G.R. No.

L-33037-42 August 17, 1983

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant

The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant.

Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Two constitutional rightsspeedy trial and freedom from double jeopardyare interposed as
defenses by the accused in this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch V, which dismissed the criminal cases against accuse Demetrio Jardin because his
constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated.
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon
requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of
public documents on six counts.
The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary
investigation.The accused moved to postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the
investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.
On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspire of their
absence, the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations
were filed against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, docketed
as Cases Nos. 16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-ML 16055 (0046-M), 16056
(0047-M), and 16057 (0048-M). The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.
The records show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for
June 26; then from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions
for postponement filed at the instance of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66
and 69).
When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused
verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity
to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the
first reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. On this date, however, the Investigating
Fiscal motu proprio postponed said reinvestigation due to the non-appearance of accused and his
counsel and re-set the date for December 21, 1967.
A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing further. delays of the
reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared together but requested for
a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.
In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the Investigating Fiscal filed a manifestation before
the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be
set.

The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order transferring the six (6) cases to
the new branch (Branch V) of the Court of First Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by the
latter of the records of these cases, the arraignment and trial were set for December 3, 1968.
On the latter date, the counsel for the accused sought again the postponement of the arraignment
and this was followed by more postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original
records, [0043-M] pp. 90,93,120 and 125).
On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused moved for the postponement of the arraignment and
requested the court that the records be returned again to the Office of the Fiscal for further
reinvestigation. This was granted and the reinvestigation was again set for May 5, 1969. The
accused and his counsel, however, failed to appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set
for June 2, 1969. On this date, counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5) days
within which to file a written sworn statement of the accused which would constitute the defense
of the latter, subject to the cross-examination of the Investigating Fiscal.
Considering the fact that the period to file such sworn statement had already expired without
anything being filed, the records of the cases were returned to the court which set said cases for
arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused again moved for
postponement.
When these cases were called for arraignment on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin, pleaded
not guilty to the crime as charged, after which he requested that the trial be postponed and re-set
for September 29, 1970.
On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on that day was postponed again on motion of
counsel for the accused. The trial was re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.
On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for
the prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who
remained silent during the proceedings.
Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take
advantage of the prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the
dismissal of the cases. The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of
constitutional rights of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "
Two questions are now raised by the People in this appeal:
I. Considering the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was the respondent
Court correct in dismissing the cases and in predicating the dismissal on the right
of the defendant to a speedy trial?
II. Does the present appeal place the respondent accuse in double jeopardy?
The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in
basing the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a
speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its
salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense
of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may
interpose. (See Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)

[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases
were caused by the accused himself.] All the postponements of proceedings were made at his
instance and for his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused
by our Constitution cannot be invoked. From the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases
up to the trial on the merits, the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through
postponements and requests for reinvestigation. [It would, therefore, be a mockery of the criminal
justice system if the accused would be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical
maneuvers intended to frustrate the administration of justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is
deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial. In the case of Andres v.
Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:]
In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the right to a
speedy trial in the first case when the herein petitioners sought and obtained
several postponements of the trial: first, when they asked for the deferment of the
arraignment because the accused Ladislao Tacipit was not present; second,
when they asked for the postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the
ground that they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a
reinvestigation of the case; and finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution,
to postpone the hearing set for November 28, 1968 to January 4, 1969..
The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground
that his right to speedy trial had beer violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order
denying the motion for reconsideration is similarly infirm. There being no basis for the questioned
orders, they are consequently null and void.
Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused in double jeopardy?
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the
following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77).
The last requisite assumes a valid acquittal and a valid acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by
a court of competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having
been issued without legal basis, it follows that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also
void. Hence, no jeopardy can attach from such acquittal. The act of respondent judge in
discussing the cases amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from
attaching. In the case of People v. Court of appeals (10 1 SCRA 450) we ruled:
Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal ends the case
which cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they would be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense. That is the general rule and presupposes a valid
judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of
acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction No
double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. (Comia v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492 [1969]) By it no rights are
divested Through it, no rights can be attains & Being worthless, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Gomez v.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722.[1925]; Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA
663, 685 [1968]; Parades v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526, [1974]). ...
We also note that the dismissall of the criminal cases was upon motion and with the wxpress
consent of respondent Demetrio Jardin. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the
dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Salico, 84

Phil. 722; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v.
Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312).
If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some other basic right had been
impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the
accused had expressly moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant case, however,
the defendant had deliberately used all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused
the principle that the accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal charge.
The doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this purpose.
Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the
attorneys for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself
because of the breach of duties to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this
case.
The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: xxx xxx xxx
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor,...
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action
or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take
effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.
As aptly stared:
12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice
An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its
cause. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9,
1972, 31 SCRA 1; In re Climaco, G.R. Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55
SCRA 107) For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs,
perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin 57 Phil, 23 [1932];
De los Santos vs. Sagalongos 69 Phil. 406 [1940]).
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many
forms. They include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal
action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case against the client,
the accused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin supra) asking a client to
plead guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, (Nueno
v. Santos, 58 Phil. 557 [1933]) advising a client who is detained for a crime to
escape from prison, (Cf. Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept. 30, 1974)
employing dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid claims, Pajares

vs. Abad Santos, G.R. No. 29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 748) prosecuting
clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other party and
compel him to submit out of exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado, G.R. No.
22304. July 30, 1968) and filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that
has been previously rejected in the false expectation of getting favorable action.
(Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 173;
Ramos vs. Potenciano, G.R. No. 27104, Dec. 20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v.
Uy Kim, G.R. No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 251) Acts of this or similar
nature are grounds for disciplinary action." Agpalo Legal Ethics, U.P. Law Center,
1980 Edition, pp. 405-406)
The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is without merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned orders of the respondent court are
hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046M, 0047-M, and 0048M are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed
in these cases.
SO ORDERED.
CAPT. CONRADO M. CABAGUI, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION,
and
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents,
EUGENIO
M.
MILLADO, Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Supreme Court ordered the third petition for
review of a Court of Appeals decision filed by respondent counsel expunged from the records,
and required him "to SHOW CAUSE within (10 days from notice hereof why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him for trifling with the Court by filing his third petition despite
previous resolutions of this Court." The Supreme Court previously dismissed the second petition
which was in the guise of a new petition forcertiorari with preliminary injunction but which merely
raised the same questions in his first petition (which was dismissed for late filing) seeking to set
aside
his
clients
conviction
of
malversation
of
public
funds.
For failure to submit the explanation within the required period, counsel was suspended from the
practice of law. Thereafter, he filed a petition for "Relief from Resolutions and Compliance"
pleading inter alia "mistake and/or excusable negligence" and that he was seeking to render
"optimum legal service" to his client, adding that he begged "the indulgence and tolerance of the
Court, and he condescendingly (sic) APOLOGIZES therefor . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Supreme Court found that respondent was grossly negligent in failing to comply, within the
required period, with the Courts show-cause resolution, and that his explanation for his having
filed multiple petitions one after the other was unsatisfactory and untenable. However,
considering the suspension so far served by respondent to be sufficient penalty for the serious
infractions committed by him, the Court lifted the suspension order.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; COUNSEL AND LITIGANTS WARNED AGAINST FILING MULTIPLE
PETITIONS. Litigants and counsels are cautioned not to file in the Supreme Court multiple
petitions for the same cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from one division
as against the adverse action of the other division, since such conduct would tend to trifle with the

Court

and

impede,

obstruct,

and

degrade

the

administration

of

justice.

2. ID.; ID.; MISCONDUCT; FILING MULTIPLE PETITIONS. Where respondent counsel in his
memorandum urged that either of his three petitions be given due course, notwithstanding that he
knows that the Supreme Courts resolutions denying and dismissing the first two petitions have
long become final and entries of judgment made, and that his third petition was ordered
expunged from the records, i.e. stricken from the records and therefore considered non-existent,
it was held that his interjection of the same irrelevant matter denotes either a stubborn refusal to
comprehend or abide by the Courts injunction that he cannot be filing one petition after another
for the same cause or worse a deliberate attempt to drag out the case and impede the execution
of the judgment of conviction against his client which had become final and executory. Such
misconduct on the part of a member of the bar cannot be tolerated.
3. ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION; SUSPENSION OF COUNSEL MAY BE LIFTED WHERE THE
COUNSEL HAD BEEN SUFFICIENTLY PUNISHED. Counsels gross negligence in failing to
comply with the Supreme Courts show-cause order within the period required warrants his
suspension. However where counsel had been under suspension for about eight months, the
Court would be inclined to view with liberality his plea that "he has been sufficiently punished" and
that "his suspension . . . is substantial enough as to make him improve his professional service to
his client and duties to the bench," and would thus consider the suspension so far served by him
as sufficient penalty for the serious infractions committed by him.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court finds respondent, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado, guilty of gross negligence in not having
complied with a "show-cause" resolution and of abusing the right to recourse to the Court by filing
multiple petitions for the same cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from one
division as against the adverse action of the other division. The Court deems his suspension from
the practice of law since February, 1975 as sufficient penalty and now lifts his suspension with
the warning that the commission in the future by respondent of the same or other infractions shall
be
dealt
with
severely.
Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Court, acting on a third petition for review of a
Court of Appeals decision affirming petitioners conviction of the crime of malversation of public
funds, as filed on November 13, 1974 by his attorney, Eugenio M. Millado, with address at
Koronadal, South Cotabato, ordered that said petition be expunged from the records and required
"Atty. Eugenio Millado to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for trifling with the Court by filing this third petition despite
previous
resolutions
of
this
Court."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
In its previous Resolution of May 8, 1974 referring to the first two petitions filed by respondent
Millado on behalf of the same petitioner, 1 the Court had dismissed the second petition (filed on
March 18, 1974) by respondent Millado in the guise of a new petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction but which merely raised again the same questions in his first petition (filed on January
9, 1974) seeking to set aside petitioners conviction for malversation of public funds, by decision
of the court of first instance of Misamis Oriental dated June 20, 1963 as affirmed with modification
by the Court of Appeals decision dated June 8, 1973, for alleged lack of jurisdiction and praying
for reversal of the conviction or for a reduction of his criminal liability by finding appellantpetitioner guilty of technical malversation only for the amount of P1,161.65. Said. first petition had
been denied on January 15, 1974 by virtue of the petition having been filed late by 4 months and
25 days beyond the last date for filing which fell due since August 15, 1973. The Court therein

reiterated its warning to litigants and counsels against the filing of multiple petitions for the same
cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from one division as against the adverse
action of the other division, since "such conduct would tend to trifle with the Court and impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice," as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In a similar case (L-37411, Teodoro Fojas v. CA), the Court per its resolution of March 20, 1974
admonished that (L)itigants and their counsels are warned under pain of contempt and
disciplinary action that a party who has already failed to have a decision of the Court of Appeals
set aside through a petition for review by certiorari with the denial of his petition (by the First
Division to which such petitions for review are assigned under the Courts standing resolution of
November 15, 1973) should not under the guise of a special civil action file a second petition for
the same purpose of setting aside the same Court of Appeals decision to be acted upon by the
Second Division (to which special civil actions are assigned under the Courts resolution of
November 15, 1973), and vice-versa, for such conduct would tend to trifle with the Court and
impede,
obstruct
and
degrade
the
administration
of
justice."
2
For failure on the part of respondent to submit the explanation required under the Courts
Resolution of November 20, 1974, notwithstanding the lapse on January 3, 1975 of the period
therein given him, the Court per its Resolution of February 7, 1975 resolved to suspend
respondent from the practice of law effective immediately and until further action in the premises.
On April 14, 1975, respondent filed his "Petition for Relief from Resolutions and Compliance"
pleading inter alia "mistake and/or excusable negligence" for his failure to take note of and attend
to the filing of the explanation required in the Courts Resolution of November 20, 1974 and that
he was seeking to render "optimum legal service" to petitioner and "to exhaust all remaining legal
remedies." He added with reference to the third petition that "if, however, there is any portion
thereof that can suggest that its filing trifles with this Honorable Court, he respectfully begs the
indulgence and tolerance thereof, and he condescendingly (sic) APOLOGIZES therefor,
respectfully
assuring
that
he
will
be
more
cautious
hereafter."
3
The Court set the petition for relief for hearing on June 2, 1975 on which date it heard respondent
and
further
granted
him
time
to
submit
his
memorandum.
In respondents memorandum filed on June 27, 1975, he again urges that either of his three
petitions be given due course, notwithstanding that he well knows that the Courts Resolutions
denying and dismissing the first two petitions have long become final and entries of judgment
made since March 12, 1974 and May 13, 1974, respectively, and that his third petition was
ordered expunged from the records, i.e. stricken from the records and therefore considered nonexistent. Respondents interjection of the same irrelevant matter here denotes either a stubborn
refusal to comprehend or abide by the Courts injunction that he cannot be filing one petition after
another for the same cause or worse a deliberate attempt to drag out the case and impede the
execution of the judgment of conviction against his client which had become final and executory
since August 15, 1973, date of finality of the Court of Appeals decision of June 8, 1973 affirming
the conviction. Such misconduct on the part of a member of the bar cannot be tolerated.
The Court thus finds that respondent was grossly negligent, to say the least, in failing to comply
within the required period with the Courts Resolution requiring him to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for filing multiple petitions for the same cause
notwithstanding the Courts previous adverse resolutions. His original period to file the required
explanation expired on January 3, 1975 and more than a month elapsed thereafter without his
having done anything until the Court took note thereof en February 7, 1975 and ordered his
suspension. As already indicated, the Court also finds respondents explanation for his having
filed multiple petitions one after the other to be unsatisfactory and untenable.
Considering, however, that respondent has been under suspension since the Courts Resolution
of February 7, 1975 since after respondent filed his belated compliance, the Court as per its

Resolution of April 21, 1975 ordered that respondent remain under suspension until it could hear
the matter on the merits, the Court is inclined to view with liberality respondents plea that "he has
been sufficiently punished" and that "his suspension .. is substantial enough as to make him
improve his professional service to his client and duties to the bench .." The Court will thus
consider the suspension so far served by respondent as sufficient penalty for the serious
infractions
committed
by
him.
ACCORDINGLY, respondents suspension from the practice of law is lifted effective as of the
promulgation of this Resolution with the warning that the commission in the future by respondent
of the same infractions or other violations of his duties as a lawyer shall be dealt with severely.

LIBERATO
V.
CASALS,
and
JOSE
T.
SUMCAD, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, BR.
1, REBECCA T. PALANCA and GRECAN CO., INC., respondents.
Ortile Law Office for petitioners.
Delante, Orellan and Associates for private respondents.
RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law upon counsel of
respondents for improper conduct and abuse of the Court's good faith by his acts in the case at
bar manifesting gross disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of his solemn
duty to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass gravely the
administration of justice.
Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten
days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court inter
1
alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case pending before it below.
Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents, stating
that while he had received on November 15, 1972 notice of the Court's resolution of November 9,
1972, "no accompanying copy of the petition has been attached thereto, hence the undersigned
counsel would not be able to prepare the comments of the respondents as directed in said
resolution without said copy." filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of
such petition within which to submit respondents' comment. The Court granted such first
extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972.
Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan &
Associates as counsel for respondents filed a verified second motion for extension of ten days
from December 15, 1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the ground "2. That
Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record, got sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to work
as yet" as per verified medical certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has
just recovered from his ailment, and has requested the undersigned to specially make this motion

for another extension of TEN (10) days in order to enable him to finish the comments for the
respondents."
Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last
extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to submit the required comment, stating "That
the undersigned counsel has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due to
pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has not
been finalized and typed out in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972.
The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five
days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous
extensions sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12, 1973, the Court
as per its resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents
to explain and show cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required
comment.
Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the
first time that "in view of (his) pressing professional commitments," he requested his clients "to
have the answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents) took delivery of
the records of the said case from his office and contracted the services of Atty. Antonio
Fernandez."
Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12,
1973 requiring his explanation that he learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to
prepare an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty. Fernandez' affidavit
together with a medical certificate which certified however to the latter's confinement at the Davao
Doctors' Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan. 15,
1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his services had been retained by
respondents "sometime on December 12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors'
Hospital and subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972) and that
Gregorio Caeda, president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital and asked
from me the answer and I told him that I may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer
because of the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R. No. L-35766
from me."
Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Caeda,
president and general manager of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now
that their corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to prepare the answer to meet
the deadline" and delivered the records of the case to the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is
however not sworn to before any official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the
statement "(T)hat the foregoing facts are true and correct as what actually transpired" under the
signature of one Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-Treasurer)."
Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition
of the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given
an opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within the period granted by this
Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition
of this similar incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and without
blinking an eye notwithstanding that the required comment has long been overdue for almost
four months at the time that he "be given an opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for
the respondents."
Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the
inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's explanation, opposing his plea to still be

allowed to file respondents' comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying
that the petition be considered submitted for resolution by the Court.
In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the petition and dismissed the
same for insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in
denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course from any adverse
decision on the merits being the merits being the proper and adequate remedy.
The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the Court finds to be
unsatisfactory.
Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents' comment is due to the
failure of the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez, contracted by his clients at his instance because of
his pressing professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical operation," is unworthy of
credence because it is contrary to the facts of record:
In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated allegation now
that another lawyer had been retained to file the required comment, and no other lawyer, much
less Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents;
In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as reason the fact
that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972 and had just recovered and needed the additional
10-day extension "in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;"
In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court "that (he)
has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments" and cited "pressure of work in his
office" and the Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a
clean copy" which comments never came to be submitted to this Court;
His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which
shows that he was confined in the hospital for sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and
therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended deadline
on January 12, 1973;
Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the
records of the case had been given to the former, for Atty. Fernandez swore therein that when
Gregorio Caeda of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime between
December 23-26, 1972) he advised Caeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and Caeda
got back the records of the case from him;
He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the desired comments" was
"already prepared" since year-end of 1972 and only had to be "finalized and typed out" he utterly
failed to submit the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months and worse, in his
"explanation" of May 7, 1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the anser [which] he will try
his best to do it within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored
and disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12, 1973; and
He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty.
Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that the required comment was filed within the
last extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him from the Court on his
assurance that the final draft was ready and did nothing for three months until after he received
the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation.

The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his
extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the
courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented
and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when
this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and
unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as
by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting
the required comment which according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already
prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly
asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been
readied by him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross
disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.
2

In Pajares vs. Abad Santos the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action."
It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to
the Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients.
The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the
case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct
of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead"
3
the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law."
The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a
great detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the
submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by the
Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they
are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the
utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty
4
towards the court is concerned."
Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure
to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them,
(except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in
accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the
profession would require fidelity on their part."
Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his
admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is
directed to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first
instance and other courts of similar rank.

Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal record and furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.

A. CARMINIA C. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ANTONIO F.
ROXAS, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
[1]

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated April 21, 1999 and
[2]
[3]
Resolution dated July 20, 1999 of the Court of Appeals nullifying the Orders dated May 13,
1998, May 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
Branch 260, which found private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas liable to pay
support pendente lite and subsequently in contempt of court after failing to tender the required
amount of support pendente lite.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 4, 1997, petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Roxas filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque City, Civil Case No. 97-0523, which is an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband, Jose Antonio F. Roxas,
private respondent herein, with an application for support pendente lite for their four (4) minor
children. The case was raffled to Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City
presided by Judge Rolando C. How. But the petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said RTC
Branch 257 a Notice of Dismissal dated November 20, 1997, to dismiss the complaint, without
prejudice, pursuant to the provision of Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
considering that summons has not yet been served and no responsive pleading has yet been
filed.
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was re-filed on November
25, 1997. It was raffled in due course to Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
City presided by Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
On May 13, 1998, when the case was called for a pre-trial conference, the matter of
plaintiffs (petitioners) application for support pendente lite of their four (4) minor children was
taken
up. Judge
Bautista-Ricafort
received
evidence
on
the
application
for
support pendente lite. The private respondent and her counsel, Atty. Alberto Diaz, participated in
that proceedings by conducting an extensive cross-examination of the petitioner. The trial court
then issued its Order dated May 13, 1998 declaring the proceedings on the application for
support pendente lite terminated and deemed submitted for resolution; and as prayed for by the
parties, also set the case for pre-trial on June 15, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.
On May 19, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort, issued an Order
support pendente lite, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxx

xxx

[4]

granting the application for

xxx

The plaintiff, testifying under oath, submitted Exhibit A itemizing the expenses incurred for the
support of the children over a period of time during their stay at Ayala-Alabang; and showed that
their total monthly average expense is P84,585.00, or P42,292.50 per month, per
spouse. Interestingly, the defendant did not adduce any evidence to dispute the figures

presented to the Court by the plaintiff, nor did he present proof of his financial incapacity to
contribute more than 50% of the childrens school tuition fees.
The court has painstakingly reviewed the item included in Exhibit A, and found the same
reasonable, xxx.
Under Art. 49 of the Family Code, there being no written agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendant for the adequate support of their minor children xxx, this Court finds the prayer for
support pendente lite to be in order. Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to contribute to
the support of the above-named minors, (aside from 50% of their school tuition fees which the
defendant has agreed to defray, plus expenses for books and other supplies), the sum of
P42,292.50 per month, effective May 1, 1998, as his share in the monthly support of the children
until further orders from this Court. xxx. All expenses for books and other school supplies shall
be shouldered by the plaintiff and the defendant, share and share alike. Finally, it is understood
that any claim for support-in-arrears prior to May 1, 1998, may be taken up later in the course of
the proceedings proper.
On July 22, 1998, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the trial court to cite
private respondent in contempt of court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 61 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, after the latter failed to comply with the said Order dated May 19, 1998 of the
trial court. Private respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Alberto Diaz, filed a countermanifestation and motion admitting that xxx there is really no genuine issue as to his obligation
and willingness to contribute to the expenses for the support of his minor children xxx. He simply
wants to make sure that whatever funds he provides for the purpose will go to the expenses for
[5]
which they are intended. Thus, he prayed that the manner and mode of payment of his
contribution to the expenses of his minor children be modified such that he will pay directly to the
entities or persons to which the payment for such expenses are intended. On September 23,
[6]
1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order directing the private respondent to comply fully
with the Order of this Court dated May 19, 1998 by updating payment of his share in the support
of the minor children, pendente lite, covering the period May 1998 to September 1998, within five
(5) days from his receipt hereof xxx under pain of legal sanctions if he still fails to do so. xxx.
On September 28, 1998, or about four (4) months later, private respondent, through his new
counsel, Atty. Francisco Ma. Guerrerro, filed an Omnibus Motion (1) applying to be authorized to
discharge Atty. Alberto Diaz as his counsel and to substitute him with the new counsel; (2) to reopen hearing on the Motion for SupportPendente Lite; and (3) to temporarily stay execution of the
Orders dated May 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998. The omnibus motion was set for hearing
on October 2, 1998. Private respondent requested that before the omnibus motion is heard the
May 19, 1998 Order be temporarily suspended. When the presiding judge did not grant that
request of private respondent, the latters new counsel refused to proceed with the hearing of his
omnibus motion.
On October 8, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order giving private respondent ten
(10) days to comply with the May 19, 1998 Order, otherwise, he would be cited for contempt of
court.
On October 23, 1998, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari questioning the Orders of the trial court dated May 19, 1998, September 23, 1998 and
October 8, 1998.
Meanwhile, on November 27, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued another Order,
dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx

xxx

[7]

the

xxx

Accordingly, and on the strength of the provisions of Sec. 5 Rule 61 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the defendant (herein private respondent) is hereby pronounced guilty of Contempt of

Court, and is hereby ordered arrested and confined at the City Jail of Paraaque City, Metro
Manila, without bail, and as long as he has not complied with and obeyed in full the Order of this
Court dated May 19, 1998 by updating his monthly contribution of P42,292.50 for the period of
May 1998 to the date, giving the said amount directly to the plaintiff, or depositing it with the Clerk
of Court, who shall therefor (issue) the corresponding receipts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent was arrested by the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
on December 14, 1998 but he was released on the following day after the appellate court
temporarily enjoined Judge Bautista-Ricafort from enforcing her November 27, 1998 Order as
well as her Orders dated May 19, 1998, September 23, 1998, and October 8, 1998. When the
temporary restraining order lapsed on March 11, 1998, the respondent was again arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort. After depositing with the clerk of
court of the trial court the amount of support in arrears stated in the Orders of the trial court,
private respondent was released from custody.
On April 21, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, being meritorious, the instant petition is GRANTED. Consequently, all the
proceedings/actions taken by respondent Judge on the matter of support pendente lite in Civil
Case No. 97-0608 (formerly Civil Case No. 97-0523) are hereby declared NULL and VOID, and
said CASE is ordered RETURNED to Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
for appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

[8]

The appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings of the trial court for the reason that
the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior filing of Civil Case
No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How and the dismissal thereof without prejudice. The
decision of the appellate court elaborated the reasons for the granting of the petition, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

While a complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service of the answer (Sec. 1, Rule 17), there is however a need to state the fact of prior
filing and dismissal thereof in the certification on non-forum shopping, in the event the complaint
is refiled, as in this case. This must be so in order to prevent the plaintiff or principal party from
invoking Section 1 of Rule 17 in the hope that, if and when refiled, the complaint will be raffled to
a more sympathetic judge.
To the mind of the Court, private respondent availed of Section 1 of Rule 17 not for any other
reason or purpose than to take the case out of the sala of Judge How and to have it assigned to
another. This belief finds support from the fact that private respondents lawyer and respondent
Judge were classmates at the UP College of Law.
Not only that. While private respondent actually resides in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City, it was
made to appear in the complaint that she is a resident of Paraaque City, where respondent
Judge is one of the RTC Judges. While the question of venue was not properly raised on time,
this circumstance is being cited to support petitioners charge of forum-shopping.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Needless to say, forum-shopping merits such serious sanctions as those prescribed in Section 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Considering, however, that when the complaint was
withdrawn, no substantial proceedings had as yet been taken by the court to which it was first
raffled, and that the dismissal thereof was then a matter or (sic) right, the Court is not inclined to
impose any of the said sanctions. Instead, for the peace of mind of petitioner who entertains
some doubts on the impartiality of respondent Judge, the annulment case should be returned to
Branch 257 of the RTC of Paraaque City, to which it was originally raffled. And, to enable the
Presiding Judge of said Branch to act on the matter of support pendente lite, which gave rise to
this petition for certiorari and disqualification, the proceedings/actions taken by respondent Judge
relative thereto should be set aside, the same having been attended with grave abuse of
[9]
discretion.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the instant petition the petitioner poses the following statement of issues, to wit:
I
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER
GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING?
II
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NULLIFYING JUDGE RICAFORTS
ORDER OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE AND HER RELATED IMPLEMENTING ORDERS
WHICH IT WAS HER JUDICIAL DUTY TO ISSUE UNDER ART. 49 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND OTHER RELATED PROVISIONS OF LAW?
III
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NULLIFYING THE PROCEEDINGS
ALREADY HELD BEFORE JUDGE RICAFORT AFFECTING HER QUESTIONED ORDERS, AT
THE SAME TIME IMPLIEDLY UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE REST OF THE
PROCEEDINGS INCLUDING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE FOR ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE?
IV
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN ORDERING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 970523 RAFFLED TO JUDGE RICAFORT BE RETURNED TO JUDGE HOW OF BRANCH 257
OF THE RTC OF PARANAQUE CITY?
In other words, if a case is dismissed without prejudice upon the filing by the plaintiff of a
notice of dismissal pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 17, before the service of the answer or
responsive pleading, would the subsequent re-filing of the case by the same party require that the
certificate of non-forum shopping state that a case involving the same issues and parties was
filed and dismissed without prejudice beforehand? Would the omission of such a statement in the
certificate of non-forum shopping render null and void the proceedings and orders issued by the
trial court in the re-filed case?
It is our considered view and we hold that the proceedings and orders issued by Judge
Bautista-Ricafort in the application for support pendente lite (and the main complaint for
annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered
null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding

the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same
parties and issues.
Section 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered
in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. The language of the Supreme Court circular (now the abovequoted Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) distinctly suggests that it is primarily
intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for
[10]
relief. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on
[11]
the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.
Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to
improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision
has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the
[12]
courts. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present, and where a
[13]
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For the principle of res
judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties,
[14]
subject matter and causes of action.
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in Civil Case No. 970523 which was the first case filed and raffled to the sala (Branch 257) of Judge How. The
dismissal without prejudice of the complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 at the instance of the
[15]
petitioner was pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure considering
that it was done before service of answer or any responsive pleading. The dismissal does not
amount to litis pendencia nor to res judicata. There is no litis pendencia since the first case
before Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn by the plaintiff (herein petitioner), without
prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. To use the wording of that rule, Judge Hows order is one merely
confirming the dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff (herein petitioner). Neither is there res

judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice.
Thus, private respondents apprehension that the case was dismissed in order to be
transferred to the sala of a judge who is allegedly more sympathetic to the petitioners cause is
baseless and not a valid reason to declare the petitioner guilty of forum shopping. First, the
petitioner is not assured that the case would be raffled to a more sympathetic judge. There are
five (5) RTC branches in Paraaque, namely, branch nos. 257, 258, 259, 260 and 274. Second,
Judge Bautista-Ricafort of RTC of Paraaque, Branch 260, is presumed to be fair and impartial
despite private respondents claim that she is an alleged law school classmate of the petitioners
counsel. In any event, at the slightest doubt of the impartiality of the said trial judge, private
respondent could have filed before the same judge a motion for her inhibition on that ground. But
private respondent did not.
Private respondent is also estopped in questioning the proceedings and orders of Judge
Bautista-Ricafort. He tacitly acknowledged the validity of the proceedings and the orders issued
by the said trial judge by participating actively in the hearing on the application for
support pendente lite and by praying for the modification of the Order of May 19, 1998 in that he
should be allowed to directly pay to the persons or entities to which payments of such expenses
are intended in connection with the required support pendente lite of their minor children. Private
respondent cannot validly claim that he was not ably and sufficiently represented by his first
counsel, Atty. Diaz, especially during the hearing on that incident on May 13, 1998 when he
himself was present thereat.
It is also too late for the private respondent to claim wrong venue in the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque City as a alleged proof of forum shopping. He should have raised that ground in
his answer or in a motion to dismiss. But he did not, so it is deemed waived. Besides, petitioner
is also a resident of Paraaque where the family of her parents reside.
Considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 was dismissed without prejudice by
virtue of the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) Notice of Dismissal dated November 20, 1997 filed
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no need to state in
the certificate non-forum shopping in Civil Case No. 97-0608 about the prior filing and dismissal
[16]
of Civil Case No. 97-0523. In Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that it is scarcely
necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 (now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the
Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as
an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules or procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible. The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores
its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether
disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
[17]
justifiable circumstances.
Thus, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not
constitute res judicata and litis pendencia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum
[18]
Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of
procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.
For a party to be adjudged guilty of forum shopping in the trial courts, a motion to dismiss on
the ground of either litis pendencia or res judicata must be filed before the proper trial court and a
hearing conducted thereon in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The same ground cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari before the appellate

court while the main action in the trial court is still pending for the reason that such ground for
a motion to dismiss can be raised before the trial court any time during the proceedings and is
[19]
not barred by the filing of the answer to the complaint.
The petition for certiorari in the case at bar on the ground of alleged forum shopping in the
trial court is premature for the reason that there is an adequate and speedy remedy available in
the ordinary course of law to private respondent, i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion for
reconsideration on the ground of either litis pendencia orres judicata before the trial court. But
private respondent did not file such a motion based on either of said grounds. And where the
ground is short of res judicata orlitis pendencia, as in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it granted the petition for
certiorari filed by herein private respondent. The trial court should have been given an
opportunity to rule on the matter of alleged forum shopping in consonance with the hierarchy of
courts.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution dated April 21, 1999 and July 20, 1999
respectively, of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED, and the Orders dated May 13,
1998, May 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
Branch 260, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THE
PHILIPPINE
vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.
Nat.
M.
Balboa
and
Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

NATIONAL

Dominador

BANK, plaintiff-appellant,

J.

Endriga

for

appellant.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the
defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
The trial court erred:
1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone
the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the
Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila.
2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274
situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the
appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy Teng
Piao.
3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the
balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise
to condone, could bind the appellant corporation.

5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for
the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una
senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said
judgment.
6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600,
the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even discounting
the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said property.
7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1,
reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the
appellant bank.
8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the
amount claimed in the complaint with costs.
On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the
Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum
amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount
with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his
failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264
and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to
the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold
the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for
P300 and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his
right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same
date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the
bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In
other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the
two parcels of land.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with
interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to
redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an
understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance of
the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not
to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct
examination was as follows:
P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco
Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la

propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil

novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted explicar al
Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? R. Si, seor. Esto desde mil
novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien, me haba dicho el
seor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos intereses mensuales.
Entonces me dijo Pecson, "como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted
intereses?"
P. Quien es ese seor Pecson? R. Era encargado de este asunto.
P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? R. Era encargado de estas
transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al seor Pecson. Entonces
hable al seor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los alquileres no pueden
cobrarse por anticipado.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta.
Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion.
JUZGADO. Que la termine.
TESTIGO. Me dijo el seor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "por que usted cobra
alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir sus
deudas.
P. El seor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," a que bienes
se referia el ? R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco.
P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el
Exhibit 1? R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.
P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? R. Parece que
Paco.
P. No recuerda usted muy bien? R. No recuerdo.
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el seor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, le dijo a
usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? R. Al Banco Nacional.
P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el seor Pecson con respecto al saldo
deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? R. No recuerdo
mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
P. Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?
Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.
JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.
P. Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?
SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.

Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.

JUZGADO. Puede contestar.
Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos
terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces dije
ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo
comprar.
P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este documento
Exhibit 1, recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? R. Nada, absolutamente.
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of
defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked
when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not
remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the
parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in
buying it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing
in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the
law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they
should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon
19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case
to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid
testifying in court in behalf of his client.
Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in
Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in
Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is
reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem
both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon
some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to
redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing
to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the
sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the
defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such
agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of
directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since
the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement. The
fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of the

defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the resale was a
sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is
condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per
cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

FELICITAS BERBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust
and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally
speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
[1]
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
In a sworn Affidavit-Complaint dated March 11, 1999 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), complainant Felicitas Berbano seeks the disbarment of Atty. Wenceslao
Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and
[2]
Unjust Enrichment. Complainant alleges:
1. I am one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, owner of a 244-hectare lot situated at
Alabang, Muntinlupa, which property is being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp. in a
case pending with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
Quezon City. The heirs of REH has appointed Mr. PORFIRIO DAEN as their
attorney-in-fact giving him authority to prosecute the case for and in their behalf.
2. On January 26, 1999, Mr. Porfirio Daen was arrested by a Muntinlupa police on the
strength of an expired warrant of arrest-it was issued on February 1990-and
subsequently detained at the Muntinlupa City Jail, Tunasan, Muntinlupa City, until
his release on February 18, 1999.
3. Since Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his release from incarceration,
we tried to look for one. We told our friend Naty Sibuya, about the predicament of
Mr. Daen, who recommended Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to us, his wife being
Natys cousin/relative.
4. So on January 26, 1999, at about 10:30 in the evening, Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona
arrived at the Muntinlupa City Jail and conferred with Mr. Daen. We learned later
that Mr. Daen has engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for the latter to secure
the release of the former from prison. After their conversation, Atty. Barcelona told
us that if you could produce the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos
he will cause the release of Mr. Daen from prison the following day. I told him that it
was already late in the evening and I cannot any more produce the amount. But he
insisted that I must produce even just a small amount. So, what I did was ask my
relatives who were with me at the time to contribute and we were able to raise
FIFTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN-HUNDRED (P15,700.00) Pesos. In the meantime,

Atty. Barcelona proceeded to Chowking Restaurant which is just located across the
city jail where he waited for us there.
5. At the aforesaid restaurant, I handed to Atty. Barcelona the amount who accepted
the same. He reiterated his promise to secure the release of Mr. Daen the following
day. Before he left, he asked us to meet him at Max Restaurant at around 12:00
noon at EDSA Crossing. He thereafter left because according to him, he would go
and see somebody, (a justice) from the Supreme Court who could help the release
of Mr. Daen. It was already about 12:30 in the early morning of January 27, 1999.
6. As agreed upon, I, together with Romana Soriano, proceeded to Max
Restaurant. We arrived at around 12:00 noon. Atty. Barcelona came at around 1:00
P.M. He even told us that he just came from the Supreme Court where he fixed
the case of Mr. Daen. It surprised me though, that he did not have with him any
single document at the time. Then, I handed him a pay-to-cash check for
TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND (P24,000.00) Pesos, dated January 29, 1999. We
told him that the check may be encashed on the said date. Although, he said that
the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept check he nonetheless, accepted it
saying that he will have the same rediscounted. We thereafter left.
7. The following morning, January 28, 1999, at around 7:00 oclock Atty. Barcelona
called me up by phone to say that since he was unable to have the check
rediscounted, I must produce the amount of P5,000.00 and give the amount to him
at Max Restaurant at EDSA Crossing at around 12:00 noon. We were unable to
meet him because we arrived at about 1:00 oclock already. Nonetheless, we
waited for him until 3:00 in the afternoon. Thereafter, I called him through his pager
saying that we were waiting for him at Max. I also called up our house and inquire
(sic) if a lawyer has called up. I was able to talk to my husband who informed me
that a certain Atty. Barcelona called up. That Atty. Barcelona wanted to meet us at
McDonalds at Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong. So we rushed to the place but he
was not there. I again paged him informing him that we were already at McDonalds
and to return my call through my cell phone. After a while, his wife called up to
inform us to proceed to their house which was just five houses away from
McDonalds. When we reached their house, we were met by his daughter who
called her mother. We were ushered inside the house and after introducing
ourselves, we gave not only P5,000.00, but TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos
in cash to his wife in the presence of his daughter. Then we went to Putatan,
Muntinlupa, hoping that he might be there.
8. We arrived at Putatan, Muntinlupa at around 4:30 in the afternoon and there we saw
Atty. Barcelona. We informed him that we left the P10,000.00 with his wife at their
house. Since Atty. Barcelona informed us that he could not secure the release of
Mr. Daen because the check had not been encashed, Mr. Gil Daen, a nephew of
Porfirio Daen, gave him FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) Pesos in cash. I also
gave him an additional P1,000.00 for his gasoline expenses.
9. The next time that we saw Atty. Barcelona was on February 3, 1999, Wednesday at
around 6:00 in the evening at Putatan, Muntinlupa. He informed us that he just
came from the city jail where he had a conversation with Mr. Daen. He told us that
he is going to release Mr. Daen from prison tomorrow, February 4, 1999. However,
in the morning of February 4, we learned from the wife of Atty. Barcelona when she
returned my call that her husband had left for Mindanao early that morning on board
a private plane owned by Chiongbian allegedly to attend a peace talk with the
Muslims.
10. After more than a week, I went to Putatan, Muntinlupa, because I was informed by
the son of Mr. Daen that he saw Atty. Barcelona there. When I saw him, I
confronted him about his undertaking to release Mr. Daen from prison, but he only

advised us not to worry and promised (again) that he will return the entire amount of
P64,000.00 more or less, on Thursday, February 18, 1999. But I never saw him
again since then. I have repeatedly paged him to return my call but he never
[3]
returned any of my calls.
In an Order dated April 15, 1999, Investigating Commissioner J. Virgilio A. Bautista of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, required respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint, with a warning that he will be considered in default and the case will be heard ex parte,
[4]
[5]
if he fails to do so. Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer. Thus, complainant
[6]
filed a motion to declare respondent in default, resolution of which was held in abeyance by the
Investigating Commissioner who required the parties to appear for hearing before the
[7]
Commission on August 13, 1999. On said date, respondent again failed to appear despite due
[8]
receipt of notice. Commissioner Bautista was thus constrained to consider respondent in default
and complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. Complainant testified and
[9]
affirmed under oath the truthfulness and veracity of her Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant also
[10]
manifested that she will present the check in the amount of P24,000.00 at the next date of
hearing.
Further hearings were set by the Commissioner, on October 1, 1999, November 19, 1999,
October 12, 2001, December 14, 2001 and June 28, 2002, but both parties failed to appear on
[11]
said dates despite due notice.
Commissioner Bautista submitted his Final Report and Recommendation on December 23,
2002 finding respondent guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending that respondent be disbarred and ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P64,000.00. The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner
Bautistas findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.
The Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governors in reducing the penalty and upholds
the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Bautista. Under the facts established by
complainant, respondent should not only be suspended, but disbarred from practice.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney
himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose
disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
[12]
in them as members of the bar.
In In re Almacen, the Court expounded on the nature of disbarment proceedings, viz.:
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis . Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
[13]
pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . .
[14]

As in the Ricafort case, herein respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyers
oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the
fair and impartial administration of justice a vital function of democracy a failure of which is
[15]
disastrous to society. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent

[16]

must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently
held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
[17]
penalty.
Complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the
Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit. Commissioner
Bautista and the IBP Board of Governors found her testimony together with her affidavit sufficient
to support the finding that respondent committed the acts complained of . The matter of
assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best done by the investigating body (which in
this case is the Investigating Commissioner) because unlike appellate courts, it can weigh such
[18]
testimony in light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial. Witnesses
are weighed not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may suffice if trustworthy and
[19]
reliable.
The non-presentation of the check given to respondent does not affect complainants case
as it will merely serve to corroborate her testimony and there is no law which requires that the
testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except where the law expressly mandates such
[20]
corroboration which is not so required in administrative cases.
The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the
Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal
proceedings. Thus, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating
Commissioners judgment.
Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of several Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times upholds the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts
but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Instead of promoting respect
for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking
money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a Member of this Court.
The Court has taken into consideration the penalties imposed in other administrative cases
involving similar offenses, e. g.:
[21]

In Judge Angeles vs. Atty. Uy, Jr., the respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for one month for failing to promptly report and remit the amount of P16,500.00 he received on
behalf of his client.

[22]

In Gonato vs. Atty. Adaza, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six
months for charging his clients the amount of P15,980.00 as filing fees when in fact no such fees
were due.
[23]

In Dumadag vs. Lumaya, the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not
remitting to his client the amount of P4,344.00 that he had received pursuant to an execution.
[24]

In Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., vs. Atty. Naldoza, the respondent was
disbarred for obtaining from his client the amount of US$2,555.00 allegedly as cash bond in an
appealed case before this Court, when in fact no such amount has been paid or that the Court
required such payment.
In the present case, respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of
the detained person in the total amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee
through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court. He deserves to be disbarred
from the practice of law.
This is not the first time that respondent has been charged with and found guilty of conduct
[25]
unbecoming a lawyer. In Gil T. Aquino vs. Atty. Wenceslao C. Barcelona, respondent
misrepresented to the complainant that he could secure the restructuring of the complainants
loan with the PNB through his connection with a certain Gonzalo Mericullo, legal assistant in the
PNB. Based on such misrepresentation, respondent asked and received the amount of
P60,000.00 from the complainant allegedly to be paid to the PNB. It turned out that there was no
such employee in the PNB by the name Gonzalo Mericullo and the complainants property was
eventually foreclosed. As in the present case, respondent did not appear before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline despite receipt of the notices sent and duly received by him. After
due proceedings, the IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty of professional
misconduct, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months and
ordered to render the accounting and restitute whatever remained of the P60,000.00 to the
complainant. The Court adopted such finding and recommendation and respondent was ordered
suspended from the practice of law for six months, effective immediately.
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the
proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will
allegedly be given to such connections. In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant
that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court
Justice. Not only that, respondent even had the audacity to tell complainant that the Justices of
the Supreme Court do not accept checks.
In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt. In Surigao
[26]
Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, the Court expounded on a lawyers duty to the courts,
viz.:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, and instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. Faith in the courts a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is a disastrous to the continuity of the
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. [Malcolm Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and
malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the
judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be
tolerated. Respondent made a mockery of the Judiciary and further eroded public confidence in
courts and lawyers when he ignored the proceedings in the Aquino case and in the present

case. More so, when he misrepresented to complainant that he has connections with a Member
of the Court to accommodate his client and that Justices of the Court accept money. Indubitably,
he does not deserve to remain a member of the Bar any minute longer.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the
legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its
members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the
[27]
Court is demanded of its members.
WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct, respondent Wenceslao C. Barcelona is DISBARRED
from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is
further directed to return to complainant Felicitas Berbano the amount of Sixty Four Thousand
Pesos (P64,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Let copies hereof be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President;
the Department of Justice; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL
S.
vs.
ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, respondent.

SEBASTIAN, complainant,

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against
Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for "obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding
final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme
Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an
administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics."
The Facts
Complainant alleged the following:
1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the
Department of Agrarian Reform who represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in
1
numerous cases which raised the same issues. Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a
land owned by complainants spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners
filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land
use from agricultural to residential. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment
2
ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance compensation. The
3
4
RTCs judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

2. Respondent, as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to

produce the conversion order. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and
5
lack of cause of action.
3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The case raised the same issues of conversion and
6
disturbance compensation.
4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since
she misused the rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the
7
administration of justice.
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
8
complaint lodged against her.
9

After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment, respondent submitted her
Comment alleging the following:
1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not authorized to prosecute the
10
disbarment suit.
2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorneys Oath" and performed duties in
11
accordance with Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
3. Respondents client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal remedies to obtain benefits
12
secured for him by law.
On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not
confront the issues of her disbarment squarely but raised issues that were decided upon with
13
finality by the courts.
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within
14
10 days from notice.
On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent
15
failed to comply with the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder.
On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be
subjected to disciplinary action for failure to comply with the Courts 25 March 1992 Resolution.
The Court also required respondent to Comment on the complainants 2 June 1992
16
Manifestation.
On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially
complied with the Courts orders relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had
transferred to the Public Attorneys Office and since she was no longer a "BALA lawyer," the
17
cases involved in this proceeding had become moot and academic.
On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case against
respondent "has not been mooted and nothing set out in her Manifestation excuses her failure to
18
obey this Courts Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992." The Court had also
resolved to impose a fine of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to
19
comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.

On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating that respondent had not complied
20
with the Courts orders.
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of respondent for
detention at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that
21
respondent should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent for five days
22
and released her on 25 October 1993.
On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of
23
the Philippines (IBP) for hearing and decision.
On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder. Respondent claimed that complainant had
24
no legal personality to file this case. Respondent also alleged that she was merely protecting
the interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Respondent contended
that "she had comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the
25
latter if only to impart truth and justice."
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating Commissioner
Jose) submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose
enumerated respondents violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility that rendered her
unfit to continue the practice of law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction
26
of justice.
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or
27
multiplication of suits should be avoided, and respondents acts were tantamount to
forum-shopping which is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and
28
proceedings.
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the
29
hearing on 25 May 1995. The want of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful
language used.
On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149
dated 30 March 1996. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating
Commissioner Joses recommendation that respondent be "suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible
character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility
30
rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law." Governor Angel R. Gonzales
31
recommended her "outright disbarment."
In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP Resolution suspending respondent
32
indefinitely.
On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to circularize the resolution of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending respondent
33
indefinitely from the practice of law.
On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular No.
30-99 informing all courts that respondent had been suspended indefinitely.

On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and Terminated.
34
Respondent apologized for her demeanor and prayed that the suspension be lifted.
On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for report and
35
recommendation.
On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating
Commissioner Raval) conducted a hearing. Respondent claimed that she did not receive any
36
notice of the OCAs Circular on her indefinite suspension. Respondent alleged that the Court
Resolution which she received merely noted the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite
37
suspension. Respondent claimed that she only knew of the suspension when she filed an
38
application for a judicial position in Mandaluyong City.
In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in
Mandaluyong City despite her suspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in
the 20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean an implementation of the IBPs Resolution on her
39
indefinite suspension.
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19 September
2003. Complainants counsel asserted that respondent had been practicing law in the midst of her
suspension and this constituted a violation of the suspension order which she wanted to be
40
lifted. Investigating Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground to lift the
41
suspension order. Respondent requested that her detention for five days at the NBI be
converted into a five-year suspension, one year for every day of detention such that she would
42
have served five years of indefinite suspension.
Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their Verified
43
Position Papers.
In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondents motion did not state
valid grounds to convince the Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that by
continuing to practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the Supreme Court by showing that
44
she can hoodwink another branch of government." Complainant also prayed for respondents
45
disbarment due to the gravity of her offense.
In respondents Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest
since the property that was litigated was owned by complainants wife. She asserted that she
never betrayed her clients cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath, and it was complainant
who filed this case for harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered closed and
46
terminated due to lack of merit.
Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a
Resolution in a Preliminary Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended that in
this Preliminary Investigation case, she recommended its dismissal because the offended party
47
was not the real party-in-interest.
Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality to file the disbarment
48
complaint against her; hence, it should have been dismissed outright.
After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-229 dated 16 April 2004. The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Ravals Report
and Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest flagrant misconduct in
49
disobeying the SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension."

As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which
recommended respondents indefinite suspension. "The term noted means that the Court has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter it does not imply agreement or
50
approval." Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors
has not attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.
xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action. (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support
the IBPs findings. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on respondent.
51

Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of their
52
own. They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the
53
conduct of its officer. They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
54
grievance.
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the
misconduct of its officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and
55
reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence. "Lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers
for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
56
honesty, probity, and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court."
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or
57
suspension proceedings.
The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Courts lawful orders in
two instances:
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder
within 10 days from notice. However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November
1993 after she was detained at the NBI for five days for failure to heed the Courts order.
2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on
complainants manifestation. She instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993
or almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged that she had
substantially complied with the Courts orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993

Resolution stated that nothing set out in respondents manifestation excused her failure
to obey the Courts Resolutions.
These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section
58
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes
59
utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
60
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to comply
with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores
61
her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect
62
their processes.

is
to
is
to

Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment
also constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable,
shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration
of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause." It
63
is a "conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose."
64

In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez, the Court held that failure to comply with the Courts directive to
comment on a letter-complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect.
65
In Cuizon v. Macalino, a lawyers failure to comply with the Courts Resolutions requiring him to
file his comment was one of the infractions that merited his disbarment.
Furthermore, respondents defenses are untenable. Firstly, respondent contends that
complainant is not the real party-in-interest since the property that was litigated was owned by
complainants wife. The Court is not persuaded with this defense.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-ininterest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called
the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no
66
interest in the outcome." "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an
67
administrative complaint against a lawyer."
68

In Heck v. Santos, the Court held that "any interested person or the court motu proprio may
initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to
clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the
69
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client.
70
In Suzuki v. Tiamson, the Court enunciated that "while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients rights, they should not forget that
they are first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice." Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in
other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. "To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous
practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes
71
of the state the administration of justice."

Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanliocos
counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality
of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that "an
important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same
72
reliefs. Indeed, "while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the
73
expense of truth and administration of justice."
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients
with zeal but within the bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed
other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly,
respondent violated the proscription in Canon 19.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent
has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly
disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the
legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will
suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a
superior court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Her suspension is consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period ofTHREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

A.C. No. 5955

JOHN CHRISTEN S. HEGNA,

Complainant,

- versus -

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,

Respondent.

September 8, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a letter-complaint

[1]

dated June 3, 2002, filed by complainant John

Christen S. Hegna with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) against respondent Atty. Goering
G.C. Paderanga for deliberately falsifying documents, which caused delay in the execution of the
decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8, Cebu City, in Civil
Case No. R-45146, entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip.
Herein complainant was the lessee of a portion of Lot No. 5529, situated at Barangay Quiot
Pardo, Cebu City, which was owned by the heirs of Sabina Baclayon. The heirs of Baclayon,
through their representative Gema Sabandija, entered into a contract of lease with complainant
for a period of ten (10) years, commencing from June 26, 1994, with a rental of P3,000.00 per
year, or P250.00 per month.
On September 26, 2001, complainant filed a complaint for forcible entry against therein
defendants docketed as Civil Case No. R-45146, entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo
Panaguinip, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8 of Cebu City. In said
complaint, he alleged that in about the second week of March 1996, therein defendants entered
the vacant portion of the leased premises by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; destroyed the barbed wire enclosing the leased premises of complainant, then built a
shop on the said premises without complainants consent. He averred that despite his demands
upon therein defendants to vacate the premises and demolish the structure built thereon, the
latter failed and refused to comply.

[2]

When therein defendants failed to file their Answer, complainant filed a motion that
judgment be rendered in default.
On December 21, 2001, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of complainant, ordering
therein defendants to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainant compensatory
damages for illegal occupation and use of the subject property, as well as attorneys fees and
costs of suit. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court directs judgment against Defendants MR. &
MRS. ELISEO PANAGUINIP and directs them to vacate Lot No. 5529 over the
portion in an area of 1,596 square meters thereof, as leased to herein Plaintiff,
situated at Barangay Quiot Pardo, Cebu City, and to pay Plaintiff the sum of
PESOS: ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) per month from the second week of March

1996 until the present date by way of compensatory damages for the illegal
occupation and use of the contested property, subject to 12% annual legal
interest until fully paid, and thereafter pay the same amount per month until they
vacate the subject property hereof, and to further pay Plaintiff the sum
of P5,000.00 by way of Attorneys Fees, and the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.

[3]

On February 8, 2002, the MTCC granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by
complainant, and issued a Writ of Execution onFebruary 18, 2002.
On February 21, 2002, Sheriff Edilberto Suarin of the MTCC, Branch 8 of Cebu City levied
on certain personal properties of therein defendants.

[4]

On March 1, 2002, therein defendants requested the complainant to move for the dismissal
of the complaint against them so as to prevent the issuance of the writ of execution thereon.
While therein defendants wanted to amicably settle the case, however, they failed to mention the
proposed settlement amount stated in the decision dated December 21, 2001.
Subsequently, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim

[5]

dated March 5, 2002 before Sheriff Suarin, the sheriff executing the judgment in the said

civil case. In the said affidavit, respondent claimed that he was the owner of Lot No. 3653-D-1
and a FUSO (Canter series) vehicle, which he bought from therein defendants on November 27,
2001,

[6]

[7]

and December 12, 2001, respectively, both of which could be erroneously levied by a

writ of execution issued in the civil case.

On April 3, 2002, Sheriff Suarin tried to levy therein defendants parcel of land and motor
vehicle, but failed to do so because of the third- party claim filed by respondent.
on April 24, 2002, respondent filed a Complaint

[9]

[8]

Subsequently,

for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the

issuance of an injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) with damages against
complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of Cebu City, docketed as Case
No. CEB-27614, entitled Mr. Eliseo Panaguinip, Mrs. Ma. Teresa Panaguinip and Goering G.C.
Paderanga v. John Hegna, Mila Hegna, Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales and Edilberto R. Suarin.
In an Order

[10]

dated May 13, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction

enjoining the MTCC to desist from further proceeding with the civil case, and the Sheriff to desist
from conducting a public auction of the levied properties of therein defendants. The RTC
subsequently
Decision

[11]

dismissed

respondents

dated June 29, 2006.

complaint

for

annulment

of

judgment

in

its

In a letter dated June 3, 2002, filed with the OBC, complainant alleged that he was filing a
complaint against respondent for deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible
denial of justice to be served in Civil Case No. R-45146. He alleged that after the decision in the
said civil case was rendered, therein defendants called him on the telephone, requesting the stay
of the execution of judgment, as the latter would be settling their accounts within ten days, but
they failed to comply.
[12]

On March 14, 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint

for falsification of public

documents against respondent; false testimony and perjury against therein defendants; and
falsification under paragraph 6, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code against Atty. Elena Marie
Madarang, notary public, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. Anent the
complaint against respondent, complainant averred that the third-party claim was full of
irregularities, to wit: (a) the Deed of Absolute Sale involving Lot No. 3653-D-1, covered by TCT
No. T-11127, dated November 27, 2001, had no record of transfer in the Register of Deeds of
Cebu City; (b) the registration of the motor vehicle allegedly owned by respondent by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 21, 2001 did not reflect any change of ownership from
May 4, 2001; (c) the two Deeds of Absolute Sale dated November 27, 2001 and December 21,
2001 showed that both were notarized under Series of 2000 of the notary public; (d) Notarial
Register No. 177 on page 37, Book II showed erasures and tampering done by substituting the
intended entry of Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Person to a Deed of Absolute Sale under the
names of the spouses Eliseo and Ma. Teresa Panaguinip, therein defendants, representing the
sale of Lot No. 3653-D-1 under TCT No. 11127; and Notarial Register No. 188 on Page 39, Book
II of Atty. Madarang also had tampering and erasures, as the entry of Affidavit of Loss was
substituted with a Deed of Absolute Sale under the name of Ma. Teresa Panaguinip representing
the sale of the FUSO (Canter series); and (e) the Community Tax Certificate number appearing in
both Deeds of Absolute Sale was actually issued to another person, not to therein defendant Ma.
Teresa Panaguinip.
On April 28, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City dismissed the criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents against respondent for lack of prima facie evidence
of guilt, as the allegations therein were similar to the instant administrative complaint.
In his Comment

[14]

[13]

dated April 29, 2003 on the administrative complaint filed against him,

respondent argued that he did not falsify any document and maintained that he had already
satisfactorily explained the irregularities before the Office of the City Prosecutor. He added that
the genuineness and due execution of the deeds of sale had not been affected by the fact that he
failed to register the same. Also, he alleged that the MTCC Decision dated December 21,
2001 was unjust and void due to lack of jurisdiction, and for being based on spurious claims.

In a Resolution

[15]

dated July 9, 2003, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision
within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record.
On November 21, 2003, the parties appeared in a mandatory preliminary conference and,
upon termination thereof, were ordered to submit their respective verified position papers within
ten (10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
and respondent submitted their position papers on December 11, 2003,
2003,

[18]

[17]

[16]

Complainant

and December 2,

respectively.

On June 1, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP submitted his Report and
Recommendation, which contained the following observations:
III. FINDINGS:
Based on the resolution of the City Prosecutors office in Cebu City, the
complaint against the Panaguinip spouses and Attys. Paderanga and Madarang
(the notary public) was dismissed for lack of prima facie of guilt. Such resolution
is accorded great weight but certainly not conclusive considering the
administrative nature of this instant complaint. In criminal prosecutions, a prima
facie evidence is necessary but in this instant case, substantial evidence is all
that [is] necessary to support a guilty verdict.
According to the Respondent, it was perfectly normal for him to obtain
properties without registering the same under his own name. In his Position
Paper, he even cited several other transactions where he merely possessed
Deeds of Sale but not Certification of Registration or Transfer Certificates of Title.
He alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these
properties in the name of the previous owner. The alleged discrepancies in the
notarization were fully explained as well. The notary public explained that the
erasures in her Notarial Register were made to correct mistakes so that entries
will speak the truth. These corrections include the entries under entry number
177 to indicate the correct entry which was the Deed of Sale executed [by] the
spouses Panaguinip. The original entry, Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons,
was actually notarized but was later cancelled at the request of the same affiants.
The full explanation of these affiants, very doubtful and highly suspect, was
nevertheless taken into consideration by the Prosecutor for reasons known only
to him. The Respondents also managed to convince the Cebu Prosecutor that
the discrepancy in the Residence Certificates was due to human error!
Not necessarily disagreeing with the findings of the City Prosecutor of
Cebu City, the Resolution dismissing the case for falsification is not entirely
convincing. There were certainly evidentiary matters which could have been
better addressed by a judge, namely, the affidavit of the secretary of the notary
public, the explanation in the incorrect entries in notarial register, the affidavit of
the two (2) witnesses who sought the cancellation of their original affidavit, and
the explanation of Paderanga himself regarding the difference in the dates.
Complainant is a layman who filed his own Position Paper unaided by
counsel while Respondent is a lawyer. Nevertheless, Complainant managed to

present one (1) piece of evidence not squarely addressed by Respondent

Paderanga: the letter handwritten by Respondents clients, written in Cebuano,
asking the Complainant for mercy and forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry
case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE
transfer of ownership of properties owned by the Panaguinip spouses to their
lawyer, Respondent Paderanga. This letter, attached to the Complaint, was
never refuted in any way by Respondent Paderanga who may have skirted the
issue by inadvertence or by design. The letter dated March 1, 2002 indicates that
the Panaguinip spouses still believe and assert ownership over these properties
despite the existence of a Deed of Sale allegedly datedMarch 5, 2002.
Complainant also went further by attaching an Affidavit by a Third Person who
stated that the Panaguinip spouses still assert ownership over the parcel of land
and vehicle.
Moreover, Complainant alleged that Respondent invited him consecutive
times after the issuance of the writ of execution in the lower court; the first was at
the Majestic Restaurant, the second was at Club Cebu at Waterfront Hotel. There
was an offer to settle the judgment award of P100,000. During the first meeting,
the offer was P3,000, on the second meeting, this time with the Panaguinip
spouses, the offer was P10,000. When Complainant refused to settle with
Respondent, he received a copy of the Affidavit of Third-Party Claim a few days
later.
The parties did not stipulate this particular issue; however, this
Commissioner feels that for the final disposition of this case, it is worthy to
mention Article 1491 of the Civil Code. It specifically states that:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another:
x x x
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected
with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigations or levied upon execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession.
x x x
This is a classic case where a lawyer acquired the interests of his client in
certain properties subject for execution. Regardless of the courts apparent lack
of jurisdiction, Respondent Paderanga acquired the two (2) matters subject for
execution in the forcible entry case in violation of [the] Canon of Legal Ethics. A
thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it
in court, but also the moment that becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. x x x
In all likelihood, although Complainant failed to get a favorable resolution
from the City Prosecutors office in Cebu City, the Affidavit of Third Party Claim
was simulated to defeat the rights of Complainant herein. It is immaterial that the
decision of the lower court granting a judgment award was subsequently
reversed or nullified. It is immaterial that the City Prosecutor did not find a prima

facie case of falsification. The fact remains that there was a MULTITUDE of
irregularities surrounding the execution of the Affidavit and, coupled with the
letter sent by the Panaguinip spouses left unrebutted by Respondent Paderanga,
there is substantial evidence that the Affidavit of Third Party Claim was purposely
filed to thwart the enforcement of the decision in the forcible entry case.
It is worthy to note that the proceedings before the prosecutors office did
not take into consideration the handwritten letter from the Panaguinip spouses.
For whatever reason, Complainant did not present such letter, which if he did, the
prosecutor may come up with a different resolution.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
While Complainant cannot fully prove the existence of falsity in the
execution of the Affidavit of Third Party Claim, this Commissioner is convinced
that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a violation of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property of his
client which is in litigation. x x x Respondent necessitates a heavy penalty since
the circumstances surrounding the transfer of ownership of properties tend to
indicate an anomalous transfer aimed to subvert the proper administration of
justice. The numerous discrepancies in the transfer document, some dismissed
as clerical errors and other explained by incredulous stories by way of affidavits,
compounded by the letter left uncontested by Respondent Paderanga, inevitably
lead a rational person to conclude that Paderanga may not have acquired the
properties prior to the judicial action of execution. Even if the City Prosecutor
found no prima facie case of falsification, this Commissioner finds substantial
evidence to support a conclusion that Respondent Paderanga committed an
ethical violation and should be meted the penalty of suspension of five (5) years
[19]
from the practice of law.
In a Resolution dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved,

with

modification,

the

Report

and

Recommendation

of

the

Investigating

Commissioner, viz:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that a lawyer ought to know that
he cannot acquire the property of his client which is in litigation, Atty. Goering
[20]
Paderanga is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On March 23, 2006, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and, onAugust 18, 2006, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated August 23, 2006, the Court referred the motion for reconsideration to
the IBP.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP issued a Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, and affirmed its Resolution dated December 17, 2005.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138

[21]

of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be

disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. In the
present case, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct.
Although respondent denied having acted as counsel for therein defendants, the Spouses
Panaguinip, in the forcible entry case filed by complainant, his involvement in the said case was
still highly suspect. After the writ of execution had been issued on February 18, 2002, he went
with defendants-spouses to amicably settle with complainant on two separate occasions,
ostensibly to protect his own interests. Complainant claimed that during those two meetings,
respondent did not disclose his ownership over the properties in question, leading the former to
believe that respondent was, in fact, the counsel for defendants-spouses. He averred that
respondent and defendant spouses initially offered a settlement of P3,000.00, which he refused
as he had already spent P10,000.00 on court expenses. On their second meeting, the offer had
been raised toP25,000.00, which again complainant declined, as the latter had, at that time,
spent P25,000.00. Complainant maintained that it was only after said meetings had transpired
that he received the affidavit of a third-party claim executed by respondent, stating that the latter
was the owner of the property and motor vehicle. On the other hand, respondent claimed that the
meetings took place in April 2002, after he had filed a third-party claim.
Had respondent been the rightful owner of a parcel of land and motor vehicle that were still
registered in the name of defendants-spouses, he should have immediately disclosed such fact
immediately and filed a third- party claim, as time was of the essence. Moreover, in their letter
dated March 1, 2002, defendants-spouses did not mention any transfer of ownership of the said
properties to respondent, as the former still believed that they owned the same. The continued
possession and ownership by defendants-spouses was also attested to by a certain Brigida
Lines, who executed an Affidavit

[22]

in favor of complainant.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is more inclined to believe that when complainant and
defendants-spouses failed to reach an agreement, respondent came forward as a third-party
claimant to prevent the levy and execution of said properties. He, therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,

[23]

which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under this rule, conduct has been construed

[24]

not to pertain exclusively to the performance of a lawyers professional duties.

cases,

[25]

In previous

the Court has held that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,

whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor; or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Notably, in the falsification case earlier filed, complainant was able to cite several
irregularities in the documents evidencing the deeds of sale in question: the non-registration by
respondent of the sale transactions; a Community Tax Certificate number appearing on said
deeds which was different from that issued to defendant Ma. Teresa Panaguinip; and the
erasures of the entries pertaining to said deeds from the Notarial Register.
Of these irregularities, only one can directly be attributable to respondent his nonregistration of the sale transaction. He argues that the sales were valid despite non-registration,
and maintained that it was perfectly normal and regular for a lawyer like him to choose not to
register and cause the transfer of title of the land and the FUSO jeepney after the execution of the
Deeds of Sale, so the transactions would not appear in the records of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office. He added
that he had also bought four lots, which had not yet been transferred to his name, for estate
planning or speculation purposes. He claimed that he found it legally wise not to immediately
register after buying so that he would not pay for the expenses of the sale and transfer twice,
once he decided to sell; or place them in his childrens name, and avoid paying estate and
inheritance taxes upon his death.

[26]

While the act of registration of a document is not necessary in order to give it legal effect as
between the parties, requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to prevent
frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that a recorded instrument
exists and is genuine.

[27]

However, while the RTC was correct in holding that said omission on

respondents part may not be considered falsification, he had shown an intent to defraud the
government, which had the right to collect revenue from him, as well as from other persons who
may have an interest in said properties.
Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the
Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein,
and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live
up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
[28]

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

Respondents act of non-

registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as a servant of
the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar for others to emulate. The responsibilities of a
lawyer

are

greater

than

those

of

private

citizen.

He

is

looked

up

to

in

the

community.

[29]

Respondent must have forgotten that a lawyer must refrain from committing acts

which give even a semblance of impropriety to the profession.

In cases wherein lawyers have similarly engaged in deceitful and dishonest conduct, the
Court has imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law ranging from six (6) months
to one (1) year.
In Spouses Donato v. Asuncion, Sr.,

[30]

where therein respondent lawyer filed a complaint

for reformation of instrument to obtain financial gain, and prepared a contract which did not
express the true intention of the parties, he was found guilty of gross misconduct and suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In Yap-Paras v. Paras,

[31]

where therein respondent lawyer applied for free patents over

lands owned by another person and not in the formers physical possession, he was found guilty
of committing a falsehood in violation of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors
recommended a penalty of suspension to be imposed upon respondent for five (5) years and one
(1) year, respectively. The Court, however, believes that a penalty of one (1) year is more
commensurate to respondents deceitful and dishonest conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga is found guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, and isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would result in
the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.

PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006, finding
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the
court, misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
To recall, the antecedents of the case are as follows:
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite
(PARAD) in favor of herein complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers
Leopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido de Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez
Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, who
were the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondents
clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was
elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainants rights over
the land. Continuing to pursue his clients lost cause, respondent was found to have committed
intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of
the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and
the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed nonlawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law holding themselves out as his
partners/associates in the law firm.
The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is
SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the
IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information
1
and guidance.
Respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, appealing to
the Court to take a second look at his case and praying that the penalty of suspension of two
years be reduced to mere reprimand or admonition for the sake of his family and the poor clients
2
he was defending.
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he
took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19,
1999, but were based on his serious study, research and experience as a litigation lawyer for
more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes
that the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the
3
rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. He stresses that he was not the original
lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because
Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very
well, refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent
candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. They
maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession of the land
in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was
resorted to in order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers
that he merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled

under the law, considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of physical
4
harm and summary eviction by the complainant. He posits that he was only being protective of
5
the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his own family, and that his
6
services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono. 1avvphi1
Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of law, he
humbly submits that there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the same or did he fail to
dispute this, contrary to the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was counsel
of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the cooperative Kalayaan Development
Cooperative (KDC). He was just holding his office in this cooperative, together with Attys.
Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the late Alfredo Caloico and Marciano Villavert. He signed the
retainer agreement with Atty. Dominador to formalize their lawyer-client relationship, and the
7
complainants were fully aware of such arrangement.
Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of action he took
in behalf of his clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind consideration, pardon
and forgiveness. He reiterates that he does not deserve the penalty of two years suspension,
considering that the complaint fails to show him wanting in character, honesty, and probity; in
fact, he has been a member of the bar for more than 20 years, served as former president of the
IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal aide lawyer of IBP Quezon City handling detention prisoners
and pro bono cases, and is also a member of the Couples for Christ, and has had strict training in
8
the law school he graduated from and the law offices he worked with. He is the sole breadwinner
in the family with a wife who is jobless, four (4) children who are in school, a mother who is
bedridden and a sick sister to support. The familys only source of income is respondents private
practice of law, a work he has been engaged in for more than twenty-five (25) years up to the
9
present.
On August 15, 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from respondent,
requesting that he be issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarial commission. Respondent
10
stated therein that he was aware of the pendency of the administrative cases against him, but
pointed out that said cases had not yet been resolved with finality. Respondent sought
consideration and compassion for the issuance of the clearance -- considering present
economic/financial difficulties -- and reiterating the fact that he was the sole breadwinner in the
family.
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence,
skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee
11
or for free. A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to
deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every
12
defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may
not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondents acts
complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the
interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication
and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this
case is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility
as an officer of the court. We stress what we have stated in our decision that, in support of the
cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and
13
justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his
14
case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by
15
impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be countenanced, as respondent must have realized
with the sanction he received from this Court. However, the Court also knows how to show

compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in the
presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondents length of service, acknowledgment of his
or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable
considerations, and respondents advanced age, among other things, which have varying
significance in the Courts determination of the imposable penalty. Thus, after a careful
consideration of herein respondents motion for reconsideration and humble acknowledgment of
16
his misfeasance, we are persuaded to extend a degree of leniency towards him. We find the
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law sufficient in this case
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED.
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondent is
DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said Resolution within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the
IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator, who shall circulate it to all courts for their information
and guidance.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

FIL-GARCIA, INC.,
represented by its President,
Filomeno Garcia,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7129

Present:
- versus -

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. FERNANDO CRESENTE

C. HERNANDEZ,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 16, 2008
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fil-Garcia, Inc.,

represented by its President and General Manager, Filomeno T. Garcia, against respondent Atty.

Fernando Cresente C. Hernandez charging the latter of malpractice, gross misconduct and for
violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The facts are of record.

Sometime in 1990, complainant entered into an agreement with Magdalena T. Villasi
(Villasi) for the completion of the construction of a condominium building owned by the latter
located in Quezon City. During the progress of the construction, controversy arose between
complainant and Villasi regarding the billing and payments. On March 11, 1991, complainant
filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Villasi before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 77. At that stage, complainant was represented by
Atty. Bernardo F. Ligsay (Atty. Ligsay). On June 26, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of complainant and against Villasi. The dispositive portion of the Decision

[1]

states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,865,000.00 as actual
damages and unpaid accomplishment billings;
2.
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00
representing the value of unused building materials;
3.
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P100,000 as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.

[2]

Aggrieved by the RTCs decision, Villasi filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA). On November 20, 2000, the CA granted Villasis appeal and reversed the decision of the
RTC. The dispositive portion of the Decision

[3]

states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby

GRANTED and the appealed decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8187 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
plaintiff-appellee to return to defendant-appellant the sum of P 1,244,543.33 as
overpayment under their contract, and the further sum of P 425,004.00
representing unpaid construction materials obtained by it from defendantappellant. Plaintiff-appellee is likewise hereby declared liable for the payment of
liquidated damages in the sum equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the contract price for
each day of delay computed from March 6, 1991.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[4]

On December 14, 2000, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

[5]

This time,

complainant engaged the legal services of a new counsel in the person of respondent.

In its April 27, 2001 Resolution,

[6]

the CA denied complainants motion for reconsideration

and noted the appearance of respondent as counsel for complainant in substitution of Atty.
Ligsay. Respondent received a copy of the resolution on May 8, 2001. Thus, he had until May
23, 2001 within which to file an appeal in accordance with Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court.

However, instead of filing an appeal within the reglementary period, respondent filed
three (3) successive motions for extension of time with the Court.

On May 22, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by
Certiorari.

[7]

In his motion, he alleged that he was engaged as counsel by a mayoralty candidate

and a senatorial candidate which required his presence in the canvassing of votes. Due to the
[8]

enormous time pressure from these commitments,

respondent prayed for an extension of

thirty (30) days or until June 21, 2001 to file complainants appeal.

On June 21, 2001, respondent filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal
by Certiorari.

[9]

He alleged that [he] fell ill

[10]

[11]

revealed that he needs extended bed rest.

and that [h]e sought medical consultation, which

He prayed for an extension of twenty (20) days or

until July 11, 2001 to file the appeal.

On July 11, 2001, respondent filed a Third Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by
Certiorari,

[12]

alleging that [he] severely underestimated the time needed to complete the petition

because he had to work on other equally urgent legal matters, which were unattended to during
his illness.

[13]

He prayed for an extension of ten (10) days or until July 21, 2001 to file the

appeal.

Thereafter, respondent filed complainants Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 21,
2001.

[14]

On August 6, 2001, respondent received a copy of the Courts Resolution

[15]

dated July 2,

2001 denying his first motion for extension of time, viz:

G.R. No. 147960 (Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc., represented by its
President-General Manager Filomeno Garcia vs. Magdalena T. Villasi).-

Petitioners motion for extension of thirty (30) days from 22 May 2001 within
which to file petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for petitioners failure to
show that it has not lost the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period within which to
appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, in view of the lack of statement of material dates of receipt of the
assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals and of filing of the motion for
[16]
reconsideration of said judgment.

Hence, on August 17, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration

[17]

of the

above resolution.

On August 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution

[18]

denying respondents second and

third motions for extension of time considering that the first motion for extension had already been
denied in the resolution dated July 2, 2001. On September 28, 2001, respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration

[19]

of the resolution.

On October 1, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution

[20]

denying respondents motion for

reconsideration of the resolution dated July 2, 2001 and complainants petition for review on
certiorari, viz:
G.R. No. 147960 (Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc., represented by its
President-General Manager, Filomeno Garcia v. Magdalena T. Villasi)
Acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution of 02 July 2001
which denied its motion for extension of time to file petition for review on
certiorari for lack of showing that it has not lost the 15-day period to appeal due
to lack of statement of the dates of receipt of assailed judgment of the Court of
Appeals and of filing of motion for reconsideration of said judgment, the Court
Resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, no compelling reason having been
adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought. Respondents comment and
opposition to said motion is NOTED.
In accordance with Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56 and other pertinent
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions which are accompanied by or
comply strictly with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On
the basis thereof, the Court further Resolves to DENY the petition for review on
certiorari for petitioners failure to:
a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of
the denial of the first, second and third motions for extension of time to file said
petition in the resolution of 02 July 2001 and 20 August 2001; and
b) state the material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Court of Appeals decision pursuant to Sections 4 (b) and 5, Rule 45 in
[21]
relation to Section 5 (d), Rule 56.

On November 21, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution

[22]

denying with finality respondents

motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated August 20, 2001.

On November 27, 2001, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment

[23]

rendering the decision of

the CA final and executory.

As admitted by respondent, he received a copy of the Courts resolution dated October 1,

2001 denying complainants appeal onNovember 15, 2001.

[24]

However, respondent forwarded a

copy of the same to complainants office only on June 16, 2002.

[25]

Feeling aggrieved by the fate of its appeal, complainant filed a Complaint

[26]

for disbarment

before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on April 21, 2004. Complainant alleged that
respondents act of filing three (3) motions for extension of time within which to file the appeal and
his wrong choice in the mode of appeal in the petition that he belatedly filed exemplify gross
incompetence and caused serious prejudice to complainant. Complainant also alleged that the
lapse of seven (7) months from the time the resolution dated October 1, 2001 was received by
respondent before he informed complainant of the same constitutes inexcusable negligence.

On June 16, 2004, respondent filed his Answer.

[27]

In his answer, respondent alleged that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file
petition for review is allowed under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provided that the
same is filed and the docket and other lawful fees and deposit of cost are paid within the
reglementary period. Hence, respondent contends that he exercised due prudence when he filed
his first motion for extension of time. Moreover, he was in the honest belief that the allegation of
the date of receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration would suffice
considering that the pertinent rules do not require that a motion for extension of time must contain
a statement of material dates. Respondent claims that the filing of several motions and within the
reglementary period to do so clearly speaks of due diligence of the legal matter entrusted to
him. He argues that the filing of his motions for extension of time was based on meritorious
grounds and the denial of the same was based solely on the ground that his first motion was
wanting of material dates.

As to complainants allegation on his erroneous mode of appeal, respondent claims that it

is speculative at this point since the determination of the same is better left to the Court.

Lastly, respondent admits that he failed to immediately inform complainant of the

development of the case. However, the said omission was not deliberate nor prompted by malice
or intent to injure the complainant but was brought about by the sudden unexpected
[28]

technicalities that besieged the appeal of the case to the Supreme Court
dismay and made it hard

[29]

which caused him

for him to inform complainant of the same.

After a mandatory conference, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, the investigating

commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, submitted her report and recommended to
the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.

The Board, in its Resolution

[30]

No. XVII-2006-04 dated January 28, 2006, adopted and

approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. It
reduced the penalty of disbarment to suspension for six (6) months; hence, the transmittal of the
case and its records to this Court for final resolution pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the
Rules of Court, viz:
Review and Decisions by the Board of Governors.- x x x x (b) If the
Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate
from the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondents conduct
relative to the belated filing of complainants petition for review on certiorari falls short of his
obligation to serve his client with competence and diligence under Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondents act of filing three (3) successive motions for extension of time to file the
petition on the careless assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, and without
taking care of informing himself of the Courts action thereon, constitutes inexcusable
negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed
as an afterthought in his desperate attempt to salvage the appeal.

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

[31]

He must constantly keep in mind

that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Thus, he is
expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals
with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence
but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause.

[32]

While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file
a motion for extension of time to file pleadings,he should not presume that his motion for
extension of time will be granted. Well-settled is the rule that motions for extension of time to file
a pleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is
thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon
as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should
he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but
himself to blame.

[33]

As noted by Commissioner San Juan, respondent alleged in his answer that he

anticipated that he could not file the petition within the reglementary period due to his prior
commitments for the municipal canvassing of votes of a mayoralty candidate. However, this fact
was not called to the attention of the complainant. In doing so, complainant could have engaged
the services of another lawyer who can file the petition in time.

[34]

A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue representing a client should inform the
latter of his predicament and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client
to engage the services of another counsel who can study the situation and work out a solution.

[35]

To make matters worse, it took respondent seven (7) months from the time he received a
copy of the Courts resolution denying complainants petition to inform complainant of the
same.

[36]

Under Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall keep the

client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.

Finally, the IBP Board of Governors correctly imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months considering that respondent humbly admitted his fault in not
immediately informing complainant of the status of the case.

[37]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the January 28, 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in
CBD Case No. 04-1230 is AFFIRMED.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of respondent with the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all its chapters, and to all the courts in the land.