The argument.

9
gathered ift their Courfe, is to take out fome of the Water ^
and to let it fettle ; then to draw or pour it off from the
Sedi9nent it has depofed; and then to frain or filter it,
Whejt all this is do?2e, hut not before, jiifl Rxperiinents may
he made, to prove W.hat are its inherent Qualitys. And
thefe Qualitys being thus fairly afcertained, if afterwards
we ca7i trace the River upward to //j Source, we 7nay then
difcover, how fnuch of its original and native Spirit the
derived Streai}t has lof ; a?id we may then reafonably conclude, that fome fubtle Particles (p/* Earth and K\v were fo
inti?nately mingled with it in its dowjiward Flow, as not to
be feparable from it by the known Methods of Purification.
In like 7namter we are firf to becojne acquainted with the
Virtue of our own peculiar Nature, its proper End, and
true Good, by feparati72g in our Minds and viewing it
apart from thofe foul Dregs is/'Evil which are mixed with
it, before we can, in the ordijiary way of Re af on, find the
Fountain, frof?t which our own Virtue, Good, and Knd,
are derived ; and before we can difcover the nature of its
everlivijig, pure, and uftdefiled Water. Hence it appears, that, however the remote ajid ultimate Defign of
this Dialogue may be, (and ?nof willingly we ack?iowlege
that it is,) to lead us to a difcovery of That which is abfolutely and u7iiverfaUy The Sovereign Good, yet the proximate and immediate Defign ought to be, and is, to make us
acquainted with the Nature and Rffence of That which is
B the

10 The a R G U M E N T.
the Chief Good to Us. It remains farther to he ohfervedy on the Subjecl of this Dialogue^ that the Inveftigatioii of the Chief Good of Man rightly fets out with the
co77f deration of Plea fu re, a Good, which prefents itfelf tO'
our View the very Firft ; as it is the vioft obvious of a?iyy
common to all Sentient Beings^ and the only Good felt,
even by Such of them as are Rational, before the Dawn of
Reafon. Our Searches are the?z naturally led thro eveiy
Order of Good., which hath a?iy Prete?ifions to be of the
Final Kind, or Good for its own fake. TVe meet with
All of thefe in this Dialogue ; and find their Values^ relative to Man., feverally afcertained. Viewing the Philebus in this light .^ we may intitle it., , not i?nproperly^ a
Dialogue concerning Good, that is., Good in general.
Mr. J. Petvin has accordi7igly given it that Title., i?i his
Letters on Mind, page 17. A?id in our Synopfis, page
18, we have followed his Example. 'Thus much may
fuffice concerni?ig the Name, the Title, the Subjed, ajid
the Defign of this Dialogue : and if the Account, thus
given, of thefe Articles of it be true, the wonderful Propriety of the Introdudlory Part, as relative, not oitly to
the Subject a?id Delign, but alfo to the larger and argu-

mentative Parts, the Body of it, and to the concluiive or

finifhingP^r/, the iVTiT^iX^ci and the^o\A of it, willjuflly
be admired. But no mail can form a right judgment of
any Work, before the Work is fnijljed; unlefs he has feen
3 i^^^

The argument. it
the Plan or Model of it ; or U72lefs he has been otherways
informed of the Purpofes, to which all the Parts of it are
meant to ferve. 'Tis ?iecejfary therefore to a jufl Difcern7nent of the Excellence of this Dialogue, in the maflerly
Compoftio7i of it, that a Reader, to whom it may be quite
new, fbould be ntade acquaijited, beforehand, with fo much
of the Conclufion, as willpow the Connedlion of the larger
Parts, and alfo of their Sub- divisions, a7td the Reference
which they all have to the principal D^^ign. Li the Concluiive Part theji of the Dialogue, all the Kinds of Good,
which are pur fu able as Ends, (a7id 07ie or other of which
is aBually purfued, as Such, by Every jnan, in the general
Courfe of his Life,) are e7iu7nerated in Order, according
to the relative Value of Each of thetn to Man ^-an Order,
fettled by Socrates, /;2 co7ifequence of his whole preceding
Arguf7tentation. Firfl: i7i Rank, a7jd alone, y?^;;<^j Meafure,
the Eflence of all Good, and the Principle of all Moral
Virtue; runni72g thf^o every Kind andS^^ec\Qs of it', and
guardi7ig every Moral Adtion fro7n thofe Excefles 07i the
one fide, and thofe Defeds on the other, which it is ever in
da7iger of. In the Second Ra7ili of Goods appear Symmetry
^7?<3(' Beauty, the Symmetry of a Ma7i s whole Condud as
ruled by Meafurc, and the Beauty the72ce refidting;
together with Sufficiency and Fulnefs, a fufficient and
full Pojfeffion of all thiiigs requifite to Pradic Virtue.
The Third Place is held by Mind, (co7fdered as IntelliB 2 gent,)

12 The A R G U MEN T.
gentj) and Wifdom (confidcred as Speculative). The
Fourth Place is filled by Sciences, and Arts, a7id Right
Opinions. /;/ the Fifth Ra7'ik ^vse fi.nd the Pleafures,
which ive feel from Things Corporeal, thro the outward
Senfes of Sight, Hearing, ^WSmelling; F\ca.kiVQ&j which
are 7ieither preceded, accompanied, nor followed by any
Pain, cither of the Soul, or of the Body. hi the Sixth
a7id lajl PlacCy far behind all the other Goods, we dif cover,
in a tumultuary Group, the Pleafures e77Joyed by A7iimals of
all Kindsy the Pleafures of the Tafte and of the Touch ;
Pleafures, attended all of them, with Pain, either pafl,
prefent, or to come. Now thefe Six Kinds of Goo<^, valued
often for their ow7i Sakes, without regaYd had to any far-

ther Benefits, expc&ed to accrue from them, are reducible

to thofe Three, the Exajnining of which co7tfitutes the Body
of this Dialogue, Virtue, Knowlege, and Pleafure.
T'his threefold Rxaminatio7i is fet 07i foot, by fuppofmg a
Contef to have happened between Socrates and Philebus,
0ncer7iif7g Pleafure and Knowlege, Whether of thefe
Two was the Chief Good of Man. For 7ieither Sophifts
Tior Philofophers, in that age, fee7n to have thought of
Virtue, as a fit Cojnpetitor with Either of the Tsvo for fa
high a CharaSler, until the Superiority of Virtue to Both
the Others was fijown by Socrates. The Co7itefl is fuppofed to have conti7iued for fo7ne time, a7id to remai7i at
lafl undecided j as every cofitefed Point for ever fnufl, if
it

The argument. 13
// be cont7~ovcrted in a declamatory 'way ; tmlefs the co7itending Pariys are bou7id to abide by the Decifioii of fome
Authoritative Judge ; or tmlefs they will fubmit^ by
Agreement, to fome Referee or Umpire. 'The Mode
therefore of Difputation is here changed^ frotn the Dogmatical, pof lively afferti77gj and flatly contradi&i?jg^ to
the Dialedlic, quefioning and anfwer'ing : for in this Socratic way of arguing^ the Refpondent, if in the wroitg^
may be confuted out of his own mouth. To effeSi this
Cha^tge, it was necejfa?y to change the Perfon alfo of the
Advocate for PleaJureyfro7n Philebus, a peremptory a7id
ferce Dog7natifl^ to Protarchus, who was candid^ and
gentky and could hearke7t coolly to the Reafoning of a7t
Adverfary. This Change of Perfon gives occafo7i for a
frefj Stating of the Controverfy. And fuch a7t Occafo7t
was neceffary to be contrived ; becaufe it was neceffary for
the Readers of the Dialogue^ to be i7ifor7ncd^ %vhat Poi7its
were to be debated on. The like 7iecejfity occafoned mofi
of the ancient Dramatic Pieces to be i7itroduced by Prologues ; in which the Audience were 7nade acquainted with
the Foundation of the Fable, the7t to be reprefe7ited. But
in this Dialogue, to ftate the Controve7fy, after // had been
long on foot, to propofe the Points diflinSlly and at
large, as at the fi}fl Opening, to make this Repetition
appearnatural and proper, required i7iuch /.^^r^ Addrefs,
than to make a Prologue, giving only a ft/tple Narrative
3 ./

14 The ARGUMENT.
of what had pajfed previous to the Drama. From thefe
obfervatiofts, a judicious Lover of Dialogue-CompoJitio7is .
will have pleafure tJi perceivings with what Art Plato,

the greatejl Mafler in this Kind of Writ i fig , has introduced his Diale&ic Inquiry into the nature of Pleafure
a?id the nature of intelligent Mind, Two of the Three
Things to be examined. With no lefs Art has he opened
a Way for inquiring into the ?jature of the remaifting
Third, Moral Virtue ; ajid for manifefling the fuperior Value of This, compared with Knowlege and
with Pleafure. For, however the clear Reafojmtg of
Socrates might be alone fujficiefit to make that Superiority appear evidefit to Pe?fons attentive to his
Reafonifig, -yet no little Skill or Addrefs were requifte
to raife a proper Degree of Attention to an Hypothejts
fo paradoxical, as it muft fee7n to the Company, then
around Socrates, the Freque?7ters of the Lyceum ;
None of whom, "'tis probable, had ever confidered any
of the Moral Virtues, otherwife than as Means, fubfervient to the acquiftio?i of Knowlege, or the en^
joyment of Pleafure. Btit the Introdudlion to the
Dialogue procures their Atte7ttion, a77d C07ifeque77tly
prepares the Way to the Reafoni7Jg of Socrates 07i this
additional Third SubjeEi, by fuggefling a Poilibility,
that the Chief Good of Ma7i might co7ififi neither
177 Knowlege 7ior in Pleafure, but in fo?jte Other Thii7g
(770t