CASTILLO VS ESCUTIN

G.R No. 171056

13 March 2009
Ponente: Chico-NAzario,J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dinah Castillo is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel),
married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her
favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla
(Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy.
Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner upon verifying the ownership of the said lot was able to secure an Order issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform approving the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc.
for conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713. She was also able to get from
the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true
copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a
Certification attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not
covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale
of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned
that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point
Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty. The public auction still pushed through and
Petitioner bought Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot 13713,
she was shocked to find out that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to
be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129642 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A, both in the
name of Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac).
On 25 July 2002, TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T134609 in the name of Summit Realty was issued in its place.
Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman to charge the officials
privy on the disputed property. She averred that: (1) The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin , as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, did not
express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and
conformity to the terms of the Deed. (2) That being a corporation, Summit Realty could only act through
its Board of Directors. (3) That Catigbac had long been dead and buried. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin
no longer had authority to execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of
Summit Realty, making the said Deed null and void ab initio. (4) That the Special Power of Attorney
dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty
which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. (5) Lastly,
petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the
issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled title

which was used as basis for canceling petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No.
00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner Juanita H. Sta.
Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance registered. He likewise
denied petitioners request to have her Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated on TCT No. T134609.Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any probable cause to criminally
charge private individuals
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
finding no reason to administratively or criminally charge respondents. Hence, this petition for certiorari
to Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON petitioners title evidenced by tax declaration must be upheld rather than that covered by
certificate of title
HELD: NO. As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioners title, evidenced
only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate
of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B.
RATIO:
The court even clarified the distinction between a title and certificate of title. Title is generally
defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation
of ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property.
Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.
Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a
true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original
registration.
Catigbacs certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent public
officers and even petitioner herself. Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax
receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not
conclusive evidence of the same. Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square meter property from
Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence
her title.
The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of the issuance of
a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000
square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT
No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence
of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and
conclusive upon the whole world. Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the
City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax
declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name
of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of
another person, not supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled;
otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the
same property.
Petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty by
Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman

for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already acquired a certificate of
title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible
evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally attacked in the
administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree categorically provides that a certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant
petitioners prayer in the instant Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty.

RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS vs RD PARANAQUE

G.R No. 133240

15 November 2000

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from Rudolf
Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence of
its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real
properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a
petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Paraaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the
titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the
subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the
custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and alleged
that its lands are located in Paraaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground
of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the
properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied the
Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay
City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it
could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE: WON the subject parcels of land are located in Paranque City hence venue was properly laid
HELD: YES. In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces of the
titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are situated, pursuant
to the following rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or
a portion thereof, is situated.

RATIO: Petitioner although named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay City is under the
mistaken impression that it was still the custodian of the titles to lands in Paraaque. Later, petitioner
learned that a Register of Deeds for Paraaque City had taken over the record and custody of titles
therein. Petitioner, thus, promptly moved for leave of court to amend its petition. This, to our mind, was
justified. In preparing its amended petition, petitioner likewise corrected its allegation on the location of
the lands involved.

Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. It relied on the allegation in the petition that the lands are located in Pasay
City. However, the titles of the land, copies of which were attached to the petition, plainly show that the
lands involved are situated in Paraaque City. The trial court should have considered these annexes, as
these form an integral part of the pleading.
At the very least, the trial court should have allowed petitioner to amend its petition, for this was still
a matter of right on its part.
Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking the
amendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over matters involving
the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:
Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest therein, and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land
Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or
issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within
five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such as the one
brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus:
Amendment and alteration of certificates. --- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same
by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). A
registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of
Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the
ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on
the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or
been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered
owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs
or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has
not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground and the court
may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a
new certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as
it may consider proper.

INTESTATE ESTAE OF DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO vs CA

G.R No. 103727

1 December 1996

HERMOSSISIMA, JR. J;
FACTS:
The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the
ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000
hectares or 214,047 quiniones, on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero
4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon
City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands
extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan
Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south
They filed complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with
damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San
Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban against
Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz,
Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose
D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment &
Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro.
It was alleged (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able
to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592,
149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614[9] and Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333;
(2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain
portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory
decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of
Forest Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars
dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the
existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the
subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the
defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 312-B.
Then the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and also the Court of Appeals. Hence
this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and therefore the lands covered or claimed under
such title are not included in the estate of the deceased
HELD. YES. The Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo
and Dela Cruz. Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents became

indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592,
8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of
validity.
RATIO: By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within six (6)
months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. Otherwise, noncompliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. Spanish titles can no longer be
countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.
Moroever, the court found that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the
complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R. No. 103727 on August
15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasaos Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulos validity
notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez
Order of November 17, 1978. The court is in accord with Court of Appeals courts holding insofar as it
concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo,
Buhain and Dela Cruz.
In the SCs mind, the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is the
lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. In
both cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor
a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo
despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. Q-RP) to produce it as requested by the Republic from the then
administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other
interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners
referred to a document known as hypoteca allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said
hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery
of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of
their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented.

LEGARDA vs SALEEBY
G.R No. 8936

2 OCTOBER 1915

Johnson,J:
FACTS:
Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila. Between
their lots is a stone wall which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On March 2, 1906, Consuelo and
her husband presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration to register their lot. The registration
was allowed on October 25, 1906. They were then issued an original certificate and the title was
registered. Both included the wall. T he said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the
Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906.
On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of N.M. Saleeby presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for registration. The court decreed the registration of the land which also included the
wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, her husband, discovered that the wall has also been registered to
N.M. Saleeby. They presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for adjustment and correction
of the error where the wall was indicated in both registrations.
However, the lower court contended that during the pendency of the petition for the registration
of the defendants land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall,
in the name of the defendant.
ISSUE: WON Legardas registration shall prevail
HELD: YES
RATIO: The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in
part, comprised in the earlier certificate. Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by
the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the
certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two
certificates of title to be conclusive.
The primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a
certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing
with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and
the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the
method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after
the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or
right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under
such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, Saleeby was the first negligent
(granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not
opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the

registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear
and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and
should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land
upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that
judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.
Courts have decided that in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. In case
of successive vendees, the general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than
his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier
certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be
protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of
third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections.
In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the
same to Saleeby.
The court ruled that defendant Saleeby cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of
the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the
purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another
earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence.
By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the
difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in
said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a
certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the
original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
Furthermore, the court ruled that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his
successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the case at bar
rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of
the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one
who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights.
The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the
public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer
the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence. It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons
have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.