PEOPLE v PURISIMA

November 20, 1978

Munoz Palma, J.
PETITIONERS
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS
1.
2.
3.

HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, etc.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, etc.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, etc.

NATURE
26 petitions for review of CFI decisions
BRIEF
In the informations of the cases, it was only alleged that the accused carried weapons, it was not alleged that they
carried them with intent to do bad things. Carrying + intent are the 2 elements of the offense. Since incomplete
yung Informations, Judges dismissed charges. Sol Gen: Mere carrying of weapon is prohibited na kagad, regardless
of intent! Court: OA mo edi nakulong na lahat ng barbero sa kanto? Kaloka. No thanks!
FACTS
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three
respondent Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on the ground that the Information
did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state
one essential element of the crime. There are two essential elements of the offense in PD 9: (1) the carrying
outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon and (2) it is in furtherance or on the
occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder. Only the first element, the carrying of the weapon, was alleged. The second element was not included in
these Informations.
CFI DECISIONS
Judge Purisima: [] the information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for
the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public
disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this
specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege
sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. []
Judge Maceren: It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed,
pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D.
No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
or is intended to bring about these conditions. [...] The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly
weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear
to be not unlawful and punishable by law.

Judge Polo: [] We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforecited Presidential decree, the same should
be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. [...]
PD 9 PREAMBLE + PROVISIONS

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been
placed under a state of martial law; []
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms,
explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan
knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles
are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.

Sol Gen: The prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. The act proscribed is essentially a malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
The City Fiscal of Manila: In statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial. ;
that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated.
ISSUES x RULING
1.

WON the Informations filed by the People are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense
of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9

a.

It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Sec 5, Rule 110 of ROC: For a complaint or information to be sufficient it must state the designation of the
offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

NO.

Judge Maceren: The carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila
city ordinance.

Sec 26, Act No. 1780: It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie
knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: [...] Any person violating the provisions of this section
shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five

hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of Manila (amended by 3928): penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 and/or
imprisonment for not more than one month anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any
manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon
[...] in any public place.

This statute and ordinance are not repealed by PD 9 (3).

b.

The elements of the offense in PD 9 are: (1) the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and (2) that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal
offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it.
c.

The position taken by petitioner that PD 9 (3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside
his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent,
or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the
presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When
ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the
measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

d.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law.

Legislative intent is the controlling factor. To determine the intent of PD 9 (3), two things should be looked at:
i.

The presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly
spelled out in the "whereas" clauses: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation
1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by
the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.

Sol Gen: A preamble of a statute, usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and
cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute [...]
Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within PD 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent
and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble which enumerates the facts or
events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
ii.

The result or effects of the PD must be within its reason or intent.

NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7,
do hereby order and decree that:

It is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081. Some of the
reasons for the issuance of Proclamation 1081 are the prevention of acts of armed insurrection, rebellion, turmoil,
etc. from lawless elements.

e.

Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied.
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should
be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose.
In the construction of PD 9 (3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a
strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences.
f.

Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.

The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3)
must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The
sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and
do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.

Sec 2 (a), Rule 117 of ROC: The defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.

These Petitions were unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available remedies.

Sec 7, Rule 117 of ROC: If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another information
be filed. [...]
Sec 13, Rule 110 of ROC: The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

If the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the second
element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges.
If the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under the statute Sec 26 of Act No. 1780 or
Manila City Ordinance No. 3820 (amended by 3928), especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal
was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
DISPOSITIVE
Petitions DENIED. CFI decisions AFFIRMED. State/Petitioners may file amended Information (under PD 9) or file a
new one (under other statute or ordinance).