Quimen v.

CA
257 SCRA 163
DOCTRINE: Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in
Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio
and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio
designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter
Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her
uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix.
According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But
Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's
property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.
Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who
provided her a pathway between their house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence.
The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long.
Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with
facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the
road.
Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was that the
proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sarisari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store.
TC dismissed Yolandas complaint, but the CA reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners
property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her
property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon. -- YES
HELD:
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due
to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures
obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most
convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way
which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

AMOR vs. FLORENTINO ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-48384
October 11, 1943
FACTS: Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on the north side,
three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the house receives light and air from the
lot where the camarin stands. Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel,one of the
respondents herein, and to Jose, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse and the lot where it is
situated to Maria Encarnancion. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1882, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the windows
in question.
Maria Encarnacion sold her lot and the warehouse thereon to the petitioner Amor, the deed of sale stating that the vendor had inherited
the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. Later, petitioner destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house.
Respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from building higher than the original structure and from executing any work
which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through the four windows referred to.
The trial court declared that an easement of light and view had been established in favor of the property of the plaintiffs (respondents
herein) and ordered Amor to remove within 30 days all obstruction to the windows of respondents house, to abstain from constructing
within three meters from the boundary line, and to pay for damages.
The CA affirmed the judgment of the CFI, hence this petition asking for the setting aside of said decision.
ISSUE:
1.

1. WON the easement of light and view under review has been established in favor of the property of respondents through
prescription

2.

2. WON Art 541 of the civil code is applicable in this case, especially regarding the correct time of death of Maria Florentino

3.

3. WON the Yu-tibo case applies in the case at bar

4.

4. WON Amor is an innocent purchaser for value

HELD: the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed

1. YES; The easement involved in this case is of two aspects: light and view and altius non tollendi. These two aspects necessarily go together
because an easement of light and view prevents the owner of the sevient estate from building to a height that will obstruct the windows.
This court in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo, supra, held that the easement concerned when there is an apparent sign established by the owner of two
estates is positive. This being so, and inasmuch as the original heirs of Maria succeeded to these two estates either in 1885 or in 1892 and as
petitioner bought one of the lots in 1911, the prescriptive period under any legislation that may be applied the Partidas, Civil Code or
Code of Civil Procedure has elapsed without the necessity of formal prohibition on the owner of the servient estate. The respondents
action was brought in 1938. The persons who were present, and 20 years between absentees. According to article 537 of the Civil Code,
continous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription for 20 years. Under sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the period is 10 years.
At the time the devisees took possession of their respective portions of the inheritance, neither the respondents nor Maria Encarnacion
said or did anything with respect to the four windows of the respondents house. The respondents did not renounce the use of the
windows, either by stipulation or by actually closing them permanently. On the contrary, they exercised the right of receiving light and air
through those windows. Neither did the petitioners predecessor in interest, Maria Encarnacion, object to them or demand that they be
closed. The easement was therefore created from the time of the death of the original owner of both estates, so when petitioner bought the
land and the camarin thereon from Maria Encarnancion, the burden of this easement continued on the real property so acquired because
according to Article 534, easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively pertain.
It is well known that easements are established, among other cases, by the will of the owners. (Article 536 of the Code.) It was an act which
was, in fact, respected and acquiesced in by the new owner of the servient estate, since he purchased it without making any stipulation
against the easement existing thereon, but, on the contrary, acquiesced in the continuance of the apparent sign thereof. As is stated in the

decision itself, It is a principle of law that upon a division of a tenement among various persons in the absence of any mention in the
contract of a mode of enjoyment different from that to which the former owner was accustomed such easements as may be necessary
for the continuation of such enjoyment are understood to subsist. It will be seen, then, that the phrase active enjoyment involves an
idea directly opposed to the enjoyment which is the result of a mere tolerance on the part of the adjacent owner, and which, as it is not
based upon an absolute, enforceable right, may be considered as of a merely passive character
2. YES; Art. 541 provides:
The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of
them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed
Petitioner assigns as an error of the CA the supposed failure of that tribunal to pass upon his motion to consider certain allegedly new
evidence to prove that Maria Florentino, the original owner of the properties, died in 1885. Petitioner alleges that Maria Florentino died in
1885 and, therefore, the Law of the Partidas should be followed in this case and not the Civil Code.

Granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino died in 1885, as contended by petitioner, nevertheless the same principle enunciated in article 541
of the Spanish Civil Code was already an integral part of the Spanish law prior to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have
to be upheld. The law before the Civil Code was the same as at present.
3. NO; petitioner contends that the doctrine in that case is controlling in the present one, but the facts and theories of both cases are
fundamentally dissimilar. In that case, Cortes sought an injunction to restrain Yu-Tibo from continuing the construction of certain
buildings. Cortes wife owned a house in Manila which had windows that had been in existence since 1843. The defendant, who occupied a
house on the adjoining lot, commenced to raise the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in the house owned
by plaintiffs wife had been covered. This Court, in affirming the judgment of the lower court which dissolved the preliminary injunction,
held that the opening of windows through ones own wall does not in itself create an easement, because it is merely tolerated by the
owner of the adjoining lot, who may freely build upon his land to the extent of covering the windows, under article 581, and that his kind
of easement is negative which can be acquired through prescription by counting the time from the date when the owner of the dominant
estate in a formal manner forbids the owner of the servient estate from obstructing the light, which had not been done by the plaintiff in
this case.
It will thus be clear that one of the essential differences between that case and the present is that while the Yu-Tibo case involved
acquisition of easement by prescription, in the present action the question is the acquisition of easement by title, or its equivalent, under
article 541. Therefore, while a formal prohibition was necessary in the former case in order to start the period of prescription, no such act
is necessary here because the existence of the apparent sign when Maria Florentino died was sufficient title in itself to created the easement.
Another difference is that while in the Yu-Tibo case, there were wo different owners of two separate houses from the beginning, in the
present case there was only one original owner of the two structures. Each proprietor in the Yu-Tibo case was merely exercising his rights
of dominion, while in the instant case, the existence of the apparent sign upon the death of the original owner ipso facto burdened the land
belonging to petitioners predecessor in interest, with the easements of light and view and altius non tollendi in virtue of article 541.
Finally, the Yu-Tibo case was decided upon the theory if the negative easement of altius non tollendi, while the instant case is predicated on
the idea of the positive easement of light and view under article 541.
4. .The petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the lot and camarin thereon, and that he was not bound to know
the existence of the easement because the mere opening of windows on ones own wall does not ipso facto create an easement of light. Such
contention might perhaps be in point if the estates had not originally belonged to the same owner, who opened the windows. But the
petitioner was in duty bound to inquire into the significance of the windows, particularly because in the deed of sale, it was stated that the
seller had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. Referring to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain dated February
7, 1896, which applied Article 541, this Court in the case of Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo already cited, said that the establishment of the easement was
an act which was in fact respected and acquiesced in by the new owner of the servient estate, since he purchased it without making any
stipulation against the easement existing thereon, but on the contrary acquiesced in the new owner of the servient estate, since he
purchased it without making any stipulation against the easement existing thereon, but on the contrary, acquiesced in the continuance of
the apparent sign thereof. (p. 31). Moreover, it has been held that purchasers of lands burdened with apparent easements do not enjoy the
rights of third persons who acquire property, though the burden it not recorded. (Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, April 5,
1898).

When petitioner bought this lot from the original coheir, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, the windows on respondents house were visible.
It was petitioners duty to inquire into the significance of those windows. Having failed to do so, he cannot now question the easement
against the property which he purchased.
NOTES:

1. According to Article 536, easements are established by law or by will of the owners. Acquisition of easements is first by title or its
equivalent and secondly by prescription. What acts take the place of title? They are mentioned in Articles 540 and 541, namely,
(1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate;
(2) a final judgment; and
(3) an apparent sign between two estates, established by the owner of both, which is the case of article 541.
2. under article 541 of the Civil Code, the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence .
3. As to the implied contract. Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3 provided that easements were acquired by contract, by will and by prescription.
There was consequently an implied agreement between Maria Florentina and the devisees of the house with the four windows to the effect
that the service of these windows would continue, thus creating the easement of light and view and the concomitant easement ofaltius non
tollendi. Hence, the easement in question was acquired by Gabriel and Jose through contract under Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3
Solid Manila v. Bio Hong Trading
195 SCRA 748
DOCTRINES:
1. Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part, and even if they are possessed of a separate juridical
existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or mortgaged separately.
2. The vendee of real property in which a servitude or easement exists, did not acquire the right to close that servitude or put up
obstructions thereon, to prevent the public from using it.
FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. (petitioner) owns a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel owned by
Bio Hong Trading (respondent). The latters title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an
easement of way approx. 914sqm converted as a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. As a consequence, an annotation
was entered in the respondents title. The petitioners and its neighbors made use of the private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep. Thereafter, respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use. Respondent filed a case to remove said gates and
to allow full access to the easement, which was granted. In the Court of Appeals, it was held that since respondent has acquired title to the
property, merger brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
ISSUE:
Whether the easement still exists or had been extinguished by merger?
HELD:
The easement still exists on the property of Bio Hong Trading.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it,
because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintains an independent existence. Thus: Art. 617.
Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as
mere accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's
claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to
use (jus utendi). As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring
914sqm, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ." and precisely, the former
owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on account of the easement.

Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property including the disputed alley as a
result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public
from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of
the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and
servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to
be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of
a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a
dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner
relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the
public if that is possible no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
2 Phil. 24
DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative easement. When easement is negative, there should be a formal act of
opposition for prescription to run.
FACTS:
Cortes wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows open on the adjacent property (No. 63), a neighboring house on the same
street. This setting has been in existent since 1843. The tenant of the adjacent property raised the roof of house No. 63 in such a manner
that half of the windows of house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large part of air and light.
Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years, he acquired from prescription an easement of
light in favor of house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63. Consequently, he has acquired the right to restrain the making of any
improvement in the latter house which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. Further, he contends that the easement of
light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the
date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, from the time that said windows were opened with the
knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part.
Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition must begin from the date on
which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something
which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.
Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed the case.
ISSUE:
WON the easement is positive/negative
HELD:
Easement is negative.
The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and therefore pertains to the class which cannot be
acquired by prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the
owner of the dominant estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an act which would be lawful were
it not for the easement.
In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of house No. 63 to make
improvements which might obstruct the light of house No. 65, at any time prior to the complaint, has not acquired, nor could he acquire
by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the period which the law demands for such
prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.