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Mathematicians, Historians
and Newton's Principia
Stephen D. Snobelen

Department of History and Philosophy of

Science , University of Cambridge , Free School
Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH, UK
Published online: 05 Nov 2010.

To cite this article: Stephen D. Snobelen (2001) Mathematicians,

Historians and Newton's Principia, Annals of Science, 58:1, 75-84, DOI:
10.1080/000337901457704
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An n a l s o f Sc i e n c e , 58 (2001), 75 84

Essay Review
Mathematicians, Historians and Newtons Principia

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Ni c c o l o ` Gu i c c i a r d i n i , Reading the Principia : The Debate on Newtons Mathematical

Methods for Natural Philosophy from 1687 to 1736. Cambridge : Cambridge University
Press, 1999. v 285 pp. 50.00 (hbk), ISBN 0 521 64066 0.
Reviewed by
St e p h e n D. Sn o b e l e n , Department of History and Philosophy of Science,
University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK
1. Introduction
Already known for The Development of Newtonian Calculus in Britain, 1700 1800,
together with a series of articles on the history of mathematics, Niccolo` Guicciardini
has now given the world of Newton scholarship a study of the mathematics of the
Principia that is at once technically sound and historically sensitive. Reading the
Principia is not meant to be a general introduction to the mathematics and physics
of Newton s magnum opus ; as the author himself acknowledges, for this, specialist
readers can already turn to a rich supply of works by such scholars as John Herivel,
Bernard Cohen, Derek Whiteside, Bruce Brackenridge, Subrahmanya n
Chandrasekhar, Franois De Gandt and Dana Densmore. To this list we can now
add Cohens valuable Guide to the new translation of the Principia executed by
himself and Anne Whitman. Instead, Guicciardini s book simultaneously ful ls both
a more speci c function (encapsulated in the second part of the volumes title) and a
broader role (situating Newtons mathematics in the context of his other intellectual
endeavours).
2. The main themes of Reading the Principia
The book is laid out in three parts. The rst part is concerned primarily with
providing the reader with a background to the state of mathematics before and during
the composition of the Principia. Following an introductory chapter, Guicciardini
details the method of uxions (calculus) that Newton developed in the 1660s and,
importantly, how Newton in the following decade began to revert from this `new
analysis back to geometrical methods rooted in the classical past a shift that
Guicciardini calls `Newtons methodological turn of the 1670s (p. 98). Chapter 3, the
most technically di cult in the book, focuses on the mixture of mathematical
methods actually used by Newton in the composition of his Principia in the 1680s.
These are `(i) geometrical constructs independent of the method of uxions, (ii)
geometrical limit procedures based on the synthetic method of uxions, and (iii)
symbolic methods based on the analytic method of uxions (p. 96). Partly in keeping
with seventeenth-centur y practice, however, much of the analysis remained hidden.
The second part focuses on the three most important early readers of the
Principia : Newton himself, Christiaan Huygens and Gottfried Leibniz. Devoting a
chapter to the responses of each of these gures, Guicciardini discusses the revisions
Annals of Science ISSN 0003-379 0 print/ISSN 1464-505 X online 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
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that Newton either considered or carried out, the ways in which a natural philosopher
and mathematician from the previous generation such as Huygens reacted to the
work and nally that, while the varieties of calculus employed by Newton and Leibniz
were conceptually similar, they were `not equivalent in practice . In addition,
Guicciardini contrasts Newtons eorts to link his mathematical methods with the
ancients with Leibnizs opposing desire to stress the novelty of his own work.
The third part treats the wider reception of the Principia in the early eighteenth
century by tracking the divergent developments of the `Newtonian British and
`Leibnizian Continental mathematical schools. Chapter 7 on the Newtonian school
both shows the di culties faced by those who lacked mathematical skills in reading
the Principia and discusses how the more competent British mathematicians read the
work. Edmond Halley is identi ed as the rst reader of the Principia who saw the
great potential that the book oered `Philosophers without Mathematicks , and
Guicciardini outlines the subsequent production of popular expositions of Newton.
Chapter 8 oers a careful presentation of the labours of Continental mathematicians
(led by the Bernoullis) to convert the geometrically framed problems of the Principia
into the analytical method of calculus. The historical coverage of this chapter extends
to 1736 : the year that the culmination of this programme was realized in Leonard
Eulers Mechanica. A key conclusion coming out of Guicciardinis analysis in these
chapters is that the Newtonians and Leibnizians pursued radically dierent
publication policies, with the latter group promoting the potential of calculus in
public while the former concealed it. Yet, as Guicciardini illustrates, by entering the
private world of the Newtonians, one discovers that the two schools actually had a
great deal in common with respect to their mathematical methods and use of calculus.
These chapters provide ample justi cation for a claim that Guicciardini makes in his
introduction, namely that for this period it is proper to speak of a plurality of calculi,
rather than calculus in the singular. The third part comes to a conclusion in the very
valuable nal chapter 9 that ends with an apologetic appeal to historians of
mathematics.
3. Two cultures ?
One of the rst questions that we may want to ask of a book of this nature is: for
whom it is written ? As the subject matter ranges from high-level mathematical
argumentation to sophisticated historical analysis, one is reminded of C. P. Snows
now legendary 1959 Cambridge Rede Lecture on `The two cultures , which James
Axtell invoked 10 years later in a study that considered how far a `literary
intellectual such as John Locke could understand a work of advanced mathematical
physics such as the Principia.1 Is it possible to reach both `cultures with a single
book ? If so, will it be necessary to compromise detail on one side or the other ? If such
compromises are made, how much of the meaning would be lost ? Finally, if meaning
is necessarily lost in the process, is it in the end really possible to reach an unprepared
audience with a specialist message? If the mathematics are watered down for the
bene t of scholars trained in the humanities, the book will lose its lustre for
mathematicians. If, on the other hand, the political, sociological and theological
narrative is crowded out by equations, the author will cut ohistorians. Some might
argue that there is a greater chance that a competent mathematician will understand
the history than vice versa. Most will readily agree that understanding high level
1
James L. Axtell, `Locke, Newton and the two cultures, in John Locke : Problems and Perspectives,
edited by John W. Yolton (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 165 82.

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77

mathematics requires a long period of groundwork and training, but why should the
dynamic be any dierent with disciplines such as history, sociology and theology,
which also require rigorous preparation and have their own sophistications ? If a
mathematically illiterate arts scholar explicating calculus and number theory would
be prone to glaring errors of interpretation, would not a mathematician or scientist
writing on, say, theology, also miss the mark since it takes years of immersion in this
eld to develop depth and an intuition ? Also, how many are equally adept in both
cultures ? Newtons apologists were adamant that the great man himself was equally
profound and pro cient in mathematics, theology and chronology, even though
others scorned this possibility as a myth, but are not the days of the Renaissance man
now long gone in this world of increasing specialization ? Such are the di cult issues
facing Guicciardini, who has chosen to present both the mathematical and the
historical analysis with a high degree of sophistication. The worry with this book,
therefore, is that historians will avoid the mathematics and that mathematicians will
jettison the history. The authors own message, however, is that the book will appeal
to both audiences. Despite the very real problems just outlined, it is hoped that each
group will read it as widely as possible.
From the outset, Guicciardini immerses the reader in the world of seventeenthand eighteenth-century mathematics, and it is one of his chief aims to acclimatize
modern mathematicians to the very dierent methods and conceptions of this period.
More than this, Guicciardini situates the mathematics in the framework of the general
historical milieux. For this, he is to be applauded. Of all the sciences, mathematics is
the most prone to be viewed in an exclusively idealist manner, and Guicciardinis
work provides a brilliant corrective to any vestiges of the tendency to study
mathematics in history as a `pure cognitive enterprise gloriously isolated from the
contexts of politics, theology, personal animus and other such bothersome
subjectivities. In this regard, Guicciardini s book far outshines the approach taken by
scholars such as Chandrasekhar, whose misleadingly and even possibly arrogantly
entitled Newtons Principia for the Common Reader (1995 ) is no more meant for the
vulgar than Newton s great work was in the rst place. It is, as Guicciardini observes,
painfully `ahistorical even if `mathematically masterful . In stark contrast,
Guicciardini not only goes a long way to bringing the historical to the mathematical
but also amply demonstrates the success of this approach through a skilfully argued
and well-documented account.
What, then, does this book oer the historian ? A quick look through the volume
will reveal large clusters of geometrical diagrams and algebraic equations, and the
response of some potential readers may not be dissimilar to most of those who rst
thumbed through Newtons Principia in the late seventeenth century. This initial and
perhaps despairing sense of the book s contents may be reinforced through reading
the introduction, where Guicciardini notes in a matter-of-fact fashion that the
mathematical experts may pass over not only chapter 2, but also the more heavygoing chapter 3. The irony of this recommendation was not lost on this reviewer who,
it must be said, writes as a `historian without mathematics . Heeding the authors
advice, but for the opposite reason to that intended, after reading the introduction I
was tempted to skip chapters 2 and 3 completely, once like Locke with Huygens I
had received guarantees from a mathematician that they were sound (and for the
most part within the capabilities of a competent rst- or second-year undergraduat e
in mathematics). However, before I passed them by, I took a closer look. I was glad
that I did. It would be a shame if either a mathematical expert or a `historian without

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mathematics missed sections 2.3.1 and 2.4, which introduce a central theme of the
book : Newtons mathematical classicism. In chapter 3, section 3.15 (on Book 3 of the
Principia) and the concluding section that follows should also be read with care by
mathematicians and historians alike. These more purely historical sections (and
others found in later chapters particularly chapters 4 and 7) are delights for a
historian to read ; so interesting and revealing are they that one may have hoped them
to be rather fuller than they are especially since some of the mathematical material
has, by the authors own admission, already been dealt with by previous scholars.
That being said, two elements of Guicciardinis historical argument are especially
well done and deserve further comment. Much of the recent scholarship on Newtons
natural philosophy, theology and alchemy has focused on two pivotal dimensions of
his thought and actions, namely Newtons primitivism and commitment to the prisca
sapientia (ancient wisdom) on the one hand, and the marked distinction between the
presentation of his thought in the public and private spheres on the other. For this
reviewer, the greatest signi cance of Guicciardini s new book is that it shows in a
highly readable way that these two features applied to Newtons mathematics as well,
thus adding to what we know about the fundamental unity of Newton s thought. The
remainder of this review will be devoted to a consideration of these wider implications
of Guicciardinis work to current Newton historical scholarship.
4. The Prisca and the Principia
As an example not only of his eorts to locate the Principia in its historical context
but also of his attempts to relate the mathematical work behind this book to
Newtons other endeavours, Guicciardini correctly points out that Newtons reversion
in the 1670s to an emphasis on geometrical methods ts nicely into his general
intellectual reorientation from roughly the same period towards the importance of the
prisca sapientia (broadly construed ; there is some debate over precisely how, and how
far, he appropriated this line of thinking). Brie y put, Newtons adherence to the
prisca tradition, which saw ancient thought as superior to its corrupted modern
counterparts, forms part of an over-arching primitivism that permeates every major
aspect of his thought. The pioneering scholarship of J. E. McGuire, P. M. Rattansi,
Paolo Casini and Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs has led to a realization that Newton saw his
work in natural philosophy, theology and alchemy as part of a large eort to
recover and not discover true knowledge.2 It is thus noteworthy that, as
Guicciardini shows, Newton starts to attack contemporary mathematicians from the
middle of the 1670s and moves to align his own work with the methods of the
ancients. His new stance, to which he held rm for the rest of his long life, is
epitomized in a comment he penned two decades later when he declared : `if the
authority of the new Geometers is against us, nonetheless the authority of the
Ancients is great (p. 29). This attitude of viewing the moderns as astray and the
ancients in possession of truth is one that Newton displayed towards learning of all
sorts ; he could just as easily have uttered the above formula when discussing his views
on ancient heliocentrism, or biblical theology and its modern Trinitarian corrupters.
Guicciardini s technically informed discussions of the ways in which Newton used
2
J. E. McGuire and P. M. Rattansi, `Newton and the ``Pipes of Pan , Notes and Records of the Royal
Society, 21 (1966) 108 43 ; Paolo Casini, `Newton : the classical scholia , History of Science, 22 (1984) 1 57 ;
B. J. T. Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius: the Role of Alchemy in Newtons Thought (Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also the relevant essays in John Fauvel, Raymond Flood, Michael
Shortland and Robin Wilson (editors), Let Newton Be ! A New Perspective on his Life and Works (Oxford :
Oxford University Press, 1988).

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79

classical geometry both in the presentation and even often in the foundation of the
physics of his great work neatly complement the more philologically oriented work
that has already been carried out on the centrality of the prisca tradition in Newtons
conception of the Principia. His careful analysis demonstrates that what has long
been termed the `classical faade of the Principia was more than mere outward
adorning. The geometrical presentation of the Principia is also characterized by
Guicciardini as the major factor behind the works built-in obsolescence. It was
precisely Newton s commitments to what Guicciardini justly terms the `prisca
geometria (a neologism that compares well with Newtons own expression `Geometria
Veterum ) that the Continental mathematicians refused to accept. For Leibniz and his
followers in Europe, the way forward was with the new analysis of calculus, and not
the old and increasingly irrelevant ways of the ancient geometers. Herein lies a
profound irony. While many of Newtons contemporary supporters in Britain and on
the Continent hailed his natural philosophy as a triumph of the moderns over the
ancients, Newton himself believed the ancient ways to be superior.3 Many equally illinformed twentieth-century historians of science and mathematics have also
characterized Newton as an icon of modernity who overcame the ignorance of the
past. Guicciardini s study helps to show how much more complicated the matter
actually is.
5. The problem of understanding the Principia
Newtons rm belief that ancient wisdom whether in natural philosophy,
theology, alchemy or mathematics was superior to that of the moderns is not the
only link between these areas of Newtons thought. One of the most fascinating
aspects of this book is Guicciardini s demonstration of the important distinctions
between the public and the private both within the camp of the Newtonian
mathematicians, and between the Newtonians and the Leibnizians. By including a
treatment of Newton s private negotiations, and by eshing out the dierences
between Newton in public and Newton in private, as well as the `open and `closed
aspects of Newton s scholarly practices, Guicciardini is once again in line with the
best and most recent scholarship on Newtons natural philosophy, theology and
alchemy. All this is achieved by extending the investigation of the Newtonian
mathematicians to what Guicciardini calls `the unpublished, private, side of their
scienti c production (p. 169). To give a particularly illuminating example,
Guicciardini demonstrates that while Newton studied to put a veil over the analysis
in the public text of his Principia, he fully revealed the secrets of his method of
uxions to a select group of acolytes. Once again, we see symmetry between this
practice and the identical strategies that Newton employed in his natural
philosophical, theological and alchemical negotiations, as recent studies have
revealed. Newton, who composed vast tracts on prophecy and heretical theology,
released only brief sanitized statements on religion in the public sphere and yet
cautiously communicated his true beliefs to a handful of trusted disciples in private.
His alchemical world was even more restricted.4 With Leibniz, it was much otherwise.
The German natural philosopher and mathematician was an energetic publicist for
3
On this, see James E. Force, `Newton, the ``Ancients, and the ``Moderns , Newton and Religion :
Context, Nature, and In uence, edited by James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht : Kluwer,
1999), 237 57.
4
Lawrence Principe, `The alchemies of Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton : alternative approaches and
divergent deployments, Rethinking the Scienti c Revolution, edited by M. J. Osler (Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 201 20.

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his cause, disseminating his mathematical ideas and calculus in learned journals and
correspondence networks. For Leibniz and his followers, the dominant themes were
novelty and revolution ; for Newton, they were continuity and restoration.
That Newton s Principia could only be understood by a handful of highly able
mathematicians when rst published is well known. In the past few decades, scholars
have detailed the dynamics of this fact further. Guicciardini uses some of this work
to emphasize the great di culty that most had with the Principia, but he does more
than this. He also provides a careful account of the precise technical reasons why the
Principia was so impenetrable : the analysis was often hidden, and even then few were
competent enough in 1687 to plumb the depths of such a revolutionary work.
Guicciardini further notes that it was a standard practice for early seventeenth
century mathematicians `to give priority and publicity to the geometrical construction
which solves the problem, rather than to the analysis necessary to achieve such a
construction (an analysis which was often kept hidden by mathematicians) (p. 98).
Moreover, the author even hints that Newtons exposure to alchemical and
theological codes of practice may have reinforced the ideal of refraining from
releasing `the methods of discovery (p. 32). With the addition of further crucial
evidence, we can extend this sophisticated analysis of the public and private
dimensions of Newtons mathematics to reveal that Newton intended his great work
to be so ponderous and inscrutable.
At the beginning of the pivotal section 4.4 (`Newton and his readers ),
Guicciardini writes : `Despite the fact that reference to the ``Ancients played an
important role in Newtons justi cation of the geometrical structure of the
mathematical methods for natural philosophy, the Principia was written to be read by
his contemporaries (p. 106). He then notes how hard it was for Jacob and Johann
Bernoulli to fathom the calculus presented in Leibnizs Nova Methodus (1684) and
contrasts this with the style of the Principia, which `was written in a language
comprehensible for [Newton s] readers , thus insinuating that Newton chose geometry
in large part to increase the accessibility of his Principia. What Guicciardini fails to
explain satisfactorily is why, if this was the case, virtually everyone who read the
Principia when it rst appeared including the most skilled mathematicians still
had great di culty reading and comprehending it. In section 7.2 (`Philosophers
without Mathematicks ), Guicciardini himself provides powerful evidence to secure
this phenomenon, and other scholars have identi ed additional testimony from the
period that also shows that the Principia was a closed book to all but a fortunate few.
What is more, even competent mathematicians had trouble. Huygens, thoroughly
schooled in the geometrical tradition though he was, could not fathom the entire
book. David Gregory, too, complained about Newton s elusive style and incomplete
demonstrations. Something else is at work here.
Aside from the fact that Guicciardini has himself given in the prisca tradition a
fundamental reason why Newton would prefer geometrical form, there is a wealth of
evidence that suggests that Newtons motivations for the Principia were much less
democratic and altruistic. Nowhere is his strategy more notable than in Book 3 of the
Principia, where Newton presents his system of the world, including his theory of
universal gravitation :
On this subject I composed an earlier version of book 3 in popular form, so that
it might be more widely read. But those who have not su ciently grasped the
principles set down here will certainly not perceive the force of the conclusions,

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nor will they lay aside the preconceptions to which they have become
accustomed over many years ; and therefore, to avoid lengthy disputations, I
have translated the substance of the earlier version into propositions in a
mathematical style, so that they may be read only by those who have rst
mastered the principles.5
This is what Newton said in public. On the face of it, Newtons reason for
discarding his plan for a more accessible version of Book 3 seems reasonable ; in order
to appreciate fully the revolutionary discoveries presented in this part of the Principia,
one needed a great deal of training and preparation in mathematics. Newton had to
decide between reaching a wider audience with a watered-down message, or
narrowing his appeal with a more sophisticated treatment that could be appreciated
by those who knew best. Newton preferred to cut othe former group but, even in
this public apology, the allusion to avoiding `lengthy disputations hints at something
a little more sinister.
When we turn to Newton s private world, what is implicit in the printed text
becomes explicit in the spoken word. Here we need to remember that, when Newton
was composing the Principia in the mid-1680s, he was a veteran of controversies
initiated by the publication of his 1672 paper on colours and, what is more, had just
been challenged by Robert Hookes claim to priority in devising the inverse-square
law. The di culties that resulted from publication would have served to reinforce his
belief that the higher truths whether of Nature or Scripture should be treated only
by the cognoscenti. As William Derham later related (albeit with a perhaps overly
positive attribution of intention), the
Controversies with Leibniz, Hooke, and Linus, and others about Colours, made
Sir Isaac very uneasy ; who abhorred all Contests, accounting Peace a
substantial Good. And for this reason, namely to avoid being baited by little
Smatterers in Mathematicks, he told me, he designedly made his Principia
abstruse ; but yet so as to be understood by able Mathematicians, who he
imagined, by comprehending his Demonstrations, would concur with him in his
Theory.6
Hooke in particular was a target of this policy. On the question of Hooke s ability
to demonstrate the inverse-square law mathematically, Newton claimed that `Dr
Hook could not perform that which he pretended to . `Let him give Demonstrations
of it, Newton expostulated, `I know he hath not Geometry enough to do it. 7
Whether Hookes mathematics were really as weak as this is less important than the
fact that Newton thought they were and thus attempted to marginalize him and
others with his putative abilities. There are other lines of evidence that con rm this
intention for the Principia, as the valuable studies by Axtell and Ilie have revealed.8
Guicciardini himself has admirably demonstrated that much of the crucial analysis
was omitted in the structure of the composition. Is it not clear, then, that in trying
5
Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosoph y, translated by I. Bernard
Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by Julia Budnez (Berkeley, California : University of California Press,
1999), p. 793.
6
Kings College, Cambridge, Keynes Ms. 133, p. 10. Abbreviations are expanded in this and the
following manuscript quotations. The Keynes manuscripts are cited by the kind permission of the Provost
and Fellows of Kings College.
7
Keynes, Ms. 133, p. 6.
8
Axtell (note 1); Rob Ilie, ```Is he like other men ? The meaning of the Principia Mathematica, and
the author as idol , Culture and Society in the Stuart Restoration : Literature, Drama, History, edited by
Gerald Maclean (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995), 159 76.

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to sideline such `little Smatterers Newton was restricting access to his work and
doing so with deliberate intent ?
Guicciardini twice repeats his claim. First, when discussing the policy of the
Newtonian school, he writes that `the refusal of in nitesimals and of uninterpreted
symbols, and the preference accorded to geometrical proofs in the published writings,
are linked to their conception of mathematics, to the cosmology that they accepted,
to the competence of the audience that they had in mind (p. 170). Then, in his
conclusion, the author asserts that Newton `wished to communicate this work to an
audience by and large unable to read equations and uxions. It was easier to nd
some preparation in elementary geometry (p. 255). Yes, Guicciardini shows that
Newton admired what he saw as the simplicity of geometry and probably wanted to
promote this form. This is not in question. What is in question is Newton s intended
audience. Here Guicciardini appears to con ate the motivations of the popularizers
of the Principia with those of its author.
However, there was a world of dierence between Newtonian popularizers such
as John Theophilus Desaguliers and William Whiston, who wanted to render the
Principia easy, and Newton himself, who wanted to make it obscure. Whiston oers
a particularly stark contrast, since he not only failed to take notice of Newtons
distinction between public and private but also resolutely pursued a policy of
openness and publicity with respect to both his Newtonian religion and his
Newtonian physics. Whereas Newton (who aimed at more experienced mathematicians) drove students away from the lecture halls through his incomprehensible
lectures at Cambridge, his successor at the Lucasian Chair initiated from the
beginning a new pedagogical regime that focused on presenting Newtonianism in a
form palatable to undergraduates . Whiston made a career out of making Newton
public through accessible textbooks, popular astronomical charts and demathematized experimental demonstrations. On top of this, Whiston was quite
comfortable portraying the natural philosophy of the Principia as a great discovery,
even to the extent of characterizing it in millenarian terms. Once again, Guicciardini
does an excellent job of tracking the eorts of the Newtonian popularizers of the
British school, who converted the Principia into a style that could be digested by those
with little or no mathematics. Nevertheless, he does not leave the reader with a clear
idea that there was a fundamental dierence between the masters own mission and
the goals and publishing practices of those who preached his word.
The fact is that Newton did not believe that the truth of the Principia could be
expounded without resorting to involved mathematics, as a revealing anecdote
recorded by John Conduitt reveals. When the Earl of Halifax (Charles Montague )
asked Newton `if there was no method to make him master of his discoveries without
learning Mathematicks Sir Isaac said No it was impossible. Nevertheless John
Machin was `recommended to his Lordship for that purpose who gave him 50
Guineas by way of encouragement. Machin as he told me himself tried several
schemes but never any that satis ed him and gave it up in despair. 9 Guicciardini
himself cites this valuable testimony to good eect but does not adequately explain
how radically Newtons policy diered from that of his popularizers, who not only
watered down the mathematics but even tried to eliminate it altogether. Another
anecdote, which Guicciardini does not cite, but which also involves the mathematician
John Machin, helps to complete the picture:
9

Keynes Ms. 130.5, . 3v 4r.

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Mr Machin said to Sir Isaac Newton when courses of experiments were rst in
vogue what a pity it was that when people had a demonstration by Geometry
they should trust to their senses which might be deceived, upon which Sir Isaac
said he had rst proved his inventions by Geometry and only made use of
experiments to make them intelligible and convince the vulgar.10
This illuminating testimony accords well with what we know about Newtons
preference for mathematical demonstrableness over other forms of proof including
experiment. 11 Once again, it is important that we do not too closely elide the agendas
and actions of Newtons popularizing followers with his own commitments and
desires. Yes, it is certain that Newton did write his great work for his contemporaries ;
but it is equally certain that he did not want to reach all of them. Guicciardini himself
supplies most of the ingredients for this conclusion, and the lines of evidence that he
provides need only some lling out with a greater exploitation of such testimony as
the valuable material collected by John Conduitt in the Keynes manuscripts.
Newtons intensional obfuscation of the Principia, and his desire to reach only the
most able mathematicians reveal yet another area of symmetry between Newtons
natural philosophical and mathematical work on the one hand, and his theological
and alchemical practices on the other. For Newton, the practitioners of various
spheres of activity were divided into two groups able mathematicians and the
vulgar, the remnant class and the apostate, the adept and the unenlightened or, to
paraphrase Daniel 12 :4 that Newton himself used in this way : the wise who
understood, and the wicked who did wickedly. This almost Manichaean bisection of
those around him provides the backdrop to Newtons deliberate eorts to push aside
the `little Smatterers in order to extend the truth exclusively to the `able
mathematicians .

6. A book for historians and mathematicians

Let there be no mistake, however ; this is an important book. My hesitations about
a few aspects of the authors interpretation of the evidence aside, this publication
makes a number of extremely valuable historical and methodological contributions.
It is also certain to appeal to a range of scholars, just as the dust-jacket claims. Above
all, it oers a commendable model for the history of mathematics. With this in mind,
I can do no better than repeat the concluding sentences of Guicciardinis book, which
ends with an appeal :

mathematics, as any other human enterprise, does develop in a context, in

continuous relation with other scienti c disciplines and with culture in general.
It is applied to the real world for theoretical or technical purposes. It interacts
with philosophy, religion, society. It is taught defended, used. It is only when we
consider mathematics in this broad cultural context that it becomes possible to
write its history (p. 260).
Guicciardini s appeal is particularly relevant to the Principia and its time. In the
seventeenth century, science (that is to say, natural philosophy) not only encompassed
such studies as physics and mathematics but also took on board theological,
10

Keynes Ms. 130.9, . 2r v.

On which, see Mordechai Feingold, `Mathematicians and naturalists: Isaac Newton and the nature
of the early Royal Society , Isaac Newtons Natural Philosophy, edited by Jed Buchwald and I. Bernard
Cohen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000).
11

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Essay Review

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philosophical and literary concerns that are now routinely cordoned ofrom the
discipline, and this was never less true than of Newton, who was equally at home in
both cultures. We must approach him and his book on his own terms. Thus, while the
50 that the book costs will not make a non-mathematicia n master of the discoveries
of the Principia, and although `historians without mathematics may inevitably have
to pass by some of the more technical content, it is hoped that both they and
`mathematicians without history will heed the authors appeal to situate the
Principia in its original historical context as strange and counter-intuitive as this
may prove to be. For, above all, Guicciardini s study reveals just how dierent from
modern science this foundation work of modern science really is.