G.R. No.

111416 September 26, 1994

FELICIDAD UY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial
Prosecutor of Pasig, Metro Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE
JAVIER, respondents.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the order dated 2 July 1993 of public respondent Judge Maximo C.
Contreras of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati,
Metro Manila, denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss
is based on the failure of the private respondents, as the offended parties
therein, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and Section 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior referral of
disputes to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the proper barangay.
At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance of the
issue to be resolved in the light of the revised law on katarungang
pambarangay provided for in the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
1
No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992, this Court would have
declined to accept the invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ prayed for. We have already ruled that while it is true
that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, such
concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor may be directed. There is a
hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should
also serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for the application
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by
the petitioner and her lawyers ought to have led them to file the petition
2
with the proper Regional Trial Court.
The antecedent facts as disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not
complicated.
Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde
(hereinafter Atayde) the other half of the second floor of a building located
at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila. She operated
3
and maintained therein a beauty parlor.

The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the petitioner

was not able to remove all her movable properties.
On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde
when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her
remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror,
4
a shampoo bowl, and an air conditioning casing. The argument
degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and
Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including private respondent
Winnie Javier (hereinafter Javier), on the other.
On 21 April 1993, the private respondent had themselves medically
5
examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the petitioner.
On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the
barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, which was docketed as Barangay
6
7
Cases Nos. 1023 and 1024.
The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain
for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared. The
8
barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.
On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two
informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC
of Makati, which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
145234 and assigned to Branch 61 thereof.
On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered
the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.
On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counter9
affidavits. In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged
the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo
conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents
10
of Manila. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain
of Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an ongoing
conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in Barangay Case No.
11
1023.
On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D.
No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to
Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order

denying the motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which read:
The court finds the motion to be without sufficient merit.
In the first place, the offense subject of these cases
accussed in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17, 1993; that
Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had
started the conciliation proceedings between the parties
but as of May 18, 1993 nothing has been achieved by the
barangay (Annex "2" of the Counter-Affidavit of the
accused); that the above-entitled cases were filed
directly with this court by the public prosecutor on May
11, 1993; and the accused and her witnesses had already
filed their counter-affidavits and documents. At this
stage of the proceedings, the court believes that the
accused had already waived the right to a reconciliation
proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati
considering that accused and complainant are residents
of different barangays; that the offense charged occurred
in the Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense is
about to prescribe.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes,
and so holds, that the complainants may go directly to
the court where their complaint is about to prescribe or
barred by statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6 of
12
PD 1508."
A motion to reconsider the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.
Hence this special civil action for certiorari. The petitioner contends that
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that
the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement
of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
In their Comment, the private respondents contend that the denial of the
motion to dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to
the lupon is not applicable in the case of private respondent Javier since
she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city or

municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities

and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may
Otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of
private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially
complied with the requirement.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the
petitioner that Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 should be
dismissed for non-compliance with Sections 408, 409, 410, and 412 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Section 7, Rule VI of the
Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.
The petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents and of
the Office of the Solicitor General. The private respondents filed a
rejoinder to the petitioner's reply to their comment and a reply to the
comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.
In the Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda,
which the petitioner and the private respondents complied with. The
Office of the Solicitor General, in view of its prior submission, moved that it
be excused from filing a memorandum.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D.
No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local
Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III
13
thereof, revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a
consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed
pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. Pertinent portions of Chapter 7,
Title I, Book III thereof read as follows:
Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Exception Thereto. The luppon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and

the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest

therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real
property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one

(1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00);

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending

parties are employed or at the institution where such
parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President
may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within
the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may,
at anytime before trial, motu proprio refer the case to
the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
Sec. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons
actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought
for amicable settlement before the lupon of said
barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation

proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the
same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which
may confront the punong barangay in resolving
objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted
to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated
representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.
Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While
the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or
arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and
cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted
upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That
such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from
the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of
complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or
any other government office for adjudication, unless
there has been a confrontation between the parties
before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified

by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested

to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless
the settlement has been repudiated by the parties
thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties
may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under
detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with
provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property, and
support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be
barred by the statute of limitations.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. In all
katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who
may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
Pursuant to the authority vested in him under Section 421 of the Code, the
Secretary of Justice promulgated the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules to
implement the revised law on katarungang pambarangay. Sections 8 and
11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in part as
follows:
SECTION 8. Failure to appear.
a. Sanctions

The complaint may be dismissed when

complainant, after due notice, refuses
or willfully fails to appear without
justifiable reason on the date set for
mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
Such dismissal ordered by the Punong
Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after
giving the complainant an opportunity
to explain his non-appearance shall be
certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary as the case may be, and shall
bar the complainant from seeking
judicial recourse for the same cause of
action as that dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and
cause of action. The prescriptive periods for offenses
and causes of action under existing laws shall be
interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong
Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods shall
resume upon receipts by the complainant of the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file
action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary:
Provided, however, that such interruption shall not
exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint
with the Punong Barangay. After the expiration of the
aforesaid period of sixty days, the filing of the case in
court or government office for adjudication shall be
subject to the provision of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII
of these Rules.
It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang pambarangay law
has at least three new significant features, to wit:
1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal
offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in
P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00.

2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the

workplace where the contending parties are employed or
at the institution where such parties are enrolled for
study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive
periods of offenses during the pendency of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph
(c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some
ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods
"shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the
complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary." What is referred to as receipt by
the complainant of the complaint is unclear; obviously, it
could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the
above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations
issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the
complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption of
the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be
from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of
repudiation or the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or the pangkat secretary. Such suspension,
however, shall not exceed sixty days.
The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of
the lupon and if the mediation and conciliation process at that level would
be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice
would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships
among protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace
and order therein enhanced.
The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the
Local Government code, also broadens the authority of the lupon in the
sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents
occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located. That barangay
may not be the appropriate venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)
of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the parties.
Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a
fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between

14

them as a result. Elsewise stated, convenience is the raison d'etre of the

rule on venue.
The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any
intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the
prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as
the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties
sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism and
more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of their
dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the
difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive
litigation between the parties.
While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of
1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to
the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains
applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially
reproduced in the Code.
In Peregrina vs. Panis,

15

this Court stated:

Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de
Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that
P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the
Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a
complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to
compromise suits between family members, lacking
which the case can be dismissed.
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D.
No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay
and their disputes does not fall under any of the
excepted cases." (Emphasis omitted)
Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so
16
in Garces vs. Court of Appeals:

In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to

the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is
not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with
which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and
non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably
raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance
of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.
xxx xxx xxx
The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the
same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies; the complaint becomes
afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy
there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
(emphasis omitted)
There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the
defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to the
17
appropriate lupon operated as a waiver thereof. Furthermore, when
such defect was initially present when the case was first filed in the trial
court, the subsequent issuance of the certification to file action by the
barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said
18
requirement, cured the defect.
On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary
19
Procedure. Section 18 thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to
the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing
of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed
without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This
provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the
accused was arrested without a warrant.
In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner and the
respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further invoked

the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the
Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the
petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the
weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their
grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed
tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a
complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay
Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the requirement of the
20
Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code." Yet,
in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it
disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not
applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner
and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or
municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said
cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has
substantially complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted
enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral
to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the
Local Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on
the Katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken
judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of
"the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
21
rules. He should have applied the revised katarungang
pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done
so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention
and time which could have been devoted to more important cases.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled
mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May
1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the
MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was
premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local
Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the

motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking
refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4)
of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may
go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because,
as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of
sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their
complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.

Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that

the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation
proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that
the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays."
The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before
the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of
23
referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay

Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing
the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of
trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away
with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak
havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that
the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request
24
the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. The request is
25
dated 23 June 1993, or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this
was done to support their contention in the said court that, in any event,
there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to
appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.

Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical
injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight
physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal
22
Code, considering that per the medical certificates the injuries sustained
by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of
complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated
them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The
penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos and censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two monthspursuant to Article
90.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter.
Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April
1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22
June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said
period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is
issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which
to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there
was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception
provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.

The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.
Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role
which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of
justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress
therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and
wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should,
with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government
prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with
it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions
for non-compliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent
Judge of 2 July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
1452334, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy" are
hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to
DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
decision.
Costs against the private respondents.

CASE DIGESTS:

motion to dismiss. A motion to reconsider the above order was denied as

well. Hence this present special civil action for certiorari.

FELICIDAD UY, petitioner, vs.

HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 61,Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial
Prosecutor of Pasig, MetroManila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE
JAVIER,
respondents.
G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of
the second floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets,
Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and maintained therein a beauty
parlor.
The sublease contract expired on 15 April1993. However, the petitioner
was not able to remove all her movable properties.
On 17April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde
when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her
remaining movable properties. The argument degenerated into a scuffle
between the petitioner and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees.
On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the
barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati
.
The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain
for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared. The
barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.
On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed
two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the
MTC of Makati
.
On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered
the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.
On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counter-affidavits.
On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases for
non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508. On 2 July 1993,
public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the

ISSUE:
WON THE CASE FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF
FAILURE TOCOMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIRMENT OF P.D. NO.
1508, NOW EMBODIED INSECTION 412 OF THE LGC OF 1991.
HELD:
Yes. While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code
of 1991,the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the
lupon as a pre-condition tothe filing of an action in court remains
applicable because its provisions on prior referralwere substantially
reproduced in the Code. The precise technical effect of failure to
complywith the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the
same effect produced bynon-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy
there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Moreover, having brought the dispute
before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents
are stopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they
themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the
lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings
and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be
countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation
system. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity,
exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors
should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial
courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for noncompliance thereof.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals211 SCRA 753
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building.
Two units were leased (now unlawfully occupied) by respondent Jose T.
Dizon. Said lease was originally covered by written contracts and except for
the rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said contracts were
impliedly renewed on a month to month basis. One of the terms of the
lease, that of monthly payments, was
violated by respondent. Upon failure of respondent to honor the demand
letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation

which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted

by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma (who is not a lawyer) during the
Barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological
ailments a scan be seen from prescription and receipts by her psychiatrist.
Due to the stubborn refusal of the respondent to vacate the premises,
petitioner was constrained to retain the services of a lawyer to initiate the
ejectment proceeding. MTC ordered respondent to vacate. RTC affirmed
the MTC. Respondent however found favor in the CA because of lack of
cause of action. CA held that petitioner failed compliance with Sections 6
and 9 of PD 1508.Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised
by respondent in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
Issue:
Whether there is non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.
Held:
When respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by
the Barangay, he, in effect, was stating that since he was never summoned,
he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation and/or
amicable settlement. Without the mandatory confrontation, no complaint
could be filed with the MTC. Moreover, petitioner tries to show that her
failure to appear before the Barangay was because of her recurring
psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1998, there is no
indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist. The only
conclusion is that 1998 was a lucid interval. There was therefore no excuse
then for her non-appearance. Therefore, she cannot be represented by
counsel or by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. Her non-compliance with
PD 1508 legally barred her from pursuing case in the MTC

G.R. No. 115213 December 19, 1995

WILSON DIU and DORCITA DIU, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PETER LYNDON BUSHNELL and PATRICIA
PAGBA, respondents.

alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to

petitioners, and (b) another for P12,000.00 representing the cost of the
two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. Private respondents
likewise alleged that despite the confrontations before
the barangay chairman, petitioners refused to pay their just and valid
obligations to private respondent and her husband.

Before us is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of

1
Appeals setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
2
Biliran, Branch 16, without prejudice to the refiling of the case by
petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law."

Aside from petitioners claim and private respondents' counterclaims, the

Municipal Trial Court of Naval also resolved the issue on whether or not
there was compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
on conciliation. In resolving the said issue, the trial court relied on the case
5
of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy which held that:

Prefatorily, the Court desires to digress and call attention to the

lamentable saga of delay in the dispensation of justice and the regrettable
abuse of judicial processes exemplified by this case. For, if just to collect an
indebtedness of P7,862.55 incurred way back in 1988, the proceedings had
to go through all the rungs of the judicial ladder and still present the
prospect of hereafter infringing again upon the time of this Court and
three other courts, such protraction being manipulated by trifling with the
very law which ironically was intended to prevent such delay, then the
bench and the bar should soberly reflect thereon and now take stock of
themselves. Indeed, it is not improbable that there are other cases
agonizing under the same ennui created by our courts.

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court

from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably
taking exemption thereto, they instead invoked the very
same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated
in the trial of the case by cross-examining the
respondent. Upon this premise, petitioner cannot now
be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had
6
submitted themselves voluntarily.

Coming now to the case at hand, it appears that on several occasions from
January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989, private respondent Patricia
Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from
petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by
receipts of goods marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's
Manifestation filed in the trial court, dated August 9, 1991. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval
and the latter set the case for hearing, but private respondents failed to
appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties appeared but
they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly,
3
the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action. Petitioners
then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial
Court of Naval.
4

Private respondents, in their Answer, while admitting the indebtedness to

petitioner, interposed two counterclaims, namely, (1) one for P6,227.00 as

However, said lower court dismissed the complaint by ruling against the
admissibility of Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15", which are the receipts of good
marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioners' manifestation therein, for not
7
having been properly identified in court.
On private respondents' counterclaims, said trial court also ruled that the
same had been settled when the contending parties entered into a
compromise agreement which was approved on January 9, 1989 by the
Regional Trial Court of Naval, Branch 16, in another action between them,
8
that is, Civil Case No. B-0719.
Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed to the
aforementioned Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. Said appellate court, however, did not find it necessary
to pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Presidential
Decree No. 1508 but, instead, decided the appeal on the merits. Modifying
the decision of the lower court, the Regional Trial Court held that:

The case should have proceeded to its conclusion under

the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and the
regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court
applies to the special cases only in a suppletory capacity
insofar as they are not inconsistent. . . .
The claim of the plaintiff is less than P10,000.00. It
properly falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The
only pleadings allowed are complaints, compulsory
counterclaims and cross claims pleaded in the answer,
and the answers thereto. The case could have been
decided based on affidavits of the witnesses and other
evidence on the factual issues defined in the order of the
Court, after the preliminary conference, together with
the position papers setting forth the law and the facts
relied upon by the parties.
The need for a formal offer, identification and crossexamination on Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15" was not
necessary. The said exhibits were inadmissible (sic). The
receipts constituted evidence of indebtedness and their
possession by the plaintiff at the commencement of the
suit gives rise to the legal presumption that the debts in
the total amount of P7,862.66 have not been paid.
Where, under the contract of sale, the ownership of the
goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully
neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the
terms of the contract of sale, the seller may maintain an
9
action against him for the price of the goods.
Accordingly, it rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners and
ordered private respondent Patricia Pagba to pay the former the amount
of P7,862.55 plus legal interest from July, 1991, P1,000.00 as attorney fees,
and the costs of suit.
Private respondents then went to the Court of Appeals, raising just two
issues, viz.: (1) whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in not making
a factual finding that herein petitioners did not comply with Presidential
Decree No. 1508; and (2) whether or not said Regional Trial Court erred in
not dismissing the appeal or case for non-compliance with the mandatory
10
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508.

Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, on the ground that there had been no compliance with Presidential
Decree No. 1508, with this ratiocination:
It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of the barangay
captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in
view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement.
If no conciliation or settlement has been reached
pursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be
brought to the regular courts.
In the case at bar, it has been established that there was
no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. The
efforts of the barangay captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran
to mediate the dispute between the parties having failed,
the Pangkat ng Tagapamayapa should have been
constituted for purposes of settling the matter. However,
the Pangkat was not constituted, instead, a Certification
to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in favor
of respondent spouses Diu. In the same case of Ramos
vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, the Supreme Court
ruled that the "Punong Barangay has no right to say that
referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary merely
because he himself has failed to work out an agreement
between the petitioner and private respondent. Dispute
should not end with the mediation proceeding before
the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a
settlement . . . . In Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA
566, it was held that "failure to avail of conciliation
process under P.D. 1508, . . . renders the complaint
vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss." Inasmuch as
petitioner has pleaded in his answer the lack of cause of
action of respondent, objection to the complaint has
11
been timely made.
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the
confrontations before the BarangayChairman of Naval satisfied the
requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508. This Court finds for
petitioners.
It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by
12
codification in the Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on

January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the
trial court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local Government
Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law have been
substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412, respectively, of the
latter law. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT.
(b) . . . . If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation
effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of
the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for
the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter.
Sec. 412. CONCILIATION. (a) Precondition to filing of
Complaint in Court. No complaint . . . shall be filed or
instituted in court . . . unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman
or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat
chairman . . . .
In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations
before the Barangay Chairman of Naval although they were not sent to
the pangkat as the same was not constituted. Their meetings with
said barangaychairman were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was
reached. This prompted the issuance of the following Certification to File
13
Action.
This is to certify that:
Respondent, Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness
with complainant but she refused to pay because
according to her, complainant has also an unsettled
accounts (sic) with her husband. Hence no
settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the
corresponding complaint for the dispute may now be
filed in court.
Date(d) this 10th day of July 1991.
(Sgd.) JHONY C. JEREZ

Lupon Pangkat Chairman

Attested:
(Sgd.) IRENEO DOCALLOS
Lupon/Pangkat Secretary
According to private respondent, however, the above certification is
"falsified" since no pangkat was constituted. She, therefore, insists that
petitioners have not complied with the mandatory provision of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 on compulsory arbitration. We disagree.
While no pangkat was constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at
14
the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement. The efforts
of the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, we believe that there was
substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section
412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before
the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.
This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410 (b) of the same
law that the barangay chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his
mediation efforts. Section 410 (b) should be construed together with
Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the
case. On this score, it is significant that thebarangay chairman or punong
barangay is himself the chairman of the lupon under the Local Government
15
Code.
From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial
compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 which does not require
strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the
factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to
appear before the pangkat caused any prejudice to the case for private
respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before
the barangay chairman and, as will hereafter be discussed, their sham
insistence for a meeting before the pangkat is merely a ploy for further
delay. We are thus forced to remind them that technicalities should not be
made to desert their true role in our justice system, and should not be
used as obstructions therein.

The court a quo was likewise correct in invoking the doctrine in Tijam and,
as indicated by the factual scenario in this case, private respondents are
clearly in estoppel to assail the jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is
also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree
No. 1508 was still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local
Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the
validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case.
Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
16
retrospective in that sense.
To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a
circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue and further delay
and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court should dismiss the complaint
and require the parties to meet before the pangkat, only to bring the case
all over again through the hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for
decision on the merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of private
respondents. For, when private respondents appealed to respondent
court, they did not at all assail the propriety or correctness of the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners for
the sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has
been laid to rest, but private respondents would wish to keep the case
alive merely on a conjured procedural issue invoking their supposed right
to confrontation before the pangkat.
However, from the very start of this action, private respondents failed to
show or evince any honest indication that they were willing to settle their
obligations with petitioners, notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to
submit the matter to conciliation. It is, therefore, quite obvious that their
insistence on technical compliance with the requirements of
the barangay conciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident
and inevitable conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this
petition is only the supposed failure of petitioners to comply with
the barangay conciliatory procedure and not the denial or repudiation of
their indebtedness.
We do not agree with the findings of respondent appellate court that
inasmuch as private respondents pleaded in their answer the alleged lack
of cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the complaint had been
timely made. It will be readily observed that said defense was only one of
the six affirmative defenses cryptically alleged in single short sentences in
private respondents' Answer in the court a quo, running the implausible
gamut from supposed defects in parties to res judicata and up to capacity

to sue, without any statement of the facts on which they would rely to
support such drivel. This calculated travesty of the rules on pleadings
betrays the ulterior motives of private respondents and cannot be
countenanced.
The failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there was no
compliance with the barangayconciliation procedure constitutes a waiver
of that defense. All that they alleged in their Answer in the trial court was
that "the complaint states no cause of action" without giving even the
semblance of any reason to support or explain that allegation. On the
other hand, they admitted the confrontations before
17
the barangay chairman in paragraph 13 of their Answer.
Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense
founded thereon is deemed waived, especially since they actually did not
pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, the conciliation
procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and
18
private respondents as defendants therein.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE,
and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, in
Civil Case No. B-0842 is hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117005. June 19, 1997]
CARLITO D. CORPUZ, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and JUANITO ALVARADO, Respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court of
1
Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 10, dismissing the petition for review in Civil Case No. 92-62869.
Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent
Juanito Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6,
docketed as Civil Case No. 138532, for recovery of possession of the room
being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for
their own use.
Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo
who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the tenants. Due to
economic difficulties, however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed
an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any
person who can afford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold
his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy
relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.
In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that
he vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of
Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the room
as demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.

Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March 11, 1993, said
3
court rendered its decision which, in effect, reversed the MTC's decision
on the ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was
the subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing
Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It also
concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo
was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for
unlawful detainer, and ruled that Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from
the subject premises.
His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied for lack
4
of merit by the RTC on July 16, 1993, Corpuz elevated his case to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible error in the
assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its entirety in its assailed
5
decision dated July 14, 1994. A subsequent motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
6
September 1, 1994. Hence, this petition.
The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz' unlawful
detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado should be suspended
until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of
said property, and whether the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and
Barredo was authentic. Corpuz maintains that the mere assertion
challenging his ownership over the said property is not a sufficient ground
7
to divest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment
8
cases. As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession
over the real property, that is,
9
possessionde facto. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
10

In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged
"Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery;
and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.
Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the MTC of Manila
handed down on August 11, 1992 a decision ordering Alvarado to vacate
2
the room. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the recent case of Refugia v. Court of Appeals, however, we ruled that:

"In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court, in making
a distinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of the
issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence
of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would
indicate or determine the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve
the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is the
true and lawful owner of the subject property, because the resolution of

said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not

sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a
premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested that inferior courts are now
conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or
ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit."

It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We have ruled

that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall
it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving
13
possession. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Consequently, since the present petition involves the issue of possession

intertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., the controversy pending in
the NHA), the doctrinal pronouncement in Refugia is applicable.

Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the
ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by
Presidential Decree No. 1508.

Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel.
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale,
title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same
11
property. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general
short sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held
14
in Dui v. Court of Appeals that failure of a party to specifically allege the
fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation
procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's
answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his
allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment.

In Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations, et

12
al. v. Court of Appeals, Justice (now Chief Justice) Andres Narvasa
outlined the following cases involving the annulment of the title or
document over the property which should not be considered in the
abatement of an ejectment suit, to wit:
"Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting
property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property
(Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA
167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153
[1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v.
Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet
Consolidated,
Inc
. [annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]."
Clearly, the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant
not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy
pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and
assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter
the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the
purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the
parties.

In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional

requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and
the parties therein.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated
July 14, 1994, of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch 6,
in Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113615. January 25, 1996]
BIENVENIDO VELARMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA
PANSACOLA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Will the lot owners agreement to sell the property to the
government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang
Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to defeat a
forcible entry suit? This was the main question raised in this petition for
review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision dated January
1
26, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33332. By a Resolution
dated October 25, 1995, this case, along with several others, was
transferred from the First Division to the Third. After due deliberation on
the submissions of the parties, it was assigned to undersigned ponente for
the writing of the Courts Resolution.
2

This case arose from an ejectment suit filed by private respondent

against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Mauban,
Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1) that sometime in May 1981,
petitioner surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at
Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban, Quezon, registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-91037 in the name of private respondents
husband Publio (deceased); (2) that the matter was reported to the
Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences during which
petitioner promised to vacate the land and remove his house therefrom,
notwithstanding which he still failed or refused to do so; (3) that she
instituted Criminal Case No. 1068 against petitioner in 1986 for violation of
P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court convicted
petitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that,
despite such judgment, and notwithstanding repeated demands to vacate,
petitioner continued occupying the property, compelling her to bring the
suit.
The trial court in its nine-page judgment rendered on April 2,
1991 found that private respondent had satisfactorily established her
ownership over the parcel of land in question. It also found that petitioner
entered and occupied private respondents land without authority of law
and against the will of the owner x x x through strategy and
3
stealth. Furthermore, it declared that the claim of petitioner that by
virtue of an agreement between the former owner (Publio Pansacola) and
the Municipality of Mauban x x x the lot [being occupied by petitioner]

became the property of the government, and therefore, [respondent] has

no cause of action against *petitioner+ was baseless and
4
unwarranted, since no deed had ever been executed to perfect the
deal between the municipality and Publio for the exchange of a portion of
the abandoned provincial road with a portion of the lot owned by Publio
(on which was built petitioners dwelling), such that the Pansacola spouses
later demanded that petitioner vacate the land and sought the help of the
barangay council. They eventually instituted the criminal case against
petitioner for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
The trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the subject land, remove
his house therefrom and pay private respondent exemplary damages and
attorneys fees in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner insists that private respondent has no cause of action
against him because the land on which his house stands belongs to the
government. Petitioners dwelling is situated on the shoulder of the new
provincial highway, part of which was constructed on a portion of the land
belonging to and titled in the name of private respondents husband.
According to petitioner, while it is conceded that the premises *occupied
by him+ is still within the area covered by *private respondents+ title,
nonetheless, x x x [the subject premises] x x x already belong to the
5
government by virtue of its exchange of the abandoned road and bridge.
Petitioners claim is anchored on a document entitled Minutes of the
Meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon
dated November 5, 1974. Therein, Publio Pansacola signified before the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the transfer of that
portion of his land traversed by the new provincial highway and its
shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion of the old abandoned
provincial road.
As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the
Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the execution of any deed to perfect
the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned
road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned
road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the
land traversed by the new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced
by petitioner to show that the survey was actually undertaken and a
specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and conveyed to the
Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the
property was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual
transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is consummated,

or expropriation proceedings instituted by the government, private

respondent continues to retain ownership of the land subject of this case.
We note that the ejectment suit should have been filed before the
Municipal Trial Court, and not the Regional Trial Court. The issue of
ownership, however, had been specifically raised before the Regional Trial
Court by petitioner himself, who at the same time did not move to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, he filed his answer and went
6
to trial. Estoppel by laches has already set in at this point in time.
Petitioner also challenges the findings of the respondent Court that
prior referral to the Lupong Barangay had been made before the ejectment
case was filed in the lower court, and that therefore, the trial court
properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. We agree, however, with the
trial courts finding that
The compliance (with) the provision of P.D. No. 1508, Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, can no longer be assailed by the defendant [herein
petitioner], its reference having been admitted (in) his affirmative
allegations and affirmative defenses in the Answer (page 3, par. 3.3 of
7
defendants answer). (italics supplied)
Other issues raised had already been adequately traversed and
disposed of by the appellate Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco,. JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992

CECILIA U. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T. DIZON, respondents.

NOCON, J.:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal of the
1
Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of August 30, 1990 ordering
the dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the Manila Metropolitan
Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-compliance with Sections
6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well as the
2
Resolution of January 7, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of said Decision.
The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner in her Memorandum
are as follows:
Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building
located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two
(2) units of said apartment building were leased (now
being unlawfully occupied) to private respondent at
monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit/apartment
located at 800 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila and
P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment located at 802
Remedios Street, Malate, Manila, respectively. . . .
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of
lease both dated December 10, 1984 and except for the
rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said
contracts were impliedly renewed on a "month-tomonth" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of
Lease, that of monthly rental payments, was violated by
private respondent and that as of October 31, 1988, said
private respondent has incurred arrears for both units in

the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand

were sent to, and received by, private respondent.

position paper failed to do so, contrary to evidence on

record;

Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand

letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay
for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to
file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond
U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay
proceeding as she was suffering from recurring
psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from
the receipts and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist,
copies of which are attached as Annexes "E-E10" of the
said Petition.

2. In failing to consider that private respondent had

waived his right to question the lack of cause of action of
the complaint, if there is any, contrary to law, established
jurisprudence, and evidence on record;

Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent to

vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to retain
the services of counsel to initiate this ejectment
3
proceeding.
The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila, rendered a decision on
June 21, 1989 ordering private respondent to vacate the premises, to pay
rentals falling due after May 1989 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount
4
of P2,500.00. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, on appeal,
affirmed the MTC ruling except for the award of attorney's fees which it
5
reduced to P1,000.00.
Private respondent, however, found favor with the respondent Court of
Appeals when he elevated the case in a Petition for Review, when it ruled,
thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October 13, 1989
of the RTC of Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case No. 89-49672 is
reversed and set aside and the Complaint for Ejectment
against petitioner is dismissed for lack of cause of action.
6
No costs.
Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error, namely, that the
Court of Appeals erred
1. In holding that private respondent raised the issue of
non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 in the
lower court when in fact and in truth his answer and

3. In giving undue weight and credence to the selfserving allegations of the private respondent that
summons was not served him, contrary to law,
established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that
barangay authorities are presumed to have performed
their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing
the certificate to file action and grossly and manifestly
erred in making an opposite conclusion to this effect,
contrary to law, established jurisprudence and evidence
on record.
5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated,
contrary to law and evidence on record.
6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court below.
Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of noncompliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for
review with the appellate court and which mislead the court to
erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:
Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.
No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided
in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or
any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon
Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the

Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has

been repudiated. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

defendant was never summoned nor subpoenaed by the

Barangay Chairman to appear for hearing in connection
with the alleged complaint of the plaintiff. In effect the
mandatory provision of P.D. 1508 was not complied with
warranting the dismissal of the instant complaint.

while Section 9 states that:

xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. In all
proceedings provided for herein, the parties must appear
in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of minors
and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of
kin who are not lawyers.
Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by private
respondent in the court below, cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, specially in the Court of Appeals, citing Saludes
7
vs. Pajarillo. Private respondent had waived said objection, following the
line of reasoning in Royales vs. Intermediate Appelate Court. 8
Private respondent denies having waived the defenses of non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508. His Answer before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, specifically paragraphs 4, 7, & 8, substantially raised the fact of
non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 and
consequently, subjected petitioner's complaint to dismissal for lack of
cause of action, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Answering defendant denies the allegations of
paragraph 8, the truth of the matter being that he was
not duly summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay
Chairman, who issued the alluded certification, to appear
9
for hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against answering
defendant.
8. The certification to file action (annex D of the
complaint) was improperly or irregularly issued as the

10

We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with

Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the Court
of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he was never summoned
or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that
since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the
needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for
conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory personal
confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC. Private
respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he was never
summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no
cause of action against him as alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and
that the certification to file action was improperly issued in view of the
foregoing allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the
mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the
Answer are in substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or
objections in the court below.
Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court that she appeared
before the Lupon Chairman to confront private respondent. She stated in
11
12
her Petition and her Memorandum that:
Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand
letters, petitioner referred the matter to the barangay
for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to
file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond
U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay
proceeding as she was suffering from recurring
psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from
the receipt and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist
copies of which are attached herewith as Annexes
"E-E10."
However, as found out by the respondent court:

We agree with the petitioner that private respondent

Cecile Ledesma failed to comply with section 6 of P.D.
1508. The record of the case is barren showing
compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the
documentary evidence of the private respondent herself
attached to the complaint buttresses this conclusion.
They show that it is not the private respondent but her
son. Raymund U. Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty. Epifania
Navarro who dealt with the petitioner regarding their
dispute. Thus, the demand letter dated October 18, 1988
sent to the petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum
of P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma. On the
other hand, the demand letter dated November 14, 1988
was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More telling is the
Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman,
Alberto A. Solis where it appears that the complainant is
13
Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private respondent.
As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation
of the parties because:
. . . a personal confrontation between the parties without
the intervention of a counsel or representative would
generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to
amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In
other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to
the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay
14
level.
Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the
barangay Chairman was because of her recurring psychological ailments.
15
But for the entire year of 1988 specifically September to December 6
there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist
for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for
petitioner. There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance
at the Lupon Chairman's office.
Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be
represented by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact
who is next of kin.

16

As explained by the Minister of Justic with whom We agree:

To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal

confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the
effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as
a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted
provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover,
pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction
dictating that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", the
express exceptions made regarding minors and
incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all
17
others not mentioned.
Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred
18
her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila. Having
arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to discuss the other
issues involved.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the respondent
Court are affirmed in toto with treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

to comply with the mandatory barangay conciliation process required by

Presidential Decree No. 1508,
G.R. No. 101328. April 7, 1993.

Otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS,
respondents.

It appears on record that petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido are

the only legitimate children of spouses Agapito Candido and Florencia
Santos as shown by the certificates 2 of the latter's Record of Marriage and
the petitioners' Record of Birth.

Alberto M. Diaz for petitioners.

Luis S. Cuvin for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (P.D. NO. 1508);
SCOPE OF POWER; RULE. From the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear
that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between
parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or
municipality or adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities. The
Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all
types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same
municipality, city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is
one of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said
conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that no conciliation
or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case could be
dismissed on motion. In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and
private respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan
does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the
other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities
and provinces.
DECISION

However, petitioners' father eventually left his legitimate family and lived
with Sagraria Lozada until his death on May 6, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido,
Maximina Candido and Eduardo Candido who represented themselves to
be the sole heirs of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale 3 covering parcels of land owned by
the latter and sold to private respondent Mila Contreras in whose name
said properties are now registered under TCT No. T-120656-M.
On November 6, 1990, petitioners instituted an action with the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 against
Sagraria Lozada, Gorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido,
Eduardo Candido, Register of Deeds of Bulacan and private respondent
Mila Contreras to annul the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale, to cancel TCT No. 120656-M issued in the name of private
respondent and to reinstate TCT No. 223602 in the name of Agapito
Candido married to Sagraria Lozada.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on
the ground that petitioners failed to comply with the mandatory
conciliation process required under P.D. No. 1508 as she resides in the
same municipality with the petitioners.
On July 10, 1991, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:

NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders 1 dated
July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 of the trial court dismissing the complaint
of petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido against private respondent
Mila Contreras on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure

"WHEREFORE, as prayed for, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED in

so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned for lack of prior referral of
the dispute before the Katarungang Pambarangay, without prejudice." 5

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 which was

denied in an Order 7 dated August 9, 1991.

property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where

the real property or any part thereof is situated.

Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge dismissing private respondent in the complaint
instituted by the petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other
defendants in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities
and cities.

"The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508 provides:
"SEC. 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
"(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof:
"(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
"(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding P200.00;
"(4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
"(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local Government."
Further, section 3 of the same law provides:
"SEC. 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in
the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the
Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the
barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides,
at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or

municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; . . ."
From the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the
barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties
who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or
municipality or adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities.
In the instant case, petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are
residents of Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan while
defendants' residences are as follows: Sagraria Lozada and Jorge Candido
at Javier Compound, Bo. Sto. Nio, Taytay, Rizal; Virginia and Maximina
Candido at Road 2, Doa Faustina Village, San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City; Eduardo Candido at 388 Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of
Obando, Bulacan; Mila Contreras at San Pascual, Municipality of Obando,
Bulacan; and the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan at his official address in
Bulacan.
The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably
all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same
municipality, city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is
one of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said
conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that no conciliation
or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case could be
dismissed on motion. 8 In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and
private respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan
does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the
other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities
and provinces.
Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the
purpose of the law in discouraging litigation among members of the same
barangay through conciliation where the other parties reside in barangays
other than the one where the Lupon is located and where the dispute
arose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of the trial
court dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 697-

[5]

M-90 in so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned are hereby

annulled and set aside. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan for further proceedings and to REINSTATE private respondent Mila
Contreras as defendant in Civil Case No. 697-M-90. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 18 of the
[6]
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. to be referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay
[7]
concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.

FIRST DIVISION

The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 1995 denying
petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground that they failed to seasonably
invoke the non-referral of the cases to theLupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure
to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by
petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the
[9]
cases.

[G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000]

FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA
GATCHALIAN and FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH BALISING,
ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA
SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO
CANON
, EDITHA ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY
ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES
AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo, Rizal, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 dated August 26,
[1]
1997.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia
Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases
[2]
for estafa filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to
the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. Ncm
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not
[3]
guilty, they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on the
ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of
the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong
[4]
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners averred
that since they lived in the same barangay as private respondents, and the
amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos
(P200.00), the said cases were required under Section 412 in relation to

[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned

Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Court is it stated that
the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised seasonably
[10]
in a motion to dismiss.
On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order
dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice,
pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
[11]
Procedure. Scncm
More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the abovementioned criminal
cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to
[12]
the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with. Attached to
the motion was a Certification dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong
[13]
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal stating that the parties
appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private
respondents against petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable
settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a Comment and
Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the municipal
trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long
become final and executory; hence, private respondents should have re[14]
filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive.
[15]

On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order granting
private respondents Motion to Revive. Petitioners filed a Motion for
[16]
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the
[17]
municipal trial court.

Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
a petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing the Order
dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They claimed that the
said Order dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases against
them had long become final and executory considering that the
[18]
prosecution did not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order. In
[19]
response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment, arguing that
the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with law, particularly
[20]
Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective
[21]
contentions, the Regional Trial Court rendered the assailed Decision
denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition, stating as
follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and
respondents comment thereto, the Court regrets that it
cannot agree with the petitioner(sic). As shown by the
records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without
prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of
the private respondent to comply with the mandatory
requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases
was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that
the questioned order has not attained finality at all.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Sdaamiso
SO ORDERED.

[22]

The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners Motion for

[23]
[24]
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision for lack of merit.

2. Whether or not the action or case that had been

dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion
after the order of dismissal had become final and
executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired
jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without
prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to
revive after the order of dismissal has become final and
[25]
executory.
Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without
prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary
period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the
reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion
for reconsideration of the courts order, the order of dismissal becomes
final and the case may only be revived by the filing of a new complaint or
[26]
information. Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal
of a case attains finality, the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction
thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act on any motion of the
[27]
parties with respect to said case.
On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered by the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure such as the criminal cases
against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of
decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of Court. They insist that
cases dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance with the
requirement of conciliation before theLupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned may be revived summarily
by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number of days which
[28]
has lapsed after the dismissal of the case.
Petitioners contentions are meritorious. Sdaad

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners raise the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action
without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed
within the reglementary period, as in the present case;

A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what
[29]
has been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an
"interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely,
[30]
but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.

This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without
[31]
prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,

[32]

we stated thus:

The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not

however mean that said dismissal order was any less
final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details,
and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally
disposed of the matter. It was not merely an
interlocutory order but a final disposition of the
complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his
receipt of the courts decision or order disposing of the action or
[33]
proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and
executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which
[34]
rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order
cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for
the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which
[35]
rendered the same.
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final,
and therefore becomes outside the courts power to amend and modify, a
party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new
complaint.
This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs.
[36]
Velasco, where we ruled thus: Scsdaad
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the
reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the
dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from
the Courts docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be
without prejudice, the case could no longer be
reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original
docketed action, but only by the filing of another
complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of
the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.

xxx
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action
does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days
therefrom, and consequently within that time the action
still remains within the control of the Court, the plaintiff
may move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive
his action before that period lapses. But after dismissal
has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day
reglementary period, the only way by which the action
may be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of
a subsequent action through the filing of another
complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law.
This is so because upon attainment of finality of the
dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period,
the Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and can
no longer make a disposition in respect thereof
[37]
inconsistent with such dismissal. (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to private respondents claim, the foregoing rule applies not only
[38]
to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca vs. Blanco, the Court
defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal
becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
[39]
offense." Supremax
Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition
for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the order of the
municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without
prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality
and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally erroneous is private respondents contention that the rules
[40]
regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules of Court do not
apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for
failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required
under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government
Code. The said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon
for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential

[41]

Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of

compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed
without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This
provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the
[42]
accused was arrested without a warrant.
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private
respondents view. Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without
prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be
revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to
barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There
is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere
motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a
motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly
provides that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by
the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular
procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to
the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory
[43]
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991
Revised Rule of Summary Procedure and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to
[44]
[45]
Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, and Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other conclusion than that the
rules regarding finality of judgments also apply to cases covered by the
rules on summary procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a
judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for
reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains
[46]
finality. Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every statute must be
so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
[47]
system of jurisprudence
applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders,
likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine applies to cases
covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental

considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some
[48]
definite date set by law. Misjuris
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases
subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule
[49]
governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously. To
construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by
mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same
would prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies with
[50]
finality, thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of
petitioners and the municipal trial court that the non-referral of a case for
barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code of
[51]
1991 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has
been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation
[52]
[53]
when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and
may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
[54]
dismiss. The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked
the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the
failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as
soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the
said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the
criminal cases against petitioners on the ground that the same were not
referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said
ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be
revoked at present considering that the same had long become final and
[55]
executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled by the
Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this
[56]
Court. Scjuris
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II dated August 26, 1997 and
its Order dated January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092 are hereby SET
ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-0831, 94-0832, 940833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839, 94-0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 940850, 94-0854 and 94-0058 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo are

ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
SO ORDERED. KAPUNAN

On October 7, 1992, that court issued a temporary restraining order

8
against the enforcement of the writ of execution. Later, however, on
October 23, 1992, it dismissed the petition on the ground
that certiorari with injunction was not the proper remedy of the petitioner,
9
appeal being then still available to him.
10

The dismissal was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. His

11
motion for a reconsideration having been denied, Felizardo is now
before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
G.R. No. 112050 June 15, 1994

The core issue is the propriety of the special civil action

for certiorari instituted by the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City to challenge the judgment rendered by the court a quo.

QUINTIN F. FELIZARDO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS & NEMESIO B. JOSE, respondents.

The petition has no merit.

Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor of a house and lot

located at No. 63-20th St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, filed on
February 24, 1992, an action for ejectment with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner
1
Quintin Felizardo. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3163 in the
Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City.
On February 27, 1992, summons was issued directing the petitioner to file
an answer and informing him that the Rule on Summary Procedure would
2
be applied.
In his answer, the petitioner averred inter alia that the private
respondent's allegations to support his prayer for a preliminary injunction
were utterly false and intended only to evade the requirements of P.D.
3
4
1508 for prior barangay conciliation.
At the preliminary conference and in his position paper, the petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of the private
respondent's cause of action for non-compliance with the said decree.

It is settled that the writ of certiorari is available only where the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
12
of law. It is also the rule that this special civil action should not be
allowed as a substitute for an ordinary appeal or where there are other
13
remedies available.
There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City had
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case lodged by the private
respondent and over the person of the petitioner, who had filed his
answer to the complaint. The only question is whether that court, in
continuing to act on the case despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation
as required by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, committed a
mere error or judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an
error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.
Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law provides:

On September 1, 1992, judgment was rendered against the petitioner. On

September 17, 1992, upon motion of the private respondent, the court
6
issued an order for the execution of its decision.
On that same date, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance
7
of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of

complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or
any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation between the parties
before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no

conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified

by the lupon secretary or the pangkat secretary, attested
to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless
the settlement has been repudiated by the parties
thereto.
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. The
parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpusproceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the private
respondent contained an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129.
The suit would, therefore, ostensibly fall under the exception mentioned in
Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. A different
conclusion must be reached, however, after a closer look at the attendant
circumstances in light of the following allegations made by the private
respondent in his complaint:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Such act of subdividing and subleasing said property by
the defendant to other persons has resulted in great
irreparable loss and great injustice to the plaintiff and as
a result thereof plaintiff incurred actual damages to be
proven during the proceedings.

10. Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded which

consists of immediately restraining the further
subdivision or alteration and subleasing of the property
and enjoining the defendant from proceeding with any
alteration, subdivision or subleasing of the properties
subject of the controversy.
11. Defendant is doing, or about to do, is procuring or
suffering to be done, the act herein complained of, in
violation of plaintiffs right and tending the judgment of
the case ineffectual.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the issue of the subdividing and
subleasing of the property may no longer be raised again in this case
because it had already been adjudicated in the antecedent case between
the petitioner and the private respondent. This was Civil Case No. 3031,
where it was held:
On the matter of subleasing the property, plaintiff
underscored the contention of the defendant that since
part of the provisions in the contract between them is to
the effect that he may use the premises in question for
business purposes, this is controverted by the specific
provision thereat that the same should not be subleased
to other persons. While the terms appear to be so broad
as to be susceptible of different interpretations and while
the court likewise does not countenance that a specific
provision controls a general provision in a contract,
however, it is to be noticed that the intent of the parties
to a contract should also be given credence. It likewise
cannot be countenanced by this court that the plaintiff
has no knowledge about this alleged violation affecting
the subleasing, in a way that when the rooms were
constructed, it was with the knowledge of the plaintiff as
contained in the affidavits submitted by the defendant
forming part of his position paper to this effect.
Therefore there appears to be an implied consent upon
the plaintiff as it is quite impossible that the plaintiff
would not notice that a construction was going on the
leased premises. The plaintiff therefore is estopped from
claiming otherwise. (Cited in the CA decision, p. 7.)

The above finding is now final and conclusive in view of the private
respondent's withdrawal of his appeal therefrom. As the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City observed:

bond; and
c) periodically depositing with the appellate court
the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

The court notes plaintiff had virtually withdrawn his own

appeal concerning the finding of the lower court that the
construction of additional rooms and the consequent
subleasing of the properties to third persons were with
the consent of the plaintiff and which therefore cannot
be treated as additional ground to eject the defendant. . .
. (Cited in CA decision, p. 9.)
That withdrawal deprived the private respondent's prayer for a preliminary
mandatory injunction of all legal basis and removed his complaint from the
operation of Sec. 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
It is also worth noting that during the preliminary conference and in his
position paper, Jose had conveyed the impression that he was no longer
interested in pursuing his application for such provisional remedy and was
14
limiting his cause of action to the recovery of the unpaid rentals. This
strengthens all the more the petitioner's contention that the prayer was
merely a pretense designed to avoid the requirements of the said law.
Whether or not the court acted correctly in proceeding with the case even
without the prior barangay proceeding is a procedural question that could
not be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari but only in an
ordinary appeal. A similar observation is made on its declaration that it
was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that the private respondent's
allegations in support of the prayer for preliminary injunction was false
and that compensation or set-off was not a proper defense. These
conclusions would at most constitute errors of judgment reviewable only
on appeal and not errors of jurisdiction reviewable by certiorari.
An additional consideration against the petitioner is his contention that
appeal, although available, was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. He errs again.
The judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, if in favor of
the plaintiff, must be executed immediately to prevent further damage to
him arising from loss of possession. Nevertheless, the defendant is not
entirely without recourse. Under the Rules of Court, he may stay such
immediate execution by a) perfecting an appeal; b) filing a supersedeas

These remedies are expressly provided for in Rule 70, Section 8, of the
Rules of Court, reading in part as follows:
Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay
same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files
a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court
and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the
Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages,
and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the
appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount
of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any,
as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court
to exist. . . .
Although an order for the execution of the judgment in favor of the private
respondent had already been issued and Felizardo's ejectment from the
leased property was imminent, he could still prevent the implementation
of the said order by availing himself of the above remedies. But he did not.
His reason was that "there is no way that Mr. Jose can lose in Olongapo
City and there is nothing to prevent him from securing a writ of execution
notwithstanding the filing of a supersedeas bond. This had happened
before in the very same MTCC and in the very same RTC in the first case
between him and herein petitioner."
It appears, though, that the petitioner's apprehensions are unfounded. The
record shows that in the earlier case between him and the private
respondent, he was in fact able to obtain the suspension of the adverse
judgment against him during the pendency of his appeal with the Regional
15
Trial Court by filing a supersedeas bond.
The petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Echaus vs. Court of
16
17
Appeals which reaffirmed Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, thus:

. . ., that certiorari lies against an order granting execution

pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good
reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had appealed from
the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in
respondent court as the appeal could not be an adequate
remedy from such premature execution.
That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to
prevent execution pending appeal, as suggested by the two
lower courts, is not to be held against him. The filing of such
bond does not entitle him to the suspension of execution as a
matter of right. It cannot, therefore, be categorically
considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no
rule requires a losing party so circumstanced to adopt such
remedy in lieu or before availment of other remedial options at
hand.
Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39
should be that the requirement for a supersedeas bond
presupposed that the case presents presumptively valid
occasion for discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no
good reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing
party would unjustly compel the losing party to post a
supersedeas bond through the simple expedient of filing a
motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ of
execution pending appeal although the situation is violative of
Section 2, Rule 39. . . .

The above observations are not squarely applicable to the case at bar
because what were sought to be reviewed in the certiorari proceedings
instituted by the petitioner in those cases were the orders of execution
pending appeal, which were interlocutory and unappealable. Moreover,
the orders of execution in those cases were for the collection of damages
and attorney's fees and were issued pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court. This section requires good reasons to support the issuance
of the writ. Certiorari was available to challenge the orders, which were
annulled because there was no showing of such good reasons to sustain to
sustain the execution pending appeal.
By contrast, what was challenged in the special civil action
for certiorari filed by the herein petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
was not merely the order of execution but the judgment of the court a
quo on the merits of the case. This was final and appealable. Besides, the
writ in this case was issued under Section 8, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court,
under which it is not necessary to show good reasons for the immediate
execution of the judgment against the defendant. This is an ejectment

case. As the Rules of Court require the judgment in such cases to be

executed immediately, the writ of execution can be stayed only upon
compliance with the requirements of the said action.
It is understood that the trial court retains its discretion to issue an order
of execution pending appeal even when the defendant posts a
supersedeas bond. Of course, this discretion is not absolute. The court can
still disregard the supersedeas bond but only when there are special and
18
compelling reasons justifying immediate execution. If that discretion is
exercised arbitrarily, the aggrieved party has the right to question such act
in a petition for certiorari.
To recapitulate, when the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it could act on
the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent even without
prior barangay conciliation proceedings, it committed a mere error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. We have held in many cases that while
the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for
the filing of a complaint in court, non-compliance therewith cannot affect
the jurisdiction which the court has already required over the subject
19
matter and over the person of the defendant. Hence, the remedy
available to the petitioner was to question the ruling of the court a quo in
an ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in a special action
for certiorari.
At any rate, even assuming that the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner was the proper remedy, the same cannot be granted as it
cannot be said that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding the allegations for the issuance of preliminary injunction to be
sufficient compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. We agree
with the Regional Trial Court that:
Thus, when the lower court allegedly disregarded the
counterclaims of petitioner, when it refused to rule on
"compensation off-setting" and ruled that the application
for a provisional remedy in the complaint for ejectment
was not sham or that it was not proved as such, and also
when said court failed to dismiss the case for lack of
compliance with the requirement of PD 1508 there
was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court . . . It cannot be said that respondent judge acted in
a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner to
be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Besides, as already pointed out, the petitioner had other plain, speedy and
adequate remedies available to him under Rule 70, Section 8, of the Rules
of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

[G.R. No. 111915. September 30, 1999]

HEIRS OF FERNANDO VINZONS, represented by LIWAYWAY VINZONSCHATO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MENA
EDORIA, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of
[1]
[2]
the January 27, 1993 Decision and September 10, 1993 Resolution of
[3]
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23948. The Court of Appeals (CA)
[4]
set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet,
Camarines Norte in Civil Case No. 5832, affirming that of the Municipal
[5]
Trial Court (MTC) in Civil Case No. 2137 , which ordered the ejectment of
herein private respondent.
The factual antecedents of this case are:
Petitioners Heirs of Vinzons are co-owners of a parcel of land in
Barangay 5, Daet, of which a portion measuring 148.5 square meters is
being occupied by respondent Mena Edoria as lessee since
1951. Respondent built thereon a residential house worth P40,000.00. He
started paying a monthly rent of P4.00 which by 1986 had reached P13.00.
Sometime in 1986, an ejectment suit was filed by petitioners against
respondent and several others also occupying the same lot owned by
them, docketed as Civil Case No. 1923, on the ground, among others, of
non-payment of rentals. After trial, however, the case was dismissed on
the finding that respondent was not in arrears but was even advance in his

rental payments. Both petitioner and respondent appealed from said

decision to the Regional Trial Court.
Sometime in 1988, while the aforesaid Case No. 1923 was pending
appeal before the RTC, petitioner filed another ejectment suit, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2061, against respondent and thirty-nine (39) others alleging
that said defendants refused to enter into an agreement with them as
tenants-lessees and refused to pay the increased rent of P1.00 per square
meter per month. Respondent resisted the claim alleging, among others,
lack of cause of action and pendency of the earlier ejectment case. The
trial court rendered its decision dismissing the case against respondent in
view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 1923 on appeal. This decision was
again elevated to the RTC.
While Civil Case No. 2061 was pending appeal in the RTC, petitioners
again filed the instant suit for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 2137
on the following grounds: (a) expiration of lease contract as of 1984; (b)
refusal to sign written renewal of contract of lease; and (c) non-payment of
rent for one (1) year and ten (10) months. In his answer, respondent
sought dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds; (a) it did not
pass through barangay conciliation; (b) no prior demand was made or if
there was such a demand, it was made more than one year prior to the
filing of the case; (c) there was no cause of action as it was in violation of
PD 20 and BP Blg. 25; (d) the case is barred by prior judgment; and (e)
there is still pending appeal a similar case between the parties, Civil Case
No. 2061.
After trial, the MTC of Daet rendered its decision ordering respondent
to vacate the premises and pay the accrued rentals. On appeal to the RTC,
the said decision was affirmed in toto. The CA, however, reversed the two
(2) earlier decisions by dismissing the complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia, failure to comply with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (PD
1508); and lack of evidence of prior demand to vacate before instituting
the complaint.
Hence, this petition on the following grounds:
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION UPON THE GROUND THAT THE GROUNDS THEREIN
[6]
AVERRED HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED UPON IN ITS DECISION.

Petitioners argue that the CA was duty-bound, under the rules and
jurisprudence, to give weight to the findings of fact of the MTC since the
same had already been affirmed in toto by the RTC. Further, it is argued
that the action is not barred by prior judgment and the principle of litis
pendentia does not apply; that the petitioners complied with the
requirements of PD 1508; and that demand to vacate is not necessary for
judicial action in case of expiration of the lease contract.
The petition is devoid of merit, we find that the MTC had improperly
assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.
First, this case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been filed
within one year from the date of last demand with the Municipal Trial
Court,
otherwise
[7]
it is an accion publiciana cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. The rule
is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
[8]
of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed
[9]
should be counted from the last letter of demand to vacate. Accion
publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when
[10]
dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
There is no question that the petitioners dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. In their Complaint and Position paper, petitioners
[11]
alleged that the lease contract expired in 1984 ; that thereafter, private
[12]
respondent became a lessee on a month-to-month basis ; and that
before the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 1908, 1923 and 2061, demand to vacate
[13]
had already been made to defendant. Since Civil Case No. 1908 was
instituted in 1986; Civil Case No. 1923 in 1986; and Civil Case No. 2061 in
April 1988, the alleged demands to vacate to abort an implied renewal of
the lease on a month-to-month basis were made between 1986 and 1988,
the last one, before April 1988. Verily, the instant Complaint for ejectment
filed by petitioner in October 1989, was filed more than one year from the
termination of the month-to-month lease some time before April 1988. It
is well-established that what determines the nature of an action and
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it is the allegation
[14]
made by the plaintiff in his complaint.
Second, the challenged decision correctly dismissed the case for
failure of the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to avail of the barangay
conciliation process under PD 1508, preliminary to judicial recourse. The
Court of Appeals had found that there is no clear showing that it was
brought before the Barangay Lupon or Pangkat of Barangay 5, Daet,
Camarines Norte, where the parties reside and the property subject of the

case is situated, as there is no barangay certification to file action attached

[15]
to the complaint.
[16]

Paraphrasing Peaflor vs. Panis , the Lupong Barangay is with

jurisdiction under PD 1508 to pass upon an ejectment controversy where
the parties are residents in the same barangay or in barangays within the
same city or in barangays adjoining each other. It is clearly averred in the
Complaint that herein petitioners, then represented by the widow of the
late Fernando Vinzons, resided in the same barangay, hence, covered by
[17]
the said law. In Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court , this Court
ruled that non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by PD
1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make
his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity. Defendants, private respondents herein, objected
to the failure of the parties to undergo a confrontation at the barangay
level in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo to no
avail as the trial courts merely brushed aside this issue. Hence, the Court
of Appeals had to rectify this error by the trial courts.
In refutation of the said findings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners
submit that it is clear in the findings of fact of the MTC of Daet, as
affirmed by the RTC of Daet that before the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 1908,
1923 and 2061, demand to vacate had already been made to the
defendant after efforts to settle the controversy at the barangay level had
[18]
failed. This is not a factual finding of the MTC, but an allegation in
petitioners Complaint. As mentioned earlier, the MTC merely brushed
aside the issue of non-recourse to barangay conciliation. This allegation in
petitioners Complaint that efforts to settle the controversy at the
barangay level had failed in Civil Cases Nos.1908, 1923 and 2061, does not
constitute compliance with the requirements of PD 1508 for purposes of
filing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2137. Section 6 of PD 1508 insofar as
pertinent provides:
SEC. 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon chairman or the
Pangkat xxx.
Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior
to the filing of the ejectment case under PD 1508. Legal action for
[19]
ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay court. The
Complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 2137, should

have been coursed first to the barangay court. Petitioners cannot rely on
the barangay conciliation proceedings held in the other cases and consider
the same as compliance with the law.
Third, petitioners rely heavily on the general rule that findings of trial
courts deserve to be respected and affirmed by appellate courts. Almost
as well-recognized as the general rule is the exception that the factual
findings of the trial court may nonetheless be reversed by the Court of
Appeals if by the evidence on record or the lack of it, it appears that the
[20]
trial court erred. Considering that the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals arrived at different factual findings, we have reviewed the
evidence on record and have found as aforesaid, the improper assumption
by the MTC of the case due to non-recourse to barangay conciliation and
the lapse of the one-year period for bringing the case for unlawful
detainer.
Having arrived at the above conclusion, the Court finds no need to
discuss the other issues, specifically, those bearing on the application of
the principles of litis pendentia and/or res judicata. Moreover, the records
of Civil Cases Nos. 1923 and 2061 are not before us to enable us to
determine the presence of the elements thereof in the instant case.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-687 February 9, 1994

ENGINEER EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MELJOHN DE LA PEA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, CaibiranCulaba, Leyte [Acting Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Naval,
Leyte], respondent.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated June 18, 1992, Engineer Edgardo C.
Garcia charged Judge Meljohn de la Pea in his capacity as acting judge of
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte with partiality, abuse of authority and
grave abuse of discretion in connection with Crimimal Case No. 2577 for
grave oral defamation which was filed against his wife, Ignacia G. Garcia, a
supervising nurse of Naval District Hospital, by respondent judge's brother,
Dr. Melencio de la Pea. Respondent judge, while acting as the presiding
judge of the MTC of Naval, Leyte, is the incumbent presiding judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte.
Complainant Engr. Edgardo C. Garcia, husband of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 2577, claimed that respondent judge took cognizance of the
criminal case without the requisite certification from the Lupon
Tagapayapa; that he should have inhibited himself from acting on the case
because private complainant Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea is his brother; that
he issued a warrant of arrest without the accompanying copy of the
complaint and affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses; that when
complainant sought the approval of the cash bail bond he posted for the

provisional release of his wife at 2:40 P.M. of June 8, 1992, respondent

judge was not in his office, thus the Order of Release prepared by the Clerk
of Court was brought to respondent's house by Rey Morillo, a process
server, for his signature at around 2:56 P.M., but they were informed that
he left for Ormoc City then by boat for Cebu; that at around 4:00 P.M. he
hired a pump boat and sent Basilio Borrinaga to Maripipi to have the bail
bond approved and get the order of release from Judge Dulcisimo Pitao of
MTC of Maripipi but the latter explained in his letter that he cannot do so
because he does not know whether or not Judge de la Pea is on leave;
that the following morning of June 9, 1992, they learned that respondent
judge left the Order of Release with his wife, Lolita de la Pea, instead of
leaving it with the Clerk of Court; that because of respondent judge's
actuations, complainant's wife was detained at the municipal jail for
twenty (20) hours from 2:55 P.M. of June 8, 1992 to 10:10 A.M. of June 9,
1992; and that it was only on June 15, 1992 that they received a copy of
the criminal complaint, affidavit of the witnesses and respondent judge's
inhibition order dated June 15, 1992.
On November 19, 1992, this Court required respondent judge to file his
comment and, upon receipt thereof, the case was referred to the Office of
the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. On
July 20, 1993, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez submitted a
memorandum with the corresponding evaluation and recommendation,
duly approved by the Court Administrator.
Records show that Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea filed on June 8, 1992 a
complaint for grave oral defamation against Ignacia G. Garcia with the
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2577.
The complaint for oral defamation arose from an incident which occurred
on April 19, 1992 in Naval, Leyte. After the preliminary examination was
conducted, respondent Judge Meljohn de la Pea issued on the same date
3
a warrant for the arrest of the accused Ignacia G. Garcia. By virtue of said
warrant, SPO3 Teofanes Pacioles of the Philippine National Police arrested
the accused.
On the same day, June 8, 1992, Engr. Edgardo Garcia, husband of the
accused, posted the cash bail bond in the amount of P2,000.00 as fixed in
the warrant of arrest for the provisional liberty of the accused. Thereafter,
herein complainant sought at around 2:40 P.M. the approval of the cash
bail bond and the Order of Release of the accused but respondent judge
was not in the office at that time. Meantime, the accused remained under
detention in the municipal jail of Naval. It was only the following day, June
9, 1992 at around 10:10 A.M. after complainant secured a copy of the

Order of Release dated June 8, 1992 duly signed by respondent judge that
the accused was released from detention. Complainant was informed that
before respondent judge left for Cebu City, he entrusted the Order of
Release to his wife, Lolita de la Pea, whose whereabouts, however, were
unknown in the afternoon of June 8, 1992 despite efforts by the Clerk of
Court to look for her. The delay in the release of his wife from detention by
one day because the Order of Release could not be obtained as
respondent judge left for Cebu City despite proper posting of the cash
bond of P2,000.00 for her provisional liberty on the same day of her arrest
on June 8, 1992, prompted complainant to file on July 22, 1992 this
administrative case against respondent judge.
Earlier, or on July 16, 1992, a complaint containing the same charges was
filed by complainant with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),
docketed as OMB VIS-92-397.
In his comment, respondent judge stated that he is adopting his
counter-affidavit and memorandum filed with the Ombudsman as part of
his comment, wherein he asserted that the certification to file action from
the Lupon Tagapayapa was not necessary for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2577 because the imposable penalty of
the crime of grave oral defamation (4 months and 1 day to 3 years and 4
months) is not within the coverage of the Lupon Tagapayapa; that even if
the private complainant is his brother, he need not inhibit himself to
"mobilize the machinery of justice" because the case has been deferred for
quite a long time due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the nondesignation of a presiding judge from April to May 1992; that there is no
room for bias or partiality in the issuance of a warrant of arrest which is
both a mandatory and ministerial duty provided the complaint and the
supporting affidavit engender a probable cause; that to show his
neutrality, he issued an inhibition order dated June 15, 1992; that the cash
bond posted was defective for there was no written undertaking as
required under Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; that his Clerk of
Court was informed in the morning of June 8, 1992 that he would be going
to Cebu City that afternoon for his pre-scheduled medical check-up and
that he is preparing an order of release which could be obtained from his
wife, Lolita de la Pea, in case the accused actually files a bail bond, after
determining that the same is in order.
It is at once clear that the administrative charges against respondent judge
focused mainly on the fact of his taking cognizance of the criminal case of
grave oral defamation filed by his brother, Dr. Melencio de la Pea, against
complainant's wife, Ignacia Garcia, which, as a consequence, gave rise to

the incidents narrated in the letter-complaint descriptive of the perceived

bias and partiality of respondent judge in the discharge of his official
functions in connection with Criminal Case No. 2577.
The Court agrees with respondent judge that the certification to file an
action required under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not necessary in the
prosecution for grave oral defamation for the same is beyond the coverage
of said Katarungan Pambarangay Law. But, the charge of partiality, abuse
of authority and grave abuse of discretion as regards respondent judge's
taking cognizance of the criminal case despite the fact that private
complainant is his brother a relative within the second degree of
consanguinity in violation of the rule on compulsory disqualification of
judges under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is a different matter.
The Court, in this regard, will not hesitate to exercise its full disciplinary
powers in the instant case where the violation is so patent and the same
has caused grave injustice to a party in a criminal case. The facts
manifesting respondent's partiality are patent in the records.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides, thus:
Sec.1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise
, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he was presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied)

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as

in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle
that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of

rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely

free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law
conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in
such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority
to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties
concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in
the courts of justice.
The fact that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second degree of
consanguinity to private complainant is obviously a glaring violation of the
rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case. The proffered
excuse that Criminal Case No. 2577 has been dragging on for some time
due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the non-designation of a
presiding judge will not justify the violation of a well-settled rule on
compulsory disqualification of judges to hear a case. Respondent judge
should have formally informed the Executive Judge of the RTC of Leyte if,
indeed, the case had been deferred, and thereafter sought the designation
of another MTC judge to take cognizance of the case. He should have
foreseen the possibility that his actuation and motives would have been
suspect if he had ruled in favor of the prosecution as his blood relationship
with the private complainant was of general knowledge.
The violation was aggravated when respondent judge thereafter issued a
warrant of arrest on June 8, 1992 but at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
the same day, left for an alleged pre-scheduled medical check-up in the
nearby province of Cebu, thus depriving the accused of the opportunity to
secure an order for her provisional liberty upon proper posting of a bail
bond on the same day of her arrest. As a consequence, the accused spent
her night in the municipal jail of Naval until the following morning of June
9, 1992 after spending almost 20 hours in jail.
To make matters even worse, the excuse given by respondent judge that
he left the duly signed order of release with his wife instead of the Clerk of
Court before he left for Cebu exposed his total disregard of, or indifference
to, or even ignorance of, the procedure prescribed by law. Respondent
judge's actuation is unquestionably not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It
is conduct prejudicial to the rights of the accused. Realizing perhaps that
he has violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 par.
(d),
Canon3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent judge belatedly issued
an order inhibiting himself from the case on June 15, 1992, or seven (7)

days after he caused the arrest and detention of the accused. Clearly, the
damage and intrusion on the liberty of the accused were already fait
accompli.
Respondent judge likewise violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides: "A judge shall not allow family, social, or
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige
of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge."
Respondent judge in the instant case tainted the image of the judiciary to
which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all times unsullied
and worthy of the people's trust. As this Court has had occasion to declare:
"As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the
visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From
them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law." If
judges, who have sworn to obey and uphold the Constitution, shall
conduct themselves as respondent did, in wanton disregard and violation
of the rights of the accused, then the people, especially those who have
had recourse to them shall lose all their respect and high regard for the
members of the Bench and the judiciary itself shall lose the high moral
ground from which it draws its power and strength to compel obedience to
the laws.
Worthy of note is the fact that respondent judge had been previously
charged in A.M. No. R-48-MTJ (Ragir v. de la Pea) with ignorance of the
law and incompetence, for having taking cognizance of, and having
decided, a case for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 5926) over which
his court has no jurisdiction. To rectify the error, respondent judge, three
days after the rendition of judgment, recalled his decision and remanded
the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal at Naval, sub-province of
Biliran, Leyte, now province of Biliran. In the resolution of October 15,
1985, the Court, giving credence to respondent's allegation of good faith in
the rendition of the judgment and the fact that he took steps to rectify his
mistake three days after the rendition of the erroneous judgment,
imposed on him a fine equivalent to a month's salary with the warning that
repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealth with more severely.
From all indications, it is clear from the facts on record and, in the absence
of evidence to negate the perceived bias and partiality which resulted in
undue prejudice to the accused, that respondent judge, through his
oppressive and vindictive actuations towards the accused arising from his

relationship to the private complainant in the Criminal Case No. 2577,

committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He does not, therefore,
deserve to remain in the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from
the service.
In a recent case, a municipal trial court judge who presided over the trial
of Criminal Case No. 89-3905 for grave threats against the accused,
Roberto Cruda, who later became her brother-in-law by virtue of a
marriage ceremony she herself solemnized, and who thereafter rendered
judgment acquitting the said accused, was dismissed from the service by
the Court, after investigation for charges of grave misconduct, violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, among others. The Court observed, thus:
. . . For one, she deliberately disregarded Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules
of Court which pertinently provides in part: . . . and Rule 3.12 (d), Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which reads: . . . considering that (a) Roberto Cruda, the
accused in Criminal Case
No. 89-3905, is her brother-in-law, being the husband of her youngest sister and,
therefore, her (respondent's) relative by affinity within the second degree, and (b)
she did not obtain the written consent of all the parties in interest. That it was only
on 9 August 1991 or long after the case had been submitted for decision that
she became Roberto's sister-in-law provides no reason for a departure from the
enunciated rule as the above quoted provisions impose an absolute prohibition
regardless of the stage in the resolution of the case that the relationship is
established. As a matter of fact, given her special bias for the accused whom she
even wanted to reform and rehabilitate a task which became an
obsession and in whose behalf she interceded to obtain settlement of the
criminal cases against him, thereby necessarily blinding her impartiality and
irreparably affecting the cold neutrality she is supposed to possess as a judge, the
voluntary disqualification from a case provided under the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 should have been availed of by the respondent. (Emphasis
supplied)

The dismissal of the criminal aspect of the same complaint (OMB-VIS-92397) by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in its resolution of March
23, 1993 will not affect the resolution of this case which basically relates to
the power of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnel's
compliance with all laws and pertinent rules and take proper
administrative action against them, in the event that they commit any

violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this

power without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Meljohn de la Pea (Acting Judge of
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte is hereby DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or
reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.