Naval Surface Self-Protection in a Passive Countermeasures

Context
Seduction Countermeasures
Introduction
The development of chaff as a radar countermeasure started in the Second World War independently by both the British and
the Germans - each were unaware that they shared the same secret. In July 1942, Lady Joan Curran investigated the idea of
generating a cloud of false radar echoes by dumping packets of aluminium stripes from an aircraft. The invention originated
from the idea by Doctor Reginald Victor (R.V.) Jones in 1937, that a piece of metal foil (Dipole) cut to half the wavelength of the
transmitter radar frequency could be used dispersed from aircraft and create false target echos to deceive enemy radar
operators. The invented device was codenamed Window by the British and "Chaff" by the Americans. The German codename
for chaff was Duppel (a district in Berlin, where the first tests were executed in 1942). However, Duppel saw limited use by
the Germans during World War II as it was thought by Field Marshall Goering that it would best not to be used for fear of
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inviting retaliation. Thus, he ordered subsequent technical records destroyed.
The decision not to use the Window application was a much debated and well-kept secret by the highest in Allied Command.
It wasn't until mid July, 1943, that Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved and authorized the use of "Window". A couple of
weeks later, on July 24, 1943 Window was first used by the Royal Air Force (RAF) during Operation GOMORRAH- the
devastating air-raids on Hamburg. During this Operation, 90 million aluminized paper strips were dispersed, each measuring
12 by 0.6 inches. Window greatly contributed to the
confusion of the Wurzburg radar system and its
operators, blinding them almost completely and
rendering the German air defence batteries useless. Out
of the 791 RAF bombers deployed, only 12 did not
return, whereas in earlier missions, without the use of
"Window", more than 10% of the aircrafts had been
lost.
Window was for the longest time only used to attack the
German Wurzburg radar systems. Quite notably, and
along with other deceptive devices, it was also used to
provide the two false-target (fictitious) fleets during the
D-Day invasion components of Operation Glimmer and
Taxable. The success of these operations was greatly
contributed by the Canadian destroyer HMCS HAIDA,
who was designated as the lead Trial ship for trials off
the coast of Scotland a couple of months prior to the
planned invasion. HAIDA, along with Sterling and
Lancaster bombers, and smaller seaborne vessels,
conducted extensive and successful testing trials which
led to the enabling and success of these two
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operations.

Figure 1: HMCS HAIDA. Photo by Jerry Proc. Used with permission.

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Web page http://hmcshaida ca

Today Window, which is more commonly referred to as Chaff, is used by many modern military forces to distract radar guided
missiles off their targets. Three different types of Chaff Countermeasures techniques are commonly used. These are Chaff C
(Charlie) for Confusion, Chaff D (Delta) for Distraction and Chaff S (Sierra) for Seduction. Each are deployed differently to
provide the desired deception effect during the different phases of an active radar missile attack with the ultimate aim of
creating deception to either the firing unit's targeting radars or the active radar seeker in the missile head and/or the firing
platform's operators.
Chaff C: Launched before the enemy's targeting radar turns on. The aim is to provide numerous equally sized false
targets- thus creating confusion to the firing unit in its target selection prior to launch. In order for the chaff
clouds to be effective after deployment, the chaff firing unit, and/or the Task Force, needs to manoeuvre and
maintain a course and speed to that of the true wind. (See Figure 2);
Chaff D: Launched just prior to when the active homing seeker of the in-flight enemy missile is believed to turn on and
search for its target based on its pre-programmed firing data. The aim is to distract the enemy missile from its
intended target by creating additional false targets. As in Chaff C, the Chaff firing unit and/or Task Force, needs
to manoeuvre and maintain a course and speed to that of the true wind for Chaff D to be effective. (See Figure
2); and
Chaff S:

Launched when it is known that the fired missile is locked-on to its intended victim. This is usually indicated by
its flight path, plus the electronic emission parametric search pattern changes detected by the victim's
Electronic Support (ES) sensor operator. The intent of Chaff S is to walk the missile away from its intended
target by fooling the missile tracking sensors and having it track and follow the deployed chaff. However,
instead of using true wind, the targeted ship needs to manoeuvre to create the desired relative wind and speed
to cause separation and lure the missile to the deployed chaff. Because of the shorter timeline, Chaff S may be
re-sown at rapid intervals to produce this desired effect. (See Figure 3)

During any of these Chaff applications or disciplines, timing is of the essence. Of them all, the most critical is deterring a missile
during the deployment of Chaff S, just before the missile is about to impact. Improvements in the deployment and the
understanding and use of calculable data for a successful Chaff S tactical deployment is the main topic of this article.

Figure 2: This figure shows the desired results for either

Chaff C when deceiving a Firing Unit, or Chaff D when
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deceiving an enemy missile

Figure 3: This figure shows the intent of Chaff S when

deployed at missile lock-on. The attacking missile is
separated from its intended target through the use of
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Relative Wind, ship manoeuvring and re-sowing.

The Intention of this article

This articles main focus is on the tactical design of a passive countermeasure scenario considering the knowledge of the
estimated timeframe, the seeker tracking type (Leading Edge and Centroid), the track gate depth/pulse width, cloud design and
geometry as well as separation considerations between ownship and the deployed chaff cloud. Furthermore, it will show the
necessity of wind compensation between different chaff firing times of an available softkill countermeasure system to increase
the effectiveness of this countermeasure against a modern seeker which uses a small track gate depth.
Passive countermeasures, through the use of Chaff Sierra, are well known engagements and have proven their effectiveness in
many international trials. To improve the effectiveness of this passive countermeasure, it is necessary to have a thorough
understanding of many parameters. These include; the defensive and manoeuvrability abilities of your ownship, and a detailed
knowledge and understanding your ownship's Radar Cross Section (RCS) - how will the attacking missile see you?
Figure 4 shows an example of an RCS pattern diagram for a given ship model in different roll angles in a transmitter / receiver
elevation of 0.28 degree using a frequency measurement of 9.0 Gigahertz (GHz), horizontally polarized. The values of the
measured RCS show significant deviations between the 0.0 degree roll angle (blue line) and the 2.0 degree / -2.0 degree roll
angles (red and green lines). In some aspect angles (i.e. 290 degrees) the RCS at the 0.0 degree roll angle is up to ten times
higher than in the 2.0 degree / -2.0 degree roll angles. By taking into account that this diagram ignores additional types of radar
propagation or ducting effects, which are highly influenced by environmental conditions, this diagram can serve only as an
indication, of how the attacking missile may see you. To have a more precise view, additional data about the ownships RCS
distribution, the missile and seeker data and the environmental data is essential.

Figure 4: View of a RCS diagram of a given ship model in different roll angles. The RCS values were calculated by cadRCS
software using the Computer Aided Design (CAD) model from the ship.

Known missile data can be possibly derived from compiled intelligence, limited open source data or trade show events. Other
values may range from either collected emission intercepts or derived data from technical engineering analysis. Having this
advance knowledge may provide you the missile's known transmitting or operating values or ranges for its Frequency, Pulse
Width, Pulse Repetition Frequency and Scan time, to the missile's speed, polarisation, beam width and launch ranges, including
its attack profile or even the recommended countermeasure, or possibly no data at all. Known or estimated radar values can
parametrically be reprogrammed into one's Electronic Support (ES) system, thus cueing its recognition and aiding you a little

longer timeline for your decision and response time. Environmental data i.e. sea state, wind, ship course and speed, as well as,
the desired turning rate, may also be available to assist in your countermeasure reaction(s). Using this data, a tactical decision
to introduce a more accurate chaff countermeasure can be initiated, including different course-and-speed-alterations to
minimize the RCS signature of your ownship and optimize the separation of the deployed chaff cloud which will hopefully
enable one the ability to foil the missile from its intended target.
This paper will focus on the calculation and tactical deployment of the seduction clouds and its priority placement. By placing
the chaff cloud at the right time and place can produce the desired effect to spoof the cloud into the missile's radar seeker
range gate in order to present a fictitious, but valid target to the incoming missile, thus deceiving it.
Using passive countermeasures in the Chaff Sierra seduction mode limits the effective time that chaff can be deployed and
achieve it potential mimicking bloom or equivalent RCS pattern. Chaff Sierra is initiated when the missile is assumed to have
acquired its target by locking-on. Providing the victim is fitted with the appropriate ES sensor, it can in most cases, detect this
phase via their ES by a change in the missiles scanning techniques (changing from a fast sector scan to an audible fixed (steady)
scan tone). The distance from which lock-on can be attained strongly depends on the missile type. This may vary somewhere
between 5 and 8 nautical miles, or in the case of Stand-Off Anti-Ship missiles, possibly well outside the victims or Ownship's Air
Search radar range.
The attack height of the missile, the missile seekers transmitting frequency, its polarization, ownships pitch and roll angle
aspect to the missile while in a manoeuvre, as well as the calculated environmental data, will have an impact on the available
time for an effective seduction to take place; nonetheless, even without pre-detection or intelligence, one can assume that this
time will be very short. One of the best possible uses of calculating this available data, enabling one to provide an effective
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response in deceiving an anti-ship missile during a seduction countermeasure, is through the use of a 3D RCS modelling .
Figure 5 illustrates a 3D RCS model for three different roll angles using aspect angles between 180 and 280 degrees. The model
is calculated for distances between 15,000 and 0 meters using a horizontally polarized radar frequency of 9.0 GHz. The missile
attack height is assumed at 5 meters above sea level, in a sea state 3 (wave height 0.5 1.25 meters) weather environment.
Figure 5 includes radar propagation effects and environmental data. The resulting RCS values of the used ship model are
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displayed through different colors. The underlying RCS ranges from 10 dB = 10 m (dark blue) up to 50 dB = 100,000 m or more
(red color).
The location where the chaffs RCS exceeds the ownships RCS strongly depends on the roll angle seen from the missiles aspect
angle. These locations are displayed in the 3D RCS diagram by the colours of dark blue, up to green and yellow. Orange and red
colored areas depict critical zones in which the chaff clouds RCS is most probably too small for a successful countermeasure.
Furthermore, Figure 5 illustrates that the timeframe for a seduction countermeasure can be increased by utilising the heeling
effect while in a manoeuvre. The timeframes dt -2 and dt -8 shown in Figure 5, are more than double the size of dt0.

Figure 5: 3D RCS diagram for ownships roll angle at 0.0, -2.0 and -8.0 degrees. The diagram shows the different timeframes
available at different roll angles. Due to a high dynamic pitch and roll of the ship, the timeframe analyses of different roll angles
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is always searching for a positive trend and not for a single static solution .

For a missile travelling at the speed of approximately 300 m/s, a timeframe of roughly 20 seconds can be achieved, by
maintaining a roll angle between -2.0 and -8.0 degrees for your ownship. This can be achieved by manoeuvres exploiting the
heeling effect mentioned before. The timeframe excludes the time needed for missile detection and classification.
In this example, an effective countermeasure using Chaff Sierra has to be calculated, initiated, with the added time to allow for
blooming and separation, within these 20 seconds. This short time stresses the importance and success of quick reaction time in
combination with a valid tactical calculation for any countermeasure system.
Following the analysis of the available timeframe, (by consideration of an ownships 3D RCS diagram) the next logical step is the
analysis of the impacts caused by the location and geometry of the chaff cloud with the aim to achieve maximum effectiveness
of the countermeasure. This is subject to a potential future continuation of this article.

Summary
It has been almost 70 years now since its first deployment in 1943. Through this time, there have been many mechanisms
created to increase the ability to effectively calculate and deploy Chaff. You have been shown some of the latest examples that
are available today. Although the composite make-up of the Chaff product is similarly the same and it still designed to produce
the same desired effect, it still remains increasingly important in defeating today's complicated threat(s) in a matter of short
mere seconds.

About the author

Dipl.-Ing. Peter Huber is a self-employed engineer with his office based in Bischofswiesen / Germany. He is a retired Captain of
the German Armed Forces and has more than 10 years of industrial experience in the development of tactical algorithms for
passive countermeasure systems. Current activities focus on his dissertation at the Universitt der Bundeswehr in Munich
with the topic: "Mathematical Optimization for positioning of decoys in Anti Ship Missile Defence", as well as on the
development of the ASM simulation software ASMD-CAT.

References:
1. Bodyguard of Lies (Volume 2) - Anthony Cave Brown - Page 588
2. Bodyguard of Lies (Volume 2) - Anthony Cave Brown - Pages 589-591
3. Most Secret War - Dr. R.V. Jones - Chapter's 33 and 34.
4. Fig. 1: Photo by Jerry Proc, used with permission. Web page http//hmcshaida.ca
5. Fig. 2/3: AGSI courtesy Don Gilman http://wiki.computerharpoon.com/index.php?title=Electronic_Battlefield
6. cadRCS Gert Albert Lindqvist www.cadrcs.com
7. ASMD-CAT www.asmd-cat.com
8. Material Editor: Robert Langille EWCS (Electronic Warfare Consulting Services) Inc.