Chapter 2

ACTIONS
Kinds of Actions
As to subject matter, we have personal, real or mixed.
An action is personal when it is based on the privity of contract and it is not founded on real rights.
An example of which is an action for a sum of money.
A real action is one brought for the protection of real rights or real property.
And a mixed action is one brought for the protection or recovery of a real property and also, award
for damages.
Merely Incidental
Russel v. Vestil, GR 119349, 3/17/99
Facts: Russel filed a complaint against Tagalog, et al to declare the nullity of a document and also partition
with the Regional Trial Court. Tagalog filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the
property is valued at only around 5,000 pesos, exclusively cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court.
Issue: What is the nature of the action?
Ruling: The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in
which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to
be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property,
this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Brgy San Roque v. Pastor, GR 138896, 6/20/2000
Facts: Brgy San Roque seeks to expropriate Pastors land. The value is less than 20, 000 pesos. The
Municipal Trial Court dismissed the case as according to it, the same is cognizable with the RTC exclusively.
However, RTC also dismissed the case being again cognizable by the MTC. Hence, the plaintiff went to the
Supreme Court to clear things out.
Issue: What is the nature of the action?
Ruling: It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property.
Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and
the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise
of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
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As to their binding effect, we have in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

An action is in personam if it binds only a specific person or persons. An example of which is an
action for a specific performance under a contract to sell.
An action is in rem if it is enforceable against the whole world. Examples of which are land
registration proceedings, forfeiture proceedings, and an action to establish a personal status of the plaintiff.
An action is quasi in rem if the purpose is to be enforced against a specific person but in effect binds
the whole world. Some examples of which are foreclosure and attachment proceedings, action between the
parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of the property owned by them, or of some interest
therein and quieting of title.
Cadastral Registration Proceedings are Actions in Rem
Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 41 Phil 120
Facts: A cadastral proceeding was commenced over a huge tract of land. In this case, there are three
claimants: the municipality; the Roman Catholic Archbishop; and various private individuals. In this case, the
cadastral court allegedly erred in refusing to admit evidence of the Royal Title from the Roman Catholic
Archbishop.
Issue: Was the court correct? What is the nature of the proceeding?
Ruling: Yes, the court was correct. To resolve the facts into their simplest terms, it is evident that when an
admission was made of the royal title, the Church had shown that it was the legitimate owner of the land to
which it refers. The most perfect title could, however, be lost by abandonment. When, therefore, the private
oppositors showed possession for the prescriptive period, they had made their case, and the burden of proof
had shifted. To overcome this burden, it was then incumbent upon the Church to demonstrate that such
possession had been interrupted, or that it was merely possession through the tolerance of the Church.
The object of a cadastral petition, as all know, is that the title to the various lots embraced in the
survey may be settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted by the Director of
Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree. In one sense, there is
no plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the Government is the plaintiff and all the- claimants
are defendants. The trial is conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of
Land Registration. As to this court, now abolished, the Land Registration Act provides that it "shall conform,
as near as may be, to the practice in special proceedings in courts of first instance." The Code of Civil
Procedure, which is thus brought into relation with the Cadastral Act, prescribes the order in which the trial
must proceed. The usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence govern registration proceedings.
Obviously, orderly procedure must be followed if injurious surprises and annoying delays in the
administration of justice are to be avoided. Evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The strict rule is that the
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plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the
sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an
eminent author, "is, that material testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the
defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of
deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously."
The Nature of Forfeiture Proceedings
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 461 Phil. 598 (2003)
Facts: This case is a motion to reconsider the decision in forfeiting the swiss deposits in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank. According to the Marcoses, forfeiture proceedings are criminal in nature and
should not be subject to summary judgment.
Issue: What is the nature of forfeiture proceeding?
Ruling: A careful study of the provisions of RA 1379 readily discloses that the forfeiture proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan did not violate the substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. These proceedings are civil in
nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is penal in character.
Imelda R. Marcos likewise asserts that the factual finding that the foundations involved in the instant
forfeiture proceedings were businesses managed by her and her late husband, will adversely affect the criminal
proceedings filed by the Republic against her. The contention is bereft of merit. The criminal cases referred to
by said respondent are actions in personam, directed against her on the basis of her personal liability. In
criminal cases, the law imposes the burden of proving guilt on the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, and
the trial judge in evaluating the evidence must find that all the elements of the crime charged have been
established by sufficient proof to convict.
But a forfeiture proceeding is an action in rem, against the thing itself instead of against the
person. Being civil in character, it requires no more than a preponderance of evidence. And by preponderance
of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. Hence,
the factual findings of this Court in its decision dated July 15, 2003 will, as a consequence, neither affect nor
do away with the requirement of having to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal cases
against her.
Quasi in Rem Cases
El Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca 37 Phil 921, 1918
Facts: Engracio Palanca Limquico entered into a mortgage with El Banco Espanol Filipino, using various
parcels of real property to secure his indebtedness amounting to 292, 588 pesos. After which he returned to
China and there, he died. El Banco wishes to foreclose the property, so there was publication and mailing of
summons to the last residence of Engracio in China. However, during the trial, there was no evidence that the
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Clerk of Court was able to send the said mail. The administrator of Engracios property contended that
jurisdiction was not acquired over the person of Engracio as it was not properly mailed.
Issue: Is jurisdiction over the person of Engracio required to be obtained?
Ruling: No need for it. In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the
preliminary seizure is to be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case
the lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to subject the
property to that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the preliminary
seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely
as though the property had been seized upon attachment. It results that mere circumstance that an
attachment the property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is
not taken into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not materially affect the fundamental
principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a
proceeding directed essentially in rem.
De Midgely v. Fernandos, GR L-34314, 5/1375
Facts: In a case filed to settle ownership over some mining claims, De Midgely, who was in Hawaii was
served summons via publication there at the instance of Quemada. She then challenged the proceedings
because jurisdiction was not properly acquired over her person.
Issue: Was jurisdiction over her person required in the case at bar?
Ruling: No, in fact it is not even necessary as she has submitted herself already by a voluntary appearance.
Supposing arguendo that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Mrs.
Midgely, still her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada's action against her may be
regarded as a quasi in rem action where jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not
necessary and where service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement
of due process.
San Pedro v. Ong GR 177598, 10/17/08
The Distinction of the Four
Domagas v. Jensen, GR 158407, 1/17/05, 448 SCRA 663, 673-674
Facts: This is a case of forcible entry which illustrates the distinction between action quasi in rem and that
one in personam.
Issue: What are the distinctions between quasi in rem and action in personam?
Ruling: The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by
these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his
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right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it
in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose,
through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of
this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the
person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against
the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and
obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the
affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual
is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation
or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
An Action in Personam
Yu v. Pacleb, GR 172172, 2/24/09
The Concepts of the Four
Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., GR L-29791, 1/10/78
Facts: A lot may be confused of action in rem with real action and action in personam with personal action.
This case made some clarifications regarding this. This is a case of compelling a Rural bank to accept payment
in a form of a check.
Issue: What is the difference between action in rem and real action? What is also the difference between
action in personam and personal action?
Ruling: A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is not the same as an action in
personam.
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as
indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery
of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.

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An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an
action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person, Hence, a real action may at the
same time be an action, in personam and not necessarily an action in rem. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged in
their complaint that they were residents of San Juan, Batangas, which in their brief they characterize as their
legal residence and which appears to be their domicile of origin.
As to where it may be filed, we have local or transitory.
An action is local if it is required to be filed only in a single place of jurisdiction; while, a transitory
action may be filed in more than one places of jurisdiction.
As to their governing rules, we have ordinary or special.
An ordinary action is governed by the Rules of Court; while, a special action is governed by special
rules.
Commencement of a Civil Action
This may be done by filing the original complaint in court; but with respect to an additional
defendant, it shall be by impleading him. It does not matter whether the motion for admission is denied or
admitted.
Nonpayment of Filing Fees
Magaspi v. Ramolete, L-34840, 7/20/82
Facts: There was an original complaint and there was an amended one. The judge of the trial court insisted
for them to pay based on the original complaint for the docket fee.
Issue: What amount should be paid?
Ruling: It should be the amount for the amended complaint. When a pleading is amended, the original
pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The case
stands for trial on the amended pleading only.
Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, GR 75919, 5/7/87
Facts: This is an action for torts and damages. Manchester Development Corporation seeks the application
of the ruling in Magaspi v. Ramolete. According to the petitioner, the amount of filing fee must be assessed
based on the amended complaint. In the amended complaint, the petitioner did not mention anymore the
amount of damages being sought.
Issue: What should be the basis of the amount of filing fee in the case at bar?
Ruling: The basis should be the original complaint. The Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of
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omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78
million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of
the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of
the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint,
deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only
when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of
damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the
much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The
design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that
fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, GR 79937, 2/13/89
Facts: In this case, the court found that the plaintiff paid the docket fee but the same was insufficient. The
defendant seeks nullity of the proceedings as the court did not acquire jurisdiction by reason of the
nonpayment of the proper docket fee. This case is very much the Manchester case but unlike it, the plaintiff
here manifested willingness to pay.
Issue: Should the proceedings be nullified because of insufficient docket fee?
Ruling: No, it must not. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The
pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it are obvious not only in the filing of
the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided
by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this
Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint
could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

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In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike
Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering
influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court.
It triggered his change for stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be
ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the
total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly
authorized docket clerk or clerk in charge should determine and, thereafter, it any amount is found due, he
must require the private respondent to pay the same.
The court may allow the plaintiff to pay for the docket fee within a reasonable time.
Tacay v. Regional Trial Court, GR No. 88075, 12/20/89
Facts: Godofredo Pineda filed three separate cases of action publiciana against three defendants. Allegedly,
he who owns the property allowed the three defendants to occupy it by mere tolerance. When there came a
time that Pineda needs the property, the three refused to abide by the demand to vacate and pay reasonable
rentals. In the prayer, a handwriting indicates P5, 000 as and for above the phrase actual damages as
proven. The apparent intention is to make the entire phrase read: P5, 000 as and for actual damages as
proven.
The defendants seek dismissal of the case for failure to state the amount of damages and the assessed
value of the property, making the court having no jurisdiction. This motion was denied, thus the defendants
made their way to the SC by a petition.
Issue: Has the court acquired jurisdiction?
Ruling: Yes, the court acquired jurisdiction. It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being
claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for
the recovery of sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature
of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof,
not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and
regardless of the value of the property.
Ayala Corporation v. Madayag et al., GR 88421, 1/30/90
Facts: The Sabio spouses filed an action against Ayala Corporation before the regional Trial Court for and
action for specific performance with damages. The respondents who are the petitioners in this case, the Ayala
Corporation, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to pay the prescribed docket fee and to
specify the amount of damages being sought. This motion to dismiss was denied same as its motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this is filed. Allegedly, the Sabio spouses only filed P1, 616 instead of P13, 061.35
based on the assessed value of the real properties in question.
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Issue: Must the case be dismissed?

Ruling: No, it should not. What must be done is expunge the damages which are not specified or, upon
motion, give reasonable time for the plaintiff to specify and pay for it.
This case also reiterated the ruling in Manchester and Sun Insurance.
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 1 a similar case involving an action
for specific performance with damages, this Court held that the docket fee should be assessed by considering
the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed value
thereof should be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for specific performance with damages although it is in
relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be
paid should be computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the amount of
exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in accordance to Manchester.
The trial court denied the motion stating that the determination of the exemplary damages is within the
sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private
respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent
case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion 2 in support of its ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1.

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the

payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2.

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,

which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate

pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee."
*Resolution dated 9/21/04 suspended the new rates on compulsory counterclaim motions.

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PART I
CIVIL ACTIONS
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS
No Civil action may stand without a Cause of Action
Definitions
Cause of Action- an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
Right of Action- the juridical capacity to file an action.
Relief- The benefit or redress awarded to a claimant by a court, or claimed in a court, especially that
which is equitable in nature, such as an injunction against future harm, as distinct from monetary
damages. (Webster Law Dictionary)
Remedy- The way a right is enforced or an injury is redressedmost commonly by imposition of
monetary damages. (Webster Law Dictionary)
Subject Matter- whatever is in dispute; the actual cause of the law suit; the issue about which a right
or obligation has been asserted or denied. (Webster Law Dictionary)
One Suit for every Cause of Action
A single suit may contain more than one cause of action; but, a single cause of action cannot be filed
or embodied in more than one suit. If such is done to the contrary, the same constitutes multiplicity of suits
and shall be a ground for dismissal of that which is filed on a later date.
Singleness of a cause of action/ Effect of splitting
Joseph v. Bautista, L-41423, 2/23/89
Facts: Joseph filed an action before the Court of First instance against various defendants for damages by
reason of a road accident. Joseph was having trouble determining who the owner of the truck (which caused
the accident) was. Hence, he filed supplemental pleading, impleading various alternative defendants. Some
defendants paid Joseph through an insurance company. Because of this, Joseph released them. The same
defendants also paid some separate defendants the same way. Because of the release executed by Joseph,
other defendants seek to be released also by reason of solidary liability. The judge dismissed the case. Hence,
Joseph filed this appeal by certiorari.
Issue: Was the claim extinguished?
Ruling: Yes it was. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed
by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can
be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several

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separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of
one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts only one cause of action
arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That
vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different
respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved
although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily
identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner
under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from
the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
Bacharach Motor Co. v. Icarangal, 68 Phil 287
Facts: Icarangal executed promisory notes in favor of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and, in security of his
payment, executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land. Icarangal defaulted in the payment; thus, an
action to enforce the promissory notes was filed. Judgment was rendered in favor of the collection. During
the execution, the same property subject to mortgage was being asked to be attached. This was opposed by a
third party corporation. According to this third party, it already acquired the property by a public sale. At
which point, Bachrach instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. Icarangal now contends that Bachrach
is now barred from foreclosing the property as it has already obtained a judgment in its favor concerning the
same matter.
Issue: Is Bachrach barred from asking for the foreclosure?
Ruling: Yes, the corporation is already barred. We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory
provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or
a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not
both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the
debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon
would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the
defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In
either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attend- ant to the
pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election.
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The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between
the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary
vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim
nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem, cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause).
And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as are interposition of courts
upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary
litigations.
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs Coscolluela, GR No. 167724, June 27 2006
Facts: Various promissory notes of different maturity dates were executed by Coscolluela spouses in favor
of Far Eastern Bank and Trust Co. The first 33 notes mature on February 9, 1998; while the remaining 34
notes mature on December 28, 1998. They also executed a real estate mortgage in favor of FEBTC.
For failure to settle their accounts, FEBTC filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged property only on the first 33 promissory notes. While this case is pending. FEBTC also filed with
the RTC, an action to collect a sum of money covered by the remaining 34 notes.
Issue: Can FEBTC collect while a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is pending?
Ruling: No, it cannot. By resorting to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, petitioner
thereby waived its personal action to recover the amount covered not only by said promissory notes but also
of the rest of the promissory notes. This is so because when petitioner filed its petition before the Ex-Oficio
Provincial Sheriff on June 10, 1999, the entirety of the loan account of respondent under the 67 promissory
notes was already due. The obligation of respondent under Promissory Note Nos. 1 to 33 became due on
February 9, 1998 but was extended up to March 11, 1998, whereas, those covered by Promissory Note Nos.
34 to 67 matured on December 28, 1998. Petitioner should have caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage for the recovery of the entire obligation of respondent, on all the promissory notes. By
limiting the account for which the real estate mortgage was being foreclosed to the principal amount of
P4,687,006.68, exclusive of interest and penalties, petitioner thereby waived recovery of the rest of
respondents agricultural loan account.
Quiogu v. Bautista, 4 SCRA 478 (1962)
Facts: There are two loans secured by two deeds of mortgage. One was executed May 9, 1944 and the other
is October 11, 1944. The defendants set up a defense that the same has been barred by a present civil case.
Issue: Was the plaintiff barred?
Ruling: No, he was not. The contention that this action is already barred by the filing of Civil Case No.
11969 for the simple reason that the two loans herein involved could have been included in said action
because at the time it was filed they had already matured, is likewise untenable, considering that the first case
refers to a transaction different from those covered in the present case. Section 3, Rule 2, of our Rules of
Court, invoked by appellants, which provides that a single cause of action cannot be split up into two or more
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parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints, does not apply, for here there is not a single cause
of action that was split up, but several causes that refer to different transactions. And it was held that a
contract embraces only one cause of action because it may be violated only once even if it contains several
stipulations. Thus, non-payment of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes a single cause of action. The
creditor cannot split up this single cause of action into two separate complaints, one for payment of the debt
and another for the foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the
second complaint. In other words, the complaint filed for the payment of certain debt shall be considered as a
waiver of the right to foreclose the mortgage executed thereon. The lower court, therefore, did not err in
denying the motion to dismiss on this ground.
Enriquez v. Ramos, GR 16797, 2/27/63
Facts: Enriquez and Dizon spouses sold to Ramos a notarial deed of even date, eleven parcels of land.
Ramos paid a down payment of 2, 500 in cash and another 2, 500 in check. To secure the balance, Ramos
executed a real estate mortgage over the same parcels of land and an additional mortgage over another
property. Ramos failed to comply with his obligation; thus, an action for foreclosure of mortgage was filed.
Ramos sought to dismiss the case because there is already an action filed against her concerning the down
payment.
Issue: Were the plaintiffs guilty of splitting a single cause of action?
Ruling: No, they are not guilty of this. An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the
Court of First Instance of Manila shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment
of the check for P2, 500 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was
for non-payment of the balance of P96, 000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2, 500.00 was,
therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted on lands
situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes
of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.
Mallion v. Alcantara, GR 1441528, 10/31/06
Facts: This is a case to declare nullity of marriage based on several grounds: psychological incapacity and lack
of marriage license. In this case, multiple suits are filed. Defendant seeks to dismiss on the ground of splitting
a single cause of action?
Issue: How many causes of action are there?
Ruling: Only one. Although there may be more causes which have triggered the institution of the action, still
there is only one marriage being sought nullified.
Larena v. Villanueva, 53 Phil 925
Facts: The plaintiff, De Larena says that she has three causes of action. The first one states that despite the
final judgment rescinding the contract of lease, Villanueva continued the possession of the subject property.
The second one states that Villanueva, being obliged to take care of the property with the diligence of a good
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father of a family and return it, failed to do so, completely. The third one is regarding the illegal harvest done
by Villanueva on the property. The defendant answered that the first and third causes of action are already
included in the past case; thus, must be considered res judicata.
Issue: Was there res judicata?
Ruling: No, not on this one. The lease did not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any definite time,
and it appears plainly from the record that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered due until the
end of the corresponding year. It follows that the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 had not become
due at the time of the trial of the case and that consequently the trial court could not render judgment
therefor. The action referred to is, therefore, no bar to the first cause of action in the present litigation.
To simply state, not all rents are due during the previous civil action, thus, there is no splitting of
cause of action.
Anticipatory Breach
Blossom & Co. v. Manila Gas Corp., 55 Phil 226
Facts: This is an action filed by Blossom and Co. against Manila Gas Corporation. It started when Blossom
entered into a contract with Manila Gas to deliver coal and water gas tar every month for ten years. In the
middle of the ten years, Manila Gas refused to deliver because it now demands higher price for the products.
Blossom, immediately filed an action for damages for breach of contract. Manila Gas seeks to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action.
After the plaintiff has recovered the damages, it now asks for the specific performance to be done by Manila
Gas.
Issue: Was the action filed by Blossom premature? Can Blossom compel performance even after being
awarded damages?
Held: No, it was not premature. By the principle of anticipatory breach, whenever a debtor has manifested
or if it appears that the debtor can no longer fulfill his obligation, even before it is due, the situation may be
considered as a default or breach as the case may be.
Blossom can no longer demand performance of the obligation as it has been awarded damages. Res
judicata has set in. Having recovered damages against it, covering a period of four years, upon the theory that
the defendant broke the contract, and in bad faith refused to make deliveries of either of the tars, how can the
plaintiff now claim and assert that the contract is still in force and effect? In the instant case the plaintiff
alleges and relies upon the ten-year contract of January 1, 1920, which in bad faith was broken by the
defendant. If the contract was then broken, how can it be enforced in this action?
Danfoss, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp., GR No 143788, 9/9/05

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Facts: Continental filed an action against Danfoss for damages. It has started when Continental purchased
from Danfoss converter/inverters for their cement plant which should be delivered within eight to ten weeks.
When the end of the ten weeks are nearing, Danfoss then manifested that there were still checking the status
of the converters/inverters. Continental surmised that Danfoss cannot perform its obligation; so, it
manifested the cancellation of the delivery and files an action for damages. Danfoss seeks to dismiss on
account of failure to state the cause of action.
Issue: Was there anticipatory breach?
Ruling: No there was none. The principle contemplates future periodic deliveries and a willful refusal to
comply therewith. Here, the obligation was single and indivisible to deliver two units of frequency
converter/inverter by November 19, 1997. The records do not show that petitioner refused to deliver the
goods on the date agreed upon. On the contrary, petitioner exerted efforts to make good its obligation by
looking for other suppliers who could provide it the parts needed to make timely delivery of the frequency
converter/inverter ordered by respondent.
Joinder of Causes of Action
The following are the requisites for the joinder of cause of action:

It must comply with the rule on joinder of parties;

It must not include actions governed by special rules;

If the actions pertain to different venue of jurisdiction, they may be joined in the Regional Trial court
provided that one of them is cognizable by the said court;

If the causes of action are for a sum of money, the aggregate amount shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Flores v. Mallare-Philipps, 144 SCRA 377 (1986)

Facts: Flores has two causes of action against two different defendants. The one against Binongcal amounts
to the payment of P 11, 643.00; while the one against Calion amounts to 10, 212. According to the rules, the
aggregate amount shall determine the test of jurisdiction, so she filed with the RTC instead of the MTC. It
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Was there a proper joinder of causes of action?
Ruling: No, there was none. There was a misjoinder of causes of action in this case. Under the present law,
the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a
defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against
two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or
more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.

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In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after
a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the
claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls
within its jurisdiction.
Perez v. Hermano, GR 147417, 7/8/05
Facts: Aviso and the Perez spouses filed and action for enforcement of contract and damages with prayer
for TRO and preliminary injunction against Zescon Land including Hermano, who filed a compulsory
counterclaim, before the Regional Trial Court. Hermano then, after filing his answer sought dismissal and
severance of the causes of action, which was granted. Again there are three causes of action in this case. First
is the enforcement of a contract to sell, the second is annulment or rescission of the two contract of
mortgage between the plaintiff and Hermano, and the third one is for damages.
Issue: Was there a misjoinder of causes of action?
Ruling: No, there was no misjoinder. While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party
litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint
conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties,
or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and
subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of
litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where
possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be
liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one
time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient
administration of justice.
It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different
parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law
common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.
From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes reasonably apparent that there are questions
of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of
transaction over the same properties. There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon
Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano. There is
also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under
Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute
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owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently
declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of
mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally,
there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras, and
respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for damages.
Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, GR 140746, 3/16/05
Facts: A passenger bus of Pantranco, hit the rear of a jeepney. The insurance company only paid a part and
the rest was shouldered by the jeepney owner. The insurance corporation and the owner of the jeepney
sought reimbursement from Pantranco by a complaint for a sum of money before the RTC. Pantanco
contended that MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction. The RTC ruled in favor of the reimbursement.
Issue: Was the trial court correct in assuming jurisdiction and rendering the judgment?
Ruling: Yes, what the RTC did was proper. In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more
than P20, 000.00 which at the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional
Trial Court.
Appellants contend that there was a misjoinder of parties. Assuming that there was, under the Rules
of Court (Sec. 11, Rule 7) as well as under the Rules of Civil Procedure (ditto), the same does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint.
Permissive joinder of parties requires that:
(a) The right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions;
(b) There is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and
(c) Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the rear side
of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There
being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action
against petitioners.
Misjoinder of Causes of Action
Effect:

It will not be a ground for dismissal of the complaint.

Remedy:

The court will order that it be proceeded with separately.

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