Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
City of Manila
JOSEPH AQUINO
,Plaintiff-Appellee
-

C.A. G.R. No. 2014-10677

Civil Case No. 1234-2013
MCTC Case No. 2012-045

versus -

JINGGOY ENRILE
,Defendant-Appellant
x----------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR REVIEW

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, by its undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully
states as follows

I.

The Parties

1. Defendant-Appellant JINGGOY ENRILE is a resident of 12 Golden Arc,

Antipolo City, Rizal.
2. Plaintiff-Appellee JOSEPH AQUINO is a resident of Lot 13, Block 24 Royal
Residences, Antipolo City, Rizal.

II.

Material Date/s

3. On April 21, 2014, Defendant-Appellants received a resolution from the Court

wherein the Motion for Reconsideration filed on February 20, 2014 was
denied.
4. Hence, this petition.

III.

Statement of the Case

5. In January 2011, ENRILE was paid Php. 100,000.00 (Exhibit B) to construct a

fence in AQUINOS property.
6. ENRILEs initial work that commenced in February 2011 was criticized by
AQUINOs wife Araceli as being substandard (p. 7, TSN, May 21, 2012) for
which reason ENRILE was told by Araceli to stop working on the fence.
7. ENRILE acceded to this when he sent AQUINO a letter in March 2011
(Exhibit 1). However, the Construction Agreement does not state that unlawful
termination of the contract (at least insofar as the construction of the
perimeter fence is concerned) will free ENRILE therefrom (p. 8, RTC
Decision).
8. AQUINO therefore insisted that ENRILE finish the construction of the fence.
9. AQUINO filed a case for SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE in the MCTC of
Antipolo. On March 6, 2014, the court ruled against ENRILE, directing him to
finish the perimeter fence that AQUINO paid him to do.
10. On appeal to the RTC of Antipolo City, the court, in a decision dated February
7, 2014, mainly adopted AQUINOs claim that the MCTC has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the specific performance case (pp. 2-5, Memorandum for
Aquino), that the complaint (Annex A, Memorandum for Aquino) filed in the
case is a proper remedy (p. 5, Memorandum of Aquino), and that the
defendant's refusal to honor the construction agreement, as pleaded in his
answer (Annex 1, Memorandum for Enrile), is not proper (p. 6, Memorandum
for Aquino).
11. The RTC rejected ENRILE's arguments that the MCTC has no jurisdiction
over the case on the ground that it is a construction dispute cognizable by the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (pp. 4-8, Memorandum for
Enrile), that the specific performance case is not the proper remedy to
enforce a contract (p. 9, Memorandum for Enrile), and that, if at all, ENRILE is
already free from his contractual obligations, when his services were
terminated by AQUINO's wife Araceli (p. 13, Memorandum for Enrile).
12. The Construction Agreement expressly states that any dispute arising
therefrom or in the performance of obligations thereunder, the value of such
dispute not exceeding P100,000.00, shall be resolved by filing the proper

action in the MCTC of Antipolo City (Sec. 3, Part III, Construction Agreement).
This was not disputed by ENRILE (p. 3, TSN, May 18, 2012).

IV.

Assignment of Errors

13. The RTC erred when it upheld the MCTC decision in the case for Specific
Performance, as the latter had no jurisdiction to hear and try the case;
14. The RTC erred when it ruled that Specific Performance is the proper remedy
for the case at hand;
15. The RTC erred when it did not consider Defendant-Appellant JINGGOY
ENRILE as was terminated.

V.

Arguments/Discussion

A.) The MCTC had no jurisdiction to

hear and try the case.
The law1 specifically confers the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission with
the jurisdiction to hear and try cases involving construction disputes. As stated in the
Implementing Rules and Regulation of EO 1008, The CIAC shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes, which arose from, or is connected
with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines
whether the dispute arose before or after the completion of the contract, or after the
abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve government or private
contracts.The MCTC had no jurisdiction to hear and try the case.2
Construction is defined as referring to all on-site works on buildings or altering
structures, from land clearance through completion including excavation, erection
and assembly and installation of components and equipment.3The contract between
ENRILE and AQUINO clearly fall within the purview of a Construction Agreement
1E.O.

1008 - CREATING AN ARBITRATION MACHINERY IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY OF THE

PHILIPPINES
2
Rule 2, Section 2.1 Jurisdiction, Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration
3
Gammon Philippines, Inc. v. Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation, G.R. No. 144792, 31 January
2006, 481 SCRA 209, 218-219.

wherein the former was paid by the latter to construct a fence in the latters property.
The dispute arose even before the subject of the contract was completed.
The Construction Agreement states that any dispute arising therefrom or in the
performance of obligations thereunder, the value of such dispute not exceeding
P100,000.00, shall be resolved by filing the proper action in the MCTC of Antipolo
City.4 However, the aforementioned stipulation in the Construction Agreement cannot
be given legal effect. It is a well-settled rule that the constitution and the law confer
the jurisdiction of the courts, and not by consent or agreement of the parties.
Premises considered, the MCTC of Antipolo have no jurisdiction to try the case.
B.)

Assuming

the

MCTC

had

Jurisdiction; Specific Performance was

not the Proper Remedy and that the
RTC erred when it did not consider
ENRILE as dismissed.
Assuming that the MCTC had jurisdiction and that the Defendant-Appellant was at
fault, he may not be required to fulfill the contract via a suit for Specific Performance.
The Civil Code states:
Article 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to
do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in
contravention to the tenor of the obligation. Furthermore,
it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be
undone.
Pursuant to the above-mentioned provision, the obligation may be performed by a
third person and the expenses thereof shall be charged against the obligor.

Sec. 3, Part III, Construction Agreement

Therefore, the facts which is similar to an earlier case5 ruled that, if a person obliged
to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost, he is
chargeable with the cost of completing the said project, for it is axiomatic in law that
compliance with what is lawfully agreed upon is obligatory.6
The law does not authorize the imposition of personal force or coercion upon the
debtor to comply with his obligation. The application of the above-mentioned
provision presupposes the act can be done by third persons. In this case, different
carpenters can do the act, as the job is fairly easy, putting up a fence.
Under Article 1167 of the Civil Code, a person who is obliged to do something and
fails to do it shall be liable for the cost of executing the obligation in a proper
manner.7At most, Defendant-Appellant JINGGOY ENRILE shall be liable for the cost
of executing the obligation.Defendant-Appellant cannot be compelled by the use of
public force to comply with the obligation because this would be in complete violation
of personal liberty granted by our Constitution.
When Araceli fired Defendant-Appellant from the job, JINGGOY ENRILE was
complying in good faith with an order of an agent of his employer. Article 1869 of the
Civil Code emphasizes the consensual nature of the contract of agency, as it
provides that Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from
his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Agency may be oral, unless
the law requires a specific form. Therefore, the acts of the Wife, Araceli, were in turn
the acts of Plaintiff-Appellee JOSEPH AQUINO.
Jurisprudence8 provides that an agency may be expressed but it may also be implied
from the acts of the principal, from his silence, or lack of action or his failure to
repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. Likewise, acceptance by the agent may also be express, although it may

Insular Life AssnCo,m Ltd. vs Hernandez, et al 12 C.A. Rep. 750

Cui vs. Gonzales, 41 Phil. 523
7
Chaves vs Gonzales, 32 SCRA 574
8
Equitable PCI-Bank v. Ku, 355 SCRA 309 (2001)
6

also be implied from his acts that carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction
according to the circumstances. Thus, when Araceli was inspecting the work of
JINGGOY ENRILE, manifesting authority in the contracted project between plaintiff
and defendant, she acted as an agent of JOSEPH AQUINO, thereby making her
acts to be those of the latter.
Furthermore, JOSEPH AQUINO did not repudiate the acts of his wife, Araceli, to be
without authority. From the Decision of the RTC, dated February 07, 2014, the court
stated that the Construction Agreement does not state that unlawful termination of
the contract will free ENRILE therefrom.9 From this, AQUINO therefore insisted that
ENRILE finish the construction of the fence. 10 Based on the foregoing, AQUINO
merely rooted his claim from the Construction Agreement without repudiating the
acts done by his wife. He could have merely stated that his wife had no authority to
fire Defendant. Instead, AQUINO cowered from his wife and based his suit on the
Construction Agreement, thereby acceding to the acts of his wife as his own.
Hence, based on the foregoing, assuming the MCTC had jurisdiction, Specific
Performance is not the proper remedy for the plaintiff-appellee and that Araceli acted
as the agent of Joseph Aquino.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
that the assailed Decision dated March 06, 2014 be reversed and/or set aside, and a
judgment be rendered dismissing the case of Specific Performance for lack of
jurisdiction.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
20 May 2014 at Antipolo City.

P. 8, RTC Decision, February 7, 2014

P. 6 Memorandum of Aquino

10

COPY FURNISHED:
Numeriano Hernandez
Counsel for Plaintiff
Makati City

PETRACHE, Jose Gabrielle G.

Counsel for the Defendant-Appellee
11th Floor, Lucas Arts Bldg., Ayala Ave,
Makati City
Tel. No. 888-1234
PTR No. 3217654 1/1/2010 Legaspi
City
IBP Lifetime Membership No. 67890
Roll of Attorney No. 11223
MCLE Compliance No. IV-012345610/01/10

VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION
I, JINGGOY ENRILE, of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident ofAntipolo City, after having been
duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:
1) I am the plaintiff in the above-captioned Complaint;
2) I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint, read the same and the contents
thereof are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief;
3) I have not commenced any other action or proceedings involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, or in the Court of Appeals or in any tribunal or agency;
4) If I should learn that a similar action or proceedings has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or any tribunal or agency, then we hereby undertake to
notify this Honorable Court within five (5) days from such notice

JINGGOY ENRILE
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 27th day of November 2013, the affiant,
JINGGOY ENRILE exhibiting to me his Drivers License bearing No. N01-12-987654 which will expire on
July 12, 2015.
RENE RAFFY T. PINERA
NOTARY PUBLIC
Appointment No. M123 Until Dec. 31, 2014
6/F Rene Bldg., 29 Aguinaldo St., Quezon City
PTR No. 2521458/01.03.12/Makati City
IBP No. 85742/01.03.12/PPLM
Roll No. 6124845678

Doc. No._____
Page No._____
Book No._____
Series of 2014.