Socialstatus,civilizationandtheideaofanormativepowerEurope

EdwardKeene
SamNunnSchoolofInternationalAffairs
GeorgiaInstituteofTechnology
TosaythattheEuropeanUnion(EU)isanormativepoweristosaythatitwieldspowerofanideational
nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions
(Manners2002,239).TheEUstandsforseveralclearlystatedcoreprinciplescommitmentstopeace,
liberty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, social solidarity, antidiscrimination, sustainable
development and good governance which are different from the principles according to which the
Westphaliansystemhastraditionallybeenorganised,andwhichitaimstodiffusethroughavarietyof
meansacrossinternationalsocietyasawhole.OneofthemainrolesoftheEU,andperhapsevenits
principalrole,isthustochangethenormsofthesocietyofstates.Itdoessonotjustbysayinganddoing
things,butinpartsimplybybeingdifferent,byembodyingdifferentvaluesthatotherswishtoemulate.
MypurposeinthispaperisnottocontestthisinterpretationoftheEUasitexiststoday,butto
offersomesociologicalandhistoricalreflectionsontheideathatitisanormativepower.Therearetwo
themestothediscussion.First,Iwanttoraisethequestionofwhatnormativepowerisandwhereitcomes
from:whataretheattributesofastateorinternationalorganisationthathasnormativepower;andwhydo
someappeartohavemoreofitthanothers?Thelatterquestionisespeciallyimportantbecauseitisnot
enoughjusttosaythatnormativepowerderivesfromvalues:everyonehasvalues;thecriticalissueiswhy
somepeopleareabletomaketheirvaluesthedefinitionofwhatisnormal.Allvaluesarenormative,but
theyarenotinthemselvesnormativepower.Whatweareinterestedinistheabilitytogetotherstoaccept
onesvaluesasanindexofhowtheyshouldbehave.TodescribetheEUasanormativepowerinany
meaningful sense is to say that it has that ability to a greater degree than many, if not most, other
internationalactorsotherwiseitwouldbebetterdescribedasanormativeweaklingandwetherefore
need to explain why it does so. Economic and, to a lesser degree, military resources are relevant to
answeringthisquestion,butIwanttotakeseriouslyIanMannerscontentionthatnormativepoweris
powerofanideationalnatureandexplorewhatideationalnonmaterialandhencenoneconomicand
nonmilitary attributes are crucial to it. Although there are several possible ways of tackling such
questions,Iwilladoptasociologicalapproachhere,drawingonWeberianandneoWeberianideasabout
socialstatusandsocialclosure.Theseconceptscanhelpustounderstandhowpeopleorgroupswithin
societiesingeneralareabletomaketheirvaluesonesthatotherswishtoemulate,andsocanprovidea
starting point for thinking about these issues within the context of international society. Beyond the
particular idea of normative power, this line of enquiry could also provide a sociological basis for
understandingrelatednotionsincontemporaryinternationalrelationstheory,suchasJosephNyesideaof
softpower(Nye2002,2004&2008),orMichaelBarnettandRaymondDuvallsconceptualizationof
powerascompulsory,institutional,structuralandproductive(Barnett&Duvall2005).
Thesecondtheme,whichIwillraisemorebrieflyattheendofthepaper,isthattherearesome
obvious similarities, at least on the surface, between the EUs ability to diffuse and shape norms
internationallytoday,andthewaythatEuropean statesinthepastwereabletosetupastandardof
civilizationininternational law,andtopresent theirownwayoflifeintermsofaprivilegedset of
civilizedvalues(Keene2002:seealsoDietz2005andManners2006).Indeed,severalofthespecific
principlesthroughwhichtheEUsnormativepowerissaidtobeexpressednotablytheruleoflawand

goodgovernancedirectlycorrespondtosimilaronescontainedintheearliernineteenthcenturynotionof
civilization.Therearetwodistinctpointshere.First,itsuggeststhatitmayberelevanttothinkaboutthe
contemporaryEUnotsomuchastheexpressionofanovelvisionofapostWestphalianinternational
order,whichisanimportantelementinMannerspresentationoftheconcept,butratherascontinuingan
oldertraditionofpromotingEuropeanorWesterncivilizationininternationalsociety.Togofurther,one
couldseethenormativepowerofthepresentdayEUasrestingatleastinpartonthatlegacy:theEUis,in
effect,drawingontheculturalcapitalthatwasaccumulatedinamuchearlierperiodinthehistoryof
internationalsociety.Secondly,however,despitethesecontinuities,therearealsosignificantdifferencesin
howthenineteenthcenturystandardofcivilizationworked,comparedwiththewayinwhichtheEUaims
topromoteitsvaluestoday.DrawingonmydiscussionofWeberiansocialtheory,Iwillsuggestthatthe
oldnormativepowerEuropesoughttoprotectitsstatusthroughacollectivistformofsocialclosure
containedinthedistinctionbetweencivilizedandbarbarouspeoples.Bycontrast,theprestigeonwhich
the current EUs normative power is founded relies on a more individualist form of closure, rooted
especiallyincredentialism.Inmanyrespects,thismakesthenormativepoweroftheEUlessvulnerable
tosomeoftheobjectionsthatarecustomarilylevelledagainstnineteenthcenturyEuropeanimperialism,
andsuggeststhatitisnotfairtoreducebothtoanessentiallysimilarlogicofself/otheridentityrelations:as
Mannershasrepeatedlytriedtoclaim,thenormativeroleoftheEUisnotacolonialone.Ontheother
hand,individualistformsofclosuredocontainsomepotentialproblems,especiallyintermsoftheEUs
abilitytoretainasenseofitsdistinctiveculturalidentity,andperhapsevenintermsofitsabilityinthe
longtermtoprotecttheprivilegedpositionthatitsmemberstatesenjoyininternationalsocietyandthe
worldeconomy.Thatmaynotbeamajorconcernfromthepointofviewofglobaljustice;butitisunlikely
tobeaprospectonwhichEuropeanswilllookwithmuchenthusiasm.
Normativepower,socialstatusandsocialclosure
Thenotionofnormativepowerimmediatelyplacesourdiscussionwithintherealmofideasorvalues,as
opposedtomaterialresourcesandtheirusetoinfluencetheinterestsofotheractors.Nevertheless,thatis
nottosaythateconomicorothermaterialfactorsarecompletelyirrelevanttoanycomprehensiveaccount
ofhownormsareestablishedandchanged.Indeed,accordingtoManners,oneofthemostimportantways
inwhichtheEUisabletodiffuseitsvaluesisthroughthecarrotandstickismoffinancialrewardsand
economic sanctions (2002, 245). The desire of other states to gain economic benefits from their
interactionswiththeEU,oreventhroughacquiringmembershipoftheUnion,actsasapowerfulincentive
forthemtoacceptthevaluesforwhichitstands,ifonlyforlargelyinstrumentalreasons(Manners2002,
244245).NoonecandisputetheimportanceoftheseaspectsofthenormshapinginfluencethattheEU
enjoys,buttofocusonthemseemstometomakethedistinctionbetweencivilianandnormativepower
hardtosustain,ifnotevenslightlyillusory.Ifnormativepowerisnothingmorethancarrotandstickism,
thenitmightbemoreaccuratetosaythattheEUisessentiallyacivilianpower,which(likemanyother
civilianpowers,ormilitarypowersforthatmatter)usesitsinfluenceinthisspheretoimposeitspreferred
normsonotherinternationalactors(see,forexample,Dietz2005,61618).Inthiscontextitisworthnoting
thatMannersoriginaldistinctionbetweencivilianandnormativepowercontainedadifferenceinhow
eachkindofpowerisdefined,whichleadstoacertainambiguityinhowhedistinguishesthem,andso
makeshisargumentvulnerabletothiskindofobjection.Civilianpowerisdescribedastheabilitytouse
civilianinstruments,whilenormativepoweristheabilityto shape conceptionsofnormal(Manners
2002,240,myemphasis).Althoughthisispresentedasifitdemarcatedaboundarybetweenthetwotypes

ofpower,itreallydoesnot:thereisnocontradictionbetweenthem,sinceonecould(andtheEU,as
Mannersshows,does) use civilianinstrumentsto shape conceptionsofwhatisnormal.Thus,onthis
interpretation,MannersargumentreallyamountstolittlemorethantheclaimthattheEUisastrong
civilianpower, whichjust happens tobenormativelydifferent from most other statesorinternational
organizationsintheworld,andsopartoftheeffectofitsuseofcivilianpoweristoreshapeinternational
norms.Thatmaybeanimportantandcorrectpoint,butitishardtoseewhatworkthespecificideaof
normative powerisdoinginthat formulation,andthereforeraisesthequestionofwhyweneedthe
conceptatall.
Oneresponsewouldbetosaythatcivilianpowerisindeedaricherandmorenormativeconcept
thanMannerssuggests(forexample,Nicolaides&Howse2002).ButhereIwanttotakeadifferentroute
byretainingtheideaofnormativepower,butmakingitsconceptualdistinctivenessclearerbytreatingit,in
parallelwithMannersdefinitionofcivilianpower,astheabilitytouseideationalinstruments,ratherthan
justtheabilitytoshapenorms.Thisaspect ofnormativepoweriscertainlynotabsentfromManners
discussion.Forexample,itisrelevanttohowhetalksaboutseveralaspectsofnormdiffusion,suchasthe
ideaofaculturalfilter,orthesymbolictransmissionoftheEUsprinciples(Manners2002,245&252).
And,asheremarkselsewhere,ifwetrytoexpandthecivilianpowerideatoembraceEuropesnormative
role,werunariskof,amongotherthings,overemphasisingitsmaterialistandstrategicallyinstrumental
dimensions,whereasoneofthemajorpointsofpreferringtouseadistinctideaofnormativepoweristo
emphasise the nonmaterial exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation...and
attraction(Manners2006,176).
IwillreturntothesespecificissuesaboutthenormativepoweroftheEUinamoment,butfirstI
wanttotrytothinkmoregenerallyaboutwhatitmightmeantoconceptualizenormativepowerinmore
exclusivelynonmaterialterms:howcanideationalinstrumentsalonemakeothersattractedtoEuropean
values,andmakethemwanttoimitateitsnorms?Ithinktherearethreebroadwaysofansweringthis
question:normativepowerunderstoodstrictlyasthepowerofideascouldrestonthemoralrightnessofthe
valuesbeingupheld,onthepoliticalskillwithwhichtheyarecommunicated,oronthesocialstatusthat
theycommand.Inotherwords,normativepowercouldbeunderstoodasmoral,politicalorsocial:asa
functionofvirtue,persuasionorprestige.(Or,ofcourse,onsomecombinationofallofthem;theyarenot
intendedtobemutuallyexclusivecategories.)Iamgoingtotrytodevelopthesociologicallineofenquiry
inmostdetailhere,butitisrelevanttocastaquickglanceatsomeofthealternativewaysinwhichthese
questionsmightbehandled,notleastbecausetherearesomeimportantandinterestingoverlapsbetween
them,aswellassignificantdifferences.
Threetypesofnormativepower:moral,politicalandsocial
Inthefirstplace,valuescouldbeseenashavinganintrinsicqualitythatdependsontheircorrespondence
withmoralreason.Thepowerofanidea,inotherwords,isdeterminedbyitslogicalvalidityinawaythat
canbedemonstratedthroughphilosophicalreflection,anditsacceptancebyotheractorssimplyrequires
themtobewillingtoaccepttheforceofthebetterargument.ThepowerofJohnRawlsconceptionof
'justiceasfairness',forexample,mightbesaidtoderivefromthefactthatitpurportstorepresentthe
logicalconclusionthatwouldbereachedbyanyreasonableanddisinterestedenquirer;toresisthisideaof
whatconstitutesajustsociety,onewouldhavetooffer,attheveryleast,analternativeargumentthat
showswhyareasonableanddisinterestedpersonwouldhavegroundstopreferadifferentconceptionof
justice(Rawls1971,and,foranexampleofsucharesponse,seeNozick1974).Somethinglikethisclaim
doesappeartobemadeinmuchoftheliteratureon'normative'or'softpower'.Nye,forexample,saysthat

'softpowerarisesinlargepartfromourvalues':itrestsonthe'universalityofourculture'andourabilityto
'appealtovaluesaboutthejustnessofcontributingtothosesharedvaluesandpurposes'(2002,910;2008,
31:valuesaboutthejustnessofvalues!).ItisperhapsalsoevidentinMannersassertionthatthenormative
poweroftheEUitselfhasanormativequality:itshould acttoextenditsnormsintotheinternational
system (Manners 2002, 252, emphasis original). It comes through yet more strongly in his later
formulationoftheconcept,whereoneofthekeyelementsofnormativepowerissaidtoderivefrombeing
reasonable,anotionthatexplicitlyinvokesthedeontologicalmethodofKantianethicalenquiry(Manners
2008,57).
AsfarasIamaware,andwithduedeferencetoJohnRawls,wedonotyethaveaanabsolutely
perfectandlogicallyunarguablemoralphilosophicaldemonstrationofthemoralvalidityoftheprinciples
onwhichtheEUisbased,atleastintermsofhowtheyaredefinedbytheEU.Eventhemostthorough
goingKantianmightadmitthatthereisscopehereforfurtherphilosophicaldebate,ratherthanmerelythe
exerciseofnormativepower.Graverproblems,however,surroundthiswayofthinkingwhenitisplaced
intotheinternationalcontextthatisdemandedbyaconsiderationoftheEUasanormativepower.Insuch
acontext,itmaynotevenbepossibletogivearigorousphilosophicaldemonstrationofthemoralvirtueof
the EUs values that would be universally compelling. In his later work on justice, Rawls himself
emphasisesthathisargumentwillappealtothosewhoalreadyacceptthebroadprinciplescontainedwithin
theoverlappingconsensusofpoliticalliberalism(Rawls1993),anditisthereforeconceivablethata
rationalanddisinterestedmoralphilosopherfromoutsidethatconsensusmightreasontowardsadifferent
idea of justice in an entirely different manner; in his work on international justice he explicitly
acknowledgesthepossibilitythatilliberalsocietiesmaybe'wellordered'ontheirownterms(Rawls1999).
Ifthatiscorrect,itdramaticallyreducestheabilityofaninternationalactorsuchastheEUtorelyuponthe
moralrectitudeofitsvaluesasthebasisofitsnormativepower:beingreasonablemaymeanverydifferent
thingstopeoplewhoinhabitdifferentsortsofoverlappingconsensus.Thus,whiletheremay,asManners
contends,beanormativedifferencetotheEU,canwebesurethatthatisamorallyrelevantdifference?
Many other systems of values presume to being universally applicable: what is special about the
principlesforwhichtheEUstandsinthisrespect?
Ofcourse,manymoralphilosophersdonotfollowadeontologicaloridealtheoreticalmethod,but
takethelinguisticturninsteadintothedomainofordinarylanguageratherthanidealtheory.Onthis
view,propositionsaboutvaluesaremadewithinapreexistinglanguage;normativepower,then,mightbe
conceived in terms of ones ability to make certain moves within the language game as presently
constructed,orperhapsintermsofonesabilitytochangetherulesbywhichthewholelanguagegame
works,forexamplebyendowingaconceptwithanewmeaning,oralteringoursenseoftheimportanceof
andrelationshipbetweendifferentconcepts(forexample,MacIntyre1988;Skinner2002,especiallyvols.i
&iii).Thisquicklymovesbeyondtheconfinesofrationalmoralargumentassuch,andpointstowards
whatIwoulddescribeasamorepoliticalperspectiveonthepowerofideas,stemmingfromtheinsight
thatmerelysettingoutawellarguedphilosophicaldefenceofaparticularvalueisnotsufficienttoensure
itsacceptancebyothers.Persuasionisalsonecessary.Thinkingofnormativepowerinthesetermsadmitsa
rolefor,amongotherthings,rhetoricalandotherpoliticalstrategies,apointthatiscentraltoNye'sanalysis
of soft power, and which also figures prominently in Manners analysis of EU diplomacy and
communications.Indeed,itseemstomethatthelattersunderstandingoftheideationaldimensionsof
normative power is most fully grounded on this aspect of how the EU relates to other states and
internationalorganisations.Anothergoodexampleofthisapproachininternationalrelationstheorywould
betheanalysisofnormchangeofferedbyMarthaFinnemoreandKathrynSikkink,which,especiallyinthe
early stages of the development of a new norm, highlights the importance of persuasion by norm

entrepreneurs, and then, once the norm has been adopted by at least a few states or organizations,
understandstheconsolidationofanewnormintermsoftheabilityofnormleaderstopersuadenorm
followerstoacceptit(Finnemore&Sikkink1998;seealsoBarnett&Finnemore2005).
One question that this political perspective on norm change raises is why some 'norm
entrepreneurs'andnormleadersaresomuchmoresuccessfulthanothers.Here,again,theconceptof
normativepowerasideationalriskscollapsingbackintoaconsiderationofmaterialresourcesthrough
whichpersuasionoperates.Itisclearthattheeffectivenessofanormentrepreneurmaytoasignificant
degreedependonhisorhereconomicresources.Havingmoneyallowsanindividualtodevotetimeto
politicalactivismratherthangainfulemployment;topublicisehisorherviewsmoreeffectively;tobuild
anorganisation;and,ofcourse,toofferincentivestootheractorsiftheytakeupthenorm.Butmoneydoes
notwineveryargument,andthisisnottheonlydimensionofpersuasion.Itdemandsrhetoricalskills,the
abilitytocallattentiontoissuesorevencreateissuesbyusinglanguagethatnames,interprets,and
dramatizesthem(Finnemore&Sikkink1998,897).Andonceindividualnormentrepreneurshavesold
theirvaluestostatesandotherorganizations,itcanalsobefacilitatedbythelattersaccesstoexpertiseand
informationalresources,factorswhicharenotsimplyreducibletowealth.Forexample,environmentalist
groups,whosematerialresourcesarepunyincomparisonwiththecorporationsthatoftenopposethem,
have nevertheless beenable tomake considerable advances inpart because oftheir support from the
professional scientific community, and their ability to draw on that as a source of influence within
bureaucracies and government agencies (see Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 899). Being able to deploy
technicallyexpertknowledgeindefenceofonesclaimcanbeavitalpoliticalasset,andscientistswhocan
communicateeffectivelywiththepublicareworththeirweightingold(seeLitfin1995).
Irecognisethatthisisanimportantdimensionofnormativepower,butIthinkitstillleavesus
wonderingwhysomeorganisations(suchastheEU)seemtobeabletoinstitutionaliseitandretainitover
aperiodoftime.Itistemptingtotreattheabilitytopersuadeasamoreorlesscharismaticattribute
indeedNyeexplicitlylinkshisideaofsoftpowertotheWeberiannotionofcharismaorasthefruitofa
highlydevelopedcreativefaculty,throughwhichtheskillednormentrepreneurunderstandsexactlythe
rightwaytodramatisetheissueheorshewantstoputontheagenda.Yet,asWebernotes,charismais
extremelydifficulttoroutiniseinorganisations,andwhentheinitialimpetusoftheoriginalcharismatic
leaderislost,itoftentransformsintoatleastamoremundanekindofauthority,andoftenintoonethatis
traditional or rationallegal rather than charismatic (I will discuss this distinction in a moment), the
continuedpersuasivenessofwhichthenbecomesratherpuzzling.Itishardtoseehowanorganisation
couldsomehowpreservethischarismaticabilityoveralongperiodoftimewithinitsinstitutionalstructure
asthebasisforitscontinuingnormativepower.Similarly,ifwetaketheabilitytopersuadeasakindof
creativetalent,thequestionagainariseswhythelatterqualityappearstobesounequallydistributedthat
someorganisationshavelotsofnormativepower,othersverylittle.Again,thespontaneous,evenrandom,
characterofcreativeimpulsesmakeithardtounderstandhowanorganisationsuchastheEUisapparently
abletoinstitutionalisethisabilitytopersuadeandmakeitintoanattributethatsystematicallyadvantages
themoverthedefendersofalternativevaluesintheireffortstoshapewhatisgenerallyconsideredtobe
normal.Onecanperhapsunderstandhowcertainparticularindividualnormentrepreneursmightmanage
notonlytobeunusuallycreativeinemployingtheartofpersuasion,andevensustainthateffortfora
while,butnotcomplexpolitical organisationsoveralongperiodoftime.Apoliticalresponsetothat
questionmightpointtotheinternalstructureoftheEUnotonlydemocracy,butalsotheneedtosecure
agreementacrossseveraldifferentmemberstates(seeManners&Whitman2003,39899)assomething
whichpredisposesEuropeans toamorepersuasive styleofpolitics,andhencegivesthem anunusual
abilitytoaccessnormativepower(althoughitmightalsomakethemlesseffectiveinotherareas,suchas

militarypower).OnecouldperhapsmakeasimilarargumentforthesoftpoweroftheUnitedStatesasa
functionofitsdemocraticandfederalsystemandtheconstitutionalseparationofpowers.Butmanytypes
ofmasspoliticswillrequiresomeformofpersuasiveabilitytosucceedwithinit,evenifitisthecharisma
ofthedemagogueortheorganizationalzealoftheparty apparatchik,ratherthanthegentlerdiplomatic
talentsofthebackroompoliticalfixermorefamiliartodemocraticandfederalsystems.
Adifferentresponsewouldbetosuggestthatsomearebetteratpersuasionthanothersbecause
theyenjoyanadvantageintermsofhowtheyareperceivedbyotheractorswithininternationalsociety.
Indeed,whendescribinghowtheoriginalstageofnormentrepreneurshipturnsintoanormcascade,
nowlednotbyskilfulindividualactivists,butbystatesandinternationalorganisations,Finnemoreand
Sikkinkmoveawayfrompersuasionandotheremotivequalitiessuchasempathy,andhighlightinstead
the importance of legitimacy, reputation and esteem (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898). And, by
introducing concepts such as reputation and esteem, they move beyond what I would call a political
perspectiveonnormativepower,andtowardsamoresociologicalone.Moreover,convenientlyformy
purposeinexploringtheideationalsourcesofnormativepower,theypointtowardsanaspectofsocial
relationsthatdoesnotnecessarilydependuponthepossessionofmaterialresources:socialstatus.What
then,isstatus?Andhowdocertainpeopleorgroupswithinsocietiescometooccupypositionsofhigh
statuswheretheyarelookeduptobyothers,andwheretheirvaluesbecomeonesthatpeoplewantto
emulate?
AWeberianframeworkforthinkingaboutsocialstatusandsocialclosure
LetusbeginwithWebersfamousdescriptionofthedistributionofsocialpowerasoperatingalongthree
axes,capturedbytheformula,class,status,party(Weber1968,ii.92640;Scott1996isagoodrecent
commentaryandanalysis,whichIwillfollowcloselyhere).Webersdefinitionofclassisconcernedwith
thedistributionofproperty,and,tobeprecise,situationswherethekindofchanceinthemarketisthe
decisivemomentwhichpresentsacommonconditionfortheindividualsfate(Weber1968,ii.928).This
formulationisintendedtocapturethemostelementaleconomicfactthatthewayinwhichthedisposition
overmaterialpropertyisdistributedamongapluralityofpeople,meetingcompetitivelyinthemarketfor
thepurposeofexchange,initselfcreatesspecificlifechances(Weber1968,ii.927).Thiscanincludea
moreMarxistviewofclass,sinceonlythewealthyhavearealisticopportunitytoconverttheirpossessions
intocapital,inthesenseofownershipofthemeansofproduction,butthecrucialpointisthatWeberdoes
notwantustoseethepotentialforownershipofcapitalastheonlywayinwhichwealthconferspoweron
itsholders.Therich,forexample,havegreaterfreedomtopickandchoosewhentoengageinmarket
exchange,andwhichgoodstobuyorsell,andthushavegreaterpowerinthepricestrugglethanthose
whohavenothingtoofferbuttheirlabourortheresultingproducts(Weber1968,ii.927).Thiscould
perhapsbeunderstoodasanalogoustothenotionoftheEUscivilianpower:theEUisinarelatively
strong position within the world economy, which greatly facilitates its use of civilian instruments to
achieveitsgoals;inWeberianterms,thisisanaspectoftheEUsclasssituation.
Thesecondmajoraxisofstratification,whichinterestsmemoreinthepresentcontext,isstatus.
Weberdefinesthisaseverytypicalcomponentofthelifeofmenthatisdeterminedbyaspecific,positive
ornegative,socialestimationof honour(Weber1968,ii.932,emphasisoriginal).Weberacknowledges
that status is seldom entirely divorced from the distribution of property and class situation, and that
propertyrequirementsfunctionasaqualificationformembershipofastatusgroupwithextraordinary
regularity(Weber1968,ii.932).Nevertheless,itwouldbeacardinalerrortoreducestatushonourtoa
merefunctionofsocialclass,and,indeed,statusnormallystandsinsharpoppositiontothepretensionsof

mereproperty(Weber1968,ii.932).Asonepithyformulationputsit,statusischaracterisednotbyhow
muchoneearns,somuchashowonespendsit:classesarestratifiedaccordingtotheirrelationstothe
productionandacquisitionofgoods;whereasstatusgroupsarestratifiedaccordingtotheprinciplesoftheir
consumption ofgoodsasrepresentedbyspecialstylesoflife(Weber1968,ii.937;seealsoRunciman
1969).Highlightingasharedlifestyleisawayofcreatingdistanceandexclusiveness,thenecessary
foundationsofstatushonour(Weber1968,ii.935),whichoftenbecomethebasisformonopolizingvarious
privilegesandopportunities,andsohinderingthefreeoperationofthemarket,theuseofpurelyeconomic
powerandtheformationofclassbasedrelationships.
TheconceptsofclassandstatusareusedbyWebertodescribethewaysinwhichasocietymaybe
stratified,butunlike,say,Marxism,heiswaryabouttreatingeitherclassesor(toalesserextent)status
groupsascoherententitiesthatactwithinasocietyinordertoachievedistinctinterests;histerminology
moreoftenreferstoclassandstatusassituationswhichhaveagreaterorlesserdeterminingeffectonan
individualsfatedependingonhowthesocietyasawholeisstructured,theextentofthemarketisationof
socialrelations,howclosedstatusgroupsare,andsoon.Thus,ifonessocialpowerandhencelifechances
happentobedeterminedbyonespositionwithinthemarket,onemaybesaidtobeoperatingwithina
classsituation;ifthegrantingorrefusalofsocialhonourisofdeterminateimportance,thenitisastatus
situation.Ofcourse,Weberrecognisesthatthesesituationscanbebasesforsocialaction,butforthishe
prefers to employthe concept of party, in thesense ofan association of people for the purpose of
acquiringsocialpowerasameanstoinfluencingsocialactionnomatterwhatitscontentmaybe(Weber
1968,ii.938).Whetherasocietyisstratifiedbystatusorbyclasswillbeimportantinshapinghowaparty
operates, thekindsofinterestsitaimstorepresent, whence itdrawsrecruitsandsoon,butthemost
importantfactordetermininghowpartiesevolve,Weberargues,isthestructureofdomination,forthe
simplereasonthatpartiesarealwaysformedinordertoinfluencesocialactionandthat,forWeber,isan
exerciseindomination.
Weberhimselfdevelopedthisideawithreferencetothevariouswaysinwhichdominationmaybe
legitimated,identifyingthreetypesofauthoritytowhichpartieslayclaim.First,thereischarismatic
authority,whichisrootedindevotiontotheexceptionalsanctity,heroismorexemplarycharacterofan
individualperson,andofthenormativepatternsororderrevealedorordainedbyhim(Weber1968,i.
215).Becauseofitsfocusonauniqueindividual,suchauthorityisunstable,butitcanberoutinisedand
thusmademoresustainable,althoughatthepriceofaninevitablelossinthemystiquethatattachedtothe
original bearer: thewarlordandhiscompanionsbecomethemoremundanestate;theprophet andhis
disciples,thechurch;andsoon(Weber1968,iii.1121).Secondly,thereistraditionalauthoritybasedon
an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions (Weber 1968, i. 215), which is most
commonlyexpressedthroughpatriarchalismandpatrimonialism,wheresubordinateactorsareunderthe
personalsubjugationoftheirrulerasmaster,whoseauthorityisjustified,andsometimeslimited,bythe
appealtotraditionratherthanothernormativebases.Andthirdly,thereislegalauthority,whichdepends
onabeliefinaconsistentsystemofabstractruleswhichhavenormallybeenintentionallyestablished,to
whichtheholderofauthorityissubjectinthesamewayashissubordinates,andwhereobedienceisowed
tothesystemofrulesassuchratherthanaspersonalloyaltytotheauthorityholderasanindividual(Weber
1968,i.217).This,Weberargues,ischaracteristicofmodernsocieties,andisreflectedinbureaucracy;
here,partiesbecomeassociationsformedwithavieweithertoshapethelegalorderasawholethrough
representationinalegislature,tocommandthebureaucracythroughpossessionofexecutiveministerial
positions,ortoinsertthemselvesmoreorlessdirectlyintotheofficialdecisionmakingprocessasinterest
groups.

Nevertheless,itisoftenargued,Ithinkwithgoodreason,thatitisamistaketolimittheconceptof
partytoassociationsbasedonclassorstatus(orboth)thatoperatewithinthesestructuresofdomination
toacquirepowerandshapesocialaction;andalsothatitmaybeexcessivelycautiousonWeberspartto
restrictthepossibilitiesforactualgroupformationandconcerted,associativeactiontopartiesalone,while
denying it toclasses orstatusgroups.What thismisses,as JohnScott argues, isthat we might treat
authoritybyitselfasanotherimportant axisofstratification,suchthatwecouldidentifypeoplewho
occupysimilaradvantaged[ordisadvantaged]commandsituationsinthesocialdistributionofauthority
(Scott1996,42),whichitmightbepreferabletocallcommandgroups,blocsorelitesratherthan
parties. Such authority may be buttressed by wealth or status, but does not need to be, and thus
independently creates possibilities for the formation of social strata in its own right: a bureaucratic
functionary,forexample,mayhaveconsiderableauthoritywithinaparticularsphere,andyetstillbepoorly
paidandillregarded. Thinkingintheseterms,onemightwishtoaddafurthercategorytoManners
conceptualscheme:perhapstheEUhasakindofbureaucraticpower,whichreflectsitsabilitytocreate
tiesbetweenitsofficialsandthosewithinotherorganizations,andactuallytoacquirepositionsofauthority
withinhierarchicallystructuredinternationalorganizations.ButIwillnotdevelopthatpossibilityhere.
TocompletethisconceptualframeworkIwouldliketointroduceanotherWeberianidea,which
hasalsobeenexpandedbyneoWeberianscholars:theconceptofsocialclosure(Parkin1979;Murphy
1988).Theessenceofsocialclosureistheattempttorestrictaccesstosocialpowertoaparticulargroup,
whetheraclass,astatusgrouporanelite.Thusithelpsustothinkaboutthewaysinwhichpeoplewithin
particularclass,statusorcommandsituationsemployvariousstrategiesinordertoensuretheirdomination
overothers.Throughsocialclosureastatusgroup(anaristocracyoracaste,perhaps)couldmonopolise
opportunitiestogainwealthoroccupypositionsofcommand;or,alternatively,aneconomicclasscould
employ techniques of social closure to increase its status and authority. Social closure may involve
exclusion,whichisemployedbycurrently superioractorstokeeptheirinferiorsdown;orusurpation,
whichisamoreradical strategy employedbyinferior actorstoimprove theirposition(Parkin1979).
Exclusionisusuallymuchmoreprominent,andusurpationarystrategies(suchastheunionisationoflabour
orstrikeaction)mustoftenoperateontheedgeoflegality.Eachmay,inprinciple,takemanyforms,and
maybedirectedatdifferentcharacteristicsofsocialgroups.Thus,forexample,exclusionmaybeorganised
alongraciallines,asforexampleintheapartheidsystem;oritmaybeorganisedonthebasisofkinship,as
insystemswherebloodandlineageareseenasimportantdeterminantsofsocialposition.Closuremay
operatebetweensocialclassesforwhichMarxisttheoriesoffercopiousexamplesoritmayoperate
withinaclass,asforexampleinattemptsbyworkingclassestorestrictrightsofimmigrantlabour.Itcould
operatebetweenstatusgroups,asforexampleinacastesystemwherebirthdefinessocialprestige;or
withinstatusgroups,forexampleinthedenialofwomensrightsofinheritancewithinaristocraticfamilies.
Inmodernsocieties,Parkinargues,themosttypicalformsofexclusionaryclosureareproperty
ownershipandcredentialism.(Inpremodernsocieties,closureisoftenachievedthroughalternativemeans,
suchaslineageandkinassociation.)Thepurposeoftheformeristopreventgeneralaccesstothemeans
ofproductionanditsfruits(Parkin1979,48),andisthusgenerallyassociatedwithsocietiesstratified
along class lines. Credentialism involves the inflated use of educational certificates as a means of
monitoringentrytokeypositionsinthedivisionoflabour(Parkin1979,54;seealsoCollins1979).Of
course,appropriatetrainingforspecificpositionsmaybeimportanttoguaranteeingefficiency,andthusis
explicableinfunctionalistterms(DavisandMoore1945istheclassicaccount).Butinmanycases,as
Weberobserved,thisconcernforefficientperformancerecedesbehindtheinterestinlimitingthesupply
ofcandidatesforthebeneficesandhonoursofagivenoccupation(citedinParkin1979,55).Itistelling,

totakejustoneexample,thatfewprofessionsinsistonretestingtheirmemberscompetenceafterinitial
entryintothefield.
Onepointofinterestinthesetwotypicallymodernformsofexclusionaryclosureisthedifficulty
theypresentforthedominantclassintermsofpassingonitsadvantageoussocialpositiontosubsequent
generations.Itisnot,ofcourse,impossible.Manysocieties,despiteclaimstomeritocracy,continueto
allowpropertytobehandedonthroughinheritanceandpermitprivateeducationtopersistasawayof
creatingstructuraladvantagesforchildrenfromwealthyfamiliestogainthecredentialsthatarenecessary
for well paid, high status or authoritative careers. Nevertheless, both property and credentialism are
relativelyindividualisticformsofsocialexclusion,andprovidefewerguaranteesforthesuccessofones
descendantsthansystemsbasedlessequivocallyonfamilyconnections.Bythesametoken,itismuch
hardertoexcludetalentedmembersoflowerclassesfromrisingwithinsuchsystemsofsocialclosure,and
ingeneralthesocietyislikelytobemorefluid,inthesenseofeasiermobilitybetweensocialstrata,andthe
stratathemselvesareconsequentlylikelytobemorefragmentedandsegmentedintermsoftheirinternal
composition.Thepoint,asParkinobserves,isthatthesystemisnotdesignedtoprotecttheprivilegesofa
particular groupofpeople assuch; it ismorededicated totheperpetuation ofbourgeoisvaluesthan
bourgeoisblood,as,mutatismutandis,isalsothecaseintheocraciesorcommunistpartysystemswhere
ideologicalzealisprizedabovebiologicaldescent(Parkin1979,63).
Thissuggestsacontrastbetweencollectivistandindividualistformsofclosure,andthetension
betweenthemthatischaracteristicofmanysocialhierarchies.Collectivistexclusiondiscriminatesonthe
basisofgroupcharacteristics,oftenintermsofhighlyvisiblemarkerssuchasrace,gender,religion,and
evensymbolicindicatorssuchasclothing.Itstendencyistocreateasubordinategroupofacommunal
character that is, one defined in terms of an allencompassing negative status (Parkin 1979, 68).
Although, as this suggests, collectivist exclusion is typical of status societies, it can extend to class
stratifiedsocietiesaswell:onemightpointheretonineteenthcenturyEuropeansocietieswheremembers
oftheworkingclasses(often,revealingly,referredtoaslowerorders)sufferedfromwholesaleexclusion
fromcivilsociety,inthesensethat[t]hebadgeofproletarianstatuscarriedwithitthekindsofstigmata
commonlyassociatedwithsubordinateracialandethnicgroups.Itwasatotalconditionwhichpermitted
littleleewayforthecultivationofthosesmallparttimeidentitiesthatbringtemporaryreleasefromthe
humilitiesofservilestatus(Parkin1979,68).Individualistformsofsocialclosure,bycontrast,createa
subordinategroupmarkedbyintensesocialfragmentationandinchoateness(Parkin1979,68).Among
otherthings,thisunderminessystemsofdeference,whichcanonlyoperateeffectivelywhenthestatusof
strangerscanaccuratelybejudged,andtheinformationrequiredforthisisdifficulttocomebywithoutthe
aidofacollectiviststereotype(Parkin1979,69).
Socialstatus,socialclosureandtheEUsnormativepower
I have proposed that there are three main ways of conceptualizing where normative power comes from: the
logical validity of a moral argument, the rhetorical skill with which values are communicated, and the
attractiveness of certain values because of the high prestige of the status group whose way of life embodies
them. Each implies a particular strategy through which the values will be diffused. The moral perspective
on normative power suggests the importance of reasonableness, and that both advocate and listener should
be open-minded about accepting the force of the better argument. The political perspective highlights the
importance of effective communication in terms of the ability to persuade. And the social perspective
concentrates on how high status groups come to command the esteem of other actors through their adoption

of a culturally distinctive style of life, which gives their values an attractiveness that makes others want to
emulate them, to ape the lifestyles of the elite.
Typesofnormativepower
Whyarevaluespowerful?

Howarevaluesdiffused?

MORAL

Logicalvalidity

Reasonableness/
Forceofthebetterargument

POLITICAL

Rhetoricalskill

Persuasiveness/
Effectivecommunication

Highprestige

Exclusiveness/
Attractionandemulation

SOCIAL

ThenormativepoweroftheEUcoulddependonalloftheseatonce:theyarenotmutuallyexclusive;itis
quiteeasytoimagineavirtuous,smoothtonguedaristocrat.However,Ihavealsosuggestedthatthereare
problemswiththefirstwayofconceptualizingnormativepower,sinceitreliesonthenotionthatmoral
reasonisindeedsomethinguniversalthatcanmakeatransculturaldiscussionofthelogicalvalidityof
differentmoralprinciplesagenuinepossibility;thatwayliesacontroversyintowhichIdonothavetimeto
go any deeper here, but I will merely signal it as a possible dilemma for that particular way of
understandingtheconcept.Thepoliticalimportanceofpersuasioniswidely,andrightly,seenasintegralto
theEUsnormativepower,andtodiscussionsaboutsoftpoweringeneral,andIhaveagreedthatitis
indispensable.However,Ihavealsonotedthatthereareproblemsinexplainingsystematicinequalitiesin
thenormativepowerofdifferentactorsintheseterms.Ifnormativepowerisjustafunctionofrhetorical
skill,it ishard,althoughbynomeansimpossible,toseepurelypolitical reasons whytheEUshould
consistentlyhavemoreofitthanotherinternationalactorsororganizations.
This is where I think the social dimension of normative power can be particularly helpful,
especiallywhentheideaofsocialclosureisemployed.ItsuggeststhatthenormativepoweroftheEU
ultimately depends on its ability to establish itself as a prestigious, highstatus actor in international
politics.Inotherwords,thesocialdimensionofnormativepowerhelpsustounderstandwhytheEUisa
normativepowerratherthananormativeweakling.AsMannersrepeatedlyasserts,anessentialdimension
ofnormativepowerEuropeistheEUsabilitytoconstructforitselfaninternationalidentitythatembodies
ahighlydistinctivewayofbeingintheworld,oforganisingbothdomesticpoliticalsystemsandrelations
betweenstates(aswellasManners2002,seealsoManners&Whitman2003).Thethesisofnormative
powerEuropecallsattentiontowhattheEU is,ratherthansimplywhatitsaysordoes;andoneofthe
cardinalpremissesofthethesisisthattheEUisakindofinternationalactorthatisfundamentallydifferent
fromtraditionalWestphalianpolities:itrepresentstheantithesisofthestateinthepostColdWarworld
(Manners&Whitman2003,399).Aswithanystatusgroup,itssocialpositionrestsnotuponitswealth,but
uponthefactthatitpursuesaparticularlifestyle,andonethatretainsacertaindistanceorexclusiveness

10

fromothers;these,asWebersuggested,arethefoundationsofstatushonour.Moreover,onemightnote
thatinseveralrespectstheEUdoesseemtovaluewhatonemightcallstateswaysoflifeforexample,
theirhumanrightsrecordoverwhatWeberdescribedasthepretensionsofmereproperty.Aspirantsto
membershipneedtomeetanexactingsetofnormativestandards,andwhiletheireconomiesneedtoexhibit
certaincharacteristics,beingarelativelysmallorpoorstatedoesnotappeartobeasignificantbarrierto
entry.WithintheEU,also,thisleadstoacertainegalitarianismbetweenlargeandsmallstates.Although
largerstatesobviouslyhaveagreaterinfluenceonEUdecisionmakingthroughinstitutionssuchasQMV,
ingeneraltheEUisorganisedinawaythatrepresentsaradicaldeparturefromtheinternalpoliticsofthe
Europeansystemofthenineteenthcentury,wherethespecialmanagerialroleoftheGreatPowerswas
explicitlyintendedtogivethemadecisivesayininternationalaffairs,andtorelegateLesserPowersor
SecondaryPowerstoanunambigiouslysubordinaterole.Onecouldsaythatthereisacertainequalityof
status within the EU that it constitutes a distinct statusgroup, inother words that mitigates the
dramaticinequalitiesinsize,capabilityandwealthamongtheMemberStates.
Thisstillleavesacrucialquestion.TheEUmayhavebeenabletoconstructadistinctiveidentity
andlifestyle(orstyleofconductinginternationalrelations,ifoneprefers)thatunderpinsitsspecialstatusin
internationalrelationsbylendingitdistanceandexclusivityfromotheractors.Butwhydoesthatlifestyle
appear to attract so much prestige as to encourage emulation from other states and international
organisations,andhowisitabletoretainthatprestigeovertimeinsuchawaythatitappearsasagenuine
and lasting normative power? One obvious answer to that question would simply be that the EUs
differentidentityappearstoworkintermsofgeneratingmaterialbenefitsforitself,suchaspeaceand
prosperity.OtheractorsassociatetheculturalandinstitutionaldistinctivenessoftheEUwithsuccess,and
thereforeseektoemulateitinthehopethattheytoowillenjoysimilarrewards.ButIthinkthatafurther
partoftheanswertothequestionistoexplorethepracticesofsocialclosurethroughwhichtheEUisable
tomarkitselfoffasadistinctivekindofactorinworldpoliticsandwinprestigeforthevaluesitembodies.
Toseehowitdoesso,itishelpfultoturntoamorehistoricalconsiderationofhowthenormativepowerof
Europehasdevelopedovertime,andtoexploresomeofthecontinuitiesanddifferencesbetweentheold
normativepowerEuropeofthenineteenthcentury,andthatwhichexiststoday.
A 19th-century normative power Europe?
Manners sees the historical context out of which the present-day EUs normative power has evolved as
important to understanding its special character: it was created in a post-war historical environment which
reviled the nationalisms that had led to barbarous war and genocide (Manners 2002, 240: note, in passing,
the reference to barbarous in this context). But he also strongly argues against extending that historical
comparison back into Europes somewhat murkier past of imperialism and the mission civilisatrice. Indeed,
he observes that one of the main purposes of his normative power thesis is an attempt to escape civilising
missions by countering the neocolonial discourses of claims implicit (or explicit) in civilian power
(Manners 2006, 175). As I understand it, this suggests that the old standard of civilization promoted by
European lawyers and statesmen was a phenomenon of civilian power, rather than normative power; I am
not sure that such a distinction can be maintained. In the first place, as we have already discussed,
Manners original distinction between civilian and normative power does not clearly distinguish between
them, and in his substantive discussions of how the EU diffuses its norms he frequently appeals to carrot
and stickism, and the use of civilian instruments to shape international norms. In that respect, then, the
difference between the EUs current normative role and the way in the past that it used to promote its
civilized norms is harder to see. On the other hand, Manners is also insisting that normative power is

11

something different from civilian power, and as I have argued, I think that that claim can be sustained. If we
think of normative power as ideational, then it does carry at the least a significantly different emphasis from
the more materialistic and strategically instrumentalist character that is ineluctably part of civilian power.
The question, however, is whether the old civilizing mission was essentially rooted in the exercise of
civilian power, and did not involve normative power as understood in this narrower sense. Was there a
normative power dimension to the nineteenth-century European promotion of the standard of civilization?
The civilization/barbarism dichotomy was not promoted exclusively through civilian
instruments, and did to a very large degree rest upon the construction of a distinctive cultural identity and
lifestyle that was claimed for Europe and Europeans. (Or, to be more specific, for upper and middle-class
British and French lifestyles, and occasionally central European aristocratic ones.) To be sure, European
imperialists used economic and legal institutions to promote their values, but the idea of civilisation was
developed and defended in numerous other contexts, including works by political philosophers and
historians, and works of fiction as well. Moreover, the civilized identity of nineteenth-century Europe
was, although partly, by no means entirely based on the economic and military superiority of civilized
nations. It was reflected through numerous other, often more symbolic, indicators. Race is one obvious
element to this story, but so are others, such as dress, etiquette, demeanour, and so on.Thisisnotcivilian
power.Onthecontrary,itsuggeststhatculturalandsymbolicwaysofmarkingthenormativedifference
betweenEuropeandtherestoftheworldwerenotonlyanessentialelementofthepowerwithwhich
Europeanstatesimposedtheirvaluesonothers,butperhapshaveanevenmorecentralroleinthatearlier
manifestationofEuropesattempttoshapeideasofwhatisnormalthantheydointhecontextofthe
presentdayEU.PerhapstheEuropeanimperialistswereevenmoresteepedinnormativepowerthantheir
counterpartstoday.
Having thus suggested that the old mission civilisatrice was at least in part dependent on
normative as well as civilian power, I would go further to contend that one reason for the relatively high
prestige that attaches to the EUs normative difference in international relations today is that it still draws
on that legacy created in the nineteenth century. This claim may appear counter-intuitive. Despite a few
dissenters (for example, Ferguson 2003), it has become almost axiomatic that imperialism is one of the
worlds great evils. Is this not a past of which we should be ashamed? Surely, then, any whiff of association
between the current EU and earlier European imperialism would do more harm than good to the formers
social prestige in contemporary international affairs? That would perhaps be true, if the normative
principles embodied in the standard of civilization had indeed been expunged from the society of states
after the Second World War. But they were not. On the contrary, as I have argued elsewhere (Keene 2002),
the reconstruction of international order after 1945 was characterised above all by the attempt to merge the
putatively universally applicable values embodied in the European idea of civilization with the more
tolerant and pluralistic attitude contained in the rapid spread of the norm of the reciprocal recognition of
sovereignty to those other parts of the world which had previously laboured in subjection under the
imperialist yoke. Manners is quite right to point to the repulsion with barbarous war as a key normative
element in the origins of the EU; but what that tells us is that, having previously sought to civilize Asian
and African peoples, Europeans now found it necessary to civilize themselves, or, more particularly the
German (and Communist) elements that had long been suspicious of the Anglo-French civilizing mission,
which they had seen as an attempt to impose English (or capitalist) values upon themselves. Once that
project had been successfully completed within Europe -- that is to say, once the European critics of
civilization had effectively been neutralized -- the EU could return to its mission of exporting these values
to the outside world. And, in a sense, Manners is quite right to suggest that these values constitute aseries
of normative principles that are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be
universallyapplicable(Manners2008,46).ButthatisbecauseEuropeansweresuccessfulininsinuating

12

theirideaofcivilizationintotheCharteroftheUnitedNationsitself.WithintheUnitedNationssystem,
theyhadalreadysubstantiallywonthebattletoshapewhatwasregardedasnormal,andforthattheycan
thanktheconsiderablepowermilitary,civilianandnormativethattheirnineteenthcenturyancestors
hadalreadyinvestedinthestruggle.Inbrief,then,theEUdoesconstituteitselfasanormativelydifferent
kindofentity,atleastifwetaketheWestphalianmodeltobedefinitiveforinternationalsocietyinthe
periodbefore1945(anassumptionthatIwould,forthereasonsgivenabove,contest).Butwhatreally
givesititshighprestige,andhenceitsnormativepower,isthefactthatthisinternationalidentitydraws
uponasetofprinciplesthathadalreadybeenestablishedasacentralpartofthestructureofinternational
society.TheEUisnowspendingtheculturalcapitalthatwasgraduallyaccumulatedoverthetwocenturies
beforeitsfoundation.
Nevertheless, having just stressed the continuities between normative power Europe today and in
the nineteenth century, I would also like to acknowledge some significant differences between the two. I
think that Manners is correct to dispute any simplistic identification of the present-day EU and earlier
forms of European imperialism, but I would draw that distinction not on the grounds that one employs
normative power, while the other was rooted in civilian power, but instead on the fact that their attempts to
maintain and enhance their high status within international society involve quite different forms of social
closure, and this marks a fundamental distinction between the two.
To return to the framework used by Parkin, the old idea that Europe constituted a family of
civilized nations represented a largely collectivist type of social closure, in the sense that it relegated nonEuropeans, especially Asians and Africans, to asubordinategroupofacommunalcharactercondemned
inescapablytoanallencompassingnegativestatus.Thefactthatsymbolicmarkerssuchasskincolour,
dressandevenmannerismswereemployedtodenotetheboundarybetweencivilizationandbarbarismwas
crucialtothis,inpreciselythesamewaythatthelowerorderswerelockedintoasubordinatesocialrole
thatwasclearlymarkedbysimilarindicators.Anineteenthcenturymemberoftheworkingclasseslooked
asdifferentfromabourgeoisasanIndianNativePrincedidfromLordSalisbury(seeCannadine2001for
interestingreflectionsontheinterlockingbetweendomesticandinternationalhierarchiesinthisrespect,
onewhichsuggeststhatitmaynotbeaccuratetospeakinovergeneralisedtermsaboutEuropeinthis
context).Insuchaworld,socialmobilitywasextremelyrestricted,andonesimmersion,probablyforlife,
withinaparticularstatusgroupaffectedalmosteverysingleaspectofhowonerelatedtoothers,thekinds
ofpastimesinwhichoneindulged,thekindsoforganisations(internationalaswellasdomestic)ofwhich
onewasamember.
Bycontrast,theEUsnormativepowertodayoperatesthroughamuchmoreindividualistformof
socialclosure,onethatreliesheavilyoncredentialismratherthancommunalorsymbolicindicatorsof
identityandstatus.ItwouldbeabsurdtoimagineanyonefromwithintheEUtodayassertingthatits
prestigerestsonfactorssuchasskincolour,dressorgoodmanners;whattheEUclaimsforitselfnow,
instead,isknowledge andcompetence. Byknowledge Ipartlymeanmoral knowledge,especially in
regardtoitspromotionofvaluessuchaslibertyandhumanrights,butIalsomeantechnicalexpertisein
spheressuchastheeconomy,theenvironment,orthefieldsofinternationalorganizationsandinternational
law.Onthebasisofitsmanagement ofalarge, complexandmultinational economicsystem,andits
contributiontoasustainedperiodofpeaceamongEuropeanstates,itcanalsolayclaimtocompetencein
thematterofgoodgovernment.Thisapproachislessimmersivethanthekindofsocialclosurethrough
whichEuropeanstatesmarkedthemselvesoffasnormativelydifferentinthepast.Thestateswithwhich
theEUcurrentlyengagesarenolongersubordinatedunderacommunalidentityofbarbarism,andthe
shift towards credentialism makes it easier for their governments to move closer towards the values
advancedbytheEUontheirownaccount,byacquiringthenecessarycredentials,particularlyintheform

13

ofexpertadvisersandbureaucratswiththeappropriatetraining,or(forexample)bysigninguptolegal
instrumentsthatmimicEUprinciplesonissuessuchashumanrights.Thus,asaverysignificantdifference
fromtheoldcivilization/barbarismdichotomy,thechangeinhowtheEUtriestoreinforceitsprestige,and
hencethepowerofitspreferredvaluesleadstogreaterpossibilitiesforwhatwemightcallsocialmobility
ininternationalsociety.
Atthesametime,however,thismayposeproblemsfortheEUinthefuture.Aswesawearlier,
theflipsidetoincreasedsocialmobilityinindividualisticsystemsisatendencytowardsintensesocial
fragmentationandinchoateness.ThiscouldchallengetheEUsabilitytomaintainitsownsenseofits
internationalidentityanditsnormativedifference.Ifitdoesnotstand,asinthenineteenthcentury,foran
avowedlyEuropeancivilization,butinsteadforakindofadministrativeandinternationalbestpractice,
will it perhaps lose its cultural distinctiveness altogether and become just one kind of competent,
technicallyexpertbureaucraticregulatingmechanisminaworldmadeupofexactlyidenticalmechanisms?
ThereiseventhepossibilityofadangertoEuropeanstatescurrentlyprivilegedpositionasprestigious
and,indeed,materiallywealthyactors.AsParkinobserved,authenticallyindividualistsystemsofsocial
closuretendnottobeconcernedwithmaintainingtheprivilegesofaparticulargroupofpeopleovertime,
butratherwithpreservingbourgeoisvaluesratherthanbourgeoisblood.Ofcourse,manysupposedly
individualistsocietiesdoimposelimitsonsocialmobilityfromoneclassorstatusgrouptoanotherinways
thatruncountertothesupposedfluidityoftheprinciplesonwhichtheyarebased.Thus,forexample,
credentialist societies often fail toprovide genuinely equal access to educational opportunities and so
facilitate the transmission of inequalities from one generation to another; through laws permitting
inheritance,propertyispasseddowninasimilarway,conferringadvantages,ifnotalwaysdecisiveones,
onthosewhoarebornintowealthyclasses,andsoagainmakinginequalitiesmorelikelytopersistacross
generations. Obviously,many of these specific ways ofrestricting the consequences of individualistic
socialclosuredonotapplytointernationalrelations.Butitdoessuggestthat,whilewemaywanttolaud
thepositivesthatcomewiththeshiftfromacollectivisttoanindividualistformofsocialclosureinhow
theEUtriestomaintainitsdistinctivestatusininternationalsocietyanddeployitsresultingnormative
power,weshouldalsokeepacarefuleyeonhow,atthesametime,theEUwillnaturallyhaveaninterestin
ensuringthepreservationoftherelativelyprivilegedposition,inbothmaterialandnormativeterms,thatit
anditsmembersenjoy.
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