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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990
JOSE SONGCO, ROMEO CIPRES, and AMANCIO MANUEL, petitioners,
vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), LABOR ARBITER FLAVIO AGUAS, and F.E. ZUELLIG (M),
INC., respondents.
Raul E. Espinosa for petitioners.
Lucas Emmanuel B. Canilao for petitioner A. Manuel.
Atienza, Tabora, Del Rosario & Castillo for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV20840-78-T entitled, "Jose Songco and Romeo Cipres, Complainants-Appellants, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee" and
NLRC Case No. RN- IV-20855-78-T entitled, "Amancio Manuel, Complainant-Appellant, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee,"
which dismissed the appeal of petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering private respondent to
pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of
service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred to as Zuellig) filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4)
an application seeking clearance to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres, and Amancio Manuel
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners) allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. This application was seasonably
opposed by petitioners alleging that the company is not suffering from any losses. They alleged further that they are being dismissed
because of their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case, however, petitioners manifested that they are no longer
contesting their dismissal. The parties then agreed that the sole issue to be resolved is the basis of the separation pay due to
petitioners. Petitioners, who were in the sales force of Zuellig received monthly salaries of at least P40,000. In addition, they received
commissions for every sale they made.
The collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between Zuellig and F.E. Zuellig Employees Association, of which petitioners are
members, contains the following provision (p. 71, Rollo):
ARTICLE XIV Retirement Gratuity
Section l(a)-Any employee, who is separated from employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off
not due to the fault of said employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to
one (1) month's salary per year of service. One month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent
to the salary at date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at
least six months being considered one year, including probationary employment. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code then prevailing provides:
Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. The termination of employment of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving-devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, and other similar causes, shall entitle the employee
affected thereby to separation pay. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and other similar causes, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, Sections 9(b) and 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code provide:
xxx

Sec. 9(b). Where the termination of employment is due to retrechment initiated by the employer to prevent losses or
other similar causes, or where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by
law or is prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employee shall be entitled to termination
pay equivalent at least to his one month salary, or to one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
xxx
Sec. 10. Basis of termination pay. The computation of the termination pay of an employee as provided herein shall
be based on his latest salary rate, unless the same was reduced by the employer to defeat the intention of the Code,
in which case the basis of computation shall be the rate before its deduction. (Emphasis supplied)
On June 26,1978, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 78, Rollo):
RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, respondent should be as it is hereby, ordered to pay the complainants
separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of
service that they have worked with the company.
SO ORDERED.
The appeal by petitioners to the National Labor Relations Commission was dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
On June 2, 1980, the Court, acting on the verified "Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of Petition dated April 7, 1980 filed
by petitioner Romeo Cipres, based on the ground that he wants "to abide by the decision appealed from" since he had "received, to his
full and complete satisfaction, his separation pay," resolved to dismiss the petition as to him.
The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the
purpose of computation of their separation pay.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of separation pay due them, whether under the Labor Code or
the CBA, their basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added together. They cited Article 97(f) of the Labor
Code which includes commission as part on one's salary, to wit;
(f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being
expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other
method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten
contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair
and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily
furnished by the employer to the employee. 'Fair reasonable value' shall not include any profit to the employer or to
any person affiliated with the employer.
Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor Code as well as its implementing rules to include commission in the
computation of separation pay, it could have explicitly said so in clear and unequivocal terms. Furthermore, in the definition of the term
"wage", "commission" is used only as one of the features or designations attached to the word remuneration or earnings.
Insofar as the issue of whether or not allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation
of their separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case of Santos v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76721, September 21, 1987,
154 SCRA 166, where We ruled that "in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of the basic
salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living allowances." This ruling was reiterated in Soriano v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124 and recently, in Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78524, January
20, 1989.
We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or not earned sales commission should be included in the monthly salary of
petitioner for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.
Article 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in the definition of the term "wage". It has been repeatedly declared by the
courts that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or construction; there is only
room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, G.R. Nos. 24116-17, August 22, 1968, 24 SCRA 708;
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. L-2 7455, June 28,1973, 51 SCRA 381). A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and

any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity. How ever, it may be argued that if We correlate Article 97(f) with
Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules,
there appears to be an ambiguity. In this regard, the Labor Arbiter rationalized his decision in this manner (pp. 74-76, Rollo):
The definition of 'wage' provided in Article 96 (sic) of the Code can be correctly be (sic) stated as a general definition.
It is 'wage ' in its generic sense. A careful perusal of the same does not show any indication that commission is part of
salary. We can say that commission by itself may be considered a wage. This is not something novel for it cannot be
gainsaid that certain types of employees like agents, field personnel and salesmen do not earn any regular daily,
weekly or monthly salaries, but rely mainly on commission earned.
Upon the other hand, the provisions of Section 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the implementing rules in conjunction with
Articles 273 and 274 (sic) of the Code specifically states that the basis of the termination pay due to one who is
sought to be legally separated from the service is 'his latest salary rates.
x x x.
Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use 'monthly pay or monthly salary'.
The above terms found in those Articles and the particular Rules were intentionally used to express the intent of the
framers of the law that for purposes of separation pay they mean to be specifically referring to salary only.
.... Each particular benefit provided in the Code and other Decrees on Labor has its own pecularities and nuances
and should be interpreted in that light. Thus, for a specific provision, a specific meaning is attached to simplify matters
that may arise there from. The general guidelines in (sic) the formation of specific rules for particular purpose. Thus,
that what should be controlling in matters concerning termination pay should be the specific provisions of both Book
VI of the Code and the Rules. At any rate, settled is the rule that in matters of conflict between the general provision
of law and that of a particular- or specific provision, the latter should prevail.
On its part, the NLRC ruled (p. 110, Rollo):
From the aforequoted provisions of the law and the implementing rules, it could be deduced that wage is used in its
generic sense and obviously refers to the basic wage rate to be ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission
basis or other method of calculating the same. It does not, however, mean that commission, allowances or analogous
income necessarily forms part of the employee's salary because to do so would lead to anomalies (sic), if not absurd,
construction of the word "salary." For what will prevent the employee from insisting that emergency living allowance,
13th month pay, overtime, and premium pay, and other fringe benefits should be added to the computation of their
separation pay. This situation, to our mind, is not the real intent of the Code and its rules.
We rule otherwise. The ambiguity between Article 97(f), which defines the term 'wage' and Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules, which mention the terms "pay" and
"salary", is more apparent than real. Broadly, the word "salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or
industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it
carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. Indeed, there is eminent authority for holding that the words
"wages" and "salary" are in essence synonymous (Words and Phrases, Vol. 38 Permanent Edition, p. 44 citing Hopkins vs. Cromwell,
85 N.Y.S. 839,841,89 App. Div. 481; 38 Am. Jur. 496). "Salary," the etymology of which is the Latin word "salarium," is often used
interchangeably with "wage", the etymology of which is the Middle English word "wagen". Both words generally refer to one and the
same meaning, that is, a reward or recompense for services performed. Likewise, "pay" is the synonym of "wages" and "salary" (Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.). Inasmuch as the words "wages", "pay" and "salary" have the same meaning, and commission is included in
the definition of "wage", the logical conclusion, therefore, is, in the computation of the separation pay of petitioners, their salary base
should include also their earned sales commissions.
The aforequoted provisions are not the only consideration for deciding the petition in favor of the petitioners.
We agree with the Solicitor General that granting, in gratia argumenti, that the commissions were in the form of incentives or
encouragement, so that the petitioners would be inspired to put a little more industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them, still
these commissions are direct remuneration services rendered which contributed to the increase of income of Zuellig . Commission is
the recompense, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is
calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., citing
Weiner v. Swales, 217 Md. 123, 141 A.2d 749, 750). The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of
remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that commission are part of petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice
of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, are
part of petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact that some salesman do not received any basic salary but depend
on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists. Bearing in mind the
preceeding dicussions, if we adopt the opposite view that commissions, do not form part of wage or salary, then, in effect, We will be
saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and therefore, not entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from

employment. Will this not be absurd? This narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of our labor laws and considering
the purpose of separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown the the streets to face
the harsh necessities of life.
Additionally, in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., supra, in resolving the issue of the salary base that should be used in computing the separation
pay, We held that:
The commissions also claimed by petitioner ('override commission' plus 'net deposit incentive') are not properly
includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to
petitioner.
Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to
petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the
average commissions earned during their last year of employment.
The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance
to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved
in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140; Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
78763, July 12,1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED
by including allowances and commissions in the separation pay of petitioners Jose Songco and Amancio Manuel. The case is
remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of said separation pay.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 81077 June 6, 1990
LUIS DE OCAMPO, JR., JOSE RODRIGO, EUGENIO ESQUEJO, VICTORINO TABERNERO, RIZALO DALIVA, FRANCISCO
ACOSTA and 87 others listed in Annex 'A' hereof, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Alfra Beta A. Serquina for petitioners.
Maximo P. Amurao, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petition seeks a reversal of the decision of the respondent NLRC dated June 8, 1984, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as hereinabove indicated. Consequently, the
application for clearance to dismiss the union officers is granted; the employment status of the individual
complainants who were project employees is also considered severed, not on account of illegality of the strike but
due to the expiration of their employment contracts; and the respondent is ordered to reinstate, without back wages,
the individual complainants who were regular employees except those who were officers of the union among them or
paid separation pay at their option, equivalent to one month's pay or one-half month's pay for every year of service,
whichever is greater.
It appears that on September 30, 1980, the services of 65 employees of private respondent Makati Development Corporation were
terminated on the ground of the expiration of their contracts; that the said employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
MDC on October 1, 1980; * that on October 8, 1980, as a result of the aforementioned termination, the Philippine Transport and

General Workers Association, of which the complainants were members, filed a notice of strike on the grounds of union-busting,
subcontracting of projects which could have been assigned to the dismissed employees, and unfair labor practice; that on October 14,
1980, the PTGWA declared a strike and established picket lines in the perimeter of the MDC premises; that on November 4, 1980, the
MDC filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a motion to declare the strike illegal and restrain the workers from continuing the strike;
that on that same day and several days thereafter the MDC filed applications for clearance to terminate the employment of 90 of the
striking workers, whom it had meanwhile preventively suspended; that of the said workers, 74 were project employees under contract
with the MDC with fixed terms of employment; and that on August 31, 1982, Labor Arbiter Apolinar L. Sevilla rendered a decision 1
denying the applications for clearance filed by the MDC and directing it to reinstate the individual complainants with two months back
wages each.
This is the decision modified by the NLRC 2 which is now faulted by the petitioners for grave abuse of discretion. The contention is that
the public respondent acted arbitrarily and erroneously in ruling that: a) the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; b) the strike
was illegal; and c) the separation of the project employees was justified.
Having considered the issues and the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings, including the petitioners' ex parte motion
for early resolution of this case, the Court makes the findings that follow.
On the first issue, we note that the rule on motions for reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC is now found in Rule X of the
Revised Rules of the NLRC, providing thus:
Section 9. Motions for reconsideration Motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the
Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is
under oath and filed within ten (I 0) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision, with proof of
service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the aforesaid reglementary period, the adverse party and
provided further, that only one such motion shall be entertained.
Subject to the provisions of Section 3, Rule IX of these Rules, motions for reconsideration of an order, resolution or
decision of a Division shall be resolved by the Division of origin.
However, this section was promulgated only on November 5, 1986, and became effective only on November 29, 1986, after the
required publication. 3 It was therefore not yet in force when the required resolution in the present case was rendered in 1984.
Apparently agreeing that the reglementary period then was fifteen days, the Solicitor General argues that the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was nevertheless filed late on June 26, 1984, the decision of the NLRC having been rendered on June 7, 1984, or 19
days earlier. 4 This is not exactly accurate. The fact is Annex "C" of the petition shows that a copy of the decision was received by the
petitioner only on June 13, 1984, and it was from that date that the reglementary period commenced to run. This means that the motion
for reconsideration was filed on time, only 13 days having elapsed before the deadline.
But this notwithstanding, we must hold that under the law then in force, to wit, PD No. 823 as amended by PD No. 849, the strike was
indeed illegal. In the first place, it was based not on the ground of unresolved economic issues, which was the only ground allowed at
that time, when the policy was indeed to limit and discourage strikes. Secondly, the strike was declared only after 6 days from the notice
of strike and before the lapse of the 30-day period prescribed in the said law for a cooling-off of the differences between the workers
and management and a possible avoidance of the intended strike. That law clearly provided:
Sec. 1. It is the policy of the state to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining within the
framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Therefore all forms of strikes, picketing and lockout are hereby
strictly prohibited in vital industries such as in public utilities, including transportation and communication, companies
engaged in the manufacturer processing as well as in the distribution of fuel gas, gasoline and fuel or lubricating oil,
in companies engaged in the production or processing of essential commodities or products for export, and in
companies engaged in banking of any kind, as well as in hospitals and in schools and colleges.
However, any legitimate labor union may strike and any employer may lockout in establishments not covered by
General Order No. 5 only on grounds of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining, in which case the union
or the employer shall file a notice with the Bureau of Labor Relations at least 30 days before the intended strike or
lockout. (Emphasis supplied)
It is our ruling that the leaders of the illegal strike were correctly punished with dismissal, but their followers (other than the contract
workers) were properly ordered reinstated, considering their lesser degree of responsibility. The penalty imposed upon the leaders was
only proper because it was they who instigated the strike even if they knew, or should have known, that it was illegal. It was also fair to
rule that the reinstated strikers were not entitled to backpay as they certainly should not be compensated for services not rendered
during the illegal strike. In our view, this is a reasonable compromise between the demands of the workers and the rights of the
employer.
Coming now to the last question, we stress the rule in Cartagenas v. Romago Electric Co., 5 that contract workers are not considered
regular employees, their services being needed only when there are projects to be undertaken. 'The rationale of this rule is that if a

project has already been completed, it would be unjust to require the employer to maintain them in the payroll while they are doing
absolutely nothing except waiting until another project is begun, if at all. In effect, these stand-by workers would be enjoying the status
of privileged retainers, collecting payment for work not done, to be disbursed by the employer from profits not earned. This is not fair by
any standard and can only lead to a coddling of labor at the expense of management.
We believe, however, that this rule is not applicable in the case at bar, and for - good reason. The record shows that although the
contracts of the project workers had indeed expired, the project itself was still on-going and so continued to require the workers'
services for its completion. 6 There is no showing that such services were unsatisfactory to justify their termination. This is not even
alleged by the private respondent. One can therefore only wonder why, in view of these circumstances, the contract workers were not
retained to finish the project they had begun and were still working on. This had been done in past projects. This arrangement had
consistently been followed before, which accounts for the long years of service many of the workers had with the MDC.
It is obvious that the real reason for the termination of their services-which, to repeat, were still needed-was the complaint the project
workers had filed and their participation in the strike against the private respondent. These were the acts that rendered them persona
non grata to the management. Their services were discontinued by the MDC not because of the expiration of their contracts, which had
not prevented their retention or rehiring before as long as the project they were working on had not yet been completed. The real
purpose of the MDC was to retaliate against the workers, to punish them for their defiance by replacing them with more tractable
employees.
Also noteworthy in this connection is Policy Instruction No. 20 of the Department of Labor, providing that "project employees are not
entitled to separation pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are
employed, regardless of the projects in which they had been employed by a particular construction company." 7 Affirmatively put, and
interpreting it in the most liberal way to favor the working class, the rule would entitle project employees to separation pay if the projects
they are working on have not yet been completed when their services are terminated. And this should be true even if their contracts
have expired, on the theory that such contracts would have been renewed anyway because their services were still needed.
Applying this rule, we hold that the project workers in the case at bar, who were separated even before the completion of the project at
the New Alabang Village and not really for the reason that their contracts had expired, are entitled to separation pay. We make this
disposition instead of ordering their reinstatement as it may be assumed that the said project has been completed by this time.
Considering the workers to have been separated without valid cause, we shall compute their separation pay at the rate of one month
for every year of service of each dismissed employee, up to the time of the completion of the project. 8 We feel this is the most equitable
way to treat their claim in light of their cavalier dismissal by the private respondent despite their long period of satisfactory service with
it.
It is the policy of the Constitution to afford protection to labor in recognition of its role in the improvement of our welfare and the
strengthening of our democracy. An exploited working class is a discontented working class. It is a treadmill to progress and a threat to
freedom. Knowing this, we must exert all effort to dignify the lot of the employee, elevating him to the same plane as his employer, that
they may better work together as equal partners in the quest for a better life. This is a symbiotic relationship we must maintain if such a
quest is to succeed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED but with the modification that the contract workers are hereby
declared to have been illegally separated before the expiration of the project they were working on and so are entitled to separation pay
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING
OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.

CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no
jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His
widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the
vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties
ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that
the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the
exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent
himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of
the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to
promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created
earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on
Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is
that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social
Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time
he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker
outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract
worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen"
4
or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or
partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not
disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern
Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's
employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization
and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its
payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D.
No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's signature, described the subject of
the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the
light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an
overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although
working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it
necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund
which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the
definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum
Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign
and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been
required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had
never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done

so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any
ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any
other format of employment contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said
circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard
shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed
in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in
the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition,
if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes
of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in
the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power,
however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is
called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a
significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board)
in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.
That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and
equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and
efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was
accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that
she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a
P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen
under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount
of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from, and will be in
addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of
the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July
12,1976, providing an follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Employees Compensation
and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the
seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all
benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his
beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and
the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied due process because the
same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law
itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to
promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples
abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the
Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board
and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective
administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered
violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line
with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be
counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given
the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can
negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986
is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21849

December 11, 1967

LOURDES VDA. DE MAGALONA, petitioner,


vs.
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE NATIONAL SHIPYARD AND STEEL CORPORATION (NASSCO),
respondents.
Pablo B. Badong and Associates for petitioner.
P. C. Villavieja and P. E. Villanueva for respondent WCC.
Eduardo S. Rodriguez for respondent NASSCO.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Since April 1, 1954, Jorge Magalona worked for NASSCO-Iligan Steel Mills, as batteryman, then as electrician-helper and finally as pulpit operator
with a weekly salary of P26.40, with hours of work at 7:00 A.M.-12: 00 Noon, 1:00 P.M.-4:00 P.M. As a batteryman, he filled jars of dry cells with
hydrochloric acid inside a room that was always damp because of the sprinkling of water over the dry cells to prevent the acid from flowing. As
electrician-helper, he helped clean electric motors, rewound coils and did other work in the electric shop. In his last designation as pulpit operator, he
worked in the rolling mill department, which was hot, operated an electric switch and caught steel bars passing through at a finish line.
On February 16, 1956, Magalona went on sick leave, to last up to March 10, 1956. He was not able to report for work after his leave expired. On
May 1, 1956, he was admitted in Riverside Hospital, Bacolod City, where he died on May 17, of that year, of duodenal ulcer with partial obstruction
at the pyloric end of the stomach, severe anemia with kidney complications.
On July 25, 1956, his widow, Lourdes Magalona, filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Respondent company did
not controvert the claim. The hearing officer of the Regional Office, Department of Labor, awarded the widow and her child P2,745.60 as death
benefits, P200.00 as burial expenses, P1,645.60 as medical expenses and P135.28 as attorney's fees. The award was based on the ground that the
conditions of work inhalation of gas fumes, incessant heat, irregular eating habits might have caused duodenal ulcer, in line with the principle
of liberal construction of labor laws in favor of the laborer.
On review before the Workmen's Compensation Commission in Manila, claimant's counsel filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Appeal or Reply to Petition
for Review", alleging, as it did before the hearing officer, that the case should be dismissed because NASSCO had not filed any written notice of
controversion of the claim. Since medical considerations were involved, Workmen's Compensation Commissioner Cesareo Perez referred the case to
the Evaluation Division of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation for a medical opinion. Dr. Elda M. Montemayor, Senior Compensation Rating
Medical Officer therein, in her report dated February 20, 1963 (approved by the Chief of the Evaluation Division), stated that although the exact
cause of duodenal ulcer is still unknown, the conditions of his work, in the absence of sufficient proof that the deceased missed or had irregular
meals, had no causal relationship with the ailment causing his death. Without resolving the motion to dismiss, Commissioner Perez reversed the
decision of the hearing officer, absolved NASSCO and ruled that duodenal ulcer is not compensable without any showing that there was any causal
connection between the ulcer and the nature of the work, such as aggravation of the illness through an accident, over exertion and the like.
After the Commission en banc denied her motion for reconsideration, claimant appealed to Us by way of certiorari, raising the following questions
for determination:
1. Could the NASSCO have legally petitioned for review of the decision of the hearing officer considering that it had not controverted the claim?
2. Was the admission by Commissioner Perez of the medical opinion of a Senior Compensation Rating Officer of the Commission proper?
3. Was there need for claimant to show causal connection between the death of the employee and the nature of his work?

As the hearing officer found, NASSCO failed to controvert the claim. It is NASSCO's position that granting there was no controversion, the
acceptance by the hearing officer of NASSCO's evidence was tantamount to reinstatement of its right to controvert, citing Section 4 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. However, to reinstate one's right to controvert, the section requires a petition under oath by the
employer, specifying the reason for its failure to controvert.itc-alf In the case at bar, there was no such petition. Mere acceptance by the hearing
officer of the evidence presented did not mean the reinstatement of the right to controvert. The law itself provides that only the Commissioner may
reinstate the right to controvert. (See Sec. 45, par. 2, Workmen's Compensation Act; Agustin v. WCC, L-19957, Sept. 29, 1964).lawphil.net By failing
to present a written controversion of the claim, the employer, NASSCO, renounced its right to challenge the claim. And this means that all nonjurisdictional defenses, such as non-compensability of the illness, prescription, etc., are barred. 1
Respondent NASSCO, in its answer before Us, alleges that the claim had prescribed, for it allegedly received notice of the claim for compensation
only on July 25, 1962 (p. 64 of the Record).itc-alf The hearing officer, however, found that the records show the claim to have been received July 25,
1956 (Record, p. 33). Furthermore, it was the company physician who diagnosed the employee's illness (pp. 73 of T.s.n., quoted in petition, p. 22 of
Record).The wife testified under oath that she sent a telegram to NASSCO right after the death of her husband and later filed her claim with its
manager. These matters were not touched on by the reviewing commissioner or the Commission en banc and should stand. The widow's acts after the
death of her husband may be considered as substantial compliance with the required notice of claim for compensation. In a case, We accepted as
substantial compliance with Section 24 of the Act an oral demand for compensation hardly a month after lay-off, making of little consequence a
subsequent written claim filed much later.2 And besides, as stated, for lack of proper controversion, the defense of prescription is likewise barred.
With regard to the admissibility of the medical opinion report of Dr. Montemayor, said report should not have been admitted because while technical
rules of procedure need not be followed by the Commission, 3 no evidence should be taken into account where the adverse party was not given the
opportunity to object to its admissibility.4 This is sound especially where on such admitted report was principally based the decision of reversal.
Based on the medical report, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner ruled that the claimant must first establish a causal link between the nature
of the employment and the cause of death of Magalona, before claimant can be compensated. This is a reversible error. The employee had obviously
been sick. His inability to report sack to work when his sick leave expired did not sever the employer-employee relationship. NASSCO never claimed
that it had terminated his employment. NASSCO claimed that he was "absent without leave" (pp. 36-38 of T.s.n., quoted in respondent's answer, pp.
68-69 of the Record).lawphil.net It is now unquestionable that once the illness supervened at the time of the employment there is a rebuttable
presumption that such illness arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. The claimant is relieved from the burden
of proving causation once the illness or the injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment. 5 Thus, the precise medical cause of the illness
is not legally significant, as long as the illness supervened in the course of the employment. The presumption of causation or aggravation then
applies. The function of a presumption is precisely to dispense with the need for proof. The burden to overthrow the presumption and to disconnect,
by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from employment, is laid by the statute at the door of the employer. 6 In the case at bar no substantial
evidence exists to overcome said presumption. And, even if the medical report is considered, since the report itself admits that the real cause of
duodenal ulcer is unknown, the presumption established by law would still apply as against a mere opinion on the non-causal connection between
duodenal ulcer and the nature of Magalona's employment.lawphil.net
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Workmen's Compensation Commission en banc and the Commissioner's decision are hereby reversed,
and the award of the hearing officer granting claimant P2,745.60 as death benefits; P200.00 as burial expenses; P1,645.60 as medical expenses; and
P138.25 as attorney's fees, is affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-9878, U.S. v. Molina


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
December 24, 1914
G.R. No. L-9878
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANK TUPASI MOLINA, defendant-appellant.
Julio Borbon Villamor for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:

On the 6th day of February, 1914, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Ilocos Sur filed a complaint against the defendant charging him with
the crime of perjury, alleged to have been committed as follows:
The said Frank Tupasi Molina, the above-named defendant, did on September 10, 1912, in the municipality of Tayum of the Province of Ilocos Sur, P.
I., for the purpose of gaining admission, as in fact he did, owing to the deceit he practiced, as will be hereinafter related, to the examinations for the
municipal police service in the Province of Ilocos Sur, which were held in the municipality of Vigan, said province, on or about January 18, 1913,
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally take a false oath by affirming and asserting in an oath that he knew to be false, in an examination application
which he himself filled out and signed, that prior to the said date, to wit, September 10, 1912, he had never been indicted, tried, or sentenced for the
violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation in any court, when he knew at the time he took that oath and signed his examination application, as he
knows at the present time, that he had been twice indicted for disturbing the public peace, and for injurias graves, and sentenced to pay a fine and
undergo imprisonment therefor, by the justice of the peace court of Tayum and the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
The defendant made the false declaration previously mentioned after he had sworn before Lucas Magno, notary public, authorized by law to
administer oaths, that he would state the truth; and said false declaration made under the oath taken by the defendant, as above stated, concerned a
fact of such importance that without it he would not have been admitted to said examinations prescribed for the municipal police service. In violation
of the law. (Sec. 3, Act No. 1697 .)
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Francisco Santamaria, judge, found the defendant guilty of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of two months and to pay a fine of P100, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law, and to pay the costs. The defendant was further sentenced to be disqualified from holding
any public office or from giving testimony in any court in the Philippine Islands until such time as the sentence against him is reversed. From that
sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in holding section 3 of Act No. 1697 to be applicable in this case.
2. The trial court manifestly erred in sentencing the appellant for violation of section 3 of Act No. 1697, when the prosecution did not present any
evidence demonstrating that he had willfully and corruptly sworn or taken an oath.
3. The trial court erred in not sustaining the defense set up by the appellant Tupasi with reference to the construction he placed upon the fifth question
of Exhibit A of the prosecution.
4. The trial court erred also in holding that the words "which he does not believe to be true," used in Act No. 1697, are equivalent to the term
"knowingly," used in section 31 of Act No. 1761.
5. The trial court erred in not acquitting the defendant.
It appears from the record that on the 10th day of September, 1912, the defendant signed a petition to be permitted to take the examination for the
position of municipal policeman. Said petition was signed by the defendant and sworn to by him before a notary public. Said petition contained a
number of questions which the applicant was required to answer. Among other questions we find that No. 5 was as follows:
Have you ever been indicted, tried, or sentenced in any court for violation of any law, ordinance, or regulations, or have you ever been tried or
sentenced for violation of regulations of the Army, Navy, of the Constabulary, in any court martial of the Army or of the Constabulary, or in any other
court?
To said question the defendant answered: "No, sir; I cannot remember any."
During the trial of the cause the prosecuting attorney presented Exhibits B, C, and D.
Exhibit B shows that one Francisco Tupasi and others, on the 8th day of February, 1911, had been arrested by an order of the justice of the peace of
the municipality of Tayum, Province of Ilocos Sur, and charged with disturbing the public peace, were found guilty, and sentenced, on the 20th day of
February, 1911, to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen days, and each to pay a fine of 25 pesetas, and to pay the costs.
Exhibit C shows that Francisco Tupasi, on the 18th day of May, 1911, had been arrested and taken before the justice of the peace of the municipality
of Tayum, Province of Ilocos Sur, charged with the crime of "injurias graves," and was sentenced on the 22d day of May, 1911, to be imprisoned for a
period of fifteen days and to pay a fine of 75 pesetas and the costs.
Exhibit D is the certificate of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Sur and shows that the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, on
the 26th day of April, 1911, in an appealed case for disturbing the public peace, sentenced the said Francisco Tupasi and others to pay a fine of 60
pesetas, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
Exhibit A was the sworn petition presented by the defendant for permission to take the examination. Said petition was signed by Frank Tupasi y
Molina. It was shown during the trial of the cause, by the admission of the defendant himself, that he was the same person accused and sentenced in
Exhibits B, C, and D. It was argued that the defendant signed said application in the name of "Frank Tupasi y Molina" when he had theretofore been

known as "Francisco Tupasi," for the purpose of avoiding identity. The defendant said that "Francisco" was the same as "Frank" and that he had
adopted the name of "Frank" instead of "Francisco." The answers to the questions in said application were made in English.
With reference to the first assignment of error, that the lower court committed an error in applying section 3 of Act No. 1697 to the facts in the
present case, it may be said that said article provides that:
Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes
an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by
him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty or
perjury, and shall be punished, etc.
Act No. 2169 of the Philippine Legislature, which is an Act to provide for the reorganization, government, and inspection of municipal police of the
municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83 , provides for the reorganization of the municipal police of the
municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83.
Said Act further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare general
regulations for the good government, discipline, and inspection of the municipal police, "compliance wherewith shall be obligatory for all members
of the organization."
Said Act further provides for an examining board for the municipal police. It further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare an examination manual, prescribing, at the same time, suitable rules for the conduct
of the examination.
Said Act (No. 2169) also provides for the time and place for holding said examinations.
Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible for examination, a candidate shall have the following requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal
record."
In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director of Constabulary prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same time rules for
conducting examinations, which examination manual was approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of
law. Said manual prescribed a form in blank, known as "Municipal Form No. 11," which form each applicant was required to fill, in order to be
permitted to take said examination. Said application required the applicant to swear to the facts stated therein. We have, therefore, a law which
authorizes the administration of an oath in the present case.
Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as
the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive
officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender
liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of law. (United States vs. Bailey, 9 Pet., 238, 252, 254, 256; Caha vs. United States, 152 U. S.,
211, 218; United States vs. Eaton, 144 U. S., 677.)
In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations
for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the
legislative department of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and management of the work of the
particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular
department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have
uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of
the law. Many illustrations might be given. For instance, the Civil Service Board is given authority to examine applicants for various positions within
the Government service. The law generally provides the conditions in a most general way, authorizing the chief of such Bureau to provide rules and
regulations for the management of the conduct of examinations, etc. The law provides that the Collector of Customs shall examine persons who
become applicant to act as captains of ships for the coastwise trade, providing at the same time that the Collector of Customs shall establish rules and
regulations for such examinations. Such regulations, once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as
binding upon all of the parties, as if the regulations had been written in the original law itself. (United States vs. Grimaud, 220 U. S., 506; Williamson
vs. United States, 207 U. S., 425; United States vs. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S., 207.)
By reference to Exhibit A, the application made and sworn to by the defendant, we find that the oath was taken before a notary public, a person
qualified to administer an oath, in accordance with the provisions of law.
The defendant, in support of his first assignment of error, argues that the purpose of Act No. 1697 was not intended to cover cases like the present.
He argues that said Act was an Act only authorizing the appointment of commissioners, to make official investigations, fixing their powers, for the
payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official investigations. The same question was presented to this court in the case of
United States vs. Concepcion (13 Phil. Rep., 424). In that case the court decided against the contention of the defendant in the present case. It is true
that the title of said Act (No. 1697) does not seem to indicate that said law contained a provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. Reading
the title alone, it would seem to be a law punishing the crime of perjury in particular cases. The law (Act No. 1697) is a general law. It is not a private
or local law. In the United States the constitutions in the different States generally provide that the title of a law shall indicate the general purpose of

the law. There seems to be no provision in the Philippine Islands that the title of a general law shall contain a statement of the subject matter of the
law. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, provides:
That no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.
We held in the case of United States vs. Concepcion, supra, that said Act of Congress did not apply to general laws, and that said section 3 was a
provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. (U. S. vs. De Chaves, 14 Phil. Rep., 565; U. S. vs. Estra?a, 16 Phil. Rep., 520; U. S. vs. Fonseca,
20 Phil. Rep., 191.)
In the case of United States vs. Dumlao (R. G., No. 8721, not reported) this court held the defendant guilty of the crime of perjury, under facts exactly
analogous to those in this case, under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. We find no reason, either in law or in the argument of the appellant
in the present case, to modify or reverse our conclusions in that case (No. 8721).
With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant alleged that the lower court committed an error in finding that he had committed the
crime of perjury voluntarily and corruptly. There is nothing in the record which shows that he did not present to the proper authorities Exhibit A
voluntarily. It is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that the defendant had theretofore been convicted of two different offenses and in one of
them by two courts, how he could, within a few months thereafter, make a sworn statement that he "did not have a criminal record," unless he
answered said question No. 5 in the manner indicated in said application for the express purpose of deceiving the authority to which said application
was presented.
With reference to the third assignment of error, it may be said that the language of question No. 5 seems to be perfectly clear. The defendant admitted
that he could read and understand Spanish. It is to be noted that at the very beginning of said application there are three paragraphs devoted to
instructions to the applicant, which he should have read and no doubt did. Said instructions were sufficient to indicate to the defendant that if there
were any questions which he did not fully understand, he should have acquired a full understanding of the same before answering them. If there was
any fault in understanding said question No. 5, it was wholly due to his own negligence.
With reference to the fourth assignment of error, the appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in holding that the phrase "which he
does not believe to be true," found in section 3 of Act No. 1697, is equivalent to the word "knowingly," used in other laws. The lower court cited the
case of U. S. vs. Tin Masa (17 Phil. Rep., 463) in support of his conclusion. Said section 3, in effect, provides that any person who takes an oath
before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath, that he will testify, etc., or that
any written testimony, declaration, etc., by him subscribed is true, and thereafter willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material
matter, "which he does not believe to be true," is guilty of perjury. Under said section, three things are necessary, in order to constitute the crime of
perjury:
1. The person must have taken an oath, in a case where the law authorizes an oath, before a competent person, or a person authorized to administer an
oath;
2. That the person who has taken the oath will testify, declare, dispose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or
certificate by him subscribed is true;
3. That he willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter, "which he does not believe to be true."
It is difficult to understand how a person can state, under oath, that a fact is true or subscribe a document, asserting that the same is true, which he
does not believe to be true. If, under his oath, he declares that said facts are true, we must conclude that he believed that they were true. If, as a matter
of fact, they were not true, and he had full knowledge of the fact that they were not true, then his declaration that they were true would certainly be a
sworn statement that a certain fact was true which he did not believe to be true and, therefore, he must have made a false statement knowingly.
Without attempting to show or assert that the phrase "which he does not believe to be true" is equivalent to the word "knowingly," as the lower court
held, we are of the opinion that whoever makes a statement or subscribes a document, under the circumstances mentioned in said section 3, which is
false and which he, at the time he makes the same does not believe to be true, is guilty of the crime of perjury. In other words, under the
circumstances mentioned in said section, if one swears positively that a fact is true, which he does not believe to be true, and it turns out that it is
false, he is guilty of the crime of perjury. No one should swear positively that a fact is true or subscribe a document asserting that the facts stated
therein are true, unless he at least believes that they are true at the time he takes such oath or subscribes such document. It can scarcely be believed
that the defendant in the present case believed that the answer to said question No. 5 was true. He must have signed or answered said question not
only believing that it was not true, but, as a matter of fact, signed the same knowing that the answer was false.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, we are of the opinion that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause clearly shows that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed with costs.

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