot)sm_'ed any rate greater than
sleep. You sleep completely relaxed and very, 1°/see about, any one axis. Generally, if there
very soundly to the point that you have trouble were a rate about one axis as great as this, there
regrouping yourself for a second or two when were no rates about the other two axes. These
you come out of it. However, I noted that I rates would switch from axis to axis and more
was always able to awaken prior to having a than likely only two axes would have any rate
task to do. I did not encounter any type of at all, and these rates would be between
the so-called"break-off phenomena." Although 1A°/see and l/_°/sec, at the most. Frequently,
this flight was very enjoyable, a thing of de- for long periods of time, the spacecraft would
light, it still is a strange environment to a hu- have absolutely no rates at all and would be
man being and you have every desire to get ahnost completely motionless. The one axis
back to earth at the planned time. that qppeared to have more predominate rates
than the others was the roll axis; and the rate,
Comments on Systems Operation almost invariably, was to the left, approxi-
mately 1/2°see.
The automatic control is rather sloppy due Although my suit temperature was satisfac-
to the wide limit cycle it operates within. It tory, like _Vally Schim:a I had to adjust the
is no problem as soon as you get accustomed to water flow continually to attempt to hold tem-
it. t found that Grissom's and Schirra's de- perature in limit. The condensate pump that
scription of the manual proportional flight con- was added just prior to launch failed; so that
trol system was very accurate. It is a rather the condensate tank filled up and the suit was
sluggish system until you learn to use short very moist all the time.
blips. The fly-by-wire low is much more precise The valve on the drinking water container
with the crispness of control produced by the was leaky, and I was unable to place water into
firing of the 1-pound thrusters. the plastic freeze-dehydrated food containers.
I found that orienting the spacecraft after Therefore, I ate only the bite size foods.
drifting flight was quite easy on the day side
and not too difficult on the night side, although
Visual Sightings
orientation on the night side takes more time
unless there is moonlight or broken clouds or
I)uring the day, the earth has a predomi-
land masses below. Stars an(l star 1)atterns are
nately bluish cast. I found that green showed
more difficult to recognize because of the limited
up very little. Water looked vel 7 blue, and
view through the window. You can slowly
heavy forest areas looked blue-green. The
drift until you find a star pattern that is recog-
only really distinctive green showed up in the
nizable and from this you can pick up a zero
high Tibetan area. Some of the high lakes
yaw star. If you have moonlight, or any broken
were a bright emerald green and looked like
cloud masses or land masses, you can pick up
zero yaw very readily if you turn all the lights those found in a copper-sulphate mining area.
off in order to become dark adapted "rod pitch The browns of the Arabian desert showed up
down to approximately -20 °. quite distinctly, but the Sahara was not quite
Speed is very al)parent when flying over clear so brown. If you are looking straight down on
or broken-cloud areas. However, if there is a things, the color is truer than if you are looking
solid cloud deck underneath you and no other at an angle.

353
I coulddetectindividualhousesandstreets rectly,but the wholecumulusmassof clouds
in the low-humidityandcloudlessareassuch would light up. From space, ground lights
as the Himalayamountainarea,the Tibetan twinkle, whereas stars do not. I could not dis-
plain,andthe southwestern desertareaof the tiuguish features on the moon. It was a partial
U.S. I saw severalindividual houseswith moon at night, but it appeared full when it was
smokecomingfrom the chimneysin the high setting in the daytime. It was quite bright at
countryaroundthe Himalayas. Thewindwas night, but on the day side it was a lightish blue
.apparently quitebrisk andout of thesouth. I color.
couldseefields,roads,streams,lakes. I saw I immediately saw the airglow layer, which
whatI tookto bea vehiclealonga roadin the all the orbital pilots have seen, in which the
Himalayaareaandin the Arizona-WestTexas stars appear to facle as they pass through it and
area. I couldfirst seethe dustblowingoff the then reappear below it 1)efore disappearing be-
road,thencouldseetheroadclearly,andwhen hind the horizon. The earth has a sharp hori-
the light wasright, an object,that wasprob- zon even at night. At the time, the layer ap-
ablyavehicle. peared to be about 1'2 ° to 13 ° high. It was, of
I sawa steamlocomotive byseeingthesmoke course, actually lower than this as discussed in
first; thenI notedtheobjectmovingalongwhat paper 19.
wasapparentlya track. This wasin north- At two different times, I saw a faint glow
ern India. I alsosawthe wakeof a boatin a just after sunset or prior to sunrise ; it was some-
largeriver in the Burma-Indiaarea. what cone shaped, and I believe it was the faint
At timesduring the day, the patternof the glow of zodiacal light. It was not exactly per-
sun comingthrough the windowwashot on pendicular to the horizon. I had a feeling that
my suit. I couldalsofeel heaton the inside this was just a glow off the sun. It was not as
of the windowright throughmy glove. Like bright as the Milky Way. Another night phe-
Scott,I nevertired of lookingat the sunsets. nomenon that I noticed occurred when I was
Asthesunbeginsto getdowntowardsthehori- over South America looking east or northeast.
zon,it is very well defined,quite difficult to It appeared to be the lower edge of a cloud
lookat, andnotdiffusedaswhenyoulookat it ceiling on an overcast day. It did not appear
throughthe atmosphere.It is a very bright to have an upper edge. It was not distinct and
white; almostthe bluishwhitecolorof an arc did not last long, but it was higher than I was,
lamp. As it beginsto impingeon thehorizon was not well defined, and was not in the vicinity
line, it. undergoesa spreading,or flattening of the horizon. It was a good sized area, very
effect. The sky beginsto get quite dark and indistinct in shape. It had a faint glow with a
givesthe impressionof deepblackness.This reddish brown cast. It seemed to be quite ex-
light spreadingout from the sun is a bright tensive, very faint, and contrasted as a lighter
orangecolorwhichmovesout undera narrow area in the night sky. It may have been the
band of bright blue that is always visible same high airglow layer that Wally reported.
throughoutthe daylight period. As the sun When there is no moon, the earth is darker
setsfarther, it is replacedby a bright gold- than the sky; there is a difference in the two
orangebandwhichextendsout for somedis- blacks. In general, there was more light from
tanceon eitherside,definingthe horizoneven the sky; the sky is a shining black as compared
moreclearly. The sungoesbelowthe horizon with a dull black appearance of the earth.
rapidly,andthe orangebandstill persistsbut There is a distinct line at the horizon and the
gets considerablyfainter as the black sky earth is the darker.
boundedbydarkbluebandsfollowsit ondown. I saw the lights of Pel'th, Australia, and a
Youdoseea glowafterthesunhasset,although bright orange light from the British oil refinei T
it is not ray-like. I could still tell exactly to the south of the city. If there is moonlight,
wherethe sun had set a numberof seconds then cloud layers and ground features can be
afterward. seen. The moonlight was bright enough to de-
At night I couldseelightning. Sometimes tect motion of the ground. On several occasions
fiveor six differentcumulusbuildupswerevis- I could see light from cities on the ground
ibleat once. I couldnot seethe lightning di- through the clouds. On the last night pass, I

354
usedthelight of Shanghaiglowingthroughthe In addition, I attempted to get dim light pho-
cloudsto help meline up in yaw for retrofire. tographs as well as movies (see paper 12).
At times I could see the glow from evel_- one Ground light experiment.--The ground light.
of the thrusters. I saw a tremendous amount experiment was attempted on all the orbital
of John Glenn's fireflies regardless of my atti- flights. However, weather precluded John,
tude. They appeared to come out from the Scott, and Wally from seeing it. I was fortu-
spacecraft and go back along the flight path. nate enough to have excellent weather and saw
I could see some of them for as long as 30 or the ground light as scheduled. The lights from
40 seconds. I could see them coming directly the town of Bloemfontein, S. Africa, were more
out of the pitchdown thruster when it was ac- distinctive than the si_nml light and helped me
tivated. I had the feeling that the direction of to locate it.
their motion back along the orbital path was Flashing light experiment.--On the MA-9
distinct enough that they could be used as a flight, we tried a new experiment designed to
rough yaw reference. provide information that would help us on fu-
The first indication I got of the sun coming ture rendezvous missions. A 5.75-inch-diameter
up behind me was the lighting of the clouds sphere with two xenon-gas discharge lamps
from underneath. I noted the clouds getting which strobed at approximately one flash per
lighter and lighter, and I could still see the second was ejected from the spacecraft into its
stars. Suddenly, my window would get into own orbit. In this orbit, it moved back and
the oblique sunlight and appear to frost over forth relative to the spacecraft so that it would
just as an aircraft canopy does. This was the appear at different distances.
result of a greasy coating on the inside of the At 3 : 25 : 00 I went to fly-by-wire low, slowly
outer l)ane, which completely occluded my pitched up to the -20 ° mark on the window,
vision under these lighting conditions. deployed the flashing beacon, and there was a
loud "eloomp" as the squib fired and it de-
Experiments
parted. I then caged the _a'yros and powered
Since MA-9 was so much longer than pre- down the ASCS a-c bus. I never did see the
vious flights, I had ample time to conduct nu- beacon on that first night after it was ejected.
merous experiments. The first orbital flight However, I was having some difficulty finding
had very few experiments. As the experimental my 180 ° yaw and the spacecraft may not have
program increased and the flights lengthened, been properly alined for making the observa-
the number of experiments carried on board in- tion. I tried unsuccessfully to observe the flash-
creased. In addition to the experiments all of ing beacon early on the day side also.
us have tried to make as careful 6bservations as On the second night side after deploying the
possible. We have been told that these observa- flashing beacon, shortly after going into the
tions of new phenomena can provide some of night side, I spotted the little rascal. It was
the most valuable data on features such as the quite visible and appeared to be only 8 to 10
spectacular colors in sunrises and sunsets, zo- miles away. I deliberately moved off target,
diacal light, airglow, space particles, stars on waited until 5:40:00 and eased back to 180 °
the day side, and various distinct earth features yaw and saw the light again, at which time it
(see paper 19). appeared to be around 12 to 14 miles away and
Photography.--All the orbital flight pilots still quite visible.
have carried along a hand-held camera of some On the third night side after deploying the
type for color photographs of interesting phe- flashing light, I had no anticipation of seeing it
nomena. These have all yielded some good at all: but at 6:56:00 ground elapsed time
photos of the earth from a new vantage point. (g.e.t.) there it was, blinking away. It was
Several photographic programs were carried very faint and appeared to be at a distance of
out during the orbital flight program. Scott about 16 to 17 miles. I would say it was ap-
Carpenter took horizon definition pictures for proxim'ttely the brightness of a fifth-magnitude
MIT, and Wally Schirra made an evaluation of star, whereas on the second night side after de-
several different filters for the Weather Bureau. ployment it had appeared to be about that of a
These two studies were extended on my flight. second-magnitude star.

355
Systems Difficulties Encountered Towards the End of to make a purely manual, or fly-by-wire, retro-
the Flight fire and reentry.
Analysis of these malfunctions illustrated
Partial pressure of oxygen in the cabin slowly
that the eutire Mercury network had developed
dropped throughout the flight to about 3.5 l>sia.
I was worried that the network might get con- an operati<>nal concept of teamwork that euhni-
cerned about this <m the next to the last pass. rotted in an ahnost perfect example of coopera-
tion between the ground and the spacecraft on
Also, the partial pressure of CO_ in the suit
circuit had gradually increased to a readino" of the MA-9 flight. Almost everyone followed the
prestated ,,'round rules exactly, and the radio
3.5 mm Hg. I suspe<'ted the gage and went to
discipline was excellent.
emergency rate flow and did not get any ap-
parent decrease in this reading. IIowever, I Retrofire
did not stay on emergency rate flow very long.
I recognized that my breathing was more rapid All of us believed that we could control at-
and deep. The PCO= gage indie,_ted that we titude mammlly during retrofire. However,
were up over 5 on the gage setting just prior to the flight plans call for autopilot control. Nev-
retrofire. However, I couhl h'tve gone on ertheless, because of failures of one type or an-
emergency O= flow and accepted slightly higher other. Wally's was the only flight in which only
suit temperatures because of the fans shuttin_ the autopilot controlled attitude during retro-
down, which reduces suit circuit flow. [ire. John had trouble with a low-torque thrust-
On the 19th orbital pass, I h'ul been swit<'h- ev and elected to assist the autopilot with the
ing the warning light control switch to the "off"' manual proportional system. Scott had ,'t prob-
position in order to darkeu completely the in- lem with the horizon scanner and controlled
terior of the si>acecraft and thus l>ecome dark durintz retrofire with the fly-by-wire and man-
adal>ted. When I returned the switch from the ual proportional systems. I had a malfunction
"off" to "dim" position, the I).05g green light associated with one of the control relays which
illuminated. I immediately turned off the eliminated my autopilot as well as my attitude
ASCS 0.05g swfleh fuse and the emergency indicators. Therefore I had to initiate retro-
0.05g fuse. Thereafter, we made three checks fit'e, use window view for attitude reference, and
to verify that the ASCS it.(tSg relay functions control the spacecraft with the manual propor-
were operative. Since the amp-cal was now tional system. This was no problem, though I
latched into the reentry mode, the atti- did have some difficulty reading the rate indica-
tude gyros were no longer operational. tors due to the large variation in illumination
The 0.50 v-amp mr/in inverter failed to operate between the inside and outside of the spacecraft.
on the 21st pass. At al>out 33 : 0.3 : 00 g.e.t, the This disparity in ilhunination became a problem
automatic ehangover light for the standby because I had to shift back and forth for atti-
inverter came on. I had noticed two smqll tude reference outside and readings of the rate
fluctuations in the ammeter just previous to this indicators inside. In order to be ready for ret-
time and had gone through an electrical check : rofire which had to occur just after first light,
everything appeared normal. The temperature I oriented the spacecraft to the retrofire attitude
on the 250 v-amp inverter was about 115 ° F. on the night side. Night orientation is no prob-
The temperature on the fans inverter was about lem, but it does take considerably longer, be-
125 ° F, and the standby inverter was about 95 ° cause yaw determination is more difficult than
F. At this point the light came on and on the day side.
I checked the inverters. The 250 v-amp in- .ks with the others, there was no doubt in my
verter was still reading about 115 ° F on tem- mind when the retrorockets fired. They produce
perature, but it was indicating 140 volts on the a g'ood solid thump which you can see and hear.
ASCS a-e bus voltage. I then turned it off. I[owever, our sensations at the time they fired
At that time I selected the slug" position (man- were different. John Glenn felt like he had
ual selection of the standby inverter for the reversed dire<:tion and was going "back toward
ASCS) and found that the standl>y inverter Hawaii." Scott Carpenter felt that he came to
would not start. I put the switch back to the a standstill. _Vally Sehirra and I did not feel
"off" position of ASCS a-c power and elected that the motion of the spacecraft changed.

356
Reentry ately after landing in the event it starts to sink.
I f the pilot knows that the recovery forces are
After retrofire, there is a period of several
in the immediate area, this first period on the
minutes prior to the start of reentry (0.05g).
water is considerably more relaxed and
As you approach O.O5g, the spacecraft control
enjoyable.
becomes sluggish and feels as though it wants
By the time the landing occurs, the pilot is
to start reentry.
As in the retrofire case, all of us knew that we perspiring profusely. The air from the snor-
could reenter on manual control. However, the kels is quite cooling, but the cabin is fairly
warm and humid.
flight plans generally called for autopilot con-
trol during reentry. Nevertheless anomalies of
system function resulted in partial manual con-
trol in all but Wally's flight. I used manual
proportional control on MA-0 since I had lost
the ASCS and standby inverters during the 20th
orbital pass. The reentry worked out very SUC-
cessfully and showed again that the pilot can
accomplish this control task very adequately.
I
I found that the oscillations of the spacecraft
were not difficult to damp until I descended to
an altitude of approximately 95,000 feet. At
this point, the amplitude of spacecraft motions
increased as they normally do and it took a sub-
stantial increase of control inputs to keep within
comfortable limits. The oscillation became
more severe at approximately 50,000 feet, but
I I
I deployed the drogue parachute at 42,000 feet,
as planned, and the spacecraft was quickly sta-
bil ized.
The g-forces are more sustained on reentry
than on launch but are still easily tolerable.
During reentry there w,as no uncomfortable
increase in cabin temperature. If the pilot is
20-3.-Astronaut Cooper climbs out of Faith 7
FIGURE
performing a manual reentry, he will be perspir- after the 34 hour MA-9 flight.
ing profusely when landing, but mostly because
of the work load rather than the increased tem-
perature.
Landing And Recovery
Landing at a rate of 30 fps with the landing
bag down is a good solid jolt, but certainly
tolerable. I n fact, one does not really have to
be in an ideal position and braced tightly to be
able to take this momentary shock in good shape.
There have been varied opinions among the
pilots of all the Mercury space flights as to the
sensations encountered upon landing in water.
When the spacecraft rolls over and goes under
the water, there is a natural tendency to wonder
if it will sink or float and whether it will right
itself. One item me stressed in training was F'IGGRE L'O--i.--Astronaut Cooper stands on the deck of
that of preparing during the descent 011 the the US'S lic'rrrsctr!7eimlnedintely after egressing from
parachute to evacuate the spacecraft immedi- Fnitlr 7.

357
Almost the full gamut of recovery procedures successfully. Scott had a problem in the con-
were used in the course of the Mercury pro- trol system also, but his manual retrofire, al-
gram. The recovery procedure is greatly sire- though not. quite as precise as he would have
pitied if the spacecraft lands near a recovery liked, brought the Aurora 7 spacecraft home.
ship. In this case, the spacecraft can be lifted Wally Schirra, after bringing his suit tempera-
out of the water directly onto the deck. How- ture under control, completed a "textbook" six-
ever, all the procedures would be simplified pass mission and landed just under 5 miles from
even more if land landings were made. the USS Keawsarge.
When I first stepped from the spacecraft on As I think back over my mission, which ac-
board the U,_S Kear._.arge I felt fine (figs. 20-3 tually began right after Wally's flight, it has
and _20-4). As I stood still waiting on a blood been an exciting experience indeed. The spe-
pressure check, I began to feel dizzy. I men- citic training for my 1-day mission, the many
tioned this to the doctors, who then started mov- engineering reviews of the changes required for
ing me along. As soon as I took two or three the Faith 7 spacecraft, the physical condition-
steps, I immediately began to feel clear-headed ing, and even the low-residue diet were all mem-
once more, and at no time did I become dizzy orable parts of the prelaunch preparation. The
again. initial experience of prolonged weightlessness
Concluding Remarks and the magnificent view of the earth takes a
while to get used to just as it did for all the or-
After my recovery in the Pacific, the aero-
bital pilots, but once I was accustomed to the
medical specialists conducted their prescribed
new surroundings, events and activities pro-
tests designed to glean as much from my flight
ceeded as scheduled. In fact, until that in-
as possible. Upon my return to the launch
famous moment in the 19th orbital pass, it
site, a series of formal debriefings covering
seemed like another Wally Schirra "textbook"
every aspect of my space flight experience were
flight. Only three more passes stood between
begun. In these debrietings, I found it useful
me and a routine landing off the bow of the
to refer to my previous training, and that of
USS Kear,_ar.qe. When I received the first indi-
my six colleagues, in describing my sensations
cation that the sequencing system had malfunc-
and observations. In the 4 years since we were
tioned a number of interesting experiments and
first initiated into Project Mercury, a great deal
systems evaluations had been completed, with
has been accomplished and a great deal has been
just a few more to go. Then, with the sudden
learned. Many of the anxieties and misgivings
electrical anomaly and the sequence of events
of space flight have been relieved. Although
which followed, I knew I had a job ahead of me.
relatively brief, our early training was inten-
Unlike Scott's ease, however, I had sufficient
sive and complete, and its effectiveness has been
time to contemplate a plan of action and col-
proven, we believe, by our ability to participate
laborate with the flight-control personnel on the
actively in the operation of the spacecraft.
ground. Their valuable assistance was instru-
A1 Shepard's flight was our first manned
mental in the completion of my successful
launch, and this initial experience in getting
retrofire, reentry, and landing.
the spacecraft, launch vehicle, and the man
Now that Mercury is over and we stand at the
ready at the same time was valuable. As a
threshold of more ambitious programs, the les-
result of losing Gus Grissom's spacecraft, our
sons each of us have learned will be constant
landing and recovery procedures were promptly
tools with which to accept and aeeomodate
changed. In John Glenn's flight, a serious
new developments. Mercury has been only a
control system malfunction and a somewhat
beginning for the seven of us. The job at hand
frightening but erroneous signal that the heat
is to work to meet our new challenge in space
shield had been released caused some concert1
with the same enthusiasm tha_ everyone exhib-
among us on the ground, but John's manual
retrofire and reentry completed his mission ited throughout this program.

358
V

APPENDIXES

359
APPENDIX A
TYPICAL DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR MERCURY
This appendix contains a listing of the types of documents prepared for use in the control and
reporting of Project Mercury. Most of these documents are not available for general distribution.

Estimated
number of
different
volumes of

Type of document each type Prepared by-- Remarks


1. Mission Rules ....................... 8 MSC
2. Technical hfformation Summary ....... 14 MSC
3. Flight Plan .......................... 4 MSC
4. Mission Directive .................... 17 MsC All issued as working
5. Data Acquisition Plan ................ 13 MSC papers.
6. Instrument Calibrations .............. 23 MSC
7. Recovery Documents ................. 27
a. Recovery Operations
b. Recovery Requirements
c. General Information
d. Recovery Procedures
e. Operations Plan for Recovery
Team.
8. Postlaunch Reports .................. 21 MSC Issued as working papers
prior to MR-1 (7
issues).
9. Working Papers ..................... 134 MSC Includes Items 5 and 9.
10. Technical Memorandums ............. 2 MSC
11. Miscellaneous ....................... 61 Includes items (a) through
(d).
a. Schedule and Cost Analysis .....
b. Descriptive Synopsis of Project
Mercury.
c. Articles for journals ............ 23
d. Conference papers ............. 30
e. Operational Requirements ...... 3
12. Documentary Film ................... 26 MSC
13. Quarterly Reports .................... 20 MSC
14. Flight Controller Handbook-1 ......... 14 MSC
15. Flight Controller Handbook-2 ......... 6 MSC
16. Consolidated Remote Site Report ...... 6 MSC
17. Mercury-Redstone Monthly Status Report_ 12 MSFC
18. Master Operational Schedule .......... 4 MSFC
19. Complete Firing Test Report (5 parts)__ 4 MSFC
20. Operations Procedures ................ 2 GSFC
21. Network Countdown ................. 5 GSFC
22. Communications Operations Procedure_ 2 GSFC

_o7-o_oo--o_---2_ 3 61
Estimated
number of
different
yoLume8 of

Type of document each type Prepared by-- Remarks


23. Network Performance Report ......... 3 GSFC
24. Network Operation Directive .......... 1 GSFC
25. Test Requests, covering such items as: 1, 125 Contractors
vibration, shock, heating, systems
tests, destruction tests, accoustical
tests, Project Orbit, functional tests.
26. Drawings (spacecraft) ................ _ 1,800 McDonnell
(3,200 Aircraft Does not include revi-
pages) Corp. sions.
27. Formal Report Releases .............. 200 McDonnell
Aircraft Includes items (a)
Corp. through (e).
a. Spacecraft configuration ........ 20 ........... For each spacecraft.
b. Failure Summary Report ....... 41
c. Full Scale Simulated Mission 25
Test.
d. Contractor Furnished Equipment 1 ........... Periodically revised.
Status Report.
e. Other ........................ 128
28. Service Engineering Department Reports 444 McDonnell Separate SEDR's were
((SEDR). Aircraft generally issued for
Corp. each system and test
for each spacecraft.
29. Miscellaneous:
a. Contracts (formal) .............. 85 MSC
b. Contract change proposals ....... 390 McDonnell
Aircraft
Corp.
30. Detailed Test Objectives ............... 9 Aerospace
Corp.
31. Operations Requirements .............. 3 Air Force
Missile Test
Center
32. Operations Directive .................. 2 Convair/
33. Flight-Test Reports ................... 9 Astronautics

362
APPENDIX B

NASA CENTERS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

This appendix contains a list of government Wright Air Development Center, Wright-
agencies that supported Project Mercury. Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., and Air Force Missile Development Center,
the following NASA Centers participated in ttolloman Air Force Base, N. Mex.
Project Mercury: _+aval Ordnance Test Station, Pensacola,
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, Calif. Calif.
Flight Research Center, Edwards, Calif. Pensacola Naval Air Station, Pensacola,
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Fla.
Md. Air Proving Ground Center, Eglin Air
Langley Research Center, Langley Station, Force Base, Fla.
Hampton, Va. Army Ballistic Missile Agency, Redstone
Launch Operations Center, Cocoa Beach, Arsenal, Ala.
Fla. U.S. Army Transportation Command, Ft.
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio Eustis, Newport News, Va.
Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Tex. U.S. Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Point, N.C.
Ala. Military Air Transport Sciences, Dover,
Wallops Station, Wallops Island, Va. Del.
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. : White Sands Missile Test Center, White
Space Systems Division, U.S. Air Force, Sands, N. Mex.
Los Angeles, Calif. Pacific Missile Range, Point Mugu, Calif.
U.S. Navy, 5th Naval District Headquar- Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Tex.
ters, Norfolk, Va. Atlantic Missile Range, Cape Canaveral,
Arnold Engineering Development Center, Fla.
Arnold Air Force Station, Tenn. State Department, Washington, D.C.
E1 Centro Naval Parachute Test Facility, Weather Bureau, Washington, D.C.
E1 Centro, Calif. Aeronautic Chart and Information Center,
Naval Air Development Center, Johnsville, St. Louis, Mo.
Pa. Public Health Service, Washington, D.C.

363
APPENDIX C

PRIME CONTRACTORS

This appendix contains a list of the prime McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, St. Louis,
contractors for Project Mercury. Mo.
North American Aviation, Inc., E1 Segun-
Aerospace Corp., E1 Segundo, Calif. do, Calif.
Chrysler Corporation, Highland Park, Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
Mich. Guided Missiles Range Division, Patrick
General Dynamics/Astronautics, San Air Force Base, Fla.
Diego, Calif. Philco Corporation, Philadelphia, Pa.
General Electric Co., Schenectady, N.Y. Thiokol Chemical Corporation, Bristol, Pa.
Burroughs Corp., Detroit, Mich. Western Electric Company, Inc., New
The B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio York, N.Y.

365
APPENDIX D

SUBCONTRACTORS AND VENDORS

This appendix contains a list of Project Mer- DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd.,
cury spacecraft subcontractors and vendors that Downsview, Ont.
had contracts totaling more than $25,000: Dit-MCO, Inc., Kansas City, Mo.
AiResearch Manufacturing Co., Los Ange- Donner Division, Systron-Donner Corp.,
les, Calif. Concord, Calif.
Airwork Corp. I Miami, Fla. Dorsett Electronics Laboratories, Inc.,
American Welding and Manufacturing Co., Norman, Okla.
Warren, Ohio Dynamic Research, Inc., Los Angeles,
Ampex Corp., Redwood City, Calif. Calif.
Applied Electronics Corp., Metuchen, N.J. The Eagle-Picher Co., St. Louis, Mo.
Arnoux Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., Sara-
Atlantic Research Corp., Arcadia, Calif. s0ta, Fla., and Princeton, N.J.
Barnes Engineering Co., Stamford, Conn. Electronic Associates, Inc., New York,
Beckman and Whitley, Inc., San Carlos, N.Y.
Calif. Electronic Wholesalers, Inc., Melbourne,
Beckmazl Instruments, Inc., Berkeley Div., Fla.
Fullerton, Calif. Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co., St.
Bell Aerosystems Co., Div. of Bell Aero- Louis, Mo.
space, Buffalo, N.Y. Endenco Corporation, Los Angeles, Calif.
The Bendix Corporation, Utica Division, F. M. C. Corp., Buffalo, N.Y.
Utica, N.Y. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp.,
Bohanan Manufacturing Co., Falcon Field, Cable Division, Joplin, Mo.
Mes_, Ariz. Filtors, Inc., E. Northport LI., N.Y.
Brush Beryllium Co., Cleveland, Ohio General Devices, Inc., Princeton, N.J.
Burton Manufacturing Co., North Ridge, Gulton Industries, Metuchen, N.J.
Calif. Harris Manufacturing Co., St. Louis, Mo.
CTL Division of Studebaker-Packard Haynes Stellite Co., Chicago, Ill.
Corp., Cincinnati, Ohio Hurletron, Inc., Control Products Division,
Cannon Electric Co., Salem, Mass. Wheaton, Ill.
Cannon-Muskegon Corp., Muskegon, Mich. Interelectronics Corp., New York, N.Y.
Carlton Forge Works, Paramount, Calif. Johns Manville Sales Corp., Chicago, Ill.
Collins Radio Co., Chicago, Ill. Walter Kidde and Co., Inc., Chicago, Ill.
The Connecticut Hard Rubber Co., New Kollsman Instrument Co., Elmhurst, N.Y.
Haven, Conn. Leach Corp., San Marino, Calif.
Consolidated Electrodynamics Corp., Pasa- Linde Co., Chicago, Ill.
dena, Calif. Lockheed Propulsion Co., Redlands, Calif.
Consolidated Vacuum Corp., Rochester, J. A. Maurer, Inc., Long Island City, N.Y.
N.Y. D. B. Milliken Co., Arcadia, Calif.
Corning Glass Works, Chicago, Ill. M. B. Electronics, Div. of Textron Elec-
Crucible Steel Co. of America, Pittsburgh, tronics, New Haven, Conn.
Pa. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
Custom Printing Company, Ferguson, Mo. Boston Division, Boston, Mass.

367
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., Selb Manufacturing Co., St. Louis, Mo.
Aeronautical Division, Minneapolis, Southwest Truck Body Co., St. Louis, Mo.
Minn. (2 locations) Tarco, Inc., Santa Monica, Calif.
Missouri Metal Shaping Co., Overland, Mo. Teleflex, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa.
National Car Rental, Sarasota, Fla. Thiokol Chemical Corp., Elkton Div., New
National Water Lift Co., Kalamazoo, Mich. York, N.Y.
Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., Win- Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., Cleve-
chester Western Div., Eastern Alton, Ill., land, Ohio
and Baltimore, Md. Titanium Metals Corp. of America, New
The Perkin-Elmer Corp., Norwalk, Conn. York, N.Y.
Radioplane, Division of Northrop, Van Unidynamics, A Division of IJniversal
Nuys, Calif. Match Corp., St. Louis, Mo.
Raymond Engineering Laboratory, Mid- United Aerospace Div. of United Electro-
dleton, Conn. dynamics, Inc., Pasadena, Calif.
Rock County National Bank, Janesville, Waltham Precision Instrument Co., Inc.,
Wis. Waltham, Mass.
Sehmelig Construction Co., St. Louis, Mo.

368
APPENDIX E

NASA PERSONNEL WHO PARTICIPATED IN PROJECT MERCURY

This appendix contains a listing of NASA personnel tha,t contributed to the Mercury Proj_c_
and represents the best effort possible to obtain a complete listing; however, it is known that some
n,_mes are missing, such as people from the Langley Research Center. Those comributors whose
names are missing are recognized as a group.

Aekerman, Sylvester J. Ashley, Fancine Beach, Mary


Actor, J. Paul Askew, Abner N. Beane, Patricia B.
Adams, Robert S. Assadourian, Arthur Beatty, Lamarr D.
Adams, Ruth Ann Atamanchuk, Ivan J. Beck, Harold D.
Adams, Walter I. Atkins, Jones, Jr. Beck, Jeanette H.
Adkins, James E., Jr. Augerson, William J. Beeker, Robert W.
Aiken, Donna S. Ault, John _V., Jr. Beckman, David A.
Aldrich, Arnold D. Avery, John J., Jr. Beddingfleld, Samuel T.
Aldridge, R_)y C. Babola, Robert J. Beerman, Rebecca
Alexander, James D. Bailey, Charles L., Jr. Beers, Charles A.
Alexander, Nancy C. Bailey, E. Lou Beeson, Willirie M.
Alexander, W. Carter Bailey, Frederick J., Jr. l;egnand. Ellis L.
Algranti, Annebell Bailey, Glenn F. Behuncik, John A.
Algranti, Joseph S. Bailey, James W. Bell, Anita S.
Allaback, Wilber Bailey, John R. Bell, Daniel M.
Allen, Charlie C. Bailey, Norman R. Bell, John
Alien, David J., Jr. Bailey, Robert J. Bell, Larry E.
Alien, Elizabeth D. Baillie, Richard F. Bell, Lawrence Wilson
Alien, Louis D. Baker, Ben R. Bender. David
Allen, Thomas H., Jr. Baker, Robert L. Bennett, James A.
Alien, Vera J. Balinas, ¥erby Lee Bennett, Marvin L.
Allison, Howard J. Balisky, Eileen M. Benson, Donald D.
Anastos, Steve Ball, George D. Benson, Richard B., Jr.
Anderson, Donald W. Ball, William R. Bergman, Clayton M.
Al)pel, Margaret C. Ballas, Bebe B. Bergtholdt, Charles P. I.
Arabian, Donald B. Banks, Harold'H. Berlmrdin, Robert M.
Arbic, Richard G. Banks, Judith Bower Berney, K;ithryn C.
Ard, Elizabeth H. Barker, Edward S. Bernstein, Ruth
Armistead, Lucille B. Barker, Joseph T. Berry, Dr. Charles A.
Armitage, Peter J. Barkley, Garland B. Berry, Ronald Lewis
Armstrong, Carol A. Barnard, Jack Bertram, Emil P.
Armstrong, Curtis S. Barnes, Harold F. Bias, A. Dell
Armstrong, Dale E. Barnes, Lyndon S. Biggs, Charles
Armstrong, Geri Barnett, James II.. Jr. Billingham. John
Armstrong, Lawrence D. Barney, Waiter F. Bilt)deau, James W.
Armstrong, Stephen Barrow, John M. l_ishol_. IIalley 3I.
Armstrong, William O. Barsky. Jerome Bivens, Virginia T.
Arnette. ,_andra A. Barton, Ruth A. Bhu.k. Dugald O.
Arnold. James P. Bates. James Richard Black, Thonias
Arslnnian, J.ohn G. Battaglia. Harold F. Blackwood. Itoward F...Ir.
Arthur. James S. Ihtttin. Richard B. l_lnkemore. Thomas I,...h'.
Ashe. Gl,,ria Jean BaUlll. Herlnan Blanee. Lucille

369
Blanchard, Robert S. Briggs, Thomas Butler, Wilbur E.

Blanco, J. A. Brigham, Richens E. Butterworth, Ronald C.

Bland, William M., Jr. Brinkman, John Byer, David L.


Blankenbaker, Lloyd Britt, Leon E. Byrnes, Martin A., Jr.
Blanton, Fred B. Britt, Malcolm V. Byrum, Doris
Blanton, Lelia M. Broadwell, James D. Cagle, Jewel J.

Blase, William A. Brock, Eugene II. Cain, James L., Jr.

Blevins, Edwin K. Broman, Roseanna A. Caldwell, Ernest S.

Blue, Barbara Brooks, Laura A. Call, Dale W.

Blume, Donald D. Brooks, Melvin F. Callaway, Shirley L.


Blumentritt, James Brooks, Russell G. Calloway, Willis G.
Bobik, Joseph M. Broorae, I)ouglas R. Calonna, Richard
Bobo, Leonard F. Broughton, Thomas G., Jr. Calvillo, Efren
Bobola, Robert E. Broussard, Marcus J. Camady, John E.
Bodmer, James E. Brown Beverly P. Cameron, Winifred S.

Bogart, William M. Brown Constance G. Camp, Howard C.

Boler, L. Joseph Brown David Campagna, G. Edward


Bond, Aieck C. Brown Doris J. Campbell, Jack A.
Bond, Arthur C., Jr. Brown James T. Campbell, Janet S.
Bone, Eric Dale Brown J. Robert Campbell, Jewel T.
Bone, James E. Brown Richard L., Sr. Campbell, Marianne C.
Bonham, Robert L., Jr. Brown Shirley A. Campbell, Melvin E.
Booher, Cletis R. Brown Timothy Murphy Cannon, William L.
Boozer, Becky Brown Woodridge C. Canright, Richard B.
Bvpp, Marlin Leroy Browne Robert A. Capo, Raymond V.
Borgman, Elsa M. Brownstein., Herbert Capps, Charles H.
Borgman, Richard R. Bruce, David F. Carbaugh, James P.
Boring, James W. Bruce, D. Jean K. Carley, Richard R.

Bostick, Jerry C. Bruemmer, Carline M. Carlson, Robert L.

Bostick, Linda T. Brumberg, Dolores Carmines, Sidney D.


Bost, James E. Brumberg, Paul G. Carpenter, Edward A.
Boswick, Guy W., Jr. Brums, Dr. Rudolf H. Carpenter, Malcom S.
Bosworth, George L. Bryan, Catherine C. Carr, Ronald
Bothmer, Clyde B. Bryan, Comer B., Jr. Carroll James B.

Bott, Barbara E. Bryan, Doris E. Carson June M.

Bowen, Maureen E. Bryan, Frank G. Carson Thomas M.

Bowman, Melvin D. Bryant, George K. Carter Dan S., Jr.

Bowman, Robert A. Bryant, John P. Carter Elmer J., Jr.


Boyce, William M. Bryant, William C. Carter Nancy K.
Boyd, Robert Byrne, Frank Carter Rosemary
Boydston, Donald L. Buck, Ann L. Carter Thomas F., Jr.
Boykin, Wilbur R. Buck, Kenneth J. Case, Darlene D.
Boynton, John H. Buckley, Charles L., Jr. Casey, Francis W., Jr.
Bracey, Gerald W. Buckley, Robert Hunt Casey, L. O.

Bradford, Halley, Jr. Buller, Elmer H. Cash, Wanda

Bradford, William C. Bullock, Edward C. Cashion, Kenneth D.

Bradley, Raymond H. Burbank, LaBue W. Cason, Barbara L.

Brady, James T. Burbank, Paige Cassels, George A.

Branscomb, Albert L., Jr. Burge, Betty Shelton Cassetti, Marlowe D.

Braquet, Louto J., Jr. Burgeson, Frances Catloth, Mary M.

Braslow, Myrtle S. Burgess, James A. Catron, Dora B.


Braun, Alois, Jr. Burgh, Anabel Catterson, Dr. Duane

Braun, Jane D. Burke, Richard J. Cerven, James C.

Bray, Donahl O. Burkett, James E. Cessac, Robert J.

Bray, Julia F. Burton, Mary Shepherd Chalkley, Lois G.


Brent, Mary Sue Burton, Walter G., Jr. Chamberlin, James A.

Brenton, Westley tI. Busch, Arthur M. Chambers, Jerome P.

Brewer, Mary II. Chambers, Milton


Bush, William H., Jr.
Brewer, Gerald W. Bushong, Wilton E. Chambers, Thomas V.
Brickel, James R. Butler, Walter Emmett Chandler, Amie F.

370
Chandler, William Collins, Daniel D. Crutcher, Thomas M.
Chandler, William O., Jr. Collins, Dorothy Crowell, James L.

Chaplick, Robert G. Collins, Harold G. Crunk, Henry G., Jr.

Chapman, Arthur C. Collins, Walter E. Cumberworth, Gloria E.

Chaput, Paul Theodore Collner, Joseph D. Cunningham, Monte T.


Charlesworth, Clifford E. Collura, Salvadore J. Curlee, Harvey L., Jr.

Charters, Richard E. Colonna, Diane Currie, C. Elsie


Chase, William Raymond Colonna, Richard A. Curry, T. Bradley, Jr.
Chauvin, Leo T. Comer, Howard E., Jr. Dabbs, John H.
Chauvin, Theodore T. Compton, Harold R. I)alby, James F.
Cheatham, Donald C. Conley, James O. Dalke, Edgar A.
Chicoine, Ervin L. Conlon, John W. Dall, C. E.
Childers, Frank M. Conn, W. Jane Dalton, Danny A.

Childs, Dewey L., Jr. Connelly, Russell Daniel, Tom H., Jr.

Chilton, Robert G. Conner, Alfred L. I)aniels, Patricia A.

Chitwood, Willie N. Conneway, Fred D. Dasilva, Anibal J.

Chop, A1 Conrad, Ralph Davenport, William H.


Christman, Laurence M. Contella, Janice E. Davidson, William L.
Christopher, Kenneth W. Cnntella, Milton C. Davids, Irving
Christopher, Maxwell G. Conversano, Andrew Davis, Lawrence

Claffey, Patricia L. Cooke, Arthur M. Davis, Mary S.

Clark, Bobbie W. Cooper, James Davis, Walter A.

Clark, Howard E. Cooper, LeRoy G., Jr. l)awn, Frederic S.


Clark, Robert H. Coppedge, Frank O. I)ay, Joe L.
Clark, Stewart Corbett, Bailey L., Jr. Day, Richard E.
Clarke, J. C. Corbett, Gloria C. Davidson, John C.
Clary, Charles D. Corbett, Wayne W. Davis, Leo P.
Clason, Robert M. Corcoran, Donald hi. Davis, Philip W.
Clay, Russell P. Corey, Donna De La Portilla, Martha

Clayton, Elden G. Cormany, Charles A. De La Rosa, Herman J.


Clayton, Mance S. Cornelius, PauI T. Dealy, Kathleen R.
Clemence, Raymond R., Jr. Corn, Graydon F. l)eagro, Richard P.
Clemens, Joan Correale, James V. Dean, Kenneth J.
Clements, Henry E. Coston, Charles L. Deans, Philip M.
Clements, James R. Cottee, Gatha F. Deason, William P.
Clemmons, Margaret D. Cotton, Paul E. l)ebus, Dr. Kurt H.
Cour-Palais, Burton G. Decamp, Royal D.
Clever_ Edwin C.
Clickner, Russel E., Jr. Covington, Clarke Decker, William E.
Cline, Jack S. Covington, Ozro M. Deering, Ross E.
CIinton, Thomas S. Cowan, John R. Deese, James H.
Coats, Boyd R. Cox, Flo Deluca, Louis A.
Cochran, Harold W. Cox, Roy L. Dement, Marvin Ernest
Cobb, James B. Cox, William M. Deming, James E.
Coble, Bill M. Craighead, Paul T. Dennis, William R.
Cockerham, Earl D. Crain, Doris J. I)er Bing, William
Coe, Frank S., III Crain, Josephine C. Deshields, Shirley R.
Coffman, Sandra B. Crain, Ronald L. Dessens, Charles Wayne
Cofleld, John T. Crane, Luther L. Devine, Robert G.
Cohen, Jack Craven, John P. Devore, Phoneille
Cohen, Robert Creech, Norwood Dewell, William G.
Cohen, William Creighton, Henry C. Diaz, Rodolfo A.
Cohn, Stanley H. Cressman, John H. I)ibella, Josephine
Cole, Charles W. Cribb, Herbert E. Dickinson, John H.
Coleman, Donald J. Crichton, Frank M. Dickinson, William B.
Coleman, Mary R. Criddle, Willi_ln S. l)ickson, Ernest L.
Coler, Charles Critzos, Chris C. I)ietlein, Lawrence F.
Coley, Patsy M. Critzos, O. Constance Dills, Judith
Colleps, Dorothy Crone, Norm_ln A. I)ingman, Reece
Collier, Frank (_vow, Frank G. I)isher, John H.
Collins, Curtis C. Crow, Pauiine G. l)ittmer, 1)r. Daniel

371
Divone, Louis V. Elk, Jimmy R. Fisher, Vernon E.

I)ixnn, Ruth H. Eller, Joseph M. Fitch, David C.

I)()bbs, John II. Ellis, Anna _Vhiteside Fitzgerald, Evelyn B.

Dobbs, Nancy Lynn Ellis, Wilbert Edward Fitzgerald, Hugh D.

l)odd, Richard P. Elms, Charles P. Fitzgerald, James J.

Dodson, Joe W. Emily, Jerry Fitzgerald, Norma B.


I)on.ldio, Sullivan C. Enders, John H. Fitzkee, Archie L.

l)onaway, A. Inez Enderson, Laurence W.. Jr. Flanagan, James R.


l)onegan. James J., Jr. Engel, Jerome N. Fletcher. Calvin B.

l)(mnelly, Paul (4. Engvall. John L. Flournoy, Walter


Enlow, Roger D. Foley. IIelen N.
l)'On_)frio, Gus A.
I)otts, Homer Ensley, Betty M. Folkes, Doris P.

Dougherty, Raymond Epperly, James W. Folkes, William G.


Epperly, Virginia H. Fohvell, Paul A., II
Douglas, _,Villi.lm K.
I)owling, Carlise W. Erb, Bryan R. Forquer, Madeline H.
I)owns, James E. Ernull, Robert E. Foster, Galloway B., Jr.
Ertel, Ivan Foster, Mary P.
Doyle, Eugene I,.
Ertl, Emily M. Foster, Norman GI
DriskilI, Billie R.
Driver, Mary H. Erwin, Sue R. Foster, Richard W.

Driver, W. B. Esenwein, George F. Four, Blanche H.

Drone, Benjamin R. Evans, Norma M. Fowler, James W.

Drummond, William E. Everline, Robert T. Fowler, Joe

Dryden, Dr. Hugt_ L. Ewart, David D. Fowler, John F.


Din.k, Kennetll J. Ezell, Melvin Frandsen, Niels P.

I)udley, Brenda T. Faber, Stanley Franklin, Arthur E.

l)udley, Nan Go()de Fagan, John E. Franklin, Darold Bernard

l)uggan, Orton L. Faget, Maxime A. Franklin. George C.

Duggins, Alberta I). Fahlstrom, Paul G. Franklin, Marion R.. Jr.


Fairchild, John J., Jr. Frank, M. P.
Dugoff, Leon
Falbey, Iola M. Frasier, Cline W.
l)ukes, Francis B.
Fannin, Lionel E. Frazier, Jesse C.
I)umay, William Henry
I)ungan, Larry J. Farley, John S. Frazier, Thomas Vi _'.

Dunning, Robert W. Farmer, Norman B. Frazier, Violet M.

I)unseith, Lynwood C. Farrior, Leona Freedman, Gilbert M.

Dupree, B. Faulk, Ryan J., Jr. Freeman, Gil

l)uret, Eugene L. Feddersen, William E. Freenmn, James R.

l)urocher, Charlotte Fellows, Mary E. French, Burrell O.

l)urvett, William Reuben Fergerson, Shirley J. French, Harold N.

Dutton, Richard E. Ferguson, Barbara French, John C.


Ferguson, Clarence Frere. John A.
Dyal, Lawrence E.
Easter, William B. Ferguson, Gordon M. Fridge, Ernest Marion III

Eaton, Albert J. Ferguson, Helen L. Friloux, Henry J., Jr.

Eckert, Charles J. Ferguson, Nellie G. Frye, C. Lawrence

Eddingt0n, Chester E. Ferguson, Paul O. Fugler, Bartley A.

Eddy, B. Eugene Ferguson, Richard B. Fuller. Carolee Boykin

Edelberg, Robert E. Fernandez, Joseph Fuhner, Otis, Jr.

Edmonds, Eugene Ferrall, Gordon B. Funderburg, Paul E.

Edmondson, Florence M. Fielder, Dennis E, Fult.on, Jeanne S.

Edmondson, F. William Fields, E. M. Fultz, Bennet M.


Edrington, John W.. II Filipowski, John J. Funk, J.
Filley, Charles C. Funkhouser, Robert B.
Edwards, Elwood S.
Filley, Charles W. Gadow. Charles G.
Edwards, Kermit A.
Edwards, Marion D., Jr. Finn, James E. Gaffney, Patrick S.

Edwards, Thonms M. Finley, Robert P. Galcz(_wski, Stanley II.

Eiband, A. Martin Fiorentino, Kelly A. Gallagher. Thomas F.

Eicher, Grace E. Firth, Ruth R. C,allagher. Virginia 3I.


Fisher Emmitt E. Galb*way. Sarah Helms
Eickmeier, Alfred B.
Fisher, Frankie Gaml)ill. Ilona G.
Eickmeier, Lester R., Jr.
Eik-Nes, Kristen B. I). Fisher. Jackie L. (_amm()n, Frank hi.

Ekeroot, Stig Fisher, Lewis R. Gans. Barbara

372
Gant, William L. Grace, Thomas J. Hall, Dr. Harvey

Gantz, B. R. Grafe, Robert L. Hall, James L.


Graffe, Robert T. Hall, John B., Jr.
Garbacz, Michael
G_)rdner, Benson B. Graham, Glenn W. Hamblett, Edward B., Jr.

Gardner, Virgil F., Jr. Graham, John B., Jr. tIamby, William H.

Garino, Joe D., Jr. Graham, Ralph E. ttammack, Jerome B.

Garland, Benjamine J. Graham, William tIammer, Louis

Garner, Charles _V. Grames, H. Jack IIammersmith, John


Grammcr, Donald B. IIamm_ck, David M.
Garner, Iris A.
Garrett, Arnold W. Grana, David C. Hammond, James P.

Garrett, Crayton Grandfield, Allen L. Hammond, Joseph W., Jr.

Garrison, John C., Jr. Granger, Harold E. Haml)ton, Harold D.

Garza, Alfred M. Grant, Charles M., Jr. Hand, Arthur A.

Gaster, Barbara J. Graves, Barry IIaney, Francis J.

Gaster, Jeanne Gray, Wilbur H. IIannigan, James E.

Gatchell, Herbert L. Green, Don IIansen, Paul

Gates, Sally D. Green. M. Linda tIardin, Donald W.


Green, Robert N. Hardin, William G.
Gaughan, David
Greene, L. Annette IIardwin, William B.
Geddes, Leslie A.
Geier, Douglas J. Greene, Mert_n D. IIargrave, Claude S.
Greenfield, Sarah F. IIarper, Richard H.
Geier, Robert
Greenfield, Terry B. [Iarper, Velda B.
Geisler, Phyllis A.
Geller, Samuel Greenglass, Bertram IIarrelson, Patsy Ann

Gerher, David L. Gregory, Donald T. IIarrin, Eziaslav N.

Gerstle, John E., Jr. Greil, Karl F. It:lrrington, Nancy J.


Griffin, Bobby G. IIarrington, Robert D.
(}feller, Virgil A.
Griffin, Charles H. ILirris, Carl B.
Gibl_ons, Howard
Griffin, Oscar F. IIarris, Emery F.
Gibbons, Jim L.
Griffin, Wesley W. IIarris, Fred A.
Gibbons, Thomas F.
Grimes, Walter E. IIarris, George, Jr.
Gibson, Pearl C.
Griffis, Carl L. tIarris. Janet E.
Gibson, Thomas F.
Griffith, Jack A. Harris, Joe
Gifford, Burton M.
Grimhly, Samuel C. IIarris, John B.
Giles, June A.
Grimes, Walter E. Harris, Russell
Gilkey, John E.
Grimwood, Jim Harris, Sylvia
Gillespie, Ben
Grissom, Virgil I. tIarrison, Floyd L.
Gillespie, Warren
Gill. William L. (]ross, Bernard D. IIarrison, .Margaret R.
Gro_s, tIarry G. Harrison, Rcna B.
Gills, Sidney
Gilruth, Robert R. Gross, Stanley A. Hart, Robert F.
Grow, R. Bruce Hartlein, John
Glenn, John H., Jr.
Glenny, Virginia T. Grow, Emily H. Hartung, Jack B.

Glover, Kenneth E. Gruene, Dr. Hans F. IIarvey, Gordon W.


Guice, Mildred L. Hassett, Raymond
Glynn, Francis I. P.
Guidry, Mark A., Jr. Hathcock, Juanita
Goad, John W.
Gunnersen, Alf'S., Jr. Hatton, George
Goldcamp, Thomas F.
Goldenbaum, David M. Gundersen, Robert T, Haugew, Kenneth R.
Gurley, John R., Jr. Havenstein, Paul L.
Goldsmith, Verl A.
Goldstein, Stan Guthrie, Alfred E. Hawk, Willard E.

Gonzalez, Jose L. Guthrie, George C. IIawkins, George M., Jr.

Guy, Judith Hawkins, I. Edna


Goodman, Jerry R.
Guy, Walter W. IIayes, Leroy
Goodson, Adolph
Gwinn, Ralph T. Hayes. Leslie E.
Goodwin, Burney H.
Goodwin, Haskell J. Habron, Betty H. Hayes, Neisel M.

Goodwin, Mary Ann Hackworth, Robie IIayes, William C.

(_ordon, Bob Hagan, ,_Iason IIaynes, James F.

Gordon. Donald L. IIager, Mary C. Hays, Edward L.

German, Robert E. Hagood, Martin L. IIays, Robert 1).

German, T. P. tIairston, Ernest IIearn, Ch'_se P.

G_,slee. John W. lI_lll. Charles .]'. IIeath._.()te, Dennis E.. Jr.

(;_ttus,;. Vincent J. IIall. l,]ldon W. Ileather, Gerald ]).

373
Heaton, Sydney N. Hoffman, Raphael F. Irwin, Kenneth
Heberlig, Jack C. Hogan, Edward J. Isley, William C.
Heckelmoser, Charles J. Hogg, Carolyn Jaap, Fred S.
Heetderks, H. Richard Hoggard, Walter C. Jackson, Arnold B., Jr.
Hegwood, Robert B. Hoisington, Jerry E. Jackson, Bruce G.
Hegwood, Sarah E. Holden, Joan S. Jackson, Carmault B.
Hehn, Joseph A. Holland, John Jackson, James
Heidler, Homer F., Jr. Hollingsworth, Miles M. Jackson, Margaret M.
Heinlein, Marjorie J. Holloway, Tommy W. Jacobs, Donald L.
Heiser, Robert F. Holman, Richard A. Jacobs, R_chard M.
Heitman, Erwin W. Holmgren, Herbert L. Jacobs, Stephen
Heller, Niles R. Holt, Richard L. Jacobsen, Stanley
Heller, Robert H. Holt, Talmadge W. Jafferis, William
Helterbran, Irene J. Holt, Thomas E. Jakir, N. S.
Henderson, Grady P. Honicker, Candy B. James, Frances L.
Henderson, Joseph D. Hoover, Ida B. James John L., Jr.
Henderson, Melba S. Hoover, Luther L. Janokaitis, John, Jr.
Henderson, Sharon Hoover, Richard A. Jarrett, Jaye C.
Henderson, Thomas Harder Hopton, Conrad E. Jenke, Richard K.
Hendrickson, Douglas R. Horsman, Paul F. Jenkins, Morris V.
Henry, James P. Horstmann, Robert W. Jenness, Martin D.
Hensley, James B. Horton, Caroline L. Jenness, Phyllis T.
Henson, Kirby Horton, Elmer A. Jensen, Louisa
Herbert, Frank J. Horton, Eugene E., Jr. Jesen, Wtllard G.
HerberL Herbert L. Hough, Agnes S. Jeter, John D.
Herring, Hugh S. House, Edward G. Jevas, Nickolas
Herring, Robert W., Jr. Howard, Carole A. Jezewski, Donald J.
Herrman, Dorothy M. Howard, Lalah Johns, James A.
Hershey, Theodore P. Howell, Joseph J. Johnson, Ann C.
Hessberg, Rufus Howerton, John C. Johnson, Bryant L.
Hesson, Robert K. Huffman, Bobby R. Johnson, Caldwell C., Jr.
Hester, Randolph H. Huffstetler, William J., Jr. Johnson, Carl P.
Hettinger, Fredric L. Huggins, Matilda M. Johnson. Carol L.
Hibbs, William C. Hughes, Carroll V. Johnson Edward T.
Hicks, Claiborne R., Jr. Hughes, Donald F. Johnson Edwin Cyril
Hicks, Wilburn Hughes, George H. Johnson Elizabeth P.
Hiers, Harry K. Hughes, Helen W. Johnson Francis, Jr.
Hiers, James R. Hughes, James Johnson Harold I.
Higgins, Rodney F. Hughes, Virginia B. J_)hnson Jane
Hightower, Libbie L. Hull, Anne L. Johnson Jeanne
Hill, Ann W. Humphrey, Francis S. Johnson John H.
Hill, Elizabeth J. Humphrey, John T. Johnson Kenneth L.
Hill, Harold H. Humphrey, William R. Johnson R.E.
Hill, Lawrence E. Hungall, Robert G. Johnson Robert
Hill, Ralph E. Hunt, Gerald L. Johnson Suellyn
Hill, Norma L. Hunt, Hal Johnson, Virginia W.
Hiller, Mary Jo Hunt, Phyllis S. Johnson, W. Kemble
Hilyer, Euell Hunt, Shirley A. Johnston, Richard S.
Hinds, James J. Hunter, Daniel S. Jollay, James H.
Hinds, Noble F. Hurlbert, Alma Adams Jonas, Arthur
Hinson, James K. Huss, Carl R. Jones, Enoch M.
Hirst, Carolyn W. Hutchens, Rachel B. Jvnes, Jack A.
Histand, Dorothy B. Hutchinson, Nell Barrie Jones, Jeremy B.
Hjornevik, Wesley L. Hux, Lillie R. Jones, Rosemary
Hock, Catherine Hyle, Charles T. Jones, Sidney C., Jr.
Hodge, B. Leon Idomir, Kenneth Jones, Z. Vance
Hodge, John D. Incerto, Donald J. Jordan, Adaran B.
Hoff, 0rlo Ingalls, Charles W., III Jordan, Carolyn
Hoffman, Ernest E. Ingels, Claude Jordan, Patricia L.
Hoffman, John P. Ireland, Fred H. Jordan, Sandy

374
Jorolan, Albert E. Kline, Robert T. Lavigne, Adeline M.
Jow, Josephine Kl_)ckmann, Robert K. Law, Fleming
Kadesch, Charles S. Kloetzer, Paul H. Lawrence, Bernard W.
Kaiser, Bena W. Knapp, Joan R. Lawrence, James A.
Kammerman, Mary Knapp, William F. Lawrence, Thelma
Kanak, John M. Knauf, CoL George M. Lawson, Shirley W.
Kane, Beverly E. Knell, Kenneth E. Layton, Norma
Kaplet, Ruth P. Knepp, Judith R. Lea, Robert N.
Kapryan, Walter J. Knight, Gordan W. Leach, Barney H.
K_trakulko, Wttalij Knothe, Dr. Adolf H. Leach, Diane E.
Karberg, Elmer H. Knox, Betty S. Leatherman, Pattie S.
Karick, Francis S. Kokoski, Dorothy J. Leblanc, Curtis
Kase, Louise E. Konneker, Patti K. Lecl_ter, Sidney
Katchmore, Betty R. Keens, Fred D. Ledbetter, Otis W.
Kaufman, Louis L. Keens, Wayne E. Lee, Arc F.
Kavanaugh, Walter W. Koos, Richard H. Lee, John B.
Keathley, William H. Kopcik, Donna J. Lee, Lewis H.
Keathly, William Koplin, James Lee, Mark T., Jr.
Keck, Frank Koplin, Joyce H. Lee, Dr. William A.
Keegan, Evelyn P. Kornegay, John H. F. Leech, Ted B.
Keene, Bernard A. Koslosky, John T. Leech, .Theodore
Keene, Lester F. Kosmo, Joseph J., Jr. Leezer, Robert
Keffer, Clarence O. Koutsandreas, Peter Legg, Ruby L.
Kehl, Robert P., Jr. Kovitz, Carl J. Lem, John
Keil, Esther Kraft, Christopher C., Jr. Lem, John D., Jr.
Keith, Ernest L. Krambo, Bett_ Jane Lemay, Harold J.
Keller, James A. Kramer, Paul Clinton Lemmon, Carl L.
Keller, Leonard Kranz, Eugene F. Lemons, Eddie J.
Kelley, William A. Krasnican, Milan J. Lendle, Joseph F.
Kelly, Ferdinand G. Krause, Marilyn H. Leonard, John
Kelly, James R. Kreske, Doris S. Leonard, Pauline O.
Kelly, Keith V. Kreske, Joseph Leonard, Sylvia
Kelly, William R. Krpec, Charles Leopold, Louis
Kempainen, Leona L. Krueger, Mary L. Leshko, John E.
Kendall, Joseph Kubasko, James J. Lesky, Edward S.
Kenerly, Barney G. Kuehnel, Helmut A. Leslie, Claude E.
Kennedy, Daniel C. Kugel, Harold Lewis, Charles R.
Kennedy, E. Frances Kyle, Howard C. Lewis, ,lames L.
Kennedy, Richard C. Lackey, Camille D. Lewis, John H., Jr.
Kent, Henri J. Lackey, David J. Lewis, Louise B.
Kent, Thomas, Jr. Labutka, Joseph R. Lewis, Martha Camp
Kerns, Carl Wesley Lail, Margaret H. Liccini, Luke L.
Kiehl, Paul F. Lafleur, Walter Lichtey, Donald H.
Kiker, John W. Lamache, Andy Liddy, Joan M.
Kil,by, Ann B. Lamay, Harold J. Liddell, John J.
Kilgallen, Raymond F. Lamey, William C. Liebau, Charles R.
Killmer, George F., Jr. Lambert, Clarence C. Lightsey, Alfred E.
Kinard, Martha Rebecca Lamonte, Robert J. Lill, Joseph C.
Kincaide, Patricia N. Lane, James Howard Lilly, William E.
Kincaide, William C. Langford, John H. Lindeman, James L.
King, Charlotte E. Langosh, Eva K. Lindell, Keith G.
King, Fred L. Lankford, Charles E. IAneberry, Edgar C., Jr.
King, John W. Laporte, Charles M. Link, Dr. Mae
Kinnaird, Oxley T. Largent, Harold R. Link, Patricia D.
Kinzler, Jack A. Larson, Mark S. IAnn, Daniel
Kirby, Ryborn Ray Lnsater, Jack Linn, Kathryn E.
Kirk, Albert Lawrence Lasure, Clarence R. IAppitt, Maxwell W., Jr.
Kirkpatrick, James C. Laughlin, Dr. C. Patrick Lishman, Penny P.
Klabosh, Charles Lauten, William T., Jr. Little, George Watkins
Kleinknecht, Kenneth S. Lautzenheiser, Ernest G. Littlehales, Mary C.

375
Martin, Shell E. 3I(,Kee, Charles W.
I,iz('ano, Ester R.
Martin, Thomas E. McKee, John
Llewellyn, John S., Jr.
Martin, Virginia A. M(.Kim, W. P.
Lobb, John I)., Jr.
l,ockard, I)aniel T. Mason, Betty B. McKinsey, Cynthia L.
Mason, Charles D. M(.Lane, John
Lockard, Miles L.
Mason, Helen I. M(.Laughlin, George _V.
Locke, Vandiver
Mason, William D. M(.Leaish. John
l,ogan, llarry K.
Mathews, Charles W. McMahan, M. h'ene
Lohner, Ant(m, Jr.
Matthews, George D. M('Mann. IIarohl J.
Long. James L.
Matthews, Hayword E., Jr. 3h.Matb, 1)aniel ('.. Jr.
Long. Robert G.
Mattson, Axel McMilli(m, Lee N.
],oomis, Leonard W.
Lopez, Mary F. Maxwell, Preston T. McMurry, William C., Jr.
Mayberry, Netha A. M('Nee(.e. James E.
Loranzo, Arturo T.
Mayer, John P. M<.Tavish, (!harles J.
Lord, Douglas R.
Lord, Harold W. Maynard, Joan B. Meade, N,ora H.

Lorenzen, Gerald A. Maynard, John W., Jr. Meadows, May T.


Maynard, Owen E. 3Iedilm, Pete
Lovan, James G., Jr.
Mayo, Alton P. Meeks, Em<)ry J.
Lovej0y, William L.
Mayo, Edward E. Mehailescu, George J.
Low, George M.
Mayo, Richard Meintel, Alfred J., Jr.
Low, James S.
Lowe, John B. Mays, Jackie D. Melga, Roy

Lowe, Joyce T. McBarron, James W., II Melton, Riley P.

Lowe, Nancy C. McBrayer. Robert O. 3Ielldoza, Ted

Lowinan, Dr. Paul D. McCafferty, Riley D. .Mengel, John T.

Luker, Nephi M. McCann, Robert R. Mercer, Jinx


McConneil, James R. Mercer, Robert D.
Lowry, Bryce W.
McCown, _Veldon B. Merchant, Ernestine C.
Lowry, Dr. Rom
Lucas, Dick Manton McCoy, Hugh E., Jr. Merritt, Fred V.

Lucas, Majorie Frye McCreary, Ben F. Mersereau, Ann

Lucas, Paul V. McCurley, John H. Messier, Roger N.

Lucas, William A. McCurry, Ollie E. Mething, Raymond H.

Lumsden, Elmer G. McCutcheon, Ernest P. Meyer. Andre J., Jr.

Lunney, Glynn S. McEhvee, Edward M. Meyer, Grayden F.

Lusby, George V¢. McHenry, Jessie P. Meyer, William R.

Lutz, Charles C. McKay, Scott S., II Michael, Ed

Lytle, Carroll D. McMillan, Aron Michael, James M.

MacDougall. George F.. Jr. McCollum, Marcia H. Michel, Edward I,.

Magin, Roy L. McCrurey, Geneva E. Middleton, William A., II


Mahone, Mildred A. McGuire, Charles W. Miller, Arthur, Jr.
Maillet, Louise H. MeKee. Daniel D. Miller. Bohette J.

Maimes, Howard G. McCarthy, Bill J. Miller, Blanche I).

Malone, Claude McCleece, Howard M. Miller, Douglas H.

Maloney, Philip R. MeClendon, Mary Lou Miller. Harold G.

M.alpass, Wendell McCloud, Mary W. Miller. Henry ",V.

Mann, Everette S. McCoy, Hugh E. Miller, Robert D.

Mannen, Patricia McCracken, Roberta A. Miller, Ruth T.

Mansberg, Gerald McCraw, D. Mills, Blanche H.

Mansfield, John McCreary, B. F. Mills, Ronald W.


Marak, Ralph d. McCreary, Martin E. Mills. Wayne L.

Marek, Raymond McDonald. Imogene C. Minderman. Peter A.

Marbach, James R. McDonnel, Robert H. Minners, Dr. Howard A.


Markley, J. Thomas MeDougall, G. F. Minster. J.ohn E.
Markos. Athena T. McDowell. James W. Minter. John B.

Marlowe, Gilbert D., Jr. McElyea, Bennie A. Mire, John L.

Marn, Joe D. McGeen, Bernard J. 3Iitchel. Harry


Maronde, Del R. McGuire, Charles _V. Mitchell, Arlene R.
Mars, Charles B. McGuire, Peggy D. Mitchell, John P.
Marsh, Louise K. McHale. Helen M. Mitchell, Junior M.
Marshall, Margaret S. M(.Kalm. R,bert E. MiWhell. Virden M.
Martinkovic. Carol Ann 3h.Ka._[:le, Verdie M. Mitscherling. Mary A.

376
Mixson, Meryle W. Nesbitt, William J. Parten, Richard P.
Mockbee, Jean Ness, Harold J. Pashby, Paul J.
Monfalcone, Delores A. Ness, Lawrence A. Patnesky, Andrew
Monroe, Tallulah T. Newall, Robert Patterson, Charles W.
Montgomery, Carole A. Newgent, Joyce L. Pavlosky, James E.
Moody, James F. Newman Frank B. Payne, Stanley C.
Moor, Joel W., Jr. Newman, Geraldine H. Peake, Robert L.
Moore, Alan Joseph Nicaise, Pa.tricia A. Pearce, Fred T., Jr.
Moore, Arthur H. Nichols, Daniel G. Peele, Theresa M.
Moore, Dale E. Nichols, Ralph E. Peerboom, Robert
Moore, Frances A. Nichols, Donald L. Pendley, David D.
Moore, Gladys C. Nichols, Lee R. Penland, Dennis T.
Moore, James S. Nieman, Ed Pennington, John B.
Moore, Rebecca Nies, Charles B. Pereboom, Robert L.
Moore, Rose M. Nolan, James P., Jr. Perkins, E. Franklin
Moore, Sarah H. Noll, Jean F. Perkinson, John A.
Moore, Thomas E. Nonamaker, Laura S. Perlmutter, Robert
Morewitz, Alvin H. Nordstrom, John R. Perreten, David E.
Morris, David P., Jr. North, Warren J. Perry, Donald M., Jr.
Morris, Dowsie W., Jr. Norton, Albert T. Perry, Harold Ethelbert
Morris, Norman S. Nuttall, John C. Pesman, Gerard J.
Morrison, Ned O'Briant, Thomas E. Peters, Karl G.
Morrison, Nellie Odenwalder, Edgar P., Jr. Peters, Stanley, Jr.
Morrow, Lola H. Oglesby, Theodore L. Peterson, Jean L.
Morse, Archibald E., Jr. Ohnesorge, Thomas E. Peterson, John J.
MorVon, John W. Okand, Kazuo Fred Pettit, Richard V.
Moseley, William A. Okeefe, Dr. John A. Petynia, William W.
Moseley, William C., Jr. Olasky, Oharles C., Jr. Peytonel, Milton
Moser, Jacob C. Olough.lin, Carol R. Pfau, Robert W.
Moser, Robert E., Jr. Oloughlin, John C. Pfeiffer, William A.
Moses, Claude S., Jr. Olsen, Aaron B. Phelps, Ellsworth, Jr.
Muchinsky, Lawrence Oneal, Robert L. Phifer, Judy G.
Muhly, William C. O'Neill, James E. Phillips, Donald E.
Mulcahey, William T., Jr. Orman, Donald L. Phillips, Emmett
Munford, Robert E. Osgood, Catherine T. Phillips, Franklyn W.
Mungall, Robert G. Osgood, Donald R. Phillips, Paul J.
Murphy, James F: Ostrander, Robert F. Phlieger, Graydon A., Jr.
Murphy, Richard Ottinger, Jack Pic'kett, Andrew J.
Murphy, Thomas P. Ould, Wallace Picos, Marvin N.
Murray, Charles S. Owen, Murline L., Jr. Pierce, Bobby J.
Murray, George W. Owen, Robert Piland, Joseph V.
Muse, Gene F. Owens, Marion C. Piland, Robert O.
Musil, Mildred V. Owens, Mary S. Pinson, Vestor L.
Myer, Sheila J. Pace, Charles W. Pitt, Patricia
Myles, David T., Jr. Packard, Calvin A. Pittman, James D.
Myrsten, Antonette T. Packham, Leonard E. Pitts, Joseph B.
Nagy, Alex P. Pairque, Hildred B. Platt, William E.
Nagle, Charles C. Panizza, John R. Plaumann, Robert H.
Nagle, Margaret Pantano, Stephen T. Plunkett, Robert A.
Nanz, Robert A. Pantoliano, Thomas D. Pollard, Dr. Richard
Nassiff, Samuel H. Parker, Carl Pond, Margaret B.
Nau, Rowena S. Parker, Clarence O. Poole, Richard B.
Neal, James L. Parker, Dorothy J. Poole, Walter L.
Nelms, Nick Parker George H. Pordon, Ellen
Nelson, Clair D. Parker, Michael C. Porten, Rita
Nelson, Donald A. Parker, Robert N. Porter, Diana S.
Nelson, Helen G. Parks, Francis G. Porter, Harry
Nelson, Morris C. Parsons, Nelson D. Posavec, Catherine T.
Nelson, Richard David Parsons, Walter E. Powell, Alice J.
Nersesian, Richard R. Parmenter, Frank Powell, Doris E.

707-0560---6_-----2_5 377
Pratt, Billy W. Riegert, Daniel Russo, James F.

Preston, G. Merritt Rigell, Ison A. Rutland, James M.

Preston, Richard K. Riley, Phyllis E. Sachen, Richard J.

Price, Donald F. Rinecker, Franz Georg Saecker, Albert J.

Price, Thomas G. Rippstein, Wayland J., Jr. Saieg, Richard L.

Prim, James W., III Risler, Welby T. Salmanson, Jay A.


Prince, Robert N. Risso, William P. Salyer, Walter D.
Prine, Elbert Ritch, Robert E. Salzberg, Irving M.
Privette, James E., III Rivers, James E. Samonski, Frank H., Jr.
Proctor, LeRoy, Jr. Roach, John T. Samonski, Joan P.
Proferes, Constantine Gus Roach, Jones W. Sanders, Roger H.
Prothman, Lillian V. Roach, Leo 0., Jr. Sandige, Carolyn W.

Purser, Paul E. Roane, Mary Sandridge, Richard A.

Quarterman, Wallace L. Robbins, Donald E. Sargent, John D.

Quayle, Howard G. Robbins, Howard Sarlis, Catherine

Quinn, Edith O. Robbins, Rosaleigh M. Sarokon, Ethel Reda

Quinn, Joseph R. Roberts, Benjamin H. Sapp, George F.


Rabren, Robert B. Roberts, Eugene Sasseen, George T., Jr.

Radford, George E. Roberts, Glenn B. Saucer, Dr. Rayford T.


Radnofsky, Matthew I. Roberts, John E., Jr. Saunders, James F., Jr.
Rafel, Norman Roberts, Tecwyn Saunders, Nannie L.
Rainwater, Wallis C. Robertson, Duane E. Savage, Melvyn
Raley, Eldon O. Robertson, Norman E. Sawyer, Barbara E.
Rall, Paul M. Robins, C. Howard, Jr. Sawyer, Diane F.
Ramey, William P. Robins, Joyce F. Sawyer, 0. McCoy, Jr.
Raney, James L. Robinson, Bertly Sawyer, Ralph S.
Rann, John A. Robinson, Glover H. Sayers, Robert

Rapp, Rita M. Robinson, Peter J. Sayler, J. 0.

Rasberry, James R. Robinson, Ray Schaefer, Lola S.

Rasco, Woodrow W. Rochford, Alan M. Schaibley, John R.


Rasnick, Thomas W. Rodriguez, Emilio Jr. Scheetz, Carlton F.
Rathburn, Donald Ford Rogers, Charlie E., Jr. Scherer, Harris F., Jr.
Rayfleld, John F. Rogers, Christine M. Scheuerman, Hugo P.
Razwich, Irene M. Rogers, Ernest R. Scheurmann, Henry
Ream, Harold E. Rogers, William F. Schiesser, Emil R.
Reardon, Lester D. Rollins, Robert H. III Schiller, Barbara A.
Reaves, Ollie M. Rose, James T. Schirra, Walter M., Jr.

Redfleld, Marvin Rose, Rodney G. Schisser, Glenna

Reed, Gene A. Rosen, Milton W. Schler, Morton

Reed, Dr. John H., Jr. Rosenbaum, Alan Charles Schlottman, Paul W., Jr.
Reed, Lettie B. Rosenbaum, Floyd W. Schmidt, Richard A.
Reid, Doris W. Rosenberg, Frank T. Schmitt, Arthur L.
Reini, William A. Rosenberry, John Schmitt, Joe W.
Regelbrugge, Robert R. Ross, Edward A. Schnarte, Dave
Remely, Rosemarie R. Ross, Mihlred C. Schneider, Harold
Remson, O. James Rosser, David C. Schnell, Doran E.
Reumont, Maurlee R. Roth, Carl E. Schnell, Minnie

Reveley, Madeline F. Roth, Janet S. Schoch, Robert H.

Reveley, William F. Roth, John A. Schuiling, Roelof L.


Revell, Ruth S. Rouiller, Charles A., Jr. Schultheiss, Linda K.

Revels, Antoinette P. Rouse, Carroll R. Schultheiss, Richard F.

Rexroad, Eva O. Roush, George Bernard Schultz, Sandra C.

Reyer, Bobby G. Rowell, Steiner L. Schulz, Raymond Henry


Rial, Joseph K. Rudolph, Pauline B. Schulze, Joan

Richard, Louie Gene Rullin, Rene F. Schwartz, Bob

Richards, Gary M. Ruff, George E. Schwartz, Daniel E.

Richards, Stanley R. Ruggeri, Ann L. Schwartz, Robert F.

Rideout, Janet H. Russell, Howard Scott, Edwin C.

Ridley, Edna R. Russell, J. B. Scott, Iva L.

Ried, Robert C., Jr. Russell, Libreda B. Scrip, Mary M.

378
Scrivener, Nina O. Sit, on, Frank W. Steele, Robert H.
Sea, Andrew M., III Sitze, Roy F. Stelges, William R.
Seals, Marie M. SJoberg, Sigurd A. Stenfors, Hal
Secreti, Eugene J. Skinner, Francis J. Stephens, Emily W.
Segota, Mary P. Skinner, Louise L. Stevens, Edwin H.
Segota, Peter Skopinski, Ted H. Stevens, James M.
Seigel, David Slack, Wanda S. Stevens, R. Lawrence
Seille, Mary A. Slayton, Donald K. Stewart, Frederick F.
Selby, LeRoy, Jr. Sleeman, William T. Stewart, Harry D.
Seligman, Margo S. Slight, John B. Stewart, Lester A.
Semmons, Mary Sloan, James E. Stewart, Wallace Franklin
Sendler, Karl Small, John W., Jr. St. Leger, Leslie G.
Shankle, Ralph Smart, James Stilley, John David
Shankles, Thyra K. Smead, Wilbur It. Stimson, Bailey E.
Shannon, Autumn Y. Smith, Alva E. Stockum, Frederick E.
Shannon, James Dennis Smith, CamiIla M. Stodgill, Jo Ann
Shannon, James J. Smith, Charlotte R. Stoffel, Bernard L.
Shantz, Irving Smith, Dorothy P. Stokes, Davis A.
Shaper, Sue Z. Smith, Earl Stokes, James C.
Sharma, Herman S. Smith, George B. Stokes, Katherine S.
Shaw, Nathaniel Smith, Henry A. Stone, Ivan E.
Shaw, Shirley M. Smith, Leona G. Stone, William, Jr.
Shea, Dr., Joseph F. Smith, Norman F. Stonesifer, John C.
Shelton, Loyd C. Smith, Richard F. Stotler, Herbert J.
Shempp, William M. Smith, Robert Stout, William H.
Shepard, Alan B., Jr. Smith, Wilma Stovall, Margie L.
Sheppard, Margaret W. Smitt, Joseph Strass, H. Kurt
Shewmake, Glenn A. Smylie, Robert E. Strauss, Eugene J.
Shigekawa, George Snead, Wilbur H. Strickland, James L.
Shillings Virgie J. Snyder, Kenneth Strohecker, Frances M.
Shillito, Thomas Snyder, Richard G. Stuart, Thomas A.
Shimshock, Leo J. Sobel, Donald Stubbs, Donald R.
Shinkle, Frank J. Sobik, Joseph M. Stullken, Donald Edward
Shirk, Nancy M. Sordi, Joseph J. Sturdivant, Vernon R.
Shirkey, Retha Soulant, Matthew R., Jr. Sturtevant, Paul M.
Shirley, Robert C. Southers, Raymond C. Stutz, Lillian G.
Shoaf, Harry C. Spann, Robert L. Suite, James F., Jr.
Shockey, Harry P. Span, Flo Suler, Frank J.
Shoosmith, John N. Sparks, Charles E. Sulester, James M.
Shores, James P. Spearing, Robert E. Sullivan, Leslie J.
Shows, James C. Speilman, Natalie J. Sullivan, Waiter B.
Shrum, Gene S. Spence, Judith Summy, Ray, Jr.
Shrum, Janet A. Spencer, Bobby Theron Sumner, Kenneth
Shumilak, Edward E. Spencer, Dwight Superka, Joseph L.
Shumilak, Joann P. Spencer, Nancy L. Sustaita, Amelia V.
Shupe, Joyce Spencer, Thomas Sutton, Cermon S.
Siegfried, Joseph P. Sprake, Marvyn D. Swanson, Joanna E.
Siller, Mary M. Springfield, Carlos L., Jr. Swart, Leroy
Simmons, James Virginus Springfield, Miles G. Sweat, C. Downing, Jr.
Simmons, Jan Spritzer, Edith K. Sweet, Floyd J.
Simmons, Joseph C. Stacey, Shirley Taeger, Paul E.
Simmons, Mary A. Stacey, Thomas A. Tagsdale, Mary G.
Simonton, Margaret P. Stack, Mary J. Talani, Angelo J.
Simpkins, Lorenz G. Stanford, I. Duke Talbert, Rexford H.
Simpkinson, Sco_t H. Stanley, Howard J. Tartaglia, Anthony D.
Simpson, George W., Jr. Standwood, Robert K. Tatham, Steven W.
Simpson, Shirley Starkey, Sylvia L. Tatum, Emma Jo
Singer, Herbert Steadham, Moody M. Taub, William P.
Sink, James A. Stealy, William T. Taub, Willard M.
Siry, Dr. Joseph W. Steele, Evelyn G. Taylor, Dale H.

379
Taylor, Geneveive B. Twigg, John M., Jr. Warren, James W.
Taylor, George D. Tynan, Charles, Jr. Warren, Lawrence

Taylor, James A. Tzaperas, Nick A. Wasel, Robert A.

Taylor, Lafayette C. Ulman, Inez L. Waters, John G.

Taylor, Maggie S. Underwood, Thomas C., Jr. Watkins, Edith N.

Taylor, Robert E. Underwood, William J. Watkins, Julia R.

Taylor, Virginia E. Uzzell, Bobby R. Watson, Riley A.


Tepoel, Harold Eugene Vacca, Gennaro A. Watt, John D.
Terry, James F. Valdyke, George H. Watts, George A.
Tessler, Martin Vale, Robert E. Waugh, Merle G.
Thiberville, A. J., Jr. Van Bockel, John J. Webb, Dalton D.
Thibodeau, Joseph R., III Van Ness, Cdr., Harper E. Webb, James E.
Vandeveer, Doris B. Webster, George I.
Thiel, Alphonse M.
Thiel, John J. Varnado, Darol B. Wedding, Michael A.
Thoman, Charles A. Vaughan, Norma _Veedon, Jack Sanford
Thomas, Geraldine Vaughn, Norbert B. Weinberger, Robert A.
Thomas, Guy I. Vaughn, Patricia L. _Veiner t, Robert
Thamas, James A. Vaugn, Charles M. Weining, Roger F.
Thomas, James B. Vavra, Paul H. Welhan, Alex
Thomas, Juanita P. Velander, Wallace Wells, James L., Jr.
Thompson, Alicia M. Verostko, Charles E. Welly, Charles E.
Vestal, Jim West, Edward L.
Thompson, Clifford D.
Thompson, Ira T. Vetuski, Sims T. West, Julian
Thompson, Jeannine C. Vincent, John L. West, Walter M., Jr.

Thompson, Julius T. Vinograd, Sherman Westbrook, Samuel S., Jr.


Vitale, William V. Westerlage, Lois R.
Thompson, Robert F.
Thorsen, Rolf E. Voas, Robert B. Westervelt, Maurice A.

Tilson, Lois A. Vogel, Harle L. _Veston, Kenneth C.


Tilson, Paul E., Jr. Vogel, Kenneth J. Westphal, Ralph L.
Timmons, Eddy Vogt, Fred B. Wetmore, Warren C.
Tindall, Howard W., Jr. Vohringer, Virginia D. Wetzel, Waunita D.
Tindall, William Volpe, Frank A. Whalen, John E.
Tischler, A. O. Von Ehrenfried, Manfred H., II Whatley, Billy G.
Tomberlin, James L. Vonroeder, Robert H. Wheeler, Andrew E.
Voris, Capt., Frank B. Wheeler, William P.
Toney, Marshal A.
Wagoner, Ralph Wheelwright, Charles D.
Toppen, Theodore
Walden, Ann D. _Vhisenant, Elmo R.
Toryak, Anna W.
Walder, Aden Whitaker, Paul R., Jr.
Towey, James M.
Townsend, Quwatha S. Waldron, L. Whitbeck, Philip
Toy, Harold D. Walker, Gary L. White, James R.
Trader, Arthur G. Walker, Jefferson H., Jr. White, Robert
Walker, Louie T. "White, Ted A.
Tredway, Harrison E.
Walker, Vivian Whitehurst, Herman D.
Trombley, Joseph R.
Wallace, Hugh O. _'hiter_an, Lynn R.
Trovillion, Delores L.
Waller, Barbara E. Whiteside, Carl A.
Trueblood, Joseph R.
Trulson, Leroy Wallis, Robert J. Whiting, Donald F.
Tsitsera, Voula Walliser, Sylvan A. Whitney, Ernest G.
Tucker, Charles M. Walsh, Leo F. Wible, Veronica A.
Walters, Ernest E. Wiggins, Judy
Tudge, Henrietta
Tuntland, Richard D. Waiters, Louise H. Wikstrom, Harold
Waiters, William H., Jr. Wiley, Alfred N., Jr.
Turner, Barbara
Walton, Thomas S. _Vilfert, Donald F.
Turner, Bernadine E.
Turner, Charles A. Walz, Joseph E. Wilhelm, John R.

Turner, Connie R. Wanczyk, Eleanore _Vilkerson, Alex.

Turner, Don Waranch, Myer Wilkes, T. Marshall

Turner, Gordon I. Ward, George L. Wilkinson, Reuben L.


Turner, Kenneth L. Ward, Welby G. Willadson, Richard D.
Turner, Thomas R. Warnock, Charles F. Williams, David C.
Turnock, Dr. James H., Jr. Warnock, James M. Williams, Elburta B.
Turvy, Roscoe R. Warren, Carlos S. Williams, Foster T., III

38O
Williams, Grady F. Wisniewski, Richard J. Wright, William W.
Williams, Jack H. Witherington, Guy N. Wrightsman, Harold E.
Williams, John Joseph Wobig, Orrin A. Yannotta, Lucille N.
Williams John T. Woldorff, Leon Yarbrough, Alvie E.
Williams Joseph B. Wolfe, Gayle N. Yates, Sandra S.
Williams Lawrence G. Wolfer, M. Ernestine Yenni, Kenneth R.
Williams Paul F. Wolhart, Walter D. Yodzis, Charles W.
Williams Richard Wolman, Dr. William W. Yokum, Charles O.
Williams Rose T. Womack, William D. Yorker, Lloyd O.
Williams Thomas N. Womick, Otto Youmans, Henry B.
Williams Walter C. Wood, Bruce M. Youmans, Randall E.
WiIliams Wiley Edward Wood, H. W. Young, Earl B.
Willis, William E., Jr. Wood, Sandra Young, Eugene N.
Wilson, &lmeda P. Wood, Wilfred Young. Kenneth A.
Wilson, Anne F. Woodling, Carroll H. Young, Minerva S.
Wilson, B. M. Woodman, Ray S. Young, William J.
Wilson, James M. Woodruff, James W. Yusken, John W.
Wilson, Terry L. Woodsmall, Charline W. Zarcaro, John G.
Wilson, William T. Woodward, Charles F. Zavasky, Raymond L.
Windier, Milton L. W_odyard, Charles E. Zedekar, Raymond G.
Winn, Grace Woods, Donald J. Zeigler, Irene B.
Winnette, Waiter M. Woods, Gary J. Ziegler, Thomas A.
Winterhalter, David L., St. Woods, Thomas F. Zelenevitz, Joyce
Winters, James G., Jr. Woodyard, Jean M. Zepp, John P.
Wirhan, Nelson R. Worf, Dr. Douglas L. Zetler, Albert
Wirman, Nelson R. Workman, Bob Zirnf_s, Edward R., Jr.
Wise, John P. Wright, David S. Zita, Myrtle C.

381
APPENDIX F

MA-9 AIR-GROUND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS

The following is a transcript of the MA-9 either of these reasons, 'the first column
flight communications derived from both the contains the notation "unreadable" for that
spacecraft onboard recordings and the Mercury communication.
network station recordings to form a single The communicators are id6ntified as follows :
text. It is, therefore, a complete transcript of P--Pilot
the aAr-to-ground and ground-to-air commu- CC--Spacecraft communicator at the range
nications during station passes and inflight station
comments made by the pilot between stations. SY---Systems monitor at the range station
A few nonflight-related transmissions and an F--Flight director at Mercury Control
occasional repetitive word or partial sentence Center
were removed by the astronauts and the editors R1--Pilot of primary recovery helicopter
to improve the clarity. Instances of this type RP.---Pilot of backup recovery helicopter
are noted by an asterisk at the beginning of the Stony--Blockhouse communicator at launch
altered transmission. Where a whole trans-
complex 14
mission has been deleted because of lack of con- K--Communicator onboard the USS Kear-
firmation or nonflight-relationship, the asterisk sarge
appears where the transmission was removed.
At various times throughout the flight, the
The text is otherwise verbatim.
pilot or network station communicator would
The format used for presentation is as fol-
indicate a precise time, event, or action by the
lows, from left to right: The first column con-
use of a significant word, such as "MARK",
tains the spacecraft elapsed time (c.e.t.) from
or "NOW". The transcript editors also se-
lift-off in hours, minutes, and seconds at which
lected a few significant words or events for
each communication was initiated. The sec-
timing. The timing of these words or events
ond column identifies the communicator and the
was/accomplished by the same process as that
third column contains the text of the communi-
used to determine the c.e.t, times for column
cation. The station in communication with
one and is indicated by the time enclosed in
the astronaut is designated at the initiation of
brackets followed by the superscript T.
communications. When no station contact was
All temperatures are given in ° F; all cabin
made for a complete orbital pass the text is
and suit pressures are in pounds per square
headed with the orbital pass number only.
inch, absolute (psia) ; fuel and coolant quanti-
The c.e.t, was reduced from the recording of
ties are expressed in remaining percent of total
the spacecraft-clock commutated time segments
nominal capacities; retrosequence times are
on both the onboard tape and the network sta-
expressed as ground elapsed time (g.e.t.) in
tion tapes. These c.e.t, times are accurate to
hours, minutes, and seconds.
--+0.8 second. Timing of a few communications
Within the test, a series of dots is used to des-
was not obtained because of either weak noisy
signals on the network tapes, or the short sam- ignate communications or portions of communi-
pling of onboard commutated time segments cations which could not be deciphered. A single
resulting from commutator sampling interrup- dash indicates a pause during a communica-
tions when the pilot was recording in the vox- tion. Information contained within unmarked

record programed mode and paused longer than parentheses indicates editorial insertions for
1/(2 second. When timing was not obtained for clarification.

383
CAPE CANAVERAL (FIRST PASS)

Stony 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0.
00 00 01 CC Lift-off.
O0 00 02 P Roger. I have a lift-off and the clock is operating.
00 0005 CC Roger, clock.
000007 P Sigma Seven, Faith Seven on the way.
00 00 14 P Standing by to start the backup clock.
00 O0 16 CC Roger.
00 0018 CC 3, 2, 1, MARK. [00 00 20] T
00 00 23 P Roger. And the backup clock is running.
00 0025 CC Roger. You look good here, Gordo.
00 00 27 P Roger. Feels good, buddy.
O0 O0 29 CC Good sport.
O0 O0 31 P Thirty seconds, and fuel is go. Oxygen is go. Cabin pressure on the top peg. Altemeter is
working.
000038 CC Roger. You're looking beautiful.
00 0048 P What an afterburner !
00 0051 CC That's a beauty, and your clock's are in sync.
00 01 01 P One minute and fuelis go. Oxygen is go. Cabin pressure, 10 psi on schedule. All systems go.
00 0109 CC Roger. We have a good go here, and pitch, 50 [degrees].
00 01 29 CC Still looks go.
00 01 30 P Roger. One minute 30 seconds. Fuel is go. Oxygen is go. Cabin pressure is 6 psi.
00 01 37 CC Roger. Pitch 32 [degrees], looks good.
00 01 41 P Roger. The Sun is coming in the window now.
00 0146 CC Roger. Standing by for your BECO.
00 01 50 P Roger.
00 01 58 P Running pretty smooth now.
00 01 59 CC Good show.
00 0202 P Two minutes. Standing by on BECO.
000203 CC Roger. Time out good.
O0 0214 P Roger. Have BECO.
00 02 15 CC Roger. Your BECO. Confirm staging.
* [ Undetermined transmission omitted. ]
00 0222 P And you can feel the staging--waiting on tower.
00 02 27 CC Very good on BECO time ; SECO should be nominal.
00 02 29 P Roger.
00 02 38 P And there goes the tower. Does she take off !
00 02 41 CC Roger. Confirm your tower.
00 02 43 P Roger. Retrojettison switch to off.
00 0245 CC Retrojettison switch off.
00 0255 P *Okay. Fuel is go ; oxygen is go ; cabin pressure sealed at 5.6 [psi] and holding.
00 0303 CC Roger. Sealed on 5.6 [psi] and holding. Very good. Pitch --4 [degrees].
00 03 10 P Roger. I agree on pitch.
00 0312 CC You look real pretty here.
000314 P She felt real pretty.
* [Nonflight-related transmission omitted. ]
00 0324 P All electrical is go. Pressure is go. Oxygen is go. Sigma, Faith Seven is all go.
00 0334 CC We have a full go here for you, Gordo.
00 0336 P Roger.
000338 CC This is Sigma Seven down here, buddy.
00 0340 P That's what I said. Sigma, Faith Seven is go.
00 0344 C'C Roger, Faith Seven.
00 0400 P Four minutes and fuel is still go. Oxygen go. Pressure holding. All systems look good.
O0 04 08 CC Roger. Your pitch indication is --4 [degrees] : we concur.
00 0411 P Roger.
000413 C_ Trajectory looks real good, Gordo. I'll give you a mark on 0.8 [V/V,].
000417 P Roger.
O0 0432 P Four plus 30 [seconds]. All systems still go.
O0 04 35 CC Roger. We're still go here. Coming up on 0.8 [_'/Vr]. Stand by.
OO 04 38 P Roger.

384
CAPE CANAVERAL (FIRST PASS)--Continued

00 04 40 CC We have 0.8 V/Vr.


00 04 42 P Good deal.
0004 48 CC You have a real sweet trajectory, Gordo.
00 04 50 P Excellent.
00 04 58 CC Oo.
0O 04 59 P Roger.
00 05 O4 P Roger. I have SECO, sep cap. Going to aux damp.
0O 05 O9 CC Right in there, baby.
0O 05 12 P Have sepcap green. SECO. I'm on aux damp. Going fly-by-wire.
00 05 24 P Everything is green here.
OOO5 30 CC Seven, we're right smack dab in the middle of the plot.
00 05 34 P Say again.
0OO5 35 CC Smack dab in the middle of the "go" plot. Beautiful.
OO05 45 CC Seven. Your turnaround looks beautiful.
O0 05 47 P Roger. She's yawing around very nicely. What a view. Boy, oh boy !
O0O5 59 P And there's the booster.
0O O6 03 CC Real pretty.
O0 O6 04 P Boy, oh boy, is it ever close, too.
O0 O6 08 CC Fun, isn't it ?
OOO6 10 P Yeah.
O4) O$ 18 P Fly-by-wire is working just like advertised.
0006 21 CC *We have good indications on systems here. You (lid a real good job of it.
OOO6 44 P Booster is still smoking. It looks silver, WaUy.
0O O6 48 CC Good.
O0 07 O6 CC Hello. Cape Cap Com.
O0 07 17 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com. Seven, Cape Cap Com.
0O 07 19 P I'm in retroattitude or in orbit attitude.
OO O7 23 C_ Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com. How do you read?
O0 07 25 P Roger. Cape Cap Com. ,Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
0O O7 29 OC Roger. You're on Bermuda relay, and you're coming in real sweet, and everything looks
perfect here.
00 07 33 P Roger. Looks mighty good here. Booster is really in sight.
00 07 37 CC Very good. What color is she?
00 07 39 P *Silver. Silvery as can be with a white frosty band right around the middle.
00 07 45 CC Roger. Understand.
OO 07 53 CC Faith Seven, this is Cape. Your 1-Alpha [contingency recovery area retrosequence] time
is nominal.
OO07 57 P Roger. Thank you.
O0 08 O5 P Yaw shows up very well.
0O08 07 CC Roger. Are you ready to copy [recovery area] 2-1 [retrosequemre] time?
0O_ 10 P Negative. Stand by and let me get on auto here.
_08 35 P Going to auto control.
0O08 37 CC Roger. How is she hitting in auto?
0O08 39 P Roger. No quiver at all on bhe rates. I'm in auto. She seems to be holding so far.
45 CC Very good. Let me know when you're ready for 2-1.
OO_ 48 P Roger.
0O_ 51 CC Pretty nice equipment, isn't it?
OO 08 54 P Very nice.
OOO9 0O CC Faith Seven, Cape. We had a cabin [heat exchanger] dome [temperature] of 65 [degrees]
at Bermuda.
OOO9 O8 P Roger. I have a cabin dome of 65 [degrees] and a suit dome of about 64 [degrees].
OO 09 13 CC Roger.
O0 09 15 P I'm increasing flow very slightly.
O0 O9 17 CC Roger. You're increasing flow slightly.
OOO9 23 CC I'll give you your 2-1 [recovery area retrosequenee] time, and you can write it later. It's
01@27_52. Over.
O009 31 P Roger. 0l 27 52.
0O09 34 CC Roger. And [contingency recovery area] 1-Alpha [retrosequen(.e time] is nominal. Have
a good ride, boy.
0OO9 38 P Thank you, buddy.

385
CAPE CANAVERAL (FIRST PASS ) --Continued

0O1026 P Roger. My Ts-{-314.5 lights have gone out. Squib switch to off.
[A dome-temperature warning tone occurs at OO 11 00] T
O0 12 43 P And th_ boo_tcr is still following me along at 12 minutes 45 seconds. It's coming down into
the bottom of the window. ASCS is working nicely. It is diverging [drifting] off, to
the 11 degrees ....
O0 1306 P *Seems to be correcting properly. I have both suit and cabin dome temps on bottom peg.
I'm going back to my initial setting. *[Nonflight-related transmission omitted.]

CANARY ISLANDS (FIRST PASS)

00 14 53 CC Faith Seven. Faith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. We have T/M solid. We would like
a temperature readout, our segment is very low. That's dome temperature, Faith Seven,
suit dome.
00 15 07 P Roger, Canary Cap Com. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear. What temperatures
would you like? Over.
00 15 14 CC I would like a readout of suit [heat exchanger] dome temperature. Over.
O0 15 19 P Roger. My suit dome temp warning light is on. I have gone back to my initial suit setting.
My cabin dome was on, and I have gone back to my initial setting on it. Cabin dome
temperature is normal, about 52 degrees. Suit dome is still setting down rather low. I
think it is coming back up though. Over.
00 15 45 CC *Roger. Understand. I have a message from the Cape. [Contingency recovery] area
1-Bravo [retrosequence time] is nominal. Your apogee is 144.6 [nautical miles]. You
will have no problems with nighttime. Also the Cape would like a blood pressure at this
time. They missed it at Bermuda. Over.
00 16 08 P Roger. Sending you blood pressure now.
00 18 31 P Canary Cap Com.
00 18 35 CC This is Canary Cap Com. Have you started your T'+5 second check? Over.
OO 18 39 P I'm getting ready to start it right now.
00 18 43 CC Roger.
00 19 47 CC This is Canary Cap Com. Would youconfirm your 16-millimeter camera is off? Over.
00 19 56 P Roger. 16-millimeter camera is off.
00 19 58 CC Roger.
00 21 12 CO This is Canary Cap Com. Could you give us another readout on suit dome temp. We have
lost T/M on that segment. Over.
O0 21 20 Roger. Suit dome temp is slowly coming up here. It's still reading about 40 [degrees],
but it's easing back up now.
00 21 31 CC Roger.
04) 21 35 CC We are having T/M LOS. Could you give us a reading on cabin dome. It's going back down
at LOS here.
OO2144 P Roger. At 50 [degrees], cabin dome.
OO2153 CC Faith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. Do you read ? Over.
00 21 58 P Roger, Canary, Faith Seven. Still reading you.
00 22 11 CC Faith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. Do you read? Over.

KANO (FIRST PASS)

002216 CC Faith Seven, this is Kano Cap Com. We have T/M solid. We request the suit-dome tem-
perature reading. We have no reading on the ground. Over.
00 2228 P Roger, Kano Cap Com. I have about 42 degrees. The suit-dome temp is easing back up
now. Over.
O02236 CC Roger. You are 42 degrees.
00 2239 P That is affirm.
OO2244 CC Kano, Roger.
00 22 49 CC Faith Seven., this is Kano Cap Com. We have an indication that your TV is still on. Will
you confirm ? Over.
00 22 58 P TV is off now.
002301 CC Kano, Roger.
00 23 09 P Thank you.
0023 13 CC We request a cabin-dome temperature reading. Over.
00 23 21 P Roger. Cabin-dome temp is bouncing around a little. It now reads 42 [degrees]. I've
decreased my setting here slightly on it.
OO2335 CC Kano, Roger. We're reading 40 [degrees] on the ground.

386
KAN0 (FIRST PASS)--Continued

0O2646 CC Faith Seven. Give us another cabin-dome temperature, please.


002650 p Roger. Cabin-dome temperature is 54degrees.
002657 CC Please give us suit dome.
002658 P Roger. Suit dome is 40 [degrees]. I have decreased my setting a little more to ease it on
up. Over.
0027 07 CC *Thank you. What is your present setting?
00 27 10 P Roger. I am down below my nominal setting now.
00 27 13 CC Roger.
00 27 43 CC Faith Seven. We had a roll scanner ignore. Are you orienting the capsule at all? Over.
00 27 49 P Negative.
00 27 51 CC Roger,
ZANZIBAR (FIRST PASS)

00 30 47 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, this is Zanzibar Cap Com. How do you read?
00 30 54 P Roger, Zanzibar. Reading you loud and clear. Faith Seven here.
00 30 57 CC Faith Seven. Our telemetry on the ground looks like you have a very good capsule at this
time. We would like to confirm the suit-dome temperature, however.
00 31 07 P Roger. The suit-dome temperature is still down low. I'm easing up on it.
00 31 12 CC We're reading approximately 40 degrees on the ground.
00 31 15 P Roger. I'm indicating about 42 [degrees] here. and I have decreased my setting. It should
be coming up momentarily.
00 31 27 CC Could you give me auto fuel, manual fuel, and oxygen readings?
00 31 32 P Roger. Auto is still 101 [percent]. Manual is 102 [percent]. Oxygen is 1.96 [percent] on
primary and 100 [percent] on secondary.
00 31 44 CC Roger.
00 32 20 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cal_Com.
00 32 24 P Go ahead, Zanzibar.
00 32 25 CC *We just had a report from the Cape. Based on Smithsonian 2, you have approximately
20 over 25 orbits. This gives you approximately three times as much on more conserva-
tive estimates.
00 32 45 P Roger. I understand I have at least 25 then. Is that affirm?
00 32 51 CC Faith Seven. Zanzibar Cap Com.
00 32 55 P Go ahead, Zanzibar. Faith Seven.
00 32 58 CC Have you confirmed your Ts_-5 check and that the TV is off?
00 33 O3 P That is affirm. TV is off. I have confirmed my T._d-5 second check.
00 33 10 CC Roger.
00 33 26 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
00 33 28 P Go ahead Zanzibar, Faith Seven.
00 33 31 CC We've had a slight rise on both cabin and suit-dome temperature.
00 33 39 P Roger. I have a cabin [heat exchanger] dome [temperature] up to 60 [degrees]. Suit
[heat exchanger] dome is still about 42 [degrees]. Over.
O0 33 45 CC Cabin-dome 60 [degrees]. Suit-dome temp, 42 [degrees].
O0 33 48 P That's affirm.
O0 33 51 CC Roger. You received that [contingency recovery area] 1-B [retrosequence time] was
nominal. Is that correct?
00 33 52 P Roger. Understand it is nominal.
00 33 56 CC Okay, do you have anything else for this time for us?
00 34 O2 P Negative. Not this trip, I don't believe.
00 34 05 CC Please repeat.
00 34 07 P Negative. Not this time.
00 34 09 CC Roger. We'll leave you alone then.
00 34 11 P Roger. Thank you.
00 36 46 CC Zanzibar Cap Com. Do you read?
00 36 48 P Roger.
00 36 56 CC Negative. We had a small prol)lem on T/M on the ground. What is your ASCS bus
reading ?
00 36 59 P ASCS bus reading, 121 [volts].
00 37 02 CC We confirm. We had a small T/M prolflem.
00 37 05 P Roger.
00 37 06 CC Zanzibar, out.
00 37 30 CC Faith Seven, Zanzihar Call Com. How about giving me a suit and dome right now? It'll
be LOS time.
387
ZANZIBAR (FIRST PASS)--Continued

00 37 36 P Roger. Suit dome is about 45 degrees. Cabin dome is about 61 degrees.

00 37 43 CC Roger. Thank you very much. See you next time.


00 37 46 P Roger. Will do.
00 38 35 P Okay. I finally have my dome temps--fairly good handle on them. I have about 62
[degrees] on the cabin dome. I have approximately 45 [degrees] on the suit dome.
These temperatures have taken a setting of 2.0 [comfort-control-valve setting] on the suit
and about 3.8 [comfort control valve setting] on the cabin. I have checked my control
systems out. Manual proportional is oi)erational. It is very sloppy comi)ared to fly-by-
wire low. The Sun is very hot coming in the window. I have the Sun directly in the
window. I have from fairly nfidway through the launch. Lost it at the top of the
trajectory. And then picked it up again when I yawed back around to orbit attitude.
003950 P My cabin pressure has slowly dropped to the advertised value of 5.2 [psia] and appears to
be holding. My suit dome has dropped down again now to about 42 [degrees] and seems
to be oscillating about this point area. Body temperature is good, not quite as cool as I
would prefer, but good. My suit inlet temperature indicates 60 degrees, however, so the
sun is probably the biggest factor heating me up. I have drunk some water.
O0 40 56 P Time for my short status report. My N_ low pressures, auto is 475 [psi] ; manual is about
480 [psi]. B-nut temperatures: retro temp, 60 degrees; pitch down, 85 [degrees] ; pitch
up, 84 [degrees] ; yaw left, 78 [degrees] ; yaw right, 89 [degrees] ; roll counterclockwise,
90 [degrees] ; roll clockwise, 90 [degrees].
O0 41 57 P Peroxide reserve tank temperature, 68 [degrees] ; peroxide manual tank temp, 69 [degrees] ;
peroxide auto fuel tank temp is 72 [degrees].
O0 42 30 P Isolated bus voltage is 28 [volts].
0O43")'2 P *First night side and I have a bright blue band. A thick diffused band of blue color. A
bright blue band. The Sun is spread out very widely. It's setting now. And there it
goes. A very bright blue band all the way around the earth.
O0 44 03 Captured another washer. That's my second one.
O0 45 16 *I believe I have the dome temps somewhat under control now. My face plate is open.
Cabin air is indicating 100 degrees. Suit inlet temp is 60 degrees. Dome temperature
has stabilized pretty well There is a very pronounced band--a bright blue band--around
the Earth. ASCS is holding attitude very well on this night side.
*[Non-fight-related transmission omitted.]
00 47 14 Taking my pilot light out, NOW [00 47 15]T--very good.
00 47 43 Turning my warning lights off--to dim.
00 47 58 And I have the haze layer that Wally was talking about. I can see the stars down
in it, But it is--up and around the Earth--to a number of degrees. It is several
degrees thick, perhaps 12 to 15 degrees thick. I can see the stars above it, I can
see the stars down in it.
O0 48 35 *I have seen several lightning flashes on the Earth, now. I see them on the Earth, now.
O0 49 19 *Water squeezers are working.
O0 49 53 Closing my face plate.
O0 50 05 And there is Orion, Betelgeuse. What a beautiful night tonight.

MUCHEA (FIRST PASS)

00 51 02 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. Over.


005106 P Roger, Muchea Cap Com, Faith Seven.
00 51 10 CC Roger. Reading you loud and clear.
00 51 11 P Roger. Likewise here. How are things down there?
00 51 12 CC Very fine, very fine.
00 51 16 P Roger.
00 51 21 P You appear to be having a little lightning and thunderstorms down there.
00 51 26 CC Looks clear from here.
00 51 29 P Roger. Back out to the west of you there are some.
00 51 33 CC Aeromed is standing by for your bh)od pressure.
00 51 41 P Roger. Blood pressure coming now.
00 52 01 CC Faith Seven. How does your cabin dome and suit dome temp look now ?
00 52 17 P Roger. I was waiting until the bio,)d pressure got finished there.
00 52 25 CC How does your suit and cabin [heat exchanger] dome [temperature] look now?
00 52 26 1' *Roger. My cabin dome and suit dome [teml)eratures] have been fluctuating somewhat.

388
MUCHEA (FIRST PASS)--Continued

00 52 36 CC Stand by for emergency voice check.

00 52 38 P Roger.
00 52 45 CC This is Muchea Cap Corn, transmitting on emergency voice for a short count. 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. Do you copy?
00 52 58 P Roger. Muchea Cap Com. Reading you loud and Clear on emergency voice.
00 53 02 CC Roger.
00 53 07 P Roger. On these dome temI)s. I have decreased my setting again, and my cabin dome
is running about 48 degrees. My suit dome is back on the bottom, 40 degrees now. I've
de(.reased it; it should be coming back up momentarily.
00 53 25 CC Roger. Stand by for an astro alarm check.
005331 P Roger.
005334 CC Command is on the way. [Command tone occurs at 00 7_3 35] T
005336 P Roger. I have retro reset light and the tone.
0O5340 CC Roger.
OO5356 CC Faith Seven, would you give me a reading on your cat)in temperature ldease.
005400 P Roger. Cabin telni_erature is running 100 degrees.
O054O4 CC Roger.
0054 12 CC Faith Seven. Perth has their lights (m tonight : you might l<_)l¢ f(_r theln and see if they're
visible.
005419 P Roger.
00 5421 CC They should be just slightly off to the right of your flight path.
005427 P Roger. I'll watch for them.
OO5428 CC Roger.
00 55 O3 P Roger. I have thelights of Perth in sight. Loud and clear.
00 55 08 CC Roger, Faith Seven. People here will l)e glad to hear that.
005511 P Roger. Looks good.
O05523 P Looks like the refinery down to the south is hunting again too.
005527 CC *That's affirmative.
005529 P Roger. I can see that separately.
00 5532 OC Cape Flight would like to know how your ASCS is working now after selecting gyro slave.
005537 P Roger. ASCS appears to be operating as advertised. Over.
005542 CC Roger.
OO5552 CC This is Muchea Cap Com. We have about 1 minute to LOS.
OO5556 P Roger.
00 5647 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. Could you give us your [comf_)rt] control valve setting?
0O5657 P Roger. I'll give you my heat exchanger dome temps here.
OO57OO CC Roger.
O057O3 P Roger. I'm reading 52 degrees on cabin dome, and I'm reading 40 degrees on suit. I have
decreased suit again, slightly. And it should be coming up again.
0057 15 CC Roger.
00 5845 P *This haze layer. I'm describing as light in color. It's a white haze, does not appear to
have any color at all to it.
0104 08 I now have the suit coolant valve set to 1.5. cabin valve set to laun(.h mark, about 3.6. and
cabin [dome temperature] reads _'_) degrees, and suit [dome temperature] is (_uning up
slowly, now reads about 45 degrees. Suit inlet temp is al)out 5S degrees.
01 05 18 P There is considerable cloud cover over the Earth now. This lmze layer is still up above
tha.t. I can see a dark hazy sky above the Earth. and then this haze layer aplJears t,)
be sitting several degrees--it's hard to estimate the nmnl)er of degree._--above the Earth.
The stars are in the background. The stars are al)[)ve this haze layer, and they're quite
clear, of course, above it.
01 06 07 P Long status report. B-nut temperature : Pitch down is 90 [degrees[ ; pitch up is 85 [de-
grees] ; Yaw left is 82 [degrees] ; yaw right is 95 [degrees] ; roll counterclockwise is 92
[degrees] ; roll clockwise is 92 [degrees]. Cabin outlet. 40 degrees; 250 inverter, 110
degrees; 150 inverter. 112 degrees; standby inverter. 90 (degrees). Cal)in temperature.
102 degrees; suit telnp 58 degrees. IIeat exchanger dome temps: cabin is now 50 [de-
grees] ; suit is now 46 [degrees].
01 08 04 1 ) I'm reading IS amps on current. Main bus reads 24 [volts] ; isolated [bus]. 2_ [volts] ;
number one battery. 24 [volts] ; numl)er two battery. 24 [volts] ; number three battery.
24 [volts]; standby [battery] one. 25 [volts]; standby [battery] two, 25 [wdts]; iso-
lated [battery], 28 [volts].
01 0S 36 P I'm now opening my face plate to take an oral temp.

389
CANTON ISLAND (FIRST PASS)

01 10 02 CC Faith Seven, this is Canton Cap Com. Over.


01 10 14 CC Faith Seven, we have a valid body temp.
01 10 18 P Roger, I'll talk to you (ben. Ha, ha ! Faith Seven here, reading you loud and clear.
01 10 24 CC Roger. Would you give me a readout on your cabin heat exchanger dome letup, please.
01 10 31 P *Roger, standby 1 second. Roger. Cabin heat exchanger dome temperature is 50 degrees ;
suit heat exchanger dome temp is 45 degrees; the suit inlet temperature is 58 degrees;
and cabin outlet temperature is about 40 degrees.
01 11 03 CC Understand, 43.
01 11 05 P 40.
01 11 07 CC 40.
01 11 35 CC Seven, Canton.
01 11 37 P Go ahead Canton, Faith Seven.
01 11 41 CC [Recovery] area 2-1 retrosequence time 14 32 03. Over.
01 11 49 P 14 32 03. Roger.
01 11 52 CC Affirmative.
01 11 54 P Roger.
01 12 25 CC Seven, Canton. Your c.e.t. [capsule elapsed] time on the 2-1 retrosequence time is 01 27 50.
Over.
01 12 39 P Roger. 01 27 50. That's on 2-1. Is that affirm?
01 12 45 CC Affirmative.
01 12 47 P Roger.
01 13 02 CC *Seven, Canton. All readouts are in the green.
01 13 06 P Roger, they all look green here, thank you.
01 18 01 P *I have transferred the urine from the internal suit bag to the number one bag at this time.
01 19 27 P Alpha and Beta Centauri.
* [ Non-flight-related transmission omitted. ]
01 20 52 Sweet little baby.
01 21 15 *At this time I now have 1 hour and 21 minutes and I am observing John's fireflies drifting
away from me. I can observe them--appear to be departing from the spacecraft and
drifting out to the rear. I then can see some of them a considerable distance out to
the rear.
01 22 02 The Sun is coming up behind me ; I'm beginning to get the glow on the clouds.
01 22 22 *The fireflies appear to be white, very whitish, ahnost a green, like real fireflies.
01 23 01 The clouds on the Earth below are changing color, are getting quite light.
01 23 54 *I am now on the day side; the Sun is not yet quite up and I am observing stars. The
Earth is light below me. The sun is still behind me, the sky looks dark above me, and
I can see stars very distinctly.
01 24 41 I am decreasing cabin dome [comfort control valve setting] now to about 3.4.

GUAYMAS (FIRST PASS)

01 27 13 CC Faith Seven, Guaymas Cap Com.


01 27 16 P Roger, Guaymas Cap Corn, Faith Seven here.
01 27 19 CC Hey, Gordo, give me your heat exchanger outlet temperatures please.
01 27 24 P Roger. I've got 50 [degrees] on the cabin, and 50 [degrees] on the suit.
01 2731 CC Roger. Are you comfortable?
01 27 34 P Roger. Just slightly warmer than absolutely ideal, but well within a very eomfortable
range. My suit inlet temperature is 58 degrees. Over.
01 27 43 CC Very good. Everything looks good down here. We give you a go for seven more.
01 27 48 CC We are giving you a go for seven orbits.
01 27 51 P Roger. for 30 how many ?
01 27 55 CC As many as you want.
01 27 56 P Ha. ha ! Roger.
0l 27 58 CC And Gemini sends you their regards.
01 2_ 03 P Roger. Thank you.
01 28 0t_ CC Will you give me a short report ?
01 28 12 P Roger. It's great.
01 28 19 CC That's good enough.
01 2_ 22 P It's pretty hard to descril)e, t)ut it really is. I've seen the haze layer that Wally talked about.
and I've seen John's fireflies, saw the lights of Perth. and it's been quite a full night. Quite
iml)ressive. Everything appears very nora nal on board here.

390
GUAYMAS (FIRST PASS)--Continued

012840 CC Itow was the sunrise ?

012842 P Quite impressive.


01 28 49 P Everything seems very nominal on board here.
01 28 53 CC Excellent.
01 29 11 P How's the fishing?

CAPE CANAVERAL (SECOND PASS)

01 33 50 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.


01 33 52 P Roger, Cape Cap Coln. Faith Seven here.
01 33 55 CC Roger. You look real good. Fm going to send you a T/M command.
01 33 59 P Roger.
01 34 05 CC I will wait for your TV camera.
01 34 08 P Roger.
01 34 14 CC Gordo, could you give me a readout on your H202 pressures, please?
01 34 20 P Pressure ?
01 34 22 CC Pressure.
01 34 23 P I have 475 [psi] auto and I have 490 [psi] in manual.
01 34 29 CC Roger. You're getting kind of chinchy on this fuel up there.
01 34 32 P Roger. FQI [fuel quantity indicator]: I'm indicating 101 [percent] on auto and 102
[percent] on manual.
01 34 41 CC You son-of-a-gun, I haven't got anything to talk about.
01 34 42 P Ha, ha, ha !
01 34 46 CC How's your I-I20 separator lights working ?
01 34 51 P Fine. They're Just beating their little hearts out every 10 minutes.
01 35 00 Stony Faith Seven, this is Stony. Maybe, maybe the FQI is stuck. Why don't you try the
hammer ?
01 35 07 Ha, Ha! I'll save that for later. I'm thinking of using the hammer on the dome temp,
however. On the dome templight.

01 35 20 CC We're starting to pick a picture up now. You look pretty casual.

01 35 27 P Oh, I am.

01 35 41 CC Do you want to do your KK experhnent over us please ?

01 35 45 P Roger. Opening the KK clamp.


01 35 52 CC Roger.
01 36 42 P Roger. I'm getting ready to power down.
01 36 46 CC Roger. I would like to have you open up your TV about one stop.
01 36 51 P Roger. Is that any better? It's already wide open.
01 37 08 CC Roger. I still see that fly on your nose.
01 37 13 P Ha, ha. ha !
01 37 17 CC Okay, Gordo. I guess you can shut your power down.
01 37 19 P Roger. Going to fly-by-wire low. On fly-by-wire low.
01 37 22 CC Roger.
01 37 30 P Going to fly-by-wire low. Going to gyros caged, and they caged just as advertised. And
ASCS a--c bus off.
01 37 50 CC Roger. Checking volts down, and amps down.
01 37 54 P Roger.
01 38 28 P *Apparently the heat exchanger dome temps have stabilized pretty well now.
01 38 36 CO Roger. It takes quite a while to get a grasp on it.
01 38 38 P Roger.
01 38 43 CC Before LOS, don't forget your TV camera. We're still reading you very well now.
01 38 50 P Roger.
01 39 01 CC The other item to check is your tape recorder on program.
01 39 05 P Roger. Tape recorder going to program.
01 39 08 CC You are program.
01 39 10 P Are you still receiving the TV picture?
01 39 13 CC That's affirm.

01 39 19 P Roger. I'll hold. Turning it off for a moment.


01 39 21 CC Okay.
01 39 30 P Mode select switches to off.
01 39 33 CC Roger. Mode, off.
01 39 35 P Manual fuel is off.

391
CAPE CANAVERAL (SECOND PASS)--Continued

01 39 38 CC Manual, off.
01 39 44 CC Frank [Sanmnski] says you can stop bohling your breath any time and use some oxygen
if you'd like.
01 39 49 P Okay. You set such a good example ; I've got to equal you here.
01 40 01 CC Yeah, you son-of-a-gun. I'm still higher and faster, but I have an idea you're gonna go
farther.
01 40 O9 P A1, .what is my apogee height ?
01 40 15 CC It's about 146 nautical [miles].
01 40 19 P Roger.
01 40 20 CC You can kill your TV, Gordo.
01 40 22 P Roger. TV off.
01 40 24 CC Roger. And put your C-band to ground command.
01 40 31 P Roger. C-band's on ground command. S-band's on ground command.
01 40 37 CC Roger.
01 4O 40 P Recorder on program ; I'm leaving telemetry on continuous.
01 4O 50 CC All of our monitors down here are overjoyed. Everything looks beautiful.
01 40 54 P Very good. Looks mighty good up here, too.
01 41 O2 CC There's LOS on your T/M. Bermuda may have picked up, but I don't think they'll discover
anything we haven't.
01 41 09 P Roger.
01 41 43 CC Faith Seven. This is Sigma Seven. Do you read?
01 41 46 P Roger. Sigma Seven, Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
01 41 49 CC Roger. We have no messages for you. We'll let you have some quiet time. Have a
good ball.
01 41 54 Roger. Thank you.
01 4203 Might tell Bob Graham I've found a couple of those items that we were discussing. I can
see the smudge layer on the window that Wally was discussing. It looks just like road
grease splashed on a car. It also has spreckledy, streakedy, dots on it, smudged in with
it. The smudge---the added smudges--run length of the window. Closing my visor now
at 01 44 38.

CANARY ISLANDS (SECOND PASS)

01 4826 CC Faith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. We have T/M solid, all systems look green. Over.
01 48 35 P Roger, Canary Cap Con]. I'm turning TV on here for you.
01 4_ 41 CC Roger.
01 48 45 P All systems are green here.
01 4848 CC Roger. Your [contingency recovery area] 2-Bravo [retrosequence] time is nominal.
01 48 52 P Roger. Nominal, thank you.
01 50 19 CC Faith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. We're having T/M LOS. Turn off your TV. Over.
01 5026 P Tv control to off.
01 50 28 CC Roger.
01 5088 P Drifting now; I was upside down in roll attitude. Just passed over Canaries. Everything
appears nominal.
01 51 09 I'm now receiving a Z and Rcal apparently from program.
01 5222 *Coming in over the coast of Africa. It's very clear here : no clouds, no haze. I'm drifting
through an ideal location here. I'll try and snap off the 16 millimeter. Just took a 16-
millimeter blurb craning over the Atlas Mountains in Africa. Coming over the coast. It's
very dry, very clear over Africa. I'm drifting window down, ideal attitude. I'm now
increasing my suit flow by just a hair. I'm opening my visor now. Cabin still appears
drier than the suit. Apparently suit is running a little moist, although it doesn't feel it
at all. Had six or seven large sips of water from the drinking-water container. I have
put a little liquid into this little experimental ball aml find that the liquid adheres to the
surface just neqr as good as it shouhl. Try a little bit more later on here.

392
KANO (SECOND PASS)

01 55 02 CC Kano, has solid T/M.


01 55 09 P Roger, Kano, Faith Seven. Everything's nominal here.
01 55 14 CC Faith Seven. this is Kano Cap Com. Everything looks nominal on the ground. Have a good
trip.
01 55 19 P Roger. Thank you very much.
02 00 36 P *At 2 hours, recording light is on ; so I'll slip something on the tape. All systems appear
nominal. My . . . cabin dome temp is 48 degrees: suit dome temp is about 56 degrees.
Oxygen is still on the top peg on both systems. So is the fuel. Cabin temp, 98 [degrees].
• . . 2 hours and 3 minutes . . . 2|hours ,_n(1 4 minutes. MARK [Unreadable]. T Rate
indicators are on, I am drifting at this I)oint; I have left roll rate of about half a
degree/sec. I have a pitch down rate of about one-quarter of a degree/sec and a right
yaw rate of about one-half of a degree, and relatively constant. They're all considerably
different than nominal. I don't feel that it's worth going into all the settings. I think
the cabin dome temp is the important thing.

ZANZIBAR (SECOND PASS)

02 05 20 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.


02 05 23 P Roger, Zanzibar. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
02 05 26 CC Reading you loud and clear, also. I have your [contingency recovery area] 2-B [retrose-
quence] time. It is nominal. Do you needit?
02 05 34 P Negative, I have it. Understand nominal.
02 05 37 CC That is affirmative. Would you give me a readout of your cabin heat-exchanger dome
temperature ?
02 05 45 P Roger. It is sitting on 40 [degrees]. It has just gone down here ; it's bobbing around, and
I am decreasing my flow to it.
02 05 54 CC Roger.
02 0602 CC Can you give me fuel and oxygen readouts, please ?
O2 0606 P Roger. I am still indicating 101 percent on auto. 102 percent on manual. I'm reading 196
percent on primary oxygen, and 100 percent on secondary. Over.

02 0622 CC Roger.

02 0628 CC How do you feel about this heat situation?

02 0634 P What, the heat exchanger ?

02 06 35 CC No, how is your comfort ?

O2 06 38 P Roger• My comfort is good.


02 06 43 CC Your comfort is good.
02 0644 That's affirmative.
P
02 06 54 F My cabin heat exchanger [dome temperature] is easing back up now to about 42 [degrees]•
Slowly coming back up.
02 07 00 CC Roger•

02 07 02 P I have about 42 [degrees], and it's coming back up slowly now.


02 0705 CC Roger.
02 07 07 P • . . dome temp.
02 07 08 CC T/M confirms all your systems go. Your clock is in sync.
02 07 14 P Roger•
02 07 23 CC T/M indicates you are getting a rise in your cabin [heat exchanger] dome temperature, also.
02 07 29 P Roger.
02 09 12 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
02 09 14 P Roger, Zanzibar. Go ahead•
02 09 16 CC We've had another increase in cabin heat exchanger dome temperature. It's now 48 de-

grees on the ground.


02 09 23 P Roger. I agree.
02 09 25 CC Roger.
02 09 32 CC What is your dome setting--the handle setting at the present time?
02 09 42 P Nominal. I don't feel that it's worth going into all the settings. I think the dome--the
cabin [heat exchanger] dome temps are the imi)ortant tllings.
02 09 49 CC Roger. You're getting weak and fadiug. I'll sign off and see you later.
O2 09 53 P Roger.

707-0,_6 0.--_26 393


ZANZIBAR (SECOND PASS)--Continued

02 14 12 P The time is 02 14 15. People wonder if it's hard to sleep up here. I just drifted off for
about 3 or 4 minutes on a quick little nap. Sleep here Just like you do anywhere else.
Status report. Nitrogen low pressure; auto source, 494 [psi] ; manual 490 [psi]. FQI
[fuel quantity indicator]; 101 [percent] on auto; 102 [percent] on manual [B-nut]
temps: pitch-down, 95 [degrees]; pitch-up, 85 [degrees]; yaw left, 82 [degrees]; yaw
right, 96 [degrees]; roll counterclockwise, 95 [degrees]; roll clockwise, 95 [degrees];
reserve tank, 75 [degrees] ; manual tank, 70 [degrees] ; auto tank, 78 [degrees]. [Iso-
lated] bus voltage, 281_.
02 21 41 P I am now drifting on the night side. I have the Moon in sight ; I'm upside down; I'm ob-
serving lightning flashes from considerable-size thunder storms that are below me. These
create static in the radio every time the lightning flashes down there.

MUCHEA (SECOND PASS)

02 24 13 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. Over.


02 24 18 P Roger, Muchea Cap Com. Faith Seven.
02 24 21 CC Roger. Reading you loud and clear. Aeromed requests that you give him a mark when
you begin your exercise and a mark when you stop your exercise. Over.
02 24 30 P Roger. Will do.
02 24 34 CC I have [recovery] area 3-1 retrosequence time, 02 58 05. Do you copy?
02 24 46 P 02 58 05. Is that affirm?
02 24 48 CC That's affirmative.
O2 24 55 P Roger. I'll be sending a blood pressure in just 1 second.
02 24 58 CC Roger.
02 25 43 CC Faith Seven. Systems reports that your suit [heat exchanger] dome temp is decreasing
rather rapidly. Would you check that, please?
022551 P *Roger. I'll Just decrease the flow on both cabin and suit here.
02 25 57 CC Roger. We confirm here.
02 26 08 P Roger. I'm getting the exerciser now.
02 26 28 P Starting the exercise.
02 26 55 P Ending the exercise now.
02 26 57 CC Roger.
02 27 01 P Sending blood pressure now.
02 27 03 CC Roger.
02 27 14 CC We're reading your cabin heat [exchanger] dome temp at 44 [degrees] now.
02 27 19 P Roger. I concur. 44 [degrees] on cabin and about 47 [degrees] on suit.
02 27 24 CC Roger. We concur here.
02 27 44 P How does your reed. like those blood pressures ?
02 27 50 CC Stand by. They report they look very normal.
02 28 01 P Roger.
02 28 25 CC Could you give me a cabin air temp reading?
O2 28 28 P Roger. Cabin air temp is 98 degrees.
02 28 31 CC Roger. 98.
02 28 33 P Roger.
02 29 24 CC Do you have the Perth lights in sight?
02 29 30 P One moment, let me get my cabin lights down.
02 29 42 P Negative, I'm upside down. I can't see them.
02 29 45 CC Roger.
02 30 1S CC We have approximately I minute to LOS.
O2 3O 22 P Roger.
02 30 25 P Tell Warren not to get lost out in the outback.
02 3029 CC We almost got lost last Sunday.
O2 3O 31 P Ha, ha !
02 30 33 ? Astro, most of the boys have joined tennis clubs here.
O2 30 36 P Roger. This is nmre fun than tennis.

394
MUCH_EA (SECOND PASS)--Continued

02 34 35 P Long status report ..... temperature: Let's see, first, retro 60 [degrees]; pitch down,
95 [degrees] ; pitch up, 82 [degrees] ; yaw left, 80 [degrees] ; yaw right, 95 [degrees] ;
roll counterclockwise, 92 [degrees] ; roll clockwise, 92 [degrees] : 250 inverter, 102 [de-
grees] ; 150 inverter, 118 [degrees] ; standby inverter, 98 [degrees] : cabin temperature,
98 [degrees] ; suit inlet temperature, 60 [degrees]. Heat exchanger dome temperatures:
cabin 50 [degrees]; suit, 48 [degrees]. Just then decreased flow and is coming back
up• Main d-c bus. 24 volts; isolated [bus], 28 [volts] ; current, 8 amps. It is 02 36 40.
Milky Way is quite distinct• Now looking at the False Cross. Upside down, drifting
flight at the moment.
02 39 38 P *And I have the constellation of Sagittarius in sight• Nunki right there. There's the Moon
directly in the top of my window•

CANTON ISLAND (SECOND PASS)

02 43 39 CC Faith Seven, Canton Cap Com. All systems look green on the ground. We're standing
by.
02 43 45 P Roger, Canton. All systems look green here, thank you.
02 47 39 CC Faith Seven, Canton.
02 47 41 P • . . Canton, Faith Seven.
02 47 47 CC Seven, [contingency recovery area] 3-Alpha [retrosequence time] is nominal•
02 47 50 P Roger, [contingency recovery area] 3-Alpha [retrosequence time is] nominal, thank you.
02 48 33 P The time is 02 48 35 NOW [02 48 36] T. Regulated pressure source on fuel, 475 [psi]
auto; 490 [psi] on manual• Fuel, FQI 101 percent on auto; 102 percent on manual.
Cabin dome temp, 50 [degrees] : suit dome romp, 50 [degrees] ; cabin temp. 95 [degrees] ;
suit inlet temp. 60 [degrees] : cabin pressure holding at 5 psi ? Main bus 241_ [volts].
I'm using 8 amps current.
02 49 53 P Sunrise---and the sun is behind me, moving to the rear of me, with Saturn along by
it. And I'm getting John's fireflies again, coming off the spacecraft. And you could
almost aline yaw by the fireflies. They drift away to the rear of the spacecraft
along to the rearward of the flight path.
02 50 32 Sunrise is coming in.
02 51 38 There's a coating of frost on the next to outside layer of window, which I believe,
seems to be burning off as the sun hits the window•

HAWAII (SECOND PASS)

02 51 44 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. How do you read?
02 51 48 P Roger, Hawaii Cap Com. Reading you loud clear•
02 51 52 CC Roger. Everything looks good on the ground• Your suit [heat exchanger] dome [tem-
perature] is 54 degrees. Aloha from Hawaii•
025200 P Roger. Aloha to you, too. Everything appears to be normal here.
025204 CC Roger. We're standing by.
025207 P Roger. Thank you.
02 53 37 P And after having entered the day side, I've drifted around where I'm looking towards the
black sky. I have seen a star again, and I've been observing the fireflies drifting away.
025801 P I'm in bright daylight now, at 2 hours 58 minutes. I'm upside down. 1 still have, oh,
about _ degree per second roll rate--very, very, very light--almost 1/2 degree [1 sec]
yaw, and pitch is oscillating between 1A and ½ [degree/see], close to the rate of roll.

CALIFORNIA (SECOND PASS)

025955 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, this is California Cap Com.


O8O0OO P
030001 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven. All systems here are green. You look real g_od here on the
ground. Over.
03O021 P
03 0048 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven. This is California, got you here, and you lo_k real good all
over on the board. The medics give you a (.lean bill of health• They would like to know
if you just feel comfortable. Over.
03 01 01 P Roger• I do feel comfortable, very comfortable. In fact, I had a little nap.
0301 06 CC Roger. We have a little news here from an old friend ,)f yours, like Major Dick Shankle.
Would you like to say hello ?

395
CALIFORNIA (SECOND PASS)--Continued

03 01 14 P Hello, Dick.
03 01 18 CC I'll pass that on, Gordo.
03 O1 2O P Roger.
03 O1 56 CC Faith Seven, we see you have powered up your ASCS : and also, I believe you are scheduled
for tape recorder, continuous.
0302 O6 P Roger.
03O2 22 P Roger. Tape recorder is on continuous.
0302 25 CC Roger. Your clocks look real good here, in syn(.. No lu-oblems that we see.
0302 27 P I'm on fly-by-wire low.
03 O2 30 CC _Ve see.
03O2 31 P Roger.
03O2 32 CC California standing by.
03O2 34 P Roger. I'm alining the spacecraft, very slowly, to go to auto. Coming in over the coastline
now; it's very clear; looks like very good wea|her down there with clouds standing off
shore.
03O2 54 CC Ha, ha ! Roger.
03O2 55 P I see the islands off shore.
03O3 44 CC Attitudes look really g(md on the ground. You must have her alined real good.
03O3 48 P Roger.
03O4 00 CC Oh, wait a minute. Your gyros are still cage(I, aren't they?
03O4 03 P That's affirm.
03O4 11 SY Ca:bin heat exchanger outlet temperature.
03 O4 13 CC Systems requests a cabin outlet ,heat ex(.hanger temperature.
03 04 19 P Roger. cabin heat exchanger (mtlet is about 4,_ degrees. I've decreased the flow very
slightly a few minutes ago and it should I)e easing on up.
03 04 _5 CC Roger. 48 [degrees] and you've decreased the setting.
03 05 54 P Okay. I'm Just about in attitude here, gel ring remedy to urn,age the gyros.
03 07 19 P I flnl on auto orbit.

CAPE CANAVI_,RAL (THIRI) PASS)

03 07 32 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.


03 07 35 P Roger, Cape Call Corn, Faith Seven.
03 07 38 CC Roger. Read you loud and a little garbled.
03 07 42 P Roger.
03 07 44 CC Like to send you a T/M command, Gordo.
03 07 46 P Roger. Go ahead.
0,2 07 54 CC I have about three requests from you, cabin teml)erature?
03 07 59 P Roger. C;ibin teml) is (,}2 degrees.
03 08 O3 CC Read 92.
03 08 05 P Roger.
03 O8 07 CC Have you had any results on your KK clamp release?
O3 08 11 P Negative. I could not see any flow at all on it. so I claml)ed it off as planned.
03 08 18 CC Roger, would you give us a readout of your c:lbin dome?
0,2 08 21 P Roger. Cabin dome [temperature] is about 46 [degrees]. I have increased the flow
slightly on it. Suit is 50 [degrees].
03 08 3O CC Roger.
O3 08 33 P I mean I have decreased the flow on cabin.
03 (_ 41 CC I'd like to give you a time hack, if you will.
O3O8 43 P Roger.
03 08 45 CC Give you an elapsed time first at 50 seconds, that will be 3 hours. 8 minutes, 50. 2, 1, MARK.
(03 08 52) T
03 08 53 P Roger. I'm 1 second fast.
O,2 09 02 CC Roger. 1 se(.ond fast.
03 09 03 P I am on auto orl)it.
03 09 06 CC Roger. Getting il_to attitude. Your attitude looks good here.
03 09 14 P *Roger. I've got my gyros alined very easily and went on auto; aud the auto appears to
be a little bit slow to ll|ove it into the slnuller g'ttes but it's working very ni(.ely.
03 0(.) 30 CC Good.
03 0(.) 34 P rl_V (.flulera ('Olllillg Oil llO_V.

396
CAPE CANAVERAL (THIRD PASS)--Continued

03 09 39 CC I'll give you a G.m.t. hack in a few seconds.


03 09 42 P Roger.
03 09 43 CC 16hours and 14 minutes. 2.1. MARK. (030948) T
03 09 54 P Roger. What was that. 14 minutes?
03 09 56 CC That's 16 hours, 14 minutes, 00 second.
03 09 59 P Roger. On my standby clock I am about 10 seconds slow on that.
03 10 11 OC Is this your G.m.t. clock?
03 10 15 P Roger. Both of them--no on the wrist watches--both of my wrist watches are together;
however, they are a little slow. I have 14 30 NOW. (03 10 31) v
03 10 34 CC Say again, Faith Seven.
03 10 35 P Never mind I'll catch you later.
03 10 38 CC Okay.
03 11 01 CC Faith Seven, Cap Com.
03 11 04 P Go ahead Cap Com, Faith Seven.
03 11 05 CC I have [recovery area] 3-2 [retrosequence] time if you're ready to copy.
03 11 09 P All right, just a moment.
03 11 27 P Go.

03 11 32 CC Faith Seven this is Cape Cap Com. We have had four R and Z cals. Request you turn
your R and Zcal switch off.
03 11 39 P Roger.
03 11 49 P Go ahead on the [recovery area] 3-2 [retrosequence] time.
03 11 59 P Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven ready to copy 3-2 time.
03 12 29 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.
03 12 33 P Roger Cape, go ahead.
03 12 34 CC Did you copy my 3-2? I did not read you.
03 12 37 P Negative, I didn't copy it.
03 12 39 CC Roger. It's 04 hours + 08 minutes + 10 seconds.
03 12 46 P Roger. 04 08 10.
03 12 50 CC That's correct.

03 13 15 CC Faith Seven. Your scanners and attitudes agree very nicely. Over.
03 13 27 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com, yon ('an turn TV off.
03 13 32 PC Roger. I already have it off.
03 13 43 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.
03 13 47 P Go ahead Cape, Faith Seven.
03 13 49 CC Are your tower sep lights and cap sep lights out?
03 13 52 P Affirm.

03 1354 CC Roger.
03 13 56 P They went out at 314.5.
03 14 00 CC Roger. They should have been. We just had a T/M. and we wondered why.
031402 P Roger•
03 14 03 CC No problem on these at all.
032506 P *I am on fly-by wire, have armed the squib, pitching up very, very slowly, and will deploy
the flashing light at the --20 degree point. Flashing light is deployed. I'm marking the
tape. Deploy light off. Squib is off. Gyros are caged, free to caged. Roger--and ASCS
a-c bus off. NOW. [03 26 28] T Stick is now cold.
03 27 01 CC • . . Cape Cap Com. I)oyouread? Over .... Do you read? Over ....
Unreadable CC Faith Seven . . . on relay. Do you read? Over.
Unreadable CC Faith Seven . . . do you read?
03 28 15 P *ASCS inverter, 110 [degrees] when I powered it down. Sitting at 90 degrees yaw right
now. It is easy to determine that the angle is very large, so far as telling to a high degree
of accuracy, in a short time ; but I am yawing around to observe the flashing light on the
night side--is very easy to determine that, it is about 90 degrees yaw, now. I'm getting
directly away from the Sun now, observing the night side coming on. With the window
head on, I can see the demarcation line between the Sun an(l the light side and the dark
side. Light blue above the Earth, and a band of blue above the Earth that fades in the
dark side. Observing fireflys taking off now. And there's a very, very distinct demarca-
tion now.
03 37 17 P At this point I have no way of knowing what my yaw is. Left cabin light only, with the red
filter . . .
03 51 29 P "2 still have not observed the flashing light. I have Sagittarius right in tim middle of the
window. It is directly on my 80 degree yaw ....

397
MUCHEA (THIRD PASS)

03 58 33 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com.


03 58 37 P Go ahead, Muchea, Faith Seven.
03 58 39 CC Roger• Will you confirm that yuur squib switch is off?
03 58 49 P Affirm• Squib switch is off.
03 58 52 CC Roger. Area [contingency recovery] 4-A [retrosequence] time is nominal.
03 5900 P Roger. Thank you.
03 59 05 CC Aeromeds are standing by for your blood pressure.
03 59 08 P Roger. Sending it now.
03 59 13 CC Roger.
(_ 59 16 CC I )id the beacon deploy ?
03 59 20 P Affirmative. I'm still trying to find it out here in the dark.
03 59 25 CC You haven't seen the light. Is this true?
03 59 28 P Negative. I still haven't found it. Still looking, though.
03 59 37 CC Roger.
04 00 34 P Everything is nominal on this trip, Muchea. I don't believe anything went wrong at all.
04 00 38 CC Roger. Understand. T/M reports you green here.
04 0O 46 P Roger.
04 00 49 CC Aeromed the same.
04 0052 P Roger. Thank you.
04 01 17 CC Faith Seven. How do you know that the beacon has deployed ?
04 01 22 P I felt it deploy.
04 01 24 CC Roger.
O4 01 27 P I don't know which deployed the fastest, me or it.
04 01 28 CC Ha. ha, ha ! Roger.
04 01 51 P I am directly on my 180 [degree] yaw, and with the Moon in the upper left hand corner
of the window.
04 020O CC Say again, Faith Seven.
04 02 02 P • . . 180 degrees, and still haven't seen it.
04 02 05 CC Would you say again your attitudes?
04 02 07 P Roger. I'm zero roll, about --34 degree pitch, and yaw at 180 degrees. _mall end forward.
04 02 17 CC Roger, and you still haven't found the light?
04 02 20 P Negative, still haven't found it.
04 04 08 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. We're approaching LOS. You found the light yet ?
04 04 14 P Negative. Not yet.
04 O5 49 P I am now yawed 180 degrees, 0 [degrees] roll, I have a very slight roll attitude into the
right. The Moon is in the upper left hand corner of the window--th_lirectly on my
180-degree path; I'm not able to see the flashing light. I am observing the haze layer
again that Wally described. At this time I am still looking for the light. I'm observing
lightning flashes on the ground, down on Earth that is. Considerable cloud cover. Venus
and Jupiter in the left-hand part of the window.
04 15 00 P I should still be right on track, on the 180-degree yaw. Still no flashing light, and I'm begin-
ning to get the brilliant blue of Sun rising in the East. Bright blue band underneath
all this haze layer. I can see the haze layer, and the bright band of light demarcation
coming underneath it. Quite distinctive• There's a faint greenish tint to it where there
are clouds, apparently.

HAWAII (THIRD PASS)

Unreadable CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, this is Hawaii.


04 16 39 P Roger, Hawaii. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear• Roger, understand.
Unreadable CC Roger. Is your C-band beacon in a continuous position?
Unreadable P Negative. I have it on ground command. I'll bring it to continuous, now.
Unreadable CC Roger. On my mark will you switch your TV control switch to T/M, and read out your
fuel and O_ quantities?
Unreadable P Roger. Will do.
04 17 28 P Roger. I am just small end forward. 1S0-degree yaw, approaching sunrise• Over.
Unreadable CC Faith, Faith Seven, this is Cape Cap Corn on Hawaii transfer for check. How do you
(CNV) read me, over ?
Unreadable P Roger. Reading you loud and (.lear, Cape Cap Com.
Unreadable ('C Roger, Gordo. Pretty long talk-line here.
(CNC)

398
HAWAII (THIRD PASS)---Continued

Unreadable P You're right.


Unreadable CC Stand by for my mark. MARK 04 23 35. Switch your TV control switch to T/M.
Unreadable P • . . now going over TV transmitter.
Unreadable CC Roger.
Unreadable P Roger. These small particles drift away from you, small end forward. In this light they
appear brilliant white, without green at all in them. They appear to move on out, and
around back toward the flight path.
Unreadable CC We're standing by for your readout of fuel and 05.
Unreadable P Roger. My auto fuel, I have 96 percent; on manual, I have 102 percent. On oxygen I
have 90 percent on primary and 100 percent on secondary.
Unreadable OC Roger. We understand. We also have a message from the Cape. It's possible that you
only felt the squib blow and not the beacon deploy. Is there any way that you might
check this?
042431 P Not from in here, I don't think.
042434 CC Roger, you haven't see the beacon at this time.
042437 P Negative. I still haven't seen the beacon.
042440 CC Check.
042446 P There was considerable noise, though, as if something were departing•
042450 CC Say again, Seven.
0424 52 P * There was considerable noise, which sounded like those doors Idowing open so I assume
the beacon has departed.
042458 CC Roger, understand.
042406 C_ T/M looks real good on the ground.
04 2508 P Roger.

CALIFORNIA (THIRD PASS)

0433 15 CC Faith Seven, this is California Cap Com. Over.


043318 P Roger, California. Faith Seven.
043321 CC Roger, Faith Seven. Systems and medics are go here.
043326 P Roger. My date [flight plan] put my telemaek to normal [switch position]...
04 33 35 CC Roger. Just, just stand by a second until systems finish marking the meters.
0433 45 P
Unreadable CC All right, at my mark then would you switch. I'll start a countdown then. 9, 8, 7, 6, 5,
4, 3, 2, 1, MARK.
Unreadable P Roger ....
Unreadable CC Okay. You confirm TV control switch to off?
Unreadable P Roger• TV control is off.
043433 CC We had a slight decrease in the two links on d-c current. Would you give us a readout?
04 34 41 P Roger• D-c current : the main bus is 24 [volts] ; isolated [bus], 281/.2 [volts].
04 34 50 CC Roger.
04 35 32 CC California standing by.
043535 P Roger.
Unreadable P •.. can see all up and down the California coast, here.., very clear.
043629 CC Roger.
043643 CC I seem to have a little discrepancy between c.e.t, and g.e.t. You're 2 seconds fast according
to my clock.
O43659 P • . . I'll give you a mark . . . 4 37.
Unreadable CC Roger.
Unreadable P 2, 1, MARK [Unreadable] T
04 37 04 cc Right. The ground shows that your readout there is confirmed with ground. However,
it is 2 seconds fast from our g.e.t.
Unreadable Roger.
CAPE CANAVERAL (FOURTH PASS)

04 40 O4 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.


04 40 08 P Roger, Cal)e Cap Com. Faith Seven.
04 40 24 P Roger, Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven here.
04 40 27 CC Faith Seven. (?ape Cap Coin. Would you turn on your TV immediately ?
04 40 32 P Roger. Will do.

399
CAPE CANAVERAL (FOURTH PASS)--Continued

O4 4O 38 P Faith Seven passing just about over Houston now.


04 40 45 CC And would you program R and Zcal to auto.
04 40 53 P Roger. TV coming on now. R and Z cal programer coming to auto.
04 41 01 CC Vnderstand TV on ; R and Z cal to auto.
O4 41 13 CC Seven, from Cape. Could you give us your best coolant valve settings, please.
O4 41 22 P Roger. Stand by 1 minute.
04 41 42 P Roger. I'm below the nominal on the suit. Um using about the 1:_ on suit.
O4 41 54 CC That's 1_ on suit.
04 41 55 P Roger, and using about 3.0 on the cabin.
04 42 01 CC l'nderstand 3.2 on the cabin•
04 42 O6 CC Give you [recovery area] 4-1 retro time. 05 43 41.
04 42 14 P Roger, 43 41.
04 42 16 CC Roger.
04 42 22 CC Have you consumed ally water up to this point ?
04 42 26 P Roger. I'm also giving the doctors their first space sample. For the Electro_Chancellor
System, that is.
04 42 43 CC Roger. We undel•stand. We may send Ill) another one; we understand you're full.
04 42 49 P Roger, who are you sending Ul) with it?
O4 42 59 CC Seven, Cap Com. We'd like a (.al)in temp. cabin heat exchange outlet temI), and three
H20._ tank temps.
04 43 14 P Roger. Cab4n outlet is 42 degrees.
O4 43 22 CC Roger.
04 43 24 P Peroxide auto tank is 80 degrees. Mamml tank is 70 degrees. Reserve tank is 75 degrees.
What else do you want?
O4 43 4O CC Like to know about the cabin air.
04 43 44 P Roger. Cabin air temp is 90 degrees.
04 43 48 CC Understand, 90 degrees.
04 43 52 CC Gordo, this is Wally. Did you have anything to eat ?
04 43 54 P Negative, not yet. I'm planning to shortly, here, though.
04 44 02 CC Roger. For your information, systems' last comlmtations on fuel at Hawaii give 88 [per-
cent] auto, 98 [percent] manual, which is somewhat better than you're indicating on
board.
04 44 17 P Roger. On board I'm indicating 96 and 102.
04 44 38 P Oh, boy what a beautiful shot of Florida.
04 44 44 CC Roger. Looks good from here on(.e in awhile too.
04 44 46 P *Roger. The whole state is ('lear. I (.an see just about all of it. It's been a beautiful
view coming over Florida.
04 44 55 P • . . looks very good.
04 45 01 CC Roger.
O445 05 P
O4 45 12 CC Roger, Faith Seven.
04 45 34 CC Faith Seven, this is Cape Cap Com. We are very impressed with the work you're doing.
04 45 42 P Thank you.
04 45 47 CC We lay a pat on the back from Walt Williams.
0445 52 P Thank you.
05 05 03 P Now on 180 [degrees] yaw. I got here on manual proportional control. I'm at last day-
light, going into dark. Have been looking for the flashing beacon. 05 05 18 NOW,
[05 05 17] v 28, I'm sorry, not 18. That light in sight--it is below me. It is quite a
brownish, reddish brown and considerable qltitude al)ove the ground. Every time I fire
a pitch down thruster, I get a shower of these little fireflies. The light is flashing now.
It is the light. It's quite bright, quite discernible . . . 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, rate. It ai)pears
to lie about--it appears to be about 10 to 12 miles away. I'm keeping it directly in the
window. About the order of a second magnitude star. NOW. [05 11 34] T. IAght is
still in sight, directly in the (.enter of the window. In the background I can make out
a lot of (.umulus activities, faced of (.ourse to the easterly dire('tion at 1S0 degrees yaw.

4O0
CAPE CANAVISRAL (FOURTH PASS )--Continued

05 13 40 *The Milky Way is quite distinct. I can see it out the window. The Milky Way is quite
distinctive. It's right in the center of the window. Quite lmti(.eable. 05 16 35 N()_V.
[05 16 35] T Light is still in sight. Moved off from it and then moved back using it for
visual--to see if I could pick it up. I am able to pick it Ul) .... thunderstorms all in
under it at the moment. It is quite distinctive. 05 18 05 NOW. [05 18 05] T Status
report: retro temperature, 62 [degrees]; pitch down is 82 [degrees]; pitch up is 72
[degrees]. Yaw left, 75 [degrees] ; yaw right, 90 [degrees]. Roll counterclockwise, 92
[degrees], clockwise, ._ [degrees]. Main inverter temp., 98 [degrees]: fans inverter
temp.. 120 [degrees] : standby inverter, 98 [degrees]. The squeezers are working again
as advertL_ed. Okay, the cabin and suit temperature: the cabin air is .90 [degrees];
suit inlet temp. is 61 [degrees]. Heat-exchange dome temperatures: cabin, 56 [de-
grees[ ; suit, 56 [degrees]. I)-c bus, 24 [volts] ; isolated blls, 28 [volts] : and reading
7 amps, current.
05 34 58 P *5 bours and 34 minutes; now it's 35 minutes MARK. [0.5 35 10[ T Aln drifting nr}w.
Do have the light in sight at the moment, apparently right on track. I see Antares on
up ahead of me, which indicates that I am on the 180-degree drift l)oint. See Corona
Australis and, saw Sagittarius with Nunki apparently. 5 hours 39 minutes 30 seconds.
MARK. [05 39 31] v
05 39 36 Have the little flashing light still in sight, out ahead of me. A1)out the or(ler of a first
magnitu(le star, now. It's not very dis(.ernable . . . due to the flashes. However, it (.an
be flicked up. It al)pears like it's around 13--13 to 14 miles•

HAWAII {FOURTH PASS)

05 41 38 ? [Unintelligible, foreign language transmission recorded here.]


05 51 15 P • . . there.
05 51 44 CC Hello, this is Hawaii transmitting on air to ground relay, l)o you read?
05 58 35 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap ConL Over.
05 58 52 P Roger, Hawaii Cap Com. Faith Seven, here. Over.
05 58 7}6 CC Roger. Faith Seven. May we have an oral telnperature at this time and also ;/ readout
of fuel and O_ quantities?
05 59 0:3 P Roger ....
05 59 06 CC Roger. It l(n)ks good down here. Reading 100 [degrees].
05 59 11 P Roger.
05 59 19 CC Stahding by for a fuel and O_ quantity.
(_5 59 24 P Roger. Auto fuel, 94 percent; manual fuel, 102 percent. Oxygen primary about 89 per-
cent : secondary, 100 percent.
05 59 4,'4 CC Roger. Are you--are you in drifting flight?
055947 P Tlmt's affirm. I'm in drifting flight.
05 59 7_) CO Roger. Retrosequence time for [contingency recovery] area 5-A is nominal.
05 59 55 P Roger. 5-A is nominal. Thank you.
06O017 CC Seven. Calm has just advised you have enough time for 92 orl)its.
060027 CC Hawaii. standing by.
O6OO3O P Roger.
0600 50 CC Seven, this is Hawaii. Have you seen the beacon yet?
O6OO54 P Affirm. I was with the little rascal all night las,t night.
06OO58 CC Roger. Very good.
06 01 01 P I tracked it the first part of the night, and tben went into drifting flight and then picked
it up the last part of the night again. Over.
06 O1 07 CC Very good.

G&LIFORNIA (FOURTH PASS)

06 05 CC Faith Seven, this is California Cap Com.


OO_ P Roger, California Cap Com. Faith Seven here.
O6OO_ CC Roger. Systems and aeronmedi('s give you a go here: mid l'd like to che(.k 1)osition on
your C-baml switch.
06 06 2-t P Roger. C-band is on continuous. Over.
06 06 2S CC Read you. That's continuous?
o5 06 29 I' That's affirmative.

401
CALIFORNIA (FOURTH PASS)----Continued

060639 GC Would you please change your S--C-band beacon switch to ground command.
0606 43 P Roger. Going to ground commund.
O6O648 CC On your schedule, for a B.P. [blo_l pressure] over this station.
060652 P Roger. You ready?
06O655 CC We are. Roger.
060831 CC Aeromeds said they received the B.P. and would you turn it off.
06 08 35 P Roger, will do.
060837 CC Would you give me a reading on your cabin PO2 pressure?
06 08 42 P Roger. Partial pressure of oxygen is about 4.4 [psi].
O6O846 CC Roger. Thank you.
060935 CC Five Baker, Five Charlie, and five . . [contingency recovery area retrosequenee times]
are nominal.
06 0940 P Roger, thank you.
06 10 14 CC
06 10 19 P Roger.
061026 P Roger, go ahe_td.
06 10 30 CC ... +17 + O9.
06 10 35 P Roger. 07 17 09.
06 10 38 CC Affirm.

OAPE CANAVERAL FIFTH PASS)

06 1440 CC Faith Seven, 0ape Oap Com. Do you read, over?


061445 P Roger, Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven, here.
06 14 53 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com. Over.
06 1456 P Roger, Oape Cap Com. Faith Seven, here.
06 15 01 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com. Over.
06 1505 P Roger, Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
06 1509 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com. Over.
06 15 17 P Roger, Cape. Faith Seven is reading you loud and clear. How me? Over.
06 15 21 CC Roger, Gordo. Read you same. Assume you have TV on. Are you looking out the window?
06 1525 P Affirmative.
061528 CC Can just see horizon line, sort of interesting.
061538 CC Gordo, how did the manual control check work out ?
06 15 45 P Worked out fine.
061546 P Very good. You're looking beautiful on fuel.
06 15 49 CC Roger.
06 15 50 CC Environment tells us that you are using about 4-percent oxygen per hour, indicated. Over.
06 15 59 P Roger. It looks that way here.
06 1604 CC Well this is a computation that will show later on. This is as much as you're using.
06 16 10 P This is 4 percent of your 200 percent.
Roger.
06 16 12 CC We'd like to have a brief rundown on the acquisition of the beacon if you acquired and
an idea of about what distance away you would guess that it was.
06 16 22 Roger. When last I saw it, in the last orbit, looked like it was about 12 to 13 miles away.
I first thought that it looked like it was about 8 or 10 miles away. And at the last it
was getting fairly dim, about the order of a fourth or fifth magnitude star.
06 16 43 CC Roger.
06 16 46 P When I first . . . looked like a nmgnitude star.
06 16 51 P There's Florida, should ....
061654 CC Roger. We're getting a pretty good picture on this, this time.
06 16 56 P Roger.
06 16 58 CC I'd say your f stop is ideal.
06 1709 CC Gordo, how did you initially acquire the beacon? Did it just come in your field of view?
06 17 14 P Roger ....
06 17 21 CC Roger, understand.
061723 P There it was.
06 1727 CC That was during the night side of this last orbit. Is that correct'?
06 17 37 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.
06 17 40 P Go ahead, Cape.

402
CAPE CANAVERAL (FIFTH PASS)---Continued

06 17 41 CC You acquired it during the night side of this past orbit. Was that correct?
061744 P It's affirmative. Just at night.
06 17 47 CC You can see it only at night.
06 17 49 P I acquired it just as it got dark, right.
0617 52 CC Very good.
061758 P It was just getting dark when I acquired it. It was shining, there was still sunlight
and I could see it shining before I could see it flash, so apparently it had some light
reflected off of it.
061804 CC Roger. Understand.
061830 P Roger. Turning off [TV] camera now.
06 18 39 P Go ahead, Cape.
06 18 43 P Go ahead, Cape, Faith Seven.
06 18 52 P Roger, Cape. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
06 25 40 P At 6 hours and 22 minutes I turned off the cabin coolant and the cabin fan. Now I'm pre-
paring to eat a little bite. The sandwiches that I am looking at here are pretty crumbly,
lot of crumbs floating all over in the bag that they're in. I may not open them.
06 32 23 P *I just had two pieces of Brownie and nut, small cakes, and just now eating bacon. Will
drink some water following this•
06 35 15 P I have just drunk six or seven large sips of water from the McDonnell drinky drink•
06,5431 P * And it's 6 hours 54 minutes 37 seconds NOW. [06 54 38]._ I have the flashing light in
sight again--extremely weak, very, very weak. Actually, just barely discernible. I
would estimate it to be somewhere in order of 18 to 20 miles away. The Moon is out, and
the water is very, very bright, below. It's quite a lovely moonlit night•
07 O3 39 Right on the flight plan, there's our old friend Delphinus. I am drinking water at 07 08 00,
very fine. Took seven or eight large swallows from the McDonnell tank.
Unreadable CC
07 18 O9 P *I was just called by CSQ and informed that Cape desired to leave C-band beacon off.
Unreadable CC
Vnreadable P Short report. Nitrogen low pressure: auto, 475 [psi]; manual 4 . . . B-nut: Pitch-down
is 80 [degrees]; pitch up, 70 [degrees]. Yaw left is 72 [degrees]; yaw right is 7.5
[degrees]. Roll counterclockwise is 78 [degrees] ; roll clockwise is 75 [degrees]• And
auto tank temp., 79 [degrees] ; manual tank, 71 [degrees] ; reserve tank, 75 [degrees].
Isolated bus voltage, 28.

HAWAII (FIFTH PASS)

Unreadable CC Hello Faith Seven. Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Do you read ?
Unreadable P Roger, Hawaii Cap Com. Loud and clear.
07 31 50 CC Roger. Faith Seven, this is Hawaii Cap Com. For your information, all your experiments
should be on time; you have two-tenths cloud coverage for the light experiment. Your
electrical power usage has been below expected. [Contingency recovery] area 6-A
[retrosequence time] is nominal. Stand by to copy [recovery area] 6-1 [retrosequence]
time, 08 50 17. Did you copy?
07 3208 P 08 50 17, for 6-1.
07 32 13 CC Roger, and 6-Bravo is also nominal. Will you turn your beacons to ground command at this
time and give me a readout on your fuel and oxygen quantities, also your peroxide reducer
[regulated] pressure, auto and manual? Over.
07 32 34 P Roger. Say again on the beacon. What do you want on them?
07 32 39 CC Roger. Will you put your beacons to ground command at this time?
07 32 43 P Roger. Beacons are on ground command. Peroxide regulated pressure: 475 [psi] on auto;
490 [psi] on manual .... 02 percent on manual : oxygen is 191 percent on primary, and
100 [percent on secondary].
07 33 12 O2 Roger, give me your fuel again please, Gordo.
07 33 15 P Fuel is auto, 90 [percent], manual, 102 [percent].
073324 CC Roger. We've copied all. Did yon turn yourT/M on for CSQ? Over.
073339 P
07 33 42 CC Say again, Gordo.
07 33 44 P Negative, I did not turn my T/M on for CSQ.
07 33 48 CC Roger. They did report getting a short burst. Will you please leave T/M off for all periods
greater than 30 minutes : no contact with ground stations.
07 33 52 P Roger.

403
HAWAII (FIFTH PASS)--Continued

07 34 15 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. I)o you read?


07 34 17 P Roger, Hawaii.
07 34 19 CC Roger. 1 have [recovery area] 7-1 and 8-1 [retrosequence] times. Do you read?
07 34 23 P Roger. Go.
O7 34 25 ('(' 7-1 is 10 23 33. 8-1 time is 11 56 24. Did you copy?
07 34 37 P Roger. 7-1 is 10 23 33 : N-1 is 11 56, and what was the seeond?
O7 34 46 CC 24.
07 34 48 P 2.t, Roger.
07 34 49 CC Roger. You're looking fine on the gr(_und, Gordo.
07 34 53 1' Roger. Thank you. I saw the flashing beacon again last night.
O7 34 5,_ CC Roger. I understand you saw it throughout?
07 35 00 P I saw the flashing beacon again last night.
07 35 04 CC Roger. Understand.
07 40 22 I' *In auto orbit. I'm pumping the condensate tank out : and will" open the KK clamp. Two
strokes, both syringes full, third full syringe full, four syringes full, five syringes full.

CALIFORNIA (FIFTH PASS)

I)7 40 52 CC Faith Seven, this is California Cap Com.


07 4055 P Roger, California. Faith Seven here.
07 40 58 CC Roger. Faith Seven. Schedule for B.P. [I)lood pressure], exercise, and a B.P.'s.
07 41 03 P Okay, you ready ?
07 41 04 C,C Roger.
07 41 06 P Understand.
07 41 09 CC Same exercise as Mu(.hea is requeste_l by the nmdics.
07 41 13 P Roger.
07 41 59 P Here co,nes the exercise.
07 42 12 1' Starting exercise now.

GUAYMAS {FIFTH PASS)

07 42 28 CC Faith Seven, Guaynms Cap Com.


07 42 29 P Roger, Guaymas.
07 42 32 CC Roger, Gordo. Have a little information to pass (m to y()ll.
07 42 36 P Roger. Let me get my exerciser stored back in here.
07 42 39 CC Roger. You through?
07 42 40 I' Blood pressure coming re)w, Cal.
O7 42 53 P Roger. I'm through with this.
07 42 56 CC Roger. We would like to remind you to l)Um t) out y()ur (.ondensate and turn on your water
wick at about 8 hours.
O7 43 04 P Roger.
t)7 43 06 (3(' And would you give us oral temperature over CSQ. Start taking your temperature at
about---elapsed thne of--at about 08 45.
07 43 18 P Roger. Over CSQ. Is that affirm?
07 43 20 CC Roger. We want to get one over CSQ.
07 43 25 P Roger.
O7 43 26 CC And the CaI)e would like to remind you to keep your T/M turned off when you're out of
contact with stations. They're trying to keel) a (.lose track of the power you've used.
{)7 43 35 P Roger.
07 43 39 CC And you can turn off your bh)od pressure now.
07 43 51 CC Did you read that, Gordo?
07 43 53 P Roger.
O7 43 58 P You _aid turn off the blood pressure. Right?
O7 44 00 CC Roger. And you can power ll l) your ASCS bus anytime.
07 44 03 P Roger. Stand by.
07 44 14 P Roger. Powered Ul). 120volts.
O7 44 19 C(' Roger, we ('an--you're okay down }lere.
07 44 26 I' Okay.
07 45 51 C(, (]or(h), have you cut anything off? We get--just got a drop in current.
07 45 57 P Negative.
07 45 5S CC Roger.
07 46 03 I' I have ASCS a-c bus powered lip. It draws niore (.urrent when it starts. I suplu_se.
07 46 09 CC Roger. I guess that's it.

404
SIXTH PASS

O75904 P *Scanners are not working very rapidly. Spacecraft is yawed to the left very, very,
except in yaw is, all right I mean. Correction, is rolled to the left about I0 degrees
and the gyros read okay. Here comes some correction in now. They're beginning to
correct. And this syringe full is about full. There is a lot of air in it; this is
the last one I'll take out.
08 (8) 47 P I'll add it on to all the others, I believe that's 5V_,. Took 10 large swallows of
water. And I am now opening the Kenney Kleinknecht clamp•
08 16 09 P *Peroxide reserve tank is 72 degrees. Peroxide manual tank, 70 degrees; peroxide
auto is 78 degrees. Cabin outlet is 66 [degrees]. 250 inverter is 105 [degrees]; 150
inverter is 120 [degrees] ; standby inverter is 95 [degrees]. Oxygen, 90 and 100 [per-
cent]. Fuel, 86 and 102 [percent] .. . Here, I have the light in sight, in the top portion
of my window. Extinetometer reading I got was--not any good there, blocking out by
the top part of the window .... I did observe the ground light ; it's quite bright.
08 23 25 P Very recognizable in the littletown. A littlehorseshoe shaped town was quite distinctive ;
it was right beside it.
Unreadalzle I) *Now in auto reentry. Gyros going to slave. I got there in fly-by-wire low to 0, 0, 0
[degrees], selected auto reentry, and have now put the gyros to slave.
O8 26 15 F *Manual pitch plane precession was a littletoo great, as the gyros are torquing a little
bit of negative pitch in here to correct for the pitch torquing . . . overage. The damn
desk is unusable; it's too far down on the lap, and it will not lock down. My legs are
in the way at zero g. Cannot bring it down to lock down.
08 35 35 P *There seems to be some difficulty with the number two urine collection bag. It's very
difficult to pump more than the 11/_ syringes full that I got into it. And I hear a hissing
back behind me: so I suspect there is too much pressure on it, and I'm going to cease
on this one.
08 44 29 P Auto reentry. I see when each one of the thrusters fires,the littlefirefliescome out of the
thrusters and drift away to the rear. Some of them impinging on the spacecraft but
depart later. The auto reentry [ASC'S reentry attitude mode] portion of the auto mode
is holding within plus or minus--within a I11/) degree band. That is, is apears to
be slightly more sloppy than ASCS orbit. However, this may not be tram; ASCS orbit
is not very fine control either. But it is controlling it fairly well.

COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (SIXTH PASS)


08 52 13 P
08 52 16 CC Roger. We're not getting T/M very good here. Do you have T/M on? Over.
08 52 21 P Roger.
08 52 22 CC Roger. He has T/M on.
08 52 26 CC Do you have TV on, Gordo? Over.
08 52 28 P Negative.
08 52 30 CC Roger.
O8 52 31 P TV coming on now.
08 52 33 CC Roger.
08 52 37 CC Are you ready to copy retro times? Over.
08 52 39 P Roger. Go.
08 52 41 CC Roger. [Contingency recovery area] 7-A [retrosequenee time] is 09-{-11d-42 and 7-B is
09-{-40-I-19. Over.
08 52 56 P Roger ....
08 53 06 CC This is CSQ. I didn't get your readback on that. Over.
08 53 30 CC Faith Seven, CSQ. Calm wants a cabin air temp readout, please. Over.
08 54 00 CC This is CSQ, Faith Seven. _Ve're reading you very weak, barely readable. Repeat cabin
air tempplease. Over.
09 00 20 P Now I am getting ready to release the balloon. I have tape on continuous; I'in on fly-by-
wire low. going to three zeros. Camera is in place in the mount and really is in the way
of the yaw indicators. And I am on three zeros, squib switch to arm, 16 millimeter
camera on, going to extend, hold for 5 seconds ; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, off.
09 01 26 P Squib off. Pitching slowly down. very, very slowly, going down--very slowly. I did not
hear the balloon deploy. Perhaps you cannot hear it deploy; I don't know. Easing
down ever so sh)wly. And I don't see the balloon anywhere yet. And I'm doing a
rather sloppy job of flying now. trying to look for the balloon.

405
HAWAII (SIXTH PASS)

09 04 21 CC Hello Faith, Faith Seven. Hawaii Cap Com. Do you read?


09 04 23 P Roger. Faith Seven here.
09 04 26 CC Roger. Gordo, reading you 3 by 3. We need a fuel, and oxygen and cabin-air temperature
readouts please.
090434 P Roger. Cabin air, 90 [degrees] ; fuel is 86 percent [auto] ; 102 percent [manual]. Oxygen
is 190 and 100 [percent].
09 04 46 CC Roger, copied. Are you ready to begin your balloon experiment at this time? Over.
09 04 52 P I have already tried to deploy the balloon at 9 hours. The balloon did not deploy.
09 05 01 CC Roger. Understand you tried to deploy the balloon at 9 hours elapsed, and it did not
deploy. Is that correct?
09 05 08 P This is affirm.
09 05 11 CC Roger. Have you had any food and water yet ?
09 05 14 P Roger. I have had food and water.
09 05 16 CC Roger. Would yon care to comment on the ground-light experiment?
09 05 20 P Roger. I saw the ground-light experiment.
09 05 24 P *Would you ask Cape if they would like me to try deploying this balloon again? Over.
09 05 30 CC Roger. They are monitoring you; you will get an answer from them shortly. What's
your control mode, your gyro switch position, and your status ?
09 05 40 P Roger. My status is go, my control mode is fly-by-wire low ; gyros are on slave.
09 05 51 CC And your gyro switch position, please ?
09 05 54 P Gyro switch position is slave. Over.
09 06 01 CC Roger.
09 06 05 CC *Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Cape advises that you try to deploy the balloon again, and
would you give us a mark when you throw the switch. Over.
O9O6O8 P Roger.
09 0617 P Roger.
090627 P Roger, 16-mm camera is on.
09 0633 CC Roger, Gordo. Is your squib switch on?
090635 P Not yet. It will be before I try again, though.
O9 0638 CC Roger. Just give us a countdown.
09 0641 P Roger. Squibis coming on NOW. [09 06 44] T
090645 CC *Roger. Understand squib switch is on now.
090656 P 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 [09 07 051%--no joy.
09 0706 CC Roger. Understand the balloSn still does not deploy.
09 0713 P Squib switch is off.
09 07 16 CC Roger. Understand squib switch is off. Hawaii standing by.
090757 CC Faith Seven. Hawaii Cap Com.
09 0758 P Go ahead, Hawaii:.
090759 CC Roger. What's your status with respect to cabin temp and suit temp? Do you feel hot?
090806 P Roger. Cabin temp is 90 [degrees], suit temp is 61 [degrees].
09 08 11 CC Okay. And you feel okay, not too hot?
09 08 12 P Roger, feel fine.
09 08 15 CC Sounds fine, you look fine. Have a good flight.
090817 P Roger, thank you.
09 1004 P *The balloon did not deploy ; felt no shock ; hear nothing on it. I will go continuous this
portion where the balloon nornmlly would have been used, in auto reentry. I will go
around in auto orbit mode. Perhaps I can snap a few pictures for the ground people.
09 11 18 P *... Bingo, I shifted into auto, orbit mode. I got no thmlsters on the shift--and scanners
seem to be holding it relatively close.
09 1840 P *What do you know? The Kenney Kleinknecht experiment is putting water in the exhaust
tube, so maybe it is working here.
09 21 31 P Short status report .... air outlet, 68 degrees. 2-_) inverter, 120 [degrees], 150 inverter,
128 [degrees], standby inverter, 102 [degrees]. Reserve peroxide tank, 71 [degrees];
manual peroxide tank, 69 [degrees]; auto peroxide tank, 78 [degrees]. [Retropack]
is 61 [degrees]. Pitch down, 52 [degrees]: pitch up, 55 [degrees]. Yaw left, 68
[degrees] ; yaw right, 68 [degrees]. Roll counterclockwise, 85 [degrees] ; roll clockwise,
82 [degrees]. Regulated low nitrogen pressure, 475 [psi] auto; 490 [psi] lnanual. Iso-
lated bus 28 volts.

406
HAWAII (SIXTH PASS)--Continued

09 27 08 P • . . going to p_m_p the rest of that urine into the number 2 tank. First . . . sample. I
believe it is pumping correctly. The thing about this pumping under zero g is not good,
tends to stand ip_ the pipes, and you have to actually forcibly force it through.
09 40 20 P Radiation experiment on at 09 39.
095O25 P Radiation exFeriment coming off, NOW. [09 50 29] T

ZANZIBAR (SIXTH. PASS)

1OO0O9 P • . . O, primary is 79 percent.


10 O0 18 CC Reconfirm that, please.
10 O0 19 P Roger. Just a hair short of 80 percent. Over.
10 O0 24 CC O, primary?
10 O0 27 P 02 primary. That's coming in at 180 percent. Over.
10 O0 33 CC Affirmative.
10 O0 35 P It's that Frank Samonski gage, and the secondary is 100 percent.
10 00 41 CC Affirmative.
10 00 47 CC Faith Seven, this is Zanzibar Cap Com. At this time, you are go for 17 [passes]. You are
go for 17.
10 01 00 P Roger. Thank you, Zanzibar.
10 01 04 CC MGC advises that they do not want you to jettison your balloon. They are working on an
alternate method for releasing the balloon.
10 O1 17 P Roger. Understand. I will not jettison.
10 01 20 CC Roger.
10 O1 29 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
10 01 30 P Go ahead.
10 O1 31 CC I have new [retrosequence] times for [recovery area] 7-1. Are you ready to copy?
100135 P Roger. Go.
10 O1 37 CC Your G.m.t. or c.--, do you want G.m or c. ?
10 O1 42 P C.e.t.
10 O1 47 CC C.e.t. is 10 23 37 c.e.t. Do you read?
10 02 O1 P Roger. 10 23 37. Understand.
10 02 05 CC That takes into account the 5-second error in your clock.
100209 P Roger. Thank you.
10 02 16 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com. Check your cabin [heat exchanger] dome temperature.
10 02 23 P Roger. Cabin dome temperature is 70 degrees.
10 02 28 CC We confirm on the ground.
100229 P Roger.
10 02 39 CC Can you give us a PO, cabin?
10 02 42 P Roger. P02 cabin is about 4.4 psi.
10 02 51 CC 4.4?
100254 P Roger.
10 03 31 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
100334 P Roger. Go.
10 03 37 CC Everything looks good here.
10 03 39 P Roger. Thank you very much. Everything looks good here.
10 03 42 CO Okay, Zanzibar out.
10 03 44 P Roger.
10 04 07 P *Putting my visor back now. I've had to keep increasing the suit flow from a [comfort
control valve] setting of 1.5 that I have right now to a setting of about 2.7. Dome is
about 58 degrees. Inlet temp. is 58 degrees. This increase in the suit water flow is
probably required by the cabin going on up. The heat load in the cabin is gradually going
on up, using powered up, and having a cabin fan and cabin coolant turned off.
10 18 23 At a [comfort control valve] setting of 3 on the heat exchanger.

COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (SEVENTH PASS)

10 24 57 CC Hello, Faith Seven, CSQ Cap Com. Over.


10 25 O1 P Roger, John. Faith Seven here.
10 25 03 CC Faith Seven, CSQ. Cape advises you could go ahead and power down here, over our site
if you like. Over.
10 25 11 P Roger. Will do. You have any kind of a reproduction device down there?

407
COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (SEVENTH PASS)--Continued

10 25 16 CC No, we're not, Gordo. We're not getting a doggone thing on that ; don't know what's wrong
with it. You are transmitting, is that affirm?
10 25 23 P Ruger.
10 25 25 CC Nope. We're not getting any TV at the moment.
10 25 28 P Okay ....
10 25 39 CC Negative. The boys here tell me we're not getting any carrier on it at the moment.
10 25 47 P Roger.
10 25 59 CC This is CSQ Cap Com. You're going ahead and powering down, is that affirmative?
10 26 07 P That is affirm. I'm going to fly-by-wire now ....
10 26 10 CC Roger.
10 26 21 P Roger. Auto is off.
10 26 24 CC Roger. Auto off.
10 26 32 P Gyros are caged.
10 26 34 CC Roger. Gyros caged.
10 26 40 P ASCS a-c bus off.
10 26 43 CC Roger.
10 26 54 P The highest my 250 inverter got up to was 130 degrees.
10 26 59 CC Roger. Understand 250 only got up to 130, is that affirm?
10 27 03 P Roger.
10 27 30 CC Roger. We're dropping you.
10 27 40 CC Gordo, the surgeon wants to know if you're sweating any at the moment. Over.
10 27 46 P Very lightly, not very much.
10 27 49 CC Roger.
Unreadable P *... At roughly 10 hours and 27 minutes, brought auto ASCS control to select. Lights
are off. Caged the _y,'os. Have ASCS a-c bus. At the time the 250 inverter was reading
130 degrees, the highest it had been. Tile cahin was 96 degrees, the highest it has been.
The cabin already is coming down ; it's 91 degrees, already.

HAWAII (SEVENTH PASS)

10 37 27 CC Hello Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Do you read?


10 37 45 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. How do you read?
10 37 5,'2" P
10 37 55 CC Roger, Faith Seven. Reading you 3 by 4. Will you turn your tape recorder to program at
this time.
10 38 05 P Roger. It is on program. Over.
10 3808 CC Roger. R and Zcal to auto.
10 38 12 P R and Zcal is in auto.
10 38 13 CC And C-band beacon to ground command now.
10 38 17 P C-band to ground command now.
10 38 19 CC Roger. We're standing by for a blood pressure and a fuel and oxygen readout.
10 38 24 P Roger. Fuel, 81 [percent] auto, 101 [percent] manual. Oxygen is 175 percent primary,
:[00 percent secondary. Cabin temp, 90 degrees. Here comes blood pressure.
10 38 44 CC Roger. Understand blood pressure is on the air. Say again cabin temp.
10 38 48 P Cabin temp is 90 degrees.
10 38 51 CC Roger. Read 90.
10 39 12 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Turn your C-band beacon on at this time. Over.
10 39 18 P Roger. Coming on now.
Unreadable CC Roger, your [contingency recovery area] 8-Alpha and 8-Bravo [retrosequence] times are
nominal.
10 39 25 P Roger. 8-Alpha and Bravo are nominal.
10 39 30 CC T/M is commanded. Stand by.
Unreadable CC Roger, Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Commanding T/M on at this time.
10 39 56 P I have it on continuous. You want it on ground command?
10 39 59 CC Negative, that's fine.
10 40 05 P Okay.
10 40 18 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Turn your T/M to ground command.
10 40 23 P Roger. Going to ground comnmnd now.
10 40 29 P On ground conmmnd.
10 40 35 CC Roger.

408
HAWAII (SEVENTH PASS )--Continued

10 41 03 ? • . . Cooper, can you come in on emergency frequency. Come up on 11176. Hickam out.
10 41 35 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Your mode and gyro switch position please.
10 41 40 P Roger. Roger. ASCS control on select, mode select off, fly-by-wire thrust select low, pitch
torquing on, gyros to cage, and pitch attitude on orbit.
10 41 53 CC Hawaii. Roger.
10 42 29 CC T/M commanded on this time. Faith Seven.
10 42 33 P Roger.
10 43 14 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. We're receiving R cal at this time. Will you make sure
you have your C-band beacon to ground command before AOS. Over.
10 43 24 P Roger, will do.
10 43 41 P C-band beacon coming to ground command now.
10 43 44 CC Roger. Understand C-band, ground command now.
10 49 34 P Took some pictures out of the window with the remainder of the first roll of film on the
16 ram. The color film camera in the bracket.
10 50 18 P * Low nitrogen pressure in 475 [psi] auto; 490 [psi] manual. B-nut temps : pitch down, 86
[degrees] ; pitch up, 65 [degrees] ; yaw left, 66 [degrees] ; yaw right, 70 [degrees] ; roll
counterclockwise, 98 [degrees]; roll clockwise, 92 [degrees]. Auto peroxide tank, 82
[degrees] ; manual peroxide tank, 68 [degrees] : reserve peroxide tank, 76 [degrees].
10 51 18 P Isolated bus, 28 volts, and I am pulling 6 amps, right now.
11 16 18 P Tape [and radiation] experiment is now on. I'm eating a pot roast or beef. I've had
considerable difficulty getting the water in it from this water device on the McDonnell
water tank. I spilled water all over my hands and all over the cockpit here trying to
get some in it. I have succeeded in getting about half of it dampened and am proceeding
to eat.
11 19 20 P I am washing my face with a damp cloth now. Certainly feels good.
11 22 30 P [Forcing grunt]. This is ridiculous. Come out of that danmed ditty bag--Pandora's
locker.
11 28 31 P Radiation experiment is off. Tape recorder to program.
]1 31 00 P * It is rather a strange feeling to be able to place objects out into the cabin and let go of
them and they'll stay in relatively their same position. This is worrisome as well as an
odd sensation. Handy sometimes.

ZANZIBAR (EIGHTH PASS)

11 33 07 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com. I'd like to get a c.e.t, time hack in about 30 seconds.
11 33 15 P Roger. We have 11 34 30 on my mark. 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, MARK. [11 33 31] T
11 33 36 P That's 11 33 30.
11 33 38 CO Roger.
11 33 49 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
]1 33 53 P Go ahead.
11 33 54 CC Your clock is now 7 seconds fast--plus 7 seconds.
11 34 01 P Roger. Understand. Plus 7 seconds.
11 34 06 CC [Recovery area] 9-1 [retrosequence] time is 13 ]9 20. 13 19 20.
11 34 21 P Roger. 13 19 20.
11 34 25 CC If you have to set your clock, you'll have to add 7 seconds to that.
11 34 30 P Roger. Understand.
11 34 40 CC Your T/M looks good on the ground, Faith Seven. Your T/M looks good.
11 34 45 P Roger. Thank you.
11 34 49 CO We'd like to have a TRF clock readout from the capsule also, please.
11 34 54 P Roger. Time to retrograde will be 22 23 20 on my mark. MARK. [11 35 07] T Retrograde
time, 33 58 26.
11 35 15 CC We concur.
11 35 17 P Roger.
11 35 57 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
11 36 01 P Go ahead.
11 36 03 CC Everything looks real good on the ground. Cape says they have nothing else for you at
this time. We'll see you next time around.
11 36 09 P Roger, Zanzibar. Thank you.
ZANZIBAR (EIGHTH PASS)--Continued

114958 P * All right on number 2 [photograph]. I've just taken [a picture, number 3] over India.
And I'm just coming in over China very shortly. This is on the general purpose film in
the Hasselblad.
115121 *Photo 3 with the general purpose film. Here come the Himalayas. Number 4 [photo-
graph] of the Himalayas. First three at 1/250, f/ll. These are two . . . that last one
was 1/250, f/16.

COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (EIGHTH PASS)

Unreadable CC Faith Seven.


Unreadable CC Hello, Faith Seven CSQ Cap Com. Over.
11 55 57 P Roger. Faith Seven here.
11 55 58 CC Roger. Reading you loud and clear, Gordo. Is the TV on?
Unreadable P Negative. I'll bring it on now. I didn't think it would work.
Unreadable CC Roger, go ahead. We didn't pick it up before here. I got your [contingency recovery
area] 0-Able and Baker [retrosequence] times for you if you're ready for them.
11 56 13 P Roger, stand by 1. Roger, go.
11 56 39 CC Roger. 9-Ais 12+18+24 andg-B is 12+43-[-05. Over.
Unreadable P Roger 12 18 24. 12 43 05.
Unreadable CC That's affirmative, and Cape requests at the end of this pass you can turn your R and Z
cal switch off so it will be off for the rest period. Over.
Unreadable P Roger.
Ii 56 57 CC There we go. We're getting a little picture on you here now, if we can get the thing ad-
justed a little better.
11 57 07 P Roger. How's that?
11 57 10 CC We're receiving a carrier on you here but we're not getting very good modulation. Just
big light spots going on and off. Over.
11 57 18 P Roger. Probably not getting too much light. Just 1 second--I should be getting enough
Earth shine off of it here to help.
11 57 25 CC Okay, good. You upside down?
11 57 27 P Roger.
11 57 37 CC Is it on you?
11 57 39 P Roger.
11 57 46 CC Can you open the lens up a little bit on that. It's not getting enough light here.
11 57 50 P Okay it's wide open now.
11 57 51 CC Roger.
11 58 49 CC You on fly-by-wire, Gordo?
11 58 52 P Negative. I have everything powered down now.
11 58 56 CC Roger. Just drifting. Affirm?
11 58 57 P Roger.
11 58 58 CC Roger.
11 5904 P Full drift with ASCS a-c powered down.
115907 CC Roger.
11 5938 CC You're sure looking good. Everything couldn't be finer on this pass.
11 59 43 P Roger. Everything looks good here, John.
12 0009 CC How's cloud cover ? Do you have a pretty good view?
12 O0 14 P Quite a bit of cloud cover right over you here. A little bit earlier there was a pretty
good open area.
12 O0 23 CC It should be interesting to look at.
12 0026 P Roger.
120107 CC For your info, Gordo, we're getting good reports from the monitor aircraft for later on,
for retro too.
12 01 13 P Roger. Thank you.
12 01 30 CC Surgeon would like to know what your cabin temp is now.
12 01 33 P Roger. Cabin temp is about 87 degrees.
12 01 37 CC Roger, very good. You're looking fine.
12 05 58 P *An interesting aspect of this little liquid experiment that I have along is that the liquid
remains on it in globules, hanging along the side in round globule form; and the air
is trapped within it in globules and does not separate from it.

410
HAWAII (EIGHTH PASS)

12 11 40 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. Do yeu read?


12 11 46 P Roger, Hawaii. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
12 11 48 CC Roger. Reading you loud and clear. Standing by for blood pressure, fuel and oxygen.
12 11 52 P Roger.
12 12 01 P Blood pressure coming now.
12 12 03 CC Roger.
12 12 O9 P Fuel is 81 percent auto; 101 percent manual. Oxyge n is just about 170 percent primary,
and 100 percent secondary.
12 12 30 CC Roger, Faith Seven. Say again oxygen secondary.
12 12 33 P 100 percent.
12 12 35 CC 100, roger. Blood pressure off at this time, please. And did you say 101 manual fuel?
12 12 46 P That's affirmative 101 manual and about 81 automatic.
12 12 51 CC Roger. That's all we need. You look good on the ground, you're _loing a great Job.
12 12 57 P Roger, thank you, Buddy.
12 13 24 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. You clock is holding 7-second error.
12 13 28 P Roger. Thank you.
12 14 08 P The eighth picture was shot over Hawaii to the south.
12 14 17 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. Could you give me suit [heat exchanger] dome temp, please.
12 14 21 P *Roger. Suit dome temp is about 45 degrees. I increased flow. Got it down a little low,
and I'm easing it back now.
12 14 31 CC Roger. Understand, understand suit dome 45.
12 14 35 P *That's right.
12 14 48 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. Wh'at about O_ partial pressure.
12 14 53 P Roger. 0_ partial pressure is about 4.2 [psi], cabin.
12 14 57 CC 4.2. Roger.
12 14 58 P Roger.
12 15 18 P Roger. Now back to the scribe mark on the suit temperature selector of about 2.7 with
the power down.
12 15 31 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. Our T/M shows suit dome of about 38 degrees.
12 15 41 P Roger. I just decreased the setting, just a minute ago, again.
12 15 45 CC Roger.
12 17 33 P *Suit dome temp.'s down to about--slightly below 40 degrees. Decreased the setting of
the flow twice, and it's on its---should be on its way back up any moment.
12 21 36 P *Short status report: Hydrogen peroxide and low nitrogen pressure: 475 [psi] auto, 490
[psi] manual. B-nut temps: pitch down, 85 [degrees]; pitch up, 60 [degrees]; yaw
left, 55 [degrees] ; yaw right, 70 [degrees] ; roll counterclockwise, 85 [degrees] ; clock-
wise, 92 [degrees] . . . auto tank, 85 [percent]; manual tank, 68 [percent]; reserve
tank, 98 [percent]. Isolated bus voltage, 28 [volts]. Pumping from the condensate tank
to the reserve tank, I have a syringe full. Suit circuit seems to be getting varying
amounts of water, probably from the condensate tank, or tin can. Coolant water flow
seems to vary considerably. I have it clear back down to a setting of 1. Still haven't
gotten the heat exchanger dome temperature out of the warning light area. It is now
about 45 degrees. Never have been able to put water in these containers, that have
water, due to the leaking of this valve in the back of it. I'm unable to put it into the
water, into the plastic neck of the container, and get water into it without leaking water
all over the cockpit.

ROSE KNOT VICTOR (EIGHTH PASS)

12 26 O9 CC Faith Seven, RKV Cap Com.


12 26 05 P Hello RKV.
12 26 07 CC We have aeromed and systems go here.
12 26 18 P Roger. Say again RKV.
12 26 21 CC We have aeromed go here, and systems go.
12 26 25 P Roger, very good. I'll take the temperature probe out now, then.
12 26 30 CC We've got a long list of capsule readouts that the Cape requires before you go into the
12 26 42 P rest period.
12 26 43 CC Roger. Go.

411
ROSE KNOT VICTOR (EIGHTH PASS)---Continued

12 26 53 Okay, 24 volts main. Just rotate the switch through, Gordo. All positions on your d-c volts.
Roger, d-c volts : Main [bus], 241_ [volts], isolated [bus], 28 [volts] ; main [battery] one is
25 [volts] ; main [battery] two is 25 [volts] ; main [battery] three is 25 [volts] ; standby
[battery] one is 25 [volts] ; standby [battery] two is 25 [volts] ; isolated [battery], 281_
[volts].
12 27 11 CC Roger, understand. 150 v-a [inverter] volts?
12 27 17 P Roger, 150 v-a is still 121 [volts] ; fan, 121 [volts].
12 27 24 CC Fans bus, 121 [volts] ?
12 27 26 P Roger.
12 27 27 CC Suit-coolant and cabin-coolant control valve settings.
12 27 33 P Roger. I'm back on 2.5 on the suit. Cabin is still shut down.
12 27 41 CC Roger. Partial CO2 and partial 02.
12 27 45 P Roger. Partial O2 cabin is about 4.2 [psi], and suit CO2 is on the bottom peg, zero.
12 27 55 CC Roger. Auto and manual fuel pressure?
12 27 59 P Roger. Auto fuel pressure, 475 [psi] ; manual fuel pressure 490 [psi].
12 2S 04 CC Roger. Okay temperatures, just rotated through pitch, and all th'e way through.
12 2S 13 P Roger. Retro, 62 [degrees]. Pitch down, 75 [degrees] ; pitch up, 60 [degrees]. Yaw left,
55 [degrees] ; yaw right, 70 [degrees]. Roll counterclockwise, 95 [degrees] ; roll clock-
wise, 93 [degrees].
12 2_ 37 CC Roger, H202 reserve, manual and auto.
12 28 41 P Roger. Auto peroxide tank is 85 [degrees], manual is 68 [degrees], and reserve is 78
[degrees].
12 28 52 CC Roger. Cabin heat-exchanger-outlet temperature.
12 28 55 P Cabin heat-exchanger outlet 72 [degrees] ; 250 inverter, 112 [volts] ; 150 inverter, about
1--just a second I'll get a light on, I'm getting in the dark--125 [volts].
12 29 13 CC Roger.
12 29 14 P Fans inverter about 110 [volts].
12 29 17 CC Roger.
122923 CC Okay, that settles this. Can you give me some indication of your tape remaining?
122929 P Roger. Just a moment. Roger. I haveabout 75 percent remaining.
12 29 44 CC Roger. Can you give us a blood pressure?
12 29 50 P Roger. Coming now.
122956 CC Okay, the Cape advises that if you desire to turn your T/M to continuous, we'll cut down
on the unnecessary communications for the rest of the rest period.
12 30 11 P Roger.
12 30 31 CC C.e.t. is showing plus 7, plus 7.
123035 P Roger. Plus 7.
12 31 12 CC Seven, RKV. Do you intend to go on a rest period from this site?
12 31 17 P Roger.
12 31 46 CC Seven, RKV. Are you sweating any?
12 31 50 P Negative.
12 31 52 CC No sweat.
12 32 08 CC We have you all go on aeromedical and systems. Looks like you can settle down for a
long rest.
12 32 14 P Roger. Thank you.
12 32 36 CC Seven, RKV. WehaveLOS.

(NINTH PASS)

13 17 17 P Photo number 8 being made over Africa, to the north.


* (Non-flight-related transmission omitted.)
13 18 47 P Another being made over Africa.
13 20 32 P I can see roads, and rivers, and some small towns down here on the ground. Small
villages are pronounced. Can ahnost make out the individual houses.
]3 23 3O P *Now we're in the next series of 12. Over . . . Africa. The first series were started
over Africa and across on orbit 9---on across Arabia through India, and that last
series of three or four pictures were made right over the Himalayas, and in the India,
India-China area.
13 2839 P Checking fly-by-wire thrusters, they all work. Fly-by-wire lows, manual proportional,
and checking manual thrusters now. Checking yaw, and yaw works, pitch down works,
pitch up works, roll left works, roll right works. Manual handle off.

412
COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (NINTH PASS)

13 32 41 P CSQ Cap Com. Faith Seven.


13 33 18 CC Hello, Faith Seven, CSQ. Roger. Received you_ go ahead with your message.
13 33 24 P Roger. Just passing over. Everything's nominal here I haven't really started my rest
period yet. I had a little tussle with the heat exchanger, with the suit, and I finally got
it adjusted.
1333 38 CC Roger. Understand, heat exchanger is adjusted now for suit. We are still trying to pick
up your TV here. We're not getting a very good picture on it. Over.
133346 P Roger.
13 33 48 CC Roger. We lind a message out around the range here to keep quiet that you were asleep,
and we thought it looked like a typical asleep-type pass on your biosensors here.
13 33 59 P Roger.
1334 02 P Roger. I was busy here just before the pass.
13 34 04 OC Roger.
13 34 10 CC Did you say you were asleep just before the pass. Over.
13 34 13 P Negative. I was busy looking out the window and fiddling with this suit dome temp.
13 34 20 CC Roger.
13 34 28 P I've checked my manual and fly-by-wire thrusters and am ready to start my rest period now.
13 34 35 CC Roger. Understand checked manuaI fly-by-wire. Ready to start rest period now.
13 34 39 P Roger.
13 34 42 CC All right. You will tell everyone to go away and leave you alone now. Okay?
13 34 48 P Roger.
13 34 52 CC You're looking real good, Gordo. Everything isgoing real fine,boy.
1334 55 P Roger. Thank you, John.
Unreadable P *... fourth picture on that second series was made just out from C_Q. Number 6 of
second series, taken over at 13 56. Went to sleep at about 13 50. Slept 'til 14 46
quite soundly, slept quite heavily, awoke not realizing where I was--completely, soundly
asleep. Picture 8 of second series in the Burma-India area at 14 58 30. Took number
9 over the Himalayas.
TI_NTH PASS

15 11 35 P *Standby inverter, 102 [degrees] ; 150 inverter, 110 [degrees] ; 250 inverter, 102 [degrees] ;
H_O._ auto tank, 85 [degrees] ; manual fuel tank, 70 [degrees]. Roll counterclockwise,
78 [degrees]; roll clockwise, 82 [degrees]; yaw right, 65 [degrees]; yaw left, 64
[degrees], pitch up, 58 [degrees] ; pitch down, 70 [degrees]. _etro, 67 [degrees]. I put
the window cover on 15 14 15 for a period of time and now have awakened.

ELEVENTH PASS

16 28 51 P *Short status report: Peroxide low pressure regulated: 475 [psi] auto; 490 [psi], manual;
clockwise thruster, 72 [degrees]; counterclockwise thruster, 78 [degrees]. Yaw right
at 61 [degrees] ; yaw left at 60 [degrees] ; pitch up is 52 [degrees], pitch down is 58
[degrees]. Retro is 55 [degrees] ; auto 85 [degrees] ; manual is 70 [degrees] ; . . . re-
serve is 70 [degrees]. Photo series at 16 hours and 40 minutes. Having the problem
with the suit exchanger dome temp, . . . down to the freezing mark with a [comfort-
control-valve] setting of about 1½. Take a setting of 1 to 1½ and then takes almost
turning it off to get it back. It seems to be very inconsistent, in the settings that will
take to hold an even heat exchanger dome temperature. Went asleep again and am awake
now. Suit temperature is... 5.

TWELFTH PASS

18 04 20 P Photo sequence number 3 made on the Indian coast line at 18 hours and 4 minutes. Next
photo made at 18 hours and 5 minutes.
18 14 01 P *The time is now 18 hours and 14 minutes. Short status report : Nitrogen low pressures:
475 [psi], auto; 490 [psi], manual. Retropack, 71 [degrees]. Pitch down thruster, 58
[degrees]; pitch up, 50 [degrees]. Yaw left, 58 [degrees]; yaw right 52 [degrees];
roll counterclockwise, 72 [degrees] ; [roll] clockwise, 70 [degrees]. H..02 auto tank, 82
[degrees] ; peroxide manual tank, 72 [degrees] ; peroxide reserve .... Main bus is 25½
[volts] ; isolated bus voltage is 28½ [volts]. [Battery number 1] 25 [volts] ; number 2 is
25 [volts] ; number 3 is 25 [volts] ; standby 1 is 25 [volts] ; standby 2 is 25 [volts] ; isolated
is 28½ [volts] ; back to main. Reading 121 volts on the fans. Everything is proceeding
along very well. Everything is normal, except for this bothersome heat-exchanger dome
temp, and I just can't seem to keep it either from being on the freezing mark or going on
over. I vary the settings between . . . and completely off.
413
COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (THIRTI_ENTH PASS)

19 38 39 P *Went to sleep again, slept very soundly. And it's time for a short status report: Nitro-
gen regulated pressure . . . auto, 475 [psi], manual, 490 [psi]. B-nut temps: First,
retro temp, 75 degrees. Pitch down thruster, 55 [degrees] ; pitch up thruster, 50 [de-
grees] yaw left, 56 [degrees] ; yaw right, 50 [degrees] ; Roll counterclockwise, 72 [de-
grees]. Roll clockwise, 70 [degrees] ; Peroxide auto tank, 82 [degrees] ; manual tank,
72 [degrees]; reserve tank, 75 [degrees]. Isolated bus voltage, 28.
19 42 15 P *One comment on these various sleep periods that I've had ; nearly everytime that I have
awakened, I found that I have been so soundly asleep I don't even know where I am
when I awake.
20 23 37 *Have a note to be added in for head-shrinkers. Enjoy the full drifting flights most of
all, where you have really the feeling of freedom, and you aren't worried about the
systems fouling up. You have everything turned off and just drifting along lazily.
However, I haven't encountered any of this so called split-off phenomena. Still, note that
I am thinking very much about returning to earth at the proper time and safely. Over.

FOURTEENTH PASS

21 0035 Time for another short status report. Auto regulated pressure: 475 [psi], manual, 490
[psi]. Retropack temp, 75 [degrees], pitch down thruster, 51 [degrees]; pitch up, 49
[degrees] ; yaw left, 55 [degrees] ; yaw right, 50 [degrees], roll counterclockwise, 72 [de-
grees] ; roll clockwise, 70 [degrees]. Peroxide auto tank, 80 [degrees] ; manual tank,
74 [degrees] ; reserve tank, 74 [degrees].
21 02 39 Darned suit heat-exchanger [comfort-control valve] again. Setting is down to 1_. One
and one-half held it for a while. And now it's gone down to 40 [degrees] on the dome
temp. Inlet temp, 62 [degrees].
21 05 16 Number 7, sequence 3 was made looking back at Arabia. At 21 05, cabin temp is now 82
degrees ; 250 inverter is 95 [degrees] ; 150 inverter is 115 [degrees] ; a standby inverter
is 95 [degrees].

MUCHEA (FOURTEENTH PASS)

[Extended garbled transmission here. It sounded as though it might have been Spanish.]
21 22 34 P Hello, Muchea Cap Com. Faith Seven here. Over.
2l 22 39 CC Go ahead, Faith Seven. This is Muehea Cap.
21 22 43 CC Go ahead, Faith Seven. This is Muchea Cap Com.
21 22 46 P Roger, Muc_hea Cap Com. Faith Seven. I'm awake now. Just thought I'd check in with
you.
21 22 50 CC Roger. How was your sleep?
21 22 54 CC How was your sleep?
21 22 56 P Very good.
21 22 58 CC Do you like your coffee white or black?
21 2302 P I'll have tea, thank you.
21 23 04 CC *Roger.
21 _ 10 P In fact, hot black tea would go very well right now.
21 23 14 CC Roger.
21 23 18 CC VChen you get a chance, will you give us your spacecraft status and your status?
21 23 24 P Roger. Everything is nominal heare. I've had some difficulty with the suit heat-exchanger
dome temp, and it's been running with t,he light on most of the time; but I have it well
under control and the suit inlet temp has been running very comfortably.
21 23 45 CC Very good.
21 23 47 P My status is excellent.
21 23 5O CC Roger. Will you give me an auto and manual fuel reading?
21 23 55 P Roger. Let me get some more lights on here, since I'm in the dark.
21 2400 P *Roger. Auto fuel is reading 69 percent and manual 95 percent.
21 24 10 CC _ay again last.
21 24 11 P Oxygen 150 percent on primary ; 100 percent on secondary. The manual fuel is 95 percent.
21 24 23 CC Roger. I didn't copy your manual fuel.
2124 25 P Roger. Manual fuel is 95 percent.
21 2428 CC I copied auto at 79.
21 24 32 P Roger. It's 69, 69.
21 24 35 CC Roger.

4,14
MUCHEA (FOURTEENTH PASS)--Continued

21 24 37 P Cabin temp is 84 degrees.


21 24 41 CC Roger.
21 24 55 CC Stand by, Faith Seven.
21 24 57 P Roger.
21 25 13 CC I have [recovery] area 15-1 retrosequence time. Please prepare to copy.
21 25 21 P Roger. Go.
21 25 24 CC 22 02 13.
21 25 28 P Roger. 22 02 13.
21 25 31 CC That's affirmative. Area 15-1.
21 25 43 P Roger. Go.t it.
21 25 45 CC What's your present control mode ?
21 25 49 P I'm in full drift.
21 25 51 CC Roger.
21 25 59 CC We have about 1 minute to LOS.
21 26 02 P Roger.
21 26 39 CC Hello, Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. Do you have anything to report?
21 26 44 P Negative. Iguess not. Everything's fine here.
21 26 47 CC Roger. Systems report, you go here and aeromed, also.
21 26 51 P Roger. Thank you.
21 26 53 CC Roger.
21 36 40 P *It is 21 36 46 NOW. (21 36 46) T I am observing lights of several small cities and scat-
tered areas on the ground. Apparently over the east coast of Australia.
21 46 18 P *I am viewing to the east now; and I can see very clearly, as I mentioned before, a band
of haze layer above the Earth's horizon through which the stars can be seen. Although
they're quite faint here and then clear below it. It goes around the earth, approximately
the same distance around, just a corona-type thing around the Earth's surface.
21 49 38 P *I would like to take this time to say a little prayer for all the people, including myself,
involved in this launch and this operation. Father, thank You, for the success we have
h_d in flying this flight. Thank You for the privilege of being able to be in this position,
to be up in this wondrous place, seeing all these many startling, wondrous things that
You've created. Help guide and direct all of us that we may shape our lives to be good,
that we may be much better Christians, learn to help one another, to work with one
another, rather than to fight. Help us to complete this mission successfully. Help us in
our future space endeavors that we may show the world that a democracy really can
compete, and still is able to do things in a big way, is able to do research, development, and
can conduct various scientific, very technical programs in a completely peaceful environ-
ment. Be with all our families. Give them guidance and encouragement, and let them
know that everything will be okay. We ask in Thy name. Amen.

CAPE CANAVERAL (FIFTEENTH PASS)

22 03 39 P Hello, Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven here.


22 03 47 P Roger, shoot.
22 03 55 CC The regulated low pressure scores.
2204 O0 P Roger. I'm reading 475 [psi] auto and 490 [psi] manual.
22 04 10 CC Could we have an H20_ reading ?
22 04 16 P Roger. That's--say again.
22 04 21 CC
22 04 28 P Just a minute on the ....
Unreadable P Roger.
Unreadable CC Faith, can I have you on H2Os tank temperature?
Unreadable P Auto tank is 81 degrees ; manual tank is 74 degrees ; reserve tank is 74 degrees.
22 06 05 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com. Over.
22 06 07 P Cape, Faith Seven.
22 06 09 CC Roger. Did you use any auto fuel during the sleep period ?
22 06 15 P Negative. 1
22 06 19 CC Would you put your R and Zcal to auto?
22 06 22 P Roger.
22 06 26 CC We reckoned your fuel to the 69 and 89 (percent). Over.
22 06 32 P Roger. I read you 69 and 95.

Pilot a_swer referred to current rest period only.

415
CAPE CANAVERAL (FIFTEENTH PASS ) --Continued

22 06 38 CC Roger.
22 06 42 CC Is your tape recorder on schedule ?
2'2 06 57 CC We ar_, getting a go(_d picture of you on TV now. Over.
22 07 01 P Roger. Understand.
22 07 04 CG Did you transffer any water or urine? Over.
22 07 10 P Boy, did I ever !
22 07 17 CC Do you have any air wick observation?
22 07 27 P Roger. They seem to separate water all right.
22 07 39 CC Faith Seven, did you make any air wick observation? Over.
22 07 43 P Affirmative. It does separate water• Over.
Unre,',dable P Did you read me, Cape?
Unreadable CC Roger. I read you now. Did you make an air wick observation?
2") 08 00 P Affirmative. It works.
22 (18 04 CC Roger. How is your comfort and humidity level in the suit?
22 08 11 P Fine.
22 08 12 CC Very good.
22 081.5 CC Our surgeon has some goodies. Did you have any dreams?
22 0S 20 P Negative. I slept too soundly to dream.
22 08 24 CC Roger. We thought you might have had one one time when your suit dome light may
have come on•
22 08 33 P My suit dome light was on a good portion of the time.
22 08 36 CC Roger. We understand that.
22 08 40 CC We'd like you to give a body temperature to Canary on your next pass over them coming
up. Would you set your oral probe on for that? Over.
22 08 50 P Roger.
22 08 53 CC Pass time at Canary is nominal, so about 2 or 3 minutes before would help.
22 _00 P Roger.
22 09 09 CC Wouhl you give us a reading on your coolant-control-valve settings, and what they are
now ?
22 09 16 Roger. Right at the moment I'm reading about 1.8 on suit temp and the cabin is still
turned off.
22 09 27 CC Roger. We concur.
22 _} 45 CO Faith Seven. R and Zcal program switch to off.
22 09 54 P Roger. Off.
22 09 56 CC And you can secure TV. We had a pretty fair picture•
22 1000 P Roger.
22 10 08 CC We can see you were drifting and dreaming, can't we ?
22 10 11 P Roger.
2"2 10 30 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Oom.
22 10 32 P Come in Cape Corn, Faith Seven•
22 10 34 CO I've been asked to relay a message to you from the president of the Republic of E1 Salva-
dor. I will read: "In the name of the Salvadorian government and people, and in my
own right, it gives me pleasure to send you cordial greetings and sincere congratulations
on the occasion of your valiant exploit, which constitutes an historic triumph for t)he
free world. Julio Adalberto Rivera, President, E1 Salvador."
22 11 06 P Very good, very good.
22 11 07 CC Roger•
22 12 00 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.
22 12 02 P Go ahead. Cape.
22 12 06 CC I'll give you c.e.t, hack at 50 mark.
22 1208 P Roger.
22 1209 CC That was 22 11 50.
22 12 13 P Roger.
22 12 16 CC MARK 12 minutes.
22 12 18 P Roger.
22 12 24 P
22 12 36 CC Faith Seven, you're cutting out, it's about LOS. See you next time around boy-san.
22 12 41 P Roger.

416
CANARY ISLANDS (FIFTEENTH PASS)

22 18 26 CC l_aith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. You need not acknowledge this transmission, re-
questing you turn on your TV and your S-band beacon if you have not already done so.
22 18 40 P Roger. TV's on.
22 18 49 CC This is Canary Cap Com. Did you put your--wait a minute, we're getting the body tem-
perature now.
22 19 17 CC This is Canary Cap Com. Surgeon requests that you hold your body temp probe in your
mouth for about 1 more minute•
222001 CC This is Canary Oap Com. You may take the body temperature probe from your mouth
now. Over•
22 20 09 P Roger• Thank you.
22 20 14 CC Your [contingency recovery area] 15-Bravo [retrosequenee] time is nominal and request a
partial 02 readout, please•
22 2026 P Roger• My 15-Bravo is nominal. Cabin partial pressure 02 is about 4•2 [psi].
222034 CC Roger• Understand 4.2. I'd like to try to get a e.e.t, clock error here ; so I'm going to give
you a time hack. I'd like for you to give me the difference in the clocks• On my mark
the time will be 22 20 40. MARK. (22 20 57) _
22 20 58 P
22 21 01 CC Understand 15 seconds•
222105 CC Roger• ....
22 21 07 P Roger• Understand.
222129 CC Astroconfirms 15. Over.
22 21 35 ? Roger•
22 22 15 CC This is Canary Cap Com. Could you give me a cabin-pressure readout, please?
22 22 20 P Roger• Cabin pressure 5.2 [psi].
222223 CC Roger•
222337 CC We're getting pretty close to LOS here. Request you turn TV off and the S-band beacon to
ground command. Over.
22 23 44 P Roger• TV off and S-band beacon to ground command.
22 23 47 CC Roger•
KANO (FIFTEENTH PASS)

22 27 16 CC Faith Seven, this is Kano Cap Com. We have T/M solid• We would like a cabin (heat-
22 27 24 P exchanger) dome temperature. That is the only high reading• Over.
• • •

2227 34 CC Say again•


Unreadable P • o °

27 27 44 CC Roger.
22 27 49 CC Astro, have you eaten? Over.
22 27 58 CC Astro, this is Kano Cap Com. Have you eaten? Over.
22 28 03 P • . . Cabin dome is 72 degrees.
Unreadable CC Roger• Have you eaten? Over.

ZANZIBAR (FII_EENTH PASS)

22 36 27 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.


22 36 29 P Roger, Zanzibar, Faith Seven.
22 36 32 CC T/M looks good on the ground here. We have no big problems. Like to have fuel and
oxygen readings.
223639 P Roger .... fuel, auto . .., manual 95 percent. Oxygen 150 percent primary, and 100
percent secondary.
22 36 53 CC Please repeat primary oxygen.
22 36 56 P 150 percent•
22 36 58 CC Roger. Your [recovery area] 16-1 [retrosequenee] time, 23 31 03. 23 31 03.
22 37 12 P 233103.
22 37 16 CC That is affirmative. That is g.e.t, and does not include your clock error.
22 37 20 P Roger.
223726 CC Faith Seven. Have you eaten this morning?
22 37 30 P Negative. Not yet this morning.
22 37 33 CC Roger.

417
ZANZIBAR (FIFTEENTH PASS)--Continued

22 37 53 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com. The surgeon would like to know what--how you feel
this morning?
22 37 58 P Fine. Excellent.
22 38 04 CC Very good.
22 49 25 P And here comes the short status report again : Nitrogen regulated low pressure : auto, 475
[psi]; manual 490 [psi]. B-nut temperature: pitch down, 50 [degrees] pitch up, 49
[degrees]. Yaw left, 55 [degrees]; yaw right, 51 [degrees]. Roll counterclockwise,
78 [degrees]; roll clockwise, 78 [degrees]. Auto peroxide tank, 80 [degrees]; manual
tank, 72 [degrees] ; reserve tank, 73 [degrees]. Isolated bus voltage, 28.

MUCHEA (FIFTEENTH PASS)

22 53 25 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com.


22 53 27 P Roger, Muchea Cap Com. Faith Seven.
22 53 30 CC Are you checking your high thrusters ?
22 5340 CC Are you checking your high thrusters ?
22 53 54 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. Do you copy?
22 53 56 P Roger, Muchea Cap Com. I am not.., my thrusters. Over.
22 54 01 CC Say again last.
22 54 02 P I am not checking my thrusters. Over.
22 5405 CC Roger. We had a partial T/M dropout.
22 54 10 P Roger.
22 54 16 CC Have you made any checks on thrusters?
22 54 19 P Roger. I made a couple of them, three different ones of them. I'm going to bring up
my rate indicators shortly and check the rest of them.
22 54 29 CC Roger.
22 55 03 CC Systems report T/M looks good and aeromeds report you look good.
22 55 07 P Roger.
22 55 33 CC Are you changing the control valve setting on your suit heat exchanger?
22 55 38 P Roger. Suit dome is on its way down very slowly.
22 55 45 CC Roger. We concur.
22 55 52 CC Have you had your breakfast ?
22 55 54 P Negative.
22 57 00 CC Faith Seven. Could you give me a report on that thruster check? Which thrusters
are okay?
22 57 06 Roger. I've checked my yaw thrusters both auto and manual. I'm going to ASCS bus
and then turn my rate gyros on, and in first-light then check the remainder of my
thrusters.
22 57 24 CC Roger.
22 57 26 P While alining the spacecraft.
22 57 28 CC Say again.
22 57 30 P I will check thrusters while alining spacecraft, while uncaging gyros.
22 57 34 CC Roger.
22 59 38 CC We have approximately i minute to LOS.
22 59 42 P Roger.
23 06 51 P *Just brought the rate indicators to manual on position, and they're indicating about
a half of a degree right roll rate, half a degree pitch up rate, and 1 degree left yaw
rate. I have now checked my manual proportional thrusters, and they all function
correctly and C-band beacon on continuous.

GUAYMAS (FIFTEENTH PASS)

23 3102 CO Faith Seven, Guaymas Cap Com.


23 31 07 P Go ahead, Guaymas Cap Corn, Faith Seven.
23 31 09 CC You sound good, Gordo. Are you going to have time for the ASCS ?
23 31 14 P Roger. The ASCS is powered up. I powered it up about 1 minute ago. Right now,
my rate indicators are powered up.
23 31 27 CC Roger. Tape recorder continuous.
23 31 30 P Roger. Tape recorder continuous.
23 31 32 CC How about the C-band ?
23 31 35 P Roger .....

418
GUAYMAS (FIFTEENTH PASS)--Continued

233136 CC Roger. Are you going to check your thrusters over here?
23 31 44 P Roger. I've already checked my manual thrusters, and I've checked about half of my
fly-by-wires. I'm going to wait 'til daylight and I'll get the rest of my fly-by-wires
while I aline the spacecraft.
23 31 59 CC Roger. You say you're waiting for daylight.
23 32 01 P Roger. I'm going to aline the spacecraft with the thrusters while getting a check on
the rest of them.
23 32 08 CC Roger.
23 32 21 P I'll check my fly-by-wires now and aline my spacecraft manually on the manual pro-
portional.
Unreadable CC Roger.
23 32 29 P Checking fly-by-wires now. Man, do those ever throw out the fire at night.
23 32 48 CC Say again, Gordo. I didn't read that.
23 32 49 P You can really see the sparks from the thrusters at night.
23 32 53 CC Ha, ha! Roger.
23 33 13 P Roger. All fly-by-wire low thrusters work correctly.
23 33 18 CC Roger.
23 33 29 CC Could you give me your fuel readings, Gordo?
23 33 33 P Roger. I have 65 percent auto and 95 percent manual.
23 33 38 CC Roger.
CAPE CANAVERAL (SIXTEENTH PASS)

23 36 44 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com. Do you read? Over.


23 36 46 P Roger, Cape Cap Corn, Faith Seven.
23 36 49 CC Roger. Welcome back, Gordo.
23 36 52 P Roger. Thank you.
23 36 53 CC I have a roll angle f_)r you for your dim light study. Over.
23 36 59 P Roger. Go ahead.
23 37 01 CC Your angle is 34 degrees at sunset. That is, roll right, 34 degrees.
23 37 08 P 34 degrees. Understand.
23 37 10 CC Could you give me a reading of your cabin air?
23 37 13 P Roger. Cabin air temp's about 86 degrees.
23 37 17 CC Roger, 86. Have you had a good meal today?
23 37 22 P Fairly good.
23 37 25 CC Roger.
23 37 27 P I'm alining the spacecraft now.
23 37 33 CC Roger. Your attitudes look like you're almost in.
23 37 39 P It would because the gyros are still caged.
23 37 42 CC That's interesting.
23 37 44 P I say they would because the gyros are still caged.
23 37 47 CC Good deal. You've got real good attitudes on the caged gyros.
23 37 50 P Roger.
23 37 52 CC Did you read that I said roll right 34 degrees?
23 37 55 P Roll right 34 degrees. Roger.
23 38 09 CC Would you give us some TV, Gordo?
23 38 27 CC Hello dahr.
23 38 28 P Hello dahr.
23 39 32 CC Faith Seven. Cape Cap Com. Would you give us a yell if you get an auto fuel light? Over.
23 39 37 P Roger.
23 40 57 P *Caged gyros coming to slave.
23 41 02 CC Roger.
23 41 20 CC Our scanners are checking out quite closely, Gordo.
23 41 24 P Roger.
23 42 36 P Going to auto.
23 42 46 P Foiled it again.
23 43 10 CC Faith Seven, Cape Cap Com.
23 43 12 P Go ahead, Cape Cap Com, Faith Seven.
23 43 15 CC Roger. Y_)u can kill your TV. Your scanners and attitudes match perfectly at LOS.
23 4321 P Roger. Thank you.

419
CAPE CANAVERAL (SIXTEENTH PASS)--Continued

23 43 26 P I'm on auto control.


23 43 28 CC Roger. Understand on auto control.
23 4330 P Roger.
*[Unconfirmed transmissions omitted.]

CANARY ISLANDS (SIXTEENTH PASS)

23 51 41 CC Faith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. We have T/M solid. All systems are green. Do you
confirm TV on? Over.
23 51 53 P Roger. TVis on.
23 53 34 CC This is Canary Cap Com. Could you send us a blood pressure now, if you please?
23 53 39 P Roger.
23 53 46 CC We are receiving blood pressure now.
23 56 22 CC Fait h Seven, would you take a deep breath and hold it, please?
23 56 26 P Roger.
23 56 31 CC Okay, exhale, exhale.
23 5703 CG Faith Seven, inhale, please-
23 57 50 CC This is Canary Cap Corn, we are coming up on LOS- You may turn off your TV camera,
please.
23 57 54 P Roger.
KANO (SIXTEENTH PASS)

23 58 01 CC Faith Seven, Kano has T/M solid.


23 5804 P Roger, Kano. All systems green here.
23 58 07 CC I'll give you a check in a minute. Thank you.
23 58 10 P Roger.
23 58 12 CC They are all green on the ground.
23 58 14 P Roger.
23 59 36 CC Faith Seven, this is Kano Cap Com.
23 59 40 P Go ahead, Kano.
23 59 41 CC I thought I'd tell you that [contingency recovery] Area 16-B [retrosequence time] is
nominal.
23 59 45 P 16-Bis nominal. Roger. Thank you.
24 05 20 CC Site of Kano will have LOS at 13 08 56.

ZANZIBAR (SIXTEENTH PASS)

24 0639 P Hello, Zanzibar, Faith Seven here.


24 0642 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com. Go ahead.
24 0645 P Roger. First, I have a message for you.
24 0647 CC Roger.
24 06 51 P Hello Africa. This is Astronaut Gordon Cooper, speaking from Faith Seven. I am right
now over 100 miles above Africa, speaking to the Zanzibar station. Just a few minutes
ago, I passed Addis Ababa. I want to wish success to your leaders there. Good luck to
all of you in Africa.
24 07 12 P Are you ready for a consumable readout now ?
24 07 14 CC Go ahead.
24 07 16 P Roger. Auto fuel, 63 [percent] ; manual, 93 [percent]. Oxygen primary, 145 [percent],
secondary 100 [percent].
24 07 29 CC Confirmed. T/M looks good on the ground here.
24 07 36 P Roger.
24 07 45 CC How does it feel on the second day, Gordo ?
24 0748 P Fine. I may get used to this thing, yet.
24 07 52 CC Roger.
24 0917 CC Faith Seven. Zanzibar Cap Com.
24 09 18 P Go ahead, Zanzibar.
24 09 20 CC The surgeon would like to know how deep is your breathing at the present time.
24 0926 P Roger. Not very deep.
24 09 28 CC Roger. Thank you.
24 0930 P Here is a full breath.

420
ZANZIBAR (SIXTEENTH PASS)---Continued

24 09 34 CC Please repeat.
24 09 35 P All right. Now I have a full breath in.
24 0939 CC You are taking full breaths. Very good. That's what our recording on the ground shows.
24 09 43 P Roger.
24 10 18 P I am now in auto control. Set up for the dim-light experiment. As soon as the Sun ap-
proaches the horizon, I will aline with the Sun. Fly-by-wire. Cage and put gyros free.
Roll 34 degrees right, cage, gyros free. Back on auto and start taking the pictures.
24 11 03 CC Faith Seven. Zanzibar Cap Com.
241106 P Go ahead, Zanzibar.
24 11 08 CC How much tape do you have remaining on your recorder?
24 11 12 P About 70 percent.
24 11 14 CC Roger. Cape advises that you can go onto continuous tape recording.
24 11 20 P Roger.
24 13 50 CC Faith Seven. Zanzibar Cap Com.
24 13 52 P Go ahead, Zanzibar.
24 13 54 CC Clock readout now shows a -[-16 _conds. I will give you a mark at 24 13 50.
24 14 02 P Roger.
24 14 06 CC 1. MARK. (24 ]4 07) T
24 14 10 P Roger. I was reading 24 14 07 at the time. That's about right--16 seconds.
24 14 22 CC Roger.
24 14 23 P Yeah. I was reading just 6, going to 7. That would be right.
24 17 54 P Okay. The Sun is almost to the horizon. I'm going to fly-by-wire low--yawing over to
the left just a little to get to the Sun.
24 19 04 P I'm perfectly alined. Caging the gyros. Bang, bang. Gyros to free. I'm going to have
to get them again. Quite alined in yaw.
24 19 50 P Boy ! This is going to be a doozy, right into the Sun.
24 20 55 P Okay, gyros caged, to free. 34 degrees right.
24 21 52 P Gyros caged; gyros free; auto orbit mode; lights off; warning lights off.
24 22 31 P Here comes 1. 1. 2..2. 4. 5, 6. 7. 8. 9, 10. 11. 12. 1._, ]4, 15. 1.00l. Number 2 exposure.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. ]1. 12. 13. 14, 15. Third exposure. 1, 2, 3. 4. 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14. 15. Fourth exposure. Trip. 1,001. Release. 1. 2, 3. 4. 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10,
]1, 12, 13. 14. 15. Trip. ], 2, 3. Release. ]. 2. 3, 4, 5. 6. 7, 8, 9, 10, ]1, 12, 13, 14, 15.
Trip. 2, ._. Release. 1.001. 2..2. 4. 5. 6, 7. 8. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. 14. 15. Number 3. 1,
2, 3. Relea._e. ], 2. 3, 4. 5, 6. 7, & 9, 10. 11. 12. 13, 14. 15. Number 4. 1, 2, 3. Release.
1, 2.3. 4, 5, 6. 7, 8. 9, 10.
Here comes 1. 1.2. 3. 4, 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 13, 14, 1.5. 1,001. Number 2 exposure. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 13, 14, 15. Third exposure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 6. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15. Fourth exposure. Trip. 1,001. Release. 1.2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15. Trip. 1, 2, 3. Release. 1. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Trip. 2, 3.
Release. 1,001. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10. 11. 12, 13. 14, 1.5. Number 3. 1. 2, 3. Re-
lease. 1, 2. 3, 4. 5 6, 7. 8, 9, 10. 11. 12. 13. 14, 15. Number 4. 1, 2, 3. Release. 1, 2,
3, 4,5,6,7.8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15. 10-second series. Trip. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
Release. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Trip. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
Release. 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15. Trip. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10. Release. 1,
2,3.4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,1.5. Trip. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7,8,9,10. Release. 1, 2, 3, 4,
6, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. 30-second exposures. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. " Release. 1, 2. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. Trip. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. Release.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.
1, 2, 3. Go ahead, Muchea. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

MUCHEA (SIXTEENTH PASS)

24 27 57 P Roger. Status is green.


24 28 00 CC Roger. We have it.
24 28 02 P Dad burn it 21, 22, 23, 24. Roger. Thank you. Roger, I'm busy taking all these picture
sequences, counting 1, 2, buckle-my-shoe type thing.
24 28 23 CC Roger.

421
MUCHEA (SL_(TEENTH PASS )--Continued

24 28 26 P Ha, ha !, I'm up to 5,244 now. Ha, ha !


24 28 43 P 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, release.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.
24 29 i0 CC • . . Minus . . . pitch attitude and about a --14 on your horizon scanner pitch output.
Would you check this?
24 29 19 P Roger. I am on gyros free ; auto control ; gyros free ; pitch plane torquing on.
24 29 27 CC Roger.
24 29 28 P I am pitching around the plane of the ecliptic to take these pictures.
24 29 31 CC Understand.
24 29 43 P 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, release. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. Identifier pic-
tures, two of them. Oops, tripped two accidently. I'm on slave.
24 30 46 P Faith Seven is now gone to slave and will let the scanners process the spacecraft back
around slowly.
24 30 51 CC Roger. Weconcur here.
24 31 07 P 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78.
24 31 59 CC Pitch attitude and horizon scanners.
24 32 01 P 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, just a minute 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
24 32 33 P Roger. My gyros--it looks like I'm fairly closely on. I can see the actual horizon, and
of course, my gyros are being precessed by tim scanners back slowly because they were
off quite a bit being gyros free and pitch plane precession on.
24 32 50 CC Roger .... You are coming in here now, too.
24 3254 P Roger. I wasn't sure the spacecraft would fly this way, but it seems to be doing all right.
24 33 01 CC Roger.
24 3307 P Now for the 30-second exposures. 1, 2, 3, 4. 5. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. Roger. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. [223-second
break here]
24 3744 P 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65,
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91,
92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
30-second one coming. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. 10-second exposure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, off.
24 4054 P Okay. Third series. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,
50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61.62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85. 86, 87. 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
24 42 29 P 30-second exposure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. 10-second exposure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. 10-second ex-
posure over. I don't believe the camera tripped right. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
24 44 56 P Okay, starting the next series. MARK [24 45 01] w' 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52. 53.54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66,
67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74. Go ahead, Canton.

CANTON (SIXTEENTH PASS)

24 45 59 CC Roger. Your [recovery] Area 17-1 [retrosequence] timeis25 04 12. Over.


24 46 08 P 25 04 02?
24 46 12 CC Negative. 25 04 12.
24 46 16 P Roger. 25 04 12.
24 46 20 CC Affirmative.
24 4628 P That just about gets it. 30-second one. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. 10-second exposure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10.
24 48 51 P Radiation experiment went on 1 minute ago.

422
CANTON (SIXTEENTH PASS)--Continued

24 49 38 P Okay, one more series here for you. Starting NOW. (24 49 45)T 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 04, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94,
95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12_ 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, exposure off. 30-second exposure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. 10-second expo-
sure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, off.
245606 P The last series. 1 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21 ..... 30, 31, (etc.) 40, (etc.) 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60,
• . . 2, 3 .... 14, 15, 16 .... 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60. There is the 2-minute
one off. 30-second one started. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. 10-second one on. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and a big fat hen and that one's off.
24 58 24 And my fuel quantity light came on at 61 percent at 24 58 25.
25 00 25 Here comes the sunrise pictures. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. The 1-second one taken and
off.
2501 50 The second set of 30 and 1. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, the 1-second one, and off. And that winds up
the zodiacal lights [photography]. May they rest in peace.
* [Unconfirmed transmission omitted.]

GUAYMAS (SIXTEENTH PASS)

250322 CC Faith Seven, Guaymas Cap Com.


250325 P Roger, Guaymas go ahead.
25 03 26 CC Have you started your photos yet?
25 03 29 P Man, that's all I have been doing all night long.
25 03 32 CC Roger, Hasselblad?
25 03 34 P Roger, I'm just getting them out right now.
25 03 37 CC Okay, you going to power down first or after?
250340 P No, I'll power down after I take the first two shots on it. Actually, I'm not going to power
down until I finish those shots. I'm going to leave the gyros up to do the shots with.
2503 49 CC Okay. Do you want to give me a mark when you take them so I can get your times ?
2503 53 P Roger.
250418 P I'm having a little trouble getting things out of Pandora's locker here.
250422 CC Roger.
250438 P Oh yeah, you might pass on to the Cape too, my fuel quantity warning light came on at
24 58, 24 hours and 58 minutes.
25 04 50 CC Roger.
25 04 58 P At 61 percent.
25 05 04 CC Roger, Gordo.
25 05 49 P Okay. I'm getting the first two shots right now.
25 05 53 CC Roger.
25 06 31 P Okay, that's the first two shots.
25 06 36 CC Okay, Gordo.
25 06 52 P Now. I'm going to fly-by-wire.
25 07 11 P Yawing around to the 90 degree point on the gyro.
25 07 17 CC Roger, we read you.
25 08 54 P Okay, snapping two mere pies.
25 09 20 P C,ging the gyros.
25 09 27 P Get down in proper attitude first here.
25 09 31 CC Okay.
25 10 19 P Now it's back to free.
25 11 49 P Two more pies.

423
CAPE CANAVERAL (SEVENTEENTH PASS)

25 12 15 CC Helloooo up there.
25 12 18 P Hello down dere.
25 1222 P Man, all I do is take pictures, pictures, pictures.
25 12 26 CC All I do is clean, clean, clean.
25 1230 P Ha, ha. Roger.
25 12 38 P I got all the zodiacal light pies and now I am busily engaged yawing around on the MIT
jobbies.
25 12 46 CC Roger. You have my sympathy.
25 12 51 P I'm not complaining, ha, ha.
25 12 57 P I'm at the 270 point now getting the last two pictures in the 30 seconds.
25 13 02 CC I have 17-Bravo [contingency recovery area retrosequence time] correction, if you can
take it.
25 13 07 P Roger, better hang on just a minute, I'm right--snapping pictures--right at the second.
25 13 13 CC Okay, standing by.
25 14 12 P Okay. I can take it now.
25 14 16 CC Roger. 17-Bravo, 26 14 48.
25 14 25 P 26 14 48.
25 14 28 CC That is affirmative. We'd like a little Snn gun time if you want to flip it on.
25 14 37 P Say again.
25 14 39 CC TV on for a couple of minutes please ?
25 14 44 P Roger, TV coming on.
25 14 56 CC Gordo, for information only, if you care to use the 6-inch outside, recommending a minimum
f stop 16 or 22 with the filter. It's not necessary to do this if you do use it outside; we
recommend going this way.
25 15 15 P At 22 with the filter, is that affirm?
25 15 18 CC Say again, please.
25 15 21 P 22 with filter.
25 15 24 CC 16, f/16 with filter.
25 15 28 P Roger.
25 16 05 P Okay, I'm caging my gyros.
25 16 10 CC Roger.
25 16 13 P And they caged correctly.
25 16 17 CC Good show ; it works.
25 16 18 P Yeah, just like advertised.
25 16 22 C_ How about that.
25 16 28 P Powering down my ASCS bus.
25 16 37 CC Roger. Understand ASCS bus is off. Your sure are a miser on the control fuel.
25 16 47 P You say I'm noisy on the controls.
25 16 51 CC I say you're miser on the controls.
25 16 57 P Roger.
25 17 51 CO • . . 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, do you read?
25 17 54 P Roger, you are coming in very broken. Over.
25 17 56 CC
CANARY ISLANDS (SEVENTEENTH PASS)

25 26 01 CC Faith Seven, this is Canary Cap Com. All systems are green. Do you confirm TV is on?
Over.
25 26 11 P Negative. TV is not on, Canary. I'm busy snapping some pictures.
25 26 24 P TV coming on now.
25 26 26 CC Roger.
25 28 46 SY Faith Seven, Canary systems.
25 28 48 P Go ahead Canary, Faith Seven.
25 28 51 SY You're looking real good here, systems-wise. This is our last pass at you. We'll see
you back in--back in Houston. Keep up the good work.
25 28 59 P Roger, will do. Thanks a lot.
25 29 35 CC This is Canary Cap Com, could you give us a cabin O_ partial pressure readout, please.
25 29 42 P Roger. Cabin O2 partial pressure is about 3.9 [psi].
25 29 47 C_ Roger.
25 29 58 CC Was that 3.9 or 3.57 Over.
25 30 02 P About 3.9.

424
CANARY ISLANDS (SEVENTEENTH PASS)--Continued

25 30 05 P Just a tad under 4. I'm going back on my suit. I've had my visor open for a while here.
25 30 11 CC Roger.
25 30 21 CC We're having T/M IX)S here. Suggest you turn off your TV camera. Over.
25 30 26 P Roger.
KANO (SEVENTEENTH PASS)

25 32 O0 CC Faith Seven, this is Kano Cap Com. We have T/M solid, and all systems are go.
25 32 06 P Roger Kano. Thankyou.
25 35 28 CC Faith Seven, this is Kano Cap Com. Your systems are still all green. Goodbye and
good luck. Out.
25 35 34 P Roger. Thank you Kano.

ZANZIBAR (SEVENTEENTH PASS}

25 41 50 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.


25 41 56 P Go ahead, Zanzibar. Faith Seven.
25 41 58 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com. Your systems look good on the ground.
25 42 05 P Roger, Zanzibar. They look good up here, too.
25 42 08 CC Okay. Could I have consumable readouts, please?
25 42 12 P Roger. Auto. fuel, 60 percent; manual fuel, 91 percent. Oxygen primary, 145 percent;
secondary, 100 percent.
25 42 28 CC Faith Seven, I read you. You are fading.
25 42 34 P Roger.
25 42 56 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com. Good luck on your pass.
25 43 01 P Roger. Thank you.
25 49 33 P Okay. Short status report: Nitrogen low pressure: auto., 470 [psi] ; manual, 490 [psi].
B-nut temperatures: Pitch down, 75 [degrees]; pitch up, 58 [degrees]; yaw left, 70
[degrees] ; yaw right, 70 [degrees] ; roll counterclockwise, 96 [degrees] ; roll clockwise,
95 [degrees]. Peroxide auto tank: . . . 2 [degrees] ; peroxide manual tank, 70 [degrees],
peroxide reserve tank, 76 [degrees]. 250 inverter, 116 [degrees]; 150 inverter, 128
[degrees] ; standby inverter, 108 [degrees].
* [Non-flight-related transmission omitted.]

MUCHEA (SEVENTEENTH PASS)

26 00 54 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com.


26 00 57 P Howdy, Muchea Cap Com. Faith Seven.
26 01 00 CC We have a systems go and aeromed go.
26 01 49 P Very good.
26 01 09 CC Aeromeds are standing by for blood pressure.
26 01 12 P Roger, coming now. Does he know how to read it?
26 01 20 CC Roger. They got it now.
26 01 33 CC I have [recovery] Area 18-1 retrosequence time. Prepared to copy?
26 01 40 P Roger. Stand by just a second.
26 01 41 CC Roger.
26 01 47 P Roger. Go.
26 01 48 CC Area 18-1 [retrosequence time], 26 34 48.
26 01 56 P Roger. 26 34 48.
26 01 59 CC That's affirmative; [contingency recovery area] 18-A [retrosequence time] is 26 58 50.
26 02 10 P That was [contingency recovery area] 18-A.
26 02 12 CC Affirmative.
26 02 16 P *I didn't get the rest of that, 26 what?
26 02 24 CC 26 58 50.
26 02 28 P Roger. 26 58 50. Roger.
26 02 31 CC And I have [recovery area] 18-2 [retrosequence time]. 27 43 48.
26 02 38 P Roger. 27 43 48.
26 02 42 CC Roger. And these times does--do not include the clock error.
26 02 47 P Roger. Understand.
26 02 49 CC That first blood pressure was no good. Would you send another one? It was cut off early.
26 03 03 CC Roger. We are getting your second blood pressure.
26 03 29 CC That was a good blood pressure.
26 03 32 P Roger.

425
707-056 O--63_-----28
MUCHEA (SEVENTEENTH PASS)--Continued

26 03 35 CC Systems report that your suit dome temp is decreasing slowly.


26 03 41 P Roger. I'm running it down fairly low. I got it a little bit high.
26 03 45 CC Roger.
26 O3 48 P It's been running consistently fairly low.
26 03 51 CC Understand.
26 04 57 CC Faith Seven. We have a message for you.
26 04 59 P Roger.
26 05 02 CC From the Australian Minister of Supply, the Honorable Alan Fairhall: "All Austral
following your progress with lively interest. Muchea and Red Lake tracking stati
staffs and Department of Supply are proud to be associated with this great NASA effo
Happy landings." End message.
26 05 20 P Roger. Thank you very much.
26 06 55 CC We have approximately 1 minute to LOS.
26 06 58 P Roger.
26 07 21 CC Could you give me a read on your partial O:?
26 07 26 P Roger. Cabin partial O__ is about 3.9 [psi].
26 07 30 CC 3.9 [psi].
26 07 32 P Roger.
CANTON (SEVENTEENTH PASS)

26 20 17 CC Faith Seven, this is Canton Cap Com. Standing by.


26 20 22 P Roger, Canton. I'm all green here.

HAWAII (SEVENTEENTH PASS)

26 27 00 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. Do you read?


26 2704 P Roger, Hawaii. Faith Seven.
26 2706 CC Faith Seven. All systems are green. We are standing by.
26 27 11 P Roger. Thank you.
26 31 35 P * And, we are approaching 26 31. We are between Hawaii and California. Very, ve
low rates. Turning on my manual proportional control. Low rates.
26 3233 P I believe it's better to leave it as it is.
26 32 43 P Now to get the camera out.
26 3406 P * And I made the first picture just then between--just off the west coast of the Unit
States. Almost on the west coast.
26 34 49 P Second one is coming in on the coastline. There are quite a bit of clouds, all differ_
types and patterns. I took one getting in part of the coastline in under the clou_
That's number 2.
26 35 12 P Snapping all these pics at f/5.6 and 1/125th.

CALIFORNIA (SEVENTEENTH PASS)

26 36 29 CC Faith Seven, this is California Cap.


26 36 32 P Roger, California. Faith Seven.
26 36 45 CC Faith Seven, this is California. We have you all green here on the ground.
26 36 51 P Roger Thank you. I'm all green here.
26 36 54 CC Roger. When you take your photographs, will you turn your tape recorder to continuol
26 3700 P Roger. I have the tape recorder on continuous.
26 37 48 P Both of those pictures were made looking to---slightly to the south.
26 39 55 P Looking back to the due west, inland on the desert area. In fact, there's the Salton S
26 40 16 P *There's the Gulf and Baja California. Next one. There's E1 Centro area. I can m_
out individual fields. Smoke from the smokestack down there. There's some roa
houses, a little airstrip. There's a dry lake.

CAPE CANAVERAL (EIGHTEENTH PASS)

26 43 28 P Faith Seven passing over Dallas.


26 45 56 CC Faith Seven, this is Cape. Everything is go here. We are standing by.
26 46 01 P Roger, Cape. Everything go here.
26 46 15 CC Faith Seven. Would you like a G.m.t. hack? Over.
26 4621 P Roger. I would.

426
CAPE CANAVERAL (EIGHTEENTH PASS)---Continued

26 46 23 CC All right. On my mark, G.m.t. will be 15 50 30. Stand by, MARK. 15 50 30. (26 46 35) v
26 46 40 P Roger. My G.m.t. clock is 10 seconds fast.
26 46 47 CC Understand the capsule clock.
26 46 53 P That's the capsule clock.
26 46 55 CC Roger•
26 46 59 CC I have a correction to Diamond Head, retrosequence time. Delta T, 4 minutes 08 seconds
for Diamond Head. Over.
26 47 11 P 10 minutes 08 seconds.
26 47 15 CC • . . 08.
26 47 16 P 4 minutes 08 seconds.
26 47 21 CC That is correct.
26 47 23 P Roger.
26 47 28 CC And if you should be inclined to, use the extra black and white 16-millimeter magazine out-
side for general photography. Recommending f/16.0 since you have no filter.
Unreodable P Roger.
26 47 51 CC We have no specific requirements for it, however.
26 47 56 P Roger.
26 53 13 P Radiation experiment coming on, NOW. [26 53 17] T. I'm at about, --10 degrees on pitch,
roll right about 10 degrees, facing back to the west. Slowly oscillating in a left yaw rate.
26 56 08 P I'm opening the KK- clamp and we'll see what h'appens here now.
26 57 51 P *And it appears to be flowing--water out of the tin can.
26 59 O0 P Radiation experiment off.
27 02 26 P The heat exchange dome temp immediately went down to the freezing point. Closing off
KK clamp. I'll have to continue on the original suit circuit.
27 09 15 P Starting on the second series of'the MIT film, just short of Africa. Coastline should be
coming in momentarily. Took.a shot out over the water of unusual---of good sized cloud
buildups.
27 11 25 P *Now the suit heat exchanger dome temp's starting back up. About thawed out.
27 16 38 F Okay, short status : Roll clockwise, 85 (degreeS), roll counterclockwise, 90 (degrees) ; Yaw
right, 68 (degrees) ; yaw left, 75 (degrees) ; Pitch up, 62 (degrees) ; pitch down, 74
(degrees). Retro temp., 75 (degrees). 250 inverter 108 (degrees) ; 150 inverter 124
(degrees) ; standby inverter 108 (degrees). Cabin outlet, 72 (degrees). Auto peroxide
tank, 72 (degrees) ; manual peroxide tanL 72 (degrees) ; reserve peroxide tank, 75 (de-
grees). Correction on that--that auto peroxide tank is 82 (degree§). Isolated bus
voltage, 28 volts. Camera going up in the glove box.
27 26 08 P [ Yawn] Man, I dropped off to sleep again for a few minutes there•
27 29 50 P Now, looks like the 1.5 [comfort-control-valve] setting is holding the suit heat exchange
dome temp for the moment. Almost down to the bottom, about 42 degrees.
27 30 47 Yo ho hoho ho ho. [He is singing.]
27 31 51 Boy, what a beautiful view from up here. Surprises you every orbit.

MUCHEA (EIGHTEENTH PASS)

27 33 39 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. Over.


27 33 42 P Roger, Muchea. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
27 33 46 CC Roger. Same. Would you place your telemetry switch in the continuous position please?
27 33 50 P Roger. Coming continuous NOW.
27 34 15 CC Roger. We have T/M.
27 34 19 P Roger.
27 35 11 CC I have some retrosequence times when you're ready to copy.
27 35 18 P Roger. Go.
27 35 21 CC Area 19-A [contingency recovery area] nominal.
27 35 28 P Roger•
27 35 29 CC 19-B, 28 31 24. Area 19-C, nominal.
27 35 45 P Roger.
27 35 51 CC Would you read back area 19-B time?
27 35 53 P Roger. 28 31 24.
27 35 57 CC Roger.
27 36 34 CC Systems here are go and aeromed is go.
27 36 40 P Roger. Thank you, I'm go from here.

427
MUCHEA (EIGHTEENTH PASS)--Continued

27 37 03 P Tell Warren to be careful and not get stuck.


27 37 06 CC Ha, ha. He knows about that.
27 37 12 P Roger.
27 37 23 CC Stuck on what?
27 37 26 P On the outback.
27 37 28 CC Roger. Acknowledge.
27 37 31 P Roger.
27 37 57 CC By the way, we have all joined tennis clubs.
27 38 02 P Excellent. That's the best thing to do.
27 38 05 CC Roger,
27 39 57 CC Faith Seven, Muchea Cap Com. We read a very low suit dome temp.
27 40 02 P Roger. I'm running it very low. I'm working it back up now.
27 40 17 CC Say again, Faith Seven.
27 40 19 P *Roger. I've already made a decrease in setting. It should be coming back up shortly.
27 41 51 P *The suit dome temp is still acting up. Suit inlet temp is back up to about 68 degrees. The
suit dome temp has gone down to about 38 degrees. Have suit coolant almost off now.
27 43 52 P All right, suit coolant is shut completely off. Now it should come up.
27 50 10 ? •.. read you loud and clear.
27 50 45 P Some of this fine plumbing they put in this thing. This sad thing on the needle---on the
diaphragm fitting has come out so I can't change the needle to any other fitting. I'll have
to leave the Kenny Kleinknecht clamp closed. Meantime, I can't pump any more. That
container is full and so is the other one.
27 52 24 P I wish some of you guys who tried to stick in some of this plumbing and---connected here
and there, and use it here and there would sit in here awhile and try and use the stuff.
27 55 33 P Wow ! Look at that bright sunshine. Oooo, weee !

HAWAII (EIGHTEENTH PASS)

28 00 28 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. Do you read? Over.


28 00 32 P Roger, Hawaii. Faith Seven reading you aloud and clear.
28 00 35 CC Read you loud and clear. All systems are green. Standing by for fuel and Oz readout.
28 00 40 P Roger. Fuel, 60/90 [percent]. Oxygen, 140/100 [percent].
28 00 55 CC Say again, 02 primary, please.
28 00 57 P 140 [percent], one four zero.
28 01 01 CC Roger. Understand everything is green.
28 01 04 P Roger. Thank you.
28 01 56 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii.
28 02 00 P Go ahead, Hawaii. Faith Seven.
28 02 02 CC C-band in the continuous position ?
28 02 05 P Roger. It is.
28 02 06 CO All right.

CALIFORNIA (EIGHTEENTH PASS)

28 08 07 CC Faith Seven, this is California Cap Com.


28 08 11 P Roger, California. Faith Seven.
28 08 13 CC Roger. We have you green clear across the board here.
28 08 18 P Roger. Good.
28 08 19 CC California standing by.
28 08 23 P Roger.
28 13 10 P Faith Seven passing over Baja California now. See entire Baja California.
28 13 25 CC Faith Seven. Were you calling California?
28 13 27 P Negative. I was just commenting that I could see all of Baja California. It's all clear,
all up and down.
28 13 38 P Disregard.
28 13 40 CC Roger, Faith Seven.
28 16 39 P Faith Seven passing over Houston, Texas. Have it in sight loud and clear.

428
CAPE CANAVERAL (NINETEENTH PASS)

28 16 46 CC Roger, Seven. We read that at the Cape.


28 16 50 P Roger.
28 17 07 CC Faith Seven, this is Cape. We would like to see your TV returns, over.
28 17 12 P Roger. I've got her on.
281740 CC Faith Seven, this is Cape.
281743 P Go ahead, Cape.
28 17 45 CC I have you ATC [Air Traffic Control] clearance. Are you ready to copy?
281749 P Roger.
28 17 51 CC "Please pass to Major Cooper, in flight, from Air Force Secretary Zuckert and Chief of Staff
General LeMay: 'It is with great pride and enthusia.sm that the entire United States
Air Force is following the progress of your historic flight--a dramatic contribution to
aerospace exploration. Godluck, and God speed.' " Over.
28 18 21 P Roger. Thank you.
28 18 24 CC That's all right, Colonel.
28 18 37 CC Faith Seven from Cape. Could you give me a comment on your general comfort, please?
28 18 44 P * Roger. My general comfort is good, now. I've had a continuing battle with the plumbing
in here. I was not able to open the KK clamp due to the fact that--that system is
full of water. One of the needles broke off--or the little insert into it broke---and I am
unable to transfer any more water out of the condensate tank.
28 1909 CC Roger. I gather you are not bothered by it.
28 19 13 P Negative. I am plenty comfortable. I've had trouble with the suit heat exchanger ; keep
having to run it up and down and chase it, but it's doing fine.
28 19 23 CC Looks like you are doing a real good job on that. Apparently you are keeping yourself
very comfortable.
28 19 28 P Roger.
28 19 30 CC I assume since you've had trouble with this clamp, that it is now in the---rather, since you've
had trouble with the condensate transfer, that the clamp is now in the closed position.
28 19 41 P That's affirmative.
28 19 44 CC Roger. Good show.
28 19 53 P Are you getting any TV yet?
28 19 57 CC I think the light is low inside there, Gordo.
28 20 01 P I'm outside.
28 20 09 CC Are you in the Sun?
28 20 10 P Negative.
2820 12 CC I recommend you turn it off.
28 20 14 P Roger.
28 20 18 CC Also, how about the little squeezers, have they been beating their hearts out every 10 minutes ?
28 2024 P Roger. Faithfully, every 10 minutes throughout the whole day and night, every time.
28 20 31 CC A couple of beady yellow eyes, huh ?
28 20 42 P Ha, ha, Roger. I'm directly over Miami. I'm looking right down on Miami Beach.
28 2048 CC
28 21 39 CO Faith Seven, this is Cape. Would you give us a blood pressure now, please?
28 21 43 P Roger.
28 31 44 P Okay, you guys will have had it now . . . another measure ....
28 41 31 P Drink some water.
2855 34 P Okay. Radiation experiment coming on now.
28 55 48 P I'm in full drifting flight, so I'll have random attitudes for it.
28 59 51 P At 28 59, my 0.05g telelight came on after I turned my warning lights off and back on to dim.
Have turned my 0.05g and emergency 0.05g switch fuse off.
290238 P Radiation measurement is off.
292419 P For my short status report : Peroxide regulated pressure: auto, 470 [psi] ; manual, 490 [psi].
75 [degrees] pitch down; 60 [degrees] pitch up. Yaw left is 80 [degrees] ; yaw right is
65 [degrees]. Roll counterclockwise is 78 [degrees] ; roll clockwise is 75 [degrees]. Auto
peroxide outlet, 72 [degrees] ; manual is 72 [degrees] ; reserve, 75 [degrees].

HAWAII (NINETEENTH PASS)

292815 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii on air-to-ground relay, do you read? Over.


29 28 19 P Roger, Hawaii. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
292829 P Roger. Faith--Faith Seven is reading you loud and clear, Hawaii.

429
HAWAII (NINETEENTH PASS)---Continued

29 34 07 P Hawaii Cup Corn, Faith Seven.


29 34 09 CC Go ahead, Seven, this is Hawaii. Read you loud and clear.
29 34 13 P Roger. Wonder if you would relay to the Cape a little situation I had happen and see what
they think on it. While turning my warning lights off and back on to dim, my 0.05g telelight
came on in my telelight panel. Now the action that I have taken is, to turn off my 0.05g
switch fuse and my emergency 0.05g switch fuse. Would you relay to them, and get their
idea on it? Over.
29 34 44 CC Understand your 0.05g light came on and your turned your 0.05g fuse switch and
emergency 0.05g fuse switch off.
29 34 56 P That's affirmative.
29 34 59 CC Is that affirmative ?
29 35 01 P Affirmative.
29 35 02 CC Can we have T/M on?
29 3506 P Roger. T/M is on now, have it on ground command.
29 35 10 CC I have retrosequence time for [contingency recovery] area 20-Alpha, is nominal.
29 35 18 P Roger. 20-Alpha is nominal. Thank you.
29 35 22 CC We also pass on to you--turn C-band beacon on, a g.e.t, of 30 58 00.
29 35 33 P 30 58 00.
29 35 37 CC Roger. Turn off at31 08 00.
29 35 56 CC Did you copy, Seven?
29 35 57 P Negative. I got 30 58 00 on.
29 36 02 CC Roger. Turn it off 10 minutes later.
29 36 05 P Roger. Will do.
29 3619 _C Seven, this is Hawaii. Was that a red or a green telelight?
29 36 38 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii. Do you read? Over.
29 36 40 P Roger. Go ahead, Hawaii. Faith Seven.
29 36 42 CC Roger. Was your 0.05g light red or green ?
29 36 46 P It was green. Over.
29 36 50 CC Consumable readout please.
29 36 52 P Roger. Fuel: 58 [percent] auto.; 90 [percent] manual. Oxygen: 140 [percent] primary;
100 [percent] secondary.
29 37 02 CC Roger. Understand.
29 37 28 CC Seven, this is Hawaii Cap Com.
29 37 31 P Go ahead, Hawaii. Seven.
29 37 37 CO Faith Seven, Hawaii. Over.
29 37 39 P Go ahead, Hawaii. Faith Seven.

CALIFORNIA (NINETEENTH PASS)

29 41 32 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven. This is California Cap Com.


29 41 35 P Roger, California Cap Com. Faith Seven here.
29 41 39 CC Roger, Faith Seven. Our panel looks good. Telemetry does not indicate 0.05g.
29 41 52 P Roger. It must be a .... I just threw a glitch into the light when I was turning my
warning lights off and on, then, probably.
29 42 02 CC There is a little diode in your light test, that failed could cause that light to come on.
29 42 08 P Roger. Does MCC recommend that I go ahead and put my 0.05 and emergency 0.05g
switch fuses back on?
29 42 21 CC Faith Seven. Leave them off.
29 4225 P Roger.
GUAYMAS (NINETEENTH PASS)

29 4407 P Go ahead, Guaymas. Faith Seven.


29 44O9 CC I have some retrosequence times for you, for [recovery area] area 20-1.
29 44 16 P Roger.
29 44 17 CC 30 53 01.
29 44 22 P Well, just a minute. Which one is that ?
29 44 25 CC Area 20-1.
29 44 28 P Roger. 30.
29 44 30 CC 53 01.
29 44 33 P 53 01. Roger.
29 44 34 CC Roger. And [contingency recovery] areas 20-B, C, and D are nominal.

430
GUAYMAS (NINETEENTH PASS)--Continued

294442 P Roger. Understand. Thank you.


29 44 45 CC Roger• And 20-1 doesn't take in your clock error•
294449 P Roger. Understand.
29 48 38 CC Faith Seven. Guaymas Cap Com.
29 48 40 P Go ahead, Guaymas. Faith Seven.
29 48 42 CC *Would you go ahead and power up your ASCS bus? We would like to know if you have
your amp cal programer.
29 48 50 CC • . . gyros caged now ?
29 48 51 P Gyros are caged. Fly-by-wire ; ASCS coming on normal now.
29 49 25 P Guaymas, are you still reading me ?
294929 CC Go ahead, Faith Seven.
29 49 32 P Roger• You still have me on telemetry?
29 49 35 CC Roger. You look good.
29 49 37 P Roger. I am supposed to do this HF antenna test, now.
29 49 43 CC Roger•
29 49 49 P I will be on HF for a couple of minutes and then back on UHF.
29 50 13 P This is Faith Seven on high frequency. Capsule elapsed time, 29 50 20. Now for HF
antenna test. My attitudes are zero [degrees] in roll ; am roiling 90 degrees and repeating.
29 51 37 This is Faith Seven on the second portion of the HF antenna test. C.e.t. 29 51 45. Now I am
rolled 90 degrees. HF out.
Unreadable P Faith Seven is back on UHF.

CAPE CANAVERAL (TWENTIETH PASS)

29 52 26 CC Faith Seven. This is Cape. How do you read? Over.


29 52 29 P Roger, Cape. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
29 52 32 CC Roger, Gordo. On this 0.05g business, we are interested in whether or not the amp cal has
switched to 0.05g logic. Do you follow ?
29 52 43 P Roger.
29 52 44 CC * We figured the best way to do it--after gyros have warmed up---is to uncage, initiate
a slow rate in any axis, and see if you have attitudes. If you do have attitudes, we
feel that the amp cal has not latched at 0.05g. Over.
29 53 01 P Roger. Assume a slow rate in any axis and see if the attitudes follow. Right?
295309 CC Right. When you uncage the gyros, you'll have to set up a very slow rate and see if
you have attitude indications.
29 53 16 P Roger.
29 54 04 CC Seven, from Cape. We may have LOS before you are able to do this. Once you have done
it, report to us through some other station, and then power down the ASCS after your
test is complete.
29 54 18 P Roger.
29 55 07 CC Seven from Cape. Have you uncaged gyros yet?
29 55 10 P Negative. Not yet.
29 55 14 CC All right. We may lose you. Advise the next station.
29 55 19 P Roger.
29 55 21 CC Try to advise us even if we've had LOS.
29 55 29 P Roger.
29 57 41 P Cape. Faith Seven here.
29 58 13 P Cape Cap Com. This is Faith Seven on high frequency. How do you read on this?
Over.
Unreadable CC
29 58 28 P Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven, on high frequency.
Unreadable CC
29 59 09 P Hello, Cape. Faith Seven on high frequency. Over.
Unreadable CC

COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (TWENTIETH PASS)

30 48 03 CC Hello, Faith Seven . . ,


30 48 13 P Roger, Faith Seven here. Go ahead.
30 48 16 CC
304848 P Faith Seven, here. Go ahead, John, just barely read you.
30 49 02 ?

431
COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (TWENTIETH PASS)--Continued

30 50 36 CC Hello, Faith Seven. Hello, Faith Seven, this is CSQ Cap Corn calling early. If you read
me, Gordo, answer on HF. Over.
30 50 58 P Roger, John. This is Faith Seven. Reading you about 4 by 4. How me?
30 51 05 CC Hello, Faith Seven. CSQ Cap Corn reads you very weak and unreadable. If you can
read, give me status of your ASCS check, please. Over.
30 51 17 P Roger. My amp eal is latched up 0.05g. I do not have ASCS. Over.
30 51 25 CC Understand you do not have ASCS. Is that affirmed?
30 51 29 P That is affirm.
30 51 37 CC Faith Seven, this is CSQ. Can you say again, trouble with. your amp cal? I did not
receive that part of your transmission. Over.
30 51 45 P Roger. My 0.05g portion of the logic is latched in on the amp cal, so I do not have attitude
indications through the auto pilot any more.
30 52 01 CC Roger . . . amp cal . . . Gordo, understand the amp cal is not working and the ASCS is in-
operative. Was your gyro in the slaved position when you overturned? Over.
30 52 11 P Say again.
30 52 58 P This is Faith Seven on UHF. How do you read, CSQ ?
30 53 33 CC Faith Seven, CSQ Cap Com. Do you still receive me? Over.
30 53 37 P Roger, C SQ. Faith Seven on UHF. How do you read? Over.
30 53 41 CC Roger. Still reading you, Gordo. Did you have any of your gyros switched to slave dur-
ing the ASCS check? Over.
30 53 47 P *Roger. I had them caged, and then I went to slave ; and in moving my rates, I did nat get
any attitudes. Over.
3O 53 59 CC Roger. Understand. No attitudes. Did you go into roll at all? Over.
30 54 03 P Roger. I tried roll, pitch, and yaw. Over.
30 54 07 CC Roger. You did not go into automatic roll. Is that affirmative?
30 54 11 P *I did not power up the ASCS. All I did was turn my ASCS o11, powered up my ASCS a-c
bus. And when it was warmed up, then uncaged my gyros to the slave position, which
should give me attitude.
30 54 30 P And if ....
30 54 32 CC Repeat that please. We don't have much time. Over.
30 54 34 P Roger. I do not have attitudes when I go to slave on my gyros. When I uncage my gyros,
I do not have attitude indications with the ASCS a-c powered up.
30 54 48 CC Understand you did not go into actual ASCS. Is that affirmative ?
30 54 51 P Negative. I did not.
30 55 39 CC Faith Seven .....
30 55 41 P Roger. Reading you loud and clear.
30 55 44 CC Roger. I am reading you rather weak. You did not go on ASCS. You powered up, and
went to the slave position; got no gyro indication. Is that affirmative?
30 55 58 P That is affirm, affirm.
30 56 05 CC Hello, Faith Seven. Be sure your T/M transmitter is on, and C-band beacon is on, for
Range Tracker pass. I rel)eat, nmke sure C-band beacon is on the T/M is on for the
Range Tracker pass.
30 56 21 P Roger. It's on.
30 56 32 CC Hello, Faith Seven. Thisis CSQ Cap Corn .... on. Acknowledge please. Over.
30 56 44 P Roger. They are on. Affirm, John.

HAWAII (TWENTIETH PASS)

31 00 30 CC Faith Seven, this is Cape Cap Com. Over. [Loud squeal.]


(CNV)
31 00 33 P Roger. Go ahead, Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven.
31 00 49 CC Faith Seven. this is Cape Cap Com. Over. [Loud squeal.]
(CNV)
31 00 53 P Roger. Cape Cap Com. Faith Seven here. Go ahe'_d.
21 00 57 CC Roger Gordo .... your amp cal is probably locked up on 0.05g. We are interested in

(CNV) just how much of your amp cal is working.


31 01 0S P You're not coming through at all, Ai.
31 01 11 CC
(CNV)
21 O1 14 P Negative, I'm not reading you.
• 3] 01 17 CC
(CNV)
432
HAWAII (TWENTIETH PASS)--Continued

31 01 23 P A1, I can't read you• My amp cal is locked up on 0.05g. I do not have attitude indicators.
Over.
31 O1 33 CC Roger. Roger. Can you read me now?
(CNV)
31 O1 37 P Just barely.
31 01 39 CC Roger. Stand by a few minutes•
(CNV)
31 0200 CC Hello, Faith Seven. How do you read me now?
(CNV)
31 0206 P A little bit better.
310209 CO Faith Seven, I do understand that you do not have attitude indications? ... do you
(CNV) read ?
31 02 20 P Negative• I'm not able to understand you yet. Over.
31 02 29 CC Okay. Stand by.
(CNV)
31 02 50 CC Seven, from Cape. How do you read?
(CNV)
31 02 51 P Roger. Reading you better now.
31 03 14 CC Seven, from Cape. How do you read now?
(CNV)
31 03 17 P Roger. Reading you loud and clear now.
31 03 25 P Roger, Cape. Reading you loud and clear now.
31 03 28 CC Roger. We're interesting in how much of your amp cal is still available to you.
(CNV)
31 03 42 CC Seven, we would like you to do a how-de-doody test over Hawaii, to find out how much
(CNV) of your amp cal is still available.
31 03 52 P Roger. Do you say you want me to power up my ASCS?
31 04 12 P Cape Cap Com, say again. You were cut out on that. Over.
31 04 30 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Do you read?
31 04 33 P A little bit, Scott.
31 05 01 CC Seven, Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com.
31 05 04 P Roger, Hawaii. Faith Seven.
Unreadable CC Go ahead Cape.
31 05 06 F *We want to use the transfer to your circuit and let Cape Cap Corn talk with him this pass.
31 05 14 CC Roger. You are relaying at this time.
31 05 17 F Roger. Would you also make sure that your people are prepared to watch for the T/M
signal also. After this pass, we would appreciate if you'd play your last pass over
again to make sure that you understand what we want in regards to what happened
to the 0.05 g light between the time you got acquisition of the...
31 05 47 CC Roger, I copied.
Unreadable SY Hawaii command carrier on.
31 07 01 P Hello, Hawaii. Are you reading Faith Seven now? Over.
31 07 24 CC Faith Seven, this is Cape. Over.
(CNV)
31 07 27 P Roger, Cape. Faith Seven here.
31 07 37 P Roger, Cape. Faith Seven here.
31 07 40 P Roger, Cape. Faith Seven here. Go ahead.
31 07 43 CO
(CNV)
31 07 53 P You're cutting in and out, I understand you want to find out how much of my amp cal is
gone.
31 0800 CC Affirmative. We would like to have you first switch your ASCS 0.05g fuse switch on and
(CNV) check the 0.05g light.
31 98 11 P Roger. I'll do that now.
31 08 20 P Roger. When I have put my ASCS 0.05g switch fuse on, my light comes green. Over.
31 08 28 CC Roger. Turn that fuse switch off and put your emergency 0.05g fuse switch on and check
(CNV) the light, please.
31 08 35 P Roger.
31 08 40 P With the ASCS 0.05g switch fuse off and emergency 0.05g switch fuse on, the light is not
green. Over.

433
HAWAII (TWENTIETH PASS)---Continued

31 0850 CC Roger. In the meantime, Hawaii will check T/M. Do not forget that we would like . . .
(CNV) fly-by-wire ....
31 0927 P You were cutting in and out. I didn't get any of that, over.
31 09 31 CC Okay. We will try it one more time .... Over.
(CNV)
31 09 57 P Roger. To go into auto and check for what?
31 10 00 CC •.. 0.05g.
(CNV)
31 10 08 P You were cut out.
31 10 11 CC Roger. We would like to have you check for the roll rate which occurs after 0.05g.
(CNV)
31 10 18 P Roger. Understand.
31 10 21 CC If you get this rate ....
(CNV)
31 15 22 P Retro temp is 80 [degrees]. Pitch down is 70 [degrees] ; pitch up is 65 [degrees). Yaw
left, 80 [degrees]; yaw right, 62 [degrees]. Roll counterclockwise, 72 [degrees]; roll
clockwise, 68 [degrees]. Auto peroxide tank, 80 [degrees] ; manual, 70 [degrees] ; reserve,
72 [degrees]. 250 inverter, 101 [degrees] ; 150 inverter, 121 [degrees] ; standby inverter,
98 [degrees].

CALIFORNIA (TWENTIETH PASS)

31 16 44 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, California Cap Com.


31 16 47 P Roger, California, Faith Seven. Loud and clear.
31 16 51 CC Be sure when you check for roll rate that the ASCS 0.05g fuse switch is in the on position.
31 16 59 P Roger.
31 17 03 CC • . •

31 17 08 P • I have both fuse switches in the on position. My ASCS a-c bus is powered. I'm going to
gyros slave. Now I understand I'm to go on to auto. Is that affirm?
31 17 26 CC Say again, Faith Seven.
31 17 28 P Roger. I have ASCS bus powered. Gyros are slaved, and now I understand that they
want me to go into auto and see if I get the roll rate. Over.
31 17 39 CC This is affirmative, Faith Seven.
31 17 42 P Roger. Then do I come right back off with it if I get the roll rate? Over.
31 17 46 CC • This is true. You can stop the capsule with the fly-by-wire.
31 17 50 P Roger. Going into auto, NOW. [31 17 52] T
31 17 58 P Roger. I do have the roll rate.

GUAYMAS (TWENTIETH PASS)

31 18 25 CC Guaymas, Cap Com.


31 18 26 P Go ahead, Guaymas. Faith Seven.
31 18 29 CC You can turn off the ASCS now.
(CAL)
Unreadable CC And turn the 0.05g ASCS fuse switch off and the ....
31 18 39 P Roger. I have my ASCS 0.05g switch fuse off, and I'm powering down the ASCS. Is that
affirmative?
31 18 49 CC Power down your ASCS.
31 18 53 P Roger. Powering down ASCS.
31 18 56 CC Cage your gyros.
31 18 57 P Roger. They are already caged.
31 19 01 CC Gyros caged. ASCS bus turned off.
31 19 04 P Roger.
31 19 13 P *Would you ask the Calm what do I have left now. I have aux damp, fly-by-wire, and
manual proportional; is that affirm, for retrofire?
31 19 46 CC • .. Com.
(CAL)
31 19 51 P Go ahead, Guaymas.
31 19 53 CC
( CAL )

434
GUAYMAS (TWENTIETH PASS)--C_ntinued

312005 P Roger. What are they recommending? Do you know?


31 20 II P Roger.
31 20 17 CC • . .

(CAL)
31 20 21 P Roger.

31 20 27 CC
° ° °
(CAL)
31 20 31 P Roger. No problem.
31 21 10 OC Gordo. This is your last pass over us.
(CAL)
31 21 15 P Roger. I'll see you in a couple of days.
31 21 18 CC Roger. You're doing an outstanding Job. I'm proud of you.
( CAL )
31 21 19 P Roger. Thank you, Gus.
31 21 23 CC Your friends in Mexico say adios.
(CAL)
31 21 25 P Roger. Muchas gracias. Muchas gracias. That's French for thank you.
31 21 37 CC The same.
(CAL)
31 54 25 P *Okay. Here I am at 31 54 28, now. Slow drift again in the nighttime. Still having
trouble with the cabin--with the suit heat-exchanger dome temp; got control of it here,
pretty close. Will fool around with it for about another 2 hours and some odd minutes.
31 55 18 P Everything looks good. I have 53 percent auto [fuel] and about 79 percent manual [fuel].
31 58 20 P Okay.
32 20 55 P I'm observing some cities through the clouds at 32 20, 32 21.
32 21 17 P Seeing out over Laos.

COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (TWENTY-FIRST PASS)

3222 O2 P Roger, CSQ Cap Com. Faith Seven here.


Unreadable CC
3222 18 P Roger, CSQ Cap Com. Faith Seven reading you.
32 22 23 P Roger. I read you, John.
32 22 38 CC Faith Seven, this is CSQ Cap Com. Answer if you read me on HF. Over.
32 23 01 P Roger, CSQ Cap Com. Faith Seven reading you.
32 23 07 CC CSQ Cap Corn, Roger. We're going to change your clock, Gordo, to keep you from doing
it. We have a list to copy here on this retro procedure. Are you ready for clock
command ? Over.
3223 16 P Roger. Go ahead.
32 23 19 CC Command, on. What we're doing is backing your clock off 1 hour. You'll still be able
to use minutes and seconds okay for retro. Over.
322327 P Okay.
32 23 29 CC Okay. Here is the list to copy. Over.
32 23 37 P Roger. Go ahead.
32 23 39 CC Roger. Also, before we start this, make sure C-band is on for Range" Tracker and also
T/M. Over.
32 23 46 P Roger. C-band and T/M are on.
32 23 55 CC Roger. Okay, are you ready to copy ?
32 23 58 P Roger. Go.
3224 00 CC Roger, number 1 is attitude permission bypass.
32 24 09 P Go.
3224 11 CC Attitude permission bypass is number 1. Do you acknowledge?
32 24 14 P Roger. I got that. Go ahead.
3224 16 CC Roger. Retroroeket arm switch, manual.
3224 21 P Roger. Got that.
32 24 24 CC Roger. Fly-by-wire thrust select switch, high and low.
32 24 32 P Roger. Got it.
32 24 33 CC Roger. Retrosequence fuse switch, number 2.
322440 P Roger. Got it.

435
COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (TWENTY-FIRST PASS)----Continued

32 24 43 CC Roger. Retromanual fuse switch, number 2.


32 24 49 P Roger.
32 24 51 _C Roger. ASCS a-c bus switch, on.
32 24 P Roger.
32 24 56 CC ASCS 0.05g fuse switch, number 1.
32 25 O4 P Roger.
32 25 O6 CC ASCS control switch, select.
32 25 16 P Roger.
32 25 18 CC Mode select switch, off.
32 25 25 P Roger.
32 25 27 CC Manual handle, push on.
32 25 34 P Roger.
32 25 37 CC Roger. That will put you on manual. If you want to go fly-by-wire all you'd have to do
is pull the manual handle off and your mode select to fly-by-wire. Roger.
32 25 45 P That's affirm.

32 25 46 CC Roger, okay. Squib arm will come on at retrofire minus 5 seconds.


32 25 57 P Roger.
32 25 59 CC Roger. And I will count down to retrofire with the Cape so you can hear. Over.
32 26 O4 P Roger, and I'll manually use fire retro then. Is that affirmed?
32 26 O9 CC Roger. The next step is to depress fire retro override ; in other words, push the fire button.
Over.
32 26 14 P Roger. Understand.
32 26 16 CC Roger. Now, if you have no retros, you can use as a backup, the following. If there are
no retros, the next procedure would be used as a backup.
32 26 26 P Okay.
32 26 29 CC Hold just a second. What does your clock read now? Over.
32 26 34 P Time to retrograde 01 31 50 now.
32 26 40 CC Say, your clock setting should read 34 59 52. Over.
32 26 47 P Negative. It does not.
32 26 50 CC Roger. Did you copy 34 59 52? Over.
32 26 58 P Roger, 34 59 52.
32 27 01 CC Roger. You can set it yourself after leaving station here. I think we should get the rest
of this procedure now. Over.
32 27 06 P Roger.
32 27 09 CC Roger. If you have no retros, use--if you get no retros--use as backup the following:
number 1, retro delay to instant.
32 27 21 P Roger.
32 27 22 CC Press retrosequence button.
32 27 24 P Roger.
32 27 26 CC Okay. Some additional precautions. The retrojettison will have to be done manually.
32 27 31 P Roger.
32 27 32 CC Be sure that you do not arm the retrojettison switch until after the rockets have fired.
Over.
32 27 38 P Roger. Don't worry.
32 27 39 CC Yeah, I'm with you. You'll probably not get a fire retro telelight, but we should get them
okay here on the ground. Over.
32 27 47 P Roger.
32 27 48 CC Okay. Hold your retroattitude until jettison retro. Keep rates as low as possible,
maintaining visual reference as aid for low rates ; and at your nominal 0.05g time, select
reentry mode.
32 28 03 P Roger.
32 28 04 CC That reentry mode of selection should be at about 34 09 19.
32 28 11 P Roger.
32 28 14 CC Okay. You'll come up on ASCS, go on auto with ASCS continuous, switch for your 0.05g,
and then your reentry. Over.
32 28 _6 P Roger.
32 28 27 CC Okay. That's the whole works now. Also go cabin fan normal now and your cabin control
valve to 3.0. Over.
32 28 35 P Roger. I already have it on.
32 28 4O P What's wrong with reentering on aux damp on the reentry portion.

436
COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (TWENTY-FIRST PASS)---Continued

32 28 46 CC Say again, Gordo.


32 28 48 P Never mind, I'm losing you. Let's go UHF.
32 28 51 CC Roger. Okay, see if you can get that 34 59 52 set up before you leave our telemetry.
Over.
32 28 59 P Roger, will do.
32 29 31 P Roger. 34 59 52.
32 29 40 CC Roger, Faith Seven. I have you at 34%59%52. Over.
32 29 45 P That's affirmative.
32 30 09 CC Faith Seven, CSQ. If you receive, switch to HF. Over.
32 30 20 P Roger. Reading you loud and clear now, John.
32 30 23 CC You came back in loud and clear then. We have your clock setting 34 59 52. That's
correct.
32 30 29 P That is affirmative.
32 30 32 P That's 1 hour off, right?
32 30 34 CC Say again, Faith Seven.
32 30 36 P That's 1 hour beyond, right?
32 30 37 CC That's correct. When we count down, we'll use minutes and seconds only. Over.
32 30 42 P Okay.
32 30 45 CC They'll check you on this--on later in this pass. Over. We should be ready next time
around.
32 30 50 P Roger.
32 31 04 P Is that next time around or the time after that?
32 31 O9 CC Say again.
32 31 10 P Roger. That is the next time around, is it not?
32 31 13 CC That is correct; next time around when we see you, I will be firing.
32 31 17 P Roger.
32 31 23 CC What is your attitude? Are you in drift now, Gordo?
32 31 26 P That's affirmative.

HAWAII (TWENTY-FIRST PASS)

32 40 42 CC Hello Faith Seven, Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Do you read?
32 40 46 P Roger, Hawaii Cap Com, Faith Seven. Loud and clear.
32 40 49 CC Roger, Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com recommend take a green as for go now and go over
your stowage checklist now.., did you copy ?
32 41 03 P Roger. I'm practically all stowed right now.
32 41 09 CC Say again, Faith Seven.
32 41 11 P I'm practically completed with my stowage checklist now.
32 41 15 CC Roger. You understand to take green for go, at this time?
32 41 19 P To take what?
32 41 21 CC Green for go. Take green for go at this time.
32 41 25 P Roger, I understand. A green for go, will do.
32 41 31 CC Roger. Zanzibar will go over this checklist that you copied from John. and John will
help you with the retrofire time. Also do you understand that the time in your clock
now is retrofire time -}-1 hour? You should read at retrofire 01 00 00.
32 41 55 P Roger. Understand.
32 41 58 CC Roger. What's your PCO_ reading please ?
32 42 02 P * Roger, PCO_ is about 2½ [mm Hg] now.
32 42 19 CC PC02 is 2.5. Is that right?
32 42 21 P That's affirmative.
32 42 48 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com.
32 42 52 P Go ahead, Hawaii.
32 42 56 CC We want the retrofire checklist completed over the Atlantic with the exception of your
squib switch which you can get at retrofire--5 sec.
32 43 07 P Roger. I intend to have it completed before then.
32 43 23 CC Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. I'm sure you're familiar with the star pattern you'll be using
during the retrofire.
32 43 32 P Roger.
32 44 21 CC Faith Seven. Hawaii Cap Com. Everything looks good on the ground. You might keep
your eye on the PCO_. What is your visor position?

437
HAWAII (TWENTY-FIRST PASS)--Continued

32 44 29 P Roger. My visor is open and I'm breathing off the cabin.


32 44 32 CC Roger.
32 44 34 P I'm going to emergency rate on my oxygen for a moment just to see if it's the gage, or if
it actually is building up a little.
32 44 42 CC Roger. Understand emergency flow rate at this time? [Tone noted.]
32 45 03 P Roger. It does not seem to be decreasnig on the gage, so it must be the gage error.
32 45 10 CC Roger. We're reading an increase on the ground as well.
32 45 23 P I'm back on normal oxygen rate.
32 45 27 CC Understand, back on normal.
32 45 3O P Roger, fans are running.
[Standby a-c auto warning tone occurs at 33 03 09] v
33 05 43 P Well, things are beginning to stack up a little. ASCS inverter is acting up, and my CO2
is building up in the suit. Partial pressure of O_ is decreasing in the cabin. Standby
inverter won't come on the line. Other than that, things are fine.
P All right, I've checked that.

ZANZIBAR (TWENTY-SECOND PASS)

33 33 14 CC Faith Seven, this is Zanzibar Cap Com. How do you read?


33 33 18 P Roger, Zanzibar. Faith Seven reading you loud and clear.
33 33 21 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com. Let's start your checklist here.
33 33 28 P Roger, go ahead.
33 33 29 CC One item has been added. Verify visor is closed.
33 33 36 P *Negative, visor is not closed at the moment ; I have a high CO2 rate in suit.
33 33 47 CC Item number 1 on the checklist now reads : cage gyro and remain caged throughout reentry.
33 33 58 P Roger. I have an item for you. My ASCS a-c inverter has failed ; so I will be making a
manual reentry.
33 3409 CC ASC S inverter has failed ?
33 34 12 P That is affirmative.
33 34 14 CC Roger. Let's continue this checklist now. Attitude permission bypass, bypass position.
33 34 21 P *Roger. Bypass.
33 34 23 CC Retrorocket arm switch manual?
33 34 26 P Roger, on manual.
33 34 28 CC *Fly-by-wire thrust selector switch, high-low.
333434 P Roger on high and low.
33 34 36 CC Retrosequence fuse switch number 2.
33 34 39 P Number 2.
33 3442 CC Retromanual fuse switch number 2.
33 3446 P Number 2.
33 34 47 CC ASCS bus switch on.
33 3451 P ASCS a-c bus is off.
33 34 53 CC Roger. ASCS 0.05g fuse switch to number 1 position.
33 34 59 P On number 1.
33 3501 CC ASCS control switch select.
3335O4 P On Select.
33 35 07 CC Mode select switch off.
33 35 08 P Mode select off.
33 35 11 CC Manual handle push on.
33 35 14 P Manual handle is on.
33 35 16 CC *Right. Squib arm at retro minus 5 seconds.
33 35 27 P Roger.
33 35 28 CC And that will occur in approximately 25 minutes.
33 35 31 P Roger, I understand.
33 35 35 CC Have you tried the standby inverter on ASCS bus?
33 35 38 P Roger, the standby inverter will not start.
33 35 41 CC The standby inverter will not start.
33 35 43 P That is affirmative.
33 3545 CC Roger. Cape Flight advises you believe your CO2 partial gauge in the capsule, as this
was confirmed over Hawaii. \
33 36 05 P Cape advises what?

438
ZANZIBAR (TWENTY-SECOND PASS)--Conttnued

33 36 09 CC We will advise you at this time. You have sufficient oxygen in to continue on emergency
rate from now- through reentry if required.
33 36 17 P Ah, Roger. I understand.
33 36 22 CC Shall we go over the retro backup?
33 36 26 P Negative• I have that straight• I'll just go to retrofire to instantaneous and punch
retrosequence.
33 36 35 CC That is correct. You trove the other additional precautions.
33 36 47 P Negative. What's that?
33 36 48 CC Retrojettison must be done manually.
33 36 52 P Oh, roger, roger. I have those.
33 36 53 CC Retrojettison switch to arm, after rockets fired.
33 36 58 P Roger. I have that.
33 37 03 CC You will probably not get a fire retro telelight.
33 37 06 P Roger.
33 37 08 CC Ground should be able to confirm, though.
33 37 11 P Roger.
33 37 31 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
33 37 34 P Go ahead Zanzibar, Faith Seven.
33 37 36 CC *We've had about 3-percent rise on the CO: partial. Do you think it is advisable to purge
again at this time?
33 37 47 P Negative. It seems to be holding pretty steady over what it has been.
33 37 51 CC Roger. We're getting very poor air-ground communications at this time.
33 37 56 P Roger.
33 38 09 CC • . . Faith Seven. Zanzibar Cap Com.
33 38 12 P Go ahead, Zanzibar. Faith Seven.
33 38 14 CC We would advise the visor be closed prior to retrofire.
33 38 20 P Roger, it will be.
33 38 35 CC Faith Seven, Zanzibar Cap Com.
33 38 38 P Go ahead.
33 38 39 CC Cape advises closing visor.
33 38 42 P Roger.
33 38 44 CC Do you confirm.
33 38 46 P Roger. Will close visor. Visor is closed and locked.
33 39 02 CC Roger, visor is closed and locked. Continue to watch that PCO_ meter and if it rises, go
on emergency rate.
33 39 10 P Roger.

COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (TWENTY-SECOND PASS)

33 56 25 P CSQ Cap Com, Faith Seven. Over.


33 57 03 CC Hello, Faith Seven, CSQ Cap Com. Over.
33 5706 P Roger, CSQ Cap Com. Faith Seven in retroattitude. Checklist complete.
33 57 16 P Roger, CSQ Cap Corn, Faith Seven.
33 57 19 CC Faith Seven, CSQ Cap Com. Roger. You're sounding good. How's that check test? All
complete?
33 57 24 P Roger. All complete except for squib.
33 57 26 CC Roger. How's the window attitude? Check okay?
33 57 30 P Roger. Right on the old gazoo.
33 57 32 CC That's the way, boy.
33 57 34 CC *Okay. Our procedure, Gordo. I'll give you the 1-minute hack before retrofire and then
I'll give you a 10-second countdown to what would normally be retrosequence. This time
there will just be a countdown to a 30-second point and then a 10-second countdown to
retrofire and at the 5 point tell you to arm squib.
33 57 53 P Roger. That's fine.
33 57 54 CC Roger.
33 57 59 CC How's your PCO2 doing?
33 58 02 P Oh, its coming on up• And my ASCS inverter has failed, few other little odds and ends.
33 58 09 CC Okay. Roger.
33 58 11 P *I'll shoot the retros on manual, and I'll reenter on fly-by-wire.
33 58 18 CC Roger. Okay.

439
COASTAL SENTRY QUEBEC (TWENTY-SECOND PASS )--Continued

33 58 20 P I'm looking for a lot of experience on this flight.


33 58 23 CC You're going to get it.
33 58 26 CC Okay, we've got the beginning of the 1-minute period and about 25 seconds here.
33 58 31 P Roger.
33 58 48 CC Okay. One minute to go on my mark. Stand by.
33 58 54 CC MARK. [33 58 54] T
33 59 00 CC Did you get that?
33 59 O3 P Roger. I got it.
33 59 O4 CC Roger. I'll give you a 10-second count here down to the 30-second point.
33 59 08 P Roger.
33 59 14 CC 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. Thirty [33 59 24] T seconds.
33 59 30 CC Okay. The next 10-second count will be a countdown to _our manual retro. Over.
33 59 35 P Roger.
33 59 44 CC 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, squib arm. 4, 3, 2, 1, fire [33 59 53] T. Roger. A green one here.
34 00 13 P Roger. I think I got all three.
34 00 16 CC Roger. How did your attitude hold, Gordo?
34 00 18 P Well, pretty fine.
34 00 20 CC Good show, boy, real fine. Looks like they came off right on the money on time.
34 00 25 P Roger, I think so.
34 00 28 CC *Roger. Very good. On the next mark at 60 seconds from that retro, you should jettison
retros ; and you'll do that one manually, right?
34 00 37 p Roger.
34 00 40 CC Got any estimate on your attitude hold, in any axis how far you drifted off on retro ? Over.
34 00 45 P No, I sure don't. I held it relatively close, John, but I couldn't guess.
34 00 52 CC That's the way to do it. Just too close to tell any error. Good head.
34 00 55 P Ha, ha. No, I wouldn't say that.
3400 59 CC Roger. You can go ahead and jettison retros and time.
34 01 01 P Roger. Jettisoning retros.
34 01 09 P And off they came.
34 01 14 CC We have your signal.
3401 17 P Roger.
34 01 18 CC *Okay. Dealers choice on reentry here, fly-by-wire or manual. I think you said, you're
coming back in fly-by-wire ?
34 01 28 P Roger. I think I'll come back in fly-by-wire.
34 01 31 CC Roger, okay. You can hold retroattitude now for a while here. If you wanted to hold
your attitude more close by llolding retroattitude until you get a little closer to 0.05g.
34 01 43 CC Your 0.05g is 34 09 19. Just before you get to that, you can come up to your zero reentry
attitude. Over.
34 01 51 P Roger.
34 01 53 CC And you can establish roll at that time also.
34 01 56 P Roger.
3402 01 P *What was the time on establishing that?
34 02 O6 CC *34 09 19. That is your 0.05g time.
3402 11 P Roger.
34 02 14 CC Just a little bit before that you could Come on up to zero zero.
34 02 20 P Roger.
34 02 31 CC Roger. Keep your rates down, keep your rates as near zero as you can.
34 02 36 P Roger. Will do.
34 02 49 CC *It's been a real fine flight, Gordo. Real beautiful all the way. Have a cool reentry,
will you?
34 02 55 P Roger, John. Thank you.
34 03 24 CC Faith Seven, CSQ.
34O3 27 P Roger, CSQ.
34 03 28 CC ASCS 0.05g switch fuse to the off position. Over.
34 03 33 P Roger. 0.05g switch fuse to the off position.
34 03 37 CC Roger.
34 03 42 P Roger.

440
RANGE TRACKING SHIP (TWENTY-SECOND PASS)

34 08 21 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, Faith Seven, this is RTK M and O [Maintenance and Opera-
tions]. How copy?
34 08 27 P Roger, Faith Seven. Reading you loud and clear.
34 08 30 CC * Roger, RTK here. I have landing area weather for you. Ready to copy?
34 08 34 P Roger.
HAWAII (TWENTY-SECOND PASS)

34 13 07 CC Faith Seven, Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Do you read?


34 13 11 P Roger.
34 13 13 CC Faith Seven. What is your status?
34 13 16 P Roger. Doing fine.
34 13 21 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Say your status. Over.
34 13 25 P Roger. Faith Seven is doing fine. Reentering.
34 13 29 CC Roger. Is your altimeter off the peg yet? Over.
34 13 33 P Roger.
34.13 36 CC Say your altitude: say your altitude.
34 13 38 P Roger, 95,000 [feet].
34 13 43 CC Roger. Understand 8_5. Are you standing by for the drogue at 40,000 [feet] ?
34 13 49 P Roger.
34 13 50 CC We have tops of cloud in recovery area at about 36,000 feet.
34 13 58 CC There is a 0.5 cloud coverage at 1,500 feet. 5 to 6 foot waves. Surface wind, 15 knots from
085 degrees. Stand by for your recovery time. Did you copy?
34 14 15 P Roger, you'll have to wait a minute, I'm just hanging on here now.
34 14 21 CC Roger, Faith Seven. Say again your last.
34 14 31 P I got a drogue.
34 14 34 CC Understand, drogue is out.
34 14 35 P Roger.
34 14 42 CC *Think I got a--an oral report of drogue out. Stand by.
34 14 52 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Is your drogue out at this time?
34 14 55 P Roger, drogue is out.
34 14 59 CC Checklist follows. Snorkel ring at 20,000 feet. Landing-bag switch to auto. Recovery
arm switch, manual. Fuel jettison fuse switch, number 1. Fuel cross-feed handle, push
on. Roll, yaw, pitch, T-handles push on. Position the T/M switch, your option. ASCS
select switch should be off. And give me the status on your fuel dump. Over.
34 15 47 P Fuel is dumped2
34 15 50 CC Understand fuel is dumped. Pressure regulator handle should be pulled.
34 16 03 P Roger. I have a good main.
34 16 07 CC Say again, Faith Seven.
34 16 09 P Roger, I have a good main chute.
34 16 11 CC Good main chute, good show.
34 16 14 P Roger, landing bag is down and green.
34 16 15 CC Repeat, please?
34 16 16 P Landing bag is down and green.
34 16 17 CC Understand the landing bag is green. What is your rate of descent?
34 16 28 P About 34 feet per second.
34 16 31 CC Everything looks good, preparation for impact. Urine transfer shutoff valve closed.
Transfer hose, disconnect. Blood pressure hose, disconnect. Aeromed connector, dis-
connect. Helmet outlet hose, disconnect.
34 16 59 CC Faith, are you staying with me, Gordo?
34 17 02 P Roger, I've got my list right here, Scott.
34 17 06 CC Say again, Gordo.
34 17 11 CC Roger, helmet should be unlocked and opened.
34 17 19 CC Temperature probe should be disconnected.
34 17 24 CC Unfasten your helmet neck-ring seal.
34 17 31 C(_ Tighten your straps.
34 17 36 CC Lock the shoulder reel harness.
34 17 41 CC Stand by for impact.
34 17 45 P Roger.

Pilot subsequently informed editor that he meant to say "fuel dump is armed." The rapidity of events at this momemt
precluded his rendition of a corrective statement to Cap Com.

+o7-o_ o-_6_--29 441


HAWAII (TWENTY-SECOND PASS )--Continued

34 17 47 CC Are there any recovery aircraft on air-to-ground now?


34 17 52 P Negative.
34 17 56 CC This is Hawaii Cap Com. Understand you are in communication with recovery aircraft,
is that correct ?
34 18 02 P Negative. Negative, I am not. Over.
34 18 09 CC We'll stay with you then.
"34 18 19 CC Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. [USS] Kearsarge has visual contact with you at this time, over.
34 18 25 P Roger, thank you. That sounds good.
34 18 29 CC Good show, pal.
34 18 43 CC Faith Seven, Hawaii Cap Com. Say your altitude.
34 18 47 P Roger. 4,000 feet.
34 18 49 CC 4,000, your preimpact check is complete. Is that correct ?
34 18 53 P Roger.
34 18 55 CC Understand preimpact checklist is complete.
34 19 00 P Roger. Fuel is jettisoned and all T-handles are in.

RECOVERY (TWENTY-SECOND PASS)

34 19 04 R1 Hello Astro. This is 1 Indian Gal. Over.


34 19 07 P Roger, this is Astro. Go ahead.
34 19 10 R1 Roger, 1 Indian Gal. We are circling you at about 500 feet; you're coming down very
nicely. Sea state is about 5- to S-foot waves, a few white caps. Wind is just perfect
for a helo [helicopter] operation. The carrier [USS Kearsarge] is about 5 miles away.
34 19 31 P Roger.
34 19 42 R1 Astro, you are swaying just a little bit, looks like ai)out a 50 or rather, correction, a
30-foot sway. You're coming down very nicely. You are presently about 1,000 feet.
The wind is from the southwest at ahout 12 knots, perhaps 15.
34 20 06 P Roger, understand.
34 20 14 R1 Astro, 1 Indian Gal. How do you feel? Over.
34 20 17 P Roger, Fm in fine shape. Excellent.
34 20 22 R1 Thank you Astro. This is Indian Gal. We still are circling you very nicely. You're
now steadying up quite nicely, about 400 feet. You are passing my starboard side.
34 20 35 P Roger.
34 20 36 R1 Have three helos right around you. Got the swimmers with me. They'll be out just
about the time you're setting down on the water.
34 20 44 P Roger.
34 20 47 R1 The carrier is only about 3 miles away. Couldn't be a nicer shot.
34 20 50 P But I missed that third elevator.
34 20 53 R1 Now you are in the water in good shape.
34 20 57 R1 Your parachute is still with you. Chute has spilled and is in the water.
34 21 09 R1 Collar in the water.
34 21 15 P Roger.
34 21 23 R1 Your dye markers out now, Astro. Looks nice. I'm coming in now for the swimmers.
34 21 39 R1 Astro, your capsule is on the side. The capsule parachute did not deploy.
34 21 46 P Roger.
34 21 49 R1 Now your capsule is coming up nicely. It's sitting at about a 30-degree angle on the water.
34 21 55 P Okay.
34 21 56 R1 You look pretty good.
34 22 02 R1 I'm on top over you, directly overhead. Your capsule is now erected nicely. You're bounc-
ing on the sea. I notice now that the parachute has released. I'm now going to drop
the swimmers.
34 22 14 P Roger. Hold them clear a minute and I'll get the HF antenna up.
34 22 38 K Astro, from Begonia on Kearsarge. How do you read me? Over.
34 22 43 P Roger, Begonia, Faith Seven. Read you loud and clear. Over.
34 22 47 K Roger, how you feeling? Over.
34 22 50 P Fine, couldn't be better.
34 22 52 R1 Astro, all the swimmers are out. The first one is on your capsule now. He's pounding. Do
you hear him? Over.
34 22 57 P Roger, good shape. [ Shouting to swimmers.]
34 23 13 P Hello dahr, how are you? [Shouting to swimmers.]

442
RECOVERY (TWt_NTY-SECOND PASS)--Continued

34 23 17 K Gordon, this is Begonia. We estimate approximately 45 minutes to have you on deck on


Kearsarge. Please advise your wishes and any info this subject. Over.
34 23 33 P I'm okay. I'll wait on the boat. [Shouting to swimmers.]
34 23 37 P I'm in good shape.
* [Nonflight-related transmission omitted.]
34 23 45 R1 Astro, this is 1 Indian Gal. Do you hear the swimmers? Over.
34 23 52 P I just had my helmet off talking to the swimmers.
34 23 54 R1 Roger. I see you don't have smoke. Apparently, you are all right. What is--Begonia
desires to know--what your desires about being picked up. O{'er.
34 24 O2 P Roger. I'd like to come aboard the carrier if they will grant me permission for an Air
Force troop.
34 24 O6 R1 *Roger. Begonia, this is 1 Indian Gal. Gordon Cooper desires to come on board the carrier
if they will let an Air Force Officer aboard. Over.
34 24 18 K Roger. Permission granted, of course, and I don't know whether he heard me before or
not. Estimate about 45 minutes to have him on deck. Over.
34 24 30 R1 *Major, Begonia estimates 45 minutes for your on-deck time. What are your desires?
Over.
34 24 37 P Roger. I'll wait to go on board. Over.
34 24 40 R1 Roger, understand that you desire pickup by Wildcat ....
34 24 44 P Thank you, sir. No, negative. I'll wait and go on board the carrier. Begonia did you
read ? Over.
34 24 47 R1 Roger. I understand you will be hoisted by the carrier. Begonia did you read? Over.
34 24 53 K This is Begona. I copy. Out.
34 25 00 K Indian Gai 1, Begonia. What status on collar? Over.
34 25 05 R1 Roger, collar is about half way around. The swimmers are in the water nicely. The
capsule is working well.
34 25 12 K Roger.
34 25 14 R1 The parachute was a little delayed in deploying. It it now riding very nicely in the water.
34 25 26 ? Roger, Wildcat, Tea Kettle 222. Go ....
34 25 31 R1 *They attached the collar just about all the way around. The sea state is the same as
the ship.
34 25 39 R1 The collar--the capsule looks like it's riding at about a 20-degree angle. Quite steady in
the water.
34 26 13 R2 One from two.
34 26 15 R1 One. Over.
34 26 16 R2 *Roger. Swimmers desire to save chute. Shall I deploy swimmers? Over.
34 26 20 R1 *This is one. I)on't deploy swimmers at this time. The boat looks like it will pick up
the chute. It is close enough.
34 26 29 R2 Roger.
34 26 30 R1 Wildcat, the collar now looks like it is all the way around the capsule. It's just about to
be inflated.
34 26 37 R1 The swimmers are still with it. The chute is still floating next to the capsule. They
don't look like they are having any difficulty. Looks like a normal operation.
34 26 49 K This is Begonia. Roger, out.
34 26 52 R1 *The collar is now inflated fully.
34 26 56 R1 It has picked the capsule up nicely. It is now erect, and the swimmers are making final
adjustments.
34 27 06 K Begonia. Roger, out.
34 27 08 P Sorry, I missed that third elevator, Begonia.
34 27 12 R1 Begonia, Gordon Cooper says he's sorry he missed the third elevator.
34 27 18 K I think it's a quite acceptable shot, Major.
34 27 25 P Thank you.
34 27 33 R1 Begonia, the swimmers are now hanging on to the collar. It is fully inflated; the capsule
is upright. The capsule looks like it's _iding very nicely in the water, just going up
and down slightly on the 5- to 8-foot waves. There are a few white caps around, but
they are not breaking over the tower.
34 27 57 R1 Looks like a normal operation, and they are just waiting for him.

443
RECOVERY (TWENTY-SECOND PASS)--Continued

34 28 07 K * This is Begonia. Gordon, are you in conmmnication with the swimmers at this time?
Over.
34 28 14 P I can yell to them through the hatch here.
34 28 18 K I understand that y_,u can hear them through the hatch. Is that correct?
34 28 21 P Roger, we can communicate by yelling back and forth, I believe.
34 28 26 K Roger. Out.
34 28 42 K Major Cooper, from the USS Kearsarge, welcome to the Pacific. Good landing.
34 29 01 R1 *Major, the Kcarsargc is now making a down base leg. They are going to make a normal
180 approach to you. They are about 2 miles away coming down wind. They will start
their turn into your position in about 10 minutes.
34 29 17 P Roger. Very fine.
34 29 19 P Hello. How are you doing? I'm fine. Okay. How arP you? [Shouting to swimmers.]
34 29 36 K Major, they estimate your miss at 3,900 yards. Looks like a re<,ord.
34 29 43 P Say again, sir. Say again, I was talking to the swimmers.
34 29 47 K Roger. You missed by 3,900 yards, very acceptable.
34 29 51 P Thank you.
24 _99 54 P What? I'll wait on the carrier. What? [To swimmers.]
34 30 05 R1 Two, this is One. Looks like the parachute is sunk now, I don't see it anymore. There
is a small drogue chute still.., upwind of the green dye.
34 30 15 K Delighted to have you back in the Pacific and congratulations on a wonderful, wonderful
ride.
34 30 23 P What ? Yeah, I'll wait on the carrier. [To swimmers.]
34 30 32 K Gordon, this is Begonia. John Graham will be on this line and be stationed down near
the hangar--near the elevator--about the time that we pick you up. Thought I would
alert you that he will be on the line to talk to you just before you get out. Over.
34 30 52 P Roger. Fine.
34 31 00 K Is there anything we can do in preparation ....

444
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

During the life of the Mercury Project, several million people have un-
selfishly contributed their knowledge_ skill_ and ingenuity to make this pioneer-
ing space project a successful national effort. The people came from all walks
of life; they came from government agencies, from industrial organizations,
and from many educational institutions. Also_ valuable cooperation has been
received from a number of people and governments of other nations to enable
the accomplishment of the essential support activities around the earth. Each
person is to be commended for his untiring efforts and his unfaltering faith in
the ultimate successful fulfillment of the objectives of the project.

ROBERT R. GILRUTH
D/rector

U.S, GOVERNMENT PRiNTiNG OFFICE : 1963 O_707-056


FREEDOM
7
LIBERTY
BELL
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