#1 Bangalisan vs.

CA,
31 July 1997
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among
the 800 public school teachers who staged mass
actions on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize
their grievances concerning the alleged failure of the
public authorities to implement certain laws and
measures intended for their material benefit.
The Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work
Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order,
thus the Secretary charged petitioners with grave
misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of
Civil Service law, rules and regulations and
reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform
official duty; gross insubordination; conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
absence without official leave in violation of PD 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines. They were simultaneously placed under
preventive suspension.
Petitioners failed to give their answer to the
complaint filed against them despite due notice.
Thus, the DECS secretary found them guilty of the
offenses and ordered their dismissal from service.
The secretary, acting on petitioners motion for
reconsideration, modified its ruling. Instead of
dismissal, petitioners would be suspended from
service for nine months without pay.
Petitioners appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. The latter reduced the suspension
period from nine months to six months with
automatic reinstatement in the service but without
payment of back wages.
Petitioners appealed the case to CA but dismissed
the same for lack of merit.
Petitioners main argument is that they were merely
exercising their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
ISSUE
WON Government employees can engage in a strike
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RULING
NO. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right
of government employees to organize, they are
prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public services. The right of
government employees to organize is limited only to
the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work
stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to realize
their demands by withholding their services. The
fact that the conventional term strike was not used
by the striking employees to describe their common
course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance,
will be deemed to be controlling.
It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised
such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service and classes in various
public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there
are efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than
the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners
could petition the government for redress of
grievances.
It bears stressing that suspension of public services,
however temporary, will inevitably derail services to
the public, which is one of the reasons why the right
to strike is denied government employees. It may be
conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances
and noble intentions in staging the mass actions,
but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice
of innocent school children. Their righteous
indignation does not legalize an illegal work
stoppage.
As a general rule, even in the absence of express
statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No.
6, public employees are denied the right to strike or
engage in a work stoppage against a public
employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit
strikes or work stoppages by public employees was

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clearly recognized at common law. Indeed, it is

frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit
such strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision,
simply incorporate or reassert the common law rule.
To grant employees of the public sector the right to
strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative
authority therefor. In the absence of any express
legislation allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, employees in the public service
may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary
work stoppages like workers in the private sector.
#2 National Federation of Sugar Workers vs.
Ovejera, 31 May 1982
FACTS
Petitioner NSFW (bargaining agent of the rank and
file) and respondent company (CAC) entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) wherein
parties agreed to maintain the present practice on
the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and
amelioration (improvement) bonus.
On Nov. 30, 1981, petitioner and respondent entered
into a compromise agreement two days after the
strike to compel payment of the 13 th month pay,
agreeing to abide by the final decision of the
Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th month
pay if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay
the same separate and distinct from the bonuses
already given.
Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition filed by Marcopper Mining
Corporation which sought to annul the decision of
the Labor Deputy Minister granting the 13th month
pay to its employees in addition to mid-year and
Christmas bonuses under a CBA was dismissed on
June 11, 1981 and became final and executory on
December 18, 1981.
On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the MOLE a
notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th
month pay. Six days after, NFSW commenced a
strike.

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One day after the commencement of the strike, or on

January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was
filed by NFSW with MOLE.
CAC filed a petition the Regional Arbitration Branch,
MOLE to declare the strike illegal, principally for
being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is,
the strike was declared before the expiration of the
15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice
(ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the
lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of
the result of the strike-vote.
Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike
illegal. CAC filed for a restraining order for the
enforcement of the of LAs decision. No restraining
order was issued.
ISSUE
Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is
illegal.
RULING
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the
deputy of labor minister, ruled that the failure of the
NFSW to abide with the mandatory cooling-off
period and the 7 day strike ban made the strike
illegal and the NFSW cannot insist on its claim that
its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in
addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC.
Language of the law. The foregoing provisions
hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off
period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after
the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were
meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says "the labor union may strike"
should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse
of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period)
from the mandatory filing of the notice," the
unmistakable implication is that the union may not
strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period.
Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike
ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in
the provision that "in every case," the union shall
furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at
least seven (7) days before the intended strike,
subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must
be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off
period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied

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with, although the labor union may take a strike vote

and report the same within the statutory cooling-off
period.
#3 UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs.
NLRC and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 91025 : December 19, 1990
FACTS: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of
the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of
Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a
Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of
CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice. Private
respondent assailed the legal personality of the
proponents of the said notice of strike to represent
the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This
notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the
parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to
which private respondent failed to attend contending
that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly
constituted and mandated in accordance with the
UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter, Company
terminated from employment all UFE Union officers,
and all the members of the negotiating panel for
instigating and knowingly participating in a strike
staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and
Cagayan de Oro on September 11, 1987 without any
notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the
purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. LA upheld the validity of the dismissal;
NLRC en banc affirmed. Subsequently, company
concluded separate CBAs with the general
membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and
Cagayan de Oro units; Assailing the validity of these
agreements, the union filed a case of ULP against
the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch
Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by
the NCMB but yielded negative result. Petitioner filed
a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute of deadlock in collective
bargaining between the parties. On October 28,
1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon certified to
the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and
Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: The
NLRC is further directed to call all the parties
immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within
twenty (20) days from submission of the case for
resolution. Second Division of the NLRC
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promulgated a resolution granting wage increase

and other benefits to Nestles employees, ruling on
non-economic issues, as well as absolving the
private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice
charge. Petitioner finds said resolution to be
inadequate and accordingly, does not agree
therewith. It filed a motion for reconsideration,
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE RESPONDENT NLRC
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CBA
TO BE SIGNED BY THE PARTIES SHALL COVER
SOLELY THE BARGAINING UNIT CONSISTING OF
ALL REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF
THE RESPONDENT COMPANY AT MAKATI,
ALABANG AND CABUYAO.
HELD: The Court is convinced that the public
respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion
in resolving only the sole issue certified to by the
Secretary and formulating a CBA which covers the
bargaining units consisting of all regular rank-and-file
employees of the respondent company at Makati,
Alabang and Cabuyao only.
In its assailed resolution, public respondent stated:
"A perusal of the records and proceedings of this
case reveals that after the issuance by the
Secretary of Labor of his Order dated 28
October 1988 certifying the dispute to Us, the
Union filed an Urgent Manifestation seeking the
modification of the certification order to include
the Cebu Davao and Cagayan de Oro divisions,
the employees/workers therein being all
bonafide members of the Union which is the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all
the regular rank-and-file workers of the company
nationwide. Their non-inclusion in the
certification order, the union argues, would give
premium to the alleged unlawful act of the
Company in entering into separate 'Collective
Bargaining Agreements' directly with the workers
thereat.
"In the same vein, the union manifested its
intention to file a complaint for ULP against the
company and its officers responsible for such
act, which it eventually did.
"Considering that the Union had reserved the
right to prosecute the Company and its officers

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responsible for the alleged unlawful execution of

the CBA directly with the union members in
Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, as it
has in fact filed a case which is now pending
with our Arbitration Branch, the issue as to
whether such acts constitute ULP is best heard
and decided separately from the certified case,
not only because of the evidentiary need to
resolve the issue, but also because of the delay
that may ensue in the resolution of the present
conflict.
"Furthermore, the consolidation of the issue with
the instant case poses complicated questions
regarding venue and joinder of parties. We feel
that each of the issues propounded by the
parties shall be better dealt with separately
according to its own merits.
"Thus, We rule to resolve the sole issue in
dispute certified to this Commission, i.e., the
deadlock in the collective bargaining
negotiations in Cabuyao/Alabang and Makati
units." (Rollo, pp. 174-176)
We agree. Public respondent's resolution is proper
and in full compliance with the order of the Secretary
of Labor. The concomitant delay that will result in
resolving petitioner's motion for the modification of
the certification order to determine whether to
include Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro Divisions
or not will defeat the very purpose of the Secretary
of Labor's assumption of jurisdiction and his
subsequent certification order for compulsory
arbitration.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary
of Labor over labor disputes causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest is in the
nature of a police power measure. It cannot be
denied that the private respondent is engaged in
an undertaking affected with public interest
being one of the largest manufacturers of food
products. The compelling consideration of the
Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction is the fact
that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to
the national economy and thus, the need to
implement some measures to suppress any act
which will hinder the company's essential
productions is indispensable for the promotion
of the common good. Under this situation, the
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Secretary's certification order for compulsory

arbitration which was intended for the immediate
formulation of an already delayed CBA was
proper.
#4 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC,
198 SCRA 586 / June 27, 1991
FACTS:
IBM representing 4500 employees of SMC working
at various plants, offices and warehouses in NCR
presented to the company a demand for correction
of the significant distortion in the workers wages
pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act.
Demand unheeded by company hence the union
members refused to render overtime services until
the distortion has been corrected by SMC.
It appears that the employees working
hours/schedule has been freely observed by the
employees for the past 5 years and due to the
abandonment of the longstanding schedule of work
and reversion to the eight-hour shift substantial
losses were incurred by SMC.
SMC filed a complaint with arbitration branch
of NLRC then before the NLRC for the latter to
declare the strike illegal.
Unions contention: workers refusal to work beyond
8 hours was a legitimate means of compelling SMC
to correct distortion.
SMC: The coordinated reduction by the Unions
members of the work time in order to compel SMC to
yield to the demand was an illegal and unprotected
activity.
ISSUE: W/N the strike was legal
HELD:
ILLEGAL. The strike invoking the issue of wage
distortion is illegal. The legality of these activities
depends on the legality of the purposes sought to be
attained. These joint or coordinated activities may be
forbidden or restricted by law or contract.

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4

The legislative intent that solution of the problem of

wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary
negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes,
lockouts, or other concerted activities of the
employees or management, is made clear in the
rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority
granted by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16,
Chapter I of these implementing rules, after
reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first
settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by
compulsory arbitration, declares that, Any issue
involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a
strike/lockout.
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement
between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions
of which are quoted by the former without the latters
demurring to the accuracy of the quotation, also
prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other
similar or related concerted activities as a mode of
resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said
agreement clearly stating that settlement of all
disputes, disagreements or controversies of any
kind should be achieved by the stipulated grievance
procedure and ultimately by arbitration.
#5 SMC v NLRC
March 2, 1999
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation (SMC), which allegedly
needed to streamline its operations due to financial
losses shut down some of its plants and declared 55
positions as redundant. Consequently, the private
respondent union (SMCEU) filed several grievance
cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for
the redeployment of the said employees to the other
divisions of the company. During the grievance
proceedings, however, most of the employees were
redeployed, while others accepted early retirement.
As a result, only 17 employees remained when the
parties proceeded to the third level of the grievance
procedure. The private respondent filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
a notice of strike. Petitioner, on the other hand,
moved to dismiss the notice of strike, but the NCMB
failed to act on the motion. Petitioner SMC filed a
Class 6 - Digests

complaint with the respondent NLRC praying for the

dismissal of the notice of strike, and an order
compelling the respondent union to submit to
grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the
notice of strike, and the recovery of the expenses of
litigation. Respondent NLRC came out with a
minute resolution dismissing the complaint.
Aggrieved by the resolution, petitioner found its way
to this Court via the present petition.
In the case under consideration, the grounds relied
upon by the private respondent union are nonstrikeable. Their grounds appear more illusory than
real. The Court held that the violation of the CBA is
chargeable against the private respondent union.
The Supreme Court granted the instant petition.
SMCEU-PTGWO was directed to complete the third
level of the Grievance Procedure and proceed with
the Arbitration proceedings if necessary.
ISSUE: WON THERE IS A VIOLATION OF A NO
STRIKE CLAUSE.
HELD:
Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as the
situation between the labor and the management of
the company where there is failure in the collective
bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate.
The situation is non-existent in the present case
since there is a Board assigned on the third level
(Step 3) of the grievance machinery to resolve the
conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the
conciliation decide the conflict, petitioner declared a
deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For
failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance
machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of
strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and
private respondent union ordered to proceed with
the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
In abandoning the grievance proceedings and
stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under
the CBA, private respondent (union) violated the
mandatory provisions of the CBA.
Petitioner (employer) having evinced its willingness
to negotiate the fate of the remaining employees

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affected , there is no ground to sustain the notice of

strike of the union.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and
private respondent San Miguel Corporation
Employees Union - PTGWO are hereby directed to
complete the third level (Step 3) of the Grievance
Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration
proceedings if necessary.
#6 Phil. Steam Navigational Co. vs. PMOG
October 29 1965
FACTS:

PHILSTEAM is engaged in inter-island

shipping, PMOG is a labor-union affiliated with
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) representing and
which represented some of PHILSTEAMs officers.
The Cebu Seamens Association (CSA) is another
labor union that represents some of PHILSTEAMs
officers.

PMOG sent PHILSTEAM a set of demands

with a request for collective bargaining but
PHILSTEAM required PMOG to first prove its
representation of a majority of PHILSTEAMs
employees before its demands will be considered.
PHILSTEAM started interrogating and investigating
its captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find out
directly from them if they had joined PMOG or
authorized PMOG to represent them.

PMOG filed a notice of intention to strike

stating PHILSTEAMs alleged refusal to bargain and
unspecified ULP.

The CSA also transmitted its own set of

demands to PHILSTEAM where the latter
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considered its demands. PHILSTEAM and CSA

signed a CBA. On that same day, PMOG declared a
strike against PHILSTEAM

ISSUE: WON PHILSTEAM committed ULP.

RULING: The acts found by respondent court

constituting the foregoing unfair labor practice are:
(1) the interrogation and investigation by
PHILSTEAM's supervisory officials of its captains,
deck officers and engineers, to determine whether
they had authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining
agent; (2) the subjection of PMOG to vilification; and
(3) the participation of PHILSTEAM's pier
superintendent in soliciting membership for a
competing union.

PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out

an investigation of its officers as to their membership
in PMOG and whether they had given PMOG
authority to represent them in collective bargaining.
The reason for this, PHILSTEAM was merely to
ascertain for itself the existence of a duty to bargain
collectively with PMOG, a step allegedly justified by
PMOG's refusal to furnish proof of majority
representation. The asserted reason for the
investigation cannot be sustained. The record
discloses that such investigation was started by
PHILSTEAM even before it received PMOG's reply
stating a refusal to submit proof of majority
representation.
Specifically, the investigation was put under way on
June 29, 1954 the same day PHILSTEAM sent its
request that PMOG submit proof of majority
representation whereas, PHILSTEAM knew of
PMOG's refusal to furnish said proof only on July 6,
1954, when it received PMOG's reply letter.
PMOG's refusal to submit evidence showing it
represented a majority had nothing to do with
PHILSTEAM's decision to carry out the investigation.

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An employer is not denied the privilege of

interrogating its employees as to their union
affiliation, provided the same is for a legitimate
purpose and assurance is given by the employer
that no reprisals would be taken against unionists.
Nonetheless, any employer who engages in
interrogation does so with notice that he risks a
finding of unfair labor practice if the circumstances
are such that his interrogation restrains or interferes
with employees in the exercise of their rights to selforganization.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the
company of its employees to a series of
questionings regarding their membership in the
union or their union activities, in such a way as to
hamper the exercise of free choice on their part,
constitutes unfair labor practice. The respondent
court has found that PHILSTEAM's interrogation of
its employees had in fact interfered with, restrained
and coerced the employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization
#7 PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION-BFLU-TUPAS
LOCAL CHAPTER NO. 896, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
AND PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., NAGA PLANT, respondent
G.R. No. L-58341 June 29, 1982
Facts:
On December 11, 1979, a certification election was
held at the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company's (PEPSI)
plant in Naga City. Out of 131 votes which were cast,
the UNION got 128 so it regarded itself as the sole
and exclusive bargaining unit. The losing labor group
contested the election at various levels but it was
unsuccessful. Meanwhile, on April 1, 1980, the
UNION filed a notice of strike with MOLE's Regional
Office in Legaspi City on the ground that PEPSI
refused to bargain. PEPSI countered that it was
willing to bargain but there was yet no final decision
on the appeal of the other labor union as to who is
the EBR. Med-Arbiter Antonio B. Caayao issued a
resolution stating that the Notice of Strike under
consideration, being premature, is illegal and should,
therefore, be dismissed. The Union disregard the
resolution and staged a strike.
Class 6 - Digests

On May 15, 1980, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair

labor practice and illegal strike. Labor Arbiter
Fulleros, declared that the strike staged by the
respondents herein was beyond doubt illegal and
therefore all officers and member of the union whose
names appear on the complaint be considered to
have lost their employment status effective May 7,
1890.
ISSUE: WON Strike Is illegal so as to declare that all
the officers and members of the union whose names
and positions appear on Annex "A" of the complaint
except Romulo Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro Nieto be
considered to have lost their employment status
effective May 7, 1980. "
HELD:
It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically
carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor
practice were committed by the employer. It suffices
if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor
as the inducing factor for staging a strike." (Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees, Assn. vs.
Tandayag, G.R. No. L-29217, May 11, 1978, 83
SCRA 56, 72. And it has also been held that the
members of a union cannot be held responsible for
an illegal strike on the sole basis of such
membership or even on account of their affirmative
vote authorizing the same. They become liable only
if they actually participated therein. (ESSO
Philippines, Inc. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa
ESSO (MME), G.R. No. L-36545, January 26, 1977,
75 SCRA 73.)
In the case at bar, although the strike was indeed
illegal, We cannot discount the presence of good
faith on the part of the rank and file members of the
UNION considering that in the certification election
the UNION obtained 128 out of the 131 votes cast
so that they could justifiably consider it as their sole
bargaining representative. Moreover, there is no
proof that the members of the UNION all participated
in the illegal strike. The ones who deserve what
Justice Barredo calls "capital punishment" in the
Esso Philippines case, supra, are the officers of the
UNION who staged the strike in defiance of the
ruling of Med-Arbiter Caayao
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the private
respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate all of those

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persons whose names and positions appear in

Annex "A" which is mentioned in the decision of the
Executive Labor Arbiter dated November 20, 1980,
under the same terms and conditions of employment
existing prior to May 7, 1980, except for the officers
of the UNION. No costs.

#8 Tiu and Hayuhay v. NLRC

August 18, 1997
FACTS:
RBS (company) had a CBA with GMAEU (union)
which took effect on July 2, 1989. RBS observed
that a huge amount of overtime expenses incurred
which moved the president to form guidelines on the
availment of leaves and rendering of overtime work.
On June 11, 1991, RBS furnished GMAEU a copy of
the said guidelines and requested the latter to
comment thereon. The union did not file any
comment. RBS then implemented the said
guidelines. GMAEU then send a letter to the
president. The union argued that, the union was not
consulted in the formulation of the said guidelines
which violates their CBA, the guidelines would
render nugatory the CBA provision of the same
subject and the diminution of benefits being enjoyed
by all employees with respect to the mid-year
bonuses (from 2-1/2 months to 1-1/2 months
constitutes a withdrawal of an existing company
policy). RBS management and GMAEU officials met
on 3 July 1991 and on 10 July 1991 to thresh out the
issues raised by GMAEU in its 26 June 1991
letter. Both talks, however, were short lived as the
union refused to hold further talks with RBS. On 12
July 1991, GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
based on unfair labor practices allegedly committed
by RBS on grounds of violation of existing CBA,
employees coercion, union interference and
discrimination. The NCMB set a conciliation meeting
on 19 July 1991, but as early as 16 July 1991 the
Union held a strike vote among its members and
submitted the results thereof to the NCMB on 18
July 1991 which showed that majority of the union
members voted to go on strike.

Class 6 - Digests

During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July

1991, RBS, through counsel, informed GMAEUs
officers that RBS did not violate any provision in the
collective bargaining agreement since the issuance
of the guidelines was a management prerogative
duly recognized in their agreement. As regards
GMAEUs charges of coercion, union interference
and discrimination, RBS argued that these alleged
unfair labor practices were neither raised by the
union in its 26 June 1991 letter nor during their 3
July and 10 July 1991 talks. RBS counsel requested
GMAEUs officers to name the persons or officers of
RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor practices
and to state the specific act or acts complained of so
that RBS management could adequately refute said
allegations or impose appropriate disciplinary
actions against its erring officers. GMAEUs officers,
however, ignored both RBS and the labor
conciliators requests for a bill of particulars.
In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July
1991, RBS reiterated its request to GMAEUs
officers to furnish RBS the details of the alleged
unfair practices committed by RBS officers. Again,
the Union denied RBS request and refused to hold
any further talks with RBS management. On the
same day, RBS filed a motion to dismiss GMAEUs
notice of strike and forewarned the Union about the
consequences of an illegal strike. On 2 August 1991,
the union struck. On the same day, RBS filed a
complaint for illegal strike and unfair labor practice
against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers with
the NLRC. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor
immediately assumed jurisdiction over the case,
issued a return-to-work order, and certified the case
to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In the
certified case, the labor arbiter found no factual and
legal ground to hold RBS guilty of unfair labor
practices against the Union. On appeal (docketed
as NLRC-NCR CC No 00076-01), the NLRC
affirmed the labor arbiters decision in a resolution
dated 31 July 1992.
Meanwhile, the labor arbiter continued to hear the
illegal strike case filed by RBS against GMAEU. On
18 February 1994, the labor arbiter rendered
judgment declaring the strike illegal and the union
officers who knowingly participated in the illegal
strike to have validly lost their employment status. 10
of them did not appeal. Tiu and Hayuhay appealed.

Labor Relations
8

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
UPHELD THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION THAT
PETITIONERS STAGED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.
HELD:
The notice of strike filed by the union before the
NCMB on 12 July 1991 contained general
allegations that RBS management committed unfair
labor practices by its gross violation of the economic
provisions in their collective bargaining agreement
and by alleged acts of coercion, union interference
and discrimination which amounted to union
busting. It is the union, therefore, who had the
burden of proof to present substantial evidence to
support these allegations.
It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union
treated RBS issuance of the guidelines on the
availment of leaves and rendering of overtime
services as gross violations of the existing
collective bargaining agreement. In its talks with the
union, RBS painstakingly explained that the said
allegation was unfounded because the issuance of
said guidelines was RBS management
prerogative. Up to that point, the union never raised
the issue of unfair labor practices allegedly
committed by RBS official under Article 248 of the
Labor Code. But in its notice of strike filed two days
later, the union raised issues of coercion,
discrimination, and union interference for the first
time.
Significantly, the union had two (2) conciliatory
meetings arranged by the NCMB at which it could
have
substantiated
these
additional
allegations. However, the fact that it had submitted
the results of the strike vote even ahead of the
conciliatory meetings, and continuously refused to
substantiate its allegations in its notice of strike
thereafter, lends credence to the NLRCs
observation that these charges were indiscriminately
hurled against RBS to give a semblance of validity to
its notice of strike.
The bottom
immediately
established
disregarding

line is that the union should have

resorted to the grievance machinery
in their agreement with RBS. In
said procedure the union leaders who

Class 6 - Digests

knowingly participated in the illegal strike have

acted unreasonably, and, as such, the law cannot
interpose its hand to protect them from the
consequences of their behavior.

#9 NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE

HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
(NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO
CHAPTER, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth Division),
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS
INC., owner and operator of DUSIT HOTEL
NIKKO and/or CHIYUKI FUJIMOTO, and
ESPERANZA V. ALVEZ, respondents.
November 11, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) is the certified
bargaining agent of dusit hotel nikko located in
Makati city. On October 24, 2000 they submitted
their CBA proposal to the hotel. The negotiations
started but they failed to arrive at mutually
acceptable terms and conditions (DEADLOCK).
December 20, 2001 they filed a notice to strike to the
National conciliation and mediation board (NCMB)
on the ground of the bargaining deadlock.
Conciliation hearings were conducted but was
unsuccessful, On January 14, 2002 they decided to
wage a strike.
On January 17 and 18 some members of the union
started to have cropped or clean shaven hair,
Eventually the hotel prevented these workers from
entering the premises claiming that they violated the
Hotel's Grooming Standards.
The union later on staged a picket outside the
premises of the hotel which eventually led to severe
lack of manpower to the hotel and temporarily
ceasing their operations in 3 restaurants.
On January 20, 2002 the hotel issued notice to the
union preventively suspending them and charging
them with the following offense ((1) violation of the

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9

duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket;

(3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the
Hotel's Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike;
and (6) commission of illegal acts during the
illegal strike)
The next day the union filed a second notice to strike
on the ground of ULP and violation of article 28(a).
On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the
services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixtyone (61) members; and suspended eighty-one (81)
employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees
for 15 days, four (4) employees for 10 days, and
three (3) employees for five days.
on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice
of Strike this time on the ground of unfair labor
practice and union-busting.
The case was later on compulsory arbitrated to the
NLRC which eventually decided that the Hotel and
the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the
receipt of the decision. The NLRC also held that the
January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal
strike in which illegal acts were committed by the
Union; and that the strike violated the "No Strike, No
Lockout" provision of the CBA, which thereby
caused the dismissal of 29 Union officers and 61
Union members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to
grant the 61 dismissed Union members financial
assistance in the amount of month's pay for every
year of service or their retirement benefits under
their retirement plan whichever was higher.
Upon appeal the CA promulgated its January 19,
2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which
dismissed the Union's petition and affirmed the
rulings of the NLRC.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, MAY BE
ADJUDGED GUILTY OF STAGING AN ILLEGAL
STRIKE DESPITE RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION
THAT THEY PREVENTED SAID OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK FOR
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE HOTEL'S
GROOMING STANDARDS
HELD:
Class 6 - Digests

First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming

Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted
action to undermine the authority of and to
embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a
protected action. The Hotel does not need to
advertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be
gleaned from the records before us that the Union
officers and members deliberately and in apparent
concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair.
Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on
grooming was designed and calculated to place the
Hotel management on its heels and to force it to
agree to the Union's proposals. Thus, we hold that
the Union's concerted violation of the Hotel's
Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary
cessation and disruption of the Hotel's operations is
an unprotected act and should be considered as an
illegal strike.
Second, the Union's concerted action which
disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly violated the
CBA's "No Strike, No Lockout" provision, The facts
are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining
deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The
concerted action is an economic strike upon which
the afore-quoted "no strike/work stoppage and
lockout" prohibition is squarely applicable and legally
binding.
Third, the Union officers and members' concerted
action to shave their heads and crop their hair not
only violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards but
also violated the Union's duty and responsibility to
bargain in good faith. By shaving their heads and
cropping their hair, the Union officers and members
violated then Section 6, Rule XIII of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code.20
This rule prohibits the commission of any act which
will disrupt or impede the early settlement of the
labor disputes that are under conciliation.
Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory
30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike
ban before it conducted the strike on January 18,
2002. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed
to observe the mandatory periods before conducting
or holding a strike.
Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct
of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was

Labor Relations
10

illegal since, as shown by the pictures21 presented

by the Hotel, the Union officers and members
formed human barricades and obstructed the
driveway of the Hotel.

situation. The parties were also directed to sign a

CBA within fifteen days from notice of the said order.
The petitioner placed the respondent unions
Director for Grievances Apolonio Bondoc, Jr. under
preventive suspension. The respondent union filed a
manifestation and motion praying that the petitioner
be held in contempt for violating the May 23, 1990
Order of the SOLE.

#10 Grand Boulevard Hotel vs. GLOWHRAIN

July 18, 2003

Michael Wilson, the petitioners general manager,

wrote the SOLE informing him of the petitioners
decision to retrench seventeen less senior
employees on a staggered basis, spread over a
period of sixty days, to lessen the daily financial
losses being incurred by the petitioner.

Facts:
Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel,
Restaurant and Allied Industries Silahis
International Hotel Chapter and the petitioner Grand
Boulevard Hotel executed a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) covering the period from July 10,
1985 up to July 9, 1988. The petitioner thereafter
dismissed some of its employees and suspended
others who were members of the respondent union.
On May 26, 1987, the respondent union filed a
notice of STRIKE with the Department of Labor and
Employment, National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR),
based on the following grounds of illegal suspension,
violation of CBA, and harassment.
The Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment
issued a status quo ante bellum order certifying
the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration
pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code; and
further directing the employees to return to work
within forty-eight hours from receipt of the order,
and for the petitioner to accept all returning
employees under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the labor dispute. The
respondent union complied with the order of the
SOLE. The respondent union filed another notice of
strike against the petitioner on account of alleged
violations of the CBA and the illegal dismissal of nine
employees.
The SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum
order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration, directing the nine employees to return to
work and enjoining both parties from engaging in
any strike or lockout that would exacerbate the
Class 6 - Digests

The next day, the respondent union, through its

president, informed the DOLE-NCR that the union
will conduct a strike vote referendum on October 23
and 24, 1990.
The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to
implement its retrenchment program to stem its huge
losses. On November 5, 1990, the petitioner
disseminated a circular to all the employees,
informing them that the personnel plantilla would be
decreased by two hundred employees to be
implemented on a staggered and last in, first out
basis. It terminated the employment of sixty
employees and two officers of the respondent union
effective December 6, 1990. Moreover, the said
employees, including the two union officers, were
immediately barred from working. On November 7,
1990, the respondent union protested the actions of
the petitioner invoking Section 15, Article VI of the
CBA. The respondent union filed an urgent motion
for a reconsideration by the SOLE of the Certification
Order dated October 31, 1990. On November 14,
1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of
eighty-six more employees effective December 14,
1990. The remaining employees were also informed
that it will close in six months. On November 14,
1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of
Kristoffer So, effective December 14, 1990.
By way of riposte, the respondent union filed on
November 16, 1990 another notice of strike because
of what it perceived as the petitioners continuing
unfair labor practices (ULP). On the same day, at
about 12:00 noon, the officers of the respondent

Labor Relations
11

union and some members staged a picket in the

premises of the hotel, obstructing the free ingress
and egress thereto. At 3:00 p.m., the police
operatives of the Western Police District arrived and
dispersed the picket line.
On November 28, 1990, the SOLE issued an order
certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for
consolidation with the previously certified case. The
SOLE issued a return-to-work order, excluding those
who were retrenched, and enjoined all parties from
committing any act that would aggravate the already
tense situation. The SOLE further stated that the
validity and propriety of the retrenchment program of
the petitioner should be ventilated before and
resolved by the NLRC. The SOLE denied the
respondent unions motion to reconsider.
The petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional
Arbitration Office of the NLRC for illegal strike
against the union, its members and officers. The
petitioner alleged inter alia that the union members
and officers staged a strike on November 16, 1990
which lasted until November 29, 1990 without
complying with the requirements provided under
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter, although sympathetic with the
respondent union, held that for the latters failure
to comply with the requirements laid down in
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, the strike
that was staged on November 16, 1990 up to
November 29, 1990 was illegal.
The respondent union and the individual
respondents therein interposed an appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. The
respondent union pointed out in its appeal that it
had complied with the requirements laid down in
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code because
its November 16, 1990 notice of strike was a mere
reiteration of its September 27, 1990 notice of strike,
which, in turn, complied with all the requirements of
the aforementioned articles.
The NLRC ratiocinated that the compliance by
therein respondents of the requirements laid down in
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code respecting
the September 27, 1990 notice of strike filed by
the union cannot be carried over to the
November 16, 1990 notice of strike. Resultantly,
Class 6 - Digests

for failure of the union to comply with the

aforementioned requirements for its November 16,
1990 notice of strike, the strike staged on November
16 up to November 29, 1990 was illegal.
Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court docketed
as G.R. No. 153664. Edna Dacanay, another officer
of the union, filed a similar petition before this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike staged by the respondent
union on November 16 up to 29, 1990 is legal.
Whether or not the dismissals of the private
respondents officers of the respondent union as a
consequence of the strike on November 16 to 29,
1990 are valid.
HELD:
The requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a
notice of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days before
the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of
ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE
of the results of the voting at least seven days before
the intended strike.[37] The requisite seven-day
period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity
to verify whether the projected strike really carries
the approval of the majority of the union members.
The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were
intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and
conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and
failure of a union to comply therewith renders the
strike illegal.[38] A strike simultaneously with or
immediately after a notice of strike will render the
requisite periods nugatory.
Moreover, a strike that is undertaken, despite the
issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or
certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and,
thus, illegal pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended.
In this case, the respondent union filed its notice
of strike with the DOLE on November 16, 1990
and on the same day, staged a picket on the
premises of the hotel, in violation of the law.
Police operatives of the Western Police District had
to disperse the picketers and take into custody

Labor Relations
12

Union President Rogelio Soluta and the other

officers of respondent union, Henry Babay and
Dennis Cosico. The respondents cannot argue
that since the notice of strike on November 16,
1990 were for the same grounds as those
contained in their notice of strike on September
27, 1990 which complied with the requirements
of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban,
strike vote and strike vote report, the strike
staged by them on November 16, 1990 was
lawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike
of September 27, 1990 had already been taken
cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on
October 31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order
enjoining the respondent union from intending or
staging a strike. Despite the SOLE order, the
respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on
November 16, 1990 simultaneously with its notice of
strike, thus violating Article 264(a) of the Labor Code
of the Philippines.
While it may be true that the petitioner itself
barred the officers of the respondent union from
working and had terminated the employment of
Kristoffer So, and sent out circulars of its decision
to retrench its employees effective December 16,
1990, the same were not valid justifications for the
respondents to do away with the statutory
procedural requirements for a lawful strike. It
behooved the respondents to avail themselves of the
remedies under the CBA or file an illegal dismissal
case in the office of the Labor Arbiter against the
petitioner or by agreement of the parties, submit the
case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that
the matter may be subjected to voluntary arbitrary
proceedings instead of resorting to an immediate
strike. There was no immediate and imperative
need for the respondents to stage a strike on the
very day that the notice of strike on November
16, 1990 was filed because the retrenchment
envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take effect
on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the
respondent union could still very well be ordered and
acted upon by the SOLE before December 14, 1990.

Facts of the Case:

-

St. Scholastica College and Samahan ng

Manggagawang Pang Edukasyon sa Sta.
Eskolastika (NAFTEU) initiated for a first
ever collective bargaining agreement but the
negotiations fail and the union file for a
motion to strike.
The union declared a strike and it paralyzed
the whole operation of the college which
affected the students.
The respondent issued a back to work order
but instead of returning to work the union
then filed for a motion for reconsideration.
The college sent each member of the union
a letter to enjoin them to return to work but
the union continued to defy the return to
work order.
Conciliation meetings were held but this
proved futile as the college remained
steadfast in its position that any return to
work order should be unconditional.
The college sent termination letters to the
individual strikers and filed a complaint for
illegal strike against the union.
The respondent issued an order directing
the reinstatement of striking union members
and holding union officers responsible for
the violation of the return to work order and
were correspondingly terminated.
Both parties moved for the partial
consideration of the return to work order.

Issue:
-

Whether or not the striking union members

terminated for abandonment of work after
failing to comply with the return to work
order of the secretary of labor reinstated.

Held
#11 St. Scholasticas College vs. Torres
June 29, 1992

Class 6 - Digests

The labor code provides that if a strike has already

taken place at the time of assumption, all striking

Labor Relations
13

employees should immediately return to work. This

means that a return to work order is immediately
effective and executor, notwithstanding the filing of a
motion of reconsideration, it must be strictly
complied with even during the pendency of any
petition questioning its validity. After all, the
assumption and certification order issued in the
exercise of the secretarys compulsive power of
arbitration and until set aside, must therefore be
complied immediately.
The college correspondingly had every right to
terminate the services of thos who chose to
disregard the return to work order issued by the
secretary of labor in order to protect the interest of
the students who form part of the youth of the land.
#12 TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EES
UNION V. SEC. OF LABOR
TEMIC TELEFUNKEN MICRO-ELECTRONICS
INC. V. SEC. OF LABOR
FACTS:
Two petitions comprise this case. The first is the
Unions petition questioning the exclusion of union
officers, among others, in the order of the Sec. of
Labor directing the company to accept back all
striking workers, and the second is filed by Company
seeking to set aside the writ of execution issued to
implement the order.
The Union and the Company reached a deadlock in
their negotiations for a new CBA. Hence the Union
struck. Sec. Brillantes, the Sec. of Labor, intervened
and assumed jurisdiction. He ordered the strikers to
return to work but the strikers failed to return.
Pending resolution of the issue involving the legality
of the strike, Sec. Brillantes directed the Company to
accept back all striking workers, except the Union
Officers, shop stewards, and all those with pending
criminal charges, whose termination shall be among
the issues to be heard by Atty. Genilo.
ISSUE: whether or not the exclusion of the Sec. of
Labor in the order of the Sec. of Labor directing the
company to accept back all striking workers is
correct

In these twin petitions, the UNION argues that the

exclusion of union officers, shop stewards and those
with pending criminal charges from the directive to
the COMPANY to accept back the striking workers is
tantamount to illegal dismissal since the workers are
in effect being terminated without due process of
law. The COMPANY on the other hand maintains
that the dismissal of those who failed to comply with
the assumption and return-to-work orders is valid
and in accordance with jurisprudence
HELD: No. It may be true that the workers struck
after the Secretary of Labor and Employment had
assumed jurisdiction over the case and that they
may have failed to immediately return to work even
after the issuance of a return-to-work order, making
their continued strike illegal. For, a return-to-work
order is immediately effective and executory
notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. But, the liability of each of the union
officers and the workers, if any, has yet to be
determined. Thus, did all or some of the UNION
leaders knowingly participate in the illegal strike? Did
any or all of the members of the UNION who then
had pending criminal charges knowingly participate
in the commission, if any, of illegal acts during the
strike? The records do not bear the answers to these
questions, but not expectedly so, for Atty. Genilo of
the DOLE has yet to hear and receive evidence on
the matter, and to submit a report and
recommendation thereon.
Thus to exclude union officers, shop stewards and
those with pending criminal charges in the directive
to the COMPANY to accept back the striking workers
without first determining whether they knowingly
committed illegal acts would be tantamount to
dismissal without due process of law. The Court
therefore holds that the Honorable Secretary of
Labor gravely abused his discretion in excluding
union officers, shop stewards and those with
pending criminal charges in the order to the
COMPANY to accept back the striking workers
pending resolution of the issue involving the legality
of the strike.
#13 University of San Agustin Employees UnionFFW vs. CA / March 28, 2006

ARGUMENTS:
Class 6 - Digests

Labor Relations
14

Facts:
This is a case between the University of San Agustin
Employees Union-FFW (UNION) and The University
of San Agustin (UNIV).
Sometime on 2000, the parties agreed on a 5-year
CBA, the economic provisions of which are effective
for 3 years only. After the lapse of 3 years, the
parties negotiated on the economic provisions but
did not agree on the terms during the remaining 2
years of the CBA and beyond.
Since the parties did not agree on the computation
of tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) which shall be
the basis for the increase of salaries, they underwent
a preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB.
Still unresolved, the Union declared a bargaining
deadlock and thereafter filed a Notice of Strike at the
NCMB, which was expectedly opposed by the Univ
through a Motion to Strike-out Notice of Strike and
Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration, since the
CBA contained a "no-strike, no-lockout" provision,
and a grievance machinery for settling disputes,
including a voluntary arbitration mechanism should
the grievance machinery fail to settle the dispute.
The NCMB, however, failed to resolved the Univ's
Motion
Thereafter, both parties made a joint request for the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to
assume jurisdiction over the dispute.
On September 18, 2003, he SOLE assumed
jurisdiction, and with such assumption of jurisdiction,
any strike or lockout was strictly enjoined.
The day after the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and
on the same day that the Assumption of Jurisdiction
Order (AJO) was supposedly served to both parties,
the Union staged a strike. Union members refused to
receive a copy of the AJO assailing that only the
Union President is authorized to receive the same.
The Union filed a Petition Declare Illegal Strike and
Loss of Employment Status of the striking
employees, which Petition was filed at the NLRC.
Such Petition was later on consolidated with the
case pending before the SOLE, at the request of the
Univ.
The SOLE rendered a Decision resolving the various
economic issues over which the parties had a
Class 6 - Digests

deadlock in the collective bargaining, and likewise

dismissed the Petition to Declare Illegal Strike.
The University elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals after its Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the SOLE.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition. It
declared the strike as illegal, but affirmed the
SOLE's decision regarding the economic issues.
Both the Univ and the Union filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration.
Basing on the CA's decision, on April 7, 2005, the
Univ served the striking employees with their notices
for termination and concurrently, the Union filed with
the NCMB a second notice of strike, this time on
ground of alleged union busting.
On April 22, 2005, the parties again took initial steps
to negotiate the new CBA but said attempts proved
futile. Hence, on April 25, 2005, the Union went on
strike. In reaction, the University notified the Union
that it was pulling out of the negotiations because of
the strike.
On August 23, 2005, the CA, acting on the parties'
respective motions for reconsideration, promulgated
the herein challenged Partially Amended Decision.
Finding merit in the respondent University's motion
for partial reconsideration, the CA ruled that the
SOLE abused its discretion in resolving the
economic issues on the ground that said issues
were proper subject of the grievance machinery as
embodied in the parties' CBA. Consequently, the CA
directed the parties to refer the economic issues of
the CBA to voluntary arbitration. The CA, however,
stood firm in its finding that the strike conducted by
the petitioner Union was illegal and its officers were
deemed to have lost their employment status.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the strike was illegal and the
Union Officers deemed to have lost their
employment status on their failure to return to work
immediately upon the service of AJO issued by the
SOLE.
2. Whether or not the economic provisions of the
CBA should be referred to Voluntary Arbitration.

Labor Relations
15

Rulings:
On the first issue, the SC ruled that ART. 263 of the
Labor Code provides: ."..Such assumption or
certification (of the SOLE) shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return to
work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout." The phrase "immediately return to work"
indicates an almost instantaneous or automatic
compliance for a striker to return to work once an
AJO has been duly served. Therefore, the act of the
striking employees is violative of the foregoing
provision.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that
economic benefits, which included the issue on the
formula in computing the TIP share of the
employees, is one that arises from the interpretation
or implementation of the CBA, and these matters
should be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator, as
provided in Art. 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. The
peculiar facts of the instant case show that the
University was deprived of a remedy that would have
enjoined the Union strike and was left without any
recourse except to invoke the jurisdiction of the
SOLE.
# 14 G.R. No. L-25003 October 23, 1981
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. plaintiff-appellee
vs. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION,
Affiliated with the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES ATRAZO,
AQUILINO DISTOR, BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ,
JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO, ERNESTO
ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO, defendantsappellants.
FACTS:

Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an

action in the CFI-Manila against Permanent
Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and for
damages it incurred when its employees were
Class 6 - Digests

prevented from getting their daily supply of

newsprint from its bodega
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee
of a part of the premises of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon
Roces, a first lessee from the aforesaid company.
The premises of the plaintiff is separated from the
compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
by a concrete and barbed wire fence with its own
entrance and road leading to the national road.
This entrance is separate and distinct from the
entrance road of the Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega
for its newsprint in the sublet property which it
uses for its printing and publishing business. The
daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its
printing plant is taken from this bodega.
On September 10, 1964, the employees of
the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. declared
a strike against their company.
October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and
without legal justification, Permanent Concrete
Workers Union and its members picketed,
stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from
entering the compound to load newsprint from its
bodega.
The union members intimidated and
threatened with bodily harm the employees who
were in the truck.
On October 6, 1964, union members
stopped and prohibited the general manager,
personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and other
employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint
in their bodega.
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the
defendants not to intimidate and threaten its
employees with bodily harm and not to blockade,
picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting
newsprint in their bodega. Defendants refused
and continued to refuse to give in to the demands
of the plaintiff.
As a consequence, plaintiff rented another
bodega during the time members of the
defendant union prevented its employees from
entering its bodega in the compound of
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus
incurred expenses both in terms of bodega

Labor Relations
16

rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier

to the temporary bodega.

The picket held by defendant-appellant

union against their employer prevented herein
plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and
unloading of its products inside the premises of
Permanent Concrete Products, where the
plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee.
Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
ISSUE:

May a picket be enjoined at the instance of

a third party?
HELD:

Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed

as a phase of freedom of expression guaranteed
by the Constitution and could not be curtailed
even in the absence of employer-employee
relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts
are not without power to localize the sphere of
demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the
context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
recognized at the instance of an "innocent
bystander" who is not involved in the labor
dispute if it appears that the result of the
picketing is create an impression that a labor
dispute exists between him and the picketing
union.
NOTES:
Picketing is a form of protest in which people (called
picketers) congregate outside a place of work or
location where an event is taking place. Often, this is
done in an attempt to dissuade others from going in
("crossing the picket line"), but it can also be done to
draw public attention to a cause. Picketers normally
endeavor to be non-violent. It can have a number of
aims, but is generally to put pressure on the party
targeted to meet particular demands and/or cease
operations. This pressure is achieved by harming
the business through loss of customers and negative
publicity, or by discouraging or preventing workers
and/or customers from entering the site and thereby
preventing the business from operating normally.
Picketing is a common tactic used by trade unions
during strikes, who will try to prevent dissident
members of the union, members of other unions and
Class 6 - Digests

non-unionised workers from working. Those who

cross the picket line and work despite the strike are
known pejoratively as scabs.
#15 G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners
Nicanor
Tolentino,
Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that they decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift
(from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4
P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and
that they informed the respondent Company of
their proposed demonstration.
A meeting was called by the Company at the
Company's canteen.
The Company asked the union panel to confirm
or deny said projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who
acted as spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated
that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that
the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management.

Labor Relations
17

 The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,

Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of
the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which
reason, the Company warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly, the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO
STRIKE' and, therefore, would be amounting to
an illegal strike.
Because the petitioners and their members
numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second
and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration, respondent Company charged
petitioners and other employees who composed
the first shift, with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in
relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section
15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
In their answer, herein petitioners claim that they
did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the
mass demonstration; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional freedom of speech against the
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and
that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)
found herein petitioners PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and dismissing the
employment of Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Class 6 - Digests

Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,

Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor
Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly
responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice.
ISSUE: WON, petitioner PBMEO is guilty of
bargaining in bad faith by violating the provisions of
the CBA particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUTNO STRIKE.
HELD: NO!
The demonstration held by the petitioners was
against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, hence, it
was not a violation of the said provision of the
CBA.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expression as well as their right of assembly and
of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of
herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights.
Said mass demonstration was purely and
completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances
in particular before appropriate governmental
agency. They only exercised their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid protection from
what they believe were police excesses. As
matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members from the harassment of
local police officers. It was to the interest of
herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well
as profits. Herein respondent employer did not
even offer to intercede for its employees with the
local police.

Labor Relations
18

 There was a lack of human understanding or

compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting
the request of the Union for excuse from work
for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for
dismissal the mass demonstration held against
the Pasig police, not against the company, is
gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
The respondent company is the one guilty of
unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses
and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concert activities for ...
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1)
regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
Apart from violating the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and assembly as well
as the right to petition for redress of grievances
of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8)
leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent
from work, constitutes a denial of social justice
likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of
the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor ...".
Class 6 - Digests

The dismissal or termination of the employment

of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is
harsh for a one-day absence from work. The
appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty
at all should have been simply to charge said
one-day absence against their vacation or sick
leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their
wages for their daily sustenance as well as that
of their respective families aside from the fact
that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the
same time strengthening the oppressive hand of
the petty tyrants in the localities.
Management has shown not only lack of goodwill or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected
to indignities by the local police. It was more
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or
profits than to assist its employees in their fight
for their freedoms and security against alleged
petty tyrannies of local police officers.
The primacy of human rights freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances over property rights
should be sustained.

The rights of free expression, free assembly

and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment
of his life, to his happiness and to his full
and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also
in the administration of public affairs as well
as in the discipline of abusive public officers.
The citizen is accorded these rights so that
he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring
public officers and employees.

While the Bill of Rights also protects

property rights, the primacy of human rights

Labor Relations
19

over property rights is recognized. Because

these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions," they
"need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity."
#16 GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE,
INC. (INPORT) v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 103560, 06 July 1995

Facts
Petitioner's employees stopped working and
gathered in a mass action to express their
grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month
pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all
members of the Macajalar Labor Union
Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with
whom petitioner had an existing collective
bargaining agreement.
Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and
arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro.
The strike paralyzed operations at said port.
On the same morning, the strikers filed individual
notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon
sa Pag-Welga") with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences
between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed
a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal
Strike with prayer for a restraining
order/preliminary injunction.
National Labor Relations Commission issued a
temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority
of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein
private respondents who continued their protest.
Counsel for private respondents filed a
manifestation that petitioner required prior
screening conducted by the MLU-FFW before the
remaining strikers could be accepted back to
work.
Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor
Union (MLU-FFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of
Class 6 - Digests

the Party Respondents From the Above Entitled

Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the
motion was filed, claimed that they were duped or
tricked into signing the individual notices of strike.
After discovering this deception and verifying that
the strike was staged by a minority of the union
officers and members and without the approval
of, or consultation with, majority of the union
members, they immediately withdrew their notice
of strike and returned to work.
The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed
any objection, the Labor Arbiter granted their
prayer to be excluded as respondents in the
complaint for illegal strike. Moreover, petitioner's
complaint was directed against the 31
respondents who did not return to work and
continued with the strike.
For not having complied with the formal
requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code,
the strike staged by petitioner's workers was
found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. The
workers who participated in the illegal strike did
not, however, lose their employment, since there
was no evidence that they participated in illegal
acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the
other striking employees back to work, the Labor
Arbiter held that the private respondents should
similarly be allowed to return to work without
having to undergo the required screening to be
undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW).
As regards the six private respondents who were
union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they
could not have possibly been "duped or tricked"
into signing the strike notice for they were active
participants in the conciliation meetings and were
thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence,
said union officers should be accepted back to
work after seeking reconsideration from herein
petitioner.
NLRC affirmed with modification the Arbiter's
decision. It held that the concerted action by the
workers was more of a "protest action" than a
strike. Private respondents, including the six
union officers, should also be allowed to work
unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However,
in view of the strained relations between the
parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of
reinstatement.

Labor Relations
20

 Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration,

NLRC modified its previous resolution. The
Commission ruled that since private respondents
were not actually terminated from service, there
was no basis for reinstatement. However, it
awarded six months' salary as separation pay or
financial assistance in the nature of "equitable
relief." The award for backwages was also
deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu
of backwages, compensation equivalent to
P1,000.00 was given.
Issue
Whether or not the strike was illegal. Yes!
Held/Ruling
A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of
labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage of work
by the concerted action of employees as a result of
an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute
includes any controversy or matter concerning terms
or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employers and employees.

As we stated in the case of National Federation of

Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, the language of the law
leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period
and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote
report were intended to be mandatory.
Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:
(i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization
. . . to declare a strike . . . without first having
filed the notice required in the preceding Article
or without the necessary strike vote first having
been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
In explaining the above provision, we said:
In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off
period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide
an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It
thus directs the MOLE to exert all efforts at
mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary
settlement' during the cooling-off period. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Private respondents and their co-workers stopped

working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985
to press for their wages and other benefits. What
transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation
of work by concerted action resulted from a labor
dispute.

The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban

after the filing of a strike-vote report, as
prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are
reasonable restrictions and their imposition is
essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives
embodied in the law. We hold that they
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of
the state.

The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the

legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that
the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the
requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263)
paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.

From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike was

illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of
the law.

The individual notices of strike filed by the workers

did not conform to the notice required by the law to
be filed since they were represented by a union
(MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective
bargaining agreement with INPORT.
Neither did the striking workers observe the strike
vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting
requirements.
Class 6 - Digests

The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article

265 (now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make a
distinction between workers and union officers who
participate therein.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
their employment status. 20 An ordinary striking
worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in

Labor Relations
21

an illegal strike. There must be proof that he

committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer,
on the other hand, may be terminated from work
when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike,
and like other workers, when he commits an illegal
act during a strike.

refused to do so for fear of reprisal. The Companies

also averred that some of them had given salaries
over and above that demanded in the
standardization, some have given sick and vacation
leave and hospitalization, etc.

In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority

of the striking workers, including union officers, back
to work. Private respondents were left to continue
with the strike after they refused to submit to the
"screening" required by the company.

The companies were given six days of grace within

which to act upon or answer the demands made by
the Philmaroa. Concilliation efforts failed to effect a
settlement and the 6 day period expired thus,
Philmaroa declared a strike.

#17 Phil. Marine Radio Officers Asso. vs. CIR

October 31, 1957
FACTS:
In this case, PHILMAROA (petitioners) presented a
list of demands to the Association de Navieros, the
Philippine Shipowners Association and the Luzon
Stevedoring Company,the most important of which
are: (1) the standardization and increase of salaries;
(2) sick and vacation leave; (3) hospitalization and
sick leave; and (4) a closed shop agreement.
As none of the companies were willing to consider
its demands the Philmaroa gave notice of its
intention to strike to the different shipping companies
and to the Chief, Conciliation Service Division,
Department of Labor.
The Chief of the Conciliation Service called the
parties for conference. At this conference the
Association de Navieros and the Philippine
Shipowners Association gave the information that
they had no authority or power to bargain collectively
and suggested that the members of the said
association be notified, so the union sent notices to
the different member companies(respondents).
The respondent companies answered, questioning
the authority of the Philmaroa to act as
representative of the radio operators and demanding
that the list of the members employed who belong to
the Philmaroa be furnished them. But the Philmaroa
Class 6 - Digests

The President of the Philippines certified the case to

the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR allowed
the strikers to go back to their respective positions,
but without backpay. They denied standardization,
vacation leave and closed shop agreement, but
granting sick leave, free hospitalization with pay.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners should be entitled to reinstatement
with backwages.
HELD:
SC upheld reinstatement but rejected the claim for
back wages. The strike was by all means a voluntary
act on the part of the strikers. The strike was used
as an economic weapon to compel the grant of the
conditions of employment; but it was not caused by
any illegal or unfair labor practice on the part of the
respondent companies/ employers at all.
There is no reason for granting backpay as they had
voluntarily absented themselves from work and there
had been no unfair labor practice on the part of the
respondent companies. The grant of backpay is
governed by the principle fair days wage for a fair
days labor.
#18 Cromwell Commercial Employees and
Laborers Union vs. CIR / September 30, 1964
FACTS:
On July 10, 1956, Cromwell Commercial Co. and
the Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers

Labor Relations
22

Union (PTUC) signed a collective bargaining

agreement (CBA).
The changes in the working conditions in the
company and the latter's failure to carry out its part
of the agreement became a source of complaint
among the employees. The company did nothing.
The grievance machinery set up in the agreement
could not function on account of the company's
refusal to name its representatives in the committee.
Then, the company dismissed Gaddi and Andrada,
leaders of the shipping department-employees. The
union dispatched another letter to the company,
protesting the dismissal of Gaddi and Andrada.
On March 8, the company took back the keys from
the warehouseman and ordered the salesmen to put
their trucks in the garage.
Finally, on March 11, 1954 the union struck and
picketed the premises of the company.
The company in turn gave the strikers until 8 a.m. of
March 14, 1957 within which to return to work
otherwise they would be considered dismissed for
cause. It warned them that the strike was illegal for
being against the no strike clause of the CBA.
In a conference called by the Department of Labor,
the strikers offered to return to work provided the
company observed the provisions of the bargaining
contract. But the company insisted that the strikers
could be taken back only under the terms of its
March 1 order.
On September 19, 1957 this case was filed in the
CIR, charging the company, with ULP. After trial, the
court rendered judgment as follows:
a) to reinstate Gaddi and the 5 salesmen with
half backpay .
b) To reinstate all the strikers listed in Annex "A"
of the complaint, without backwages.
The court in banc affirmed the decision. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUES:
(1) awarding only half back wages to Gaddi and
the five salesmen,
Class 6 - Digests

(2) awarding no back wages to the rest of the

strikers and
(3) denying reinstatement to Andrada and Dario
and to those who might have found substantially
equivalent employment elsewhere.
RULING:
At the outset, two types of employees involved in
this case must be distinguished, namely, those who
were discriminatorily dismissed for union activities
and those who voluntarily went on strike.
# 1.
To the first class belong Gaddi and
Andrada, both of whom, as earlier shown, had been
dismissed for union activities, and the five salesmen
who were virtually locked out by the company when
they were ordered to put their trucks in the garage.
#2
To the second class belong those who
declared a strike on March 11, 1957, following the
failure of the company-union conference to settle
their dispute.
The denial of backpay may be justified, although
on a different ground. For this purpose, We shall
advert again to the distinction earlier made between
discriminatorily dismissed employees and those who
struck, albeit in protest against the company's ULP.
Discriminatorily dismissed employees received
backpay from the date of the act of discrimination,
that is from the day of their discharge. On this score,
the award of backpay to Gaddi, Andrada and the
salesmen may be justified. The salesmen, as
already stated, were practically locked out when they
were ordered to put their trucks in the garage; they
did not voluntarily strike. Hence, the award of
backwages.
In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a
voluntary act of protest against what they considered
ULP of the company. The stoppage of their work
was not the direct consequence of the
company's ULP. Hence their economic loss should
not be shifted to the employer. "When employees
voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against
ULP, it has been our policy not to award them
backpay during the strike. However, when the
strikers abandon the strike and apply for
reinstatement despite the ULP and the employer
either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon

Labor Relations
23

their reinstatement new conditions that constitute

ULP, We are of the opinion that the considerations
impelling our refusal to award backpay are no longer
controlling. Accordingly, We hold that where, as in
this case, an employer refuses to reinstate strikers
except upon their acceptance of the new conditions
that discriminate against them because of their union
membership or activities, the strikers who refuse to
accept the conditions and are consequently refused
reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any
losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of
the respondent's discriminatory acts."
While it is true that the strikers in this case offered
to return to work on March 14, 1957, We find that
their offer was conditional. Their offer was
predicated on the company's observance of the
provisions of the CBA - the very bone of contention
between the parties by reason of which the union
walked out. To be effective so as to entitle the
strikers to backpay, the offer must have been
unconditional. The strikers must have offered to
return to work under the same conditions under
which they just before their strike so that the
company's refusal would have placed on the blame
for their economic loss. But that is not the case
here. Indeed the offer of the company to accept the
striker under the conditions obtaining before the
strike, without prejudice to taking up the grievances
of the strike can be considered in its favor in denying
back wages to the strikers.

discretion on the part of the CIR this Court will not

interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
The same thing may be said of the denial of
reinstatement to those who might have found
substantial employment elsewhere. We agree with
the union that the mere fact that strikers or
dismissed employees have found such employment
elsewhere is not necessarily a bar to their
reinstatement.1 According to the Court, it is for the
Board in each case to weigh the particular facts and
to determine, in the exercise of wise administrative
discretion, whether the Act would best be effectuated
by directing reinstatement despite the fact that the
given employees had found equivalent employment.
Obviously it was after considering the facts in this
case that the CIR predicated the reinstatement of
the employees concerned on the fact that they had
not found substantially equivalent employment
elsewhere. Thus, it made clear in the dispositive
portion of its decision that it was ordering the taking
of affirmative acts "which the Court finds will
effectuate the policy of the Act". The union has not
shown that in so doing the CIR abused its discretion.
DECISION:
The decision and resolution of the CIR appealed
from are hereby affirmed!
Separate Opinions

Nor may it be said that the strikers could not have

offered to return to work because the company
dismissed them upon their failure to return to work
on March 14, 1957. For the notice given by the
company was merely a "tactical" threat designed to
break the strike and not really to discharge the
striking employees
# 3.
The case of Andrada and Dario who were
found guilty of acts of violence consisting of hurling
stones which smashed glass windows of the building
of the company and the headlights of a car and the
utterance of obscenities such as "Putang ina". But
the union contends that the acts committed by
Andrada and Dario were not so serious as to call for
the forfeiture of their right to reinstatement. It is not
for Us to judge the effect of misconduct by
employees. That is primarily for the CIR to
determine. In the absence of proof of abuse of
Class 6 - Digests

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

I can not agree to the ruling laid down in the opinion
in so far as it denies backpay to the reinstated
laborers. There is no dispute that the employer was
the first to infringe the CBA by refusing to implement
its provisions, particularly by its March 1 order, and
by insisting on it as a condition for taking back the
strikers. I cannot see how the objectives and policies
of the Industrial Peace Act can be said to be
promoted by placing the economic loss on the
strikers, denying them backpay; the discouraging of
ULP is certainly one of unfair labor policies, and the
denial of backpay to the victims of ULP is a direct
encouragement for the employer to continue its
reprobable misconduct.
While the laborers technically violated the no-strike
clause, the facts as found reveal that the employer

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goaded the laborers into striking, by repeatedly

violating the CBA and by preventing the organization
of the grievance committee through the Company's
refusal to name its representatives therein.
#19 G.R. No. L-17038
July 31, 1964
CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILS., petitioner, vs. MARSMAN and CO., INC.,
and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
Marsman & Company (Company) had employees of
around 320 persons, about 140 of whom where
members of MARCELA and about 20 of the National
Labor Union. On December 23, 1953 the Industrial
Court named Marsman & Company Employees and
Laborers Association (MARCELA) as the employees'
bargaining agent in regard to rates of pay, terms and
conditions of employment. At that time MARCELA
was affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers,
or FFW, a national labor organization. On March 17,
1954 MARCELA-FFW submitted to the Company a
set of proposals for collective bargaining, which the
Company answered on March 24, 1954. Despite
negotiations held between the Company and the
Union, they failed to reach In agreement; so on April
8, 1954 the Union, failed a notice of strike with the
Department of Labor. Mediation by the Conciliation
Service of that Department proved fruitless.
On June 4, 1954 the Union declared a strike and at
the same time placed a "round-the-clock" picket line
around the Company's premises in Intramuros,
Manila. On July 30, 1954, in a conference called by
Eleuterio Adevoso, then Secretary of Labor, the
Union officials and members then present were
prevailed upon by Adevoso to accept the proposals
of Antonio de las Alas, Company vice-president, that
they stop the strike and go back to work, and that
when they were already working the Company would
discuss with them their demands. Upon being
informed to the Union's acceptance of the proposal
the strikers returned to work. The Company admitted
back sixteen picketing strikers on August 9, 1954
and later on, it also reemployed non-union
employees and a majority of the strikers. However,
complainants herein were refused admittance and
were informed by Company officials that they would
not be reinstated unless they ceased to be active
Union members and that in any case the Company
Class 6 - Digests

already had enough men for its business operations.

As a result the strike and the picketing were
resumed, because of which employees who had
been admitted to work since July 21, 1954 had to
stay inside the Company premises, where the
Company furnished them food and quarters up to
October 1954.
Because of the Company's consistent refusal to
reinstate the 69 complainants even after repeated
requests, the Confederation of Labor Associations of
the Philippines (CLAP), to which the Union had
affiliated after seceding from the FFW initiated the
present charge for unfair labor practice. Initially the
strike staged by the Union was meant to compel the
Company to grant it certain economic benefits set
forth in its proposal for collective bargaining. The
strike was an economic one, But the strike changed
its character from the time the Company refused to
reinstate complainants because of their union
activities after it had offered to admit all the strikers
and in fact did readmit the others. It was then
converted into an unfair labor practice strike.
The Court (Judge Jose S. Bautista), after hearing,
found the Company guilty of the charge and ordered
it to reinstate 60 of the aforementioned 69
complainants to their former positions or to similar
ones with the same rate of pay, without back wages.
Motions for reconsideration were denied hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike was illegal
Held:
The Company claims that the complainants applied
for readmission only on June 7, 1955, more than a
year after the offer, when the CLAP, in their behalf,
wrote the Company asking for their reinstatement.
Prior to said letter, however, complainants had, by
various means, sought readmission. After Delas
Alas' invitation to return to work was accepted by the
Union officers and members, they informed all the
other strikers accordingly. Thereupon the strikers
terminated the strike and presented themselves for
work at the Company's premises.
The Company alleges that it was economic reasons,
i.e., its policy of retrenchment, not labor
discrimination, which prevented it from rehiring
complainants. This is disproved, however, by the fact

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25

that it not only readmitted the other strikers, but also

hired new employees and even increased the
salaries of its personnel by almost 50%.
The Union began the strike because it believed in
good faith that settlement of their demands was at
an impasse and that further negotiations would only
come to naught. It stopped the strike upon the belief
they could go back to work. Then it renewed the
strike (or it started a new strike) as a protest against
the discrimination practiced by the Company. Both
are valid grounds for going on a strike.
#20 ABARIA versus NLRC
December 7, 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is
the exclusive bargaining representative of the rankand-file employees of Metro Cebu Community
Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). Under the 1987 and 1991
CBAs, the signatories were Pongasi, Sr. for MCCHI,
and Atty. Alforque and Lumapguid for NFL-MCCHI.
In the CBA effective from January 1994 until
December 31, 1995, the signatories were Buot as
Board of Trustees Chairman, Rev. Iyoy as MCCH
Administrator and Atty. Yu as Legal Counsel of NFL,
while Nava, President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo
sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of
Posting. Nava wrote Rev. Iyoy expressing the
unions desire to renew the CBA and attaching the
proposal. Nava subsequently requested that some
of the employees be allowed to avail of one-day
union leave with pay. However, MCCHI returned the
CBA proposal to secure first the endorsement of the
legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining
representative of MCCHI employees. Atty. Alforque
informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA submitted
by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL
has not authorized any other legal counsel or any
person for collective bargaining negotiations. By
January 1996, the collection of union fees (checkoff) was temporarily suspended by MCCHI in view of
the existing conflict between the federation and its
local affiliate. Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to take
over the room being used as union office but was
prevented to do so by Nava and her group who
protested these actions and insisted that
management directly negotiate with them for a new
CBA. MCCHI referred the matter to Atty. Alforque,
Class 6 - Digests

NFLs Regional Director, and advised Nava that their

group is not recognized by NFL.
In his letter addressed to Nava some of the
employees union membership was suspended for
serious violation of the Constitution and By-Laws.
Upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted
one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members.
The next day, several union members led by Nava
and her group launched a series of mass actions
such
as
wearing
black
and
red
armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital
premises and putting up placards, posters and
streamers. Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the
concerted activities being carried out by union
members which are not sanctioned by NFL. MCCHI
directed the union officers led by Nava to submit a
written explanation why they should not be
terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted
activities amounting to strike, and placed them under
immediate preventive suspension. Responding to
this directive, Nava and her group denied there was
a temporary stoppage of work, explaining that
employees wore their armbands only as a sign of
protest and reiterating their demand for MCCHI to
comply with its duty to bargain collectively. Rev. Iyoy,
having been informed that Nava and her group have
also been suspended by NFL, directed said officers
to appear before his office for investigation in
connection with the illegal strike wherein they
reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words
against the officers of the hospital, threatening other
workers and forcing them to join the strike. Said
union officers, however, invoked the grievance
procedure provided in the CBA to settle the dispute
between management and the union.
The DOLE Regional Office issued certifications
stating that there is nothing in their records which
shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor
organization, and that said union submitted only a
copy of its Charter Certificate. MCCHI then sent
individual notices to all union members asking them
to submit a written explanation why they should not
be terminated for having supported the illegal
concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has
no legal personality as per DOLE records. In their
collective response, it was explained that the
picketing employees wore armbands to protest
MCCHIs refusal to bargain; it was also contended

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26

that MCCHI cannot question the legal personality of

the union which had actively assisted in CBA
negotiations and implementation.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the
same was deemed not filed for want of legal
personality on the part of the filer. The NCMB
likewise denied their motion for reconsideration.
Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still
conducted a strike vote during which an
overwhelming majority of union members approved
the strike.
Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not
push through because the striking union members
insisted on attending the same only as a group.
MCCHI again sent notices informing them that their
refusal to submit to investigation is deemed a waiver
of their right to explain their side and management
shall proceed to impose proper disciplinary action
under the circumstances. Thereafter, MCCHI sent
termination letters to union leaders and other
members who participated in the strike and picketing
activities. It also issued a cease-and-desist order to
the rest of the striking employees stressing that the
wildcat concerted activities spearheaded by the
Nava group is illegal without a valid Notice of Strike
and warning them that non-compliance will compel
management to impose disciplinary actions against
them. For their continued picketing activities despite
the said warning, more than 100 striking employees
were dismissed.
Unfazed, the striking union members held more
mass actions. The means of ingress to and egress
from the hospital were blocked so that vehicles
carrying patients and employees were barred from
entering the premises. Placards were placed at the
hospitals entrance gate stating: Please proceed to
another hospital and we are on protest.
Employees and patients reported acts of intimidation
and harassment perpetrated by union leaders and
members. With the intensified atmosphere of
violence and animosity within the hospital premises
as a result of continued protest activities by union
members, MCCHI suffered heavy losses due to low
patient admission rates. The hospitals suppliers also
refused to make further deliveries on credit.

Class 6 - Digests

With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital

operations and the condition of confined patients,
MCCHI filed a petition for injunction in the NLRC
(Cebu City). A TRO was issued. MCCHI presented
12 witnesses (hospital employees and patients),
including a security guard who was stabbed by an
identified sympathizer while in the company of
Navas group. MCCHIs petition was granted and a
permanent injunction was issued enjoining the Nava
group from committing illegal acts. The City
Government of Cebu ordered the demolition of the
structures and obstructions put up by the picketing
employees of MCCHI along the sidewalk.
Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated
employees. Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino
rendered his decision dismissing the complaints for
unfair labor practice filed by Nava and 90 other
complainants. ELA Belarmino found no basis for
the charge of unfair labor practice and declared the
strike and picketing activities illegal having been
conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a
legitimate labor organization. The termination of
union leaders was upheld as valid. The NLRC
dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal is affirmed. Complainants elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed
the petition on procedural ground. Hence, a petition
is filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the strike and picketing activities
conducted by union officers and members were
illegal
Whether or not union officers and members who
participated in an illegal strike can be held liable
thereof
HELD:
Yes, the strike is illegal.
As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not
a duly registered or an independently registered
union at the time it filed the notice of strike and when
it conducted the strike vot. It could not then legally
represent the union members. Consequently, the
mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the
strike vote report were ineffective for having been

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27

filed and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which

has no legal personality as a legitimate labor
organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of
the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the
commission of the following prohibited activities: (1)
violence, coercion, intimidation and harassment
against non-participating employees; and (2)
blocking of free ingress to and egress from the
hospital, including preventing patients and their
vehicles from entering the hospital and other
employees from reporting to work, the putting up of
placards with a statement advising incoming patients
to proceed to another hospital because MCCHI
employees are on strike/protest. As shown by
photographs submitted by MCCHI, as well as the
findings of the NCMB and Cebu City Government,
the hospital premises and sidewalk within its vicinity
were full of placards, streamers and makeshift
structures that obstructed its use by the public who
were likewise barraged by the noise coming from
strikers using megaphones. On the other hand, the
affidavits executed by several hospital employees
and patients narrated in detail the incidents of
harassment, intimidation, violence and coercion,
some of these witnesses have positively identified
the perpetrators. The prolonged work stoppage and
picketing activities of the striking employees severely
disrupted hospital operations that MCCHI suffered
heavy financial losses.
The findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter and
NLRC, as sustained by the appellate court, clearly
established that the striking union members created
so much noise, disturbance and obstruction that the
local government authorities eventually ordered their
removal for being a public nuisance. This was
followed by an injunction from the NCMB enjoining
the union leaders from further blocking the free
ingress to and egress from the hospital, and from
committing threats, coercion and intimidation against
non-striking employees and patients/vehicles
desiring to enter for the purpose of seeking medical
treatment/confinement. By then, the illegal strike
had lasted for almost five months.

Class 6 - Digests

Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended,

provides for the consequences of an illegal strike to
the participating workers:
x x x Any union officer who knowingly
participates in illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in
a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even
if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.
The above provision makes a distinction between
workers and union officers who participate in an
illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.
There must be proof that he or she committed illegal
acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other
hand, may be terminated from work when he
knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like
other workers, when he commits an illegal act during
a strike.
Considering their persistence in holding picketing
activities despite the declaration by the NCMB that
their union was not duly registered as a legitimate
labor organization and the letter from NFLs legal
counsel informing that their acts constitute disloyalty
to the national federation, and their filing of the
notice of strike and conducting a strike vote
notwithstanding that their union has no legal
personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective
bargaining purposes, there is no question that
NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers knowingly participated in
the illegal strike.
With respect to the dismissed union members,
although MCCHI submitted photographs taken at the
picket line, it did not individually name those striking
employees and specify the illegal act committed by
each of them. As to the affidavits executed by nonstriking employees, they identified mostly union
officers as the persons who blocked the hospital
entrance, harassed hospital employees and patients
whose vehicles were prevented from entering the
premises. Only some of these witnesses actually

Labor Relations
28

named a few union members who committed similar

acts of harassment and coercion.

Class 6 - Digests

Labor Relations
29